Conflict and Cooperation Campaigns On TH

ACTA BYZANTINA FENNICA
ACTA BYZANTINA FENNICA

VOL. 4 (N. s.)
2015
Suomen Bysantin tutkimuksen seura

Helsinki 2015
ACTA BYZANTINA FENNICA (ISSN1458-7017)
ABzF is a refereed journal, published by the Finnish Society for Byzantine

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Leslie Brubaker (University of Birmingham)
Björn Forsén (University of Helsinki)
René Gothóni (University of Helsinki)
Johannes Koder (Universität Wien)
Matti Kotiranta (University of Joensuu)
Martti Leiwo (University of Helsinki)
Alice-Mary Talbot (Dumbarton Oaks)
Editors:
Björn Forsén, Mika Hakkarainen and Vesa Vahtikari
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Multiprint Oy
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Contents
Antti Lampinen
A Helping Hand from the Divine. Notes on the Triumphalist
Iconography of the Early Theodosians. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Annika Asp-Talwar
Constantine Loukites, the Emperors’ Right-hand Man in Fourteenth
Century Trebizond. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Björn Forsén, Mika Hakkarainen and Brikena Shkodra-Rrugia

Blood and Salt: Some Thoughts Evolving from the Topography
of the Battle at Dyrrachium in 1081 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
Juho Wilskman
Conflict and Cooperation: Campaigns on the Peloponnese in 1264. . . . . 85
Kai Juntunen
The Image of Cleopatra in Ioannes Xiphilinos’ Epitome of Cassius
Dio: A Reflection of the Empress Eudokia Makrembolitissa?. . . . . . . . 123
Contributors
Annika Asp-Talwar Kai Juntunen

Centre for Byzantine, Ottoman Department of World Cultures
and Modern Greek Studies Ancient Langages and Culture
Arts Building P.O. Box 59
University of Birmingham 00014 University of Helsinki
Edgebaston kai.juntunen@helsinki.fi
Birmingham BI5 2TT
asa184@bham.ac.uk Antti Lampinen
School of Classics
Björn Forsén Swallowgate
Department of Philosophy, St Andrews
History, Culture and Art Studies Fife KY16 9AL
P.O. Box 59 ajl24@st-andrews.ac.uk
00014 University of Helsinki
bjorn.forsen@helsinki.fi Brikena Shkodra-Rrugia
Instituti i Arkeologjise
Mika Hakkarainen Qendra e Studimeve
Department of Philosophy, Albanologjike
History, Culture and Art Studies Sheshi “Nënë Tereza”
P.O. Box 59 1000 Tirana
00014 University of Helsinki brikena0205@gmail.com
mika.hakkarainen@helsinki.fi
Juho Wilskman
Department of Philosophy,
History, Culture and Art Studies
P.O. Box 59
00014 University of Helsinki
juho.wilskman@helsinki
Abbreviations
AJPhil. American Journal of Philology. Baltimore (Md.).
BF Byzantinische Forschungen. Amsterdam.
BSA The Annual of the British School at Athens. Cambridge.
CPh Classical Philology: A journal devoted to research in classical antiquity.
Chicago (Ill.)
CQ The Classical Quarterly. Cambridge.
DOP Dumbarton Oaks Papers. Washington (D.C.).
GRBS Greek Roman and Byzantine Studies. Cambridge Mass.
IstMitt Istanbuler Mitteilungen. Deutsches Archäologisches Institut. Tübingen.
JEA The Journal of Egyptian Archaeology. London.
JECS Journal of Early Christian Studies: Journal of the North American Patristics
Society. Baltimore (Md.).
JRA Journal of Roman Archaeology: An international journal. Portsmouth (R.I).
JRS The Journal of Roman Studies. London.
JÖB Jahrbuch der Östereichischen Byzantinistik. Wien.
RE Paulys Realencyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft. Stuttgart.
RH Revue historique. Paris.
MDAI(R) Mitteilungen des Deutschen Archäologischen Instituts, Römische Abteilung.
Mainz.
MEFRA Mélanges de l’École française de Rome. Antiquité. Rome: École française
de Rome.
TAPA Transactions of the American Philological Association. Baltimore (Md.).
T&M Travaux et Mémoires (= Centre de Recherche d’histoire et civilisation
byzantines) Paris.
Juho Wilskman
Conflict and Cooperation:

Campaigns on the Peloponnese in 1264
This article aims to cast more light on the relatively under-researched sub-
ject of warfare in late Byzantine and Frankish Greece by analysing the de-
scriptions of military operations between the Byzantine Empire and the
Crusader Principality of Achaia in Morea (the Peloponnese) in 1264.1
Moreover, it will demonstrate that, although relations between the Latins,
Byzantines, and even the Turks were generally hostile at this time, 2 these
groups could co-operate to a surprising extent, and even showed a readiness
for peaceful co-existence.
1
This article is, to a large extent, based on my MA thesis Bysanttilaisten ja Akhaian ruhti-
naskunnan väliset sotatoimet 1259-83: Tapaustutkimus myöhäis-bysanttilaisesta so-
dankäynnistä (The War between the Byzantines and the Principality of Achaia 1259-83:
A Case Study in Late Byzantine Warfare) at the University of Helsinki in 2007. The thesis
is published with an English summary at https://helda.helsinki.fi/handle/10138/19600.
Other articles based on the same MA thesis are Wilskman 2009-2010; Wilskman 2012a;
Wilskman 2012b.
2
The distinction between Greeks and Byzantines, as well as between Latins and Franks, is
problematic. The use of these terms varies in the sources and deviates from modern defi-
nitions. The original French version of the Chronicle of Morea speaks e.g. about Greeks
(les Grex) and the Greek version about Romans (οἱ Ρωμαῖοι), both of whom modern his-
torians would usually refer to as Byzantines. I have here chosen to use the term
“Byzantines” in those cases when I want to emphasise the political affiliations of the
group in question, i.e., that they were subjects of the Byzantine emperor regardless of
ethnic origin. On the other hand, I use the term “Greeks” when I want to emphasise the
group’s ethnicity, defined by language regardless of political affiliations (whereby Greeks
can be subjects of both the Byzantium and the Crusader states). The terms “Latins” and
“Franks” I use interchangeably when referring to Catholic Europeans or their descendants
who had settled in the Aegean world although e.g. the author of the Chronicle uses the
term “Franks” mainly for persons originating from France. I also consider the troops of
the Principality of Achaia to be Latin or Frankish, although they probably also included
Greeks. For a discussion on ethnic terminology and identities, see e.g. Koder 2003;
Sansaridou-Hendrickx 2007; Vacalopoulos 1970; Jacoby 1973; Lock 1995, 8-9;
Stouraitis 2014.
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The analysis will be principally focused on the Chronicle of Morea,

which was probably first written in the 1320s. It describes the history of the
Principality of Achaia and extols the deeds of its Frankish nobility; indeed,
the anonymous writer declares that he wrote the chronicle so that the reader
or listener could learn from the deeds of excellent warriors. Although un-
stated, his other motive for writing the book was probably the desire to
maintain the spirit of the Frankish community in Greece, which at that time
had suffered serious setbacks, by recounting their glorious past. 3 The
Chronicle of Morea is a problematic source, since its account of events,
particularly those beyond the Peloponnese, is riddled with errors, and its
attitude is far from neutral. However, its record of events on the peninsula
in 1264 does seem comparatively reliable.4
The Chronicle of Morea has survived in four languages, Greek, French,
Italian and Aragonian, although its original language is still a matter for
debate. The Italian text is only a poor translation, and thus will not be used
in this analysis. Instead, I will mainly quote from the French and Greek
versions: the former, Livre de la conquest de la princée de l’Amorée, is an
abridged version of the original text; 5 the latter, the Greek Chronicle of
Morea, is written in verse and is, despite its language, hostile towards the
Byzantines. On occasion, I will also refer to the Aragonian version, Libro
de los Fechos, when its account departs from the French and the Greek.
Written towards the end of the fourteenth century, Libro de los Fechos dif-
fers from the other versions in several respects and reads more like an in-
dependent work using the Chronicle of Morea as its main source.6
3
Chronicle of Morea 1339-1355. The Chronicle of Morea has received much scholarly
attention. The current debates are well summarized by Shawcross 2009.
4
Lurier 1964, 52-53, 59-60; Geanakoplos 1953, 130-131; Wilskman 2012a, 169-172, 193;
Wilskman 2009-2010, 132-135, 150-157; Shawcross 2009, 43-44; Treadgold 1997, 916-
917; Bon 1969, 29-30; Failler 1980, 35-36.
5
Livre de la conqueste § 1.
6
Libro de los Fechos § 726; Shawcross 2009, 42, 265-266, 268-273.
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CONFLICT AND COOPERATION: CAMPAIGNS ON THE PELOPONNESE IN 1264
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Of the other relevant sources, one should first mention the history of
George Pachymeres (1242-c. 1310). Pachymeres was a Nicaean church-
man and scholar who moved to Constantinople soon after the “liberation”
of the city in 1261. He is generally considered to be a reliable author, even
when documenting the reign of Michael VIII Palaiologos (1259/61-1282),
since he only did so after the emperor’s death, allowing him to write can-
didly about events. However, Pachymeres is notorious for his use of very
difficult language and for his tendency to jump back and forth in chrono-
logical order. Furthermore, from his clerical and Constantinopolitan point
of view, the military operations in the Morea were unfortunately only of
minor importance.7 In addition, other apposite sources include the history
of Romania by the Venetian Marino Sanudo Torsello the Elder (c. 1270-
1343), papal letters, and the history of the later Byzantine Gregoras. These
deal with the war in Morea only in a very cursory manner, but, as we shall
see, they offer useful information about the context of the encounter.
The war begins
Since its foundation after the Fourth Crusade, the Principality of Achaia
was a practically independent political entity, ruled by a Frankish prince
and his most important vassals. The old Greek leaders and landowners
(archons) could keep their lands and customs, but they were excluded from
the highest circles of society. The centre of the Principality of Achaia was
on a plain in the northwestern Peloponnese, where the “capital” Andravida
was located.8 The southeastern part of the Peninsula resisted the Franks the
longest and was only subdued by Prince Guillaume II de Villehardouin
7
Pachymeres I, 1; Macrides 2003, 70-72; Lampakes 2004, 21-92.
8
The Peloponnese has four other big coastal plains besides the plain of Achaia. The
Taygetos mountain range, where the Slavs lived, is between Messenia and Lakonia, i.e.
the southwestern and southeastern plains. The interior of the peninsula is mountainous,
but there are also many valleys and plains.
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JUHO WILSKMAN
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(1246-1278) in 1250. He did, however, have to give the inhabitants of the

