058 GO vs DIMAGIBA (STA. MARIA) arguments that he had invoked in the said Motions.
We believe that his resort
June 21, 2005 | Panganiban, J.| Writ of Habeas Corpus
PETITIONERS: Susan Go and the People of the Philippines
RESPONDENT: Fernando L. Dimagiba
SUMMARY: Fernando Dimagiba issued to Susan Go 13 checks which, when
presented to the drawee bank for encashment or payment on the due
dates, were dishonored for the reason “account closed.” Dimagiba was
prosecuted for 13 counts of violation of BP 22. He was found guilty by the
MTCC, was sentenced to three months imprisonment, and was ordered to
pay the offended party the amount he owed plus interest. The appeal of
Dimagiba was raffled to RTC-Branch 4 which sustained his conviction. There
being no further appeal to the CA, the RTC issued a Certificate of Finality of
the Decision. The MTCC directed the arrest of Dimagiba for the service of his
sentence as a result of his conviction. The MTCC also issued a Writ of
Execution to enforce his civil liability. Dimagiba filed a MR. He prayed for the
recall of the Order of Arrest and the modification of the final Decision,
arguing that the penalty of fine only, instead of imprisonment also, should
have been imposed on him. The arguments raised in that Motion were
reiterated in a Motion for the Partial Quashal of the Writ of Execution filed.
The MTCC denied the MR. Dimagiba was arrested and imprisoned for the
service of his sentence. Dimagiba filed with the RTC for a writ of habeas
corpus. The case was raffled to RTC-Branch 5 which granted the writ. It
invoked Vaca v. Court of Appeals and Supreme Court Administrative Circular
(SC-AC) No. 12-2000, which allegedly required the imposition of a fine only
instead of imprisonment also for BP 22 violations, if the accused was not a
recidivist or a habitual delinquent. It held that this rule should be
retroactively applied in favor of Dimagiba.
The issue is WON the Petition for habeas corpus was validly granted? – No.
<insert doctrine> Dimagiba sought the retroactive effect of the Vaca and SC
No. 12-200 rulings, thereby effectively challenging the penalty imposed on
him for being excessive. From his allegations, the Petition appeared
sufficient in form to support the issuance of the writ. However, it appears that
Dimagiba has previously sought the modification of his sentence in a Motion
for Reconsideration of the MTCC’s Execution Order and in a Motion for the
Partial Quashal of the Writ of Execution. Both were denied by the MTCC on
the ground that it had no power or authority to amend a judgment issued by
the RTC. In his Petition for habeas corpus, Dimagiba raised the same
to this extraordinary remedy was a procedural infirmity. The remedy should
have been an appeal of the MTCC Order denying his Motions, in which he
should have prayed that the execution of the judgment be stayed. But he
effectively misused the action he had chosen, obviously with the intent of
finding a favorable court. His Petition for a writ of habeas corpus was clearly
an attempt to reopen a case that had already become final and executory.
Such an action deplorably amounted to forum shopping. Dimagiba should
have resorted to the proper, available remedy instead of instituting a different
action in another forum. The Court also finds his arguments for his release
insubstantial to support the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus. SC-AC No.
12-2000 did not delete the alternative penalty of imprisonment. As the
Circular requires a review of the factual circumstances of a given case, it
applies only to pending or future litigations. It is not a penal law; hence, it
does not have retroactive effect. Neither may it be used to modify final
judgments of conviction. The Circular merely lays down a rule of preference
of penalties (fine, imprisonment or both), it serves only as a guideline for the
trial courts. In the present case, the MTCC of Baguio City had full
knowledge of all relevant circumstances from which Dimagiba’s conviction
and sentence were based. The penalty imposed was well within the confines
of the law. Upon appeal, the conviction was sustained by RTC-Branch 4 of
Baguio City. Eventually, the Decision attained finality. Hence, RTC-Branch
5 did not have the jurisdiction to modify the lawful judgment in the guise of
granting a writ of habeas corpus.
DOCTRINE: The writ of habeas corpus applies to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention in which individuals are deprived of liberty. It was
devised as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful
restraint; or, more specifically, to obtain immediate relief for those who
may have been illegally confined or imprisoned without sufficient cause and
thus deliver them from unlawful custody. It is therefore a writ of inquiry
intended to test the circumstances under which a person is detained. The
writ may not be availed of when the person in custody is under a judicial
process or by virtue of a valid judgment. However, as a post-conviction
remedy, it may be allowed when, as a consequence of a judicial proceeding,
any of the following exceptional circumstances is attendant: (1) there has
been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a
person; (2) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or (3) the
imposed penalty has been excessive, thus voiding the sentence as to such
excess. (Note: in this case there was no exceptional circumstance!)
FACTS:
1. Fernando L. Dimagiba issued to Susan Go 13 checks which, when
presented to the drawee bank for encashment or payment on the
due dates, were dishonored for the reason "account closed."
2. Dimagiba was subsequently prosecuted for 13 counts of violation of
BP 22 under separate Complaints filed with the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities (MTCC) in Baguio City. After a joint trial, the MTCC
(Branch 4) rendered a Decision on July 16, 1999, convicting the
accused in the 13 cases. Dimagiba was sentenced to three months
imprisonment, and was ordered to pay the offended party the
amount he owed plus interest.
3. The appeal of Dimagiba was raffled to Branch 4 of the RTC in Baguio
City. the RTC denied the appeal and sustained his conviction. There
being no further appeal to the CA, the RTC issued a Certificate of
Finality of the Decision.
4. Thus, the MTCC issued an Order directing the arrest of Dimagiba for
the service of his sentence as a result of his conviction. The trial
court also issued a Writ of Execution to enforce his civil liability.
5. Dimagiba filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the MTCC Order. He
prayed for the recall of the Order of Arrest and the modification of
the final Decision, arguing that the penalty of fine only, instead of
imprisonment also, should have been imposed on him. The
arguments raised in that Motion were reiterated in a Motion for the
Partial Quashal of the Writ of Execution filed.
6. The MTCC denied the Motion for Reconsideration and directed the
issuance of a Warrant of Arrest against Dimagiba. Dimagiba was
arrested and imprisoned for the service of his sentence.
7. Dimagiba filed with the RTC for a writ of habeas corpus. The case
was raffled to Branch 5, which scheduled the hearing copies of the
Order were served Go’s counsels and the city warden.
8. Right after hearing the case, the RTC issued an Order directing the
immediate release of Dimagiba from confinement and requiring him
to pay a fine of ₱100,000 in lieu of imprisonment. However, the civil
aspect of the MTCC Decision was not touched upon. A subsequent
Order, explaining in greater detail the basis of the grant of the writ
of habeas corpus, was issued on October 11, 2001.
9. In justifying its modification of the MTCC Decision, the RTC invoked
Vaca v. Court of Appeals and Supreme Court Administrative Circular
(SC-AC) No. 12-2000, which allegedly required the imposition of a
fine only instead of imprisonment also for BP 22 violations, if the
accused was not a recidivist or a habitual delinquent.
10. The RTC held that this rule should be retroactively applied in favor
of Dimagiba. It further noted that (1) he was a first-time offender
and an employer of at least 200 workers who would be displaced as
a result of his imprisonment; and (2) the civil liability had already
been satisfied through the levy of his properties.
11. Go filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the RTC Orders dated
which was denied. Hence, this Petition filed directly with this Court
on pure questions of law.
ISSUE:
1. WON the Petition for habeas corpus was validly granted? – NO.
Dimagiba’s petition for a writ of habeaus corpus raised the same
arguments that he had invoked in his motions for reconsideration.
His filing of the petition was clearly an attempt to reopen a case
that had already become final and executory. Such an action
deplorably amounted to forum shopping. The Court also finds his
arguments for his release insubstantial to support the issuance of
the writ of habeas corpus.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed
Orders NULLIFIED. Respondent’s Petition for habeas corpus is hereby
DENIED. Let this case be REMANDED to MTCC of Baguio City for the re-
arrest of respondent and the completion of his sentence. No pronouncement
as to costs. SO ORDERED.
RATIO:
1. The writ of habeas corpus applies to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention in which individuals are deprived of
liberty. It was devised as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve
persons from unlawful restraint; or, more specifically, to obtain
immediate relief for those who may have been illegally confined or
imprisoned without sufficient cause and thus deliver them from
unlawful custody. It is therefore a writ of inquiry intended to test
the circumstances under which a person is detained.
2. The writ may not be availed of when the person in custody is
under a judicial process or by virtue of a valid judgment. However,
as a post-conviction remedy, it may be allowed when, as a
consequence of a judicial proceeding, any of the following
 exceptional circumstances is attendant: (1) there has been a
deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a
person; (2) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or
(3) the imposed penalty has been excessive, thus voiding the
sentence as to such excess.
3. In the present case, the Petition for a writ of habeas corpus was
anchored on the ruling in Vaca and on SC-AC No. 12-2000, which
allegedly prescribed the imposition of a fine, not imprisonment, for
convictions under BP 22.
4. Dimagiba sought the retroactive effect of those rulings, thereby
effectively challenging the penalty imposed on him for being
excessive. From his allegations, the Petition appeared sufficient in
form to support the issuance of the writ.
5. However, it appears that Dimagiba has previously sought the
modification of his sentence in a Motion for Reconsideration of the
MTCC’s Execution Order and in a Motion for the Partial Quashal of
the Writ of Execution. Both were denied by the MTCC on the ground
that it had no power or authority to amend a judgment issued by
the RTC.
6. In his Petition for habeas corpus, Dimagiba raised the same
arguments that he had invoked in the said Motions. We believe
that his resort to this extraordinary remedy was a procedural
infirmity. The remedy should have been an appeal of the MTCC
Order denying his Motions, in which he should have prayed that the
execution of the judgment be stayed. But he effectively misused the
action he had chosen, obviously with the intent of finding a
favorable court.
7. His Petition for a writ of habeas corpus was clearly an attempt to
reopen a case that had already become final and executory. Such
an action deplorably amounted to forum shopping. Dimagiba
should have resorted to the proper, available remedy instead of
instituting a different action in another forum.
8. The Court also finds his arguments for his release insubstantial to
support the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.
9. Administrative Circular 12-2000, as clarified by Administrative
Circular 13-2001, merely establishes a rule of preference in imposing
penalties for violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (BP 22), the
"Bouncing Checks Law." When the circumstances of both the
offense and the offender indicate good faith or a clear mistake of fact
without taint of negligence, the imposition of a fine alone -- instead
of imprisonment -- is the preferred penalty. As the Circular
requires a review of the factual circumstances of a given case, it
applies only to pending or future litigations. It is not a penal law;
hence, it does not have retroactive effect. Neither may it be used
to modify final judgments of conviction.
10. Preference in the Application of Penalties for Violation of BP 22. The
following alternative penalties are imposable under BP 22: (1)
imprisonment of not less than 30 days, but not more than one year;
(2) a fine of not less or more than double the amount of the check, a
fine that shall in no case exceed ₱200,000; or (3) both such fine and
imprisonment, at the discretion of the court.
11. When the circumstances of the case clearly indicate good faith or a
clear mistake of fact without taint of negligence, the imposition of a
fine alone may be considered as the preferred penalty. The
determination of the circumstances that warrant the imposition of a
fine rests upon the trial judge only.
12. SC-AC No. 12-2000 did not delete the alternative penalty of
imprisonment. The competence to amend the law belongs to the
legislature, not to this Court.
13. Inapplicability of SC-AC No. 12-2000 Go argues that Dimagiba is not
entitled to the benevolent policy enunciated in SC-AC No. 12-2000,
because he is not a "first time offender." This circumstance is,
however, not the sole factor in determining whether he deserves
the preferred penalty of fine alone. The penalty to be imposed
depends on the peculiar circumstances of each case. It is the trial
court’s discretion to impose any penalty within the confines of the
law.
14. The Court notes that the Petition for a writ of habeas corpus relied
mainly on the alleged retroactivity of SC-AC No. 12-2000, which
supposedly favored BP 22 offenders. On this point, Dimagiba
contended that his imprisonment was violative of his right to equal
protection of the laws, since only a fine would be imposed on others
similarly situated.
15. The rule on retroactivity states that criminal laws may be applied
retroactively if favorable to the accused. This principle, embodied in
the Revised Penal Code, has been expanded in certain instances to
cover special laws.
16. The issue of retroactivity of SC-AC No. 12-2000. Because the Circular
merely lays down a rule of preference, it serves only as a guideline
for the trial courts. Thus, it is addressed to the judges, who are
 directed to consider the factual circumstances of each case prior to
imposing the appropriate penalty. In other words, the
Administrative Circular does not confer any new right in favor of the
accused, much less those convicted by final judgment.
17. The competence to determine the proper penalty belongs to the
court rendering the decision against the accused. That decision is
subject only to appeal on grounds of errors of fact or law, or grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Another trial court may not encroach upon this authority. Indeed,
SC-AC No. 12-2000 necessarily requires a review of all factual
circumstances of each case. Such a review can no longer be done if
the judgment has become final and executory.
18. In the present case, the MTCC of Baguio City had full knowledge of
all relevant circumstances from which Dimagiba’s conviction and
sentence were based. The penalty imposed was well within the
confines of the law. Upon appeal, the conviction was sustained by
RTC-Branch 4 of Baguio City. Eventually, the Decision attained
finality. Hence, RTC-Branch 5 did not have the jurisdiction to
modify the lawful judgment in the guise of granting a writ of
habeas corpus.
19. The doctrine of equal protection of laws does not apply for the
same reasons as those on retroactivity. Foremost of these reasons
is that the Circular is not a law that deletes the penalty of
imprisonment. As explained earlier, it is merely a rule of
preference as to which penalty should be imposed under the
peculiar circumstances of a case. At any rate, this matter deserves
scant consideration, because Dimagiba failed to raise any
substantial argument to support his contention.
20. Modification of Final Judgment Not Warranted. The Court is not
unmindful of So v. Court of Appeals, in which the final judgment of
conviction for violation of BP 22 was modified by the deletion of the
sentence of imprisonment and the imposition of a fine. That case
proceeded from an "Urgent Manifestation of an Extraordinary
Supervening Event," not from an unmeritorious petition for a writ of
habeas corpus, as in the present case.
21. The Court exercised in that case its authority to suspend or to
modify the execution of a final judgment when warranted or made
imperative by the higher interest of justice or by supervening
events. The supervening event in that case was the petitioner’s
urgent need for coronary rehabilitation for at least one year under
the direct supervision of a coronary care therapist; imprisonment
would have been equivalent to a death sentence.
22. The peculiar circumstances of So do not obtain in the present case.
Dimagiba’s supposed "unhealthy physical condition due to a triple
by-pass operation, and aggravated by hypertension," cited by the
RTC in its October 10, 2001 Order, is totally bereft of substantial
proof. The Court notes that Dimagiba did not make any such
allegation in his Petition for habeas corpus. Neither did he mention
his physical state in his Memorandum and Comment submitted to
this Court.
23. Dimagiba seeks the retroactive application of SC-AC No. 12-2000 in
his favor on the basis alone of the alleged settlement of his civil
liability. Citing Griffith v. Court of Appeals, he theorizes that
answering for a criminal offense is no longer justified after the
settlement of the debt.
24. Dimagiba, however, misreads Griffith. The Court held in that case
that convicting the accused who, two years prior to the filing of the
BP 22 cases, had already paid his debt (from which the checks
originated) was contrary to the basic principles of fairness and
justice. Obviously, that situation is not attendant here.
25. The civil liability in the present case was satisfied through the levy
and sale of the properties of Dimagiba only after the criminal case
had been terminated with his conviction. Apparently, he had
sufficient properties that could have been used to settle his
liabilities prior to his conviction. Indeed, such an early settlement
would have been an indication that he was in good faith, a
circumstance that could have been favorably considered in
determining his appropriate penalty.
26. At any rate, civil liability differs from criminal liability. What is
punished in the latter is not the failure to pay the obligation, but the
issuance of checks that subsequently bounced or were dishonored
for insufficiency or lack of funds.
 059 VICENTE v. MAJADUCON (TAN)
23 June 2005 | Austria-Martinez, J. | Habeas Corpus
PETITIONER: Dante Vicente
RESPONDENTS: Judge Jose S. Majaducon
SUMMARY: The RTC, Branch 23 of General Santos City found Evelyn Te
guilty on four counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22, and sentenced her to 2
months of imprisonment on each count. This became final and executory
when the SC denied Te’s petition for review after the CA affirmed the CA
decision. Te sought clarification from the trial court whether she should
serve her sentences successively or simultaneously. The RTC, presided by
Judge Majaducon, clarified that she should serve her sentences successively,
but for humanitarian reasons and in accordance with Art. 70 of the RPC, it
held that instead of serving imprisonment of EIGHT months, the prisoner Te
should serve only 6 months. Te filed an MR, which she prayed be also
considered as a petition for issuance of the writ of habeas corpus. The
RTC denied Te’s petition for issuance of the writ of habeas corpus on the
ground that she was detained by virtue of a final judgment. Te then filed
an omnibus motion praying for her release on the ground that she had been in
jail since March 15, 2000 and had fully served the three months minimum of
her total sentence under the Indeterminate Sentence Law. In the alternative,
Te prayed for release on recognizance. Te moved for reconsideration of the
trial court’s order denying the petition for the writ of habeas corpus alleging
that the finality of the joint decision against her did not bar her
application for the writ of habeas corpus. She prayed that pending
determination as to whether the Vaca ruling applied to her, she also be
allowed to post bail pursuant to Rule 102, Sec. 14. RTC allowed Te to
post bail in the amount of Php 1M, holding that it would order her
release upon the approval of her bail bond and then certify the
proceedings to the Court as the latter has concurrent jurisdiction over
proceedings for habeas corpus. Now, Dante Vicente, the station manager of
Radyo Bombo, GenSan City, alleges that while Te was in prison, Judge
Majaducon allowed her to be released and confined at a local hospital in the
guise that she was suffering from certain illnesses. He also alleges that
Majaducon approved Te’s application for bail as part of habeas
corpus proceedings even though no petition for habeas corpus in favor of
Te was filed. Because Majaducon allowed Te to post bail, the local media in
General Santos City made an uproar and criticized him for it. In retaliation,
Majaducon cited for indirect contempt a group of mediamen who published a
critical article against him. In his comment, Majaducon alleged the
following:
The certified records of the cases against Te were forwarded to the SC on,
upon the order of undersigned by the Branch Clerk of Court for review of the
order. Te’s counsel filed not only an MR the previous order denying her
motion for release from detention but also a petition for Habeas Corpus in
the same cases; Majaducon believed then that he had the discretion to
allow her to be released on bail, based on Sec. 14, Rule 102 of the
Revised Rules of Court. The issue is whether or not Sec. 14, Rule 102 is
applicable to this case and the SC said no. Section 24, Rule 1141 of the Rules
of Court is plain and clear in prohibiting the grant of bail after conviction
by final judgment and after the convict has started to serve sentence. The
only exception this is when the convict has applied for probation before
he commences to serve sentence, provided the penalty and the offense are
within the purview of the Probation Law. In the case of Te, there is already
judgment finding her guilty of B.P. 22 on 4 counts and imposing upon her
the penalty of imprisonment for 2 months on each count has already become
final and executory. She also did not apply for probation. Therefore, at the
time she was granted bail, she was already service her sentence. Majaducon
contends that under Section 14, Rule 102, he has the discretion to allow Te to
be released on bail, but *see doctrine*.
DOCTRINE: Section 14, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court applies only to
cases where the applicant for the writ of habeas corpus is restrained by virtue
of a criminal charge against him and not in an instance, as in the case
involved in the present controversy, where the applicant is serving sentence
by reason of a final judgment.
FACTS:
1. The RTC, Branch 23 of General Santos City found Evelyn Te guilty
on four counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22, and sentenced her to 2
months of imprisonment on each count. This became final and
executory when the SC denied Te’s petition for review after the CA
affirmed the CA decision.
2. Te sought clarification from the trial court whether she should serve
1
SEC. 24. No bail after final judgment; exception. An accused shall not be
allowed bail after the judgment has become final, unless he has applied for
probation before commencing to serve sentence, the penalty and the offense
being within the purview of the Probation Law. In case the accused has applied
for probation, he may be allowed temporary liberty under his bail, but if no bail was
filed or the accused is incapable of filing one, the court may allow his release on
recognizance to the custody of a responsible member of the community. In no case
shall bail be allowed after the accused has commenced to serve sentence
 her sentences successively or simultaneously.
3. The RTC, presided by Judge Majaducon, clarified that she should
serve her sentences successively, but for humanitarian reasons and in
accordance with Art. 70 of the RPC, it held that instead of serving
imprisonment of EIGHT months, the prisoner Te should serve only 6
months.
4. Te filed an MR, which she prayed be also considered as a petition
for issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.
5. Te cited Vaca v. CA wherein sentence of imprisonment of a party
found guilty of B.P. 22 was reduced to a fine equal to double the
amount of the check involved. Te asked that her sentence be
modified as well and that she be released from detention.
6. The RTC denied Te’s petition for issuance of the writ of habeas
corpus on the ground that she was detained by virtue of a final
judgment.
7. Te then filed an omnibus motion praying for her release on the
ground that she had been in jail since March 15, 2000 and had fully
served the three months minimum of her total sentence under the
Indeterminate Sentence Law. In the alternative, Te prayed for release
on recognizance.
8. Te moved for reconsideration of the trial court’s order denying the
petition for the writ of habeas corpus alleging that the finality of the
joint decision against her did not bar her application for the writ
of habeas corpus.
9. She prayed that pending determination as to whether the Vaca ruling
applied to her, she also be allowed to post bail pursuant to Rule
102, Sec. 142.
10. RTC allowed Te to post bail in the amount of Php 1M, holding
that it would order her release upon the approval of her bail
bond and then certify the proceedings to the Court as the latter has
2
When person lawfully imprisoned recommitted, and when let to bail.·If it appears
that the prisoner was lawfully committed, and is plainly and specifically charged in
the warrant of commitment with an offense punishable by death, he shall not be
released, discharged, or bailed. If he is lawfully imprisoned or restrained on a charge
of having committed an offense not so punishable, he may be recommitted to
imprisonment or admitted to bail in the discretion of the court or judge. If he be
admitted to bail, he shall forthwith file a bond in such sum as the court or judge
deems reasonable, considering the circumstances of the prisoner and the nature of the
offense charged, conditioned for his appearance before the court where the offense is
properly cognizable to abide its order or judgment; and the court or judge shall
certify the proceedings, together with the bond, forthwith to the proper court. If such
bond is not so filed, the prisoner shall be recommitted to confinement.
concurrent jurisdiction over proceedings for habeas corpus.
11. RTC then approved the bail bonds in the reduced amount of
P500,000.00 and ordered her release. It also directed its clerk of
court to certify the proceedings to the SC.
12. Te filed a notice of appeal on the denial of her petition for the
issuance of the writ of the habeas corpus. This was denied by the
RTC, saying that the records had already been forwarded to the SC
Pursuant to Rule 102, Sec. 14.
13. Now, Dante Vicente, the station manager of Radyo Bombo, GenSan
City, alleges that while Te was in prison, Judge Majaducon allowed
her to be released and confined at a local hospital in the guise that
she was suffering from certain illnesses
14. He also alleges that Majaducon approved Te’s application for bail as
part of habeas corpus proceedings even though no petition
for habeas corpus in favor of Te was filed.
15. Because Majaducon allowed Te to post bail, the local media in
General Santos City made an uproar and criticized him for it.
16. In retaliation, Majaducon cited for indirect contempt a group of
mediamen who published a critical article against him.
17. In his comment, Majaducon alleged the following:
a. The certified records of the cases against Te were forwarded
to the SC on, upon the order of undersigned by the Branch
Clerk of Court for review of the order.
b. Te’s counsel filed not only an MR the previous order
denying her motion for release from detention but also a
petition for Habeas Corpus in the same cases;
c. Majaducon believed then that he had the discretion to
allow her to be released on bail, based on Sec. 14, Rule
102 of the Revised Rules of Court.
d. Majaducon thought that Te might be right in her contention
that she is considered to have served her sentences
simultaneously. If he denied her petition for Habeas Corpus,
and on appeal, she could get a favorable decision from the
Supreme Court, and she could return and charge him a
graver offense of ignorance of the law and abuse of
discretion.
e. To avoid this, he opted to allow her release on bail through
the writ of habeas corpus proceedings. Anyway, the
Supreme Court has the last say on that matter.
f. Therefore, Majaducon argues that the complaint of Vicente
is premature because it involved cases which are still sub
judice.
 g. He continues by saying that Vicente is trying to pre-empt the
former’s move to charge his radio station for libel or cite the
announcer for indirect contempt of Court when his radio
station and announcer had been reviling and attacking the
court for many days on the air for having allowed Te to be
treated and confined in a hospital upon recommendation of a
government doctor and for having allowed her release from
imprisonment on bail.
h. (Tapos biglang may ibang case apparently) Regarding
Majaducon’s order in the criminal case of People vs.
Jhoyche Gersonin-Palma, it was done with sound discretion
because it was already 6:30 in the evening and the offices
were closed and being a Friday, the accused would be
detained for two days and three nights, unless the bail bond
accepted and approved. Besides, the law requires judges to
approve bail even during the holidays.
i. Then the next few points are basically just saying that his
competence, honesty, and integrity is apparent from his 13
years of service and that many of his decisions were upheld
by the CA and the SC.
18. The Office of the Court Admin. Confirmed that the cases of Te were
certified to the SC but the SC returned the case to the RTC so that
the lower court can give them due course.
19. The SC then explained the applicability of Rule 102, Sec. 14, saying
that it only applies to cases where the applicant for the writ
of habeas corpus is restrained by virtue of a criminal charge
against him, not where, as here, he is serving sentence by reason
of a final judgment.
20. The OCA then, using Sec. 24, Rule 114 as a basis, found Majaducon
guilty of gross ignorance of the law and recommended that he be
fined the amount of Php 20,000.
ISSUE/s:
1. Whether or not it is Rule 24, Rule 114 or Rule 14, Rule 102 that
applies? It is Rule 24, Rule 114 that applies because Te is already
serving sentence by virtue of a final judgment.
2. Whether or not the penalty to Majaducon was proper? No because he
was already retired.
RULING: WHEREFORE, respondent judge is found GUILTY of gross
ignorance of the law or procedure. He is ordered to pay a FINE of
P40,000.00 to be deducted from the P100,000.00 set aside from his
retirement benefits in A.M. No. 10874-Ret.
RATIO:
The Granting of the Bail was Improper
1. Section 24, Rule 1143 of the Rules of Court is plain and clear in
prohibiting the grant of bail after conviction by final judgment and
after the convict has started to serve sentence.
2. The only exception this is when the convict has applied for
probation before he commences to serve sentence, provided the
penalty and the offense are within the purview of the Probation Law.
3. In the case of Te, there is already judgment finding her guilty of B.P.
22 on 4 counts and imposing upon her the penalty of imprisonment
for 2 months on each count has already become final and executory.
4. She also did not apply for probation. Therefore, at the time she was
granted bail, she was already service her sentence.
5. Clearly, Te is not entitled to bail.
6. Majaducon contends that under Section 14, Rule 102, he has the
discretion to allow Te to be released on bail.
7. Section 14, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court applies only to cases
where the applicant for the writ of habeas corpus is restrained by
virtue of a criminal charge against him and not in an instance, as in
the case involved in the present controversy, where the applicant is
serving sentence by reason of a final judgment.
Judge Majaducon is Guilty of Gross Ignorance of the Law or Procedure
8. The Court agrees with the OCA that Majaducon’s ignorance or
disregard of Sec. 24, Rule 114 and Sec. 14, Rule 102 is tantamount
to gross ignorance of the law.
9. A judge is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory
acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules.
10. It is imperative that he be conversant with basic legal principles and
be aware of well-settled authoritative doctrines.
11. He should strive for excellence exceeded only by his passion for
3
SEC. 24. No bail after final judgment; exception. An accused shall not be
allowed bail after the judgment has become final, unless he has applied for
probation before commencing to serve sentence, the penalty and the offense
being within the purview of the Probation Law. In case the accused has applied
for probation, he may be allowed temporary liberty under his bail, but if no bail was
filed or the accused is incapable of filing one, the court may allow his release on
recognizance to the custody of a responsible member of the community. In no case
shall bail be allowed after the accused has commenced to serve sentence
 truth, to the end that he be the personification of justice and the Rule
of Law.
12. When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to
simply apply it; anything less than that would be gross ignorance of
the law.
13. Considering that the granting of bail is common in criminal cases,
the explanation of respondent judge in granting bail to Te must fail.
14. Majaducon’s logic was that it would be better for him to release Te
on bail rather than deny her application because if the denial is later
found out by the appellate courts to be erroneous, Te could charge
him with gross ignorance of the law and abuse of discretion, or hold
him liable for rendering an unjust order or for damages.
15. He even said, “Anyway, the SC has the last say on the matter.”
16. He can’t simply pass the buck to the SC and say that the latter has
the final say anyway.
17. Rule 3.02, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that in
every case, a judge shall endeavor diligently to ascertain the facts
and the applicable law unswayed by partisan interests, public opinion
or fear of criticism.
25. Considering that respondent can no longer be dismissed or
suspended, the Court is left with no recourse but to impose the
penalty of fine.
26. In Chan vs. Majaducon, respondent was found guilty of violating
among others, Rules 1.01 and 2.01 and Canon 2 of the Code of
Judicial conduct and was meted the penalty of fine in the amount of
P10,000.00.
27. In the more recent case of Alconera vs. Majaducon, respondent was
found guilty of gross ignorance of procedure and was fined
P40,000.00.
28. In view of the foregoing, it is proper to impose the maximum fine of
P40,000.00 to be deducted from the P100,000.00 set aside from
respondent’s retirement benefits in A.M. No. 10874-Ret.

