Republic of the Philippines UY alias ‘MM,’ are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
SUPREME COURT special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 138874-75 July 21, 2005
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
FRANCISCO JUAN LARRAÑAGA alias "PACO"; JOSMAN
AZNAR; ROWEN ADLAWAN alias "WESLEY"; ALBERTO
CAÑO alias "ALLAN PAHAK"; ARIEL BALANSAG,
DAVIDSON VALIENTE RUSIA alias "TISOY TAGALOG";
JAMES ANTHONY UY alias "WANGWANG"; and JAMES
ANDREW UY alias "MM", Accused-Appellants.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
At bar are four (4) motions for reconsideration separately filed by
appellants (1) Francisco Juan Larrañaga, (2) Josman
Aznar, (3) Rowen Adlawan, Alberto Caño and Ariel Balansag,
and (4) James Anthony Uy and James Andrew Uy, assailing our
Decision dated February 3, 2004 convicting them of the crimes
of (a) special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention and (b) simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
7, Cebu City in Criminal Cases Nos. CBU-45303 and 45304
is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
(1) In Criminal Case No. CBU-45303, appellants FRANCISCO
JUAN LARRAÑAGA alias ‘PACO;’ JOSMAN AZNAR; ROWEN
ADLAWAN alias ‘WESLEY;’ ALBERTO CAÑO alias ‘ALLAN
PAHAK;’ ARIEL BALANSAG; and JAMES ANDREW
with homicide and rape and are sentenced to suffer the penalty
of DEATH by lethal injection;
(2) In Criminal Case No. CBU-45304, appellants FRANCISCO
JUAN LARRAÑAGA alias ‘PACO;’ JOSMAN AZNAR; ROWEN
ADLAWAN alias ‘WESLEY;’ ALBERTO CAÑO alias ‘ALLAN
PAHAK;’ ARIEL BALANSAG; and JAMES ANDREW
UY alias ‘MM,’ are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention and are
sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA;
(3) In Criminal Case No. CBU-45303, appellant JAMES
ANTHONY UY, who was a minor at the time the crime was
committed, is likewise found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention with homicide and rape and is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA; in Criminal Case
No. CBU-45304, he is declared guilty of simple kidnapping and
serious illegal detention and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
TWELVE (12) years of prision mayor in its maximum period,
as MINIMUM, to seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal in its
medium period, as MAXIMUM;
(4) Appellants are ordered to pay jointly and severally the heirs of
Marijoy and Jacqueline, in each case, the amounts
of (a) ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity, (b) ₱25,000.00 as
temperate damages, (c) ₱150,000.00 as moral damages,
and (d) ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Three (3) Justices of the Court maintain their position that RA
7659 is unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the death penalty;
nevertheless, they submit to the ruling of the majority that the law
is constitutional and the death penalty can be lawfully imposed in
the case at bar.
In accordance with Article 83 of The Revised Penal Code, as VI
amended by Section 25 of RA No. 7659, upon the finality of this
Decision, let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded to the PROSECUTION WITNESS RUSIA WAS A COACHED
Office of the President for the possible exercise of Her WITNESS."1
Excellency’s pardoning power.
B. AZNAR
SO ORDERED."
"I
Appellants anchor their motions on the following grounds:
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
A. LARRAÑAGA TRIAL COURT DID NOT VIOLATE THE RIGHTS OF THE
ACCUSED TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
"I
II
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN BARRING LARRAÑAGA AND
THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (NBI) THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN (A) DISCHARGING
REGIONAL DIRECTOR FLORENCIO VILLARIN FROM DAVID RUSSIA AS STATE WITNESS; AND (B) CONVICTING
TESTIFYING; THE APPELLANTS MAINLY ON THE BASIS OF THE
TESTIMONY OF RUSIA.
II
III
THE POLICE PLANTED EVIDENCE ON APPELLANTS;
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN REJECTING THE
III DEFENSE OF APPELLANT AZNAR.

