SpecPro Rule 74

Republic of the Philippines The oppositor-appellant assigns five errors allegedly committed by the trial court, but these
SUPREME COURT assigned errors raise only two questions for resolution, namely: whether upon the admitted facts
Manila the judicial administration of the property left by the deceased Luz Garcia lies, with the consequent
appointment of an administrator, and whether the appellant has a better right to the said office
EN BANC than the appellee.

G.R. No. 45904 September 30, 1938 1. As to the first question, we have section 642 of the Code of Civil Procedure providing in part
that "if no executor is named in the will, or if a person dies intestate, administration shall be
Intestate estate of the deceased Luz Garcia. PABLO G. UTULO, applicant-appellee, granted" etc. This provision enunciates the general rule that when a person dies living property in
vs. the Philippine Islands, his property should be judicially administered and the competent court
LEONA PASION VIUDA DE GARCIA, oppositor-appellant. should appoint a qualified administrator, in the order established in the section, in case the
deceased left no will, or in case he had left one should he fail to name an executor therein. This
Feliciano B. Gardiner for appellant. rule, however, is subject to the exceptions established by sections 596 and 597 of the same Code,
Gerardo S. Limlingan for appellee. as finally amended. According to the first, when all the heirs are of lawful age and there are no
debts due from the estate, they may agree in writing to partition the property without instituting the
judicial administration or applying for the appointment of an administrator. According to the
IMPERIAL, J.:
second, if the property left does not exceed six thousand pesos, the heirs may apply to the
competent court, after the required publications, to proceed with the summary partition and, after
This is an appeal taken by the oppositor from the order of the Court of First Instance of the
paying all the known obligations, to partition all the property constituting the inheritance among
Province of Tarlac appointing the applicant as judicial administrator of the property left by the
themselves pursuant to law, without instituting the judicial administration and the appointment of
deceased Luz Garcia.
an administrator.

Juan Garcia Sanchez died intestate, and in the proceedings instituted in the Court of First
Construing the scope of section 596, this court repeatedly held that when a person dies without
Instance of Tarlac for the administration of his property (special proceedings No. 3475), Leona
leaving pending obligations to be paid, his heirs, whether of age or not, are not bound to submit
Pasion Vda. de Garcia, the surviving spouse and the herein oppositor, was appointed judicial
the property to a judicial administration and the appointment of an administrator are superfluous
administratrix. The said deceased left legitimate children, named Juan Garcia, jr., Patrocinio
and unnecessary proceedings (Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, 17 Phil., 321; Malahacan vs. Ignacio,
Garcia and Luz Garcia who, with the widow, are the presumptive forced heirs. Luz Garcia married
19 Phil., 434; Bondad vs. Bondad, 34 Phil., 232; Baldemor vs. Malangyaon, 34 Phil., 367;
the applicant Pablo G. Utulo and during the pendency of the administration proceedings of the
Fule vs. Fule, 46 Phil., 317).
said deceased, she died in the province without any legitimate descendants, her only forced heirs
being her mother and her husband. The latter commenced in the same court the judicial
In enunciating the aforesaid doctrine, this court relied on the provisions of articles 657, 659 and
administration of the property of his deceased wife (special proceedings No. 4188), stating in his
661 of the Civil Code under which the heirs succeed to all the property left by the deceased from
petition that her only heirs were he himself and his mother-in-law, the oppositor, and that the only
the time of his death. In the case of Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, supra, it was said:
property left by the deceased consisted in the share due her from the intestate of her father, Juan
Garcia Sanchez, and asking that he be named administrator of the property of said deceased. The
oppositor objected to the petition, opposing the judicial administration of the property of her Under the provisions of the Civil Code (arts. 657 to 661), the rights to the succession of a
daughter and the appointment of the applicant as administrator. She alleged that inasmuch as the person are transmitted from the moment of his death; in other words, the heirs succeeded
said deceased left no indebtedness, there was no occasion for the said judicial administration; but immediately to all of the property of the deceased ancestor. The property belongs to the
she stated that should the court grant the administration of the property, she should be appointed heirs at the moment of the death of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had
the administratrix thereof inasmuch as she had a better right than the applicant. After the required executed and delivered to them a deed for the same before his death. In the absence of
publications, trial was had and the court, on August 28, 1936, finally issued the appealed order to debts existing against the estate, the heirs may enter upon the administration of the said
which the oppositor excepted and thereafter filed the record on appeal which was certified and property immediately. If they desire to administer it jointly, they may do so. If they desire
approved. to partition it among themselves and can do this by mutual agreement, they also have
that privilege. The Code of Procedure in Civil Actions provides how an estate may be
SpecPro Rule 74
divided by a petition for partition in case they can not mutually agree in the division. When
there are no debts existing against the estate, there is certainly no occasion for the
intervention of an administrator in the settlement and partition of the estate among the
heirs. When the heirs are all of lawful age and there are no debts, there is no reason why
the estate should be burdened with the costs and expenses of an administrator. The
property belonging absolutely to the heirs, in the absence of existing debts against the
estate, the administrator has no right to intervene in any way whatever in the division of
the estate among the heirs. They are co-owners of an undivided estate and the law offers
them a remedy for the division of the same among themselves. There is nothing in the
present case to show that the heirs requested the appointment of the administrator, or
that they intervened in any way whatever in the present actions. If there are any heirs of
the estate who have not received their participation, they have their remedy by petition for
partition of the said estate.
