STONEHILL VS.

DIOKNO

FACTS: Upon application of the officers of the government, Respondents-Judges — issued on

different dates a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners herein and/or the corporations
of which they were officers, directed to the any peace officer, to search the persons above-
named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and
take possession of the following personal property to wit: Books of accounts, financial records,
vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters,
and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursements
receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers) as
"the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense," or "used
or intended to be used as the means of committing the offense," which is described in the
applications adverted to above as "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws,
Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code."

Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null and void, as contravening the
Constitution and the Rules of Court — because, inter alia: (1) they do not describe with
particularity the documents, books and things to be seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned in
the warrants, were actually seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the
aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against them; (4) the searches and
seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the documents, papers and cash money seized
were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with
law, the said petitioners filed with the Supreme Court this original action for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus and injunction, and prayed that, pending final disposition of the present
case, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining Respondents-Prosecutors, their
agents and /or representatives from using the effects seized as aforementioned or any copies
thereof, in the deportation cases already adverted to, and that, in due course, thereafter,
decision be rendered quashing the contested search warrants and declaring the same null and
void, and commanding the respondents, their agents or representatives to return to petitioners
herein, in accordance with Section 3, Rule 67, of the Rules of Court, the documents, papers,
things and cash moneys seized or confiscated under the search warrants in question.

In their answer, respondents-prosecutors alleged, (1) that the contested search warrants are
valid and have been issued in accordance with law; (2) that the defects of said warrants, if any,
were cured by petitioners' consent; and (3) that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible
in evidence against herein petitioners, regardless of the alleged illegality of the aforementioned
searches and seizures.

ISSUE: WON the search warrants issued are valid.

HELD: With regard the search issued in the corporation – valid; with regard the search in the
houses – void.

RATIO: As regards the first group(In the offices), we hold that petitioners herein have no cause
of action to assail the legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance
thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations have their respective personalities,
separate and distinct from the personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of
shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices
they hold therein may be.8 Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be
contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby,9 and that the objection
to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties.
10 Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly object to the use in evidence against them
of the documents, papers and things seized from the offices and premises of the corporations
adverted to above, since the right to object to the admission of said papers in evidence belongs
exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by
the corporate officers in proceedings against them in their individual capacity.

Second in their houses: Indeed, the same were issued upon applications stating that the natural
and juridical person therein named had committed a "violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and
Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other words, no specific
offense had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof with respect to the
offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who
issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes
the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed
particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws.
As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts
performed by herein petitioners. It would be the legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict
anybody of a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code)
and Revised Penal Code," — as alleged in the aforementioned applications — without reference
to any determinate provision of said laws. the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of
records pertaining to all business transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of whether the
transactions were legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the
petitioners and the aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly
contravening the explicit command of our Bill of Rights — that the things to be seized be
particularly described — as well as tending to defeat its major objective: the elimination of
general warrants.

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Labels: Criminal Procedure

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY v. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD

NOTE: This is a consolidated case with (Pimentel v. COMELEC) and (Atty. Laserna v. DDB and
PDEA), regarding the constitutionality of RA 9165(c), (d), (f) and (g); ComprehensiveDangerous
Drugs Act of 2002.

FACTS: In these kindred petitions, the constitutionality of Section 36 of Republic Act No. (RA)
9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar as it
requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office, students of secondary and
tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and private offices, and persons charged
before the prosecutor’s office with certain offenses, among other personalities, is put in issue.
As far as pertinent, the challenged section reads as follows:

SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing.—Authorized drug testing shall be done by any government
forensic laboratories or by any of the drug testing laboratories accredited and monitored by the
DOH to safeguard the quality of the test results. x x x The drug testing shall employ, among
others, two (2) testing methods, the screening test which will determine the positive result as
well as the type of drug used and the confirmatory test which will confirm a positive screening
test. x x x The following shall be subjected to undergo drug testing:

(c) Students of secondary and tertiary schools.—Students of secondary and tertiary schools
shall, pursuant to the related rules and regulations as contained in the school’s student
handbook and with notice to the parents, undergo a random drug testing x x x;

(d) Officers and employees of public and private offices.—Officers and employees of public and
private offices, whether domestic or overseas, shall be subjected to undergo a random drug
test as contained in the company’s work rules and regulations, x x x for purposes of reducing
the risk in the workplace. Any officer or employee found positive for use of dangerous drugs
shall be dealt with administratively which shall be a ground for suspension or termination,
subject to the provisions of Article 282 of the Labor Code and pertinent provisions of the Civil
Service Law;

(f) All persons charged before the prosecutor’s office with a criminal offense having an
imposable penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day shall undergo a
mandatory drug test;

(g) All candidates for public office whether appointed or elected both in the national or local
government shall undergo a mandatory drug test.
(Pimentel v. COMELEC | G.R. No. 16158)

