RULE 119 The accused shall have at least 15 days to as far as practicable until terminated.

It
TRIAL
Section 1. Time to prepare for trial. —
After a plea of not guilty is entered, the
accused shall have at least fifteen (15) days
to prepare for trial. The trial shall
commence within thirty (30) days from
receipt of the pre-trial order. (sec. 6, cir. 38-
98)
What is trial?
It is the examination before a competent
tribunal, according to the laws of the land,
of the facts put in issue in a case, for the
purpose of determining such issue.
It includes hearing, reception of evidence
and other processes, such as decision in the
first instance, appeal and final and
executory decision in the last instance.
However, in terms of procedure, it is
limited to the proceedings in open court
after the pleadings are finished and the
case is otherwise ready, down to and
including the rendition of the judgment.
prepare for trial which must commence
within 15 days from receipt of the pre-trial
order.
Preparation for trial
The chief issue in a criminal prosecution is
whether or not defendant committed the
acts alleged in the accusatory pleading as
constituting the offense.
Under the present rule, the accused shall
have at least 15 days to prepare for trial,
which must commence within 30 days from
receipt of the pre-trial order. In short,
within 30 days from the receipt of the pre-
trial order, the trial will be scheduled.
Notice to the parties of the date of trial is
an elementary requirement of procedural
due process and that requirement is
satisfied only if the parties are afforded
reasonable time within which to prepare
for the scheduled proceeding. If the Court
discovers that either of the parties has not
been notified, it may on its own motion
grant a new trial.
may be postponed for a reasonable period
of time for good cause. (2a)
The court shall, after consultation with the
prosecutor and defense counsel, set the
case for continuous trial on a weekly or
other short-term trial calendar at the
earliest possible time so as to ensure
speedy trial. In no case shall the entire trial
period exceed one hundred eighty (180)
days from the first day of trial, except as
otherwise authorized by the Supreme
Court. (sec. 8, cir. 38-98).
The time limitations provided under this
section and the preceding section shall not
apply where special laws or circulars of the
Supreme Court provide for a shorter period
of trial. (n)
Continuous trial
The trial once commenced, shall continue
from day to day as far as practicable until
terminated.
Continuance or postponement of trial