There was a petition for habeas corpus filed

18. Te’s petition for habeas corpus was incorporated in the pleadings
she filed in Criminal Cases Nos. 9456-9460, although no docket fees
and other charges were paid.
19. Vicente further claims that on several occasions, Majaducon allowed
Te to be released and confined at a local hospital on account of false
illnesses. However, the Court does not find sufficient evidence to
prove this charge.
20. On the contrary, records on hand show that the confinement of Te in
the hospital is recommended by a panel of government doctors and
that such confinement is made without the objection of the public
prosecutor.
21. The Court likewise finds no sufficient evidence to find respondent
judge guilty of the charge that he uses his clout and power to stifle
criticism and dissent.
22. In the present case, the Court finds nothing irregular or arbitrary in
his act of requiring a number of journalists to show cause why they
should not be cited for indirect contempt.
23. Freedom of speech and of expression, as guaranteed by the
Constitution, is not absolute.
24. However, on February 24, 2002, respondent retired upon reaching
the compulsory retirement age of 70.
 060 In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Kunting (UMANDAP)
April 19, 2006 | Azcuna, J. | Habeas Corpus
In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Kunting
SUMMARY: Petitioner Kunting was arrested in Malaysia for violation of the
Malaysian Internal Security Act. The Royal Malaysian Police in Kuala Lumpur,
Malaysia, turned over Kunting to the PNP-IG and Task Force Salinglahi pursuant to
warrants for his arrest issued by the RTC of Isabela City, Basilan. Kunting was
charged with four counts of Kidnapping for Ransom and Serious Illegal Detention
with the RTC under separate Amended Informations. Petitioner was immediately
flown to the Philippines and brought to the PNP-IG at Camp Crame for booking and
custodial investigation. The RTC issue a commitment order at Camp Crame.
Kunting filed an Urgent Motion for Reinvestigation. RTC issued an Order denying
Kuntings Motion to Set Case for Preliminary Investigation since the PNP-IG has not
turned over Kunting. The trial court reiterated its Order dated September 15, 2003,
directing the Police Superintendent and Chief, Legal Affairs Division, PNP-IG, to
turn over Kunting to the court.
PNP-IG Director Arturo C. Lomibao wrote a letter to Chief State Prosecutor Zuo,
DOJ, requesting for representation and a motion to be filed for the transfer of the
venue of the trial from Isabela City, Basilan to Pasig City, for the following reasons:
(1) Several intelligence reports have been received by the PNP-IG stating that utmost
effort will be exerted by the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) to recover the custody of
Kunting from the PNP considering his importance to the ASG; and (2) there is a big
possibility that Kunting may be recovered by the ASG if he will be detained in
Basilan due to inadequate security facility in the municipal jail and its proximity to
the area of operation of the ASG. Police Chief Superintendent Rafanan reiterated the
request to Chief State Prosecutor Zuo to facilitate the transfer of the venue of the
trial of Kuntings case. He added that if Kunting had been transferred to Isabela City,
Basilan, he could have been one of the escapees in a jail break that occurred on April
10, 2004 as suspected ASG members were able to go scot-free.
Kunting, by counsel, filed this petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.
Kunting stated that he has been restrained of his liberty since June 12, 2003 by the
PNP-IG. He alleged that he was never informed of the charges filed against him until
he requested his family to research in Zamboanga City. It was discovered in the RTC
of Isabela City, Basilan that his name appeared in the list of accused who allegedly
participated in the kidnapping incident. He stated that since no action was taken by
the trial court or the DOJ, he filed this petition to put an end to his illegal detention.
Whether the peitition for habeas corpus will prosper? NO.
Under Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas corpus extends
to all case of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his
liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person
entitled thereto. The remedy of habeas corpus has one objective: to inquire into the
cause of detention of a person, and if found illegal, the court orders the release of the
detainee. If, however, the detention is proven lawful, then the habeas corpus
proceedings terminate.
Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides when the writ is not allowed:
SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized.If it appears that the person
alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process
issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record,
and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment,
or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after
the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality
or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held
to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in
the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.
In this case, Kuntings detention by the PNP-IG was under process issued by the
RTC. He was arrested by the PNP by virtue of the alias order of arrest. His
temporary detention at PNP-IG, Camp Crame, Quezon City, was thus authorized by
the trial court.
Moreover, Kunting was charged with four counts of Kidnapping for Ransom and
Serious Illegal Detention. In accordance with the last sentence of Section 4 above,
the writ cannot be issued and Kunting cannot be discharged since he has been
charged with a criminal offense.
DOCTRINE: Once the person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer
question his detention by a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.
FACTS:
21. This is a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus directing Police
Chief Superintendent Ismael R. Rafanan and General Robert Delfin,
Philippine National Police (PNP) Intelligence Chief, to bring petitioner
Ashraf Kunting before this Court and show cause why he is illegally
detained.
22. On October 19, 2001, petitioner Kunting was arrested in Malaysia for
violation of the Malaysian Internal Security Act. On June 12, 2003, the
Royal Malaysian Police in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, turned over Kunting to
the PNP-IG and Task Force Salinglahi pursuant to warrants for his arrest
issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Isabela City, Basilan, Branch
2, Ninth Judicial Region.
23. Kunting was charged with four counts of Kidnapping for Ransom and
 Serious Illegal Detention with the RTC under separate Amended
Informations.
24. Petitioner was immediately flown to the Philippines and brought to the
PNP-IG at Camp Crame for booking and custodial investigation.
25. Atty. Guillermo G. Danipog, Jr., Police Superintendent and Chief of the
Legal Affairs Division, PNP-IG, informed the Branch Clerk of Court of the
RTC that Kunting was already in the custody of the PNP-IG. Atty. Danipog
requested for Kuntings temporary detention at the PNP-IG, Camp Crame,
Quezon City due to the high security risks involved and prayed for the
issuance of a corresponding commitment order.
26. Emilio F. Enriquez, Acting Clerk of Court of the RTC, replied to the
request of Atty. Danipog, granting the request of the commitment order.
27. On September 15, 2003, the RTC issued an Order directing the Police
Superintendent and Chief, Legal Affairs Division, PNP-IG, to immediately
turn over Kunting to the trial court since Kunting filed an Urgent Motion for
Reinvestigation.
28. On November 5, 2003, PNP-IG Director Arturo C. Lomibao wrote a letter
to Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuo, Department of Justice (DOJ),
requesting for representation and a motion to be filed for the transfer of the
venue of the trial from Isabela City, Basilan to Pasig City, for the following
reasons: (1) Several intelligence reports have been received by the PNP-IG
stating that utmost effort will be exerted by the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) to
recover the custody of Kunting from the PNP considering his importance to
the ASG; and (2) there is a big possibility that Kunting may be recovered by
the ASG if he will be detained in Basilan due to inadequate security facility
in the municipal jail and its proximity to the area of operation of the ASG.
29. On August 13, 2004, the RTC rendered a decision against petitioners co-
accused in the consolidated Criminal Case Nos. 3608-1164, 3537-1129,
3674-1187, and 3611-1165, finding 17 of the accused, who were tried,
guilty of the crime/s charged.
30. On February 11, 2005, the RTC issued an Order denying Kuntings Motion
to Set Case for Preliminary Investigation since the PNP-IG has not turned
over Kunting. The trial court reiterated its Order dated September 15, 2003,
directing the Police Superintendent and Chief, Legal Affairs Division, PNP-
IG, to turn over Kunting to the court.
31. Police Chief Superintendent Ismael R. Rafanan reiterated the request to
Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuo to facilitate the transfer of the
venue of the trial of Kuntings case, citing the same grounds in the previous
letter. He added that if Kunting had been transferred to Isabela City,
Basilan, he could have been one of the escapees in a jail break that occurred
on April 10, 2004 as suspected ASG members were able to go scot-free.
32. Police Inspector Amado L. Barbasa, Jr., OIC, Legal Affairs Division, PNP-
IG, filed with the RTC a Motion to Defer Implementation of the Order
dated February 11, 2005, citing, among other grounds, the existence of a
pending motion for the transfer of the venue of the trial of Criminal Case
No. 3537-1129 against Kunting, which was allegedly filed by the DOJ
before this Court. Police Inspector Barbasa prayed that the Order of the
RTC dated February 11, 2005, directing the turnover of Kunting to the
court, be suspended until the motion for the transfer of venue is resolved.
33. On March 14, 2005, Kunting, by counsel, filed this petition for the issuance
of a writ of habeas corpus. Kunting stated that he has been restrained of his
liberty since June 12, 2003 by the PNP-IG led by Police Chief
Superintendent Ismael Rafanan and assisted by PNP Intelligence Chief,
General Robert Delfin. He alleged that he was never informed of the
charges filed against him until he requested his family to research in
Zamboanga City. It was discovered in the RTC of Isabela City, Basilan that
his name appeared in the list of accused who allegedly participated in the
kidnapping incident which occurred on June 2, 2001 in Lamitan, Basilan.
34. Kunting asserted that he never participated in the kidnapping incident, so he
promptly filed an Urgent Motion for Reinvestigation on September 8, 2003.
He was aware that the PNP-IG requested Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito
R. Zuo for representation to file a motion with this Court for the transfer of
venue of his case from Isabela City, Basilan to Pasig City. Having no
further information on the status of his case, he filed a Motion to Set Case
for Preliminary Investigation on January 26, 2005. He stated that since no
action was taken by the trial court or the DOJ, he filed this petition to put an
end to his illegal detention classified in the records as for safekeeping
purposes only.
ISSUE/s:
3. Whether the petition for habeas corpus will prosper? NO.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the instant petition for habeas corpus is hereby
DISMISSED.
RATIO:
Issue 1
29. Under Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas corpus
extends to all case of illegal confinement or detention by which any person
is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is
withheld from the person entitled thereto. The remedy of habeas corpus has
one objective: to inquire into the cause of detention of a person, and if
found illegal, the court orders the release of the detainee. If, however, the
detention is proven lawful, then the habeas corpus proceedings terminate.
30. Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides when the writ is not
allowed:

SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized.If it appears that the
person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer
under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or
order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to
issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not
be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person
shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the
process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to
authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an
offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under
lawful judgment.

31. In this case, Kuntings detention by the PNP-IG was under process issued by
the RTC. He was arrested by the PNP by virtue of the alias order of arrest
issued by Judge Danilo M. Bucoy, RTC, Branch 2, Isabela City, Basilan.
His temporary detention at PNP-IG, Camp Crame, Quezon City, was thus
authorized by the trial court.

32. Moreover, Kunting was charged with four counts of Kidnapping for
Ransom and Serious Illegal Detention. In accordance with the last sentence
of Section 4 above, the writ cannot be issued and Kunting cannot be
discharged since he has been charged with a criminal offense.

33. The Court holds that once the person detained is duly charged in court, he
may no longer question his detention by a petition for the issuance of a writ
of habeas corpus.

34. Nevertheless, this Court notes that the RTC in its Order dated February 11,
2005 reiterated its Order dated September 15, 2003, directing the Police
Superintendent and Chief, Legal Affairs Division, PNP-IG, Camp Crame,
Quezon City, to turn over Kunting to the court.

35. The trial court has been waiting for two years for the PNP-IG to turn over
the person of Kunting for the trial of his case. The PNP-IG has delayed the
turn over because it is waiting for the DOJ to request for the transfer of
venue of the trial of the case from Isabela City, Basilan to Pasig City. In this
regard, the Police Chief Superintendent is, therefore, directed to take
positive steps towards action on said motion
 061 SALIENTES v. ABANILLA (VARGAS)
29 August 2006 | Quisumbing, J. | Writ of Habeas Corpus
PETITIONER: Marie Antonette Abigail C. Salientes, Orlando B. Salientes,
and Rosario C. Salientes
RESPONDENTS: Loran S.D. Abanilla, Hon. Judge Pedro Sabundayao,
RTC Br. 203, Muntinlupa City
SUMMARY: Papa Loran and Mama Marie are the parents of the minor
Lorenzo S. Abanilla. They lived with Marie Antonette’s parents. Due to in-
laws problems, Papa Loran suggested to his wife that they transfer to their
own house, but Mama Marie refused. So, he alone left the house of the
Salientes. Thereafter, he was prevented from seeing his son. Later, Papa
Loran, in his personal capacity and as the representative of his son, filed a
Petition for Habeas Corpus and Custody. RTC issued an order directing
Mama Marie and the in-laws to produce and bring before the Court the body
of minor Lorenzo Salientes Abanilla and to show cause why said child
should not be discharged from restraint. Mama Marie questioned said RTC
order and argued that the order is contrary to Article 213 of the Family Code,
which provides that no child under seven years of age shall be separated
from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order
otherwise. They maintain that Papa Loran had the burden of showing any
compelling reason but failed to present even a prima facie proof thereof.
Furthermore, even assuming that there were compelling reasons, proper
remedy for Papa Loran was simply an action for custody, but not habeas
corpus because under the law, the mother has the right of custody of the
minor. There was no need for the mother to show cause and explain the
custody of her own child. On the other hand, Papa Loran counters that
Article 213 of the Family Code only pertains to the question of custody of
his son. It does not address the question of the father’s right to see his own
son. Papa Loran asserts that the writ of habeas corpus is available against any
person who restrains the minor’s right to see his father and vice versa.
The issue in this case is Whether or not the lower court erred in directing
production of minor child before the court – NO. The Court ruled that habeas
corpus may be resorted to in cases where rightful custody is withheld from a
person entitled thereto. Under Article 211 of the Family Code, Papa Loran
and Mama Marie have joint parental authority over their son and
consequently joint custody. Further, although the couple is separated de
facto, the issue of custody has yet to be adjudicated by the court. In the
absence of a judicial grant of custody to one parent, both parents are
still entitled to the custody of their child. In the present case, Papa Loran's
cause of action is the deprivation of his right to see his child as alleged in
his petition. Hence, the remedy of habeas corpus is available to him. Again,
it bears stressing that the order did not grant custody of the minor to any of
the parties but merely directed petitioners to produce the minor in court and
explain why Papa Loran is prevented from seeing his child. This is in line
with the directive in Section 9 of A.M. 03-04-04-SC that within fifteen days
after the filing of the answer or the expiration of the period to file answer, the
court shall issue an order requiring Mama Marie and in-laws to present the
minor before the court. This was exactly what the court did. Moreover,
Article 213 of the Family Code deals with the judicial adjudication of
custody and serves as a guideline for the proper award of custody by the
court. Mama Marie and in-laws can raise it as a counter argument for Papa
Loran’s petition for custody. But it is not a basis for preventing the father
to see his own child. Nothing in the said provision disallows a father from
seeing or visiting his child under seven years of age.
DOCTRINE: Habeas corpus may be resorted to in cases where rightful
custody is withheld from a person entitled thereto. In the absence of a
judicial grant of custody to one parent, both parents are still entitled to the
custody of their child. In such cases, the cause of action is the deprivation of
the parent’s right to see his or her child.
FACTS:
35. Husband: Loran Abanilla
Wife: Marie Salientes
Minor Child: Lorenzo Abanilla
Husband’s in-laws (Wife’s parents): Orlando and Rosario Salientes
36. Loran, Mama Marie, and Papa Lorenzo lived with Loran’s in-laws.
Due to in-laws problems, Papa Loran suggested to Mama Marie that
they transfer to their own house, but Marie refused. So, Loran left the
house of Salientes. Thereafter, he was prevented from seeing his
son.
37. Later, Papa Loran, in his personal capacity and as the representative
of his son, filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus and Custody, before
RTC Muntinlupa.
38. RTC issued an order directing Mama Marie and the in-laws to
produce and bring before the Court the body of minor Lorenzo
Salientes Abanilla and to show cause why said child should not be
discharged from restraint.
39. Wife and in-laws moved for reconsideration which the court denied.
Before the CA, the appellate court confirmed RTC holding that such
order did not award the custody of the child to any one but was
 simply the standard order issued for the production of restrained
persons. CA held that the trial court was still about to conduct a full
inquiry, in a summary proceeding, on the cause of the minor’s
detention and the matter of his custody.
40. MR was again denied. Hence, this appeal by certiorari anchored on
the following grounds, among others:
a. No evidence at all of restraint and no evidence of maternal
unfitness to deprive the petitioner-mother of her minor son
of tender years.
b. There is no unlawful restraint by the mother and considering
further that the law presumes the fitness of the mother,
thereby negating any notion of such mother illegally
restraining or confining her very own son of tender years.
Petition is not even sufficient in substance to warrant the
writ.
c. Loran failed to present prima facie proof of any compelling
reason of the unfitness of the mother.
ISSUE/s:
4. Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari
against trial court’s order directing production of minor child before
the court – NO. In the absence of a judicial grant of custody to one
parent, both parents are still entitled to the custody of their child. In
the present case, Loran’s cause of action is the deprivation of his
right to see his child. Hence, the remedy of habeas corpus is
available to him.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
RATIO:
1. Wife and in-laws contend that the order is contrary to Article 213 of
the Family Code, which provides that no child under seven years of
age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds
compelling reasons to order otherwise. They maintain that herein
respondent Loran had the burden of showing any compelling reason
but failed to present even a prima facie proof thereof.
2. Furthermore, even assuming that there were compelling reasons,
proper remedy for Papa Loran was simply an action for custody, but
not habeas corpus because under the law, the mother has the right of
custody of the minor. They insist that no illegal or involuntary
restraint of the minor by his own mother. There was no need for the
mother to show cause and explain the custody of her own child.
3. On the other hand, Papa Loran counters that Article 213 of the
Family Code only pertains to the question of custody of his son. It
does not address the question of the father’s right to see his own son.
Papa Loran asserts that the writ of habeas corpus is available against
any person who restrains the minor’s right to see his father and vice
versa.
4. The Court ruled that habeas corpus may be resorted to in cases where
rightful custody is withheld from a person entitled thereto. Under
Article 211 of the Family Code, Papa Loran and Mama Marie have
joint parental authority over their son and consequently joint
custody. Further, although the couple is separated de facto, the issue
of custody has yet to be adjudicated by the court.
5. In the absence of a judicial grant of custody to one parent, both
parents are still entitled to the custody of their child. In the
present case, Papa Loran's cause of action is the deprivation of his
right to see his child as alleged in his petition. Hence, the remedy of
habeas corpus is available to him.
6. In a petition for habeas corpus, the child's welfare is the supreme
consideration. The Child and Youth Welfare Code unequivocally
provides that in all questions regarding the care and custody, among
others, of the child, his welfare shall be the paramount consideration.
7. Again, it bears stressing that the order did not grant custody of the
minor to any of the parties but merely directed petitioners to produce
the minor in court and explain why private respondent is prevented
from seeing his child. This is in line with the directive in Section 9 of
A.M. 03-04-04-SC that within fifteen days after the filing of the
answer or the expiration of the period to file answer, the court shall
issue an order requiring the Mama Marie and in-laws to present the
minor before the court. This was exactly what the court did.
8. Moreover, Article 213 of the Family Code deals with the judicial
adjudication of custody and serves as a guideline for the proper
award of custody by the court. Mama Marie and in-laws can raise it
as a counter argument for Papa Loran’s petition for custody. But it is
not a basis for preventing the father to see his own child. Nothing
in the said provision disallows a father from seeing or visiting his
child under seven years of age.
 062 MONCUPA v. ENRILE (Yap)
30 January 1986 | Gutierrez, Jr., J. | Writ of Habeas Corpus
PETITIONER: Efren C. Moncupa
RESPONDENTS: Juan Ponce Enrile, Fabian C. Ver, Galileo Kintanar,
Fernando Gorospe, and Jose Castro
SUMMARY: Moncupa, et. al. were arrested on April 22, 1982 at about
10:50PM at the corner of D. Tuazon St. and Quezon Ave., Quezon City.
Moncupa was brought to Camp Bago Bantay, Quezon City where he was
detained on the allegation that he was a National Democtratic Front staff
member. A Presidential Commitment Order was issued against him. Task
Force Makabayan Investigating Group and the investigating fiscal
ascertained that Moncupa was NOT a member of any subversive
organization, and recommended his prosecution only for illegal possession of
firearms and subversive documents. He was charged for illegal possession of
firearms only, and exclude from the charge under the Revised Anti-
Subverstion Law. Moncupa’s arraignment and further proceedings have not
been pursued yet, but his motions for bail were denied by the lower court.
Hence, Moncupa filed the instant petition for habeas corpus. Enrile et. al.
filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the privilege of the writ was suspended
as to Moncupa and that it is moot and academic because Moncupa was
temporarily released. Moncupa counters that his release does not render the
petition moot and academic because of involuntary restraints on his release:
(1) freedom of movement curtailed by condition of approval from Enrile et.
al. (2) liberty of abode curtailed by the same condition (3) freedom of speech
muffiled by prohibition from participating in any interview by any local or
foreign mass media representative (4) regular reporting to Enrile et. al. or
representatives.
The issue is whether the petition is moot and academic.
The SC ruled in the negative. First, Villavicencio v. Lukban provides that a
prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint
of liberty. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to
inquire into all manner of involuntary restrain as distinguished from
voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any
restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient. Second, Toyoto
v. Hon. Fidel Ramos provides, however, that a reservation that they can be
re-arrested at any time despite their acquittal by a court of competent
jurisdiction is repugnant to the “government of laws and not of men”
principle. Third, (doctrine).
DOCTRINE: A release that renders a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
moot and academic must be one which is free from involuntary restraints.
The person concerned or those applying in his behalf may still avail
themselves of the privilege of the writ:
1. Where a person continues to be unlawfully denied one or more of his
constitutional freedoms;
2. Where there is present a denial of due process;
3. Where restraints are not merely involuntary but appear to be
unnecessary; and
4. Where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has, in light of
subsequent developments, become arbitrary.
FACTS:
1. Efren C. Moncupa et. al. were arrested on April 22, 1982 at about
10:50PM at the corner of D. Tuazon St. and Quezon Ave.., Quezon
City.
2. Moncupa was brought to Camp Bago Bantay, Quezon City where he
was detained on the allegation that he was a National Democtratic
Front staff member.
3. A Presidential Commitment Order was issued against him.
4. After 2 investigations (by Task Force Makabansa Investigation
Group and by the investigating fiscal), it was ascertained that
Moncupa was NOT a member of any subversive organization.
a. Both investgitators recommended the prosecution of
Moncupa only for illegal possession of firearms and illegal
possession of subversive documents.
5. In an information, Moncupa was charged for illegal possession of
firearms, but excluded from the charge under the Revised Anti-
Subversion Law.
6. Moncupa’s arraignment and further proceedings have not been
pursued yet, but his motions for bail were denied by the lower court.
7. Hence, Moncupa filed the instant petition for habeas corpus.
8. Enrile et. al., in their return of the writ, justified Moncupa’s detention
on the ground that the privilege of the writ had been suspended as
hto him.
a. Thereafter, they filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that
Moncupa was temporarily released and is no longer in
custody. Hence, the petition is moot and academic.
9. Moncupa argues that his petition is not moot and academic because
 his liberty is merely temporary, there being the following restraints
thereon:
a. His freedom of movement is curtailed by the condition that
he gets the approval of Enrile et. al. for any travel outside
Metro Manila;
b. His liberty of abode is restricted because prior approval of
Enrile et. al. is also required in case Moncupa wants to
change his place of residence;
c. His freedom of speech is muffled by the prohibition that he
should not participate in any interview conducted by any
local or foreign mass media representatives nor give any
press release or information that is inimical to the interest of
national security; and
d. He is required to report regularly to Enrile et. al. or their
representatives.
ISSUE/s:
1. Whether the petition for habeas corpus us moot and acadmic. NO —
because a release that renders such petition moot and academic must be
one which is free from involuntary restraints.
reservation that they can be re-arrested at any time despite their acquittal
by a court of competent jurisdiction is repugnant to the “government of
laws and not of men” principle.
a. Under this principle, the moment a person is acquitted on a
criminal charge, he can no longer be detained or re-arrested for
the same offense.
5. In effect, the principle is clear. A release that renders a petition for a writ
of habeas corpus moot and academic must be one which is free from
involuntary restraints.
6. The person concerned or those applying in his behalf may still avail
themselves of the privilege of the writ:
a. Where a person continues to be unlawfully denied one or more
of his constitutional freedoms;
b. Where there is present a denial of due process;
c. Where restraints are not merely involuntary but appear to be
unnecessary; and
d. Where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has, in light of
subsequent developments, become arbitrary.