In the cases of Malahacan vs. Ignacio, supra, Bondad vs. Bondad, supra, and Baldemor vs.
Malangyaon, supra, the same doctrine was reiterated. And in the case of Fule vs. Fule, supra, this
court amplified and ratified the same doctrine in the following language:
Upon the second question — Did the court a quo commit an error in refusing to appoint
an administrator for the estate of Saturnino Fule? — it may be said (a) that it is admitted
by all of the parties to the present action, that at the time of his death no debts existed
against his estate and (b) that all of the heirs of Saturnino Fule were of age.
In this jurisdiction and by virtue of the provisions of articles 657, 659 and 661 of the Civil
Code, all of the property, real and personal, of a deceased person who dies intestate, is
transmitted immediately to his heirs. (To Guioc-Co vs. Del Rosario, 8 Phil., 546;
Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, 17 Phil., 321; Marin vs. Nacianceno, 19 Phil., 238;
Malahacan vs. Ignacio, 19 Phil., 434; Nable Jose vs. Uson, 27 Phil., 73;
Bondad vs. Bondad, 34 Phil., 232; Baldemor vs. Malangyaon, 34 Phil., 367.)
If then the property of the deceased, who dies intestate, passes immediately to his heirs,
as owners, and there are no debts, what reason can there be for the appointment of a
judicial administrator to administer the estate for them and to deprive the real owners of
their possession to which they are immediately entitled? In the case of Bondad vs.
Bondad (34 Phil., 232), Chief Justice Cayetano Arellano, discussing this question, said:
Under the provisions of the Civil Code (articles 657 to 661), the rights to the succession of
a person are transmitted from the moment of his death; in other words, the heirs succeed
immediately to all of the property of the deceased ancestor. The property belongs to the
heirs at the moment of the death of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had
executed and delivered to them a deed for the same before his death. In the absence of
debts existing against the estate, the heirs may enter upon the administration of the said
property immediately. If they desire to administer it jointly, they may do so. If they desire
to partition it among themselves and can do this by mutual agreement, they also have
that privilege. The Code of Procedure in Civil Actions provides how an estate may be
divided by a petition for partition in case they cannot mutually agree in the division.
(Sections 182-184, 196, and 596 of Act No. 190.)
When the heirs are all of lawful age and there are no debts there is no reason why the
estate should be burdened with the cost and expenses of an administrator. The
administrator has no right to intervene in any way whatsoever in the division of the estate
among the heirs when they are adults and when there are no debts against the estate.
(Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, supra; Bondad vs. Bondad, supra;
Baldemor vs. Malangyaon, supra.)
When there are no debts and the heirs are all adults, their relation to the property left by
their ancestor is the same as that of any other coowners or owners in common, and they
may recover their individual rights, the same as any other coowners of undivided
property. (Succession of Story, 3 La. Ann., 502; Mcintyre vs. Chappell, 4 Tex., 187; Wood
et ux. vs. Ford, 29 Miss., 57.)
xxx xxx xxx
The right of the heirs in cases like the one we are discussing, also exist in the divisions of
personal as well as the real property. If they cannot agree as to the division, then a suit
for partition of such personal property among the heirs of the deceased owner is
maintenable where the estate is not in debts, the heirs are all of age, and there is no
administration upon the estate and no necessity thereof. (Jordan vs. Jordan, 4 Tex. Civ.
App. Rep., 559.)
It is difficult to conceive of any class or item of property susceptible of being held in
common which may not be divided by the coowners. It may be of personal property as
well as of real estate; of several parcels as well as of a single parcel, and of non-
contiguous as well as of adjacent tracts; or of part only of the lands of the coowners as
well as of the whole. (Pickering vs. Moore, 67 N. H., 533; 31 L. R. A., 698;
Pipes vs. Buckner, 51 Miss., 848; Tewksbury vs. Provizzo, 12 Cal., 20.)
We conceive of no powerful reason which counsels the abandonment of a doctrine so uniformly
applied. We are convinced that if the courts had followed it in all cases to which it has application,
their files would not have been replete with unnecessary administration proceedings as they are
now. There is no weight in the argument adduced by the appellee to the effect that his
appointment as judicial administrator is necessary so that he may have legal capacity to appear in
the intestate of the deceased Juan Garcia Sanchez. As he would appear in the said intestate by
the right of the representation, it would suffice for him to allege in proof of his interest that he is a
usufructuary forced heir of his deceased wife who, in turn, would be a forced heir and an
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interested and necessary party if she were living . In order to intervene in said intestate and to
take part in the distribution of the property it is not necessary that the administration of the
property of his deceased wife be instituted — an administration which will take up time and
occasion inconvenience and unnecessary expenses.