region special privileges, such as allowing the Slavs of the Taygetos Moun-
tains to continue to perform military service. At the peak of his power
Guillaume not only ruled the whole of Morea, but also beyond the penin-
sula: under his command were the Lord of Athens, the Marquis of
Boudonitza, the Triarch of Euboea, the Duke of Naxos, and the Count of
Kephalenia.9
During the 1250s the Greek “Empire of Nicaea” was the dominant
power in the region. However, a power struggle occurred when Theodore
II Laskaris died in August 1258 and left only an under-aged son as a suc-
cessor, which resulted in the aristocrat Michael Palaiologos crowning him-
self co-emperor on 1 January 1259. The Empire of Nicaea’s main rival, the
Greek ruler of Epiros, exploited the situation and formed an anti-Nicaean
coalition that included Prince Guillaume participated. This coalition was
defeated in the battle of Pelagonia, where Guillaume and all the nobles in
his army were captured by the Nicaeans. 10
According to the Chronicle of Morea, after his victory Michael
Palaiologos wanted to buy Morea, but Guillaume initially refused, declar-
ing that it was customary among soldiers to pay ransoms for their freedom.
However, after the Nicaeans recaptured Constantinople in 1261, Guillaume
agreed to cede fortified towns (including Mistra) in southeast Morea in ex-
change for his and his men’s freedom. As a reward, the emperor gave
Guillaume the title of megas domestikos11 and made him godfather to his
9
For the conquest of Morea, see especially Kordoses 198676-136, 150-155. From the
studies dealing with the Principality of Achaia, the most comprehensive is still Bon 1969.
Lock 1995 provides a good overview of the history of the Franks of Romania in general
and Ortega 2012 gives an extensive survey of the elite.
10
For these events see especially Geanakoplos 1953 and Wilskman 2009-2010. According
to Sanudo 115 there was a rebellion in Morea after the battle of Pelagonia. If this is true,
it must have been very small, because other sources do not mention it.
11
Megas domestikos was a high position in the Byzantine court and the official commander
of the army, although, as with other late Byzantine titles, the holder did not always per-
form the corresponding duties in practice. In the case of Prince Guillaume the title was
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son.12 This mirrored the old Byzantine tradition of incorporating autono-

mous minorities into the Empire’s political structure by giving their leaders
a place in the imperial hierarchy.13
Besides his acquisition of Morea and his family ties with the Prince of
Achaia,14 Michael Palaiologos perhaps also attempted to slowly assimilate
and acculturate the Franks of Morea with the Byzantine Empire and society
through mixed marriages. He forced the daughters of the late emperor
Theodore II Laskaris to marry insignificant foreigners, one of whom was
the Moreote Baron Mahieu de Véligourt. 15
The Byzantines have traditionally been seen as peace-loving and as pre-
ferring diplomatic solutions to war. Harris has cited the treaty with
Guillaume as evidence that the Byzantine emperors were primarily inter-
ested in being recognised as dominant over the other Christian rulers. 16
However, Emperor Michael VIII faced a multitude of threats after the con-
quest of Constantinople, and in 1262 the Byzantine government was in-
volved in military conflicts on five different fronts. 17 Thus, no matter what
the ideological preferences of the emperor were, he had good reasons to
reach some kind of settlement with Guillaume.
War between the Principality of Achaia and the Byzantines broke out
again as soon as the Franks returned to Morea in 1262. Evidently the pope
certainly purely formal (Pseudo-Kodinos 26-28, 204-208; Bartusis 1992, 241; Kyriakidis
2008, 241-258; Panagiotides 2004, 154-165).
12
Pachymeres I, 31; Livre de la conqueste §§ 312-328; Chronicle of Morea 4198-4514;
Gregoras IV, 1; Sanudo 125; Libro de los Fechos §§ 296-307.Guillaume was perhaps not
the best choice for godfather, because he due to his confession in principle was against
the regulations of the Byzantine church (Sansaridou-Hendrickx 2007, 247-248, 251-252).
13
Vryonis 1975, 128-131.
14
Sansaridou-Hendrickx 2007, 248-249.
15
Pachymeres III, 6; 10; Gregoras IV, 4; Failler 1980, 65-77. The barony of Mahieu de
Véligourt was among the smallest of the Principality of Achaia encompassing only four
knightly fiefs, whereas the largest baronies of Morea had 24 (Livre de la conqueste § 128;
Chronicle of Morea 1903-1967).
16
Harris 2003, 22-32, 174-175. For other views of the Byzantine attitudes concerning war-
fare, see e.g. Kolbaba 1998, 202-221; Haldon 1992; Kanellopoulos and Lekea 2010;
Stouraitis 2009, 219-232; 384-387; Kyriakidis 2011, 14-34.
17
Bartusis 1992, 48-57; Failler 1980, 85-103; Failler 1981, 148-173.
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had assured Guillaume and the other Franks that it was not necessary for
them to keep promises made during their imprisonment. 18 In fact, Pope
Urbanus IV (1261-1264) had plans for the re-conquest of Constantinople
and he also tried to assist the Principality of Achaia by promising the same
indulgences and privileges for its supporters as for those who helped the
Holy Land. Thus the conflict turned into a crusader war. The Venetians
promised to transport the crusaders free of charge. The pope also ordered
the Latin clergy in Guillaume II de Villehardouin’s domain to dedicate
themselves to fighting against the “schismatic Greeks” for three years, and
to assist Guillaume by giving him money or Latin soldiers, such as cross-
bowmen. Nevertheless, at the same time the pope was negotiating for a
peaceful solution and a church union with Emperor Michael VIII, suggest-
ing that both parties wanted to keep different options open. 19
Outside Venice and Morea, the papal appeals seem to have had little
effect. The Genoese, who were allies of the Byzantines (both were at war
against Venice), even helped transport the Byzantine army to Morea. The
pope excommunicated them, but it does not seem to have much bothered
the Genoese leaders.20 The Byzantines gave privileges to the leaders of the
Slavs of Taygetos and the regions of Gardalebos and Tsakonia in south-
eastern Morea in exchange for military service. 21 As such, the people of
18
Pachymeres I, 31. In the Chronicle of Morea it is almost admitted that the Franks started
the war (Chronicle of Morea 4513-4649, 5489-5558; Livre de la conqueste §§ 329-337;
Geanakoplos 1959, 154-160; Sansaridou-Hendrickx 2007, 202; Failler 1980, 89-103).
The fortified places that were ceded to the Byzantines were separated from each other, a
fact which makes it unlikely that Michael Palaiologos planned a war in Morea (see also
Wilskman 2012a, 172-178).
19
Les Registres de Urbain IV, registre ordinaire nos. 131-132, 231-232, 295, 322-326, 577-
578, 719-720, 740, 756; Chrissis 2012, 180-200; Setton 1976, 94-100.
20
Annali Genovesi di Cafforo 43-44, 51; Tafel and Thomas no. CCCL; Regesten der
Kaiserurkunden no. 1890; Les Registres de Urbain IV, registre ordinaire nos. 182; 228-
230. See also Barber 1989, 116-117; Chrissis 2012, 189-195.
21
The people of Tsakonia spoke Greek, but because of their peculiar dialect and customs
they were frequently considered to be a distinct ethnic group (see especially Caratzas
1976).
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these areas and those of Kinsterna joined the Byzantines, helping the im-
perial army to conquer several places in southeast Morea.22 It might be
worth noting that these areas had not only resisted the Franks the longest,
but had also taken a rebellious stance against the Byzantine government
before the Fourth Crusade.23 In addition, at least according to the Chronicle
of Morea, Guillaume had to travel to Corinth to persuade both the Latins
of western Europe and his own vassals outside the Principality of Achaia
to continue to fight for him. 24
The Commander of the Byzantine army in Morea was sebastokrator
Constantine Palaiologos, the young step-brother of the emperor.25 Accord-
ing to the Chronicle of Morea, as soon as he had heard that Guillaume had
gone to Corinth, apparently in the autumn of 1263,26 Constantine set out
from the Byzantine base area in southeastern Morea and marched towards
Andravida, the unfortified “capital” of the principality, leading his troops
along the natural corridor through the peninsula formed by the valley of the
river Alpheios. The Chronicle of Morea further states that the inhabitants
22
Chronicle of Morea 4571-4663; Livre de la conqueste §§ 330-336; Pachymeres III, 15-
16; Gregoras IV, 1; Sanudo 125; Wilskman 2012a, 174-178.
23
This is, for example, noted in Sansaridou-Hendrickx 2007, 119-129 and
Katsaphanas2003, 103.
24
Chronicle of Morea 4594-4617; 4864-4879; Livre de la conqueste §§ 334-335; Libro de
los Fechos §§ 338-358. The Byzantine navy is reported to have ravaged Euboia and the
other Latin-held islands, which was probably the main reason why the vassals were un-
willing to send troops to the peninsula (Pachymeres III, 15, 17; Les Registres de Urbain
IV, registre ordinaire nos. 228-230; “Imperatoris Michaelis Palaeologi de Vita sua” VIII;
Wilskman 2012a, 179, 197-198).
25
In the imperial hierarchy, the sebastokrator held the place immediately after the emperor
and the despotes (Pseudo-Kodinos 26). Constantine Palaiologos had held no official po-
sition before his step-brother took power, after that he was given a commandership in the
east, although the later historian Gregoras erroneously claims that he participated in the
battle of Pelagonia (Acropolita § 77; Pachymeres I, 20, II, 13; Gregoras III, 5, IV, 1;
Wilskman 2012a, 175; Prosopographisches Lexikon der Palaiologenzeit no. 21 498).
26
Failler has suggested that the battle of Prinitsa took place already in 1262 and the battle
of Makry-Plagi probably during the following year (Failler 1980, 85-103). Nevertheless,
I am not convinced and thus prefer the traditional dating of the events (for arguments see
Wilskman 2012a, 174-177).
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of the region, which was called Skorta, 27 immediately joined the

