Actor Based Theories

 States as rational actors

o Media and popular discourse anthropomorphizes states (e.g. Canberra is concerned about the
Trump admin).

o States are spoken about as they were individuals, with their own individual needs and desires.

o This is the rational actor model of state beh`aviour.

 States choose rationally from a set of alternative policies.

 They choose the policy with the biggest payoff (i.e. 'the national interest'; survival, power,
wealth).

o Critiques of this model:

 Are states really unitary?

 States are composed of millions of people with differing views.

 How do you judge what a state 'wants'? (e.g. is it majority support?)

 This is the Condorcet Paradox - if you aggregate a group of completely

rational actors, any result could claim to represent the 'national interest'.

 Under plausible conditions, any policy could realistically majority support

amongst a group of people. Thus, states cannot be really spoken about like
they were individual people and rational actors.

 Are states really rational?

 Prima facie appears to be 'reasonable' and 'sensible', but political scientists do not use
it in this sense.

 Political science rationality is either 'thick' or 'thin' rationality. Thick rationality is

more controversial.

 Thick rationality = you can make assumptions about the contents of state
preferences.

 This content is assumed to be material concerns (but also survival,

power and wealth).

 Criticised because states often act in a way which suggest they are
maximising something else (and not material concerns).

 Thick rationalists argue that these are exceptions, while thick rationality
(i.e. material concerns) are the norm.

 Thin rationality = the content of preferences cannot be assumed. Rationality is

based on consistent and transitive preferences (a > b > c, thus a > c).

 States make decisions based on maximising expected utility.

 Expected utility is the probability that the action will bring about a
given state of the world times the benefit you'd get from that state of the
 world.

 e.g. Russia would invade Ukraine if the expected utility of a

successful invasion is greater than your expected utility from the
status quo.

 States may get expected utility wrong (e.g. availability heuristic;

probability neglect; small sample bias; sunk cost fallacy).

 Availability heuristic = psychological bias where we

systematically overestimate the chances of something
happening if we can personally recall an example of it
happening (e.g. plane crashes).

 Probability neglect = treating unlikely events as

impossible and likely events as certain (i.e. it is either
impossible, 50/50, or certain).

 Small sample bias = chances of unrepresentative events

are higher when looking at small sample sizes.

 Sunk cost fallacy = the more you invest in something the

harder it becomes to abandon it; rationality falls to
emotional investment.

 Unitary rationalists understand these critiques and have offered counter-arguments:

 The model is true most of the time;

 Replace states with state leaders and the unitary critique is weakened;

 The analytical leverage of the model is too useful to discount simply because
not all states act as unitary actors (it is a useful simplification).

 Psychological decision making

o Two ways of looking at psychology in foreign policy analysis:

 General irrationality = departure from rational, System-2 decision-making.

 Particular irrationality = the ways particular individual leaders depart from rational, System-
2 decision-making.

 School of thought that believes the individual personality of leaders' matters. Some
types of leaders may emerge systemically in some types of societies, and some
decisions may be pathological in nature.

 e.g. Trump has a greater propensity to initiate conflict (because of military

experience); Trump will make mistakes often (due to inexperience); Trump
will have an aggressive yet incompetent negotiating style (due to antisocial
orientation and curiosity in other countries).

 Criticism includes psychologists not being in a position to diagnose world leaders;

public persona of leaders' may be intentionally crafted; etc.

o Decision-making systems:

 System-1 = good for low-effort tasks, but disastrous for difficult cognitive tasks.
  System-2 = good for high-level cognitive tasks, but uses up a lot of energy.

 All people have this System-1/2 distinction, and nobody is rational all the time. Even being
consciously aware of one's irrationality doesn't make it go away.

o Heuristics (mental shortcuts);

 Includes availability heuristic; sunk cost fallacy; small sample bias; probability neglect.

 But also includes:

 Fundamental attribution error = when I do a bad thing, it is because the

circumstances forced me to; when my enemies do bad things, it is because they are
fundamentally bad.

 Halo effect = when someone does something well, they will do everything else well
(e.g. the narrative that Churchill was a great decision-maker just because of one good
decision despite his other great mistakes).

 Trade off avoidance = choosing one alternative over the other makes us often ignore
the downsides of our chosen alternative.

 Confirmation bias = the tendency to look for evidence in favour of our chosen
hypothesis.

 Sacred values protection = enemies who transgress certain sacred community values
deserve excessive responses; it is hard to rationally bargain over things considered
sacred.

Forecasting

 Forecasting is hard because of:

o Our psychology = heuristics.

o Strategic interaction = you need to be deliberately unpredictable so that your opponent can't
predict your actions ('Holmes-Moriarty problem').

o Preference falsification = people don't say what they really think because their political views are
unacceptable or frowned upon.

o Non-linear dynamics = small events may have large, disproportionate and unforeseen
consequences.

o Lack of incentive for getting it right = few forecasters are assessed on their accuracy; the media
prefers sensationalist predictions.

 Advances in forecasting:

o Econometric models and A.I = algorithms that take massive amount of data, look for patterns, then
extrapolate these patterns into the future.

o Prediction markets = using money through betting as an incentive for people to get their political
predictions right.

o Crowdsourcing = an effort to find people who are able to do better in prediction than others.
 How to assess a forecast:

o Forecasts are given as probabilities from the range 0-1 (0 = impossible; 1 = 1 certain).

o Brier Score - (Outcome - Prediction) ^ 2.

 I predict Hillary wins with p = 0.7.

 If she lost, the Brier Score is (0 - 0.7) ^ 2 = 0.49.

 Brier Score of 1 means it happened; Brier Score of 0 means it didn't.

 What makes a forecast?

o They must be specific.

 Numerical = 75%, not "highly likely".

 Clear as to what they refer to: military clash with 100+ deaths; not "instability".

o They must be time-limited.

 A recession on the 31st of March 2019, not "very soon".

 Types of forecasts:

o Econometrics and A.I:

 Ben Goldsmith - Atrocity Forecasting Project.

 Jay Ulfelder - Political Instability Task Force.

 Lockheed Martin - Worldwide Integrated Crisis Early Warning Project.

 These have reasonable performance, but only in the short-term.

o Prediction markets:

 Intrade.

 Iowa Electronic Markets.

 iPredict.

o Crowdsourcing:

 Good Judgement Project - open invitation project to submit questions that you're interested
in, and have people answer them.

 A small number of participants have consistently produced a very good predictive

record. These are the 'superforecasters'.

 Superforecasters are made from:

 Cognitive style;

 Not trying to fit the world into a pre-conceived theory;

  An understanding of probability;

 The ability to make fine-grained judgements;

 Knowing a little about a lot of things.

 Superforecasting tips:

 Fermi-ize: breaking down questions into component parts.

 Being on guard against wishful thinking.