2. In view of the foregoing, there is no need to determine which of the parties has preferential right
to the office of administrator.

The appealed order should be reversed, with the costs of this instance to the applicant-appellee.
So ordered.
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Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-81147 June 20, 1989
VICTORIA BRINGAS PEREIRA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and RITA PEREIRA NAGAC, respondents.
Benjamin J. Quitoriano for petitioner.
Linzag-Arcilla & Associates Law Offices for private respondent.
GANCAYCO, J.:
Is a judicial administration proceeding necessary when the decedent dies intestate without leaving
any debts? May the probate court appoint the surviving sister of the deceased as the
administratrix of the estate of the deceased instead of the surviving spouse? These are the main
questions which need to be resolved in this case.
Andres de Guzman Pereira, an employee of the Philippine Air Lines, passed away on January 3,
1983 at Bacoor, Cavite without a will. He was survived by his legitimate spouse of ten months, the
herein petitioner Victoria Bringas Pereira, and his sister Rita Pereira Nagac, the herein private
respondent.
On March 1, 1983, private respondent instituted before Branch 19 of the Regional Trial Court of
Bacoor, Cavite, Special Proceeding No. RTC-BSP-83-4 for the issuance of letters of
administration in her favor pertaining to the estate of the deceased Andres de Guzman
Pereira. 1 In her verified petition, private respondent alleged the following: that she and Victoria
Bringas Pereira are the only surviving heirs of the deceased; that the deceased left no will; that
there are no creditors of the deceased; that the deceased left several properties, namely: death
benefits from the Philippine Air Lines (PAL), the PAL Employees Association (PALEA), the PAL
Employees Savings and Loan Association, Inc. (PESALA) and the Social Security System (SSS),
as well as savings deposits with the Philippine National Bank (PNB) and the Philippine
Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB), and a 300 square meter lot located at Barangay
Pamplona, Las Pinas, Rizal and finally, that the spouse of the deceased (herein petitioner) had
been working in London as an auxiliary nurse and as such one-half of her salary forms part of the
estate of the deceased.
On March 23,1983, petitioner filed her opposition and motion to dismiss the petition of private
respondent 2 alleging that there exists no estate of the deceased for purposes of administration
and praying in the alternative, that if an estate does exist, the letters of administration relating to
the said estate be issued in her favor as the surviving spouse.
In its resolution dated March 28, 1985, the Regional Trial Court, appointed private respondent Rita
Pereira Nagac administratrix of the intestate estate of Andres de Guzman Pereira upon a bond
posted by her in the amount of Pl,000.00. The trial court ordered her to take custody of all the real
and personal properties of the deceased and to file an inventory thereof within three months after
receipt of the order. 3
Not satisfied with the resolution of the lower court, petitioner brought the case to the Court of
Appeals. The appellate court affirmed the appointment of private respondent as administratrix in
its decision dated December 15, 1987. 4
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari where petitioner raises the following issues: (1)
Whether or not there exists an estate of the deceased Andres de Guzman Pereira for purposes of
administration; (2) Whether or not a judicial administration proceeding is necessary where there
are no debts left by the decedent; and, (3) Who has the better right to be appointed as
administratrix of the estate of the deceased, the surviving spouse Victoria Bringas Pereira or the
surviving sister Rita Pereira Nagac?
Anent the first issue, petitioner contends that there exists no estate of the deceased for purposes
of administration for the following reasons: firstly, the death benefits from PAL, PALEA, PESALA
and the SSS belong exclusively to her, being the sole beneficiary and in support of this claim she
submitted letter-replies from these institutions showing that she is the exclusive beneficiary of said
death benefits; secondly, the savings deposits in the name of her deceased husband with the PNB
and the PCIB had been used to defray the funeral expenses as supported by several receipts;
and, finally, the only real property of the deceased has been extrajudicially settled between the
petitioner and the private respondent as the only surviving heirs of the deceased.
Private respondent, on the other hand, argues that it is not for petitioner to decide what properties
form part of the estate of the deceased and to appropriate them for herself. She points out that this
function is vested in the court in charge of the intestate proceedings.
Petitioner asks this Court to declare that the properties specified do not belong to the estate of the
deceased on the basis of her bare allegations as aforestated and a handful of documents.
Inasmuch as this Court is not a trier of facts, We cannot order an unqualified and final exclusion or
non-exclusion of the property involved from the estate of the deceased. 5
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The resolution of this issue is better left to the probate court before which the administration
proceedings are pending. The trial court is in the best position to receive evidence on the
discordant contentions of the parties as to the assets of the decedent's estate, the valuations
thereof and the rights of the transferees of some of the assets, if any. 6 The function of resolving
whether or not a certain property should be included in the inventory or list of properties to be
administered by the administrator is one clearly within the competence of the probate court.