RULING: WHEREFORE, petition GRANTED.

RATIO:

1. The reservation of the military in the form of restrictions attached to the

temporary release of Moncupa constitutes restraints on his liberty.
a. Such restrictions limit his freedom of movement.
2. It is not physical restraint alone which is inquired into by the writ of
habeas corpus.
3. Villavicencio v. Lukban – a prime specification of an application for a
writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential object and
purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of
involuntary restrain as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a
person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will
preclude freedom of action is sufficient.
a. In light of the above ruling, the present petition for habeas
corpus filed by Moncupa has not become moot and academic.
4. Toyoto v. Hon. Fidel Ramos – ordinarily, a petition for habeas corpus
becomes moot and academic when the restraint on the liberty of the
petitioners is lifted either temoporarily or permanently. However, a
 063 GO v. RAMOS (YARTE)
4 September 2009 | Quisumbing, J. | Writ of Habeas Corpus
PETITIONER: Carlos T. Go, Sr.
RESPONDENTS: Luis T. Ramos
SUMMARY: This was a consolidation of three petitions for review on
certiorari that stemmed from the complaint for deportation by Luis Ramos
against Jimmy Go. Luis alleged that Jimmy was an illegal and undesirable
alien- that by fraud and falsification he was able to procure a passport, also
while all entries on his birth certificate were type written, the citizenship of
his father Carlos was hand written. Jimmy argued that the deportation case
was merely a harassment suit to prevent him from engaging in their
businesses. Furthermore, he pointed out that he was a Filipino because his
father elected Philippine Citizenship in accordance with law. At first the
complaint was dismissed by the Bureau of Immigration. However, the
dismissal was reversed which eventually led to the issuance of a warrant of
deportation and Jimmy’s detention. Thus, Jimmy commenced a petition for
habeas corpus.
The relevant issue in the SC was WON the petition for habeas corpus
should be dismissed. The court ruled in the affirmative. The objective of
the writ was to determine whether the confinement or detention was
valid or lawful. What was to be inquired into was the legality of a persons
detention. However it should be noted that even if the detention is illegal at
its inception, there are instances under Section 4 of Rule 102 where detention
was no longer considered illegal. (see doctrine) Furthermore, the cancellation
of his bail cannot be questioned through this petition. Trial Courts have no
power to release an alien even through habeas corpus. Given that Jimmy
has been duly charged before the Board and arrested pending his
deportation; the petition for habeas corpus has become moot and
academic. Petition was therefore dismissed.
DOCTRINE: Once a person detained is duly charged in court, he may no
longer question his detention through a petition for issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus. The term court in this context includes quasi-judicial
bodies of governmental agencies authorized to order the persons
confinement, like the Deportation Board of the Bureau of Immigration.
FACTS:
41. This case was a consolidation of three petitions for review on
certiorari.
42. These petitions stemmed from the complaint-affidavit for
deportation initiated by Luis T. Ramos (Luis) before the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation (now Bureau of Immigration) against
Jimmy T. Go (Jimmy) alleging that the latter is an illegal and
undesirable alien.
43. Luis presented the birth certificate of Jimmy, issued by the Office of
the Civil Registrar of Iloilo City, which indicated Jimmy’s
citizenship as Chinese. Although it appears from the birth certificate
that his parents are Filipinos, the document seems to be tampered,
because only the citizenship of Carlos (father of Jimmy) appears
to be handwritten while all the other entries were typewritten.
44. Luis also averred that, through stealth, machination and
scheming Jimmy managed to cover up his true citizenship, and
with the use of falsified documents and untruthful declarations,
was able to procure a Philippine passport from the Department
of Foreign Affairs.
45. Jimmy denied the allegations arguing that the complaint for
deportation was merely a harassment case designed to oust him
of his rightful share in their business dealings. Jimmy pointed out
he was a Filipino because his father Carlos, who was the son of a
Chinese father and Filipina mother, elected Philippine citizenship in
accordance with Com. Act No. 625 and he executed an Affidavit of
Election of Philippine citizenship.
46. With regard to the erroneous entry in the birth certificate that he is
Chinese, was not of his own doing, but may be attributed to the
employees of the Local Civil Registrars Office who might have
relied on his Chinese-sounding surname when making the said entry.
47. Associate Commissioner Linda L. Malenab-Hornilla dismissed the
complaint for deportation and affirmed the investigation of the NBI
that the citizenship of his father was transmitted to Jimmy making
him a Filipino as well.
48. However, Board of Commissioners (Board) reversed the dismissal,
holding that Carlos’ election of Philippine citizenship was made out
of time.
49. Carlos and Jimmy filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with application for injunctive reliefs before the RTC of Pasig
City. In the interim, the Board issued a Decision ordering the
apprehension and deportation of Jimmy.
50. In view of the Board’s Decision, Carlos and Jimmy filed a
supplemental petition for certiorari and prohibition before the trial
court and reiterated their application for injunctive reliefs. The trial
court issued a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction pending
 litigation on the main issue, enjoining the Bureau from enforcing the
Decision. Later, however, the trial court dissolved the writ.
51. Following the dismissal of the petition, the Board issued a
warrant of deportation which led to the apprehension of Jimmy.
Jimmy commenced a petition for habeas corpus, but the same was
eventually dismissed by reason of his provisional release on bail.
ISSUE/s:
5. Whether the cause of action of the Bureau against Carlos and Jimmy
had prescribed NO – Cases on citizenship are sui generis and it can
be litigated anytime once it is questioned.
6. Whether the deportation proceedings are null and void for failure to
implead Carlos as an indispensable party therein. NO – Carlos (the
father) is not an indispensable party for he does not stand to be
benefitted or injured by the judgement.
7. Whether the evidence adduced by Carlos and Jimmy to prove their
claim to Philippine citizenship is substantial and sufficient to oust the
Board of its jurisdiction from continuing with the deportation
proceedings in order to give way to a formal judicial action to pass
upon the issue of alienage. NO – There was no sufficient evidence to
prove that Jimmy is a Filipino citizen.
8. Whether due process was properly observed in the proceedings
before the Board. YES – Due process in administrative proceedings
are different; Jimmy was given ample opportunity to explain his side
and present evidence to prove his case.
9. Whether the petition for habeas corpus should be dismissed.
YES – Since a case has been filed in court, the court here being
the Bureau of Immigration, Jimmy can no longer question his
detention through a Petition for Habeas Corpus.
RULING: WHEREFORE the petitions in G.R. Nos. 167569 and 167570 are
DENIED. The Decision dated October 25, 2004 and Resolution dated
February 16, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 85143 are
AFFIRMED. The petition in G.R. No. 171946 is hereby GRANTED. The
Decision dated December 8, 2005 and Resolution dated March 13, 2006 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 88277 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The December 6, 2004 and December 28, 2004 Orders of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 167 are hereby REINSTATED.
RATIO:
Prescription
36. We deny the appeal of Carlos and Jimmy for lack of merit.
37. Carlos and Jimmy’s claim that the cause of action of the Bureau
has prescribed is untenable. Cases involving issues on citizenship
are sui generis. Once the citizenship of an individual is put into
question, it necessarily has to be threshed out and decided upon.
38. Decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship
cannot govern a person’s future status with finality. This is
because a person may subsequently reacquire, or for that matter, lose
his citizenship under any of the modes recognized by law for the
purpose.
Indispensable Party
1. To be indispensable, a person must first be a real party in interest,
that is, one who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment of
the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
2. Carlos clearly is not an indispensable party as he does not stand
to be benefited or injured by the judgment of the suit. What is
sought is the deportation of Jimmy on the ground that he is an alien.
Propriety of Deportation of Jimmy
1. Since his citizenship hinges on that of his fathers, it becomes
necessary to pass upon the citizenship of the latter. However,
whatever will be the findings as to Carlos’ citizenship will in no way
prejudice him.
2. In the CA, the court was not convinced that the same was
sufficient to oust the Board of its jurisdiction to continue with the
deportation proceedings considering that what were presented
particularly the birth certificates of Jimmy, as well as those of
his siblings indicate that they are Chinese citizens. Furthermore,
like the Board, it found the election of Carlos of Philippine
citizenship irregular as it was not made on time.
3. The SC found no reason to overturn the above findings. The
question of whether substantial evidence had been presented to allow
immediate recourse to the regular courts is a question of fact which
is beyond this Courts power of review for it is not a trier of facts.
None of the exceptions has been shown to exist in this case.
4. It is a settled rule that only legitimate children follow the
citizenship of the father and that illegitimate children are under
the parental authority of the mother and follow her nationality.
However, it is our considered view that absent any evidence proving
that Carlos is indeed an illegitimate son of a Filipina, the aforestated
established rule could not be applied to him.
5. As to the question of whether the election of Philippine
citizenship conferred on Carlos Filipino citizenship, we find that
the appellate court correctly found that it did not.
6. It is incumbent upon one who claims Philippine citizenship to
prove to the satisfaction of the court that he is really a Filipino.
No presumption can allowed in favor of the claimant of Philippine
citizenship, and any doubt regarding citizenship must be resolved
in favor of the state.
Observance of Due Process
1. Due process was properly observed in this case.
2. Deportation proceedings are administrative in character, summary
in nature, and need not be conducted strictly in accordance with
the rules of ordinary court proceedings. The essence of due
process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side or
an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of.
3. As long as the parties are given the opportunity to be heard before
judgment is rendered, the demands of due process are sufficiently
met. Although Jimmy was not furnished with a copy of the
subject Resolution and Charge Sheet as alleged by him, he was
given ample opportunity to explain his side and present
controverting evidence.
governmental agencies authorized to order the persons confinement,
like the Deportation Board of the Bureau of Immigration.
5. Likewise, the cancellation of his bail cannot be assailed via a
petition for habeas corpus. When an alien is detained by the
Bureau of Immigration for deportation pursuant to an order of
deportation by the Deportation Board, the Regional Trial Courts
have no power to release such alien on bail even in habeas corpus
proceedings because there is no law authorizing it.
6. Given that Jimmy has been duly charged before the Board, and
in fact ordered arrested pending his deportation, coupled by this
Courts pronouncement that the Board was not ousted of its
jurisdiction to continue with the deportation proceedings, the
petition for habeas corpus is rendered moot and academic. This
being so, we find it unnecessary to touch on the other arguments
advanced by respondents regarding the same subject.

The Grant of Writ of Habeas Corpus.