 Looking for clashing causal forces.

 Balancing the inside and outside views.

 Constantly learning and updating.

 Looking for similar past cases.

o Example of forecasting:

 "Will either India or Pakistan use nuclear weapons in the coming 2 weeks?"

 1st step - look for an equivalence class.

 A clash between India and Pakistan?

 Has India or Pakistan ever used nuclear weapons against each other in
similar crises in the past?

 No. Therefore, the probability of this happening is immediately

posited as quite low.

 Furthermore, Pakistan has threatened nuclear weapons in the past as a

way to coerce their opponents.

 Thus, the outside view suggests that this is a bluff.

 2nd step - look for differences in the equivalence class from the case.

 Pakistan has a new leader.

 Is he more reckless or aggressive (vice-versa for India?)

 "Trump impeachment".

 This is a classic case of Fermi-ization.

 You ask: what would have to happen for this to happen? The bringing of
Articles against Trump.

 Then you ask: what would have to happen for THAT to happen?

 And so-on.

 "Brexit".

 New deal to be brought before the House of Commons on March the 13th. PM May
has promised to seek an extension should the vote fail, but all 27 EU leaders need to
 agree at the European Council summit on March the 21st for the extension to pass.

 Even if this new deal passes, pro-EU parliamentarians may still push for a second
referendum.

 Fermi-izing this: what would have to happen for this to happen; break it down.

o Forecasting is still difficult however, especially into the future. The best thing to do is
straightforward extrapolation (assuming things will be similar in the future).

 The assessment

o Give a probability expressed as a decimal (e.g. 0.30, 0.75) about:

 UK leaving EU on March 29th.

 2 ways this could not happen: UK seeks extension and EU grants extension; or UK
cancels Brexit through parliamentary vote or referendum.

 US House of Representatives introduces Articles of Impeachment against Trump on March

30th.

 An attempt to do this on December of 2018 was voted down by quite a significant

margin by the House of Representatives.

 Former PM Yulia Timoshenko wins largest vote-share in the 1st round of Ukrainian
Elections on March 31st.

 She is the most popular candidate currently.

o The Brier Score

 Forecast - Outcome, squared 2.

 Outcome is = 1 if it occurred, 0 if it did not.

 e.g. You forecast that Timoshenko wins with the probability of 0.4 and she does not,
therefore your Brier Score is 0.4 - 0 squared by 2 = 0.16.

 You want a LOW Brier Score.

Bureaucratic Politics

 The Bureaucratic Politics Model

o A challenge to the unitary actor model of foreign policy analysis.

o Associated with Graham Allison and his analysis of the Cuban missile crisis.

o Argues that bureaucratic actors within states are the real main actors that should be focused on.

 State policy is a result of haggling amongst different bureaucratic agencies, with their own
different interests and worldviews.

 A state is thus more of an unruly committee, than an individual person.

o Examples:
  Army vs Navy and Air Force over the "Defence of Australia" doctrine.

 Differences emerge from different opinions of what constitutes "Australia's security"

- regional, or alliances?

 Foreign ministries are often criticised of 'going native' (sympathising with foreigners more
than their own country).

 U.S. military more cautious about the use of force relative to civilian opinion.

 The Bureaucratic Model - Why Different Interests?

o Government agencies want to increase budgets and power, because this means more prestige and
money for those working in them.

o Those working for these agencies have little alternative should their own agency be downsized.

o Individual working within these agencies may come to believe that their agency's mission is more
important than others.

o In a way, the bureaucratic model shifts the rational actor away from the state and to the
bureaucratic agencies themselves (i.e. the agencies are the rational actors, which collectively, make
up the state).

 The Bureaucratic Model - Why Different Worldviews?

o The selection of their agency (e.g. why would you join DFAT if you have no empathy for
foreigners?)

o The effects of socialisation from being with other diplomats.

o The effects of experience from spending time overseas as a diplomat.

 Standard Operating Procedures

o SOP's are essential for complex organisations to function, especially under conditions of high
stress.

o SOP's are the culmination of hard-won learning.

o SOP's however, can lead to disaster.

 The Railroad Theory of WWI is an exemplar of this.

 Russia wanted to mobilise against Austria, but not Germany, to protect Serbia.

 However, Russia's railroads' SOP meant that Russia had to mobilise against both, or
neither.

 Germany's SOP required that they then must invade Russia's ally France to knock it
out of the war.

 The Able Archer crisis is another exemplar of this.

 Soviet feared that Reagan would launch a nuclear first strike.

 Soviet receive radar reports of 5 incoming US ICBMs.

  Soviet SOPs are that if the colonel thought it was real, they must launch a
counterstrike.

 Colonel realised it was a mistake and did not launch counterstrike (but also got fired
because of not following the SOP).

 How Can Bureaucratic Actors Shape Foreign Policy?

o The sheer complexity of state government allows bureaucrats to pursue their own agendas.

o Bureaucrats have informational advantages over the political leadership.

o Using this information advantage, bureaucrats can shape the agenda by presenting the political
leadership with only plans that they support.

o Bureaucrats can leak to the press and political opposition.

 How Can Political Leaders Respond?

o They can be aware of the key department's SOPs and language (e.g. Kennedy and the U.S. army).

o Set up different agencies against each other.

o Employ people from outside of the chain of command to police the bureaucracy (e.g. special
advisors).

o "Blue dye" tests for leakers.

 Limits of the Bureaucratic Model

o Like all models, it is a generalisation.

o Even the most powerful bureaucratic agency cannot ignore fundamental structural constrains or
public opinion on the issues that the public care about heavily (e.g. Brexit).

o The theory is quite US-centric, and is less applicable when compared to other states.

Society-Based Theories

 Societal Factors shaping Foreign Policy

o Political Structure

 Democracy / Autocracy.

 Key distinction in comparative politics.

 Democracies are characterised by competitive elections with universal

suffrage (right to vote) and individual rights.

 Autocracies are states which fail to meet one, or any, of these conditions.

 Some argue that there are 'mixed regimes' which exhibit a blend of both
elements (but these are historically rare).

 The consequences for foreign policy of political structure is:

  Democratic peace theory.

 Democracies tend to be easier to manage than autocracies in

many ways: free speech; political debate; less renegading on
commitments.

 Distinctions amongst democracies also exists:

 Different powers of head of state, relative to the legislature.

 Single member vs multimember districts; the former encourages 2 strong

parties and a single-party government.

 The consequences for foreign policy of these differences are:

 In presidential systems, the foreign policy is usually reserved to

the President who must negotiate a deal then 'sell' it to the
legislature.

 In multimember district systems, a coalition government is the

norm. Small coalition parties may have an outsize effect on
foreign policy.

 Distinctions amongst autocracies also exists:

 Personalist - based on one individual and their family, with no basis in

ideology.