On Dec. 23, 2003, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 6486, prescribing the rules and
regulations for the mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office in connection with
the May 2004 elections. Pimentel claims that Sec. 36 (g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution
No. 6486 illegally impose an additional qualification on candidates for senator. He points out
that, subject to the provisions on nuisance candidates, a candidate for senator needs only to
meet the qualifications laid down in Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution, to wit: (1) citizenship, (2)
voter registration, (3) literacy, (4) age, and (5) residency. Beyond these stated qualification
requirements, candidates for senator need not possess any other qualification to run for
senator and be voted upon and elected as member of the Senate. The Congress cannot validly
amend or otherwise modify these qualification standards, as it cannot disregard, evade, or
weaken the force of a constitutional mandate, or alter or enlarge the Constitution.

(SJS v. DDM & PDEA | G.R. 157870)

In its Petition for Prohibition under Rule 65, petitioner Social Justice Society (SJS), a registered
political party, seeks to prohibit the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) and the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA) from enforcing paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36 of RA 9165
on the ground that they are constitutionally infirm. For one, the provisions constitute undue
delegation of legislative power when they give unbridled discretion to schools and employers to
determine the manner of drug testing. For another, the provisions trench in the equal
protection clause inasmuch as they can be used to harass a student or an employee deemed
undesirable. And for a third, a person’s constitutional right against unreasonable searches is
also breached by said provisions.

(Atty. Laserna v. DDB & PDEA | G.R. 158633)

Petitioner Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr., as citizen and taxpayer, also seeks in his Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 that Sec. 36(c), (d), (f), and (g) of RA 9165 be struck
down as unconstitutional for infringing on the constitutional right to privacy, the right against
unreasonable search and seizure, and the right against self-incrimination, and for being
contrary to the due process and equal protection guarantees.

ISSUE/S:
1) Do Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose an additional
qualification for candidates for senator? Corollarily, can Congress enact a law prescribing
qualifications for candidates for senator in addition to those laid down by the Constitution?

2) Are paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36, RA 9165 unconstitutional? Specifically, do these
paragraphs violate the right to privacy, the right against unreasonable searches and seizure,
and the equal protection clause?

HELD:

1) YES, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose an additional
qualification for candidates for senator. NO, Congress CANNOT enact a law prescribing
qualifications for candidates for senator in addition to those laid down by the Constitution.

2) The Court held that, paragraphs (c) and (d) are CONSTITUTIONAL; while paragraphs (f) and
(g) are UNCONSITUTIONAL. Only paragraphs (f) and (g) violate the right to privacy, the right
against unreasonable searches and seizure, and the equal protection clause.

RATIO:

1) Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the assailed COMELEC resolution,

effectively enlarges the qualification requirements enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the
Constitution (refer to the aforementioned facts). As couched, said Sec. 36(g) unmistakably
requires a candidate for senator to be certified illegal-drug clean, obviously as a pre-condition
to the validity of a certificate of candidacy for senator or, with like effect, a condition sine qua
non to be voted upon and, if proper, be proclaimed as senator-elect. The COMELEC resolution
completes the chain with the proviso that “[n]o person elected to any public office shall enter
upon the duties of his office until he has undergone mandatory drug test.” Viewed, therefore,
in its proper context, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and the implementing COMELEC Resolution add
another qualification layer to what the 1987 Constitution, at the minimum, requires for
membership in the Senate. Whether or not the drug-free bar set up under the challenged
provision is to be hurdled before or after election is really of no moment, as getting elected
would be of little value if one cannot assume office for non-compliance with the drug-testing
requirement.
Congress’ inherent legislative powers, broad as they may be, are subject to certain limitations.
As early as 1927, in Government v. Springer, the Court has defined, in the abstract, the limits on
legislative power in the following wise: “Someone has said that the powers of the legislative
department of the Government, like the boundaries of the ocean, are unlimited. In
constitutional governments, however, as well as governments acting under delegated
authority, the powers of each of the departments x x x are limited and confined within the four
walls of the constitution or the charter, and each department can only exercise such powers as
are necessarily implied from the given powers. The Constitution is the shore of legislative
authority against which the waves of legislative enactment may dash, but over which it cannot
leap.”

Thus, legislative power remains limited in the sense that it is subject to substantive and
constitutional limitations which circumscribe both the exercise of the power itself and the
allowable subjects of legislation. The substantive constitutional limitations are chiefly found in
the Bill of Rights[12] and other provisions, such as Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution prescribing
the qualifications of candidates for senators.

In the same vein, the COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering election
laws or promulgating rules and regulations to implement Sec. 36(g), validly impose
qualifications on candidates for senator in addition to what the Constitution prescribes. If
Congress cannot require a candidate for senator to meet such additional qualification, the
COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such power. The right of a citizen in the democratic
process of election should not be defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirement not
otherwise specified in the Constitution.