LARRAÑAGA SUFFICIENTLY PROVED HIS ALIBI; IV

IV THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING THE DEATH

PENALTY ON THE APPELLANTS."2
THE TRIAL COURT PREVENTED THE INTRODUCTION OF
KEY DEFENSE EVIDENCE; C. ADLAWAN, BALANSAG, CAÑO

V "I

THE CORPSE FOUND IN THE RAVINE WAS NOT THAT OF PROSECUTION WITNESS RUSIA IS NOT QUALIFIED TO BE A
MARIJOY; AND STATE WITNESS UNDER PARAGRAPHS (D) AND (E),
SECTION 17 OF THE REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE.
II
RUSIA’S TESTIMONY AND THAT OF THE OTHER
PROSECUTION WITNESSES WERE INCREDIBLE,
INCONSISTENT, AND UNWORTHY OF BELIEF.
III
BIAS AND PREJUDICE AGAINST THE DEFENSE WERE
GLARINGLY DISPLAYED BY THE COURT A QUO WHICH
GREATLY AFFECTED THE OUTCOME OF THE CASE.
IV
THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS FOR THE
CRIME CHARGED HAS NOT BEEN PROVEN BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT."3
D. JAMES ANDREW AND JAMES ANTHONY UY
"I
ACCUSED JAMES ANDREW S. UY WAS, LIKE HIS YOUNGER
BROTHER JAMES ANTHONY S. UY, A MINOR AT THE TIME
THE OFFENSES AT BAR ALLEGEDLY HAPPENED LAST JULY
16, 1997;
II
THE IDENTITY OF THE DEAD BODY OF THE WOMAN FOUND
IN TAN-AWAN, CARCAR, CEBU LAST JULY 18, 1997 WAS
NEVER CONCLUSIVELY ESTABLISHED THUS THE NEED
FOR ITS EXHUMATION FOR DNA TESTING;"4
In his supplemental motion for reconsideration dated March 25,
2004, Larrañaga submitted a separate study of Dr. Racquel Del
Rosario-Fortun, Forensic Pathologist, to show that the
examination conducted by the prosecution expert witnesses on
the body found in Tan-awan, Carcar is inadequate.
In a similar supplemental motion for reconsideration5, Aznar
submitted to this Court the Affidavit dated February 27, 2004 of
Atty. Florencio Villarin, Regional Director of the National Bureau
of Investigation, Central Visayas, to show that: (1) the police
investigation of this case was flawed; (2) he (Aznar) was arrested
in 1997 not because of his involvement in this case but because
he had in his possession a pack of shabu and firearms;
and (3) David Rusia is not a credible witness.
On July 15, 2004, the Solicitor General filed a consolidated
comment6 praying that the four (4) motions for reconsideration be
denied with finality, there being no new argument raised. He
responded to appellants’ assignments of errors by exhaustively
quoting portions of our challenged Decision.
In his consolidated comment7 to Aznar’s supplemental motion for
reconsideration, the Solicitor General enumerated the grounds
why Atty. Villarin’s Affidavit should not be given consideration. On
February 15, 2005, Aznar filed a reply alleging that the Solicitor
General "read out of context" certain portions of the Affidavit. He
argued that the
Affidavit only exposes the flawed investigation of the Chiong case
and that, at the time of his arrest, there was no evidence against
him. On March 4, 2005, the Solicitor General filed a rejoinder
stating that Aznar’s reply "actually supports the undersigned
counsel’s (Solicitor General’s) position that Atty. Villarin’s Affidavit
is utterly inadequate to prove his innocence or at least even
acquit them on reasonable doubt," thus, "it would be useless to
call for new trial on the basis of such Affidavit." On March 29,
2005, Aznar filed a sur-rejoinder insisting that the Affidavit should
be given due consideration.
Except for the motion filed by appellants Uy brothers with respect
to James Andrew’s alleged minority, we find all the motions bereft
of merit.
At the inception, let it be emphasized that the filing of a motion for
reconsideration does not impose on us the obligation to discuss
and rule again on the grounds relied upon by the movant which
are mere reiteration of the issues previously raised and
thoroughly determined and evaluated in our Decision being
questioned. In Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership vs.