However, the court's determination is only provisional in character, not conclusive, and is subject
to the final decision in a separate action which may be instituted by the parties.7
Assuming, however, that there exist assets of the deceased Andres de Guzman Pereira for
purposes of administration, We nonetheless find the administration proceedings instituted by
private respondent to be unnecessary as contended by petitioner for the reasons herein below
discussed.
The general rule is that when a person dies leaving property, the same should be judicially
administered and the competent court should appoint a qualified administrator, in the order
established in Section 6, Rule 78, in case the deceased left no will, or in case he had left one,
should he fail to name an executor therein. 8 An exception to this rule is established in Section 1 of
Rule 74. 9 Under this exception, when all the heirs are of lawful age and there are no debts due
from the estate, they may agree in writing to partition the property without instituting the judicial
administration or applying for the appointment of an administrator.
Section 1, Rule 74 of the Revised Rules of Court, however, does not preclude the heirs from
instituting administration proceedings, even if the estate has no debts or obligations, if they do not
desire to resort for good reasons to an ordinary action for partition. While Section 1 allows the
heirs to divide the estate among themselves as they may see fit, or to resort to an ordinary action
for partition, the said provision does not compel them to do so if they have good reasons to take a
different course of action. 10 It should be noted that recourse to an administration proceeding even
if the estate has no debts is sanctioned only if the heirs have good reasons for not resorting to an
action for partition. Where partition is possible, either in or out of court, the estate should not be
burdened with an administration proceeding without good and compelling reasons. 11
Thus, it has been repeatedly held that when a person dies without leaving pending obligations to
be paid, his heirs, whether of age or not, are not bound to submit the property to a judicial
administration, which is always long and costly, or to apply for the appointment of an administrator
by the Court. It has been uniformly held that in such case the judicial administration and the
appointment of an administrator are superfluous and unnecessary proceedings . 12
Now, what constitutes "good reason" to warrant a judicial administration of the estate of a
deceased when the heirs are all of legal age and there are no creditors will depend on the
circumstances of each case.
In one case, 13 We said:
Again the petitioner argues that only when the heirs do not have any dispute as
to the bulk of the hereditary estate but only in the manner of partition does
section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court apply and that in this case the parties are
at loggerheads as to the corpus of the hereditary estate because respondents
succeeded in sequestering some assets of the intestate. The argument is
unconvincing, because, as the respondent judge has indicated, questions as to
what property belonged to the deceased (and therefore to the heirs) may
properly be ventilated in the partition proceedings, especially where such
property is in the hands of one heir.
In another case, We held that if the reason for seeking an appointment as administrator is merely
to avoid a multiplicity of suits since the heir seeking such appointment wants to ask for the
annulment of certain transfers of property, that same objective could be achieved in an action for
partition and the trial court is not justified in issuing letters of administration. 14 In still another case,
We did not find so powerful a reason the argument that the appointment of the husband, a
usufructuary forced heir of his deceased wife, as judicial administrator is necessary in order for
him to have legal capacity to appear in the intestate proceedings of his wife's deceased mother,
since he may just adduce proof of his being a forced heir in the intestate proceedings of the
latter.15
We see no reason not to apply this doctrine to the case at bar. There are only two surviving heirs,
a wife of ten months and a sister, both of age. The parties admit that there are no debts of the
deceased to be paid. What is at once apparent is that these two heirs are not in good terms. The
only conceivable reason why private respondent seeks appointment as administratrix is for her to
obtain possession of the alleged properties of the deceased for her own purposes, since these
properties are presently in the hands of petitioner who supposedly disposed of them fraudulently.
We are of the opinion that this is not a compelling reason which will necessitate a judicial
administration of the estate of the deceased. To subject the estate of Andres de Guzman Pereira,
which does not appear to be substantial especially since the only real property left has been
extrajudicially settled, to an administration proceeding for no useful purpose would only
unnecessarily expose it to the risk of being wasted or squandered. In most instances of a similar
nature, 16 the claims of both parties as to the properties left by the deceased may be properly
ventilated in simple partition proceedings where the creditors, should there be any, are protected
in any event.
We, therefore, hold that the court below before which the administration proceedings are pending
was not justified in issuing letters of administration, there being no good reason for burdening the
estate of the deceased Andres de Guzman Pereira with the costs and expenses of an
administration proceeding.
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With the foregoing ruling, it is unnecessary for us to delve into the issue of who, as between the
surviving spouse Victoria Bringas Pereira and the sister Rita Pereira Nagac, should be preferred to
be appointed as administratrix.

WHEREFORE, the letters of administration issued by the Regional Trial Court of Bacoor to Rita
Pereira Nagac are hereby revoked and the administration proceeding dismissed without prejudice
to the right of private respondent to commence a new action for partition of the property left by
Andres de Guzman Pereira. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
SpecPro Rule 74
FIRST DIVISION
February 28, 2018
G.R. No. 211153
AMPARO S. CRUZ; ERNESTO HALILI; ALICIA H. FLORENCIO; DONALD HALILI; EDITHA H.