2) The Court is of the view and so holds that the provisions of RA 9165(c) requiring mandatory,
random, and suspicionless drug testing of students are constitutional. Indeed, it is within the
prerogative of educational institutions to require, as a condition for admission, compliance with
reasonable school rules and regulations and policies. To be sure, the right to enroll is not
absolute; it is subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable requirements. A random drug testing of
students in secondary and tertiary schools is not only acceptable, but may even be necessary if
the safety and interest of the student population, doubtless a legitimate concern of the
government, are to be promoted and protected.
Just as in the case of secondary and tertiary level students, the mandatory but random drug
test prescribed by Sec. 36 of RA 9165(d) for officers and employees of public and private offices
is justifiable, albeit not exactly for the same reason. The Court notes in this regard that
petitioner SJS, other than saying that “subjecting almost everybody to drug testing, without
probable cause, is unreasonable, an unwarranted intrusion of the individual right to privacy,”
has failed to show how the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing under Sec. 36(c)
and (d) of RA 9165 violates the right to privacy and constitutes unlawful and/or unconsented
search under Art. III, Secs. 1 and 2 of the Constitution. Petitioner Laserna’s lament is just as
simplistic, sweeping, and gratuitous and does not merit serious consideration.

The essence of privacy is the right to be left alone. In context, the right to privacy means the
right to be free from unwarranted exploitation of one’s person or from intrusion into one’s
private activities in such a way as to cause humiliation to a person’s ordinary sensibilities; and
while there has been general agreement as to the basic function of the guarantee against
unwarranted search, “translation of the abstract prohibition against ‘unreasonable searches
and seizures’ into workable broad guidelines for the decision of particular cases is a difficult
task,” to borrow from C. Camara v. Municipal Court. Authorities are agreed though that the
right to privacy yields to certain paramount rights of the public and defers to the state’s
exercise of police power.

As the warrantless clause of Sec. 2, Art III of the Constitution is couched and as has been held,
“reasonableness” is the touchstone of the validity of a government search or intrusion. While
every officer and employee in a private establishment is under the law deemed forewarned
that he or she may be a possible subject of a drug test, nobody is really singled out in advance
for drug testing. The goal is to discourage drug use by not telling in advance anyone when and
who is to be tested. And as may be observed, Sec. 36(d) of RA 9165 itself prescribes what, in
Ople, is a narrowing ingredient by providing that the employees concerned shall be subjected
to “random drug test as contained in the company’s work rules and regulations x x x for
purposes of reducing the risk in the work place.” It is to be noted the very reason RA 9165 was
enacted is to safeguard the well-being of the citizens from the deleterious effects of dangerous
drugs.

Paragraph (f) of RA 9165 was declared unconstitutional by the Court. Unlike the situation
covered by Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165, the Court finds no valid justification for mandatory
drug testing for persons accused of crimes. In the case of students, the constitutional viability of
the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing for students emanates primarily from
the waiver by the students of their right to privacy when they seek entry to the school, and
from their voluntarily submitting their persons to the parental authority of school authorities.
In the case of private and public employees, the constitutional soundness of the mandatory,
random, and suspicionless drug testing proceeds from the reasonableness of the drug test
policy and requirement.

The Court finds the situation entirely different in the case of persons charged before the public
prosecutor’s office with criminal offenses punishable with six (6) years and one (1) day
imprisonment. The operative concepts in the mandatory drug testing are “randomness” and
“suspicionless.” In the case of persons charged with a crime before the prosecutor’s office, a
mandatory drug testing can never be random or suspicionless. The ideas of randomness and
being suspicionless are antithetical to their being made defendants in a criminal complaint.
They are not randomly picked; neither are they beyond suspicion. When persons suspected of
committing a crime are charged, they are singled out and are impleaded against their will. The
persons thus charged, by the bare fact of being haled before the prosecutor’s office and
peaceably submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be the case, do not necessarily consent
to the procedure, let alone waive their right to privacy. To impose mandatory drug testing on
the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution,
contrary to the stated objectives of RA 9165. Drug testing in this case would violate a persons’
right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused
persons are veritably forced to incriminate themselves.

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Labels: Criminal Procedure

POSADAS VS. CA

FACTS: On October 16, 1986 at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning Pat. Ursicio Ungab and Pat.
Umbra Umpar, both members of the Integrated National Police (INP) of the Davao
Metrodiscom assigned with the Intelligence Task Force, were conducting a surveillance along
Magallanes Street, Davao City. While they were within the premises of the Rizal Memorial
Colleges they spotted petitioner carrying a "buri" bag and they noticed him to be acting
suspiciously.

They approached the petitioner and identified themselves as members of the INP. Petitioner
attempted to flee but his attempt to get away was thwarted by the two notwithstanding his
resistance.