 Single Party - based on a single governing party with a somewhat clear

ideology.

 Traditionalist - based on a real or imagined national tradition; monarchical or

religious.

 The consequences for foreign policy of these differences are:

 Traditionalist and Single Party regimes are more predictable than

Personalist regimes because they are more stable.

 Single Party regimes resemble democracies in some respects, but

they are less transparent.

 The personality of the leader is the most important thing in

Personalist regimes.

o Economic Structure

 Type of market economy.

 Almost all states today have some kind of market economy, but these are differences
in how these economies are organised.

 Moreover, economic structure overlaps with political structure in a way which is

important to foreign policy analysis (e.g. economic interdependence and
globalisation reduces the chances of war).

 In market economies, companies compete for business, and the state is theoretically
neutral between them. Private companies are not supposed to be influenced by state
foreign policy, although they are open to foreign trade and investment.
  An alternative form of capitalism is 'state capitalism'.

 Many middle-income states practice this type of capitalism - a market

economy with large state-owned enterprises or sovereign wealth funds.

 The interests of these enterprises or sovereign wealth funds often shape state
foreign policy and can become a tool of state policy.

 Politically influential sectors.

 Some business sectors may be politically crucial because they generate either great
employment or wealth.

 These sectors cannot be ignored by politicians.

Intelligence Analysis

 Markus Wolf

o Head of the foreign intelligence service for East Germany during the Cold War.

o Known as being the head of one of the most effective intelligence services.

o Said that the biggest problem in intelligence is not getting information; it is interpreting it and
getting policymakers to believe and act on it.

 Intelligence Analysis ~ Forecasting

o Intelligence analysis can be seen as a type of forecasting.

 It is both conditional and unconditional forecasting:

 Unconditional forecasting - what is likely to happen?

 Conditional forecasting - how is North Korea likely to act if we do X?

 Reasons Behind Intelligence Failure

o Politicization

 One of the reasons why intelligence forecasting sometimes fails.

 Politicization is when political leaders distort and politicize intelligence to suit their own
ends (e.g. placing political pressure on intelligence agencies to reach specific conclusions).

 It can also be more subtle: promotions and hiring decisions; and the fact that
inconvenient conclusions are more likely to be questioned.

o Complexity Effect

 While prediction in the short-term might be possible, it is harder to predict the long-term.

o Preference Falsification

 People hiding their true preferences because they have incentives to lie and cover up what
they actually think.
 o Other Side's Self-Deception

 When bureaucratic players within government attempt to deceive each other.

o Compartmentalization

 When different departments have different pieces of information, but have trouble
communicating to make the 'whole picture'.

o Cognitive Heuristics

 Groupthink

 Changing their view of things to conform with what the group thinks.

 Confirmation Bias

 Only looking for evidence that confirms your hypothesis.

 The Other Perspective

 Failing to put oneself in the opponent's shoes and understanding their culture and
views.

 State Arrogance

 Overrating one state's own importance and believing that other states act in response
to one's own state.

 Small Sample Bias

 "I know someone who..."

 Bias for causes instead of random chance

 Everything must have a cause.

 Fallacy of Identity

 Big events must have had big causes.

 What Can Be Done About It?

o Social science thinking tools

 Not selecting on the dependent variable

 Look at cases where an outcome occurred and where it did not.

 Look and intelligence failures and successes, and look for the differences between
the two.

 Look at relevant comparisons

 What happened in other similar cases?

 The problem here, is selecting what a relevant comparison is.

 Do not overlook negative evidence.

  What evidence is there that suggests my interpretation is wrong?

 What are alternative interpretations of my allegedly supportive evidence?

 The Red Team - A Digression

 Three different types of red team:

a. Plays the adversary in war games;

b. Plays the adversary to check security; and

c. Probe weaknesses in the dominant argument.

 When we say 'red team', we meant the third sense: the team designed to probe
weaknesses in the dominant argument.

 This red team is designed to mitigate confirmation bias.

 This is what you should be doing as the 'red team' in the presentation
assessment.

 The hypothetico-deductive model

 Derive 'observable implications' of your theory (i.e. what would you expect to see if
your theory was true?)

 Make your theory falsifiable (i.e. what evidence would prove your theory wrong?)

 Identify alternative theories.

 Construct discriminating tests (i.e. what evidence would you see if your theory was
correct and the alternative was wrong?)

 Bayes' Rule

 Probability that hypothesis A is true, given some evidence B.

 A = probability that Trump is a Russian asset; B = his appointment of Flynn as the

National Security Advisor.

 P (A/B) = P (B/A) x P (A) / P (B/A) x P (A) + P (B/~A) x.

 The probability that Trump is a Russian asset given that he appointed Flynn as
his advisor P (A/B) is equal to the probability he appoints Flynn as his advisor
if he were a Russian asset P (B/A) times our prior belief that he is a Russian
asset P(A), divided by the probability he would appoint Flynn as his advisor
whether he was a Russian asset or not P(B/A) x P(A) + P (B/~A) x P(~A).

 Sensitivity Analysis

 There is a saying that "assumptions make an ass of 'u' and 'me'".

 In reality, all conclusions rest on some assumptions. The question is thus - are these
assumptions reasonable? And if not, are our conclusions sensitive to these
assumptions?

 Sensitivity analysis involves examining what you are assuming, asking whether these
assumptions are reasonable, and whether your conclusion would change if you
 changed your assumption.

 Application - Is Trump A Russian Asset?

o Beginning with Theory

Trump is a Russian asset who directly takes orders from Moscow (perhaps blackmailed
financially or sexually).

Trump is not a Russian asset, but he admires Putin and believes that the US should have
better relations with Russia and dislikes NATO ally freeriding.

o For Each Piece of Evidence

3 Key Questions

 How likely would this be to occur if Trump was a Russian agent?

 What are some alternative explanations of this same evidence?

 How likely would this evidence be if these alternative explanations were true?

Keep plugging in numbers into the calculator and use the new figures to test each newer
piece of evidence.

o Aim of the Exercise

Shows us the power of 'priors' - our initial belief in whether a theory is true or false.

Shows us how important some pieces of evidence are relative to others, by seeing how
much they shift our priors.

Focuses us to be explicit about what alternative theories could be and flushes out
unexamined assumptions.

 Takeaways from Lecture

o Intelligence failures result from many of the faulty heuristics that we find in general decision-
making.

o Intelligence is about figuring out our opponent's intentions and capabilities, which allows us to
predict their actions and their responses to our actions.

o Good social-science thinking skills are crucial to figuring this out.

Public Opinion

 Questions

o Does public opinion matter for public policy?

o What issues are the most salient?

o What about Australia?

 Key Considerations
 o The public has little incentive to learn about politics in general.

o The public similarly has even less incentive to learn about foreign policy, and the consequences of
foreign policy for the public are relatively remote.

o Political leaders generally don't respond to public pressure over foreign policy (Dowding, Martin
et al 2015).