RIVERA; ERNESTO HALILI, JR.; and JULITO HALILI, Petitioners
vs.
ANGELITO S. CRUZ, CONCEPCION S. CRUZ, SERAFIN S. CRUZ, and VICENTE S. CRUZ,
Respondents
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
1 2
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to set aside the June 25, 2013 Decision and January
29, 2014 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV. No. 96345 which, respectively,
granted herein respondents' appeal and reversed the June 1, 2010 Decision4 of the Regional Trial
Court of San Mateo, Rizal, Branch 75 (RTC) in Civil Case No. 1380-98 SM, and denied petitioners'
motion for reconsideration thereto.
Factual Antecedents
In an Amended Complaint5 filed on April 6, 1999 and docketed with the
RTC as Civil Case No. 1380-98 SM, respondents Angelito S. Cruz, Concepcion
S. Cruz (.Concepcion), and Serafin S. Cruz. alleged that they - together with their
siblings, petitioner Amparo S. Cruz (Amparo) and Antonia Cruz (Anton
inherited a 940-square-meter parcel of land (the subject property) from their late parents, spouses
Felix and Felisa Cruz, which land was covered by Original Certificate of Title No. ON-658; that on
July 31, 1986, the parties executed a deed of extrajudicial settlement of estate covering the
subject property, on the agreement that each heir was to receive an equal portion of the subject
property as mandated by law; that in 1998, when the subject property was being subdivided and
the subdivision survey plan was shown to respondents, they discovered that Antonia was
allocated two lots, as against one (1) each for the respondents; that Antonia’s allocation of two lots
contravened the agreement among the heirs that they would receive equal shares in the subject
property; that Amparo and Antonia were able to perpetrate the fraud by inducing Concepcion –
who was illiterate – to sign the deed of extrajudicial settlement of estate, which was written in the
English language, without previously reading and explaining the contents thereof to the latter; that
Amparo and Antonia fraudulently took advantage of Conception’s ignorance and mental
weakness, deceiving and cajoling her into signing the deed of extrajudicial settlement, to her
damage and injury; and that Antonia passed away, but left as her heirs herein petitioners Ernesto
Halili, Alicia H. Florencio, Donald Halili, Editha H. Rivera, Ernesto Halili, Jr. and Julito Halili, who
are in possession of the two lots allocated to Antonia. Respondents thus prayed, as follows:
In view of the foregoing, it is respectfully prayed that after due hearing, judgment be rendered as
follows:
1. Declaring null and void the extra-judicial settlement executed by the parties on July 31, 1986:
2. Declaring one of the lots adjudicated to defendant Antonia Cruz-Halili to the common fund;
3. For such other relief just and equitable under the circumstances;
4. To pay the cost of this suit.6
In their Answer,7 petitioners prayed for dismissal, claiming that the July 31, 1986 deed of
extrajudicia1 settlement of estate had been voluntarily and freely executed by the parties, free
from vitiated consent; that respondents' cause of action has prescribed; that the complaint failed to
state a cause of action; and that no earnest efforts toward compromise have been made. By way
of counterclaim, petitioners prayed for an award of moral and exemplary damages, attorney's foes,
and costs of suit.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
After trial, the RTC rendered its Decision dated June 1, 2010, pronouncing as follows:
From the foregoing, the main issue is whether or not the extrajudicial settlement is null and void on
grounds of fraud, deceit, misrepresentation or mistake.
xx xx
Besides, while the Extra-Judicial Settlement was executed and signed on
July 13, 19868 x x x, and alleged fraud was discovered on May 12, 1986 when
subdivision survey was conducted x x x and defendants started to build their houses x x x this
petition was filed only on August 14, 1998 or more than 10 years from date of execution or date of
SpecPro Rule 74
discovery of alleged fraud. Under Art. 1144 Civil Code, actionable documents prescribes [sic] in 10
years. However, if a property is allegedly acquired thru fraud or mistake, the person obtaining it is,
by force of law, considered an implied trustee for the benefit of the person deprived of it, in which
case the action based thereon is 10 years from date of registration of the extra-judicial settlement
or issuance of new certificate of title (Art. 1456 Civil Codex xx). Hence, this petition is not barred
by prescription. As the period is not too long nor short, laches has not yet set in.
Moreover, fraud, as basis of the Complaint, is not delineated therein with particularity. Under Sec.
5 Rule 8, fraud must be alleged specifically, not generally. Nonetheless, apart from such
allegations, no clear and convincing evidence was presented by plaintiffs. For one, while plaintiff
Concepcion Cruz- Enriquez is admittedly only grade 3 and could hardly understand English as
what is written in the extra-judicial settlement which was not even allegedly fully explained to her, it
appears that she can absolutely read and write, and understand English albeit not fully. And as
she is deeply interested in her inheritance share, she is aware of the import and consequences of
what she executed and signed. For the past 10 years, there is no way she could feign ignorance
of the alleged fraud and make passive reactions or complaint thereof. Being adversely interested
in the property, her apprehensions were purely in the state of her mind, if not unilateral and
afterthought.