Velasco,8 we ruled that, "this would be a useless formality of ritual
invariably involving merely a reiteration of the reasons already set
forth in the judgment or final order for rejecting the arguments
advanced by the movant."
The foregoing principle applies squarely to the motions filed by
appellants Larrañaga, Aznar, Adlawan, Caño and Balansag, it
being apparent that the points raised therein are not neoteric
matters demanding new judicial determination. They are mere
rehash of the arguments set forth in their respective briefs which
we already considered, weighed and resolved before we
rendered the Decision sought to be reconsidered.
However, in view of the severity of the penalties for the crimes
charged, we deem it necessary to stress once more our basis in
convicting appellants.
The following is a précis of the issues submitted by appellants in
their motions:
This Court erred –
first, in according credence to Rusia’s testimony;
second, in rejecting appellants’ alibi;
third, in holding that the trial court did not violate their right to due
process when it excluded the testimony of other defense
witnesses; and
fourth, in holding that the body found in Tan-awan, Carcar was
not that of Marijoy.
In deciding a criminal case, the policy of the courts is always to
look at the case in its entirety. The totality of the evidence
presented by both the prosecution and the defense are weighed,
thus, averting general conclusions from isolated pieces of
evidence. This means that an appeal of a criminal case opens its
entire records for review.9
I
Appellants vigorously contend that we should not have sustained
Rusia’s testimony hook, line and sinker, owing to his tainted
record and reputation. However, it must be stressed that
Rusia’s testimony was not viewed in isolation. In giving
credence to Rusia’s testimony, the trial court took into
consideration the physical evidence and the
corroborative testimonies of other witnesses. Thus, we find no
reason why we should not uphold the trial court’s findings.
We reiterate our pronouncement in our Decision that what makes
Rusia’s testimony worthy of belief is its striking compatibility with
the physical evidence. Physical evidence is one of the highest
degrees of proof. It speaks more eloquently than all witnesses put
together.10 The presence of Marijoy’s ravished body in a deep
ravine at Tan-awan, Carcar with tape on her mouth and
handcuffs on her wrists certainly
bolstered Rusia’s testimony on what actually took place from
Ayala Center to Tan-awan. Indeed, the details he supplied to the
trial court are of such nature and quality that only a witness who
actually saw the commission of the crimes could furnish.
Reinforcing his testimony is its corroboration by several other
witnesses who saw incidents of what he narrated. Rolando
Dacillo and Mario Minoza witnessed Jacqueline’s two failed
attempts to escape from appellants near Ayala Center. Benjamin
Molina and Miguel Vergara recognized Rowen as the person
who inquired from them where he could find a vehicle for hire on
the evening of July 16, 1997. Alfredo Duarte saw Rowen when
he bought barbeque and Tanduay at Nene’s Store while the white
van, driven by Caño, was waiting on the side of the road and he
heard voices of "quarreling male and female" emanating from the
van. And lastly, Manuel Camingao and Rosendo Rio testified
on the presence of Larrañaga and Josman at Tan-awan, Carcar
at dawn of July 17, 1997. All these bits and pieces of story form
part of Rusia’s narration. Now, with such strong anchorage on the
physical evidence and the testimonies of disinterested witnesses,
why should we not accord credence to Rusia’s testimony? Even
assuming that his testimony standing alone might indeed be
unworthy of belief in view of his character, it is not so when
considered with the other evidence presented by the
prosecution.
II
Appellants likewise claimed that we should have not sustained
the trial court’s rejection of their alibi. Settled is the rule that the
defense of alibi is inherently weak and crumbles in the light of
positive declarations of truthful witnesses who testified on
affirmative matters.11 Being evidence that is negative in nature
and self-serving, it cannot attain more credibility than the
testimonies of prosecution witnesses who testify on clear and
positive evidence.12 On top of its inherent
weakness, alibi becomes less plausible as a defense when it is
corroborated only by relatives or close friends of the accused.13
This case presents to us a balance scale whereby perched on
one end is appellants’ alibi supported by witnesses who were
either their relatives, friends or classmates, while on the other end
is the positive identification of the herein appellants by the
prosecution witnesses who were not, in any way, related to the
victims. With the above jurisprudence as guide, we are certain
that the balance must tilt in favor of the latter.