 However, if and when foreign policy crises do rise, public opinion is nevertheless very
important.

 Examples of this include:

 Bush's 2004 victory through the use of the "war on terror" rhetoric;

 Obama's victory in 2008 as a result of Bush's mismanagement of Iraq;

 The fact that Australian PM's often consult pollsters over their war decisions.

 Issues in Public Opinion and Foreign Policy

o Issues in which public opinion becomes particularly salient are:

 Support for military conflict, especially as a function of casualties ('casualty cringe').

 Support for free trade and globalisation.

 Favourability towards other countries (e.g. Australia with the US and China).

 Main Schools of Thought

o The ignorant public (Almond-Lippman consensus).

o The casualty sensitivity (Mueller).

o Pretty prudent and roughly rational public (Jentleson, Feaver and Gelpi).

o Partisanship above all else (Berinsky).

 Almond-Lippman Consensus

o The public knows and cares little of foreign policy, and their opinion does and should not matter
when it comes to foreign policy decisions.

 This public opinion also, isn't "real", and shifts often.

 Thus the public has no input into foreign policy, and this is a good thing!

 Casualty Sensitivity

o Public opinion turned against wars like Iraq after learning of casualties.

o This phenomenon was first noted in regard to the Korean and Vietnam war.

o Is now unquestionable - public will turn against wars as casualties increase.

 Prudent Public

o Suggests voters make a rough calculation of the costs and benefits of foreign conflict.
  Casualties factor into the costs of conflict, but the public considers the prospective benefits
of conflict too.

 The chances of success and the goals of the conflict may counteract the costs of casualties.

 Partisanship

o Partisan identity is the base of US politics.

o Berinsky argues that the US public is motivated by partisan cues, rather than by fundamental facts.

 Casualties and prospects of success move elite partisan opinion, which then moves public
opinion.

 The Bottom-Up Theory

o Formed by Kertzer and Zeitzoff.

o Argues that elite cues can explain:

 Why US Democrat voters take a consistently pro-Palestinian stance;

 Why publics in most NATO countries opposed the Afghanistan War before any mainstream
party did;

 Why publics in many EU countries oppose the euro, whereas no mainstream parties do.

o This can be explained with a link to social networks.

 Individuals form their worldviews based on general principles, and they get information
about particular events from like-minded individuals.

 This is more relevant now that the media landscape is fragmented; the 'information
environment' has changed.

 Free Trade

o Economic models say that views of free trade should follow personal economic interest.

 High-skilled people in rich countries favour free trade.

 Those dependent on exporting industries favour free trade.

o In reality, one's opinion on globalisation and trade has little to do with personal economic interest.

 The main drivers of economic interest are ideology and identity.

o Two types of people overwhelmingly oppose free trade:

 Conservative nationalists.

 Left-wing socialists.

 Australia and Casualties

o Australia is uniquely casualty-adverse due to Gallipoli (Brown). Alternatively, Australia might be

rather insensitive (Friedman).
 o Charles' own research finds Australia is similar to the US - more casualty sensitive than in the past,
but prospects of success still play a part in the Australian public's mind.

 Australia and ANZUS

o The ANZUS alliance enjoys consistent majority support.

 Some groups of people support the alliance more than others:

 Those with high education.

 Those who are Anglo.

 Those who are left-wing.

 Those who are old.

 External shocks in the forms of wars or terrorist attacks tends to increase support for the
alliance.

o However, the alliance is less popular when Republicans are in US office.

 Trump in particular.

 Australia and China

o China is Australia's major trading partner, yet it has a very different culture and political system.

o Australia has a higher "gut favourability" to the US than to China.

 Australia's opinion towards China fluctuates year-to-year.

 Public Opinion - Conclusion

o In general, the public does not care and has little influence in foreign policy.

o However, in crises or war, the public opinion may be crucial.

o The public in most countries are more casualty-adverse than before, but casualties may be
outweighed with the prospects of conflict.

o The Australian public is still more favourable to the US than to China, but this may not last.

 Economic Pressure and Leverage

o Brexit

 UK voted in 2017 to leave the EU.

 The current UK government wants access to European markets, without allowing free
movement of EU nationals to the UK.

 The EU is unwilling to grant the UK full access to their markets without receiving the
ability of free movement of EU nationals.

o Scotland

 Had Scotland voted for independence in 2014, an independent Scotland wished to maintain
the British pound as their currency.
  This would mean however, that the Bank of England would have to act as a lender of
last resort to major Scottish commercial banks.

 Different currencies in Scotland and England however, would hurt both countries'
economies.

 Conventional Wisdom about Economic Pressure

o The advantage lies with the lender and the seller, not the debtor and the buyer.

 This advantage may be wrong however. Keynes said:

 "If you owe someone 1,000, they own you. If you owe someone 1,000,000, you own
them." - JM Keynes.

 Example:

 Israel defeated the Arab states in the Yom Kippur War due to US
assistance.

 To punish the US for helping Israel, the Arab states stopped selling oil
to the US.

 However, countries such as Japan bought oil from the Arab states then
sold it to the US.

 This round-about loop created a supply shock.

 This supply shock to a global economic downturn, which reduced the

demand and price for oil.

 In the end, the Arab states actually lost out.

o Keynes logic can thus be explained as:

 The party with the advantage is the one whose opportunity costs of disruption are lower.

 Disruption of an economic relationship hurts both parties, but the question is who it
hurts more.

 If there are more willing lenders out there than borrowers, this person is the borrower.

 If there are more willing sellers out there than buyers, this person is the buyer.

o David and Goliath

 The advantage generally lies with the bigger actor.

 If Canada lost a deal with the US, they would lose more from the disruption than the
US would.

 However, both US and Canadian policymakers know this and know that the other
country knows it.

 Thus, the US will tend to get more of what it wants than Canada will.

 This is why smaller countries tend to group up in trade federations.

  Exceptions exist, especially if you have something irreplaceable that the opponent needs
and if nobody else could find a substitutive for it.

 Sanctions

o The empirical record of sanctions is very mixed; and there is very little evidence that sanctions
work for forcing policy concessions or leadership change.

o Despite this, sanctions are popular as a bloodless alternative to military action.

 Why Don't Sanctions Work

o Sanctions must be coordinated with multiple states, which may be difficult.

o 'Sanction rents' may simply enrich and entrench the political elite.

o Sanctions may generate public support for a targeted regime.

o The Sanctions Paradox

 A theory made by Drezner.

 States with high prospective future conflict are unlikely to be vulnerable to sanctions,
because this gives their opponents leverage over them.

 Sanctions are unlikely to work where the opportunity cost gap between the sender and the
receiver is small (e.g. the sanctions hurt the sender just as much as the receiver).