Secondly, just like any other contracts, parties in an extra-judicial settlement arc given wide
latitude to stipulate terms and conditions they feel fair and convenient beneficial to one and
prejudicial to the other. By tradition and good customs, equality is relaxed if only to buy peace, or
out of compassion or courtesy. So long as not contrary to strict provisions of the law, the
supremacy of contracts shall be respected.
Being consensual, extra-judicial settlement is deemed perfected once mutual consent is
manifested. Notarization being a mere formality, whatever its infirmity cannot invalidate a contract
but at most, merely ensue to administrative sanction on the part of their notary. Even so, unless a
strong clear and convincing evidence is shown, a document, one appeared notarized [sic],
becomes a public document. As between a public document and mere allegations of plaintiffs, the
former prevails xx x.
Thirdly, for the past 10 years from 1996 [sic] when they forged an extra- judicial settlement and
defendants admittedly started constructing their house and even made a subdivision survey,
plaintiffs also occupied their allotted lots but never complain [sic] and even attended their reunions
x x x. Other heirs also waived or sold shares to Amparo and Antonia Cruz x x x. Parties were even
unified and unanimous in surrendering dominion of their parents' ancestral house in favor of
Antonia Cruz alone x x x. As such, two lots would necessarily accrue to Antonia Cruz, and only
one lot each should belong to other heirs. If the heirs are contented and unanimously
confom1able, it is quite absurd that only plaintiff Concepcion Cruz-Enriquez was disagreeable and
yet, after the lapse of 10 years. Her conduct then belies her present claim of being defrauded and
prejudiced xx x. And in the interpretation of stipulations. clarification may be had from such
subsequent acts of the parties x x x. Even so, in case of conflict or dual interpretations, its validity
shall be preferred x x x.
Fourthly, other than simply alleging that her sisters Amparo Cruz and Antonia Cruz prepared the
extra-judicial settlement, and made a house-to-home visit to have it signed by their brothers and
sisters including plaintiff Concepcion Cruz-Enriquez, no other independent facts aliunde has [sic]
been adduced to substantiate or the least corroborate actual fraud. Fraud cannot be presumed. It
must be proven. Mere allegation is not evidence. Rather, if ever both defendants were eager to
have it signed, their motive appears to be solely to reduce in writing their imperfect title over a
thing already pre-owned.
Peremptorily, following the tenet ''allegata et non probata," he who alleges has the burden of proof
Thus, the burden of proof lies on the pleader. He cannot be allowed to draw preponderance of
evidence on the weakness of the respondent. Otherwise, the relief being sought must necessarily
fail xx x Hence, this case must be dismissed.
And as plaintiffs filed this petition relying on their unilateral perception that plaintiff Concepcion
Cruz-Enriquez was prejudiced by the 2 lots for defendant Antonia Cruz, they and defendants shall
each bear their own costs of litigation and defense.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Complaint is hereby ordered DISMISSED. Costs de-
officio.
SO ORDERED.9 (Citations omitted)
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Respondents appealed before the CA, which completely reversed and set aside the RTC's
judgment and the parties' deed of extrajudicial settlement. The appellate court held:
The sole issue in this case is whether the consent given by appellant Concepcion to the subject
extrajudicial settlement of estate was given voluntarily.
We hold that it was not.
Although the action commenced by appellants before the trial court was a declaration of nullity of
the deed of extrajudicial settlement of estate, the case was clearly an action to annul the same. A
distinction between an action for annulment and one for declaration of nullity of an agreement is
called for.
SpecPro Rule 74
An action for annulment of contract is one filed where consent is vitiated by lack of legal capacity Q: That is why you signed the document even though you did not understand the same?
of one of the contracting parties, or by mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud. By
its very nature, annulment contemplates a contract which is voidable, that is, valid until annulled. A: Yes, sir.
Such contract is binding on all the contracting parties until annulled and set aside by a court of
law. It may be ratified. An action for annulment of contract has a four-year prescriptive period. Court:

On the other hand, an action for declaration of nullity of contract presupposes a void contract or Did you not ask your younger sister Amparo to read this document considering it was in English? I
one where all of the requisites prescribed by law for contracts are present but the cause, object or will reform the question.
purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy, prohibited by law
or declared by law to be void. Such contract as a rule produces no legal and binding effect even if Q: But you don't know how to read English?
it is not set aside by direct legal action. Neither may it be ratified. An action for the declaration of
nullity of contract is imprescriptible.
A: No, your Honor.