1. A petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is a special
proceeding governed by Rule 102 of the Revised Rules of Court.
The objective of the writ is to determine whether the
confinement or detention is valid or lawful. If it is, the writ cannot
be issued.
2. What is to be inquired into is the legality of a persons detention
as of the filing of the application for the writ of habeas corpus,
for even if the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by
reason of some supervening events, such as the instances
mentioned in Section 4 of Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the
time of the filing of the application.
3. Once a person detained is duly charged in court, he may no
longer question his detention through a petition for issuance of a
writ of habeas corpus. His remedy would be to quash the
information and/or the warrant of arrest duly issued.
4. The term court in this context includes quasi-judicial bodies of
017 IN RE: THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS FOR REYNALDO DE
VILLA (ACUYONG)
17 November 2004 | Ynares-Santiago, J. | Availability of habeas corpus post-
conviction
PETITIONER: REYNALDO DE VILLA, petitioner, JUNE DE
VILLA, petitioner-relator
RESPONDENTS: THE DIRECTOR, NEW BILIBID PRISONS
SUMMARY: Reynaldo was convicted for the rape of his niece by
affinity, Aileen. The rape resulted in Aileen’s pregnancy. Aileen gave
birth to Leahlyn Mendonza. When June found out about the scientific
test to determine once and for all the filiation between Reynaldo and the
putative child born of the rape. He was able to secure a saliva sample
from Leahlyn with the help of Billy Joe, a grandson of Reynaldo. The
DNA tests showed that Reynaldo is not the father of Leahlyn. Through a
petition for habeas corpus, Reynaldo and his son June seeks to set aside
final conviction of Reynaldo and prays for a new trial in light of newly
discovered evidence. ISSUE: WON the petition for habeas corpus is
proper in this case. NO. The writ of habeas corpus is an extraordinary
remedy and may be invoked only under extraordinary circumstances.
Resort to habeas corpus as a post-conviction remedy is available only in
instances of (a) there has been a deprivation of a constitutional right
resulting in the restraint of a person; (b) the court had no jurisdiction to
impose the sentence; or (c) an excessive penalty has been imposed, as
such sentence is void as to such excess. Reynaldo invokes the writ of
habeas corpus to assail a final judgment of conviction without providing
a legal ground on which to anchor his petition. Reynaldo alleges neither
the deprivation of a constitutional right, the absence of jurisdiction of
the court imposing the sentence, or that an excessive penalty has been
imposed upon him. The relief he prays for (review of findings of fact
long passed upon with finality) is far outside the scope of habeas corpus
proceedings.
DOCTRINE: The writ of habeas corpus has very limited availability as
a post-conviction remedy. Review of a judgment of conviction is
allowed in a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus only
in very specific instances, such as when, as a consequence of a judicial
proceeding:
(a) there has been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the
restraint of a person;
(b) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or
(c) an excessive penalty has been imposed, as such sentence is void as to
such excess.
FACTS:
1. In People v. Reynaldo de Villa, Reynaldo de Villa (Reynaldo) was found
guilty of the rape of Aileen Mendoza, his niece by affinity. He was
sentenced to reclusion perpetua and was ordered to pay the offended
party civil indemnity, moral damages, costs of suit, and support for
Leahlyn Corales Mendoza (Leahlyn), the putative child born of the rape.
2. In the middle of the appeal of the rape case, Reynaldo’s counsel of
record, a certain Atty. Alfonso G. Salvador, suddenly and inexplicably
withdrew his appearance as counsel. The sole explanation given was he
was leaving for the United States for an indefinite period of time.
Reynaldo made an impassioned plea that his lawyer be prevented from
withdrawing. Reynaldo alleged that his counsel’s withdrawal is an
untimely and heartbreaking event. He had placed all his trust and
confidence on his counsel’s unquestionable integrity and dignity.
3. During the trial of the case, June was unaware that there was a scientific
test that could determine once and for all if Reynaldo was the father of
the victim’s child, Leahlyn. June was only informed during the pendency
of the automatic review of Reynaldo’s case that DNA testing could
resolve the issue of paternity. This information was apparently furnished
by the Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG) Anti-Death Penalty Task
Force, which took over as counsel for Reynaldo.
4. The appellant’s brief in People v. de Villa sought the conduct of a blood
type test and DNA test to determine the paternity of the child allegedly
conceived as a result of the rape. It was denied by the court.
5. Reynaldo filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the Decision,
wherein he once more prayed that DNA tests be conducted. The Motion
was denied with finality. Hence, the conviction became final and
executory on January 16, 2002.
6. June was undaunted. Having been informed that DNA tests required a
sample that could be extracted from saliva, June asked Billy Joe de Villa,
a grandson of Reynaldo de Villa and a classmate of Leahlyn Mendoza, to
ask Leahlyn to spit into a new, sterile cup. Leahlyn readily agreed and
did so. Billy Joe took the sample home and gave it to June.
7. Thereafter, June gathered samples from four grandchildren of Reynaldo
de Villa and requested the NSRI to conduct DNA testing on the sample
given by Leahlyn Mendoza, those given by the grandchildren of
Reynaldo de Villa, and that given by Reynaldo de Villa himself.
8. After testing, the DNA Laboratory rendered a preliminary report which
showed that Reynaldo de Villa could not have sired any of the children
 whose samples were tested, due to the absence of a match between the
pertinent genetic markers in Reynaldo’s sample and those of any of the
other samples, including Leahlyn’s.
9. In this habeas corpus petition, Reynaldo, joined by his son June as a
petitioner-relator, seek to (1) have the Director of Prisons justify the
imprisonment of Reynaldo and (2) Reynaldo be granted a new trial.
10. Reynaldo argues that the DNA analysis on paternity shows conclusively
that Reynaldo is not the father of Leahlyn Mendoza. His conviction for
rape based on the fact that Leahlyn was sired as a result of the alleged
rape cannot stand and must be set aside. A new trial is proper to consider
the newly discovered evidence and may be ordered by the court in view
of the results of the DNA tests conducted.
ISSUE/s:
WoN the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus and grant of new trial is proper
to release an individual already convicted and serving sentence by virtue of a
final and executory judgment – NO. The remedy of writ of habeas corpus is
unavailing in the case at bar. Reynaldo alleges neither the deprivation of a
constitutional right, the absence of jurisdiction of the court imposing the
sentence, or that an excessive penalty has been imposed upon him. The relief
he prays for (review of findings of fact long passed upon with finality) is far
outside the scope of habeas corpus proceedings.
RULING: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition for
habeas corpus and new trial is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
RATIO:
1. The extraordinary writ of habeas corpus has long been a haven of relief
for those seeking liberty from any unwarranted denial of freedom of
movement. Broadly, the writ applies to all cases of illegal confinement or
detention by which a person has been deprived of his liberty, or by which
the rightful custody of any person has been withheld from the person
entitled thereto. Issuance of the writ necessitates that a person be illegally
deprived of his liberty.
2. Villavicencio v. Lukban: Any restraint which will preclude freedom of
action is sufficient.
3. The most basic criterion for the issuance of the writ, therefore, is that
the individual seeking such relief be illegally deprived of his freedom
of movement or placed under some form of illegal restraint. If an
individual’s liberty is restrained via some legal process, the writ of
habeas corpus is unavailing. Concomitant to this principle, the writ of
habeas corpus cannot be used to directly assail a judgment rendered by a
competent court or tribunal which, having duly acquired jurisdiction, was
not deprived or ousted of this jurisdiction through some anomaly in the
conduct of the proceedings.
4. A survey of decisions in habeas corpus cases demonstrates that, in
general, the writ of habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ which
furnishes an extraordinary remedy. It may be invoked only under
extraordinary circumstances. The writ of habeas corpus is not to be used
as a substitute for a more proper remedy.
5. Resort to the writ of habeas corpus is available only in the limited
instances when a judgment is rendered by a court or tribunal devoid of
jurisdiction. Notwithstanding its historic function as the great writ of
liberty, the writ of habeas corpus has very limited availability as a post-
conviction remedy.
6. Feria v. Court of Appeals: Review of a judgment of conviction is
allowed in a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus only in
very specific instances, such as when, as a consequence of a judicial
proceeding: (a) there has been a deprivation of a constitutional right
resulting in the restraint of a person; (b) the court had no jurisdiction to
impose the sentence; or (c) an excessive penalty has been imposed, as
such sentence is void as to such excess.
7. Abriol v. Homeres: The general rule is that writ of habeas corpus is not a
writ of error and should not be thus used. The writ of habeas corpus,
which permits a collateral challenge of the jurisdiction of the court or
tribunal issuing the process or judgment that deprives an individual of his
liberty, cannot be distorted by extending the inquiry to mere errors of
trial courts acting squarely within their jurisdiction.
8. Velasco v. CA: A habeas corpus petition reaches the body, but not the
record of the case. A record must be allowed to remain extant,4 and
cannot be revised, modified, altered or amended by the simple expedient
of resort to habeas corpus proceedings.
9. Chavez v. Court of Appeals: The writ of habeas corpus was held to be
available where an accused was deprived of the constitutional right
against self-incrimination. A defect so pronounced as the denial of an
accused’s constitutional rights results in the absence or loss of
jurisdiction, and therefore invalidates the trial and the consequent
conviction of the accused. That void judgment of conviction may be
challenged by collateral attack, which precisely is the function of habeas
corpus.
10. Gumabon v. Director of the Bureau of Prisons: Once a deprivation of a
4
Still in existence; not extinct, destroyed or lost
 constitutional right is shown to exist, the court that rendered the
judgment is deemed ousted of jurisdiction and habeas corpus is the
appropriate remedy to assail the legality of the detention.
11. In the past, the court has disallowed the review of a court’s appreciation
of the evidence in a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus,
as this is not the function of said writ. If it can be demonstrated that there
was a deprivation of a constitutional right, the writ can be granted even
after an individual has been meted a sentence by final judgment.
12. In contrast, Feria v. Court of Appeals: The Court was inclined to allow
the presentation of new evidence in a petition for the issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus, but this was an exceptional situation. The general rule is
that the burden of proving illegal restraint by the public officer rests on
the person impugning such restraint. Where the return is not subject to
exception i.e. sets forth a process which on its face is a good ground for
the detention of the prisoner, it is incumbent on petitioner to allege and
prove new matter that tends to invalidate the apparent effect of such
process.
13. Calvan v. Court of Appeals: [on scope of review allowable in habeas
corpus] The writ of habeas corpus, although not designed to interrupt the
orderly administration of justice, can be invoked by the attendance of a
special circumstance that requires immediate action. In such situations,
the inquiry on a writ of habeas corpus would be addressed, not to errors
committed by a court within its jurisdiction, but to the question of
whether the proceeding or judgment under which a person has been
restrained is a complete nullity. The probe may proceed to check on the
power and authority (itself an equivalent test of jurisdiction) of the court
or the judge to render the order serving as the basis of imprisonment or
detention. The nullity of the conviction makes it susceptible to collateral
attack through a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.
14. Other jurisdictions have seen fit to grant the writ of habeas corpus in
order to test claims that a defendant was denied effective aid of counsel.
The US Supreme Court requires a defendant alleging incompetent
counsel to show that the attorney’s performance was deficient under a
reasonable standard, and additionally, to show that the outcome of the
trial would have been different with competent counsel. For the petition
to succeed, the strong presumption that the counsels conduct falls within
the wide range or reasonable professional assistance must be overcome.
APPLICATION OF HABEAS CORPUS DOCTRINES TO
REYNALDO’S CASE
15. The remedy of writ of habeas corpus is unavailing in the case at bar.
Reynaldo invokes the writ of habeas corpus to assail a final judgment of
conviction, without, however, providing a legal ground on which to
anchor his petition. Reynaldo alleges neither the deprivation of a
constitutional right, the absence of jurisdiction of the court imposing the
sentence, or that an excessive penalty has been imposed upon him. The
relief he prays for (review of findings of fact long passed upon with
finality) is far outside the scope of habeas corpus proceedings.
16. The denial of a constitutional right has not been alleged by Reynaldo.
The court is hard-pressed to find legal basis on which to anchor the grant
of a writ of habeas corpus. A careful scrutiny of the records does not
reveal any constitutional right of Reynaldo which was unduly deprived.
17. [In relation to the withdrawal of Reynaldo’s counsel during the appeal of
the rape case] The court did not find any negligence committed by earlier
counsel as to amount to a denial of constitutional right. There is also no
showing that the proceedings were tainted with jurisdictional defect.
18. Reynaldo seeks a reevaluation of the evidentiary basis for his conviction.
He is asking the court to reexamine the weight and sufficiency of the
evidence in this case, not on its own, but in light of the new DNA
evidence Reynaldo seeks to present to the court. This relief is outside the
scope of a habeas corpus petition.
19. [On motion for new trial] The decision has long attained finality. The
DNA evidence also does not fall within the statutory or jurisprudential
definition of newly-discovered evidence. Such evidence disproving
paternity could have been discovered and produced at trial with the
exercise of reasonable diligence. The fact that June was unaware of the
existence of DNA testing until the trial was concluded carries no weight.
Lack of knowledge of the existence of DNA testing speaks of negligence
which is binding upon Reynaldo and June.
 065 Veluz v. Villanueva (BARROSO)
29 January 2008 | Corona, J. | Writ of Habeas Data
PETITIONER: In the Matter of the Petition of Habeas Corpus of Eufemia
E. Rodriguez, Filed by Edgardo E. Veluz
RESPONDENTS: Luisa R. Villanueva and Teresita R. Pabello
SUMMARY: Rodriguez was suffering from a poor state of mental health
and diagnosed with probable vascular dementia. She was living with her
nephew, Veluz. Villanueva and Pabello, her legally adopted children, took
Rodriguez from Veluz’ house. Claiming that they were restraining Rodriguez
of her liberty, Veluz filed a petition for habeas corpus with the CA. Whether
Rodriguez is being restrained of her liberty. NO. There is no proof that
Rodriguez is being detained and restrained of her liberty by Villanueva et al.
Nothing on record reveals that she was forcibly taken. On the contrary, they
are taking care of her. In order to justify the grant of the writ of habeas
corpus, the restraint of liberty must be in the nature of an illegal and
involuntary deprivation of freedom of action.
DOCTRINE: In order to justify the grant of the writ of habeas corpus, the
restraint of liberty must be in the nature of an illegal and involuntary
deprivation of freedom of action.
FACTS:
1. Rodriguez was a 94-year old widow, allegedly suffering from a poor
state of mental health and deteriorating cognitive abilities, diagnosed
with probable vascular dementia. She was living with Veluz, her
nephew, since 2000.
2. On January 11, 2005, Villanueva and Pabello, her legally adopted
children, took Rodriguez from Veluz’ house. He made repeated demands
for the return of Rodriguez but these proved futile.
3. Claiming that they were restraining Rodriguez of her liberty, Veluz filed
a petition for habeas corpus with the CA on January 13, 2005.
4. CA denied the petition and ruled that Veluz failed to present any
convincing proof that they were unlawfully restraining their mother of
her liberty. He also failed to establish his legal right to the custody of
Rodriguez as he was not her legal guardian.
5. Veluz claims that a court should limit itself to determining whether or
not a person is unlawfully being deprived of liberty. There is no need to
consider legal custody or custodial rights.
6. Villanueva et al. argue that it was Veluz and his family who were staying
with Rodriguez. She paid for the rent and utilities. They decided to take
custody of Rodriguez and she willingly went with them.
ISSUE/s:
1. Whether Rodriguez is being restrained of her liberty. NO – The restraint
of liberty must be in the nature of an illegal and involuntary deprivation
of freedom of action. There is no proof that Rodriguez is being detained
or was forcibly taken.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
RATIO:
1. Writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or
detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty or by which the
rightful custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled thereto. It
contemplates two instances: (1) deprivation of a person’s liberty either
through illegal confinement or through detention and (2) withholding of
the custody of any person from someone entitled to such custody.
2. In this case, the issue is not whether the custody of Rodriguez is being
rightfully withheld from Veluz but whether Rodriguez is being restrained
of her liberty.
3. Fundamentally, in order to justify the grant of the writ of habeas
corpus, the restraint of liberty must be in the nature of an illegal and
involuntary deprivation of freedom of action.
4. The purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to determine whether or not
a particular person is legally held. A prime specification of an application
for a writ of habeas corpus, in fact, is an actual and effective, and not
merely nominal or moral, illegal restraint of liberty Any restraint which
will preclude freedom of action is sufficient.
5. A judge must first inquire into whether the person is being restrained of
his liberty. Inquiry into the cause of detention will proceed only where
such restraint exists. Judicial discretion is called for in its issuance and it
must be clear to the judge to whom the petition is presented that, prima
facie, the petitioner is entitled to the writ. It is only if the court is
satisfied that a person is being unlawfully restrained of his liberty will
the petition for habeas corpus be granted.
6. There is no proof that Rodriguez is being detained and restrained of her
liberty by Villanueva et al. Nothing on record reveals that she was
forcibly taken. On the contrary, they are taking care of her.
 066 AMPATUAN v. MACARAIG (BALISONG)
29 June 2010 | Perez, J. | Remedial Law; Special Proceedings; Writ of
Habeas Corpus; Nominal Restraint
PETITIONER: Nurhida Juhuri Ampatuan
RESPONDENTS: Judge Virgilio V. Macaraig, RTC Manila Branch 37,
Director General Avelino Razon, Jr., Director Geary Barias, PSSupt. Co Yee
M. Co, Jr., and Police Chief Inspector Agapito Quimson
SUMMARY: The wife of PO1 Ampatuan instituted habeas corpus
proceedings on behalf of her husband who was accused of murdering Atty.
Alioden Dalaig, head of the Law Department of COMELEC. She alleges that
PO1 Ampatuan was illegally arrested in Mindanao and was brought to
Manila where inquest proceedings took place and where a charge sheet for
Grave Misconduct was issued against him. He was also place on restrictive
custody by Special Order. The Manila City Prosecutors Office recommended
and ordered the release of PO1 Ampatuan for further investigation. However,
the PNP refused to release him arguing that a Special Order for restrictive
custody was issued. The RTC denied the petition saying that the PNP as
legally deprived PO1 Ampatuan of his liberty. Hence, this petition. The issue
is whether the writ of habeas corpus should issue. The Court held in the
negative. It said that in passing upon a petition for habeas corpus, a court or
judge must first inquire into whether the petitioner is being restrained of his
liberty. If he is not, the writ will be refused. Inquiry into the cause of
detention will proceed only where such restraint exists. If the alleged cause is
thereafter found to be unlawful, then the writ should be granted and the
petitioner discharged. Judicial discretion is called for in its issuance and it
must be clear to the judge to whom the petition is presented that, prima
facie, the petitioner is entitled to the writ. It is only if the court is satisfied
that a person is being unlawfully restrained of his liberty will the petition
for habeas corpus be granted. If the respondents are not detaining or
restraining the applicant or the person in whose behalf the petition is filed,
the petition should be dismissed. In this case, the PNP chief has authority
under the DILG Act of 1990 to put PNP officers under restrictive custody.
Hence, though the Prosecutors have ordered his release, it does not preclude
continued detention for other legal reasons, in this case, the order to keep
PO1 Ampatuan in restrictive custody.
DOCTRINE: Restrictive custody is, at best, nominal restraint which is
beyond the ambit of habeas corpus. It is neither actual nor effective restraint
that would call for the grant of the remedy prayed for. It is a permissible
precautionary measure to assure the PNP authorities that the police officers
concerned are always accounted for
FACTS:
52. PO1 Ampatuan was held criminally and administratively liable for
the murder of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, head of the Law Department
of the COMELEC.
53. Version of Ampatuan: PO1 Ampatuan was directed to go and stay at
the Police Provincial Office of Maguindanao without being informed
of the cause of his restraint. He was brought to General Santos City
and was made to board a plane bound for Manila. He was turned
over to the Manila police and was brought to Manila City Mayor
Lim. He was later detained at the Police Jail after being informed
that he is accused of the murder of Atty. Dalaig. He was later turned
over to the Regional Headquarters Support Group in Camp Bagong
Diwa after undergoing inquest proceedings.
54. The Chief Inquest Prosecutor ordered the release of PO1 Ampatuan,
which was approved by the City Prosecutor. However, PSSupt.
Quimson and Police Chief Inspector Co refused to release PO1
Ampatuan on the ground that he is under restrictive custody under a
charge sheet for Grave Misconduct and a Special Order issued for
that purpose specifically placing PO1 Ampatuan under restrictive
custody of the Regional Director, NCRPO.
55. His wife, Nurhida Juhuri Ampatuan filed a petition for the issuance
of the writ of habeas corpus on the strength of the release order by
the Manila City Prosecutor’s Office. However, the petition was
denied by the RTC on the ground that the filing of the administrative
case against PO1 Ampatuan is a process done by the PNP and the
RTC has no authority to order the release of PO1 Ampatuan. Hence,
this petition.
ISSUE/s:
10. Whether the wirt of habeas corpus should issue in favor of PO1
Ampatuan and his petitioning wife. NO — The restrictive custody by
the PNP of officers under investigation is a legal process which
precludes the issuance of the write of hebeas corpus.
RULING: WHEREFORE petition is DENIED.
RATIO:
Writ of Habeas Corpus
39. In passing upon a petition for habeas corpus, a court or judge must
first inquire into whether the petitioner is being restrained of his
liberty. If he is not, the writ will be refused. Inquiry into the cause of
detention will proceed only where such restraint exists. If the alleged
cause is thereafter found to be unlawful, then the writ should be
granted and the petitioner discharged. Judicial discretion is called for
in its issuance and it must be clear to the judge to whom the petition
is presented that, prima facie, the petitioner is entitled to the writ. It
is only if the court is satisfied that a person is being unlawfully
restrained of his liberty will the petition for habeas corpus be
granted. If the respondents are not detaining or restraining the
applicant or the person in whose behalf the petition is filed, the
petition should be dismissed.

40. Restrictive custody is, at best, nominal restraint which is beyond the
ambit of habeas corpus. It is neither actual nor effective restraint that
would call for the grant of the remedy prayed for. It is a permissible
precautionary measure to assure the PNP authorities that the police
officers concerned are always accounted for.

41. Here, the recommendation by the Manila City Prosecutors Office

was made only insofar as the criminal action for murder that was
filed with the prosecution office is concerned and is without
prejudice to other legal grounds for which he may be held under
custody. PO1 Ampatuan is also facing administrative charges for
Grave Misconduct.

42. Under the DILG Act of 1990, the Chief of PNP is authorized to place
police personnel under restrictive custody during the pendency of a
grave administrative case filed against him or even after the filing of
a criminal complaint, grave in nature, against such police personnel.
restrictive custody and monitoring of movements or whereabouts of
police officers under investigation by their superiors is not a form of
illegal detention or restraint of liberty.