Byzantines when they saw Constantine’s mighty army. In spite of this, the
bailli left by Guillaume to protect the region succeeded in defeating the
Byzantine army in the battle of Prinitsa. Most of the Byzantines escaped
through the forest across difficult terrain and their camp was plundered by
the Franks and locals, who in theory were allies of the Byzantines. 28
The abortive battle at Sergiana
The winter brought a halt to the campaigns, but, in March 1264, Constan-
tine Palaiologos gathered his army in the area where the river Alpheios be-
gins.29 The army, built around the cavalry, included both mercenaries with
foreign backgrounds and native Byzantines, which seems to have been
fairly typical of the period. In Morea, the natives were mostly men from
Magedon, a district in the eastern frontier zone of Byzantine
Anatolia; according to the Chronicle of Morea, 2,000 of them served in the
Byzantine army in the Peloponnese.30 Earlier emperors had given extensive
privileges to the people of the eastern frontier so that they would defend
the Byzantine Asia Minor against the raids of the Turks. However, Michael
VIII re-organised the system and required these frontier warriors, such as
27
The region of Skorta encompassed the areas surrounding modern Gortynas, Megalopolis
and Olympia in the western part of Central Peloponnese. Its inhabitants were known for
their rebellious nature (Bon 1969, 363-336; Sansaridou-Hendrickx 2007, 129-131).
28
Chronicle of Morea 1426-1429, 4653-4884; Livre de la conqueste § 92, 338; Libro de los
Fechos §§ 349-358; Wilskman 2012a, 179-193.
29
Chronicle of Morea 4880-5027.
30
Pachymeres III, 16; Chronicle of Morea 4555-4558. Libro de los Fechos claims that the
megas domestikos came to Morea with 3,000 Greeks and 3,000 Turks (Libro de los
Fechos §§ 335-336). Libro de los Fechos however, constantly exaggerates figures given
by the older versions of the Chronicle and I do not consider it to be a reliable source
concerning the size of the armies. For the composition of late Byzantine armies in general,
see e.g. Bartusis 1992, 139-188; Oikonomidès 1981, 353-363; Kyriakidis 2011, 75-135;
Pana-giotides-.
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the men of Magedon, to also fight further afield, which seemed to demor-
alise them. The late native Byzantine cavalrymen usually drew their main
incomes from the pronoia-fiefs, but it is unclear if this still applied to the
men of the frontier zone after the reformation, or if they had lost their pos-
sessions and holdings and had to live solely on their wages. 31
The Turks formed the mercenary element of Constantine Palaiologos’
army. The Chronicle of Morea claims that 1,500 of them had come to
Morea when the war started and made a contract to serve for one year under
the Byzantines. These short-term mercenaries were probably Turkomans,
Turkish nomads from the frontier areas. 32 Yet Pachymeres uses the term
Persikon about the Turkish contingent, which might indicate a permanent
unit,33 and that there were several Turkish groups in the Morean army serv-
ing under different conditions.34 Indeed, according to the chronicle there
were an additional 1,000 soldiers of unspecified nationality that came from
outside Morea.35
Contemporaries noted the absence of Latin mercenaries in the Byzan-
tine army in Morea, with Pachymeres claiming that Latins were reluctant
to fight against other Latins.36 There are, however, many examples of Latin
mercenaries in Byzantine armies engaging fully in wars against other
31
Pachymeres I, 3-6; Bartusis 2008; Bartusis 1992, 54-57; Oikonomidès 1981, 359-360;
Korobeinikov 2014, 237-245, 267-271; Kyriakidis 2009a, 172-173 and Kyriakidis 2011,
152-153, which all give practically the same information. There has been a debate about
the nature of the pronoia-fief itself. The most recent and comprehensive account of the
institution is provided by Bartusis 2012.
32
Chronicle of Morea 4553-4554; 5723-5735; Livre de la conqueste § 331;Savvides 1990,
168-175. 
33
Pachymeres III, 16; Bartusis 1992, 52-54; Kyriakidis 2011, 112.
34
This was often the practice in the late Byzantine army (Bartusis 1992, 139; Oikonomidès
1981, 355-360).
35
Chronicle of Morea 4629-4638; Livre de la conqueste § 336. Some Byzantine cavalrymen
might have ended up serving on foot, because, according to the Chronicle, the Franks
took 1,000 horses from the Byzantine camp after the battle of Prinitsa (Chronicle of
Morea 4855). It also asserts that the Byzantines had 6,000 cavalrymen in the battle of
Prinitsa (Chronicle of Morea 4653-4677), but it does not explain from where those extra
1,500 cavalrymen would have come and I find it unlikely that the archons of southeastern
Morea would have been able to provide so many (Wilskman 2012a, 180-185).
36
Pachymeres III, 16. See also Bartusis 1992, 50-51.
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Latins,37 so perhaps Pachymeres’ assertion was only his personal opinion.

Indeed, perhaps the Latin mercenaries were fighting away from Morea in
other battles in 1262–1263, since the emperor was then involved in several
other conflicts.
That said, the declining use of Latin mercenaries, combined with the
increasing use of Turks, seems to have been a broad trend in the Byzantine
armies of the late thirteenth century. 38 I believe that the explanation lay in
the anarchic internal affairs of the Seljuk realm. This unstable situation
combined with Mongolian pressure meant not only that the Seljuks began
to lose their control over the recruitment of Turks, but also that some
Turkomans were pushed into Byzantine territory. There is evidence that the
Byzantines tried to deal with this influx by hiring some of the Turks to fight
for them,39 which perhaps resulted in there being less money to hire Latin
soldiers, causing their numbers to decline.
According to the Chronicle of Morea, the army’s local infantrymen
came from Tsakonia, Monemvasia, Skorta and from among the Slavs, 40
37
See for example “Der Brief Kaiser Heinrichs von Konstantinopel vom 13. Januar 1212”,
415-416; Acropolita § 15; Sanudo 139-141; Tafel and Thomas no. CCCLXX; Livre de la
conqueste § 270; 279, 296-302; Chronicle of Morea 3591-3608, 3703-3711, 3765-4084;
see also Palágyi 2006, 84-92. Kyriakidis has suggested that in the war in the Peloponnese
Latins were for tactical reasons not preferred against other Latins (Kyriakidis 2011, 199-
200; repeated in Kyriakidis 2012, 51-52), but I am not quite convinced (for arguments,
see Wilskman 2012a, 185-185, 195). On the other hand in the case of Pelagonia I have
held it possible that the Nicaean army was intentionaly built to fit the harashment strategy
that Michael Palaiologos had ordered to adopt, thus prefering horse-archers over close-
combat cavalry (Wilskman 2009-2010, 145-146, see also Wilskman 2012b, 46-48).
38
Bartusis 1992, 50-51. Nevertheless the use of Latins did not wholy cease. For references
to Latin troops deployed by Byzantine armies during the time of Michael VIII, see
Pachymeres IV, 27; Danilo 153; Livre de la conqueste § 270, 279, 296-302; Chronicle of
Morea 3591-3608, 3703-3711, 3765-4084. Besides the Latins played an important role at
sea and under the Latin adventurer Licario, who was a subject of the emperor, in Euboia
(Pachymeres V, 27; Sanudo 131-145; Tafel and Thomas no. CCCLXX).
39
See for example Pachymeres II, 24, IX, 9-14; Gregoras V, 5, VI, 8; Choniates 400, 421.
40
Chronicle of Morea 5016-5027.
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who had been picked up by the Byzantine army over the course of the cam-
paign. 41 There might have been thousands of them42 and most likely not
even Constantine Palaiologos knew their numbers, since they were not nec-
essarily recorded in any payrolls if they served only for a share of the spoils.
That said, it is possible that the Slavs also had some kind of collective mil-
itary obligation;43 they were experienced fighters with a warlike reputation,
and at least some of them wore hauberks. Besides the Slavs, the Tsakones
had a reputation for being good quality light infantrymen and Michael VIII
settled a number of them in Constantinople, where they served as marines.
The weapon of choice for native Morean infantrymen seems to have been
the bow.44
After the troops were gathered the Byzantines set out to march on An-
dravida. They followed the previous year’s route and passed by, for exam-
ple, the mighty castle of Karytaina that was still in the hands of the Franks.
The author of the Chronicle of Morea claims that the Byzantines had de-
cided that they would not meet the Latin cavalry with lances in close-
41
Collecting infantry during the campaign was perfectly normal for late Byzantine armies.
See, for example, Acropolita § 43, 58-59; Gregoras IV, 9; Bartusis 1992, 213-221, 256-
258; Chronicle of Morea 4660-4663; Panagiotides 2004, 69-73, 88, 123-153; Chronicle
of Morea 4660-4677; Wilskman 2012a, 180-185.
42
For the military potential of southeast Morea, see Villehardouin [329]; Chronicle of
Morea 1715-1725, 4897, 5011, 5501). Generally, historians are very sceptical about the
figures given by the Chronicle of Morea about the size of the armies (for example Bartusis
1992, 258-269; Molin 2001, 197-199), but it should be remembered that regions in which
practically all able-bodied men are armed can raise very big armies for short periods of
time (see Wilskman 2012a, 180-183).
43
Livre de la conqueste § 206; 332; Chronicle of Morea 2901-3042; 4559-4593; Bartusis
1992, 213-217, 257.
44
Pachymeres III, 9, 17, IV, 26; Livre de la conqueste § 206, 261, 696, 823; Chronicle of
Morea 1715-1725, 2985-3031, 3512-3514; Acropolita § 81; Caratzas 1976, 78-83; Doc-
uments sur le régime des terres 88-89, 99-100. The idea that there were different weapon
preferences in the Byzantine and western worlds is nicely expressed in the French version
of the Chronicle, when, during a later episode, it classifies the South-Italian infantrymen
as spear and crossbowmen and the Slavs of Morea as spear and bowmen (Livre de la
conqueste § 823). The hand-held composite bow was the one most typically used by the
Byzantines and other natives of the eastern Mediterranean and the steppes. Nevertheless,
the Byzantines clearly knew about the crossbow, even if they did not use it as much as
the Latins (Babuin 2009, 160-240; Kolias 1988, 214-250; Bartusis 1992, 330-332).
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combat, but instead use bows to shoot the unarmoured horses of their ene-
mies, since the French would be helpless without their mounts. According
to the chronicle, this tactic had helped the Byzantines beat the Franks in the
battle of Pelagonia, whereas they had suffered a humiliating defeat to a
much smaller Frankish army than their own in Prinitsa when they had tried
to engage in close-combat. The Chronicle of Morea imagined an old Frank-
ish envoy of the emperor boasting that the Franks were invincible, but
acknowledging that the Byzantines could win with cunning.45
Although the Chronicle of Morea’s description of the battles of
Pelagonia and Prinitsa might be coloured by Latin self-idealisation and by
(negative) stereotyping of the Byzantines and Greeks46, it probably was
preferable to fight the Franks with bows than to join them in close-combat.
At this time a normal Byzantine cavalryman seems to have been more
lightly equipped than his Latin counterpart and his horse was smaller.
These were disadvantages in close-combat, although the smaller and lighter
equipped Byzantine horses, besides being cheaper, were better suited to the
hot climate.47 Perhaps an even more significant advantage for the Latins in
hand-to-hand combat, particularly in terms of morale, was that many of the
Byzantines seem to have accepted the idea of Frank invincibility at close
quarters in pitched battles.48
45
Chronicle of Morea 4900-5035; Wilskman 2012a, 192.
46
Concerning the Latin view of the Greeks, see for example Carrier 2012; Shawcross 2012.
47
Useful sources about equipment and horses in late Byzantine times are Paléologue 58-59;
Babuin 2002, 97-102; Babuin 2007, 119-141; Babuin 2009, 20-250; Heath 1995, 10-35,
42-46; Bartusis 1992, 322-334; Wilskman 2012a, 188-191, 197-198; Kanellopoulos
2011, 265-273. It is worth noting that, at the time of the Fourth Crusade, there might not
have been any significant difference between the Byzantine and Frankish heavy cavalry-
men (Kolias 2005, 129-130). It is unlikely that the Byzantines’ lack of ability to produce
and rear large horses was the reason why they did not use them during the thirteenth
century. The Franks of Greece could look after their large horses, and it was always pos-
sible to buy western horses, or gain them as gifts or booty (Babuin 2007, 122-123;
Wilskman 2009-2010, 153).
48
See e.g. Gregoras V, 6. See also Wilskman 2009-2010, 152-153; Kyriakidis 2011, 202-
203, 211-212.
96
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In spite of certain downsides, the Byzantines might have preferred light