The appellants' pleading was for declaration of nullity of the deed of extrajudicial settlement of
Q: When you saw that the document was in English, did you not ask your younger sister to read
estate. However, this did not necessarily mean that appellants' action was dismissible.
the document before you affixed your signature?

Granting that the action filed by appellants was incompatible with their allegations, it is not the
A: No, your Honor.
caption of the pleading but the allegations that determine the nature of the action. The court
should grant the relief warranted by the allegations and the proof even if no such relief is prayed
Q: Why did you not ask Amparo to read the document to you considering that it was in English
for. In this case, the allegations in the pleading and the evidence adduced point to no other
and you don't understand English?
remedy but to annul the extrajudicial settlement of estate because of vitiated consent.

A: Parti-partihan daw po at nagtiwala ako, your Honor.

The essence of consent is the agreement of the parties on the terms of the contract, the
acceptance by one of the offer made by the other. It is the concurrence of the minds of the parties
on the object and the cause which constitutes the contract. The area of agreement must extend to Appellant Concepcion invoked Articles 24 and 1332 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which
all points that the parties deem material or there is no consent at all. provide:

To be valid, consent must meet the following requisites: (a) it should be intelligent, or with an exact
notion of the matter to which it refers; (b) it should be free; and (c) it should be spontaneous.
Intelligence in consent is vitiated by error; freedom by violence, intimidation or undue influence;
and spontaneity by fraud.
Here, appellant Concepcion clearly denied any knowledge of the import and implication of the
subject document she signed, the subject extra-judicial settlement. She asserted that she does not
understand English, the language in which the te1ms of the subject document she signed was
written. To quote a part of her testimony, translated in English, as follows:
Q: Did you have occasion to read that document before you affixed your signature on it?
A: The document was written in English and me as well as my brothers and sisters, we trusted our
younger sister, sir.
ART. 24. In all contractual, property or other relations, when one of the parties is at a
disadvantage on account of his moral dependence, ignorance, indigence, mental weakness,
tender age or other handicap, the courts must be vigilant for his protection.
ART. 1332. When one of the parties is unable to read, or if the contract is in a language not
understood by him, and mistake or fraud is alleged, the person enforcing the contract must show
that the terms thereof have been fully explained to the former. xxx
Article 1332 was a provision taken from [A]merican law, necessitated by the fact that there
continues to be a fair number of people in this country without the benefit of a good education or
documents have been written in English or Spanish. The provision was intended to protect a patty
to a contract disadvantaged by illiteracy, ignorance, mental weakness or some other handicap. It
contemplates a situation wherein a contract is entered into but the consent of one of the
contracting parties is vitiated by mistake or fraud committed by the other.
SpecPro Rule 74
Thus, in case one of the parties to a contract is unable to read and fraud is alleged, the person
enforcing the contract must show that the terms thereof have been fully explained to the former.
Where a party is unable to read, and he expressly pleads in his reply that he signed the voucher in
question 'without knowing its contents which have not been explained to him,' this plea is
tantamount to one of mistake or fraud in the execution of the voucher or receipt in question and
the burden is shifted to the other party to show that the former fully understood the contents of the
document; and if he fails to prove this, the presumption of mistake (if not fraud) stands unrebutted
and controlling.
Here, at the time appellant Concepcion signed the document in question, she was with appellee
Amparo. Appellant could not possibly have read the contents of the extra-judicial settlement and
could not have consented to a contract whose terms she never knew nor understood. It cannot be
presumed that appellant Concepcion knew the contents of the extra-judicial settlement. Article
1332 of the Civil Code is applicable in these circumstances.
Although under Art. 1332 there exists a presumption of mistake or error accorded by law to those
who have not had the benefit of a good education, one who alleges any defect or the lack of a
valid consent to a contract must establish the same by full, clear and convincing evidence, not
merely by preponderance of evidence. Hence, even as the burden of proof shifts to the
defendants x x x to rebut the presumption of mistake, the plaintiff xx x who allege(s) such mistake
(or fraud) must show that his personal circumstances warrant the application of Art. 1332.
In this case, the presumption of mistake or error on the part of appellant Concepcion was not
sufficiently rebutted by appellees. Appellees failed to offer any evidence to prove that the
extrajudicial settlement of estate was explained in a language known to the appellant
Concepcion, i.e. in Pilipino. Clearly, appellant Concepcion, who only finished Grade 3, was not in
a position to give her free, voluntary and spontaneous consent without having the document,
which was in English, explained to her in the Pilipino. She stated in open court that she did not
understand English. Her testimony as quoted above is instructive.
Due to her limited educational attainment, appellant Concepcion could not understand the
document in English. She wanted to seek assistance. However, due to the misrepresentation,
deception and undue pressure of her sister appellee Amparo, petitioner signed the document.
Appellant Concepcion was assured that she would receive her legitimate share in the estate of
their late parents.