43. Besides, the administrative case should have already been resolved
and the issue of his restrictive custody should have been rendered
moot and academic on the strength of the provisions of the DILG
Act of 1990 which provides that cases of grave felonies against
members of the PNP shall be subject to continuous trial and shall be
terminated within 90 days from arraignment.
 067 So v. Tacla, Jr. (BRUZON)
19 October 2010 | Nachura, J. | Writ of Habeas Corpus
PETITIONER: David E. So, on behalf of daughter Maria Elena So
Guisande
RESPONDENTS: Hon. Esteban Tacla, Jr., Regional Trial Court of
Mandaluyong City, Branch 208 and Dr. Bernardo Vicente, National Center
of Mental Health (NCMH)
SUMMARY: Accused Guisande was charged with the crime of Qualified
Theft. Prior to the institution of the criminal proceedings, Guisande was
committed by So (father) for psychiatric treatment and care at the Makati
Medical Center (MMC). Judge Tacla ordered Guisande’s referral to the
NCMH for an independent forensic assessment of Guisande’s mental health
to determine if she would be able to stand arraignment and undergo trial for
Qualified Theft. Accused Guisande was confined at the NCMH. So filed the
the writs of habeas corpus and amparo on behalf of his daughter So claiming
"life-threatening" circumstances surrounding her confinement at the NCMH
which supposedly worsened her mental condition. The petition was referred
to the CA. The CA denied the petition because Dr. Vicente of NCMH
evaluated that the accused is deemed competent to stand the rigors of court
trial. Petition for review on certiorari was filed before the SC. During the
pendency of the petition, the city prosecutor moved to withdraw the
information and Judge Tacla order the dismissal of the criminal case. Issue:
W/N the petition for writs of habeas corpus and amparo should be
dismissed? YES. The Rules on the Writs of Habeas Corpus and Amparo are
clear; the act or omission or the threatened act or omission complained of -
confinement and custody for habeas corpus and violations of, or threat to
violate, a person’s life, liberty, and security for amparo cases - should be
illegal or unlawful. The writs shall cover extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances or threats thereof. The question before the CA was correctly
limited to which hospital, the NCMH or a medical facility of accused’s own
choosing, accused Guisande should be referred for treatment of a supposed
mental condition. The CA allowed the transfer of accused to St. Clare’s
Medical Center but ordered the continuation of the arraignment and trial of
the accused for Qualified Theft before the same trial court. Guisande
remained in custody of the law to answer for the non-bailable criminal
charge against her, and was simply allowed to pursue medical treatment in
the hospital and from a doctor of her choice. With the dismissal of the non-
bailable case against accused Guisande, she is no longer under peril to be
confined in a jail facility, much less at the NCMH. Effectively, accused
Guisande’s person, and treatment of any medical and mental malady she may
or may not have, can no longer be subjected to the lawful processes of the
RTC Mandaluyong City. The cases have now been rendered moot and
academic.
DOCTRINE: With the dismissal of the non-bailable case, accused person
and treatment of any medical and mental malady can no longer be subjected
to the lawful processes of the court – petitions for writ of habeas corput and
amparo are now moot and academic.
FACTS:
56. David E. So (So) filed the petition for the writs of habeas corpus and
amparo on behalf of his daughter, Ma. Elena So Guisande
(Guisande), accused of Qualified Theft in the criminal case pending
before Judge Tacla. He alleged that Guisande was under a life-
threatening situation while confined at the NCMH, the government
hospital ordered by the RTC Mandaluyong City to ascertain the
actual psychological state of Guisande, who was being charged with
a non-bailable offense.
57. Prior to the institution of the criminal proceedings before the RTC,
Guisande was committed by So for psychiatric treatment and care at
the Makati Medical Center (MMC).
58. Judge Tacla ordered Guisande’s referral to the NCMH for an
independent forensic assessment of Guisande’s mental health to
determine if she would be able to stand arraignment and undergo
trial for Qualified Theft.
59. Claiming "life-threatening" circumstances surrounding her
confinement at the NCMH which supposedly worsened her mental
condition and violated her constitutional rights against solitary
detention and assistance of counsel, accused Guisande and her father
simultaneously filed petition for the issuance of the writs of habeas
corpus and amparo.
60. The petition for writs of habeas corpus and amparo was referred to
the CA.
61. THE CA ruled that the petition for Habeas Corpus and Amparo is
considered CLOSE and TERMINATED because the NCMH
submitted its evaluation that the accused is deemed competent to
stand the rigors of court trial.
62. Based on a series of mental status examinations and observations at
our center, she is found not manifesting signs and symptoms of
psychosis at the present time. Neither a manic episode nor a severe
depressive episode was manifested during her confinement at our
center, despite voluntarily not taking her medication is. Although she
 is complaining of mood symptoms, these are not severe enough to
impair her fitness to stand trial.
63. Petition for review on certiorari was filed before the SC. During the
pendency of the petition, the City Prosecutor filed a Motion to
Withdraw Information and Judge Tacla, Jr. ordered the dismissal of
Criminal Case. The OSG prays for the dismissal of the case for being
moot and academic.
64. So opposed the dismissal of the petitions because they had filed
criminal complaints and an administrative case against respondents
Judge Tacla and Dr. Vicente, as well as the NCMH and an attending
doctor thereat, for purported violations of accused Guisande’s rights
during her confinement at the NCMH.
ISSUE/s:
11. Whether the petition for habeas corupus and amparo should be
dismissed? YES — the case is now moot and academic.
RULING: WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing disquisition, the petitions
in G.R. Nos. 190108 and 190473 for the Writs of Habeas Corpus and
Amparo, and review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are
DENIED for being moot and academic. No costs.
RATIO:
Issue 1
1. The Rules on the Writs of Habeas Corpus and Amparo are clear; the
act or omission or the threatened act or omission complained of -
confinement and custody for habeas corpus and violations of, or
threat to violate, a person’s life, liberty, and security for amparo
cases - should be illegal or unlawful.
2. Rule 102 of the Rules of Court on Habeas Corpus provides:
Sec. 1. To what habeas corpus extends. – Except as otherwise
expressly provided by law, the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to
all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is
deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any
person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.
3. The Rule on the Writ of Amparo states:
Section 1. Petition. – The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy
available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is
violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission
of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.
4. The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances
or threats thereof
5. In Rubrico v. Macapagal-Arroyo: The privilege of the writ of
amparo is envisioned basically to protect and guarantee the rights to
life, liberty, and security of persons, free from fears and threats that
vitiate the quality of this life. It is an extraordinary writ
conceptualized and adopted in light of and in response to the
prevalence of extra-legal killings and enforced disappearances.
Accordingly, the remedy ought to be resorted to and granted
judiciously, lest the ideal sought by the Amparo Rule be diluted and
undermined by the indiscriminate filing of amparo petitions for
purposes less than the desire to secure amparo reliefs and protection
and/or on the basis of unsubstantiated allegations.
6. In Ampatuan v. Macaraig: The most basic criterion for the issuance
of the writ, therefore, is that the individual seeking such relief is
illegally deprived of his freedom of movement or place under some
form of illegal restraint. If an individual’s liberty is restrainted via
some legal process, the writ of habeas corpus is unavailing.
Fundamentally, in order to justify the grant of the writ of habeas
corpus, the restraint of liberty must be in the nature of an illegal and
involuntary deprivation of freedom of action.
7. In the case at bar, the question before the CA was correctly limited to
which hospital, the NCMH or a medical facility of accused’s own
choosing, accused Guisande should be referred for treatment of a
supposed mental condition.
8. The CA allowed the transfer of accused to St. Clare’s Medical
Center under the custody of Dr. Rene Yat, who was required
periodically to report on his evaluation, every fifteen (15) days, to
the RTC Mandaluyong City, although in the same breath, the CA
also ordered the continuation of the arraignment and trial of the
accused for Qualified Theft before the same trial court. In other
words, Guisande remained in custody of the law to answer for the
non-bailable criminal charge against her, and was simply allowed to
pursue medical treatment in the hospital and from a doctor of her
choice.
9. With the dismissal of the non-bailable case against accused
Guisande, she is no longer under peril to be confined in a jail facility,
much less at the NCMH. Effectively, accused Guisande’s person,
and treatment of any medical and mental malady she may or may not
have, can no longer be subjected to the lawful processes of the RTC
Mandaluyong City. In short, the cases have now been rendered moot
and academic.
 068 In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Cesar Gonzales and
Julius Mesa v. Gen. Efren Abu (BURGOS)
04 July 2007 | Chico-Nazario, J. | Writ of Habeas Corpus
PETITIONER: Rafael Pulido on behalf of Cesar Gonzales and Julius Mesa
RESPONDENTS: Chief of Staff Efren Abu (CSAFP)
SUMMARY: On 27 July 2003, 321 officers and enlisted personnel of the AFP
entered and took over the premises of Oakwood in Makati City to air their
grievances against the administration of PGMA. They declared their withdrawal of
support from the Commander-in-Chief of the AFP, and demanded her resignation.
Negotiations were successful, and the soldiers agreed to return to barracks, thus
ending the occupation of Oakwood. Among those involved in the occupation of
Oakwood were Cezari Gonzales and Julius Mesa, both enlisted personnel of the
Philippine Navy. Gonzales and Mesa were charged before the RTC of Makati City,
with the crime of Coup Detat. A Commitment Order was issued by the RTC
committing custody of the persons of Gonzales and Mesa to the Commanding
Officer of Fort San Felipe Naval Base, Cavite City. On 8 December 2003, Gonzales
and Mesa were discharged from military service. The court relieved the commander
of the naval base of his duty as custodian, upon the commander’s motion and
manifestation. RTC ordered the transfer of Gonzales and Mesa from the Naval
Base Cavite in Sangley Point to the Philippine Marine Brigade Headquarters,
Fort Bonifacio under the custody of the Commander of the Marine Brigade of the
Philippine Marines. RTC resolved the petitions for bail filed by the accused-
soldiers. It admitted Gonzales and Mesa, and twenty-five other co-accused to bail
pegging the amount thereof at P100,000.00 each. Both Gonzales and Mesa posted
bail. RTC issued orders directing the Commanding Officer of Philippine Marine
Corps to release Gonzales and Mesa from his custody. Despite said orders and their
service to the marines, Gonzales and Mesa were not released. The People of
the Philippines moved for partial reconsideration of the order granting bail. Prior to
the resolution of said motion, Chief State Prosecutor, advised Brig. Gen. Manuel
F. Llena, Judge Advocate General, to defer action on the provisional release of
Gonzales and Mesa until the Motion for Reconsideration shall have been resolved
and attained finality. Since Gonzales and Mesa continued to be in detention, a
Petition for Habeas Corpus was filed by Pulido on their behalf. The Court of
Appeals (3rd Division) issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus directing respondent CSAFP
to produce the bodies of Gonzales and Mesa before the Court and to appear and
show the cause and validity of their detention. A return of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus was made. Respondents prayed that the Petition for Habeas Corpus be
dismissed primarily on two grounds: (1) the continued detention of Gonzales and
Mesa is justified because of the pendency of the Petition for Certiorari questioning
the order of the RTC granting bail to Gonzales and Mesa; and (2) petitioner is guilty
of forum shopping because of his failure to state in the petition that the order
granting bail has been elevated to the Court of Appeals and pending before
its 7th Division. ISSUE: W/N the provisional release of Gonzales and Mesa can be
obtained through a petition for habeas corpus when the validity of the grant of bail
and the release under bail are live questions before another Division of the Court.
NO –There is no basis for a release on habeas corpus if the matter before the court is
already before another co-equal body whose ruling will be finally determinative of
the issue of Gonzales and Mesas release. Court held that this cannot and should not
be done as this is precisely the reason why the rule against forum shopping has been
put in place. The remedies sought being two sides of the same coin (i.e., the release
of Gonzales and Mesa), they cannot be secured through separately-filed cases where
issues of jurisdiction may arise and whose rulings may conflict with one another.
DOCTRINE: Related to topic first, then other doctrines.
FACTS:
65. At around one oclock in the morning of 27 July 2003, three hundred
twenty-one (321) officers and enlisted personnel of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) entered and took over the premises of the Oakwood
Premiere Luxury Apartments in Makati City to air their grievances against
the administration of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (PGMA). They
declared their withdrawal of support from the Commander-in-Chief of the
AFP, and demanded her resignation and that of the members of her cabinet
and top officers of both the AFP and the Philippine National Police (PNP).
66. At about one oclock in the afternoon of the same day, PGMA issued
Proclamation No. 427 declaring the country to be under a state of
rebellion. Consequently, she issued General Order No. 4 directing the AFP
and the PNP to carry out all reasonable measures, giving due regard to
constitutional rights, to suppress and quell the rebellion.
67. After a series of negotiations between the soldiers and the government
negotiators, the former agreed to return to barracks, thus ending the
occupation of Oakwood.
68. Among those involved in the occupation of Oakwood were Cezari Gonzales
and Julius Mesa, both enlisted personnel of the Philippine Navy. It is in
their behalf that the Petition for Habeas Corpus was filed before the Court
of Appeals.
69. On 2 August 2003, then AFP Chief of Staff Narciso L. Abaya issued a
directive to all Major Service Commanders and to the Chief of the
Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (ISAFP)
regarding the Custody of Military Personnel Involved in the Mutiny. On the
strength thereof, Gonzales and Mesa were taken into custody by their
Service Commander.
70. Gonzales and Mesa were charged before the RTC of Makati City, with the
crime of Coup Detat as defined under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal
Code. On 18 November 2003, a Commitment Order was issued by the RTC
committing custody of the persons of Gonzales and Mesa to the
Commanding Officer of Fort San Felipe Naval Base, Cavite City. On 8
 December 2003, Gonzales and Mesa were discharged from military service.
71. In a Manifestation and Motion, Commodore Normando Naval, Commander
of Naval Base Cavite, asked the Makati RTC to relieve him of his duty as
custodian of Gonzales and Mesa and that the latter be transferred to the
Makati City Jail. In an Order, the RTC relieved him of his duty but ordered
the transfer of Gonzales and Mesa from the Naval
Base Cavite in Sangley Point to the Philippine Marine Brigade
Headquarters, Fort Bonifacio under the custody of the Commander of the
Marine Brigade of the Philippine Marines.
72. RTC resolved the petitions for bail filed by the accused-soldiers. It admitted
Gonzales and Mesa, and twenty-five other co-accused to bail pegging the
amount thereof at P100,000.00 each. Both Gonzales and Mesa posted bail.
RTC issued orders directing the Commanding Officer of Philippine Marine
Corps to release Gonzales and Mesa from his custody. Despite said orders
and their service to the marines, Gonzales and Mesa were not released.
73. The People of the Philippines moved for partial reconsideration of the order
granting bail. Prior to the resolution of said motion, Chief State Prosecutor,
advised Brig. Gen. Manuel F. Llena, Judge Advocate General, to defer
action on the provisional release of Gonzales and Mesa until the Motion for
Reconsideration shall have been resolved and attained finality. The RTC
denied the motion for partial reconsideration.
74. Since Gonzales and Mesa continued to be in detention, a Petition
for Habeas Corpus was filed by Pulido on their behalf. In support thereof, it
was argued that since Gonzales and Mesa are no longer subject to Military
Law as they had been discharged from the service on 8 December 2003, and
since they are not charged before a court martial, the military authorities
have no jurisdiction to detain them, and there is no legal ground to detain
them further because a court order for their release had already been issued.
75. The Court of Appeals (3rd Division) issued a Writ of Habeas
Corpus directing respondents Gen. Efren Abu, Chief of Staff of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, and all persons acting in his stead and under his
authority, and Gen. Ernesto de Leon, Flag Officer in Command of the
Philippine Navy, and all persons acting in his stead and under his authority,
to produce the bodies of Gonzales and Mesa before the Court and to appear
and show the cause and validity of their detention.
76. A return of the Writ of Habeas Corpus was made. Respondents prayed that
ISSUE/s:
the Petition for Habeas Corpus be dismissed primarily on two grounds: (1)
the continued detention of Gonzales and Mesa is justified because of the
pendency of the Petition for Certiorari questioning the order of the RTC
granting bail to Gonzales and Mesa; and (2) petitioner is guilty of forum
shopping because of his failure to state in the petition that the order granting
bail has been elevated to the Court of Appeals and pending before
its 7th Division.
77. The Court of Appeals (7th Division) rendered its decision dismissing the
petition that questioned the propriety of the granting of bail to
Gonzales, Mesa, and twenty-five of their co-accused.
78. The Court of Appeals (3rd Division) dismissed the Petition for Habeas
Corpus for violation of Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. The records
show that the present petition contained a certificate of non-forum
shopping.
79. The present petition and its accompanying certification likewise show that
the petitioner never mentioned the pendency before the Seventh Division of
this Court of the certiorari. The petitioner, who is also the counsel for the
accused Gonzales and Mesa in the criminal case before Branch 148 RTC
Makati City and who represents Gonzales and Mesa as private respondents
in CA-G.R. SP No. 88440, cannot feign ignorance of the pendency of the
certiorari case. Why he deliberately kept the pendency of the certiorari case
from the court, has not been sufficiently explained. His deliberate act of
withholding information on a material fact directly required to be disclosed
by the Rules of Court cannot but have legal consequences.
80. The primary basis of the present petition is the bail granted to and posted
by Gonzales and Mesa. This is very clear from the petitioners argument that
The continued detention of the enlisted personnel constitutes violation of
the lawful orders of the civilian court. He cited in support of this argument
the grant and the posting of the bail, and the issuance of the release orders
by the lower court. He did not disclose, however, what subsequently
happened to the order granting bail. He deliberately omitted in his narration
the fact that the People moved to reconsider this order. Thus, he gave the
impression that the order granting bail immediately became enforceable
and that Gonzales and Mesas continued detention is illegal because their
constitutional rights to bail, which have received judicial imprimatur, were
continuously being violated by the respondents.
81. The certiorari case filed by the People seeks to prevent the release of
Gonzales and Mesa by annulling the lower courts grant of bail. The present
petition, on the other hand, was filed in behalf of Gonzales and Mesa to
secure their immediate release because the order granting bail is
already executory. In effect, the petitioner seeks to implement through a
petition for habeas corpus the provisional release from detention that the
lower court has ordered.
12. [MAIN] Whether the provisional release of Gonzales and Mesa can be
obtained through a petition for habeas corpus when the validity of the grant
of bail and the release under bail are live questions before another Division
of the Court. NO –There is no basis for a release on habeas corpus if the
matter before the court is already before another co-equal body whose
ruling will be finally determinative of the issue of Gonzales and Mesas
 release. motion for reconsideration and the Petition for Certiorari, petitioner claims
that the same has no legal relevance to the Petition for Habeas Corpus
13. Whether petitioner committed forum shopping. YES – the main issue in
because at the time he filed said petition, the order granting bail subsisted
both cases boils down to whether Gonzales and Mesa should be released on
and has not been reversed or modified.
bail, while the ultimate relief sought by petitioner in both
the certiorari and habeas corpus cases is the release of Gonzales 2. For filing a Petition for Habeas Corpus despite the pendency of the Petition
and Mesa. Because of the presence of the elements of litis pendentia -- for Certiorari that questioned the validity of the order granting bail, which
parties, reliefs and issue are substantially the same/similar in the two cases; order is precisely the very basis of the Petition for Habeas Corpus,
and any decision in the certiorari case will be binding on the habeas petitioner is guilty of forum shopping.
corpus case petitioner is thus guilty of forum shopping.
3. The Court has laid down the yardstick to determine whether a party violated
the rule against forum shopping, as where the elements of litis pendentia are
present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in
RULING: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of
the other. Stated differently, there must be between the two cases: (a)
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 90546 dated 12 September 2005 is AFFIRMED. Costs
identity of parties; (b) identity of rights asserted and reliefsprayed for, the
against the petitioner.
relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two
preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the other action
will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the
RATIO: action under consideration.
Issue 1 4. The ultimate relief sought by petitioner in both the certiorari and habeas
44. Court held that this cannot and should not be done as this is precisely the corpus cases is the release of Gonzales and Mesa. Petitioner should not
reason why the rule against forum shopping has been put in place. The have filed the Petition for Habeas Corpus because the relief he is seeking
remedies sought being two sides of the same coin (i.e., the release of therein is the same relief he is asking for in the certiorari case. Moreover,
Gonzales and Mesa), they cannot be secured through separately-filed cases the main issue in both cases boils down to whether Gonzales
where issues of jurisdiction may arise and whose rulings may conflict with and Mesa should be released on bail. Because of the presence of the
one another. There is no basis for a release on habeas corpus if the same elements of litis pendentia -- parties, reliefs and issue are substantially the
Court will rule in the certiorari case that the grant of bail is improper. For same/similar in the two cases; and any decision in the certiorari case will be
this very same reason, court should not entertain the present petition as the binding on the habeas corpus case petitioner is thus guilty of forum
matter before the court is already before another co-equal body whose shopping.
ruling will be finally determinative of the issue of Gonzales and Mesas
release. The Decision of the Seventh Division of this Court, ordering the
release on bail of Gonzales and Mesa drives home this point.
45. The petitioner committed forum shopping in the strict sense of that term i.e.,
the attempt by a party, after an adverse opinion in one forum, to seek a
favorable opinion in another forum. The adverse aspect for the petitioner,
while not an opinion, is no less adverse as he has failed to secure the release
of Gonzales and Mesa before the lower court and before this Court in the
certiorari case; thus, he came to CA in the present petition. That the Seventh
Division of the CA has ordered the release on bail of the soldiers-accused,
thus rendering the present petition moot and academic after the finality of
the 7th Division Decision, plainly demonstrates this legal reality.
Issue 2
1. To support his contention that there was no forum shopping, petitioner
asserts that the issues in the petitions for certiorari and habeas corpus are
not similar/identical. As to his non-disclosure of respondents filing of the
 069 TAPUZ v. DEL ROSARIO (CASTILLO)
17 June 2008 | Brion, J. | Writ of Amparo and Writ of Habeas Data
PETITIONERS: Daniel Masangkay Tapuz, et al.
RESPONDENTS: Honorable Judge Elmo del Rosario, Sheriff Nelson Dela
Cruz, PNP, CA in Cebu 18th Div, Spouses Gregorio Sanson and Lourdes T.
Sanson
SUMMARY: Spouses Sanson filed a complaint before the MCTC of Aklan
for forcible entry with damages Tupaz et al (Heirs of Antonio Tupaz and 120
other John Does). The Spouses allege that they own 1 hectare of land as
evidenced by the TCT in their name, and that Tupaz et al, one morning, came
in to the property armed with bolos and suspected firearms, with force and
intimidation, took possession of the disputed property of the Spouses and
built a nipa and bamboo structure. MCTC ruled in favor of the Souses,
finding that the latter had previous possession of the disputed land since 1993
up to 2006 when the land was taken, and that the land in question had a
concrete and cyclone wire perimeter fence around it. The MCTC rendered a
decision in favor of Spouses. Petitioners Tupaz et al appealed to the RTC.
Upon motion of the Spouses, the RTC granted the issuance of a preliminary
mandatory injunction and also issued a writ of demolition against the Tupaz
et al. The MR filed by the Tupaz et al was denied. Tupaz et al went to the CA
with Petition for Review of the Permanent Mandatory Injunction and Order
of Demolition. While the case was pending in the CA, the Sheriff of Aklan
served the Notice to Vacate and for Demolition to the Tupaz et al. Thus, the
Tupaz et al came before the SC praying for 3 remedies: Certiorari under Rule
65, the issuance of the writ of Habeas Data and the issuance of the writ of
Amparo. Issues are WoN the petition for certiorari is proper. NO - The petition
for certiorari should also be dismissed for formal deficiencies, for violation of
the non-forum shopping rule, for having been filed out of time, and for
substantive deficiencies [NOT UNDER TOPIC].
WoN the issuance of a writ of amparo is proper. NO — Fatally defective in
substance and in form. *doc 1* What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns
that are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue
on amorphous and uncertain grounds. Rather than acts of terrorism that pose a
continuing threat to the persons of the petitioners, the violent incidents
alleged appear to us to be purely property-related and focused on the disputed
land. The writ shall issue if the Court is preliminarily satisfied with the prima
facie existence of the ultimate facts determinable from the supporting
affidavits that detail the circumstances of how and to what extent a threat to
or violation of the rights to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party
was or is being committed. If at all, issues relating to the right to life or to
liberty can hardly be discerned except to the extent that the occurrence of past
violence has been alleged. The right to security, on the other hand, is alleged
only to the extent of the threats and harassments implied from the presence of
“armed men bare to the waist” and the alleged pointing and firing of weapons.
Notably, none of the supporting affidavits compellingly show that the threat
to the rights to life, liberty and security of the petitioners is imminent or is
continuing. Thus, if Tapuz et al wish to seek redress and hold the alleged
perpetrators criminally accountable, the remedy may lie more in the
realm of ordinary criminal prosecution rather than on the use of the
extraordinary remedy of the writ of amparo. (Please see Ratio # 12 for
justifying allegations in case sir asks)
WoN Whether or not the issuance of the writ of habeas data is proper. NO -
Fatally defective with respect to content and substance. *doc 2* These
allegations obviously lack what the Rule on Writ of Habeas Data requires as a
minimum, thus rendering the petition fatally deficient. Specifically, we see no
concrete allegations of unjustified or unlawful violation of the right to privacy
related to the right to life, liberty or security. Support for the habeas data
aspect of the present petition only alleges that: “Similarly, a petition for a
WRIT OF HABEAS DATA is prayed for so that the PNP may release the
report on the burning of the homes of the petitioners and the acts of violence
employed against them by the private respondents, furnishing the Court and
the petitioners with copy of the same; Petitioners apply for a WRIT OF
HABEAS DATA commanding the Philippine National Police [PNP] to
produce the police report pertaining to the burning of the houses of the
petitioners in the land in dispute and likewise the investigation report if an
investigation was conducted by the PNP.”
DOCTRINE 1: The Writ of Amparo was originally conceived as a response
to the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced
disappearances, and to the perceived lack of available and effective remedies
to address these extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address violations of
or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and
independent remedy beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as
a remedy supplemental to these Rules.
DOCTRINE 2: Section 6 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data requires the
following material allegations of ultimate facts in a petition for the issuance
of a writ of habeas data: “(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner and
the respondent; (b) The manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened
and how it affects the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party;
(c) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to secure the data or
information; (d) The location of the files, registers or databases, the
 government office, and the person in charge, in possession or in control of the
data or information, if known; (e) The reliefs prayed for, which may include
the updating, rectification, suppression or destruction of the database or
information or files kept by the respondent. In case of threats, the relief may
include a prayer for an order enjoining the act complained of; and (f) Such
other relevant reliefs as are just and equitable.”
FACTS:
1. Private respondent spouses Gregorio Sanson and Ma. Lourdes T.
Sanson (Spouses) filed with the Fifth MCTC of Aklan a complaint
for forcible entry and damages with a prayer for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against the petitioners
Daniel Masangkay Tapuz, Aurora Tapuz-Madriaga, Liberty M.
Asuncion, Ladylyn Bamos Madriaga, Everly Tapuz Madriaga, Excel
Tapuz, Ivan Tapuz and Marian Timbas (Petitioners Tapuz, et al) and
other John Does numbering about 120.
2. Spouses allege in their complaint that:
a. they are the registered owners under TCT No. 35813 of a
1.0093-hectare parcel of land located at Sitio Pinaungon,
Balabag, Boracay, Malay, Aklan (the “disputed land”);
b. they were the disputed land’s prior possessors when the
petitioners Tapuz et al —armed with bolos and carrying
suspected firearms and together with unidentified persons
numbering 120—entered the disputed land by force and
intimidation, without the private respondents’ permission
and against the objections of the private respondents’
security men, and built thereon a nipa and bamboo structure
3. In their Answer, Petitioners Tapuz, et al denied the allegations and
claimed:
a. they are the actual and prior possessors of the disputed land;
b. on the contrary, the private respondents are the intruders;
and
c. the private respondents’ certificate of title to the disputed
property is spurious.
4. Petitioners Tapuz, et al asked for the dismissal of the complaint and
interposed a counterclaim for damages.
MCTC
5. MCTC rendered a decision in Respondent Spouses’ favor. It found
prior possession in the spouses’ favor.
a. Amended Commissioner’s Report and Sketch showed that
the land in question is enclosed by a concrete and cyclone
wire perimeter fence constructed by Spouses 14 years ago.
6. Corroborated the view that Tapuz et al entered a portion of the land
in question on January 4, 2005 with view of inhabiting the same and
building structures therein prompting Spouses to confront them
before BSPU with Police Chief Inspector Wanky and Brgy Captain
Sacapaño wherein Tapuz et al agreed to vacate the disputed portion
of the land in question and agreed not to build any structures thereon.
7. Spouses also posted security guards.
8. On April 19, 2006, Tapuz et al, some with bolos and one carrying a
sack suspected to contain firearms with other John Does numbering
about 120 persons by force and intimidation forcibly entered the
premises along the road and built a nipa and bamboo structure inside
the lot in question which incident was promptly reported to the
proper authorities as shown by spouses’ Certification of the entry in
the police blotter.
9. Tapuz et al contend that prior to January 4, 2005 they are already
occupants of the property, being indigenous settlers of the same,
under claim of ownership by open continuous, adverse possession to
the exclusion of other.
10. The Court finds this untenable because of the existence of the fence
and the inconsistency of their allegations.
RTC
11. Tapuz et al appealed the decision to the RTC.
12. Judge Del Rosario granted the spouses’ motion for writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction with bond posted.
13. Tapuz et al moved to reconsider the issuance of the writ, while
 spouses filed a motion for demolition.
14. Respondent Judge subsequently denied Tapuz et al’s Motion for
Reconsideration and to Defer Enforcement of Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction.
15. Meanwhile, Tapuz et al opposed the motion for demolition. The
respondent Judge still issued via a Special Order a writ of demolition
to be implemented 15 days after the Sheriff’s written notice to the
petitioners to voluntarily demolish their house/s to allow the private
respondents to effectively take actual possession of the land.
CA
16. Tapuz et al filed with CA of Cebu a Petition for Review of the
Permanent Mandatory Injunction and Order of Demolition.
17. Sheriff Dela Cruz issued the Notice to Vacate and for Demolition.
18. Tapuz et al now filed the present petition.
19. The petition contains and prays for three remedies, namely: a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court; the
issuance of a writ of habeas data under the Rule on the Writ of
Habeas Data; and finally, the issuance of the writ of amparo under
the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
20. The petitioners maintain their claims of prior possession of the
disputed land and of intrusion into this land by the private
respondents. They based the issuance of the writ of amparo on the
following material factual allegations:
a. Armed men sporting 12 gauge shot guns intruded into the
property of the defendants [the land in dispute]. They were
not in uniform.
b. Later, the houses burned to ashes.
c. These armed men removed the barbed wire fence put up by
defendants to protect their property from intruders.
d. These acts of TERRORISM and (heinous crime) of ARSON
were reported by one of the heirs of Antonio Tupaz. Their
act is a blatant violation of the law penalizing Acts of
Violence against women and children, which is aggravated
by the use of high- powered weapons.
e. That the threats to the life and security of the poor indigent
and unlettered petitioners continue because the private
respondents Sansons have under their employ armed men
and they are influential with the police authorities owing to
their financial and political clout.
f. The actual prior occupancy, as well as the ownership of the
lot in dispute by defendants and the atrocities of the terrorists
are attested by witnesses who are persons not related to the
defendants are therefore disinterested witnesses in the case.
ISSUE/s:
1. [ISSUE NOT UNDER TOPIC] Whether or not the petition for
certiorari is proper. NO - The petition for certiorari should also be
dismissed for formal deficiencies, for violation of the non-forum
shopping rule, for having been filed out of time, and for substantive
deficiencies.
2. Whether or not the issuance of a writ of amparo is proper. NO —
Fatally defective in substance and in form. Rather than acts of
terrorism that pose a continuing threat to the persons of the
petitioners, the violent incidents alleged appear to us to be purely
property-related and focused on the disputed land.
3. Whether or not the issuance of the writ of habeas data is proper. NO
- Fatally defective with respect to content and substance. These
allegations obviously lack what the Rule on Writ of Habeas Data
requires as a minimum, thus rendering the petition fatally deficient.
Specifically, we see no concrete allegations of unjustified or
unlawful violation of the right to privacy related to the right to life,
liberty or security.
RULING: WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DISMISS the present
petition OUTRIGHT for deficiencies of form and substance patent from its body and
attachments.
RATIO:
Issue 1
4. The petition for certiorari should also be dismissed for formal
deficiencies, for violation of the non-forum shopping rule, for
having been filed out of time, and for substantive deficiencies.
 5. Based on the same material antecedents, we find too that the
petitioners have been guilty of willful and deliberate
misrepresentation before this Court and, at the very least, of forum
shopping.
6. Additionally, the required verification and certification of non-forum
shopping is defective as one (1) of the seven (7) petitioners—Ivan
Tapuz—did not sign, in violation of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 7;
Section 3, Rule 46; Section 1, Rule 65; all in relation with Rule 56 of
the Revised Rules of Court.
7. In any event, we find the present petition for certiorari, on its face
and on the basis of the supporting attachments, to be devoid of merit.
8. The MCTC correctly assumed jurisdiction over the private
respondents’ complaint, which specifically alleged a cause for
forcible entry and not—as petitioners may have misread or
misappreciated —a case involving title to or possession of realty or
an interest therein.
Issue 2
9. The writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to the
extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced
disappearances, and to the perceived lack of available and effective
remedies to address these extraordinary concerns.
10. It is intended to address violations of or threats to the rights to life,
liberty or security, as an extraordinary and independent remedy
beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy
supplemental to these Rules.
11. What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or
commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and
uncertain grounds.
12. Consequently, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo—in line with the
extraordinary character of the writ and the reasonable certainty that
its issuance demands—requires that every petition for the issuance of
the writ must be supported by justifying allegations of fact, to wit:
a. The personal circumstances of the petitioner;
b. The name and personal circumstances of the respondent
responsible for the threat, act or omission, or, if the name is
unknown or uncertain, the respondent may be described by an
assumed appellation;
c. The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party
violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or
omission of the respondent, and how such threat or violation is
committed with the attendant circumstances detailed in supporting
affidavits;
d. The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal
circumstances, and addresses of the investigating authority or
individuals, as well as the manner and conduct of the investigation,
together with any report;
e. The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the
fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the identity of the
person responsible for the threat, act or omission; and
f. The relief prayed for. (may include general prayer for just and
equitable reliefs)
13. The writ shall issue if the Court is preliminarily satisfied with the
prima facie existence of the ultimate facts determinable from the
supporting affidavits that detail the circumstances of how and to
what extent a threat to or violation of the rights to life, liberty and
security of the aggrieved party was or is being committed.
14. The petition for the issuance of the writ is anchored on the factual
allegations and other documents containing statements attached.
15. On the whole, what is clear from these statements—both sworn and
unsworn—is the overriding involvement of property issues as the
petition traces its roots to questions of physical possession of the
property disputed by the private parties.
16. If at all, issues relating to the right to life or to liberty can hardly be
discerned except to the extent that the occurrence of past violence
has been alleged.
17. The right to security, on the other hand, is alleged only to the extent
of the threats and harassments implied from the presence of “armed
men bare to the waist” and the alleged pointing and firing of
weapons.
18. Notably, none of the supporting affidavits compellingly show that
the threat to the rights to life, liberty and security of the petitioners is
 imminent or is continuing.
19. A closer look at the statements shows that at least two of them are
practically identical and unsworn.
20. As against these allegations are the cited MCTC factual findings in
its decision in the forcible entry case which rejected all the
petitioners’ factual claims.
21. These findings are significantly complete and detailed, as they were
made under a full-blown judicial process, i.e., after examination and
evaluation of the contending parties’ positions, evidence and
arguments and based on the report of a court-appointed
commissioner.
22. We preliminarily examine these conflicting factual positions under
the backdrop of a dispute that was brought to and ruled upon by the
MCTC; subsequently brought to the RTC on an appeal that is still
pending; still much later brought to the appellate court without
conclusive results; and then brought to us on interlocutory incidents
involving a plea for the issuance of the writ of amparo that, if
decided as the petitioners advocate, may render the pending RTC
appeal moot.
23. Court is not satisfied based on the ultimate facts that issuance of a
writ of amparo is justified.
24. Rather than acts of terrorism that pose a continuing threat to the
persons of Tupaz et al, the violent incidents alleged appear to us to
be purely property-related and focused on the disputed land.
25. Thus, if Tapuz et al wish to seek redress and hold the alleged
perpetrators criminally accountable, the remedy may lie more in
the realm of ordinary criminal prosecution rather than on the
use of the extraordinary remedy of the writ of amparo.
26. We cannot fail but consider too at this point the indicators, clear and
patent to us, that the petitioners’ present recourse via the remedy of
the writ of amparo is a mere subterfuge to negate the assailed orders
that the petitioners sought and failed to nullify before the appellate
court because of the use of an improper remedial measure.
27. Where, as in this case, there is an ongoing civil process dealing
directly with the possessory dispute and the reported acts of violence
and harassment, we see no point in separately and directly
intervening through a writ of amparo in the absence of any clear
prima facie showing that the right to life, liberty or security—the
personal concern that the writ is intended to protect—is immediately
in danger or threatened, or that the danger or threat is continuing.
28. We see no legal bar, however, to an application for the issuance of
the writ, in a proper case, by motion in a pending case on appeal or
on certiorari, applying by analogy the provisions on the co-existence
of the writ with a separately filed criminal case.
Issue 2
29. Section 6 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data requires the
following material allegations of ultimate facts in a petition for the
issuance of a writ of habeas data:
a. The personal circumstances of the petitioner and the
respondent;
b. The manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and
how it affects the right to life, liberty or security of the
aggrieved party;
c. The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to secure
the data or information;
d. The location of the files, registers or databases, the
government office, and the person in charge, in possession or
in control of the data or information, if known;
e. The reliefs prayed for, which may include the updating,
rectification, suppression or destruction of the database or
information or files kept by the respondent. In case of
threats, the relief may include a prayer for an order enjoining
the act complained of; and
f. Such other relevant reliefs as are just and equitable.
30. Support for the habeas data aspect of the present petition only alleges
that:
a. Similarly, a petition for a WRIT OF HABEAS DATA is
prayed for so that the PNP may release the report on the
burning of the homes of the petitioners and the acts of
 violence employed against them by the private respondents,
furnishing the Court and the petitioners with copy of the
same;

b. Petitioners apply for a WRIT OF HABEAS DATA

commanding the Philippine National Police [PNP] to
produce the police report pertaining to the burning of the
houses of the petitioners in the land in dispute and likewise
the investigation report if an investigation was conducted by
the PNP.