 Sanctions are only likely to work where there is low expectations of future conflict, and a
high disparity in opportunity costs between the sender and receiver.

 Economic Leverage - Conclusion

o The party which loses less in the event of a disruption is generally the one with the advantage.

 This however, is not always the seller or the lender.

o Sanctions are generally ineffective.

 They usually work best when threatened, but not actually imposed (the sender gets to avoid
the costs of the sanction).

The Enemy

 Why we need to understand the enemy

o To anticipate how they will react to our moves;

o To anticipate how to best react to this;

o To accurately gauge their intentions;

o To win them over.

 Why we misunderstand the enemy

o Fundamental attribution error;

  Our good deeds reflect who we are, and our bad deeds are a regrettable response to our
circumstances.

 However, our opponent's bad deeds reflect who they are, and their good deeds are only done
to placate external pressure.

o Perception of excessive centralisation;

 We understand that our own policies are the result of a messy bargain amongst multiple
actors, and we recognise that sometimes, our decisions are often mistakes.

 However, it is hard to understand the same of our adversary.

o Ownside bias;

 Nobody thinks that they're the bad guys.

 The Elephant and the Rider

 We hold the views we do because of upbringing and culture (the Elephant).

 These are deeply rooted views, and our logic and reasoning (the Rider) is
designed to protect - not examine - these beliefs.

o Simulation theory;

 Putting oneself in the adversary's shoes and asking how you would behave the in the same
situation.

 May fail because the adversary may have very different personality traits and
motivations from yourself.

 Thus:

 Do not assume the enemy is just like you. They may value certain
things more than you would, and take risks that you would not take.

 Instead, build up a picture of the enemy's motivations by paying

attention to their behaviour in costly and unusual situations.

 When trying to win people over, do not rely on facts. Build empathy
first, then use factual persuasion later.

o Theory theory;

 Developing a theory of what motivates others, then using this to predict their behaviour.

 Theory theory recognises, unlike simulation theory, that other people may have very
different motivations to yourself.

 Conclusion

o We need to understand our enemy in order to formulate policy.

o However, we are bad at doing this because we often forget that the enemy thinks and behaves
differently to us.

o Building on this, we overemphasise centralisation and intent, and overlook the fact that the enemy
sincerely believes that they are in the right.
Identity

 Strategic Culture

o 'Culture' can be defined as "collectively held ideas, beliefs and norms" (Pateman).

o Culture is a popular explanatory variable in strategic studies.

 e.g. American War Culture; Chinese Strategic Culture; Iranian Strategic Culture.

o Despite its popularity, it is a problematic concept.

 It is hard to define.

 It is often superfluous.

 It often carries dangerous ethno-centric connotations.

 e.g. 'military orientalism' - the idea that our enemies come from a different culture
and are thus irrational and impossible to understand.

 Tautology

o Tautology is a problem of the idea of culture.

 Say Russia intervenes in Eastern Ukraine because Russian strategic culture holds the
Eastern Ukraine to be of particular value.

 But how do we know that Russian strategic culture holds this to be valuable?
Because they just did it?

 i.e. the problem is circular logic.

 Essentialism

o Essentialism is another problem of the idea of culture.

 Essentialism holds that a state's decisions internationally are a function of an unchanging

national culture.

 Say Russia does what it does because of an intrinsic, ineffable Russian strategic
culture that propels them to do it.

 i.e. Therefore they cannot change, no matter what.

 Occam's Razor

o The simple solution is usually the best one.

 Thus, does invoking the term culture add anything useful?

 e.g. The American Way of War is focused on technology, use of annihilation, and the
minimalization of casualties.

 If you think about it though, the US is a large, wealthy and technologically

advanced countries. Thus, isn't their way of warfare a rational adaption to their
 economic and geographic circumstance?

 And if so, does adding the term culture add anything at all? Doesn't it just
complicate things?

 Dangerous Ethno-Centric Implications

o For purposes of propaganda, states always have incentive to paint enemies as irrational and driven
by hatred.

 However, strategists should not buy into this racism, as it turns into underestimation.

 What's Then Left of Culture?

o Culture can be valuable, but only if it provides an explanatory leverage above what a standard
rational choice account would.

 e.g. Intercultural differences.

 There is evidence that cultures systemically differ in how much they value certain
things.

 These differences can have important consequences for decision making.

 Two of these differences are:

 Trust

 The extent to which you think strangers will try take advantage of you.

 Those who do not trust others may miss out on mutually

beneficial deals.

 In the trust game, the Greeks and Saudis gave less than
Britons and Australians.

 Hierarchy

 The extent to which it is considered legitimate to consider those who

are higher up the hierarchy than oneself.

 e.g. The power distance index in Australian culture is very low;

the power distance index in East Asian culture is very high.

 e.g. Frames of Reference

 Policymakers tend to use analogies from their own countries' history first.

 e.g. Americans think by analogy to the Revolutionary War.

 This may bias how they interpret other state's movements and the best responses to
them.

 e.g. Goals

 Culture may provide the goals which state strategies pursue.

 e.g. Sacred land such as Jerusalem; Kosovo.

  However, remember that:

 Many ancient disputes are actually modern inventions;

 States have incentive to exaggerate how much they care about these issues;

 Sacred values may be rationally traded off against other things.

 China

o There is a push for an IR theory with 'Chinese characteristics'.

 IR theories tend to be developed with reference to Western history and culture.

o The Sinic World System

 Chinese system not based on formal equality or sovereignty.

 Other states in the system were vassals of the Chinese emperor (e.g. Korea;
Vietnam).

 They could run their own internal affairs, but are deeply influenced by Chinese
culture.

 This system however, was very peaceful. Only two interstate wars in East Asia between
1368 and 1840 CE.

 In contrast, there was 46 wars between England and France alone in the West.

 Thus:

 The Chinese value system was internalised by other states (Korea; Vietnam; Japan)
and was peaceful.

 This historical memory of the peacefulness of Chinese hegemony influences Asia's

reacts to China's rising hegemony today.

 This is in opposition to the West, who views hegemony as threatening.

 Counters:

 Maybe China didn't conquer the other states (e.g. in the style of West hegemons)
because of geography an technology at the time.

 'If we envision IR as a scientific inquiry, then IR theory should be universally

applied. If we do not need a Chinese school of physics or chemistry, why should we
need a Chinese school of IR theory?'

 Conclusion

o Strategic culture is a popular, but flawed concept.

o At worst, it is tautological: adding little to existing explanations and encouraging underestimation

of the enemy.

o At best, it can help explain how an enemy thinks of issues, but this relevance is limited.
Structural Considerations

 The Course

o This course focuses on foreign policy behaviour that traditional realist theory cannot explain.

o Despite this, it is impossible to ignore realist-esque structural variables in foreign policy analysis.

 e.g. Australia and the Ukraine

 In response to the downed plane, the Abbott government proposed shirt-fronting

Russia by sending Australians to guard the crash site to allow for independent
investigation.