Purpose of trial The trial may be suspended for a

Section 2. Continuous trial until
reasonable period of time. The matter of
terminated; postponements. — Trial once
To insure speedy trial. postponement of trials, as a general rule,
commenced shall continue from day to day
lies within the sound discretion of the trial
court and the discretion will not be
interfered with by mandamus or by
appeal, unless grave abuse is shown.
When a party without malice, fault or
inexcusable negligence on his part, is not
really prepared for trial, the trial court will
be abusing its discretion if reasonable
opportunity is denied him for preparing
therefor.
In passing upon applications for
continuance in a criminal case, the court
shall bear in mind “that it is the guardian of
rights of the accused as well as those of the
people at large, and should not unduly
force him to trial, nor for light causes
jeopardize the rights and interests of the
public”.
Grounds for continuance
a. An affidavit should ordinarily be filed
showing in what respect the applicant
is not ready and that he has made
reasonable exertions to prepare for
trial without success, or some good
reason or not making such exertions.
b. There must be showing that the
witness is really material and appears
to the court to be so, that the party
who applies has been guilty of no
neglect; and that the witness can be
had at that time to which the trial has
been deferred and incidentally, that no
similar evidence could be obtained.
In other words, the trial court must be
apprised of the nature of the absent
witness’ testimony for the purpose of
determining whether the evidence is of
such importance as to materially affect the
result of the trial.
Limitation of trial period
In no case shall the entire period exceed
180 days from the first day of trial, except
otherwise provided by the Supreme Court.
Said limitation does not apply where
special laws/circular of the Supreme Court
provide for a shorter period of time. A
typical example is General Order No. 39,
promulgated on September 19, 1973,
which provides that cases involving tourists
or transients must be disposed of within 24
hours after the filing thereof.
Section 3. Exclusions. — The following
periods of delay shall be excluded in
computing the time within which trial must
commence:
(a) Any period of delay resulting from other
proceedings concerning the accused,
including but not limited to the following:
(1) Delay resulting from an examination of
the physical and mental condition of the
accused;
(2) Delay resulting from proceedings with
respect to other criminal charges against
the accused;
(3) Delay resulting from extraordinary
remedies against interlocutory orders;
(4) Delay resulting from pre-trial
proceedings; provided, that the delay does
not exceed thirty (30) days;
(5) Delay resulting from orders of inhibition,
or proceedings relating to change of venue
of cases or transfer from other courts;
(6) Delay resulting from a finding of the
existence of a prejudicial question; and
(7) Delay reasonably attributable to any
period, not exceed thirty (30) days, during
which any proceeding which any
proceeding concerning the accused is
actually under advisement.
(b) Any period of delay resulting from the
absence or unavailability of an essential
witness.
For purposes of this subparagraph, an
essential witness shall be considered
absent when his whereabouts are
unknown or his whereabouts cannot be
determined by due diligence. He shall be
considered unavailable whenever his
whereabouts are known but his presence
for trial cannot be obtained by due
diligence.
(c) Any period of delay resulting from the
mental incompetence or physical inability
of the accused to stand trial.
(d) If the information is dismissed upon
motion of the prosecution and thereafter a
charge is filed against the accused for the
same offense, any period of delay from the
date the charge was dismissed to the date
the time limitation would commence to run
as to the subsequent charge had there
been no previous charge.
(e) A reasonable period of delay when the
accused is joined for trial with a co-accused
over whom the court has not acquired
jurisdiction, or, as to whom the time for
trial has not run and no motion for separate
trial has been granted.
(f) Any period of delay resulting from a
continuance granted by any court motu
proprio, or on motion of either the accused
or his counsel, or the prosecution, if the
court granted the continuance on the basis
of its findings set forth in the order that the
ends of justice served by taking such action
outweigh the best interest of the public
and the accused in a speedy trial. (sec. 9,
cir. 38-98)
Exception to continuance trial
It is to be noted in the opening paragraph
that the following period of delay shall be
excluded in computing the time within
which trial must commence. It does not
include the period of arraignment as
provided in Sec 1 (g) of Rule 116, which
provides that the arraignment shall be held
within 30 days from the date the court
acquires jurisdiction over the person of the
accused, and excluding only in the counting
of the period the time of the pendency of a
motion to quash or for other causes
justifying suspension of the arraignment.
Section 4. Factors for granting
continuance. — The following factors,
among others, shall be considered by a
court in determining whether to grant a
continuance under section 3(f) of this Rule.
(a) Whether or not the failure to grant a
continuance in the proceeding would likely
make a continuation of such proceeding
impossible or result in a miscarriage of
justice; and
(b) Whether or not the case taken as a
whole is so novel, unusual and complex,
due to the number of accused or the nature
of the prosecution, or that it is
unreasonable to expect adequate
preparation within the periods of time
established therein.
In addition, no continuance under section
3(f) of this Rule shall be granted because of
congestion of the court's calendar or lack of
diligent preparation or failure to obtain
available witnesses on the part of the
prosecutor. (sec. 10, cir. 38-98)
Purpose of factors
To control the discretion of the judge in the
grant of continuance on his instance or on
motion of any party litigant. Any abuse of
grant of continuance not in conformity with
the above factors may make the judge
administratively liable.
The section is clear: NO POSTPONEMENT
SHALL BE GRANTED JUST BECAUSE THERE
IS GENERAL CONGESTION OF THE COURT’S
GENERAL CALENDAR OR ANY OF THE
PARTY IS NOT READY FOR TRIAL OR THAT
THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR HAS NO
WITNESS AVAILABLE.
Section 5. Time limit following an order for
new trial. — If the accused is to be tried
again pursuant to an order for a new trial,
the trial shall commence within thirty (30)
days from notice of the order, provided
that if the period becomes impractical due
to unavailability of witnesses and other
factors, the court may extend it but not to
exceed one hundred eighty (180) days from
notice of said order for a new trial. (sec. 11,
cir. 38-98)
The limit for new trial
Mandated by the rule is the
commencement of trial which must be
within 30 days from the date the order for
new trial becomes final. There is no time
limit, however, within what period must
the new trial be terminated. It may happen
that as long as the first trial date is within
30 days from the date the order of new trial
becomes final, the succeeding trial dates
will have no time limit.
Section 6. Extended time limit. —
Notwithstanding the provisions of section
1(g), Rule 116 and the preceding section 1,
for the first twelve-calendar-month period
following its effectivity on September 15,
1998, the time limit with respect to the
period from arraignment to trial imposed non-bailable crime, or, is serving a term of
by said provision shall be one hundred imprisonment in any penal institution, it
eighty (180) days. For the second twelve- shall be his duty to do the following:
month period, the limit shall be one
hundred twenty (120) days, and for the (a) Shall promptly undertake to obtain the
third twelve-month period, the time limit presence of the prisoner for trial or cause a
shall be eighty (80) days. (sec. 7, cir. 38-98)
notice to be served on the person having
custody of the prisoner requiring such
Time limit
person to so advise the prisoner of his right
Inasmuch as RA No. 8493 took effect on to demand trial.
September 15, 1998, the period of
arraignment shall be as follows: (b) Upon receipt of that notice, the
custodian of the prisoner shall promptly
a. 12 months from September 15, 1998
advise the prisoner of the charge and of his
up to September 15, 1999 – 180 days
right to demand trial. If at anytime
b. 12 months from September 15, 1999
thereafter the prisoner informs his
up to September 16, 2001 – 120 days
custodian that he demands such trial, the
c. 12 months from September 16, 2001
latter shall cause notice to that effect to
up to September 16, 2002 – 80 days
sent promptly to the public attorney.
The law provides that the time limit after
the 3rd 12 months is 80 days but it did not (c) Upon receipt of such notice, the public
provide the time limit after 80 days. Such attorney shall promptly seek to obtain the
being the case, the arraignment can be presence of the prisoner for trial.
made anytime after 80 days.
(d) When the custodian of the prisoner
Section 7. Public attorney's duties where
receives from the public attorney a
accused is imprisoned. — If the public
properly supported request for the
attorney assigned to defend a person
availability of the prisoner for purposes of
charged with a crime knows that the latter
trial, the prisoner shall be made available
is preventively detained, either because he
accordingly. (sec. 12, cir. 38-98)
is charged with a bailable crime but has no
means to post bail, or, is charged with a
Public Attorneys and their duties

Public Attorneys are those attorneys of

the Public Attorney’s Office of the DOJ
who are assisting accused not financially
capable to have a counsel of their own.