equipment and smaller horses because these suited their surprise attacks,
skirmishes, ambushes and their other “indirect” methods of warfare. 49
These are traditionally considered to be their favoured tactics, especially
when they fought against the western enemy. Recent research has demon-
strated that the Byzantine strategy was actually more nuanced than this,
but, for much of the thirteenth century, including the era of Michael VIII,
the traditional view largely holds true.50
The army that Michael Palaiologos sent to Morea was especially ill-
suited to meet the Franks in close-combat, since the Turks and the men of
Magedon were probably experienced mainly in skirmishing and raiding in
the frontier zone. For people used to such warfare, a Latin heavy cavalry
charge must have been a devastating experience. In addition, the defeat at
Prinitsa might have shattered the spirits of the Byzantines.51
The Turks were traditionally light and nimble mounted archers, who
used manoeuvrability and the longer range of their weapons to avoid close-
combat until the enemy’s morale and formation had been broken by their
quick strikes and rains of arrows. Although thirteenth-century armour
seems to have provided reasonable protection against the arrows of the
composite bow, few cavalrymen would have had armoured steeds and so
their horses were targeted, as such fighters were particularly vulnerable if
49
Babuin has made the same claim concerning the relation of the Byzantine horses and
equipment to the “indirect” methods of warfare (Babuin 2007, 120-121; the issue is also
discussed by Kanellopolous 2011, 271-273).
50
For the traditional view, see e.g. Kaegi 1983, 5-10; Bartusis 1992, 354-357; Kyriakidis
2011, 63-69; Haldon 1999, 35-38, 278. A more diversified image is presented e.g. by
Syvänne 2004, 113-117; Birkenmeier 2002, 60-74, 82; Kanellopoulos 2011, 298-307.
51
Wilskman 2012a, 188-191, 196. For warfare on the frontier, see Pachymeres I, 4, III, 12.
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they lost their mount in battle.52 There seem to have been some native Byz-
antine horse archers in later Byzantine armies,53 so it is quite plausible that
the frontier men of Magedon also primarily used this style of fighting. 54
When the Byzantines arrived at the plain of Achaia they found that the
Franks had fortified Andravida with ditches. Men who knew the region ad-
vised the Byzantine commander not to attack the town, because of the “nar-
row approaches and crossbowmen”. 55 Instead, the Byzantines went to the
area of Sergiana and set their camp about 10 km from Andravida, close to
the chapel of St Nicholas of Mesiskli. In response, Guillaume gathered his
forces and marched on them the next morning. 56
The place that the Byzantines chose as a battle site was admirably suited
to the composition of their army and their preferred tactics. The terrain be-
tween it and Andravida was flat and gave their horse archers room to
manoeuver. In contrast, the ground became hilly around their camp, allow-
ing their infantry to position itself advantageously against the Frankish
attack. Similarly in Pelagonia, the heavy troops of the Nicean army had
52
See, for example, Mitchell 2006; Chronicle of Morea 1034-1161; 4030-4091; Livre de la
conqueste §§ 69-71, 299-304; Acropolita § 61; Thorau 2006, 66, 70-71; Babuin 2009,
160-206. Those who read Finnish can also benefit from Wilskman 2006 and 2007.
53
See, for example, Heath 1995, 24, 46-47; Babuin 2002, 99-100; Babuin 2007, 135;
Acropolita § 81; Wilskman 2012a, 189-190; Wilskman 2009-2010, 149.
54
Pachymeres praises the archery skills of the people of Magedon (and other inhabitants of
the eastern frontier region), although he does not explicitly say that they were horse arch-
ers (Pachymeres II, 20, III, 12, 21; see also Acropolita § 53; Choniates 640). Their life
reflected that of the Turkomans (see for example Angold 1975, 26-27, 101; Pachymeres
I, 4-6) and in my opinion they might have been able to develop the skills required for
horse archery (Wilskman 2012a, 189-190; see also Wilskman 2009-2010, 148-149).
55
The terrain surrounding Andravida is level so the “narrow approaches” must have been
the result of the Frankish fortification works. Alternatively, perhaps there were plenty of
orchards, vineyards etc.
56
Chronicle of Morea 5012-5052; Livre de la conqueste § 339. Regarding the places men-
tioned in the Chronicle, see Bon 1969, 338-339, 356-357;Dragoumes , 163-168;
259. The unwillingness to attack fortified Andravida has been seen as an indication of
the Byzantines’ inability to conduct sieges (Nicolle 2007, 47-49; Molin 2001, 225-226).
However, Byzantine sources themselves suggest that they were quite capable of conduct-
ing aggressive sieges (Wilskman 2009-2010, 138; Kanellopoulos 2011, 326-331; see also
Kyriakidis 2011, 170-175, 186-187; and for siege weaponry Babuin 2009, 253-280). If
the Byzantines lacked siege equipment at this point, it might have been the result of losing
the camp at Prinitsa (Wilskman 2012a, 192).
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stayed in the mountains while the light horse archers harassed the enemy
in the plain.57 Nonetheless, in spite of the terrain’s advantages for the
Byzantines, Guillaume was prepared to battle.
Sources describing the warfare of the Franks against the Crusader States
in Greece give several examples of nearly suicidal charges made by them,
although it is necessary to be cautious as regards the reliability and accu-
racy of the descriptions.58 This is contrary to the mainstream view in mod-
ern research concerning medieval warfare in western Europe, which em-
phasises that pitched battles were usually avoided, with leaders relying in-
stead on fortifications, siege warfare and raids, although this opinion is cur-
rently being questioned.59 In fact, warfare in Frankish Greece and in the
Latin East in general might have differed from that of western Europe. John
France has suggested that the methods of warfare in the Crusader States of
the Holy Land were unusually aggressive, arguing that the Latins of the
Levant (and the Franks of Romania) needed to maintain their reputation for
ferocity and that their equipment was better suited for close-combat than
that which the enemy used.60 Additionally, their distrust towards the Greeks
billeted in the castles might have made the Franks reluctant to rely on for-
tifications.61 Cohesion was the most important single factor in determining
57
Acropolita § 81; Wilskman 2009-2010, 145-149.
58
Some examples are Pachymeres IV, 31; Sanudo 133; Chronicle of Morea 1710-1750,
3812-4091, 4678-4863; Livre de la conqueste §§ 285-305; Choniates 603-604;
Villehardouin [321]-[329].
59
For a discussion, see e.g. Gillingham 2004; Rogers 2002; Villalon 2010.
60
France 1999, 92-93, 150-151, 217-221. As far as we know the weapons and equipment
of the heavy cavalry in the Crusader states of Frankish Greece were similar to those in
contemporary western Europe (Ortega 2012, 345, 383-386, 538; Wilskman 2012a, 188-
189).
61
Nicolle 2007, 46. For examples of unreliable garrisons or people of fortified towns, see
Villehardouin [333]-[346], [393], [399]-[401], [415]-[421]; Choniates 612-614; Livre de
la conqueste §§ 801-816. The skills of the Byzantines in siege warfare might also have
made the Franks reluctant to retreat behind the walls. It should also be noted that chivalric
values seem to have been at the heart of the Latin culture in the Crusader States in Greece
(see especially Ortega 2012, 276-277, 288-292, 341-401). Perhaps they were rather more
idealistic and more ready to follow military codes of honour than several leaders of west-
ern Europe were.
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the effectiveness of a medieval army,62 and this was an advantage the