They then checked the "buri" bag of the petitioner where they found one (1) caliber .38 Smith
& Wesson revolver, two (2) rounds of live ammunition for a .38 caliber gun a smoke (tear gas)
grenade, and two (2) live ammunitions for a .22 caliber gun. They brought the petitioner to the
police station for further investigation. In the course of the same, the petitioner was asked to
show the necessary license or authority to possess firearms and ammunitions found in his
possession but he failed to do so. He was then taken to the Davao Metrodiscom office and the
prohibited articles recovered from him were indorsed to M/Sgt. Didoy the officer then on duty.
He was prosecuted for illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions in the Regional Trial
Court of Davao City wherein after a plea of not guilty and trial on the merits a decision was
rendered on October 8, 1987 finding petitioner guilty of the offense

ISSUE: WON the search without warrant is valid.

HELD: YES it is valid.

RATIO: There are many instances where a warrant and seizure can be effected without
necessarily being preceded by an arrest, foremost of which is the "stop and search" without a
search warrant at military or police checkpoints. Thus, as between a warrantless search and
seizure conducted at military or police checkpoints and the search thereat in the case at bar,
there is no question that, indeed, the latter is more reasonable considering that unlike in the
former, it was effected on the basis of a probable cause. The probable cause is that when the
petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri bag there was a probable
cause that he was concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the right and duty of the
police officers to inspect the same.

It is too much indeed to require the police officers to search the bag in the possession of the
petitioner only after they shall have obtained a search warrant for the purpose. Such an
exercise may prove to be useless, futile and much too late.

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Labels: Criminal Procedure

PEOPLE v. SALANGUIT
FACTS: Two criminal cases were filed against Salanguit, the first for possession/use of shabu,
and the second, for possession/use of marijuana. Sr. Insp. Aguilar applied in the RTC of Cavite a
warrant to search the premises of Robert Salanguit for shabu and shabu paraphernalias. He
presented as a witness Edmund Badua, an undercover officer, which transacted with Salanguit
for the purchase of shabu.

The application was granted and the team of Aguilar proceeded to the premises of Salanguit in
QC to serve the warrant. The operatives proceeded to knock on Salanguit’s door but the same
was left unanswered. The operatives heard people panicking inside the house and they began
to force their way inside the house. They indicated their authority to conduct the search and
began which yielded to the finding of clear plastic bags with shabu and 2 bricks of dried
marijuana leaves covered in newspaper.

Salanguit refused to sign the receipt for the confiscated drugs. During his arraignment, he
pleaded not guilty and in the trial court, he gave stated that he never got the chance to review
the purported warrant that Aguilar and his team has. He further stated that the operatives ate
their food and took his cash and valuable, as well as canned goods.

The RTC found him guilty for possession/use of shabu and marijuana. Salanguit appealed the
said decision and argues that the shabu allegedly recovered from his residence is inadmissible
as evidence against him on the ground that the warrant used to obtain it was invalid and that
the marijuana seized from him was also inadmissible as evidence against him pursuant to the
plain view doctrine, and that the operatives employed unnecessary force in executing the
warrant.

ISSUES:

1. W/N the warrant used to seize the shabu was valid and the said shabu was inadmissible in
evidence against him.

2. W/N the marijuana seized was admissible in evidence against Salanguit pursuant to plain
view doctrine.
HELD:

1. Yes, all the requisites for the issuance of a search warrant were satisfied.

2. No, the marijuana was not one of the drugs indicated in the warrant and it was not in plain
view when it was seized.

RATIO:

1. The warrant authorized the seizure of undetermined quantity of shabu and drug
paraphernalia. Salanguit contends that it should be void as it did not indicate the existence of
drug paraphernalias. The warrant was valid as to the seizure of shabu and void as to the seizure
of drug paraphernalia. It is to be noted that no drug paraphernalia was seized. Salanguit further
contends that the warrant was issued for more than one specific offense because possession or
uses are punished under two different provisions in the Dangerous Drugs Act. This Court has
decided in the case of People v Dichoso that a warrant that does not specify what provisions of
the law were violated, is valid as to the authority to search and seize marijuana, shabu and drug
paraphernalias. Lastly, Salanguit argues that the search warrant failed to indicate the place to
be searched with sufficient particularity. The rule is that a description of the place to be
searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and
identify the place to be searched. The location of Salanguit’s house being indicated by the
evidence on record, there can be no doubt that the warrant described the place to be searched
with sufficient particularity.

2. Because the location of the shabu was indicated in the warrant and thus known to the police
operatives, it is reasonable to assume that the police found the packets and shabu first. Once
the valid portion of the search warrant has been executed, the plain view doctrine can no
longer provide basis for admitting the other items subsequently found. The marijuana bricks
were wrapped in newsprint. There was no apparent illegality to justify their seizure. Not being
in a transparent container, the contents wrapped in newsprint could not have been readily
discernible as marijuana. That being said, we hold that the marijuana is inadmissible in evidence
against Salanguit.