31. These allegations obviously lack what the Rule on Writ of Habeas
Data requires as a minimum, thus rendering the petition fatally
deficient. Specifically, we see no concrete allegations of unjustified
or unlawful violation of the right to privacy related to the right to
life, liberty or security.

32. The petition likewise has not alleged, much less demonstrated, any
need for information under the control of police authorities other
than those it has already set forth as integral annexes.

33. The necessity or justification for the issuance of the writ, based on
the insufficiency of previous efforts made to secure information, has
not also been shown.

34. In sum, the prayer for the issuance of a writ of habeas data is nothing
more than the “fishing expedition” that this Court—in the course of
drafting the Rule on habeas data—had in mind in defining what the
purpose of a writ of habeas data is not.

35. In these lights, the outright denial of the petition for the issuance of
the writ of habeas data is fully in order.
 071 SECRETARY OF DEFENSE v. MANALO (Arcenas edited by CASTRO)
October 7, 2008 | Puno, C. J. | Writ of Amparo
PETITIONERS: The Secretary of National Defense, The Chief of Staff, Armed
Forces of The Philippines (Sec. of Defense et al)
RESPONDENTS: Raymond (Raymond) Manalo and Reynaldo Manalo
(Reynaldo) (together, the Manalos)
SUMMARY: The brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo, are farmers from
Bulacan who were suspected of being members and sympathizers of the
New People’s Army (NPA), were forcibly taken from their home, detained in
various locations (Fort Magsaysay, Bulacan, Zambales, Bataan etc), and
tortured by CAFGU and military units. Eventually, the brothers Raymond
and Reynaldo recognized their abductors as members of the armed forces
led by General Jovito Palparan. Gen. Palparan actually talked to the brother
to tell their parents to stop going to human rights hearings and from
pursuing the habeas corpus case they filed against several members of their
unit. They also learned that they were being held in place for their brother,
Bestre, a suspected leader of the communist insurgents. While in captivity,
they met other desaperacidos (UP students Karen Empeno and Sherlyn
Cadapan and another farmer, Manuel) who were also suspected of being
communist insurgents and members of the NPA. After eighteen months of
restrained liberty, torture and other dehumanizing acts, the brothers were
able to escape and file a petition for the writ of amparo (Note: originally
they filed a case for prohibition, injunction, and mandamus – however,
while the case was pending the Rules pertaining to writ of amparo was
promulgated and hence, the Manalo brothers decided to change the nature
of the case as a petition for writ of amparo)
Issues in the case are: (1) w/n CA erred in believing and giving full faith to
Raymond’s testimony. SC held NO. SC upheld the findings of the CA as the
participation of various officers and members of CAFGU in the abduction
and torture of Raymond were sufficiently established and that the
affidavit/testimony of Raymond was also duly corroborated by his brother
and doctor for the accounts of torture as evidenced by the medical reports
procured 2 days after they escaped captivity and Raymond’s familiarity of
the facilities of the bases where he was detained, specifically those facilities
in Fort Magsaysay such as the Division Training Unit (DTU) showing they
were detained for some time in the military facility.
(2) w/n Manalo brothers are entitled to the privilege of writ of amparo
there being a threat to their life and liberty and violation to their right of
security – YES. An individual’s right to security and right to life are protected
under the 1987 Constitution, UDHR and ICCPR. In the context of Section 1 of
the Amparo Rule, freedom from fear is the right and any threat to the rights
to life, liberty or security is the actionable wrong. Secondly, right to security
of person is a guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity or security and
when taken in the context of Physical injuries inflicted constitute more than
a search or invasion of the body and may constitute dismemberment,
physical disabilities, and painful physical intrusion. In sum, we conclude that
the Manalos’ right to security as freedom from threat is violated by the
apparent threat to their life, liberty and security of person. Their right to
security as a guarantee of protection by the government is likewise violated
by the ineffective investigation and protection on the part of the military.
The continuing threat to the Manalos’ right to life and security was found
by the SC in the following circumstances (note: despite the escape of the
Manalo brothers, being beyond the ambit of the definition of “enforced
disappearance” the court said that the continued threat to the right to life
and security is a sufficient basis to grant the writ of amparo): First, the
violation of the right to security as freedom from threat to Manalos’ life,
liberty and security. With their escape, this continuing threat to their life is
apparent, moreso now that they have surfaced and implicated specific
officers in the military not only in their own abduction and torture. Second,
the violation of the right to security as protection by the
government. Apart from the failure of military elements to provide
protection to the Manalos by themselves perpetrating the abduction,
detention, and torture, the AFP also miserably failed in conducting an
effective investigation of the Manalos’ abduction as revealed by the
testimony and one-day investigation report of Sec of Defense’s own
witness, Lt. Col. Ruben Jimenez.
DOCTRINE:
ON THE COVERAGE OF THE WRIT OF AMPARO:
As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, its coverage, in its present
form, is confined to these two instances or to threats thereof.
Extralegal killings - are killings committed without due process of law, i.e.,
without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings
Enforced disappearances - are attended by the following characteristics: an
arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a government official or
organized groups or private individuals acting with the direct or indirect
acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the
fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge
the deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the protection
of law.
ON WHAT CONSTITUTES FEAR OR THREAT:
In the context of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule, freedom from fear is the
right and any threat to the rights to life, liberty or security is the actionable
wrong. Fear is a state of mind, a reaction; threat is a stimulus, a cause of
action. Fear caused by the same stimulus can range from being baseless to
well-founded as people react differently. The degree of fear can vary from
one person to another with the variation of the prolificacy of their
imagination, strength of character or past experience with the stimulus.
Thus, in the amparo context, it is more correct to say that the right to
security is actually the freedom from threat
ON THE QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE NEEDED FOR THE AVAILMENT OF THE
WRIT AND THE NATURE OF ITS PROCEEDINGS
The remedy provides rapid judicial relief as it partakes of a summary
proceeding that requires only substantial evidence to make the
appropriate reliefs available to the petitioner in the writ
ON THE THREE ASPECTS OF RIGHT TO SECURITY
1. FREEDOM FROM FEAR
2. FREEDOM FROM BODILY OR PSYCHOLOGICAL FEAR
3. GUARANTEE FROM THE GOVERNMENT
FACTS5:
The abduction of the brothers
1. Raymond Manalo recounted that about one or two weeks before
February 14, 2006, several uniformed and armed soldiers and
members of the CAFGU summoned to a meeting all the residents of
their barangay in San Idelfonso, Bulacan. The Manalos were not
5
Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU)
able to attend as they were not informed of the gathering, but
Raymond saw some of the soldiers when he passed by
the barangay hall.
2. February 14, 2006 - Raymond was sleeping in their house in Buhol
na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. At past noon, several armed
soldiers wearing white shirts, fatigue pants and army boots, entered
their house and roused him.
a. They asked him if he was Bestre6, but his mother, Ester
Manalo, replied that he was Raymond, not Bestre.
b. Among the men who came to take him, Raymond
recognized brothers Michael de la Cruz, Madning de la Cruz,
Puti de la Cruz, and Pula de la Cruz, who all acted as lookout
and brothers Randy Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza, who
were all members of the CAFGU.
c. The men forced Raymond into a white L300 van, then he
was blindfolded.
d. Before being blindfolded, he saw the faces of the soldiers
who took him. Later, in his 18 months of captivity, he
learned their names.
i. Driver of van: Rizal Hilario alias Rollie Castillo, whom
he estimated was about 40 years of age or older.
ii. Leader of the team of the abduction: Ganata; he
was tall, thin, curly-haired and a bit old.
iii. Other abductor: George who was tall, thin, white-
skinned and about 30 years old
3. The van drove off, then came to a stop. A person was brought inside
the van and made to sit beside Raymond. Both of them were beaten
up. Later, he recognized the voice of the person beside him as his
brother Reynaldo.
The beatings/torture and interrogations in Fort Magsaysay
4. They arrived at a house where Raymond and Reynaldo were each
brought to a different room. Raymond saw several soldiers
continuously hitting his brother Reynaldo on the head and other
parts of his body with the butt of their guns for about 15
minutes. After which, Reynaldo was brought to Raymond’s room
and it was Raymond’s turn to be beaten up in the other room.
6
Their older brother, Rolando Manalo (“Ka Bestre”) is known as the NPA commander in their barangay
and that Raymond and Reynaldo are CPP NPA sympathizers. Ka Bestre apparently did a lot of summary
killings of the people in their barangay and those involved with CAFGU who abducted Raymond and
Reynaldo are family to the said victims of Ka Bestre.
 a. The soldiers asked him if he was a member of the New
Peoples Army (NPA). Each time he said he was not, he was
hit with the butt of their guns. He was questioned where
his comrades were, how many soldiers he had killed, and
how many NPA members he had helped. Each time he
answered none, they hit him.
5. In the next days, Raymond’s interrogators appeared to be high
officials as the soldiers who beat him up would salute them, call
them sir, and treat them with respect.
a. He was in blindfolds when interrogated by the high officials,
but he saw their faces when they arrived and before the
blindfold was put on.
b. He noticed that the uniform of the high officials was
different from those of the other soldiers.
c. One of those officials was tall and thin, wore white pants,
tie, and leather shoes, instead of combat boots.
d. He spoke in Tagalog and knew much about his parents and
family, and a habeas corpus case filed in connection with
the the Manalos’ abduction.
e. While these officials interrogated him, Raymond was not
manhandled. But once they had left, the soldier guards beat
him up.
f. When the guards got drunk, they also manhandled the
Manalos. During this time, Raymond was fed only at night,
usually with left-over and rotten food.
6. On the third week of the Manalos’ detention, two men arrived while
Raymond was sleeping and beat him up. They doused him with
urine and hot water, hit his stomach with a piece of wood, slapped
his forehead twice with a .45 pistol, punched him on the mouth, and
burnt some parts of his body with a burning wood. When he could
no longer endure the torture and could hardly breathe, they
stopped. They then subjected Reynaldo to the same ordeal in
another room. Before their torturers left, they warned Raymond
that they would come back the next day and kill him.
7. The following night, Raymond attempted to escape. He waited for
the guards to get drunk, then made noise with the chains put on
him to see if they were still awake.
a. When none of them came to check on him, he managed to
free his hand from the chains and jumped through the
window.
b. He passed through a helipad and firing range and stopped
near a fishpond where he used stones to break his chains.
c. After walking through a forested area, he came near a river
and an Iglesia ni Kristo church. He talked to some women
who were doing the laundry, asked where he was and the
road to Gapan. He was told that he was in Fort Magsaysay.
d. He reached the highway, but some soldiers spotted him,
forcing him to run away. The soldiers chased him and
caught up with him. They brought him to another place
near the entrance of what he saw was Fort Magsaysay.
e. He was boxed repeatedly, kicked, and hit with chains until
his back bled. They poured gasoline on him. Then a so-
called Mam or Madam suddenly called, saying that she
wanted to see Raymond before he was killed. The soldiers
ceased the torture and he was returned
inside Fort Magsaysay where Reynaldo was detained.
8. For some weeks, the Manalos had a respite from all the
torture. Their wounds were treated. When the wounds were almost
healed, the torture resumed, particularly when the guards got
drunk.
9. For about three and a half months, the Manalos were detained
in Fort Magsaysay.
a. They were kept in a small house with two rooms and a
kitchen. One room was made into the bartolina7. The house
was near the firing range, helipad and mango trees. At
dawn, soldiers marched by their house. They were also
sometimes detained in what he only knew as the DTU.
10. At the DTU, a male doctor came to examine them. He checked their
body and eyes, took their urine samples and marked them. When
asked how they were feeling, they replied that they had a hard time
urinating, their stomachs were aching, and they felt other pains in
their body. The next day, two ladies in white arrived. They also
examined them and gave them medicines, including orasol,
amoxicillin and mefenamic acid.
a. They brought with them the results of the Manalos urine
test and advised them to drink plenty of water and take
7
Raymond recalled that sometime in April until May 2006, he and his brother was detained in a room
enclosed by steel bars, measuring 1 x 2 meters called the bartolina. Eighteen people were detained there
and they did everything inside, including urinating, removing his bowels, bathing, eating and sleeping.
 their medicine. The two ladies returned a few more
times. Thereafter, medicines were sent through the master
of the DTU, Master Del Rosario alias Carinyoso at Puti.
b. The Manalos were kept in the DTU for about two
weeks. While there, he met a soldier named Efren who said
that Gen. Palparan ordered him to monitor and take care of
them.
Face-to-face with Gen. Palparan in Sapang
11. One day, Rizal Hilario fetched the Manalos in a Revo vehicle. They
went to a detachment in Pinaud, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. They were
detained for one or two weeks in a big two-storey house. Hilario
and Efren stayed with them. From Pinaud, Hilario and Efren
brought the Manalos to Sapang, San Miguel, Bulacan on board the
Revo. They were detained in a big unfinished house inside the
compound of Kapitan for about three months. When they arrived in
Sapang, Gen. Palparan talked to them.
a. They were brought out of the house to a basketball court in
the center of the compound and made to sit. Gen. Palparan
was already waiting, seated.
b. He was about two arms length away.
12. Raymond narrated his conversation with Gen. Palparan in his
affidavit, viz:
a. Tinanong ako ni Gen. Palparan, Ngayon na kaharap
mo na ako, di ka ba natatakot sa akin?
b. Sumagot akong, Siyempre po, natatakot din
c. Sabi ni Gen. Palparan: Sige, bibigyan ko kayo ng isang
pagkakataon na mabuhay, bastat sundin nyo ang lahat ng
sasabihin ko sabihin mo sa magulang mo huwag pumunta
sa mga rali, sa hearing, sa Karapatan at sa Human Right
dahil niloloko lang kayo. Sabihin sa magulang at lahat sa
bahay na huwag paloko doon. Tulungan kami na kausapin
si Bestre na sumuko na sa gobyerno. 8
13. The Manalos agreed to do as Gen. Palparan told them as they felt
they could not do otherwise. So they were brought to their parents’
house.
a. Raymond was shown to his parents while Reynaldo stayed
in the Revo because he still could not walk.
8 10
Parents of the Manalos filed a petition for habeas corpus.
b. In the presence of Hilario and other soldiers, Raymond
relayed to his parents what Gen. Palparan told him. As they
were afraid, Raymonds parents acceded.
c. Hilario threatened Raymonds parents that if they continued
to join human rights rallies, they would never see their
children again. The Manalos were then brought back to
Sapang.
14. They arrived and saw Gen. Palparan talking with the four
masters9. Gen. Palparan told Raymond to gain back his strength and
be healthy and to take the medicine he left for him and Reynaldo.10
a. He said that they should prove that they are on the side of
the military and warned that they would not be given
another chance.
b. One of the soldiers named Arman made Raymond take the
medicine left by Gen. Palparan, named Alive, which was
green and yellow.
c. Raymond and Reynaldo were each given a box of this
medicine and instructed to take one capsule a day. Arman
checked if they were getting their dose of the medicine. The
Alive made them sleep each time they took it, and they felt
heavy upon waking up.
15. After a few days, Hilario arrived again. He took Reynaldo and left
Raymond at Sapang.
a. Arman instructed Raymond that while in Sapang, he should
introduce himself as Oscar, a military trainee from Sariaya,
Quezon, assigned in Bulacan. While there, he saw again
Ganata, one of the men who abducted him from his house,
and got acquainted with other military men and civilians.
Held captive in Camp Tecson – detachment of the rangers – meeting other
detainees
16. After about three months in Sapang, Raymond was brought
to Camp Tecson under the 24th Infantry Battalion.
a. He was fetched by three unidentified men in a big white
vehicle. Efren went with them.
9
Arman, Ganata, Hilario and Cabalse
Note: During his testimony, Raymond identified Gen. Palparan by his picture.
 b. Raymond was then blindfolded. After a 30-minute ride, his
blindfold was removed. Chains were put on him and he was
kept in the barracks.
17. The next day, Raymonds learned he was in a detachment of the
rangers when he was ordered to clean outside the barracks.
a. There were many soldiers, hundreds of them were
training.
b. In one of the rooms therein, he met Sherlyn Cadapan from
Laguna.
i. She told him that she was a student of the
University of the Philippines and was abducted in
Hagonoy, Bulacan.
ii. She confided that she had been subjected to severe
torture and raped. She was crying and longing to go
home and be with her parents. During the day, her
chains were removed and she was made to do the
laundry.
18. After a week, Reynaldo was also brought to Camp Tecson.
a. Two days from his arrival, two other captives, Karen Empeo
and Manuel Merino, arrived11.
i. Karen and Manuel were put in the room with Allan
whose name they later came to know as Donald
Caigas, called master or commander by his men in
the 24th Infantry Battalion.
b. Raymond and Reynaldo were put in the adjoining room. At
times, Raymond and Reynaldo were threatened, and
Reynaldo was beaten up. In the daytime, their chains were
removed, but were put back on at night. They were
threatened that if they escaped, their families would all be
killed.
19. October 6, 2006, Hilario arrived in Camp Tecson. (8th month of
detention)
a. He told the detainees that they should be thankful they
were still alive and should continue along their renewed
life.
b. Before the hearing of November 6 or 8, 2006, the Manalos
were brought to their parents to instruct them not to
11
Trivia: Karen Empeo and Sherylyn Cadapan were UP students who were also abducted as suspected
members of the Communist Party of the Philippines. A farmer, Manuel Merino, 57, came to the students’
aid but was also taken, witnesses said.
attend the hearing. However, their parents had already left
for Manila. The Manalos were brought back
to Camp Tecson.
c. They stayed in that camp from September 2006 to
November 2006, and Raymond was instructed to continue
using the name Oscar and holding himself out as a military
trainee. He got acquainted with soldiers of the
24th Infantry Battalion whose names and descriptions he
stated in his affidavit.
Transferred to Limay, Bataan Camp (9th -15th month of detention)
20. November 22, 2006 - they, along with Sherlyn, Karen, and Manuel,
were transferred to a camp of the 24th Infantry Battalion in
Limay, Bataan.
21. They stayed in that camp until May 8, 2007 (15th month of
detention)
22. Some soldiers of the battalion stayed with them. While there,
battalion soldiers whom Raymond knew as Mar and Billy beat him
up and hit him in the stomach with their guns. Sherlyn and Karen
also suffered enormous torture in the camp. They were all made to
clean, cook, and help in raising livestock.
Operation Lubog of the 24th Infantry Battalion
23. Raymond recalled that when Operation Lubog was launched, Caigas
and some other soldiers brought him and Manuel with them to take
and kill all sympathizers of the NPA.
a. They were brought to Barangay Bayan-
bayanan, Bataan where he witnessed the killing of an old
man doing kaingin. The soldiers said he was killed because
he had a son who was a member of the NPA and he coddled
NPA members in his house
b. Also, Raymond was brought to Barangay Orion in a house
where NPA men stayed. When they arrived, only the old
man of the house who was sick was there. They spared him
and killed only his son right before Raymonds eyes.
Transferred to a safehouse in Zambales then back to Limay (16th month of
detention) – the UP students and Manuel were killed at this time
24. From Limay, the five detainees were transferred to Zambales, in a
safehouse near the sea. Like in Limay, they were made to do
errands and chores. They stayed in Zambales from May 8 or 9, 2007
until June 2007
 25. In June 2007, Caigas brought the five back to the camp in
Limay. Raymond, Reynaldo, and Manuel were tasked to bring food
to detainees brought to the camp. Raymond narrated what he
witnessed and experienced in the camp, viz: (see end of digest for
full version)
a. Ikinadena kami ng 3 araw. Sa ikatlong araw, nilabas ni Lat si
Manuel dahil kakausapin daw siya ni Gen.
Palparan. Nakapiring si Manuel, wala siyang suot pang-
itaas, pinosasan. Nilakasan ng mga sundalo ang tunog na
galing sa istiryo ng sasakyan. Di nagtagal, narinig ko ang
hiyaw o ungol ni Manuel. Sumilip ako sa isang haligi ng
kamalig at nakita kong sinisilaban si Manuel.
Xxxx xxxx xxxx
b. Tinanggal ang aming kadena. Kinausap kami ni
Donald. Tinanong kami kung ano ang sabi ni Manuel sa
amin. Sabi ni Donald huwag na raw naming hanapin ang
dalawang babae at si Manuel, dahil magkakasama na yung
tatlo. Sabi pa ni Donald na kami ni Reynaldo ay magbagong
buhay at ituloy namin ni Reynaldo ang trabaho. Sa gabi,
hindi na kami kinakadena.
Transferred to Pangasinan and plot to escape (18th month of detention)
26. Roughly June 13, 2007 - Raymond and Reynaldo were brought to
Pangasinan, ostensibly to raise poultry for Donald (Caigas).
a. Caigas told the Manalos to also farm his land, in exchange
for which, he would take care of the food of their family.
b. They were also told that they could farm a small plot
adjoining his land and sell their produce.
c. They were no longer put in chains and were instructed to
use the names Rommel (for Raymond) and Rod (for
Reynaldo) and represent themselves as cousins from Rizal,
Laguna
27. The Manalos started to plan their escape. They could see the
highway from where they stayed.
a. They helped farm adjoining lands for which they were paid
Php200.00 or Php400.00 and they saved their
earnings. When they had saved Php1,000.00 each,
Raymond asked a neighbor how he could get a cellular
phone as he wanted to exchange text messages with a girl
who lived nearby.
b. A phone was pawned to him, but he kept it first and did not
use it. They earned some more until they had saved
Php1,400.00 between them.
28. Raymond and Reynaldo were housed in one of four houses while
their guards lived in the other three. Caigas entrusted the Manalos
to Nonong, the head of the guards.
a. There was no electricity so they used a lamp. There was no
television, but they had a radio.
b. In the evening of August 13, 2007, Nonong and his cohorts
had a drinking session. At about 1:00 a.m., Raymond turned
up the volume of the radio. When none of the guards
awoke and took notice, Raymond and Reynaldo proceeded
towards the highway, leaving behind their sleeping guards
and barking dogs. They boarded a bus bound
for Manila and were thus freed from captivity.
29. Dr. Benito Molino, M.D., corroborated the accounts of Raymond
and Reynaldo Manalo.
a. Dr. Molino specialized in forensic medicine and was
connected with the Medical Action Group, an organization
handling cases of human rights violations, particularly cases
where torture was involved.
b. He was requested by an NGO to conduct medical
examinations on the Manalos after their escape. He first
asked them about their ordeal, then proceeded with the
physical examination. His findings showed that the scars
borne by the Manalos were consistent with their account of
physical injuries inflicted upon them.
c. The examination was conducted on August 15, 2007, two
days after the escape, and the results thereof were reduced
into writing.
d. Dr. Molino took photographs of the scars. He testified that
he followed the Istanbul Protocol in conducting the
examination
THE PROCEEDINGS
30. This case was originally a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) filed before this Court the
Manalos on August 23, 2007 to stop Sec. of Defense et al and/or
 their officers and agents from depriving them of their right to liberty
and other basic rights.12
31. While the August 23, 2007 Petition was pending, the Rule on the
Writ of Amparo took effect on October 24, 2007.
a. So, the Manalos filed a Manifestation and Omnibus Motion
to Treat Existing Petition as Amparo Petition, to Admit
Supporting Affidavits, and to Grant Interim and
Final Amparo Reliefs.
32. August 24, 2007 SC RESOLUTION: SC ordered Secretary of Defense
et al to submit their comment and enjoin them from arresting the
Manalos or otherwise restrict their right to life, liberty and other
basic rights; Court granted and resolved to treat the August 23,
2007 Petition as a petition under the Amparo Rule and remanded
the case to the CA to conduct a summary hearing.
33. CA DECISION: in favor of the Manalos granting the privilege of the
writ of amparo ad required the Sec of Defense to furnish the court
and the Manalos a copy of the unofficial report os investigation
taken in connection to their abduction, to confirm in writing the
official assignment of Hilario and Caigas and all relevant medical
reports of the Manalos in their custody.
34. Hence, this appeal.
35. Sec. of Defense et al admitted that there was abduction but
denying any involvement. That such fact was already settled in the
habeas corpus case filed by the Parents of the Manalos before the
CA. There was no evidence introduced that would establish the
personal involvement of various officers and members of the AFP
and CAFGU in the taking of the Manalos. 13
a. Sec of Defense also attested that he assumed office only on
August 8, 2007 and was thus unaware of the Manalo
brothers alleged abduction and claimed that the Secretary
of National Defense does not engage in actual military
directional operations, neither does he undertake
12
Also sought other ancillary: Protective Custody Orders, Appointment of Commissioner, Inspection and
Access Orders, and all other legal and equitable reliefs under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the 1987
Constitution and Rule 135, Section 6 of the Rules of Court
13
CA dropped as party Lt. Gen. Hermogenes C. Esperon, Jr., then Commanding General of the Philippine
Army, and on September 19, 2006, Maj. (sic) Jovito S. Palparan, then Commanding General, 7 th Infantry
Division, Philippine Army, stationed at Fort Magsaysay, Palayan City, Nueva Ecija, upon a finding that
no evidence was introduced to establish their personal involvement in the taking of the Manalo brothers;
also exonerated M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario aka Rollie Castillo for lack of evidence establishing his involvement
in any capacity in the disappearance of the Manalo brothers, although it held that the remaining others
were illegally detaining the Manalo brothers and ordered them to release the latter
command directions of the AFP units in the field, nor in any
way micromanage the AFP operations. The principal
responsibility of the Secretary of National Defense is
focused in providing strategic policy direction to the
Department (bureaus and agencies) including the AFP.
b. That he, as Secretary of Defense, issued a Memorandum
Directive, addressed to the Chief of Staff, AFP that the AFP
should adopt the rules of action in the event the Writ
of Amparo is issued by a competent court against any
members of the AFP (see end of digest)
ISSUE/s:
1. w/n CA erred in believing and giving full faith to Raymond’s
testimony – NO. SC upheld the findings of the CA as the
participation of various officers and members of CAFGU in the
abduction and torture of Raymond were sufficiently established and
that the affidavit/testimony of Raymond was also duly corroborated