Latins often had over the heterogeneous late Byzantine armies. With all
probability this was also the case at Sergiana.
According to the Chronicle of Morea, Guillaume separated his
allagions (divisions) and formed three batailles (lines). He had both infan-
try and cavalry,63 so three successive cavalry batailles plus infantry behind
them would have been a likely battle formation for the Latins. 64 This kind
of formation was especially suitable for cavalry battles that were often
characterized by successive attacks and counterattacks until the army with
the last reserve won.65
According to my estimation, Guillaume might have had between 400
and 1,500 heavy cavalrymen with him at Andravida, depending mainly on
how much support was sent by his vassals outside the principality. The
Chronicle of Morea does not mention it, but Sanudo claims that Guillaume
received significant help during the war.66 The Latin heavy cavalrymen of
62
See especially France 1999, 70-76, 136, 150-186, 204-229.
63
Livre de la conqueste § 340; Chronicle of Morea 5052-5056. The term allagion was used
about several different military units in armies in Romania regardless of their ethnical
origin. The allagions in the Chronicle of Morea usually had c. 300 men. Allagion was
also used as a synonym of bataille as part of a battle formation (see especially Hendrickx
1992).
64
Chronicle of Morea 3998-4013; Livre de la conqueste §§ 294-296; 300; Libro de los
Fechos § 272; Wilskman 2009-2010, 153-154; Paléologue 92-93; Contamine 1980, 380-
382; Wilskman 2012a, 188.
65
For the nature of cavalry battles, see for example Goldsworthy 1996, 235-244; Syvänne
2004, 155-160; Hildinger 1997, 165-167. The most effective formation against the attack
of horse archers would have been a hollow infantry square. Heavy cavalry would have
been inside and ready to make counter-attacks. Managing this formation, however, re-
quired much skill and training (Bennett 2001; Wilskman 2009-2010, 149-150).
66
The Principality of Achaia usually sent contingents of 400-500 heavy cavalrymen on
campaigns outside the peninsula (Chronicle of Morea 6888-6890, 8841-8846; Livre de la
conqueste § 613, 962; Sanudo 107; Wilskman 2009-2010, 139-141; Wilskman 2012a,
179, 186) and the figure corresponds neatly with the probable number of fiefs in the
Principality of Achaia (Bon 1969, 114; Ortega 2012, 370-371). It should be noted that
one knightly fief could provide more than one heavy cavalryman (Chronicle of Morea
1977-1989; Livre de la conqueste §§ 129-131; Les Assises de Romanie § 67). The Duchy
of Athens might have been able to send 300 cavalrymen and the ruler of Kephalenia and
Zakynthos could perhaps have sent 100. Sanudo claims that one of the triarchs of Euboia
sent money enough to pay 400 cavalrymen (Pachymeres IV, 31; Sanudo 125; Chronicle
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the era were also accompanied by numerous armed and armoured serv-
ants67 that evened out the numerical superiority of the Byzantines, which
may itself have been exaggerated by the author of the chronicle. It is im-
possible to calculate the size of Guillaume’s infantry, although the bishops
of Romania might have given him Latin mercenaries, particularly cross-
bowmen, and there might also have been Greek infantry and cavalry among
his men.68
The Chronicle of Morea describes Kantakouzenos, 69 commander of the
first Byzantine division, as a praiseworthy soldier and as being armed with
a bow, quiver and mace.70 The reference to this first unit indicates that the
chronicle’s author thought that the Byzantines were using a formation of
of Morea 8863-8875; Livre de la conqueste § 617; 962; Wilskman 2009-2010, 140).

Other Euboians and the possible additional men collected by Guillaume in an emergency,
might be added to these figures.
67
See for example I Registri della Cancelleria Angioina no. XXIII, LXXXIX, 329; Conta-
mine 1980, 161-162.
68
For Greeks serving in the army of the principality, see e.g. Acropolita § 81; Chronicle of
Morea 3512-3514; 3960; Livre de la conqueste § 261-262; Documents sur le régime des
terres 65-115. Concerning the early phase of the war, Libro de los Fechos has included a
story about Greek vassals of the Frankish baron of Karytaina; they were loyal and brave
warriors, whom the Byzantine commander vainly tried to separate from their lord (Libro
de los Fechos §§ 313-331; Wilskman 2012a, 175-176). The Peloponnese was not a no-
ticeable source of soldiers for the Byzantine army in the era preceding the Fourth Crusade
(Ilieva 1993, 184, 189-192; Birkenmeier 2002, 31, 56, 126, 157-171, 232-233) and the
Latin conquest clearly had not demilitarised the Greeks in the main areas of Frankish
Morea, perhaps quite the contrary.
69
No other sources besides the chronicle describe a person identifiable as Kantakouzenos.
Failler suggested that he might be the megas domestikos Aleksios Philes, who, according
to Pachymeres, was the second sub-commander of Constantine Palaiologos. His wife was
from the Kantakouzenos family and, like the Kantakouzenos of the chronicle, he died in
Morea, although in dissimilar circumstances (Failler 1980, 95-99). More likely, however,
is that he was a combination of Philes and Constantine Palaiologos, the latter of whom is
constantly and erroneously labelled megas domestikos in the chronicle.
70
Livre de la conqueste § 341; Chronicle of Morea 5059-5062. For weapon terminology,
see Babuin 2009, 99-111. The terminology that the Greek version of the Chronicle uses
about the units in Sergiana is very confusing. The prince separates his allagions and forms
three syntaxeis (in the French version batailles). On the other hand Kantakouzenos com-
mands the first allagion of the Byzantines and its syntaxeis. I will assume that the terms
are used interchangeably.
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JUHO WILSKMAN
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successive batailles. This was probably one of their most common for-
mations, with horse archers often forming the first bataille, as seems to
have been the case in Sergiana.71
At the start of the battle, Kantakouzenos rode between the armies. Libro
de los Fechos claims that he was conducting reconnaissance on the orders
of the commander of the army, whereas the French and Greek versions al-
lege that he came just to taunt the Franks about their small numbers and
performed horse tricks by changing his mount. The prince urged his men
not to break ranks, but when Kantakouzenos and his horse fell the Franks
rushed forward to kill the rider and seize the mount. When the other com-
manders of the Byzantine army saw their best fighter being slain they be-
came disheartened, and ordered the trumpets to be blown and the troops to
retreat. The Franks did not follow, because the prince was warned that the
horse archers might still be dangerous. 72 While the Byzantines’ reaction to
the killing of one sub-commander may seem exaggerated, the death or cap-
ture of a commander was, in fact, often the cause of an army’s defeat in
Medieval times.73
The Turks switch sides
If the Chronicle of Morea’s account is reliable, the Byzantine commander

believed that the conquest of Andravida was to be a decisive blow to the
71
For a more detailed discussion about the late Byzantine battle orders, see Wilskman 2009-
2010, 153-156; Wilskman 2012a, 194; Kanellopoulos 2011, 307-318.
72
Chronicle of Morea 5063-5099; Livre de la conqueste §§ 341-345; Libro de los Fechos
§§ 341-346. According to the Libro de los Fechos, the Franks would have attacked and
killed many Byzantines before the rest could escape to the mountains and the thickets. It
also places the encounter before the battle of Prinitsa (Libro de los Fechos §§ 338-358).
These claims are, however, unlikely, as it is almost impossible to believe that the earlier
versions of the Chronicle would have been silent about Frankish success. Besides, Libro
de los Fechos also gives false information about a church building related to the battle
(Coulson 1996, 50).
73
For example, in 1281 the Byzantines defeated a Latin army in Berat by capturing its com-
mander during a skirmish (Sanudo 145; Pachymeres VI, 32; Gregoras V, 6).
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morale of the Franks. The Byzantines would have had little chance of keep-
ing Andravida, since there were still a number of Latin castles in the region.
Even if their object was simply to raid the Frankish heartland, their advance
to the plain of Achaia and their readiness to engage in a pitched battle was
quite a risky undertaking, especially when one considers the Byzantines’
reputation as cautious soldiers. Perhaps the following events provide an
explanation for their actions.
After retreating, the Byzantines laid siege to the town of Nikli, which
occupied a strategic position in central Morea. At this point, the Turks be-
gan to complain that they had not received any pay for six months; evi-
dently they had also served past their contracted time. According to the
Chronicle of Morea, the Byzantine commander refused to pay and claimed
that the Turks had not fought, but rather enriched themselves through plun-
dering. He was perhaps referring to the pillage of the Cistercian monastery
in Isova that was carried out by one Turkish allagion the previous year.74
In response, the Turks maintained that the Byzantines had not let them
fight, and a group of one thousand Turkish cavalrymen – led by two fighters
called Melik and Salik – left the camp and travelled back to Andravida,
where they expressed their willingness to join the Franks. Guillaume was
happy to accept their offer and sent Ancelin de Toucy as his representative
to them. Ancelin belonged to the Latin nobility of Constantinople and he
spoke both Greek and Turkish, which is said to have delighted Melik.75
74
Chronicle of Morea 4664-4473, 4791-4795, 5095-5116, 5720-5729; Livre de la con-
queste §§ 345-348. At some point before 1267, the Greeks also destroyed a Latin nunnery
in Messenia. The nuns moved after that to southern Italy (Le pergamene di Conversano
nos. 5-9; Ughelli, 706-712). For the strategic position of Nikli, see e.g. Alexopoulos1951,
111-112.
75
Chronicle of Morea 5117-5284; Livre de la conqueste §§ 347-359; Sanudo 127. It should
be noted that, according to the numbers given by the Chronicle of Morea, there were far
fewer Turks who switched sides than those who had come to Morea. Furthermore, Sanudo
claims that only part of the Turkish fighters abandoned the Byzantines. This all supports
the notion that there were several different kinds of Turkish units in the Byzantine army.
Libro de los Fechos claims that the Turkish leader had contacted Ancelin de Toucy, whom
he knew, in advance (Libro de los Fechos §§ 360-362).
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Military campaigns in western Europe were often suspended due to fi-