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Labels: Criminal Procedure

PEOPLE V MUSA

FACTS:

On 14 December 1989, the accused sold 2 wrappers containing marijuana leaves to Sgt. Amado
Ani in a buy-bust operation in Zamboanga City.

The said buy-bust operation was planned since a civilian informer told that Mari Musa was
engaged in selling marijuana and therefore, a test-buy was conducted the day prior to the said
buy-bust operation. During the buy-bust operation, after Sgt. Ani handed the money to Musa,
Musa entered his house to get the wrappings. Upon his return and with the inspection of the
wrappings, Musa was arrested, but the marked money used as payment cannot be found with
him, prompting the NARCOM agents to go inside his house. There, they could not find the
marked money, but they found more marijuana leaves hidden in a plastic bag inside the
kitchen.

The leaves were confirmed as marijuana by the forensic chemist of the PC crime laboratory,
who later on served as a witness, along with T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga, the team leader of the buy-
bust operation and Sgt. Ani.
The defense gave a different version of what happened on 14 December 1989 wherein he and
his wife, Ahara Musa, served as witnesses. They said that the NARCOM agents, dressed in
civilian clothes, got inside their house since the door was open, and upon entering, declared
that they were NARCOM agents and searched the house, despite demands of the couple for a
search warrant. The agents found a red bag whose contents were unknown to the Musas.

Musa was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt by the trial court.

On appeal, Musa contests that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. He also
questioned the credibility of the witnesses, as well as the admissibility of the seized plastic bag
as evidence since it violates his constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures
provided in Art. III, Sec. 2.

ISSUES:

1. WON Musa is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt

2. WON the seized plastic bag containing marijuana is admissible as evidence.

HELD/RATIO:

1. Yes. The testimony given by T/Sgt. Belarga only strengthened the testimony of Sgt. Ani since
it was the testimony of the latter that served as direct evidence, being enough to prove the
consummation of the sale of the prohibited drug, and that their testimonies were not
conflicting as well.

2. No. Although the warrantless search done falls under Sec. 12 of Rule 126 and that the
search may include premises or surroundings under the accused’s immediate control, it does
not fall under the “Plain View” doctrine. The agents found the plastic bag inside the kitchen,
and upon asking about the contents of the bag, the accused did not answer, making the agents
open the bag and find marijuana leaves. Even if an object is observed in "plain view," the "plain
view" doctrine will not justify the seizure of the object where the incriminating nature of the
object is not apparent from the "plain view" of the object.
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Labels: Criminal Procedure

NALA V. BARROSO, GR NO. 153087 AUGUST 7, 2003

FACTS:

PO3 Macrino L. Alcoser applied for the issuance of a warrant to search the person and
residence of the petitioner Bernard R. Nala in connection with petitioner’s alleged illegal
possession of one caliber .22 magnum and one 9 mm. pistol in violation of the law on Illegal
Possession of Firearms.

On the same day, after examining Alcoser and his witness Ruel Nalagon, respondent judge of
RTC of Malaybalay City issued Search and Seizure warrant against “Romulo Nala alias Lolong
Nala who is said to be residing at Purok 4, Poblacion, Kitaaotao, Bukidnon.”

On July 4, 2001, at around 6:30am, Alcoser and other police officers searched petitioner’s
house and allegedly seized the following articles: (a) one piece caliber .38 revolver (snub-nose)
with Serial Number 1125609 (b) one piece fragmentation grenade (cacao type) (c) one piece .22
long barrel (d) 5 pieces live ammunition for caliber .38 revolver (e) 4 pieces of disposable lighter
and unestimated numbers of cellophane used for packing of shabu.
The following day, a criminal case was filed against the petitioner for illegal possession of
firearms, ammunitions and explosives.

The petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion seeking to (1) Quash Search and Seizure Warrant (2)
declare inadmissible for any purpose the items allegedly seized under the said warrant (3)
direct release of the air rifle seized by the police officers.

The respondent Judge however denied the said Motion to Quash but ordered the return of the
air rifle to the petitioner. Respondent stated that there was probable cause which was duly
established from the deposition and examination of the witness and the testimony of Alcoser.
the fact that the items seized were not exactly the items seized bear a direct relation to the
crime of illegal possession of firearms. Also, the respondent Judge found that the petitioner was
sufficiently identified in the warrant although his first name was erroneously stated therein as
“Romulo” and not as “Bernard”, considering that the warrant was couched in terms that would
make it enforceable against the person and residence of petitioner and no other. The petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration but was also denied.