by his brother and doctor (for the accounts of torture) and
Raymond’s familiarity of the facilities of the bases where he was
detained.
2. w/n Manalo brothers are entitled to the privilege of writ of amparo
there being a threat to their life and liberty and violation to their
right of security – YES. An individual’s right to security and right to
life are protected under the 1987 Constitution, UDHR and ICCPR. In
the context of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule, freedom from fear is
the right and any threat to the rights to life, liberty or security is
the actionable wrong. Secondly, right to security of person is a
guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity or security and when
taken in the context of Physical injuries inflicted constitute more
than a search or invasion of the body and may constitute
dismemberment, physical disabilities, and painful physical
intrusion. In sum, we conclude that the Manalos’ right to security as
freedom from threat is violated by the apparent threat to their life,
liberty and security of person. Their right to security as a guarantee
of protection by the government is likewise violated by the
ineffective investigation and protection on the part of the military.
RULING: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated December 26, 2007 is affirmed.
RATIO:
Adoption of the Amparo Rule in the Philippines - and its origin and history
1. The adoption of the Amparo Rule surfaced as a recurring
proposition in the recommendations that resulted from a two-day
National Consultative Summit on Extrajudicial Killings and Enforced
Disappearances sponsored by the Court on July 16-17, 2007.
a. The Summit was envisioned to provide a broad and fact-
based perspective on the issue of extrajudicial killings and
enforced disappearances, hence representatives from all
sides of the political and social spectrum, as well as all the
stakeholders in the justice system participated in mapping
out ways to resolve the crisis.
2. October 24, 2007 - Court promulgated the Amparo Rule in light of
the prevalence of extralegal killing and enforced disappearances.
a. It was an exercise for the first time of the Courts expanded
power to promulgate rules to protect our people’s
constitutional rights, which made its appearance in the
1987 Constitution in response to the Filipino experience of
the martial law regime.
3. As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable
problem of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, its
coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or
to threats thereof.
a. Extralegal killings are killings committed without due
process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial
proceedings
b. Enforced disappearances are attended by the following
characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a
person by a government official or organized groups or
private individuals acting with the direct or indirect
acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to
disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned
or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which
places such persons outside the protection of law.
4. The writ of amparo originated in Mexico. Amparo literally means
protection in Spanish.
5. In 1837, de Tocquevilles Democracy in America became available
in Mexico and stirred great interest. Its description of the practice of
judicial review in the U.S. appealed to many Mexican jurists.
a. One of them, Manuel Crescencio Rejn, drafted a
constitutional provision for his native state, Yucatan, which
granted judges the power to protect all persons in the
enjoyment of their constitutional and legal rights. This idea
was incorporated into the national constitution in 184714
6. Amparo thus combines the principles of judicial review derived
from the U.S. with the limitations on judicial power characteristic
of the civil law tradition which prevails in Mexico.
a. It enables courts to enforce the constitution by protecting
individual rights in particular cases, but prevents them from
using this power to make law for the entire nation.
7. What began as a protection against acts or omissions of public
authorities in violation of constitutional rights later evolved for
several purposes:
a. amparo libertad for the protection of personal freedom,
equivalent to the habeas corpus writ;
b. amparo contra leyes for the judicial review of the
constitutionality of statutes;
c. amparo casacion for the judicial review of the
constitutionality and legality of a judicial decision;
d. amparo administrativo for the judicial review of
administrative actions; and
e. amparo agrario for the protection of peasants rights
derived from the agrarian reform process.
8. In the Philippines, while the 1987 Constitution does not explicitly
provide for the writ of amparo, several of the
above amparo protections are guaranteed by our charter.
a. the Grave Abuse Clause - second paragraph of Article VIII,
Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution - provides for the judicial
power to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the Government.
i. The Clause accords a similar general protection to
human rights extended by the amparo contra
leyes, amparo casacion, and amparo
administrativo.
14The federal courts shall protect any inhabitant of the Republic in the exercise and preservation of those rights granted
to him by this Constitution and by laws enacted pursuant hereto, against attacks by the Legislative and Executive
powers of the federal or state governments, limiting themselves to granting protection in the specific case in litigation,
making no general declaration concerning the statute or regulation that motivated the violation
 b. remedy of habeas corpus - Amparo libertad is comparable
to the this remedy found in several provisions of the 1987
Constitution.
c. The Clause is an offspring of the U.S. common law tradition
of judicial review, which finds its roots in the 1803 case
of Marbury v. Madison
9. Problem is these remedies may not be adequate to address the
pestering problem of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances. However, with the swiftness required to resolve a
petition for a writ of amparo through summary proceedings and the
availability of appropriate interim and permanent reliefs under
the Amparo Rule, this hybrid writ of the common law and civil law
traditions - borne out of the Latin American and Philippine
experience of human rights abuses - offers a better remedy to
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances and threats.
a. The remedy provides rapid judicial relief as it partakes of a
summary proceeding that requires only substantial
evidence to make the appropriate reliefs available to the
petitioner in the writ;
b. it is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof
beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring
preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility
requiring substantial evidence that will require full and
exhaustive proceedings
10. The writ of amparo serves both preventive and curative roles in
addressing the problem of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances.
a. It is preventive in that it breaks the expectation of impunity
in the commission of these offenses;
b. it is curative in that it facilitates the subsequent punishment
of perpetrators as it will inevitably yield leads to subsequent
investigation and action. In the long run, the goal of both
the preventive and curative roles is to deter the further
commission of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances.
Applying writ of amparo in the instant case
First contention regarding testimony/affidavit of Raymond Manalo.
1. Section 1, 17 and 18 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provide for
the required evidence in a writ of amparo. (see end of digest)
2. SC affirmed CA’s findings that the Manalos were abducted from
their houses and continuously detained until they were able to
escape. The abduction, detention, torture, and escape of the
Manalos were narrated by Raymond Manalo in a clear and
convincing manner.
a. The abduction was perpetrated by armed men who were
sufficiently identified by the Manalos to be military
personnel and CAFGU auxiliaries.
b. SC is convinced, too, that the reason for the abduction was
the suspicion that the the Manalos were either members or
sympathizers of the NPA, considering that the abductors
were looking for Ka Bestre, who turned out to be Rolando,
their brother.
3. Note: the investigation report by Lt. Col. Jimenez that the charges
of abduction against the CAFGU members were not established
hence should not be indicted for any administrative or criminal
liability.
a. He was directed by the Commanding General of the
7th Infantry Division, Maj. Gen. Jovito Palaran, through his
Assistant Chief of Staff to investigate the alleged abduction
of the Manalos by CAFGU auxiliaries under his unit. BUT,
the SC said that these efforts seemed at best, merely
superficial because the investigation of the focused on the
one-sided version of the CAFGU auxiliaries involved.
b. This one-sidedness might be due to the fact that the
Provost Marshall could delve only into the participation of
military personnel, but even then the Provost Marshall
should have refrained from outrightly exculpating the
CAFGU auxiliaries he perfunctorily investigated
Participation of various officers established by Raymond’s affidavit and
testimony
4. Gen. Palparan’s participation in the abduction was also
established. At the very least, he was aware of the Manalos’
captivity at the hands of men in uniform assigned to his command.
a. In fact, he or any other officer tendered no controversion
to the firm claim of Raymond that he met them in person
in a safehouse in Bulacan and told them what he wanted
them and their parents to do or not to be doing.
b. Gen. Palparan’s direct and personal role in the abduction
might not have been shown but his knowledge of the dire
 situation of the Manalos during their long captivity at the
hands of military personnel under his command bespoke of
his indubitable command policy that unavoidably
encouraged and not merely tolerated the abduction of
civilians without due process of law and without probable
cause.
5. In the habeas proceedings, the Court found no clear and convincing
evidence to establish that M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario had anything to do
with the abduction or the detention. However, in this case,
Raymond attested that Hilario drove the white L-300 van in which
the Manalos were brought away from their houses.
a. Raymond also attested that Hilario participated in
subsequent incidents during their captivity, often to
transfer them from one base to another. Hilario was also
among four Master Sergeants (the others being Arman,
Ganata and Cabalse)
b. It is clear, therefore, that the participation of Hilario in the
abduction and forced disappearance of the Manalos was
established. The participation of other military personnel
like Arman, Ganata, Cabalse and Caigas, among others, was
similarly established
c. As to the CAFGU auxiliaries, the habeas Court found them
personally involved in the abduction. SC also agrees the
evidence of their participation is overwhelming.
6. We reject the claim of Sec of Defense et al that Raymond Manalo’s
statements were not corroborated by other independent and
credible pieces of evidence.
a. Raymond’s affidavit and testimony were corroborated by
the affidavit of Reynaldo Manalo.
b. The testimony and medical reports prepared by forensic
specialist Dr. Molino, and the pictures of the scars left by
the physical injuries inflicted on the Manalos, also
corroborate their accounts of the torture they endured
while in detention.
c. Raymond Manalo’s familiarity with the facilities in Fort
Magsaysay such as the DTU, as shown in his testimony and
confirmed by Lt. Col. Jimenez to be the Division Training
Unit, firms up Manalos’ story that they were detained for
some time in said military facility.
7. In Ortiz v. Guatemala, a case decided by the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, the Commission considered similar
evidence, among others, in finding that complainant Sister Diana
Ortiz was abducted and tortured by agents of the Guatemalan
government.
a. In this case, Sister Ortiz was kidnapped and tortured in
early November 1989.
b. The Commissions findings of fact were mostly based on the
consistent and credible statements, written and oral, made
by Sister Ortiz regarding her ordeal.
c. These statements were supported by her recognition of
portions of the route they took when she was being driven
out of the military installation where she was detained.
d. She was also examined by a medical doctor whose findings
showed that the 111 circular second degree burns on her
back and abrasions on her cheek coincided with her
account of cigarette burning and torture she suffered while
in detention.
8. With the secret nature of an enforced disappearance and the
torture perpetrated on the victim during detention, it logically
holds that much of the information and evidence of the ordeal
will come from the victims themselves, and the veracity of their
account will depend on their credibility and candidness in their
written and/or oral statements.
a. Their statements can be corroborated by other evidence
such as physical evidence left by the torture they suffered
or landmarks they can identify in the places where they
were detained. Where powerful military officers are
implicated, the hesitation of witnesses to surface and
testify against them comes as no surprise.
Right of the Manalo brothers to the privilege of the writ of amparo
9. There is no quarrel that the enforced disappearance of both
Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo has now passed as they have
escaped from captivity and surfaced. BUT while they admit that
they are no longer in detention and are physically free, they assert
that they are not free in every sense of the word as their
movements continue to be restricted for fear that people they
have named in their Judicial Affidavits and testified against (in the
 case of Raymond) are still at large and have not been held
accountable in any way.
a. These people are directly connected to the Armed Forces of
the Philippines and are, thus, in a position to threaten
Manalos’ rights to life, liberty and security. (emphasis
supplied)
b. They claim that they are under threat of being once again
abducted, kept captive or even killed, which constitute a
direct violation of their right to security of person.
10. In sum, the Manalos assert that their cause of action consists in
the threat to their right to life and liberty, and a violation of their
right to security.
a. The right to security or the right to security of
person finds a textual hook in Article III, Section 2 of the
1987 Constitution15 where the immunity of one’s person,
including the extensions of his/her person houses, papers,
and effects against government intrusion.
i. The purpose of the constitutional guarantee against
unreasonable searches and seizures is to prevent
violations of private security in person and
property and unlawful invasion of the security of
the home by officers of the law acting under
legislative or judicial sanction and to give remedy
against such usurpation when attempted.
ii. The right to privacy is an essential condition to the
dignity and happiness and to the peace and
security of every individual, whether it be of home
or of persons and correspondence.Any
interference allowable can only be for the best
causes and reasons.[119] (emphases supplied)
b. While the right to life under Article III, Section 1 guarantees
essentially the right to be alive upon which the enjoyment
of all other rights is preconditioned
i. the right to security of person is a guarantee of the
secure quality of this life, viz: The life to which each
15Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall
be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge
person has a right is not a life lived in fear that his
person and property may be unreasonably
violated by a powerful ruler.
ii. Rather, it is a life lived with the assurance that the
government he established and consented to, will
protect the security of his person and property. A
closer look at the right to security of person would
yield various permutations of the exercise of this
right.
FIRST: Right to security is freedom from fear (under UDHR)
11. First, the right to security of person is freedom from fear.
a. In its whereas clauses, the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR) enunciates that a world in which human
beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief
and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as
the highest aspiration of the common people. (emphasis
supplied)
b. Some scholars postulate that freedom from fear is not only
an aspirational principle, but essentially an individual
international human right. It is the right to security of
person as the word security itself means freedom from
fear. Article 3 of the UDHR provides, viz: Everyone has the
right to life, liberty and security of person. (emphasis
supplied)
Security of person under ICCPR
12. In furtherance of this right declared in the UDHR, Article 9(1) of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) also
provides for the right to security of person, viz: Everyone has the
right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to
arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty
except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as
are established by law. (emphasis supplied)
13. The Philippines is a signatory to both the UDHR and the ICCPR.
14. In the context of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule, freedom from fear
is the right and any threat to the rights to life, liberty or security is
the actionable wrong.
a. Fear is a state of mind, a reaction; threat is a stimulus,
a cause of action. Fear caused by the same stimulus can
range from being baseless to well-founded as people react
 differently.The degree of fear can vary from one person to
another with the variation of the prolificacy of their
imagination, strength of character or past experience with
the stimulus.
b. Thus, in the amparo context, it is more correct to say that
the right to security is actually the freedom from threat.
SECOND: right to security is guarantee of bodily and psychological security
15. Second, the right to security of person is a guarantee of bodily and
psychological integrity or security. Article III, Section II of the 1987
Constitution guarantees that, as a general rule, ones body cannot
be searched or invaded without a search warrant.
a. Physical injuries inflicted in the context of extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances constitute more than
a search or invasion of the body and may constitute
dismemberment, physical disabilities, and painful physical
intrusion.
b. As the degree of physical injury increases, the danger to life
itself escalates.
c. Physical torture, force, and violence are a severe invasion of
bodily integrity. When employed to vitiate the free will such
as to force the victim to admit, reveal or fabricate
incriminating information, it constitutes an invasion of both
bodily and psychological integrity as the dignity of the
human person includes the exercise of free will.
d. Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution more
specifically proscribes bodily and psychological invasion.16
Also, threat and intimidation that vitiate the free will,
nevertheless constitute a violation of the right to security in
the sense of freedom from threat as afore-discussed.
THIRD: right to security is a guarantee of the government
16. Third, the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection
of ones rights by the government.
a. In the context of the writ of amparo, this right is built into
the guarantees of the right to life and liberty under Article
III, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution and the right to
security of person (as freedom from threat and guarantee
16(2) No torture, force, violence, threat or intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will
shall be used against him (any person under investigation for the commission of an offense). Secret
detention places, solitary, incommunicado or other similar forms of detention are prohibited
of bodily and psychological integrity) under Article III,
Section 2.
b. The right to security of person in this third sense is a
corollary of the policy that the State guarantees full respect
for human rights under Article II, Section 11 of the 1987
Constitution.
c. As the government is the chief guarantor of order and
security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life,
liberty and security of person is rendered ineffective if
government does not afford protection to these rights
especially when they are under threat.
d. Protection includes conducting effective investigations,
organization of the government apparatus to extend
protection to victims of extralegal killings or enforced
disappearances (or threats thereof) and/or their families,
and bringing offenders to the bar of justice.
17. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights stressed the importance
of investigation in the Velasquez Rodriguez Case, viz: (The duty to
investigate) must be undertaken in a serious manner and not as a
mere formality preordained to be ineffective. An investigation
must have an objective and be assumed by the State as its own
legal duty, not as a step taken by private interests that depends
upon the initiative of the victim or his family or upon their offer of
proof, without an effective search for the truth by the government.
Is there a continuing violation of the Manalos’ right to security?
1. First, the violation of the right to security as freedom from threat
to Manalos’ life, liberty and security.
a. While they were detained, they were threatened that if
they escaped, their families, including them, would be
killed.
b. It ought to be recalled that towards the end of their ordeal,
sometime in June 2007 when they were detained in a camp
in Limay, Bataan, the captors even told them that they were
still deciding whether they should be executed. Raymond
Manalo attested in his affidavit, viz: Kinaumagahan, naka-
kadena pa kami. Tinanggal ang mga kadena mga 3 o 4 na
araw pagkalipas. Sinabi sa amin na kaya kami nakakadena
ay dahil pinagdedesisyunan pa ng mga sundalo kung
papatayin kami o hindi
2. With their escape, this continuing threat to their life is apparent,
moreso now that they have surfaced and implicated specific
officers in the military not only in their own abduction and
torture, but also in those of other persons known to have
disappeared such as Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeo, and Manuel
Merino, among others.
3. Understandably, since their escape, they have been under
concealment and protection by private citizens because of the
threat to their life, liberty and security.
a. The threat vitiates their free will as they are forced to limit
their movements or activities because they are being
shielded from the perpetrators of their abduction, they
cannot be expected to show evidence of overt acts of
threat such as face-to-face intimidation or written threats
to their life, liberty and security.
b. Nonetheless, the circumstances of their abduction,
detention, torture and escape reasonably support a
conclusion that there is an apparent threat that they will
again be abducted, tortured, and this time, even
executed. These constitute threats to their liberty,
security, and life, actionable through a petition for a writ
of amparo.
4. Next, the violation of the right to security as protection by the
government. Apart from the failure of military elements to provide
protection to the Manalos by themselves perpetrating the
abduction, detention, and torture, the AFP also miserably failed in
conducting an effective investigation of the Manalos’ abduction as
revealed by the testimony and investigation report of Sec of
Defense’s own witness, Lt. Col. Ruben Jimenez
a. The one-day investigation conducted by Jimenez was very
limited, superficial, and one-sided.
b. He merely relied on the Sworn Statements of the six
implicated members of the CAFGU and civilians whom he
met in the investigation for the first time.
c. He was present at the investigation when his subordinate
Lingad was taking the sworn statements, but he did not
propound a single question to ascertain the veracity of their
statements or their credibility. He did not call for other
witnesses to test the alibis given by the six implicated
persons nor for the family or neighbors of the Manalos.
d. To this day, however, almost a year after the policy
directive was issued by Secretary of National Defense on
October 31, 2007, the Manalos have not been furnished the
results of the investigation which they now seek through
the instant petition for a writ of amparo.
5. Under these circumstances, there is substantial evidence to warrant
the conclusion that there is a violation of the Manalos’ right to
security as a guarantee of protection by the government.
a. In sum, we conclude that their right to security as freedom
from threat is violated by the apparent threat to their life,
liberty and security of person. Their right to security as a
guarantee of protection by the government is likewise
violated by the ineffective investigation and protection on
the part of the military.
Reliefs granted by CA being questioned by Sec of Defense et al
1. Sec of Defense’s arguments do not hold water. The production
order under the Amparo Rule should not be confused with a search
warrant for law enforcement under Article III, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution. This Constitutional provision is a protection of the
people from the unreasonable intrusion of the government, not a
protection of the government from the demand of the people such
as the Manalos.
a. Instead, the amparo production order may be likened to the
production of documents or things under Section 1, Rule 27
of the Rules of Civil Procedure17
2. SC held that the disclosure of the present places of assignment of
M/Sgt. Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and Donald Caigas, whom the
Manalos both directly implicated as perpetrators behind their
abduction and detention, is relevant in ensuring the safety of
Manalos by avoiding their areas of territorial jurisdiction
a. Such disclosure would also help ensure that these military
officers can be served with notices and court processes in
relation to any investigation and action for violation of the
Manalos’ rights.
17 Section 1. Motion for production or inspection order. Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor, the
court in which an action is pending may (a) order any party to produce and permit the inspection and copying or
photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of any designated documents, papers, books of accounts, letters,
photographs, objects or tangible things, not privileged, which constitute or contain evidence material to any matter
involved in the action and which are in his possession, custody or control
 b. The list of medical personnel is also relevant in securing
information to create the medical history of the Manalos
and make appropriate medical interventions, when
applicable and necessary.
RELEVANT PROVISIONS:
Section 1, 17 and 18 of Rule of Amparo
Section 1. Petition. The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available
to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or
threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official
or employee, or of a private individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or
threats thereof.
Sections 17 and 18, on the other hand, provide for the degree of proof
required, viz:
Sec. 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. The parties
shall establish their claims by substantial evidence. xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 18. Judgment. If the allegations in the petition are proven by
substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such
reliefs as may be proper and appropriate; otherwise, the privilege shall
be denied. (emphases supplied)
Memorandum directive of Sec. of National Defense:
(1) to verify the identity of the aggrieved party;
(2) to recover and preserve evidence related to the death or
disappearance of the person identified in the petition which may aid
in the prosecution of the person or persons responsible;
(3) to identify witnesses and obtain statements from them
concerning the death or disappearance;
(4) to determine the cause, manner, location and time of death or
disappearance as well as any pattern or practice that may have
brought about the death or disappearance;
(5) to identify and apprehend the person or persons involved in the
death or disappearance; and
(6) to bring the suspected offenders before a competent court.
Raymond’s testimony of what he witnessed and experienced in Limay Camp
in Bataan:
Isang gabi, sinabihan kami ni Donald (Caigas) na matulog na kami. Nakita ko
si Donald na inaayos ang kanyang baril, at nilagyan ng silenser. Sabi ni
Donald na kung mayroon man kaming makita o marinig, walang
nangyari. Kinaumagahan, nakita naming ang bangkay ng isa sa mga bihag na
dinala sa kampo. Mayroong binuhos sa kanyang katawan at itoy
sinunog. Masansang ang amoy.
Makaraan ang isang lingo, dalawang bangkay and ibinaba ng mga
unipormadong sundalo mula sa 6 x 6 na trak at dinala sa loob ng
kampo. May naiwang mga bakas ng dugo habang hinihila nila ang mga