Besides, a thorough examination of the evidence for the
prosecution shows that the appellants failed to meet the
requirements of alibi, i.e., the requirements of time and
place.14 They failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence
that it was physically impossible for them to be at the Ayala
Center, Cebu City when the Chiong sisters were abducted. What
is clear from the evidence is that Rowen, Josman, Ariel, Alberto,
James Anthony and James Andrew were all within the vicinity of
Cebu City on July 16, 1997.
Not even Larrañaga who claimed to be in Quezon City satisfied
the required proof of physical impossibility. During the hearing, it
was shown that it takes only one (1) hour to travel by plane from
Manila to Cebu and that there are four (4) airline companies
plying the route. One of the defense witnesses admitted that
there are several flights from Manila to Cebu each morning,
afternoon and evening. Indeed, Larrañaga’s presence in Cebu
City on July 16, 1997 was proved to be not only a possibility
but a reality. Four (4) witnesses identified Larrañaga as one of
the two men talking to Marijoy and Jacqueline on the night of July
16, 1997. Shiela Singson testified that on July 16, 1997, at
around 7:20 in the evening, she saw Larrañaga approach
Marijoy and Jacqueline at the West Entry of Ayala Center.
The incident reminded her of Jacqueline’s prior story that he was
Marijoy’s admirer. Shiela confirmed that she knows Larrañaga
since she had seen him on five (5) occasions. Analie
Konahap also testified that on the same evening of July 16,
1997, at about 8:00 o’clock, she saw Marijoy and Jacqueline
talking to two (2) men at the West Entry of Ayala Center. She
recognized the two (2) men as Larrañaga and Josman, having
seen them several times at Glicos, a game zone, located across
her office at the third level of Ayala Center. Williard Redobles,
the security guard then assigned at Ayala Center, corroborated
the foregoing testimonies of Shiela and Analie. In
addition, Rosendo Rio, a businessman from Cogon, Carcar,
declared that he saw Larrañaga at Tan-awan at about 3:30 in the
morning of July 17, 1997. The latter was leaning against the hood
of a white van.15 And over and above all, Rusia categorically
identified Larrañaga as one of the participes criminis.
Taking the individual testimonies of the above witnesses in
relation with that of Rusia, we are convinced that Larrañaga was
indeed in Cebu City at the time of the commission of the crimes
and was one of the principal perpetrators thereof.
At this juncture, it bears mentioning that this case is not the first
time that Larrañaga was charged with or complained of pruriently
assaulting young female students in Cebu. Months before the
abduction of Marijoy and Jackie, the parents of a certain Rochelle
Virtucio, complained about Larrañaga’s attempt to snatch their
young daughter and drag her in a black, stylish Honda Civic. It
happened just near the gate of Rochelle’s school, thus, showing
his impudence. We quote a portion of the transcript of
stenographic notes dated September 23, 1998, thus:
"ATTY. HERMOSISIMA:
Your Honor please, this is a …. Inspector Era handed to this
representation a copy of a Letter dated September 25, 1996,
addressed to the Student Affairs Office, University of San
Carlos,P. del Rosario Street, Cebu City, and this is signed by
Leo Abayan and Alexander Virtucio and noted by Mrs.
Aurora Pacho, Principal, University of San Carlos, Girls High
School, and for the record, I will read the content:
TO WHOM THIS MAY CONCERN:
We the parents and guardians of Rochelle Virtucio, a first
year high school student of your University of San Carlos-
Girls High School, are writing your good office about an
untoward incident involving our daughter and another
student of your school.
xxxxxx
That last Monday at around 5:00 PM, Rochelle and other
classmates, Michelle Amadar and Keizaneth Mondejar, while
on their way to get a ride home near the school campus, a
black Honda Civic with five young male teenagers including
the driver, suddenly stopped beside them, and
simultaneously one of them, which was later identified as
FRANCISCO JUAN LARRANAGA, a BSHRM I student of your
school, grabbed Rochelle by her hand to try to get Rochelle
to their vehicle. She resisted and got away from him.
Sensing some people were watching what they were doing,
they hurriedly sped away.