Hence, he filed the instant petition alleging that the respondent judge committed grave abuse
of discretion in issuing the questioned orders. The instant petition was also filed directly to this
Court in disregard of the rule on hierarchy of courts. We opt to take cognizance of this petition
in order to address the urgency and seriousness of the constitutional issues raised.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the petitioner was sufficiently described in the search and seizure
warrant?

2. Whether or not there was probable cause for the issuance of a search and seizure warrant
against the petitioner?

3. Whether or not the firearms and explosive allegedly found in petitioner’s residence are
admissible as evidence against him even though said firearms were not listed in the search and
seizure warrant?
HELD:

1. Yes, the petitioner was sufficiently described in the search and seizure warrant.

2. No, the affidavit and testimony of the witness and PO3 Alcoser failed to establish the
existence of probable cause.

3. No because the search and seizure warrant was not valid hence the items seized are
inadmissible.

RATIO:

1. On the first issue, the failure to correctly state in the search and seizure warrant the first
name of petitioner, which is “Bernard” and not “Romulo” or “Rumolo”, does not invalidate the
warrant because the additional description “alias Lolong Nala who is said to be residing at
Purok 4, Poblacion, Kitaotao, Bukidnon” sufficiently enabled the police officers to locate and
identify the petitioner. What is prohibited is a warrant against an unnamed party, and not one
which, as in the instant case, contains a descriptio personae that will enable the officer to
identify the accused without difficulty

2. Nowhere, however, in the affidavit and testimony of witness Ruel Nalagon nor in PO3
Macrino L. Alcoser’s application for the issuance of a search warrant was it mentioned that
petitioner had no license to possess a firearm. While Alcoser testified before the respondent
judge that the firearms in the possession of petitioner are not licensed, this does not qualify as
“personal knowledge” but only “personal belief” because neither he nor Nalagon verified, much
more secured, a certification from the appropriate government agency that petitioner was not
licensed to possess a firearm. This could have been the best evidence obtainable to prove that
petitioner had no license to possess firearms and ammunitions, but the police officers failed to
present the same.

the fact remains that both the applicant, PO3 Macrino L. Alcoser, and his witness Ruel Nalagon
did not have personal knowledge of petitioner’s lack of license to possess firearms,
ammunitions and explosive; and did not adduce the evidence required to prove the existence
of probable cause that petitioner had no license to possess a firearm. Hence, the search and
seizure warrant issued on the basis of the evidence presented is void.
3. Conformably, the articles allegedly seized in the house of petitioner cannot be used as
evidence against him because access therein was gained by the police officer using a void
search and seizure warrant. It is as if they entered petitioner’s house without a warrant,
making their entry therein illegal, and the items seized, inadmissible. Moreover, it does not
follow that because an offense is malum prohibitum, the subject thereof is necessarily illegal
per se. Motive is immaterial in mala prohibita, but the subjects of this kind of offense may not
be summarily seized simply because they are prohibited. A warrant is still necessary, because
possession of any firearm becomes unlawful only if the required permit or license therefor is
not first obtained.

The items seized in petitioner’s house, being “fruits of the poisonous tree”, are “inadmissible
for any purpose in any proceeding.” The exclusion of these unlawfully seized evidence is the
only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches
and seizures. Hence, the complaints filed against petitioner for illegal possession of firearms
and explosive based on illegally obtained evidence have no more leg to stand on

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Labels: Criminal Procedure

AL-GHOUL VS. COURT OF APPEALS (2001)

FACTS: Judge Mangay, presideing judge of the RTC, issued search warrants 5 for the search and
seizure of certain items in Apartment No. 2 in Kalookan City. Subsequently, the police searched
Apartment No. 8, in the same compound and found one (1) .45 caliber pistol. Found in
Apartment No. 2 were various firearms, ammunitions, explosives and other incendiary devices.
The said items seized were acknowledged in the receipt signed by SPO2 De La Cruz.

Petitioners Yousef Al-Ghoul et al. were charged with illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions
and explosives, pursuant to PD No. 1866. Thereafter, petitioners were arrested and detained.
The petitioners filed a motion for bail. They also objected to the admissibility of the evidence
obtained.

Petitioners contend that the search and seizure orders violated Sections 2 and 3 of the Bill of
Rights as well as Section 3 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure because the
place searched and articles seized were not described with particularity. They argue that the
two-witness requirement under Section 10 of Rule 126 was ignored when only one witness
signed the receipt for the properties seized during the search, and said witness was not
presented at the trial. Petitioners also aver that the presumption of regularity of the
implementation of the search warrant was rebutted by the defense during cross-examination of
prosecution witnesses.

ISSUE/S:

(1) WON the items obtained in the said search are admissible as evidence.

(2) WON there was lack of particularity in the description of objects to be seized pursuant to
the warrants.

(3) WON the two-witness rule under Sec. 10, Rule 126 ROC applies.

