Article 1193-1206
no purpose than to delay.
Chavez vs. Gonzales
G.R. No. L-27454
April 30, 1970
Doctrine: Action for collection and action for asking the
court to fix duration may be allowed if it can be shown
that a separate action for collection would be a mere
formality and would serve no purpose than to delay. (Art.
1197)
Facts
1. The plaintiff had his typewriter repaired by
defendant but was not able to finish the job
despite repeated reminders made by plaintiff.
Because of the delay, the plaintiff went to his
house and asked for the return of the typewriter.
However, the plaintiff found out that the same
was shambles, with the interior cover and some
parts and screws missing which were returned
by the defendant the following day.
2. The plaintiff had his typewriter repair to a third
person.
3. The plaintiff commenced action before the city
court of Manila demanding the defendant to pay
the repair cost done by the third person plus
damages.
4. However, the court ruled that the repair done on
the typewriter by Freixas Business Machines
should not be charged against the defendant and
only the cost of the missing parts should be
chargeable to the defendant. Hence, this
petition.
Issue
Whether or not the defendant can invoke Article 1197 of
the civil code before he may be held liable for breach of
contract.
Held
No. He can’t invoke Article 1197 of the civil code because
he virtually admitted non-performance by returning the
typewriter that he was obliged to repair in a non-working
condition, with essential parts missing. The fixing of
period would thus be a mere formality and would serve
Petition granted.
Lim vs. People
G.R. No. L-34338.
November 21, 1984
Doctrine: Obligations for whose fulfillment a day certain
has been fixed, shall be demandable only when that day
comes.
A day certain is understood to be that which must
necessarily come, although it may not be known when.
(Art. 1193)
Facts
1. An agreement was made between Lourdes Lim
and Maria Ayroso to sell Ayroso’s tobacco.
2. This agreement was made in the presence of
plaintiff's sister, Salud G. Bantug. Salvador
Bantug drew the document, Exh. A, which reads:
'To Whom It May Concern:
This is to certify that I have received from Mrs.
Maria de Guzman Vda. deAyroso, of Gapan,
Nueva Ecija, six hundred fifteen kilos of leaf
tobacco to be sold at P1.30 per kilo. The proceed
in the amount of Seven Hundred Ninety Nine
Pesos and 50/100 (P799.50) will be given to her
as soon as it was sold.'
3. As no further amount was paid, the complainant
led a complaint against the appellant for estafa.
4. The lower court found petitioner guilty and
affirmed by the Court of the appeals. Hence, this
petition.
Issue
Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals was
legally right in holding that the foregoing document
(Exhibit "A") "fixed a period" and "the obligation was
therefore, immediately demandable as soon as the
tobacco was sold"
Held
Yes. It is clear in the agreement, Exhibit "A", that the
proceeds of the sale of the tobacco should be turned
over to the complainant as soon as the same was sold,
or, that the obligation was immediately demandable as
soon as the tobacco was disposed of.
Hence, Article 1197 of the New Civil Code, which
provides that the courts may fix the duration of the
obligation if it does not fix a period, does not apply.
Petition dismissed.
Victorias Planters Association vs. Victorias Milling
G.R. No. L-6648
July 25, 1955
2
Doctrine: In obligations with a term or period, in case of
fortuitous event the contract shall be deemed suspended
during the term or period but it does not mean that the
happening of the fortuitous even shall stop the running
of the term or period agreed upon. Its only effect is to
relieve the contracting parties from the fulfillment of
their respective obligations during the term or period.
(Art 1193)
Facts
1. The sugar cane planters pertaining to the
districts of Manapla and Cadiz, Negros
Occidental, executed identical milling contracts,
setting forth the terms and conditions under
which the sugar central "North Negros Sugar Co.
Inc." would mill the sugar produced by the sugar
cane planters of the Manapla and Cadiz districts.
2. Subsequent millings took place every successive
crop year thereafter, except the 6-year period,
comprising 4 years of the last World War II and 2
years of post-war reconstruction of respondent's
central at Victorias, Negros Occidental.
3. That after the liberation, the North Negros Sugar
Co., Inc. did not reconstruct its destroyed
central. It advised the North Negros Planters
Association, Inc. that it had made arrangements
with the respondent corporation to mill the
sugar cane produced by the planters of Manapla
and Cadiz holding milling contracts with it.
4. In the following years, planters-members of the
North Negros Planters Association, Inc. and
Victorias Planters Association, Inc. considered
that the stipulated 30-year period of their milling
contracts executed had already expired and
terminated.
5. Notwithstanding repeated representations
made by the herein petitioners with the
respondent corporation for the negotiation and
execution of new milling contracts, the herein
respondent has refused and still refuses to
accede to the same.
6. Respondent contended that there was no milling
during 4 years of the recent war and two years
of reconstruction, thus the contracts have not
been terminated yet.
7. The trial court rendered the judgement in favor
of the petitioner and from the judgment the
respondent corporation has appealed.
Issue
Whether or not the respondent can claim any extension
or addition to said 30-year term or period of said milling
contract by virtue of an equivalent 6 years of the last war
and reconstruction of its central, during which there was
no planting and/or milling.
Held
No. Fortuitous event relieves the obligor from fulfilling a
contractual obligation. (Art. 1174)
Where the parties stipulated that in the event of flood,
typhoon, earthquake, or other force majeure, war,
insurrection, civil commotion, organized strike, etc., the
contract shall be deemed suspended during said period,
does not mean that the happening of any of those events
stops the running of the period agreed upon. It only
relieves the parties from the fulfillment of their
respective obligations during that time — the planters
from delivering sugar cane and the central from milling
it.
To require the planters to deliver the sugar cane which
they failed to deliver during the war is to demand from
the obligors the fulfillment of an obligation which was
impossible of performance at the time it became due.
Nemo tenetur ad impossibilia. The fulfillment of which
was impossible, if granted, would in effect be an
extension of the term of the contracts entered into by
and between the parties.