nancial difficulties, but the Byzantine tendency to use large, sometimes
quite uniform, mercenary contingents made running out of money espe-
cially risky. The desertion of the Turks in Morea was neither the first nor
the last time that the Byzantine government’s failure to pay mercenaries
led to the latter turning their weapons against their former masters. 76 How-
ever, a shortage of money might have led the Byzantines to seek a swift
conclusion to the conflict in Morea by attacking the heartland of the Franks
in the autumn of 1263 and in the following spring. This explanation chal-
lenges the common assumption that open battles were usually avoided in
late Byzantine warfare due to a lack of resources.77 One can also note that
the Genoese-Byzantine convoy to Morea had been defeated by the Vene-
tians in the summer of 1263, which apparently made the Genoese reluctant
to sail there, thus weakening the contact and supply lines of the Byzan-
tines.78 Moreover, Turkomans were pouring into Byzantine territory at this
time, so men were needed to defend their homelands, particularly in the
volatile region of Magedon.79
Presumably soon after the desertion of the Turks, Constantine
Palaiologos left Morea and put the megas domestikos Alexios Philes and
parakoimomenos Makrenos in command.80 In the imperial hierarchy,
76
The Fourth Crusade and the Catalan Company are famous examples. The use of merce-
naries has, at times, been justified in modern research (see e.g. Heath 1995, 20-21;
Kyriakidis 2009b, 209-211; Kyriakidis 2011, 101-104). It is indeed true that the natives
were not always so reliable themselves, that mercenaries could possess useful skills, and
that they usually served without trouble as long as they were paid. Nevertheless, for a
diminishing Empire struggling constantly with financial problems, the use of mercenar-
ies, especially as autonomous and coherent units, was, in my opinion, highly problematic.
Another issue is whether the Byzantine government had any real alternatives but to use
mercenaries, especially when their need of troops was acute.
77
See, for example, Bartusis 1992, 354-357; Kyriakidis 2011, 63-64; Haldon 1999, 35-38.
78
Wilskman 2012a, 193-194; Annali Genovesi di Cafforo 51-52; Dandulo 311-312; Canal
II, XXIX-XXXVI.
79
Pachymeres III, 21.
80
Pachymeres III, 17. According to the Greek and French versions of the chronicle, the
emperor’s brother participated in the battle of Makry-Plagi and was captured, yet it is
unlikely that this happened, as the Byzantine sources (and probably Sanudo) make no
104
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megas domestikos was the higher of the two titles.81 There is no information
as to whether Constantine took part of the army with him or not, although
it is worth noting that his step-brother, John Palaiologos, stabilised the sit-
uation in Magedon in the same year,82 perhaps with the help of men return-
ing from Morea. According to the Chronicle of Morea, those men that re-
mained in Morea fared badly in the battle of Makry-Plagi, as Guillaume’s
army captured 354 archons and sebastoi and more than 5030 other men.83
It is possible that the author of the Chronicle defined cavalrymen as
archons. The personal retinues of the Byzantine commanders84 and the
wealthy native Moreotes might have been enough to create a force of
around 350 men. Nevertheless, we do not know whether these 354 men
were the total cavalry force present at Makry-Plagi. It should be noted that
the cavalrymen probably had a better chance of avoiding capture than the
infantry.
The battle of Makry-Plagi
According to the Chronicle of Morea, the Turks, who had joined the
Franks, wanted to attack the Byzantines immediately. The Turks claimed
that they had learned through magic that there would be a battle against the
mention of it. The Libro de los Fechos tries to reconcile the contradictory information by
claiming that he escaped after the defeat (Libro de los Fechos §§ 371-372; see also
Zakythinos 1932, 39-40; Bon 1969, 132).
81
Pseudo-Kodinos 26-28; Macrides, Munitiz and Angelov 2013, 55. It is unclear what kind
of military experience Philes and Makrenos had before they came to Morea. The latter
might perhaps have been John Makrenos, who participated in the war against Epiros dur-
ing the 1250s, or Georgios Makrenos, who was doux of Thrakesion in 1256 (Acropolita
§ 49; Kasapides 1998, 239; Prosopographisches Lexikon der Palaiologenzeit, nos.
16358-16359; Regesten der Kaiserurkunden nos. 1839a-b).
82
Pachymeres III, 21. For the date of John Palaiologos’ campaign, see Failler 1980, 8792.
83
Chronicle of Morea 5457-5465. Livre de la conquest only mentions [3]90 “sevastades”,
“arcondes” and a number of other people (Livre de la conqueste § 378). The title of se-
bastos was at the very bottom of Byzantine court hierarchy (Pseudo-Kodinos 32;
Macrides, Munitiz and Angelov 2013, 462-463).
84
For the armed retinues of Byzantine aristocrats, see especially Bartusis 1992, 221-234.
105
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megas domestikos and that he would be beaten. Guillaume agreed to attack