We are very concerned about Rochelle’s safety. Still now,
she is suffering the shock and tension that she is not
supposed to experience in her young life. It is very hard for
us parents to think about what she’d been through."16
The presence of such complaint in the record of this case
certainly does not enhance Larrañaga’s chance of securing an
acquittal.
III
Larrañaga and Aznar bewail our refusal to overturn the trial
court’s exclusion of Professor Jerome Bailen and Atty. Florencio
Villarin, NBI, Regional Director, as defense witnesses. Professor
Bailen was properly excluded. First, he is not a finger-print expert
but an archaeologist. And second, his report consists merely of
the results of his visual inspection of the exhibits already
several months old. Anent Atty. Villarin’s failure to testify before
the trial court, suffice it to say that his belated Affidavit, which
Aznar submitted via his supplemental motion for reconsideration
dated May 5, 2004, raises nothing to change our findings and
conclusions. What clearly appears in said Affidavit is a man trying
to impress people that he was the one responsible for solving the
Chiong case and for that, he deserves a promotion. The trial
court, at the onset, must have seen such immateriality in his
intended testimony. Indeed, we agree with the Solicitor General’s
observation that such Affidavit "is neither helpful nor encouraging
to Aznar’s cause." We quote his keen reflection on the matter:
"xxxxxx
Third. Atty. Villarin’s affidavit, in paragraphs 19 and 20 thereof,
acknowledged that the body found in the Carcar ravine was that
of Marijoy. This assertion immediately conflicts with accused-
appellant Aznar’s claim in his Motion for Reconsideration that the
corpse was not Marijoy’s. Surely, something is amiss in accused-
appellant Aznar’s recollection of his defense.
Fourth. Atty. Villarin confirmed in paragraph 24 of his affidavit
that accused-appellant Francisco Larranaga was a suspect in the
subject crimes. Evidently, this statement completely supports this
Honorable Court’s findings in its Decision dated February 3,
2004.
Fifth. In paragraph 30 of Atty. Villarin’s affidavit, he stated that:
‘The arrest of Juzman Aznar was the major breakthrough in
the investigation of the case because witnesses came out
and identified Juzman Aznar as one of those allegedly seen
talking to the victims on the night they disappeared.’ Hence,
accused-appellant Aznar was in the beginning already a first-
grade suspect in the Chiong sisters’ celebrated abduction and
killing.
Sixth. Atty. Villarin admitted in paragraph 36 of his affidavit that:
‘x x x I did not take this against [Supt. Labra] for preempting
our next move to get Juzman Aznar as we were already
placing him under surveillance because I knew [Supt. Labra]
did it in his honest desire to help solve the crime x x
x.’ Clearly, this statement is not an indictment of the investigation
that the police undertook in the subject crimes.
Seventh. Paragraphs 37 to 40 are nothing but personal tirades
against alleged influence peddling by Mrs. Thelma Chiong,
mother of the victims, and the purportedly undue promotions of
the lawyers and police officers who unearthed the evidence
against accused-appellants and successfully prosecuted the
latter. In executing the affidavit, it appears that Atty. Villarin
would want to impress that he, rather than those promoted,
deserved the promotion.
Eighth. Atty. Villarin’s inability to testify in the criminal cases was
not due solely to the prosecution’s action. Whether he ought to
testify or not was an argument openly discussed in court. Hence,
for the resulting inability, Atty. Villarin has no one to blame but the
defense lawyers who did everything to make a mockery of the
criminal proceedings.
And lastly, there is nothing in Atty. Villarin’s affidavit of the
quality of a "smoking gun" that would acquit accused-appellants
of the crimes they have been convicted. For he did not finish the
police investigation of the subject crimes; this is the long and
short of his miniscule role in the instant case. Indeed, judging by
the substance of his affidavit, he would not be testifying in
case a new trial is held on anything that has not been said
and rejected heretofore, except his own unsubstantiated
opinions (i.e. not facts as required by evidentiary rules), his
self-congratulatory remarks, and his unmitigated frustration
over failing to get a promotion when almost everyone else
did."17
Neither can we entertain at this late stage Dr. Fortun’s separate
study to show that the examination conducted on the body found
in Tan-awan, Carcar is inadequate. Such study cannot be
classified as newly-discovered evidence warranting belated
reception. Obviously, Larrañaga could have produced it during
trial had he wished to.