bangkay. Naamoy ko iyon nang nililinis ang bakas.
Makalipas ang isa o dalawang lingo, may dinukot sila na dalawang Ita. Itinali
sila sa labas ng kubo, piniringan, ikinadena at labis na binugbog. Nakita kong
nakatakas ang isa sa kanila at binaril siya ng sundalo ngunit hindi siya
tinamaan. Iyong gabi nakita kong pinatay nila iyong isang Ita malapit sa Post
3; sinilaban ang bangkay at ibinaon ito.
Pagkalipas ng halos 1 buwan, 2 pang bangkay ang dinala sa kampo. Ibinaba
ang mga bangkay mula sa pick up trak, dinala ang mga bangkay sa labas ng
bakod. Kinaumagahan nakita kong mayroong sinilaban, at
napakamasangsang ang amoy.
May nakilala rin akong 1 retiradong koronel at 1 kasama niya. Pinakain ko
sila. Sabi nila sa akin na dinukot sila sa Bataan. Iyong gabi, inilabas sila at
hindi ko na sila nakita.
xxx xxx xxx
Ikinadena kami ng 3 araw. Sa ikatlong araw, nilabas ni Lat si Manuel dahil
kakausapin daw siya ni Gen. Palparan. Nakapiring si Manuel, wala siyang
suot pang-itaas, pinosasan. Nilakasan ng mga sundalo ang tunog na galing sa
istiryo ng sasakyan. Di nagtagal, narinig ko ang hiyaw o ungol ni
Manuel. Sumilip ako sa isang haligi ng kamalig at nakita kong sinisilaban si
Manuel.
Kinaumagahan, naka-kadena pa kami. Tinanggal ang mga kadena mga 3 o 4
na araw pagkalipas. Sinabi sa amin na kaya kami nakakadena ay dahil
pinagdedesisyunan pa ng mga sundalo kung papatayin kami o hindi.
Tinanggal ang aming kadena. Kinausap kami ni Donald. Tinanong kami kung
ano ang sabi ni Manuel sa amin. Sabi ni Donald huwag na raw naming
hanapin ang dalawang babae at si Manuel, dahil magkakasama na yung
tatlo. Sabi pa ni Donald na kami ni Reynaldo ay magbagong buhay at ituloy
namin ni Reynaldo ang trabaho. Sa gabi, hindi na kami kinakadena.
 071 IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT
OF AMPARO AND THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF MELISSA
C. ROXAS, MELISSA C. ROXAS, Petitioner, v.GLORIA MACAPAGAL-
ARROYO (CHUNG)
September 7,2010| Perez J. | Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data
PETITIONER: MELISSA C. ROXAS
RESPONDENTS: GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GILBERT TEODORO,
GEN. VICTOR S. IBRADO, P/DIR. GEN. JESUS AME VERZOSA, LT. GEN.
DELFIN N. BANGIT, PC/SUPT. LEON NILO A. DELA CRUZ, MAJ. GEN.
RALPH VILLANUEVA, PS/SUPT. RUDY GAMIDO LACADIN, AND CERTAIN
PERSONS WHO GO BY THE NAME[S] DEX, RC AND ROSE
SUMMARY:
 Melissa Roxas is an American citizen of Filipino decent who volunteered to
join BAYAN-Tarlac in conducting health surveys.
 In pursuit of her volunteer work, petitioner brought her passport, wallet
with Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00) in cash, journal, digital camera
with memory card, laptop computer, external hard disk, IPOD, wristwatch,
sphygmomanometer, stethoscope and medicines
 One afternoon after conducting their survey, Roxas and her friends went to
a hut to rest but was awaken by loud banging sounds from the door.
Subsequently, a group of 15 armed men abducted them to a blue van and
blindfolded them bringing them to a place where Roxas inferred that it is a
military camp because she heard gun shots and airplanes.
 Roxas was informed that she was detained because she is a part of CPP-
NPA.
 This was followed by 5 days of interrogation and torture.
 Subsequently, On 25 May 2009, petitioner was finally released and returned
to her uncle's house in Quezon City. Before being released, however, the
abductors gave petitioner a cellular phone with a SIM card, a slip of paper
containing an e-mail address with password, a plastic bag containing
biscuits and books, the handcuffs used on her, a blouse and a pair of
shoes. Petitioner was also sternly warned not to report the incident to the
group Karapatan or something untoward will happen to her and her family.
 Sometime after her release, petitioner continued to receive calls from RC
via the cellular phone given to her. Out of apprehension that she was being
monitored and also fearing for the safety of her family, petitioner threw
away the cellular phone with a SIM card.
 Seeking sanctuary against the threat of future harm as well as the
suppression of any existing government files or records linking her to the
communist movement, petitioner filed a Petition for the Writs of Amparo
and Habeas Data before this Court on 1 June 2009. Petitioner impleaded
public officials occupying the uppermost echelons of the military and police
hierarchy as respondents, on the belief that it was government agents who
were behind her abduction and torture.
 In appeal, Roxas used the doctrine of command responsibility to implicate
the higher positioned military people that she accused of being the master
mind behind her abduction
 In summary, Roxas petitioned for the following:
1. Writ of Amparo – for the return of her personal belongings and to
implicate the government officials (military personnel) responsible for
her abduction and inspect the detention areas of fort Magsaysay
2. Habeas Data – to inspect the documents that caused her to be included
to the order of battle as part of the CPP-NPA
ISSUE:
1. Is the doctrine of command responsibility proper in this case? NO
2. Are there enough evidence to convict the respondents as the one responsible
for the abduction and torture of roxas? NO
3. Can the court order the return of Roxas’ personal belongings by a writ of
amparo? NO
4. Can the court allow her to inspect the detention areas of fort Magsaysay?
NO
5. Can the court stop the public respondents from "distributing or causing the
distribution to the public any records in whatever form, reports, documents
or similar papers" relative to the petitioner's "alleged ties with the CPP-
NPA or pertinently related to her abduction and torture."?
Ruling:
1. Command responsibility is NOT PROPER in an Amparo case because
command responsibility is used to pinpoint a criminal liability while an
Amparo case is a protective remedy aimed at providing judicial relief
consisting of the appropriate remedial measures and directives that may be
crafted by the court, in order to address specific violations or threats of
violation of the constitutional rights to life, liberty or security
2. There is no enough evidence. In sum, the petitioner was not able to
establish to a concrete point that her abductors were actually affiliated,
whether formally or informally, with the military or the police
organizations. Neither does the evidence at hand prove that petitioner was
indeed taken to the military camp Fort Magsaysay to the exclusion of other
places. These evidentiary gaps, in turn, make it virtually impossible to
determine whether the abduction and torture of the petitioner was in fact
committed with the acquiescence of the public respondents. On account of
this insufficiency in evidence, a pronouncement of responsibility on the part
of the public respondents, therefore, cannot be made.
3. The court cannot order the return of the personal belongings because an
order directing the public respondents to return the personal belongings of
the petitioner is already equivalent to a conclusive pronouncement of
liability. The order itself is a substantial relief that can only be granted once
the liability of the public respondents has been fixed in a full and exhaustive
proceeding. As already discussed above, matters of liability are not
determinable in a mere summary amparo proceeding. Also, property rights
 are not protected by a writ of amparo.
4. The court cannot allow her to inspect the detention areas because
Considering the lack of evidence concretely pointing to any military
involvement in petitioner's ordeal, it is proper to deny the inspection of the
detention areas of Fort Magsaysay because this will result to a “fishing
expedition”. A basic requirement before an amparo court may grant an
inspection order is that the place to be inspected is reasonably determinable
from the allegations of the party seeking the order. While the Amparo Rule
does not require that the place to be inspected be identified with clarity and
precision, it is, nevertheless, a minimum for the issuance of an inspection
order that the supporting allegations of a party be sufficient in itself, so as to
make a prima facie case. This, as was shown above, petitioner failed to do.
5. NO. The writ of habeas data was conceptualized as a judicial remedy
enforcing the right to privacy, most especially the right to informational
privacy of individuals. The writ operates to protect a person's right to
control information regarding himself, particularly in the instances where
such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to
achieve unlawful ends.Needless to state, an indispensable requirement
before the privilege of the writ may be extended is the showing, at least by
substantial evidence, of an actual or threatened violation of the right to
privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim. This, in the case at bench,
the petitioner failed to do.In view of the above considerations, the directive
by the Court of Appeals enjoining the public respondents from "distributing
or causing the distribution to the public any records in whatever form,
reports, documents or similar papers" relative to the petitioner's "alleged
ties with the CPP-NPA," appears to be devoid of any legal basis. The public
respondents cannot be ordered to refrain from distributing something that,
in the first place, it was not proven to have.
DOCTRINE:
The writ of amparo is a protective remedy aimed at providing judicial relief
consisting of the appropriate remedial measures and directives that may be crafted
by the court, in order to address specific violations or threats of violation of the
constitutional rights to life, liberty or security
The writ of habeas data was conceptualized as a judicial remedy enforcing the right
to privacy, most especially the right to informational privacy of individuals. The writ
operates to protect a person's right to control information regarding himself,
particularly in the instances where such information is being collected through
unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends.
FACTS:
 Melissa Roxas is an American citizen of Filipino descent. While in the
United States, petitioner enrolled in an exposure program to the Philippines
with the group Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-United States of America
(BAYAN-USA) of which she is a member. During the course of her
immersion, petitioner toured various provinces and towns of Central Luzon
and, in April of 2009, she volunteered to join members of BAYAN-Tarlac in
conducting an initial health survey in La Paz, Tarlac for a future medical
mission.
 In pursuit of her volunteer work, petitioner brought her passport, wallet with
Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00) in cash, journal, digital camera with
memory card, laptop computer, external hard disk, IPOD, wristwatch,
sphygmomanometer, stethoscope and medicines.
 After doing survey work on 19 May 2009, petitioner and her companions,
Juanito Carabeo (Carabeo) and John Edward Jandoc (Jandoc), decided to
rest in the house of one Mr. Jesus Paolo (Mr. Paolo) in Sitio Bagong
Sikat, Barangay Kapanikian, La Paz, Tarlac. At around 1:30 in the
afternoon, however, petitioner, her companions and Mr. Paolo were startled
by the loud sounds of someone banging at the front door and a voice
demanding that they open up.
 Suddenly, fifteen (15) heavily armed men forcibly opened the door, barged
inside and ordered petitioner and her companions to lie on the ground face
down. The armed men were all in civilian clothes and, with the exception of
their leader, were also wearing bonnets to conceal their faces.
 Roxas tried to protest the intrusion, but five (5) of the armed men ganged up
on her and tied her hands. At this juncture, petitioner saw the other armed
men herding Carabeo and Jandoc, already blindfolded and taped at their
mouths, to a nearby blue van. Petitioner started to shout her name. Against
her vigorous resistance, the armed men dragged petitioner towards the van-
bruising her arms, legs and knees. Once inside the van, but before she can
be blindfolded, petitioner was able to see the face of one of the armed men
sitting beside her. The van then sped away.
 After about an hour of traveling, the van stopped. Petitioner, Carabeo and
Jandoc were ordered to alight. After she was informed that she is being
detained for being a member of the Communist Party of the Philippines-
New People's Army (CPP-NPA), petitioner was separated from her
companions and was escorted to a room that she believed was a jail cell
from the sound of its metal doors. From there, she could hear the sounds of
gunfire, the noise of planes taking off and landing and some construction
bustle. She inferred that she was taken to the military camp of Fort
Magsaysay in Laur, Nueva Ecija.
 What followed was five (5) straight days of interrogation coupled with
torture.\ The thrust of the interrogations was to convince petitioner to
abandon her communist beliefs in favor of returning to "the fold."The
torture, on the other hand, consisted of taunting, choking, boxing and
suffocating the petitioner.
 Throughout the entirety of her ordeal, petitioner was made to suffer in
blindfolds even in her sleep. Petitioner was only relieved of her blindfolds
when she was allowed to take a bath, during which she became acquainted
with a woman named "Rose" who bathed her. There were also a few times
when she cheated her blindfold and was able to peek at her surroundings.
 Despite being deprived of sight, however, petitioner was still able to learn
the names of three of her interrogators who introduced themselves to her as
"Dex," "James" and "RC." "RC" even told petitioner that those who tortured
her came from the "Special Operations Group," and that she was abducted
because her name is included in the "Order of Battle."
 On 25 May 2009, petitioner was finally released and returned to her uncle's
house in Quezon City. Before being released, however, the abductors gave
petitioner a cellular phone with a SIM card, a slip of paper containing an e-
mail address with password, a plastic bag containing biscuits and books, the
handcuffs used on her, a blouse and a pair of shoes. Petitioner was also
sternly warned not to report the incident to the group Karapatan or
something untoward will happen to her and her family.
 Sometime after her release, petitioner continued to receive calls from RC
via the cellular phone given to her. Out of apprehension that she was being
monitored and also fearing for the safety of her family, petitioner threw
away the cellular phone with a SIM card.
 Seeking sanctuary against the threat of future harm as well as the
suppression of any existing government files or records linking her to the
communist movement, petitioner filed a Petition for the Writs of Amparo
and Habeas Data before this Court on 1 June 2009. Petitioner impleaded
public officials occupying the uppermost echelons of the military and police
hierarchy as respondents, on the belief that it was government agents who
were behind her abduction and torture. Petitioner likewise included in her
suit "Rose," "Dex" and "RC."
 The Amparo and Habeas Data petition prays that:
o (1) respondents be enjoined from harming or even approaching
petitioner and her family;
o (2) an order be issued allowing the inspection of detention areas in
the 7th Infantry Division, Fort Magsaysay, Laur, Nueva Ecija;
o (3) respondents be ordered to produce documents relating to any
report on the case of petitioner including, but not limited to,
intelligence report and operation reports of the 7th Infantry
Division, the Special Operations Group of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) and its subsidiaries or branch/es prior to, during
and subsequent to 19 May 2009;
o (4) respondents be ordered to expunge from the records of the
respondents any document pertinent or connected to Melissa C.
Roxas, Melissa Roxas or any name which sounds the same; and
o (5) respondents be ordered to return to petitioner her journal,
digital camera with memory card, laptop computer, external hard
disk, IPOD, wristwatch, sphygmomanometer, stethoscope,
medicines and her P15,000.00 cash.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
the Court of Appeals gave due weight and consideration to the petitioner's version
that she was indeed abducted and then subjected to torture for five (5) straight days.
Court of Appeals also recognized the existence of an ongoing threat against the
security of the petitioner, as manifested in the attempts of "RC" to contact and
monitor her, even after she was released. This threat, according to the Court of
Appeals, is all the more compounded by the failure of the police authorities to
identify the material perpetrators who are still at large. Thus, the appellate court
extended to the petitioner the privilege of the writ of amparo by directing the public
respondents to afford protection to the former, as well as continuing, under the norm
of extraordinary diligence, their existing investigations involving the abduction.
The Court of Appeals likewise observed a transgression of the right to informational
privacy of the petitioner, noting the existence of "records of investigations" that
concerns the petitioner as a suspected member of the CPP-NPA.
The appellate court derived the existence of such records from a photograph and
video file presented in a press conference by party-list representatives Jovito
Palparan (Palparan) and Pastor Alcover (Alcover), which allegedly show the
petitioner participating in rebel exercises. Representative Alcover also revealed that
the photograph and video came from a female CPP-NPA member who wanted out of
the organization.
According to the Court of Appeals, the proliferation of the photograph and video, as
well as any form of media, insinuating that petitioner is part of the CPP-NPA does
not only constitute a violation of the right to privacy of the petitioner but also puts
further strain on her already volatile security. To this end, the appellate court granted
the privilege of the writ of habeas data mandating the public respondents to refrain
from distributing to the public any records, in whatever form, relative to petitioner's
alleged ties with the CPP-NPA or pertinently related to her abduction and torture.
The foregoing notwithstanding, however, the Court of Appeals was not convinced
that the military or any other person acting under the acquiescence of the
government, were responsible for the abduction and torture of the petitioner.
ISSUE:
1. Is the doctrine of command responsibility proper in this case? NO
2. Are there enough evidence to convict the respondents as the one responsible
for the abduction and torture of roxas? NO
3. Can the court order the return of Roxas’ personal belongings by a writ of
 amparo? NO
4. Can the court allow her to inspect the detention areas of fort Magsaysay?
NO
5. Can the court stop the public respondents from "distributing or causing the
distribution to the public any records in whatever form, reports, documents
or similar papers" relative to the petitioner's "alleged ties with the CPP-NPA
or pertinently related to her abduction and torture."?
Ruling:
AMPARO
petitioner invokes the doctrine of command responsibility to implicate the high-
ranking civilian and military authorities she impleaded as respondents in her amparo
petition. Thus, petitioner seeks from this Court a pronouncement holding the
respondents as complicit in her abduction and torture, as well as liable for the return
of her belongings.
Command Responsibility in Amparo Proceedings
It must be stated at the outset that the use by the petitioner of the doctrine of
command responsibility as the justification in impleading the public respondents in
her amparo petition, is legally inaccurate, if not incorrect. The doctrine of command
responsibility is a rule of substantive law that establishes liability and, by this
account, cannot be a proper legal basis to implead a party-respondent in an amparo
petition.100cralawThe doctrine of command responsibility is "an omission mode of
individual criminal liability," whereby the superior is made responsible for crimes
committed by his subordinates for failing to prevent or punish the perpetrators.
Since the application of command responsibility presupposes an imputation of
individual liability, it is more aptly invoked in a full-blown criminal or
administrative case rather than in a summary amparo proceeding.
The obvious reason lies in the nature of the writ itself: The writ of amparo is a
protective remedy aimed at providing judicial relief consisting of the appropriate
remedial measures and directives that may be crafted by the court, in order to address
specific violations or threats of violation of the constitutional rights to life, liberty or
security. While the principal objective of its proceedings is the initial determination
of whether an enforced disappearance, extralegal killing or threats thereof had
transpired-the writ does not, by so doing, fix liability for such disappearance, killing
or threats, whether that may be criminal, civil or administrative under the applicable
substantive law.
Responsibility of Public Respondents
The totality of the evidence presented by the petitioner does not inspire reasonable
conclusion that her abductors were military or police personnel and that she was
detained at Fort Magsaysay.
First. The similarity between the circumstances attending a particular case of
abduction with those surrounding previous instances of enforced disappearances
does not, necessarily, carry sufficient weight to prove that the government
orchestrated such abduction. We opine that insofar as the present case is concerned,
the perceived similarity cannot stand as substantial evidence of the involvement of
the government.
In amparo proceedings, the weight that may be accorded to parallel circumstances as
evidence of military involvement depends largely on the availability or non-
availability of other pieces of evidence that has the potential of directly proving the
identity and affiliation of the perpetrators. Direct evidence of identity, when
obtainable, must be preferred over mere circumstantial evidence based on patterns
and similarity, because the former indubitably offers greater certainty as to the true
identity and affiliation of the perpetrators. An amparo court cannot simply leave to
remote and hazy inference what it could otherwise clearly and directly ascertain.
In the case at bench, petitioner was, in fact, able to include in her Offer of Exhibits,
the cartographic sketches of several of her abductors whose faces she managed to
see. To the mind of this Court, these cartographic sketches have the undeniable
potential of giving the greatest certainty as to the true identity and affiliation of
petitioner's abductors. Unfortunately for the petitioner, this potential has not been
realized in view of the fact that the faces described in such sketches remain
unidentified, much less have been shown to be that of any military or police
personnel. Bluntly stated, the abductors were not proven to be part of either the
military or the police chain of command.
Second. The claim of the petitioner that she was taken to Fort Magsaysay was not
adequately established by her mere estimate of the time it took to reach the place
where she was detained and by the sounds that she heard while thereat. Like the
Court of Appeals, We are not inclined to take the estimate and observations of the
petitioner as accurate on its face-not only because they were made mostly while she
was in blindfolds, but also in view of the fact that she was a mere sojourner in the
Philippines, whose familiarity with Fort Magsaysay and the travel time required to
reach it is in itself doubtful. With nothing else but obscure observations to support it,
petitioner's claim that she was taken to Fort Magsaysay remains a mere speculation.
In sum, the petitioner was not able to establish to a concrete point that her abductors
were actually affiliated, whether formally or informally, with the military or the
police organizations. Neither does the evidence at hand prove that petitioner was
indeed taken to the military camp Fort Magsaysay to the exclusion of other places.
These evidentiary gaps, in turn, make it virtually impossible to determine whether
the abduction and torture of the petitioner was in fact committed with the
acquiescence of the public respondents. On account of this insufficiency in evidence,
a pronouncement of responsibility on the part of the public respondents, therefore,
cannot be made.
Prayer for the Return of Personal Belongings
In the first place, an order directing the public respondents to return the personal
belongings of the petitioner is already equivalent to a conclusive pronouncement of
liability. The order itself is a substantial relief that can only be granted once the
liability of the public respondents has been fixed in a full and exhaustive proceeding.
As already discussed above, matters of liability are not determinable in a mere
summary amparo proceeding. Also, property rights are not protected by a writ of
amparo.
The next error raised by the petitioner is the denial by the Court of Appeals of her
prayer for an inspection of the detention areas of Fort Magsaysay.
Considering the lack of evidence concretely pointing to any military involvement in
petitioner's ordeal, it is proper to deny the inspection of the detention areas of Fort
Magsaysay because this will result to a “fishing expedition”. A basic requirement
before an amparo court may grant an inspection order is that the place to be
inspected is reasonably determinable from the allegations of the party seeking the
order. While the Amparo Rule does not require that the place to be inspected be
identified with clarity and precision, it is, nevertheless, a minimum for the issuance
of an inspection order that the supporting allegations of a party be sufficient in itself,
so as to make a prima facie case. This, as was shown above, petitioner failed to do.
HABEAS DATA
the Court of Appeals granted to the petitioner the privilege of the writ of habeas data,
by enjoining the public respondents from "distributing or causing the distribution to
the public any records in whatever form, reports, documents or similar papers"
relative to the petitioner's "alleged ties with the CPP-NPA or pertinently related to
her abduction and torture."
Petitioner prayed that all the records, intelligence reports and reports on the
investigations conducted on Melissa C. Roxas or Melissa Roxas be produced and
eventually expunged from the records. Petitioner claimed to be included in the
Government's Order of Battle under Oplan Bantay Laya which listed political
opponents against whom false criminal charges were filed based on made up and
perjured information.
Pending resolution of this petition and before Petitioner could testify before Us, Ex-
army general Jovito Palaparan, Bantay party-list, and Pastor Alcover of the Alliance
for Nationalism and Democracy party-list held a press conference where they
revealed that they received an information from a female NPA rebel who wanted out
of the organization, that Petitioner was a communist rebel. Alcover claimed that said
information reached them thru a letter with photo of Petitioner holding firearms at an
NPA training camp and a video CD of the training exercises.
Clearly, and notwithstanding Petitioner's denial that she was the person in said video,
there were records of other investigations on Melissa C. Roxas or Melissa Roxas
which violate her right to privacy. Without a doubt, reports of such nature have
reasonable connections, one way or another, to petitioner's abduction where she
claimed she had been subjected to cruelties and dehumanizing acts which nearly
caused her life precisely due to allegation of her alleged membership in the CPP-
NPA. And if said report or similar reports are to be continuously made available to
the public, Petitioner's security and privacy will certainly be in danger of being
violated or transgressed by persons who have strong sentiments or aversion against
members of this group. The unregulated dissemination of said unverified video CD
or reports of Petitioner's alleged ties with the CPP-NPA indiscriminately made
available for public consumption without evidence of its authenticity or veracity
certainly violates Petitioner's right to privacy which must be protected by this Court.
We, thus, deem it necessary to grant Petitioner the privilege of the Writ of Habeas
Data.
The writ of habeas data was conceptualized as a judicial remedy enforcing the right
to privacy, most especially the right to informational privacy of individuals. The writ
operates to protect a person's right to control information regarding himself,
particularly in the instances where such information is being collected through
unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends.
Needless to state, an indispensable requirement before the privilege of the writ may
be extended is the showing, at least by substantial evidence, of an actual or
threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the
victim. This, in the case at bench, the petitioner failed to do.
In view of the above considerations, the directive by the Court of Appeals enjoining
the public respondents from "distributing or causing the distribution to the public any
records in whatever form, reports, documents or similar papers" relative to the
petitioner's "alleged ties with the CPP-NPA," appears to be devoid of any legal basis.
The public respondents cannot be ordered to refrain from distributing something that,
in the first place, it was not proven to have.