and the army marched through Messenia to encounter the enemy, with the
Turks riding ahead of the Franks. After a four-day journey the Turks ar-
rived at Mountra, where they again used magic to discover that the battle
would take place the next day.85 The description in the Chronicle of Morea
is an interesting example of how the Muslim Turks’ rituals were still con-
sidered to be quite pagan in nature during the thirteenth century (or the
fourteenth century, when the chronicle was written).
Melik, Salik and some other Turks rode to the Franks and told of their
premonition. When the Turks had returned to their camp, Guillaume organ-
ised a meeting with the Franks, in which Ancelin de Toucy said that he had
heard from his spy that the Byzantines had marched to Veligosti and pre-
pared an ambush in Makry-Plagi.86 This is an approximately seven kilome-
tre long defile that forms a natural route through the mountains and hills
separating the plains of Messenia and Megalopolis (in the latter of which
the town of Veligosti was located). The Byzantine army probably now
needed to rely mainly on the light infantry provided by the natives of
Morea, while the Latin-Turkish army had at least a formidable cavalry,
although the sources say nothing about its infantry during this campaign. It
was, therefore, better for the Byzantines to seek an encounter in difficult
terrain, where the cavalry would not be able to use its manoeuvrability and
85
Chronicle of Morea 5260-5308; Livre de la conqueste §§ 360-363; Libro de los Fechos
§§ 364-367. It is not certain how the Byzantines were sure enough of the route the Franks
would take to plan to intercept them in Makry-Plagi. Perhaps they had spies, but Bon has
alternatively suggested that the Byzantines were on their way to attack Messenia (Bon
1969, 422). If he is right, the Latin nunnery in Messenia might have been destroyed in
this attack.
86
Chronicle of Morea 5309-5333; Livre de la conqueste §§ 361-364. Libro de los Fechos
does not mention the spy. It also claims that the Byzantine commander devised the am-
bush with a Greek from Skorta, i.e. a local (Libro de los Fechos §§ 364-369). I concur
with the current consensus that the Makry-Plagi of the chronicle is the northern Makry-
Plagi defile, where the modern village of Derveni lies, not the narrow southern Makry-
Plagi as Moundreas claims (Moundreas 1976-1978, 187-195). On place names and to-
pography, see van Leuven 2010, 52-68; Demetriades 1998, 240; Bon 1969, 422-425;
Buchon 1843, 485-487; Dragoumes 1921, 178-196; Breuillot 2005, 202-204). 
106
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where the horse archers could avoid close-combat.87 In fact, the area of
Makry-Plagi might have been wooded, giving the Byzantines a further ad-
vantage.88
Although Pachymeres does not mention the battle of Makry-Plagi di-
rectly, he does potentially provide an explanation for how the Franks came
to hear about the Byzantine tactics. He writes that Philes and Makrenos
were captured on the same day and, after the former died in imprisonment,
his mother-in-law – the emperor’s elder sister Eudocia – accused Makrenos
of treason. Connecting these events to the battle of Makry-Plagi, it is pos-
sible that Makrenos might have been duplicitous and passed covert infor-
mation on to the Franks. Indeed, he wanted to marry Theodora, the daugh-
ter of Theodore II Laskaris and widow of Mahieu de Véligourt, who lived
in the court of Guillaume and supported the war of the Franks against
Michael Palaiologos. Emperor Michael believed his sister’s accusations
and blinded Makrenos upon his return. 89 Blinding and mutilating were
common punishments deployed against his political opponents;90 they were
not used to reprimand military incompetence.
While Pachymeres seems to think that Makrenos was innocent, 91 there
are other factors that support the idea that he was a traitor. He was note-
worthy among the military commanders of the early part of Palaiologos’
reign, in that he neither had close connections, such as relatives, to the em-
peror’s family nor to the circles who helped him take power.92 Furthermore,
87
Kanellopoulos (2011, 100, 299-300) has also drawn a similar conclusion, i.e., that due to
the departure of the Turkish cavalry, the Byzantines wanted to have the engagement on
rough terrain.
88
When I travelled to the area in August 2008 the hills were barren, but earlier visitors
reported that there were plenty of forests (Bon 1969, 422; Buchon 1840, 722).
89
Pachymeres III, 17.
90
Pachymeres III, 10; VI, 24-25.
91
The main purpose of Pachymeres’ description of events in Morea might have been to
criticise Michael Palaiologos as an ungrateful ruler (Lamprakes 2004, 78-79).
92
The Chronicle of Morea claims that he was the cousin of the emperor and it is also sug-
gested that he received the title of parakoimomenos when Michael Palaiologos took
power (Chronicle of Morea 4556-4558; Livre de la conqueste § 331; Kasapides 1998,
107
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with his ties to the Byzantines, Ancelin would have been a suitable contact
in the Frankish army for Makrenos.93 Finally, Michael VIII’s legitimacy as
ruler was not fully accepted, and there was discontent towards his regime. 94
Clearly, Michael believed that Makrenos might betray his army to the
Franks in order to gain support for a power struggle in Byzantium.
According to the Greek and French versions of the chronicle, Ancelin
de Toucy suggested in a war council that the Turks should be pulled back
from the vanguard, since they might panic and lead the army to disaster.
Ancelin would instead attack first with his own bataille, the Turks would
come after him and the prince would command the last bataille. When the
bataille of Ancelin had marched on foot to Makry-Plagi he ordered them
to stop for a while and made a speech to his men.95
When the Franks had arrived at Phonemenos 96 and begun to ascend a
hill there, superior Byzantine forces, led by Kaballaritses, 97 suddenly ap-
peared from behind the crest and forced the Franks to retreat to around 200
metres away, to bow (or crossbow) range. According to the Chronicle of
Morea, Ancelin made an encouraging speech to his men and launched a
momentarily successful counter-attack, with lances and swords, up to the
crest of the hill. However, according to the Greek version, the other
Byzantine troops heard the noise of the battle and rushed to help, their num-
bers forcing the Franks to retreat once more. Ancelin then rallied his men
239). However, if he had family ties with the emperor, Byzantine sources would surely
have mentioned them (Lurier 1964, 204).
93
Ancelin de Toucy was a relative of both the emperor and Guillaume. He was captured in
Pelagonia and probably gained his freedom by promising to let the Nicaean troops into
Latin-held Constantinople. However, he did not keep this promise (Acropolita § 81, 83;
Geanakoplos 1953, 137-141; see also Ortega 2012, 380-383).
94
See for example Pachymeres I, 6; I, 29; II, 8; II, 15; II, 34-35; III, 10-14; III, 19; III, 23-
26.
95
Chronicle of Morea 5316-5372; Livre de la conqueste §§ 364-368.
96
The place name is obsolete, so the exact location of the encounter cannot be determined
with certainty. There are, however, a number of hills and valleys in the area of northern
Makry-Plagi where the troops could have hidden.
97
This could be either Alexios or Michael Kaballarios. Both later participated in the war in
Thessaly and died in battle. Pachymeres (IV, 31; V, 27) praises them as brave men.
108
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again and they made a second counter-attack with swords. This time the
Byzantines panicked. In addition, the Turks arrived and began to pursue
the enemy. Those Byzantine units still waiting in ambush fled. 98
The Aragonese version of the chronicle offers an alternative account of
the battle, asserting that the Turks formed the first bataille with Ancelin as
their commander. Guy de Tremullay commanded the Franks in the second
bataille, and the prince commanded the third. When the Byzantines am-
bushed his bataille in the middle of the mountains Ancelin encouraged the
Turks to fight; seeing his bravery they stayed firm and fired their arrows,
and the second bataille came to aid them. The Byzantines from the ambush
were being overpowered, so their commander came with the rest of the
Byzantine army to help out, but they were ultimately defeated when Prince
Guillaume attacked with the third bataille.99 Hence, the Franks won be-
cause they brought the last group of reserves to the battle.
The description of Libro de los Fechos sounds most reliable. It would
have been more convenient to put the light cavalry in the vanguard. Be-
sides, Ancelin did not originally belong to the Morean nobility, but he
spoke Turkish, which makes it likely that he was in command of the
bataille of foreigners rather than one of locals. Also, Sanudo claims that
the Turks played a decisive role in the victory at “Brenizza” (Prinitsa),
which he might have understandably confused with that of Makry-Plagi, as
the two battles were fought close to each other in time and space, and dec-
ades before the time he was writing.100 Finally, the author of the Chronicle
98
Chronicle of Morea 5375-5413. The French version shortens the battle, claiming that the
first Frankish counter-attack caused the first Byzantine bataille to panic and the other two
batailles waiting in ambush to flee too. Ancelin needed to send two men to hurry the
Turks along, but the latter killed and captured a number of the enemies upon their arrival
(Livre de la conqueste §§ 364-372).
99
Libro de los Fechos §§ 369-372.
100
Sanudo 127. The fact that the Aragonian version is probably the most reliable one has not
received sufficient attention, nor has it been clearly stated by previous scholarship, alt-
hough some researchers have emphasised the importance of the Turks or pointed out that
their role may have been belittled by the author of the Chronicle of Morea (Geanakoplos
109
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of Morea has a tendency to glorify the deeds of the Franks and so might
have exaggerated their heroics in this victorious battle.
It seems that the Byzantines had one bataille in ambush behind a hill
and two other batailles behind (or perhaps even flanking) it. Their positions
reflect instructions for laying an ambush in a Byzantine manual of skirmish
warfare written in the late tenth century. This states that the soldiers should
be divided into three groups; the first group would feign a rout and lead the
enemy into the ambush of the second group; if the enemy proved to be too
strong and escaped, then they would fall into the clutches of the third group,
which would also be lying in ambush.101 However, in Makry-Plagi both the
second and the third groups seem to have rushed forward to help the first
one, and it is prudent to consider whether this was the intention or whether
it was the result of confusion or even betrayal.102 Confusion is perhaps the
most probable explanation; although the warriors in Morea might have
been skilful, it is unlikely that they were well-disciplined or that they were
a cohesive whole. Furthermore, the Latins and Turks were known to some-
times feign retreat, so perhaps the Turks used such a tactic in Makry-Plagi
to pull the Byzantines from their ambush positions and expose them to the
counter-attacks of the Latin heavy cavalry. Indeed, some kind of trap is
possible, because, judging by the amount of prisoners taken, the victory
was reasonably comprehensive.103
1959, 174; Ortega 2012, 373-374, 380-381; Kyriakidis 2012, 53-54; Kanellopoulos 2011,
99-101).
101
“Skirmishing” § 17. Kanellopoulos has similarly used Makry-Plagi as an example of the
Byzantine mountain warfare described in the “Skirmishing” (Kanellopoulos and Lekea
2009, 75-78).
102
One possibility is that the Byzantines thought that the Turks were alone. However, if this
were the case then the Byzantine commanders’ would have committed a very serious
reconnaissance error.
103
Runciman has claimed that the Turks, who followed the Franks, found a secret path that
enabled them to attack the Byzantine rear (Runciman 1980, 38). This is possible, although
I am not aware of any source that would confirm it.
110
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Aftermath of the battle of Makry-Plagi
The Chronicle of Morea claims that, after the battle, the victorious army
marched to Veligosti, where the prisoners were counted. Guillaume’s men
found that they had captured 5384 men, plus the Byzantine commanders –
the megas domestikos Makrenos and Kaballaritses – who are said to have
been found hiding in a cave near the battlefield. The capture of the enemy’s
leaders especially delighted Ancelin de Toucy, as it meant that, according
to the chronicle, he could exchange them for his brother, who had been
captured by the Byzantines.104 At their imploration, Guillaume agreed to
grant the rebellious archons of Skorta mercy; he also invited the leading
imprisoned Byzantine commander to visit and treated him with courtesy,
even though he was kept in chains. After the meeting the Byzantine prison-
ers were divided between different castles according to their rank. 105 Philes
died in captivity, but Makrenos and plausibly Kaballaritses were exchanged
for Latin prisoners.106 The fate of the rest of the Byzantine army is un-
known.107
104
Chronicle of Morea 5411-5465; Livre de la conqueste §§ 373-380. According to the
Chronicle of Morea, he needed high-ranking Byzantine prisoners for the exchange. This
is surprising, because at least the Byzantines and the Franks of the Holy Land were fa-
miliar with the practice of exchanging one high-status prisoner for several less important
ones (Acropolita § 79; Friedman 2002, 36-37, 43-44, 158-161). During the later phase of
the war, the only prisoner exchange about which we have detailed information is that of
four high-ranking Latins for four Byzantines (Minieri-Riccio, 3 December 1283; I
Registri della Cancelleria Angioina, XVII, CXIX, 766, 769; Wilskman 2012b, 60).
105
106
Pachymeres III, 17. The sources do not refer to the liberation of Kaballarizes, but if he is
one of the two Kaballarios that Pachymeres later mentions, then he probably gained his
freedom as a result of an exchange or the payment of a ransom.
107
For more discussion about the possible fates of the prisoners of the thirteenth-century
Franco-Byzantine wars, see Wilskman 2009-2010, 157-161; Wilskman 2012b, 49-51, 60.
It is also possible that, at this time the noble Frankish ladies given to the Byzantines as
hostages as part of the 1262 peace agreement were sent back (evidently unharmed) to the
principality (Chronicle of Morea 4343-4562, 7301-7335; Livre de la conqueste §§ 501-
504; Libro de los Fechos §§ 381-399; Hendrickx 2007, 367-369; Wilskman 2012b, 50-
51).
111
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According to the Chronicle of Morea, after the victory Guillaume called