HELD:

(1) Evidence from Apartment No. 2 is admissible however, the search made at Apartment No. 8
is illegal and the .45 caliber pistol taken thereat is inadmissible in evidence against petitioners
since there was no mention of the said apartment in the search warrants issued.
(2) No, the articles seized during the search of Apartment No. 2 are of the same kind and nature
as those items enumerated in the search warrants.

(3) No, the two-witness rule does not apply since the petitioners were present when the search
and seizure operation was conducted.

RATIO:

(1)Upon perusal by Court of the said search warrants 54-95 and 55-95, it specified the place to
be searched, namely Apartment No. 2 in Kalookan City however, there was no mention of
Apartment No. 8. The search conducted at Apartment No. 8 clearly violated Sections 2 and 3
(2) of the Bill of Rights, in relation to Section 3 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.

PICOP v. Asuncion: the place to be searched cannot be changed, enlarged nor amplified by the
police. Policemen may not be restrained from pursuing their task with vigor, but in doing so,
care must be taken that constitutional and legal safeguards are not disregarded. Exclusion of
unlawfully seized evidence is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction
against unreasonable searches and seizures. Hence, the search made at Apartment No. 8 is
illegal and the .45 caliber pistol taken thereat is inadmissible in evidence against petitioners.

(2) The search warrants in question specifically mentioned Apartment No. 2. The search was
done in the presence of its occupants, herein petitioners, in accordance with Section 7 of Rule
126, Revised Rules of Court. They alleged lack of particularity yet, the Court held that the
articles seized during the search of Apartment No. 2 are of the same kind and nature as those
items enumerated in the search warrants. The items seized from Apartment No. 2 were
described with specificity in the warrants in question. The nature of the items ordered to be
seized did not require a technical description. Moreover, the law does not require that the
things to be seized must be described in precise and minute details as to leave no room for
doubt on the part of the searching authorities, otherwise, it would be virtually impossible for
the applicants to obtain a search warrant as they would not know exactly what kind of things
they are looking for. Once described, the articles subject of the search and seizure need not be
so invariant as to require absolute concordance, in our view, between those seized and those
described in the warrant. Substantial similarity of those articles described as a class or species
would suffice.
One of the tests to determine the particularity in the description of objects to be seized under a
search warrant is when the things described are limited to those which bear direct relation to
the offense for which the warrant is being issued. A careful examination of search warrants
show that they were worded in such a manner that the enumerated items to be seized could
bear a direct relation to the offense of violation of Section 1 and 3 of PD 1866, as amended,
penalizing illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions and explosives. What the warrants
authorized was the seizure of articles proscribed by that decree, and no other.

(3) SEC. 10. Receipt for the property seized.—The officer seizing property under the warrant
must give a detailed receipt for the same to the lawful occupant of the premises in whose
presence the search and seizure were made, or in the absence of such occupant, must, in the
presence of at least two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality,
leave a receipt in the place in which he found the seized property.

Clearly, the two-witness rule applies only in the absence of the lawful occupants of the
premises searched. In the case at bar, petitioners were present when the search and seizure
operation was conducted by the police at Apartment No. 2. More importantly, petitioner
Nabeel Al-Riyami y Nasser admitted being an actual occupant/resident of Apartment No. 2.
Hence, there is no violation of Section 10, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court.

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Labels: Criminal Procedure

TAN VS GALLARDO (1976)

FACTS: Petitioners in this case seek the annulment of respondent Judge’s orders in criminal
cases denying petitioners’ motion for respondent judge to disqualify or inhibit himself from
hearing and acting upon their Motion for New Trial. The SC issued a Resolution asking the
respondent Judge to file his answer. Said Resolution also issued a temporary restraining order
to enjoin the respondent from further proceeding with the criminal cases.

The Solicitor General informed the SC that they are "persuaded that there are bases for stating
that the rendition of respondent Judge's decision and his resolution on the motion for new trial
were not free from suspicion of bias and prejudice. The OSG further submits that the case
should he remanded to the trial court for the rendition of a new decision and with instruction
to receive additional evidence proferred by the accused with the right of the prosecution to
present rebuttal evidence as may be warranted.

Private prosecutors submitted their Comment in justification of the challenged Orders of the
respondent Judge and objected to the remand of this case.

*contentions:

Petitioner claimed that the private prosecutor has absolutely no standing in the instant
proceedings.

The private prosecutors now contend that they are entitled to appear before this Court, to take
part in the proceedings, and to adopt a position in contravention to that of the Solicitor
General.

ISSUE: Whether or not the private prosecutors have the right to intervene independently of the
Solicitor General and to adopt a stand inconsistent with that of the latter in the present
proceedings.
HELD: NO. To begin with, it will be noted that the participation of the private prosecution in the
instant case was delimited by this Court in its Resolution of October 1, 1975, thus: "to
collaborate with the Solicitor General in the preparation of the Answer and pleadings that may
be required by this Court." To collaborate means to cooperate with and to assist the Solicitor
General. It was never intended that the private prosecutors could adopt a stand independent of
or in contravention of the position taken by the Solicitor General.