 Despite this, defence advisors noted that Australia simply cannot act unilaterally in
places like the Ukraine.

 This is because of relative power.

 Relative power is a key (realist) constraint on foreign policy decision-making.

 The Basis of (Hard) Power

o Defined by Correlates of War in relative terms (fraction of overall global resources) of:

 Total population;

 Urban population;

 Iron and Steel production;

 Military personnel;

 Military expenditure.

 Population

o A key component - more people implies larger economy and potential military power.

o Bounded by geography (a small state can only grow so big).

o Isn't the end-all-be-all, otherwise India would be a global power.

 Economic Development

o Economic development produces resources which may increase bargaining power and military
power.

o Economic development is not completely linearly linked with population.

 e.g. European states are more powerful than African states, which are much larger in size
and population.

 e.g. US is smaller than China in population, but much larger in GDP, thus US is more
powerful than China.
 o The causes of economic development are debated, with no clear answer. A few schools of thought
include:

 Geography (Sachs; Diamond)

 States that are wealthy today were also relatively wealthy in the past.

 This is because of geography: temperate climates; proximity to trade routes with

other highly populated areas created an initial advantage.

 This waxes and wanes though.

 Political Institutions

 Some believe democracy is crucial to economic development, as democratic

governments are less corrupt.

 Democratic governments also have more incentive to spend public money on

infrastructure and education, which may increase chances of economic development.

 Despite this, the economic evidence for this theory is weak.

 Economic Institutions

 Some argue that the rule of law and a strong judiciary incentivise enterprise, as
political entrepreneurs need to feel secure that they will profit from their business.

 Politicians have incentives to loot, thus states who can constrain politicians from
doing this will prosper economically.

 Military Power

o Many wealthy, populous states don’t always translate economic power into military power (e.g.
Japan).

 Economic power, however, is potent in itself and can translate to military power very
quickly (e.g. the US in WW2).

 Today

o US is dominantly politically, economically and militarily.

 However, the US is internally divided.

o China is rising, but it is unclear if this will continue.

o Russia is reviving, but this is off the back of a long-term decline.

o EU is economically powerful, but politically divided and militarily non-existent.

 US

o US potency comes from combination of economic strength and population size.

o It is likely to remain potent going into the future.

o However, internal divisions between red/blue America has harmed America's standing and will
likely do so in the future.
  China

o Larger population than the US, and projected to overtake the US in overall GDP, but not GDP per
capita.

o Its continued growth depends on whether it can move up the value chain (i.e. making more
weapons instead of vacuum cleaners) and whether there is political transition.

 Many economists are sceptical of China's continued rise.

 Russia

o Combination of tactics (e.g. disinformation; cyberwar) have allowed Russia to amplify is power.

o In the long-run though, the outlook is not great for Russia.

 Its economic power is shrinking; its population is stagnant.

 EU

o Larger population and GDP than the US.

 However, it is a union of nations, and not a unified nation.

o The breakup of the EU is unlikely despite Brexit, but further integration is also unlikely.

o Thus, the EU is likely to remain politically and militarily underpowered.

 Australia

o We still rely on US for security, and it is hard to see what would replace the US.

 The US guarantee is less credible now. Thus, we need to seek alternatives to the US
alliance.

o Australia is too small to defend itself against a great power, or significantly alter the Asia-Pacific
balance of power.

Rational and Behavioural Decision-Making Models

 Hudson - The Situation and Evolution of Foreign Policy Analysis

o The main ground of IR is not states, but human decisionmakers who may act singly or in groups.

o What follows from this ground is:

 Explanandum - that which is to be explained or understood in decisions made by human

decisionmakers with reference to entities outside of their own nation-state.

 Explanans - the factors which influence foreign policy decision making and foreign policy
decision makers.
 o FPA is possible and valuable to IR theory. Arguments against FPA centre around the state-model
used in IR and the decision maker model used in FPA, but these are not irreconcilable.

 This is because FPA contributes to IR theory the point of intersection between the material
and ideational factors in state behaviour (i.e. the human decision makers are the point of
intersection).

 This lends "agency" into IR theory and allows IR theory to accommodate for
creativity in human decision-making.

o Thus in short, FPA is valuable to IR because it accounts for human agency in state decision
making.

o The major levels of analysis in FPA are:

 Cognitive Processes;
 Leader Personality and Orientation;
 Small Group Dynamics;
 Organizational Process;
 Bureaucratic Politics;
 Culture and Identity (operational code);
 Domestic Political Contestation (two-level game);
 National Attributes;
 Regional and International Systems.

 Hudson - The Individual Decisionmaker

o When And Where?

 The leader may matter in conditions where:

 They have more control (dictatorships);

 When they are interested in foreign policy;
 When there is a crisis;
 When a situation is too difficult to handle for advisors;
 Where the leader has had diplomatic training;
 When the leader has particular expertise;
 The style of leadership; and
 Whether the leader makes decisions in a group.

o Components of the Mind

 Perceptions are filtered by biases; stereotypes and heuristics, which then pass onto our
cognition.

 Further perceptions are muddled by schemas - the blend of several items into long-
term memory as one package - which may alter our perceptions and thus cognition.

o Emotion and Reason

 Emotions also affect our reasoning and perceptions, which then lead to muddled cognition
and decision making.

o Body and Reason

 Bodily symptoms such as mental illness and stress may also strike leaders and impact
decision making.

o Situational Context
  The situation the person is in matters also (e.g. the bystander effect).

o What Lies Beneath

 Perception is filtered through to cognition, but a person's reaction to this cognition is

impacted by their attitude (habitual mental judgement) which is influenced by their mental
model (beliefs; values; etc).

o Approaching Leaders

 Psychoanalysation may be used to examine a leader and their life.

 Another means of analysis is Post's anamnesis, which has four parts: psychoanalysation; the
leader's personality; the leader's substantive beliefs; the leader's style.

o Content Analysis

 Analysis of the content produced by the leader (e.g. what they say and write) to make
inferences about their traits and personal characteristics.

 Neack - The New Foreign Policy

o Foreign policy is:

 Made and conducted in complex domestic and international environments;

 The result from the work of coalitions who have domestic and international interests;

 Often linked and delinked as a result of various parties and their concerns;

 Derived from domestic issues as well as international;

 Thus FPA should be multilevel and multifaceted in order to confront the complexity
of foreign policy.

o Defining the Subject

 Foreign policy - its "stuff" - includes statements, behaviours and actions by states and
individual actors.

o Levels of Analysis

 Foreign policy can be tackled at each level of a multilevel construct (e.g. focus on the
leader; or the involvement of interest groups; or at the state-to-state system level of
analysis).

o Worldviews and Theories

 A level of analysis that emphasizes what people think and their belief on human nature.

 e.g. realism; liberalism; constructivism; Marxism.