together a meeting of the leaders of the army. They decided to attack the
Byzantine-held territory in southeastern Morea and to siege Mistra using
the town of Lakedaimon (Sparta) as a base, since it was still held by the
Franks. Their army poured into the Byzantine territory and pillaged the
countryside. By this time, the Greek population of Lakedaimon had mostly
left the town and moved to Mistra, so Guillaume populated the town with
new Frankish settlers, whom he could trust more. It is said that the prince
planned to spend the winter in southeast Morea, but, before even a month
had passed, he heard that the people of Skorta had again rebelled and be-
sieged two castles.108
According to the Chronicle of Morea, Guillaume left men and supplies
in Lakedaimon and returned to Veligosti. He held a meeting with the Frank-
ish leaders, and they decided that it was too risky to attack Skorta, which
was a mountainous region full of difficult terrain. Instead, they offered the
task to the Turks, promising that the latter could keep everything that they
plundered. The Turks were happy to agree to the plan and irrupted into
Skorta from three different places with the help of local scouts. They pil-
laged and murdered everyone who did not beg for mercy; those that did so
were brought to Guillaume. The archons of Skorta escaped to the moun-
tains and promised to submit to the prince’s rule again, whereupon he
agreed to call the Turks back. 109 The campaign in Skorta shows that terror
tactics were considered the best way to deal with an enemy that could rely
on difficult terrain and guerrilla warfare.110 Since the prisoners were
108
109
110
A similar strategy was followed in comparable situations: e.g. by the Anglo-Normans in
their wars against the Celts and by the Crusaders in the Baltic region (France 1999, 189-
193, 203; Strickland 2006, 117-127, 139-140).
112
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brought to Guillaume, the Turks do not seem to have been entitled to take
them as part of their booty. 111
According to the Chronicle of Morea, Guillaume returned to the plain
of Achaia and allowed his troops to return home. Melik informed him that
the Turks would also now return to Anatolia. The prince begged them to
remain for another half a year, because he was planning a new campaign in
the spring. Melik, however, announced that he had originally made a deal
with the Byzantines to fight for one year and that two had passed already.
The prince yielded to his wish, although some of the Turks decided that
they wanted to stay in Morea, where they were baptised, and two of them
even received knightly fiefs and Frankish wives. 112 Nevertheless, their as-
similation was not completely smooth and, from the period after the death
of Guillaume in 1278, there were problems with both the fiefs ceded to the
Turks and substitute payments offered to them. Evidently, the Latins also
had problems with payment to other mercenaries as well, which caused
robberies and some desertions to the Byzantine side. 113
No source claims that Guillaume actually carried out the attack against
the Byzantines in spring 1265, which perhaps implies that he might have
been considering a more diplomatic solution. In fact, according to Sanudo,
the Byzantines had suggested that the son of Emperor Michael could marry
the daughter of Guillaume. The prince had no sons, so this meant that his
territories would fall under the control of the Palaiologos dynasty. The
111
On the other hand, it seems that, during the fourteenth century, the Byzantines were pre-
pared to allow their Turkish allies/mercenaries to keep Christian prisoners as slaves (see,
for example, Cantacuzenus II, 32; see also Kyriakidis 2009a, 169-172). Kyriakidis also
argues that the desertion of the Turks to the Latin side in Morea underlines the importance
of booty as a motivating factor for the mercenaries, and that excluding them from the
spoils could cause problems with them (Kyriakidis 2009a, 172, 175). Nevertheless, ac-
cording to the chronicle, the problems with wages, rather than being prevented from
claiming booty, lead to the Turk’s desertion.
112
Chronicle of Morea 5706-5738; Livre de la conqueste §§ 396-397. Libro de los Fechos
claims that also Melik stayed in Morea (Libro de los Fechos §§ 361-364).
113
I Registri della Cancelleria Angioina XXIII, XCVII, 199; Minieri-Riccio, 8 May 1283;
Hopf 1867, 317-318; Chronicle of Morea 8523-8529; Wilskman 2012b, 49, 58-61.
113
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Frankish barons of Morea, however, refused to accept this settlement. 114

The offer of marriage was probably part of Michael’s endeavours to peace-
fully resolve the conflicts of the Byzantine Empire during the early 1260s.
Of these peace efforts, especially important was the truce that the emperor
made with the Venetians in June 1265.115 The treaty deprived the Princi-
pality of Achaia of its most important ally and might have made Guillaume
ready to reach a settlement. Low-level warfare between the principality and
the Byzantines continued until peace was reached in 1289; even then, the
cessation of hostilities remained short and was hampered by armed inci-
dents.116 The Byzantines subdued what was left of the principality by 1430,
just a few decades before the Ottomans conquered the peninsula.
Conclusions
The problematic composition of the Byzantine army was integral to the

fortune of its campaigns in 1264. Occasionally, such as in Pelagonia and
Berat, it achieved victorious outcomes against the Latins, but in Morea the
heterogeneous Byzantine force showed its worst side. It was too expensive,
unreliable and lacked cohesion.
The initial march to Andravida and the willingness to engage in battle
was contrary to the cautious approach normally associated with the
Byzantines and the pattern they usually followed in their wars against the
Latins in this era. That said, one can of course note that they quickly gave
up on the idea of pitched battle at Sergiana, at least judging from the Chron-
icle of Morea. The Byzantines had left behind fortresses controlled by the
Latins and they could not have held Andravida for long, so they had prob-
ably hoped to intimidate the Latins to surrender.
114
Sanudo 129.
115
Pacta Veneta 10: I trattati con Bizanzio no. 2.
116
For a closer description and analysis of this phase of the war, see Wilskman 2012b.
114
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It is notable that Guillaume was willing to engage in battle twice,

although on both occasions the terrain favoured the enemy. Possibly the
Franks considered the Byzantines to be too much of a threat in their heart-
lands, just as the Byzantine commanders might have calculated. I consider
it also possible that the Franks of Romania were inclined to use more ag-
gressive methods of warfare than was customary in western Europe. At
Makry-Plagi they also had an expendable and evidently battle-willing sup-
plement of Turks, who plausibly carried the main burden in the battle.
The Byzantines were probably forced to be so aggressive because they
could not afford to pay the Turks. Besides which, the frontier region – from
where a large part of the expeditionary corps hailed – was under serious
attack from the Turkomans, and the sea routes to Constantinople were also
threatened. The unreliability of mercenaries was a typical issue in Medieval
armies, but the late Byzantine tendency to rely on large coherent mercenary
units made it particularly troublesome. Morea in 1264 was neither the only
nor the worst case when the mercenaries deployed by the Byzantines turned
against their employers owing to a lack of payment. The Latins also had
difficulties in paying for mercenaries during the war, but because they
mainly relied on fief holders, the repercussions were less grave. It was the
support of locals that seems to have been an essential element in the
Byzantines’ successes.
A good example of this was the Byzantine use of local infantry in
Makry-Plagi, which might also have contributed to their decision to attempt
an ambush in mountainous terrain. Although, such “indirect” methods of
warfare are usually considered more typical for them than instigating
pitched battles. It is notable that, during the wars between the Latins and
the Byzantines in the latter half of the thirteenth century, the Byzantines
generally gained victories when they were defending territories they had
115
JUHO WILSKMAN
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already conquered, and suffered defeats when they were on the offen-
sive.117
The failure at Makry-Plagi is an exception to this pattern and was prob-
ably a result of the enemy’s knowledge of what was waiting for them. It is
impossible to say if it was Makrenos who told the Latins about the ambush,
but at least the emperor believed him to be treacherous, and the sister of
John Laskaris was also supporting the Latins. The alliances did not simply
follow ethnic lines: note, for example, that the Anatolian Muslim Turks,
who participated to the campaign in Morea, seem to have been far from
fanatical gazis.118 Some of them were even ready to accept baptism,
although there might have been problems with their assimilation.
Furthermore, the Byzantine emperor, who was involved in a number of
conflicts, apparently wanted to draw the principality under his sphere of
influence in a peaceful way and perhaps also to slowly assimilate the
Franks into Byzantine society. Before his death, Prince Guillaume seems
to have been ready to accept the emperor’s overtures, and the pope also
tried to make his own peace proposal. The Byzantines and Latins could
obviously accept peace and live side-by-side; the only question was only
under what conditions this would happen.
117
I made this notion in a presentation about avoiding pitched battles in Byzantine warfare
against the Latins during the thirteenth century, where I argued that the preference to rely
on harassing, ambushes, and denying supplies might be a good method, if defending one’s
own territory. It is however more problematical if one is on offensive and the heavy siege
machines would have made it difficult to conduct swift manoeuvers as usually required
by a strategy of avoiding battles (see also Wilskman 2012a, 196).
118
The issue of whether the Turkish warriors of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries were
dedicated fighters of Islam (gazi) or merely interested in mundane gains is lively debated
in Ottoman and Turkish studies (see e.g. Wittek 1938; Darling 2000; Lowry 2003). The
affair in Morea clearly does not fit the idea of religiously motivated and fanatical gazis,
but it should be remembered that it only constitutes a small part of the larger phenomenon.
116
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Bibliography

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ACTA BYZANTINA FENNICA

ACTA BYZANTINA FENNICA

Suomen Bysantin tutkimuksen seura

ABzF is a refereed journal, published by the Finnish Society for Byzantine

For information regarding the submission of manuscripts, please contact us

Editorial Advisory Board:

Subscriptions and back issues:

Björn Forsén, Mika Hakkarainen and Brikena Shkodra-Rrugia

Annika Asp-Talwar Kai Juntunen

Conflict and Cooperation:

The analysis will be principally focused on the Chronicle of Morea,

The war begins

(1246-1278) in 1250. He did, however, have to give the inhabitants of the

son.12 This mirrored the old Byzantine tradition of incorporating autono-

of the region, which was called Skorta, 27 immediately joined the

The abortive battle at Sergiana

Latins,37 so perhaps Pachymeres’ assertion was only his personal opinion.

In spite of certain downsides, the Byzantines might have preferred light

the effectiveness of a medieval army,62 and this was an advantage the

of Morea 8863-8875; Livre de la conqueste § 617; 962; Wilskman 2009-2010, 140).

The Turks switch sides

If the Chronicle of Morea’s account is reliable, the Byzantine commander

Military campaigns in western Europe were often suspended due to fi-

The battle of Makry-Plagi

megas domestikos and that he would be beaten. Guillaume agreed to attack

Aftermath of the battle of Makry-Plagi

According to the Chronicle of Morea, after the victory Guillaume called

Frankish barons of Morea, however, refused to accept this settlement. 114

The problematic composition of the Byzantine army was integral to the

It is notable that Guillaume was willing to engage in battle twice,

Macrides 2003 = R. Macrides, ‘The Thirteenth Century in Byzantine Historical Writing’, in

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