IV
Knowing that the prosecution’s theory highly rests on the truth of
Rusia’ testimony, appellants endeavor to destroy it by claiming
that the body found at the foot of a deep ravine in Tan-awan,
Carcar was not that of Marijoy. We must reiterate the reasons
why we cannot give our assent to such argument. First, Inspector
Edgardo Lenizo,18 a fingerprint expert, testified that the
fingerprints of the corpse match those of Marijoy.19 Second, the
packaging tape and the handcuff found on the dead body were
the same items placed on Marijoy and Jacqueline while they were
being detained.20 Third, the body had the same clothes worn by
Marijoy on the day she was abducted.21 And fourth, the members
of the Chiong family personally identified the corpse to be that of
Marijoy22 which they eventually buried. They erected
commemorative markers at the ravine, cemetery and every place
which mattered to Marijoy. As a matter of fact, at this very
moment, appellants still fail to bring to the attention of this Court
any person laying a claim on the said body. Surely, if the body
was not that of Marijoy, other families who had lost someone of
similar age and gender as Marijoy would have surfaced and
claimed the body. The above circumstances only bolster Rusia’s
narration that Rowen and Ariel pushed Marijoy into the deep
ravine, following Josman’s instruction "to get rid" of her.
On the issue raised by appellants Uy brothers that James Andrew
was only seventeen (17) years and two hundred sixty two (262)
days old at the time the crimes were committed, the records bear
that on March 1, 1999, James Andrew’s birth certificate was
submitted to the trial court as part of the Formal Offer of
Additional Evidence,23 with the statement that he was eighteen
(18) years old. On March 18, 1999, appellants filed
a Manifestation of Erratum correcting in part the Formal Offer of
Additional Evidence by alleging that James Andrew was only
seventeen (17) years old.24
Now, James Andrew begs leave and prays that this Court admits
at this stage of the proceedings his (1) Certificate of Live Birth
issued by the National Statistics Office, and (2) Baptismal
Certificate. He prays that his penalty be reduced, as in the case
of his brother James Anthony.
The entry of James Andrew’s birth in the Birth Certificate is not
legible, thus it is extremely difficult for us to determine the veracity
of his claim. However, considering that minority is a significant
factor in the imposition of penalty, we find it proper to require the
Solicitor General (a) to secure from the Local Civil Registrar of
Cotobato City, as well as the National Statistics Office, a clear
and legible copy of James Andrew’s Birth Certificate, and
thereafter, (b) to file an extensive comment on the motion for
reconsideration filed by James Andrew and James Anthony Uy,
solely on James Andrews’ claim of minority.
Insofar as James Anthony is concerned, we maintain his
conviction and penalty, there being nothing in his motion which
warrants a reconsideration of our Decision.
In resolving the instant motions, we have embarked on this
painstaking task of evaluating every piece and specie of evidence
presented before the trial court in response to appellants’ plea for
the reversal of their conviction. But, even the element of
reasonable doubt so seriously sought by appellants is an ignis
fatuus which has eluded any intelligent ratiocination of their
submissions. Verily, our conscience can rest easy on our
affirmance of the verdict of the trial court, in light of appellants’
clear culpability which demands retribution.
WHEREFORE, the motions for reconsideration filed by appellants
Francisco Juan Larrañaga, Josman Aznar, Rowen Adlawan,
Alberto Caño and Ariel Balansag are hereby DENIED. The
Solicitor General is DIRECTED (a) to secure from the Local Civil
Registrar of Cotobato City, as well as the National Statistics
Office, a clear and legible copy of James Andrew’s Birth
Certificate, and (b) within ten (10) days therefrom, to file
an extensive comment on the motion for reconsideration filed by
James Andrew and James Anthony Uy, solely on James
Andrews’ claim of minority. The motion is
likewise DENIED insofar as James Anthony Uy is concerned.

SO ORDERED.