 Theories explain how things work. They can be grand theories of how the world of politics
works, or midrange theories about how particular aspects of foreign policy works.

o Bridge Between International and Comparative Politics

 Foreign policy sits within the discipline of political science known as IR.
 o Chapter Review

 The Tale of Tibet shows how no policy issue is exclusively domestic nor foreign.

 It also shows how state and non-state actors attempt to build coalitions to support
their policy preferences through linkage of issues.

 National leaders play a two-level or nested game between the demands of domestic and
international systems.

 Foreign policy studies both the statements of decision makers as well as the behaviours of
states and the processes that lead to these statements and behaviours.

 The levels of analysis used in foreign policy is individual -> state -> system. These levels of
analysis are heuristic tools to help us study the subject.

 The study of foreign policy is mainly in IR, which is dominated by 3 worldviews: realism;
liberalism; Marxism.

 Foreign policy is also a bridging discipline that draws from both IR and Comparative
Politics.

 Neack - Rational Actors and National Interests

o Rational Decision-Making Model

 Derives from realism's conceptualisation of the state as a unitary actor pursuing long-term
national interests (power).

 In this conception, government type; history; leaders; etc are immaterial.

 The goal here is to maximise utility amongst a range of choices.

 Because perfect fwopr does not exist with all choices however (e.g. actions of
another state may affect choices), states are thus boundedly rational - rational-
decision makers within limits.

 Operates in a sphere of anarchy, where no overriding legal authority exists. States thus have
a security dilemma where other states cannot be trusted and power must be gained for
security.

o Variations of Realism

 Offensive Neorealism - states are driven to become the hegemon.

 Neoclassical Realism - while decisions are boundedly rational on the international level,
they are also limited by domestic constraints (e.g. budget).

o Rationality, Deterrence, Irrationality

 Based on rational actor theory, deterrence is thus possible.

 Mutually assured destruction is the result of both states having the rational choice of
not engaging and deterring each other instead.

 Irrationality may be a problem though. What if the other actor isn't rational and can't be
predicted?
  Furthermore, what if the other actor is rational, but the lack of information available
encourages the most rational move to be simply the best of the worst?

 e.g. nuclear war where one state can't be sure the other isn't attacking and thus
the most rational choice is to attack first.

o Poliheuristic Theory

 Approach of studying foreign policy at the individual level, which blends rational choice
with individual cognition.

 Argues all decisions involve 2 steps:

 First leaders simplify the decision with their cognition (heuristic shortcuts).

 e.g. discarding all options which may impact them politically.

 Second they evaluate the remaining alternatives through rational analysis.

 i.e. making decisions without bias of their nationality/ideological

position/etc.

o Chapter Review

 Rational decision-making derives from realism.

 It assumes that all leaders aim to preserve long-term state interest and that their
individuality is thus irrelevant.

 Culture and socialization regulate and render immaterial the personality traits of
those who become leaders.

 It is a model where decisions are considered through a cost-benefit analysis, where

the decisionmaker aims to maximise utility.

 It is bounded by limited information and time.

 The security dilemma is a result of rational actors being rational in a competitive

environment where domination is the goal (i.e. they act selfish).

 Because of this dilemma, rational decision making on the international sphere of

anarchy means choosing between less than optimal choices and settling for the best
of the worst rather than best of best (i.e. Prisoner's Dilemma).

 Poliheuristic theory argues decision-making is a 2-step process of cognitive shortcuts and

rational choice.

 Neack - Cognition and Personality

o Cognition vs. Rationality

 Not all were happy to call leaders rational/utility-maximizing and discard their individual
traits on their decision-making.

o Belief Sets and Cognitive Structure

 Belief set is a cognitive filter held by an person about something else.

 e.g. enemy image - the belief that the enemy is evil by nature.
  e.g. cognitive consistency - the belief that images held within a belief set are logically
connected and consistent, thus cognitive dissonance is avoided by avoiding any
images that are contrary to the belief set.

 e.g. attribution bias - triggered when we are presented with information that is
inconsistent with pre-existing beliefs (e.g. the enemy is evil and anything good they
do is inconsistent with this belief and therefore must be evil too).

o Operational Code

 A cognitive map of the normative and behavioural beliefs held by an individual.

 Provides a framework and structure to explain a leader's decisions based on influence of

their fundamental traits and predispositions.

o Personality

 Once an operational code is made and explains what a leader's fundamental behavioural
disposition is, this is then linked to personality.

 Hermann finds 7 personality traits are linked to specific foreign policy behaviours:

 The need for power;

 The need for affiliation;
 The level of cognitive complexity;
 The degree of trust in others;
 Nationalism;
 The belief that one has control over events.
 Task orientation.

 Conclusions from Hermann's work are, for example:

 Those who belief they have control over events; need power; distrust others may be
particularly willing to violate international norms.

o Chapter Review

 Rationality isn't everything - individual differences matter.

 This is even if the leader is rational: their individual differences may change their
perception of constraint and thus rationality.

 Leaders are engaged in a two-level game, and their perception of this game is
influenced by their operational code/personality/etc.

 The study of cognition studies how individuals perceive/reason/judge issues.

 Cognitive scholars argue that human cognition can be mapped out to develop insights
that can apply to many different individuals in a variety of settings.

 This approach however, assumes people are closed-minded and do not change their
behaviour much from new information.

 It also assumes individuals are cognitive misers which rely on shortcuts to

understand incoming information.

 One exception is if people hold an ill-structured belief on an issue. If this

structure fails, individuals may be prompted to seek new information and
change their beliefs.
  Beliefs supported by society/culture/etc however are unlikely to change.

 A belief set is an integrated set of images held by an individual about a particular universe.

 It filters information according to their established views and keeps out contradictory
information.

 e.g. attribution error.

 An integrative complexity is the degree to which statements/etc are determined to involve

more complicated contingency-based deductive logic or less-complicated absolutist logic.

 Operational codes describes one's philosophical and operational beliefs.

 Leadership trait analysis looks at how leaders' emotional traits predisposition them towards
certain kinds of political action.

 The two types of leaders found were "aggressive" and "conciliatory" leadership
types.

 Tetlock - Superforecasting: The Art and Science of Prediction

o Two schools exist in forecasting: the optimist and the sceptic.

 Despite the unpredictability of life, superforecasters - those who make uncannily accurate
predictions - exist.

 Superforecasting is not innate - it derives from certain ways of thinking. Namely,

self-critical and open-minded thinking.

 Furthermore, predictions about short-term events tend to be accurate. The longer in the
future the event though, the less accurate, due to "chaos" events.

o To improve forecasting, the forecast-measure-revise procedure is undertaken (e.g. in weather).