The role of the private prosecutors is to represent the offended party, with respect to the civil
action for the recovery of the civil liability arising from the offense. 'This civil action is deemed
instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party either expressly waives the civil
action or reserves to institute it separately. Therefore, although the private prosecutors may be
permitted to intervene, they are not in control of the case, and their interests are subordinate
to those of the People of the Philippines represented by the fiscal.

It is evident, therefore, that since the Solicitor General alone is authorized to represent the
State or the People of the Philippines the interest of the private prosecutors is subordinate to
that of the State and they cannot be allowed to take a stand inconsistent with that of the
Solicitor General, for that would be tantamount to giving the latter the direction and control of
the criminal proceedings, contrary to the provisions of law and the settled rules on the matter.

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Labels: Criminal Procedure

PEOPLE VS. GODOFREDO TEVES (1999)

FACTS: The Prosecutors office of Cavite file 4 separate charges of rape against Godofredo for
raping her 13 year old daughter “CHERRY” 4 times to wit; On new years day of 1995, a week
after the new years day of 1995, sometime on 1993 and January 23, 1995. On the new years
day rape Godofredo raped her when she was washing the dishes, a week after when she was
taking a bath and her father asked her to hand over the dipper and suddenly after obeying
went inside the bathroom, January 23 1995 when her father asked her younger brother to buy
cigar.

The RTC of Cavite convicted Godofredo for all this instances of rape and sentenced him to
death. The information filed by the Prosecutor only contained the generic circumstances of
Abuse of superior strength and force and intimidation. The RTC of Cavite sentenced him to
death, Pursuant to Section 11 of the amendatory statute, the death penalty may be imposed in
rape cases under the last paragraph of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, when the rape is
committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:

1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consaguinity or affinity within the third civil
degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.

ISSUE: WON Godofredo can be sentenced to death when only the generic aggravating
circumstance and not the qualifying circumstance is alleged in the information filed by the
prosecutor.

HELD: No, the penalty should only be for the one alleged in the information.

RATIO: These seven attendant circumstances, given that they alter the nature of the crime of
rape and thus increase the degree of the penalty, are in the nature of qualifying circumstances.
Plainly, these attendant circumstances added by R.A. No. 7659 are not mere aggravating
circumstances, which merely increase the period of the penalty. So we held in People v. Ramos,
the effect that a qualifying circumstance must be specifically pleaded in the information, thus:

While Republic Act No. 7659 did not give a legal designation to the crime of rape attended by
any of the seven new circumstances introduced in Article 335 on December 31, 1993, this Court
has referred to such crime as qualified rape in a number of its decisions. However, with or
without a name for this kind of rape, the concurrence of the minority of the victim and her
relationship with the offender give a different character to the rape defined in the first part of
Article 335. They raise the imposable penalty upon a person accused of rape from reclusion
perpetua to the higher and supreme penalty of death. Such an effect conjointly puts
relationship and minority of the offended party into the nature of a special qualifying
circumstance.

As this qualifying circumstance was not pleaded in the information or in the complaint against
appellant, he cannot be convicted of qualified rape because he was not properly informed that
he is being accused of qualified rape. The Constitution guarantees the right of every person
accused in a criminal prosecution to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against
him. This right finds amplification and implementation in the different provisions of the Rules of
Court. Foremost among these enabling provisions is the office of an information.

Anent the Constitutional right afforded an accused to be informed of the nature and cause of
an accusation against him, as implemented by the relevant provisions of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure, Section 9 of Rule 110 provides:

Sec. 9. Cause of accusation. — The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense
must be stated in ordinary and concise language without repetition, not necessarily in the
terms of the statute defining the offense, but in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of
common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged and enable the court
to pronounce a judgment.

Pertinent to this case is the phrase of the current set of adjective rules: "a person of common
understanding,"
In this light, we hold that the informations do not sufficiently allege the twin special qualifying
circumstances of the victim's age and the relationship between the culprit and the victim. What
strikes us about the informations is that, as phrased, they unduly lay stress on the generic
aggravating circumstance of "taking advantage of superior strength." Be it in terms of syntax or
composition, the wording of the informations is unable to sufficiently notify the accused, a
person of common understanding or ordinary intelligence, of the gravity or nature of the crime
he had been charged with, especially considering that generic aggravating circumstace of taking
advantage of superior strength is not even an element of the attendant circumstances treated
under number 1 of the last paragraph of Article 335. The aforequoted clauses in the
informations can thus not be read nor understood as constituting a specific allegation of the
special circumstances of relationship of father and daughter and that the daughter was less
than 18 years of age at the time the crime of rape was committed.