 But in terms of politics, this is hardly done. There is no accuracy measurement and thus no
revision, and thus no improvement.

o Advancements in technology show that in almost all cases, a well-established statistical

computational prediction > a subjective human prediction.

 Despite this however, a computer cannot do everything a human can. They cannot originate
meaning - only mimic it. There is still need for human judgement.

o The Superforecasting Method:

 Unpack the question into parts.

 Distinguish between the known/unknown.

 Adopt the outside view: compare the question to others. See it not as a unique case, but one
within a wider class of phenomena.

 Adopt the inside view: consider the uniqueness of the problem.

 See what others think (e.g. prediction markets).

 Synthesize all of these into one probabilistic judgement.

  But be willing to change your mind according to new facts. Do not:

 Underreact to new information, or

 Underreaction may occur because of personal ego attached to predictions. This

is why superforecasters are so good: they're happy to change beliefs because
they have no personal stake.

 Overreact to new information.

 Instead, you must make gradual changes bit-by-bit and consider both old and new
information equally.

o Bayesian Question Clustering is breaking down a big question into little ones. The more yes's for
little questions, the more likely the pattern for the big question will emerge.

o Ten Commandments for Superforecasters:

 Triage

 Focus on realistic questions where your work is likely to pay off (e.g. election in
2020, not 2050).

 Break Down Problems

 Use Fermi-zation.

 Balance Inside/Outside.

 Balance Under/Over.

 Look For Clashing Causality.

 For every good casual argument, there is an equally likely counterargument.

 Distinguish Degrees Of Doubt

 Uncertainty is more than impossible, unlikely, likely, and certain. Open up the
degrees of uncertainty and think granularly - instead of 40/60, maybe 44.5/55.5?

 Balance Confidence

 Don't rush to conclusions, but also don't be too indecisive.

 Beware of Hindsight Bias

 Own your mistakes and learn from failures, but don't read too much into them.
Maybe everything was right but a small technicality.

 Teamwork

 Error-Balancing

 Practice. You can't learn from theory alone.

 Tetlock - Expert Political Judgement

o Good political judgement requires both getting it right (having private beliefs reflect the
observable fact) and thinking the right way (having consistent beliefs and updating these beliefs
 according to new facts).

o Getting It Right - Assessment

 Are the playing fields level (e.g. was this judgement good, or was it simply an easy one).

 Have these hits been after many misses (e.g. is this simply one case of good judgement
amongst a wave of false alarms).

 Have these hits and false alarms been equally weighted (i.e. was this mistake a good
mistake, or simply completely wrong).

 Was their prediction numerical and thus scorable (e.g. was it a percentage instead of
"likely").

 Was their prediction reality (i.e. is there a consensus about what actually happened).

o Thinking The Right Way - Assessment

 There are many ways to judge a belief system: the close-to-slam-dunk end; the controversial
end; the middle.

 To qualify as a good judge within a Bayesian framework though, reputational bets is what
matters.

 This means being one who changes beliefs according to logical implications of
reputational bets against alternatives.

 e.g. If I bet X will happen with 0.2 if my theory is right and 0.8 if another
theory is right and X happens, then I 'owe' belief change to 0.8.

o Good political judgement is possible, as the results of superforecasting proves to the dismay of
radical scepticism.

 Results show that modest meliorists are correct: humans can achieve some level of accuracy
in forecasting that extends beyond the chimp random throwing model.

 But however, the bolder meliorist contention that certain ways of thinking reliably yield
forecasting accuracy beyond that of computational models is false. Computers > humans in
some cases.

 Humans excel when they make short-term predictions and know a bit about a lot of
things (the fox - one who knows a little about a lot).

 Humans fail when they make long-term predictions in areas of expertise.

o The Fox - Qualitative Explanation

 Foxes are more sceptical of the usefulness of laws for explanation.

 Foxes are warier of simple historical analogies.

 Foxes are less likely to be swept away by their own rhetoric.

 Foxes are less likely to worry about what those in the future might think (and thus are more
open to questioning beliefs and humility).

 Foxes keep political passion out of it (i.e. they have no bias and no stake).
  Foxes self-consciously force open-mindedness.

o Conclusion - Foxes v Hedgehogs

 Foxes are better forecasters than hedgehogs, but they do not hold a candle to formal
statistical computational models.

Government and Societal Level Decision Making

 Hudson - Group Decision Making

o Foreign policy problems are not solved by one leader. They are often dealt with depending on
what type of problem it is.

 i.e. foreign policy problem

 routine

 organised behaviour

 non-routine

 crisis

 small group dynamics

 non-crisis

 bureaucratic politics (interagency)

o Small Group Dynamics

 Most high-level foreign policy problems are dealt in small group dynamics (15 people or
less).

 Groupthink is a problem in small groups. It is small group dysfunction which results

in a strong emotional response by a group because of fear.

 It comes from a need for the group to remain cohesive and may supersede the
original intent of the group (i.e. going along with a decision simply because
the consensus does).

o Organised Process

 The fact that many issues are dealt by departments and agencies challenges the notion of the
state as a unitary actor.

 Despite this, these organisations must exist to provide capabilities (e.g. manpower,
time, knowledge) that would otherwise not exist.

 These organisations are characterised by their essence: their self-understanding of what it is

and does (i.e. identity and culture).

 This essence shapes their turf: the substantive and skill domain which the
organisation has a primary claim to influence.
  These organisations can be judged by the strength of their budget and influence with
policymakers.

 These organisations also require morale to function, and want autonomy to function freely
and effectively.

 Organisations however, are limited by their slow responsiveness to learning new

information, and their reliance on procedure (which may cause them to misinterpret orders).

 i.e. standard operating procedures.

 Thus, limiting factors of organisations are turf; communication; SOP; culture.

o Bureaucratic Politics

 Bureaucratic politics is an intersection of small group dynamics; organisational process;

domestic political force; and personal characteristics of leaders.

 It takes place often in interagency groups - the primary means of dealing with noncrisis yet
nonroutine issues.

 Some relevant concepts in bureaucratic politics:

 Stakeholders are those whose roles/turf/etc allows them to affect bureaucratic politic
decisions.

 Action channels are paths used to make an outcome happen.

 Resultants refer to the outcomes made by politics - they are less a decision and more
of an outcome (usually the lowest denominator).

 Levers of manipulation are tools used to obtain ones desired ends (e.g. framing
issues; rules; deadlines; informational control; agendas).

 Coalitions are the most common form of group interactions, as there is usually very
little unanimity on issues.

 Subversion and equalisers are means of increasing one's power as a cog on the wheel
(e.g. not implementing all directives given and not drawing attention to it).

 The games refer to the overlapping contests within bureaucratic politics: clashes of
personality; struggles between organisations over specific turf; state vs NGO's, etc.