Later on, appellant Concepcion found out that appellee Antonia received two (2) lots compared to
her siblings, including appellant Concepcion, who respectively received one (1) lot each. This was
a substantial mistake clearly prejudicial to the substantive interests of appellant Concepcion in her
parent's estate. There is no doubt that, given her lack of education, appellant Concepcion is
protected by Art. 1332 of the Civil Code. There is reason to believe that, had the provisions of the
extrajudicial agreement been explained to her in the Pilipino language, she would not have
consented to the significant and unreasonable diminution of her rights.
Atty. Edgardo C. Tagle, the officer who notarized the extn1judicial settlement did not state that he
explained the contents to all the parties concerned, The records or the subject document for that
matter, do not reflect that he explained the contents of the document to appellant Concepcion nor
to the other parties in a language or dialect known to all of them. Significantly, the appellants even
denied their presence during the notarization of the document.
Therefore, the presumption of mistake under Article 1332 is controlling, having remained
unrebutted by appellees. The evidence proving that the document was not fully explained to
appellant Concepcion in a language known to her, given her low educational attainment, remained
uncontradicted by appellees x x x the consent of petitioner was invalidated by a substantial
mistake or error, rendering the agreement voidable. The deed of extrajudicial settlement between
appellants and appellees should therefore be annulled and set aside on the ground of mistake.
In Rural Bank of Caloocan, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court ruled that a contract may
be annulled on the ground of vitiated consent, even if the act complained of is committed by a third
party without the connivance or complicity of one of the contracting parties. It found that a
substantial mistake arose from the employment of fraud or misrepresentation. The plaintiff in that
case was a 70-year old unschooled and unlettered woman who signed an unauthorized loan
obtained by a third party on her behalf The Court annulled the contract due to a substantial
mistake which invalidated her consent.
By the same reasoning, if it is one of the contracting parties who commits the fraud or
misrepresentation, such contract may all the more be annulled due to substantial mistake.
In Remalante v. Tibe, the Supreme Court ruled that misrepresentation to an illiterate woman who
did not know how to read and write, nor understand English, is fraudulent. Thus, the deed of sale
was considered vitiated with substantial error and fraud. x x x
xx xx
Evidently, the applicable prescriptive period to institute the action to annul the deed of extrajudicial
settlement was four (4) years counted from the discovery of fraud as held in the case of Gerona v.
De Guzman.10 The records show that appellants' complaint was filed on 17 August 1998 or twelve
(12) years from the execution of the deed. However, as appellants arc deemed to have obtained
constructive notice of the fraud upon the publication of the same in a newspaper on June 5, 10
and 27, 1995, this Court rules that the present action has not prescribed.
Based on the foregoing, the trial court erred in ruling as it did.
SpecPro Rule 74
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision dated 1 June 2010 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 75, San Mateo, Rizal is REVERSED. 'The extrajudicial settlement of the
estate of Felix Cruz is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.11 (Other citations omitted)
Petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied via the second assailed
January 29, 2014 Resolution. Hence, the instant Petition.
In a November 9, 2015 Resolution,12 this Court resolved to give due course to the Petition.
Issues
Petitioners claim that the CA erred in ruling that the respondents' cause of action for annulment
has not prescribed, and that it ignored contemporaneous and subsequent acts of respondents
indicating the absence of fraud or vitiation of consent in the execution of the deed of extrajudicial
settlement of the estate of Felix Cruz.
Petitioners' Arguments
In their Petition and Reply13 seeking reversal of the assailed CA dispositions, petitioners
essentially insist that respondents' cause of action for annulment has prescribed, since they filed
Civil Case No. 1380-98 SM only in 1998, or 12 years after the execution of the deed of
extrajudicial settlement of estate on July 31, 1986; that pursuant to Article 1144 of the Civil
Code,14 a cause of action based upon a written contract - such as the subject deed of extrajudicial
settlement - must be brought within l 0 years from the execution thereof; that even assuming that
the four-year prescriptive period based on fraud applies as the CA ruled, respondents' cause of
action already prescribed, as the case was filed only in 1998, while the supposed fraud may be
said to have been discovered in 1986, when they learned of the survey being conducted on the
subject property; that respondents' actions belied their claim, in that they did not object when
petitioners built their home on the lots allotted to them and never registered any objection even
during family gatherings and occasions; that the subject deed of extrajudicial settlement - being a
notarized document - enjoys the presumption of regularity and integrity, and may only be set aside
by clear and convincing evidence of irregularity; that it is a matter of judicial notice that a pre-war
third-grader has the education of a high school student; and that the findings of the trial court must
be given weight and respect.
Respondents' Arguments
In their Comment15 seeking denial of the Petition, respondents reiterate the correctness of the
CA's assailed Decision; that the deed of extrajudicial settlement, being written in English, was
calculated to defraud Concepcion - who could not read nor write in said language; that owing to
the fact that she trusted petitioners, who were her sisters, she was cajoled into signing the deed
without knowing its contents; that the deed was notarized in the absence of most of the parties
thereto; that the prescriptive period to be applied is not the 10-year period under Article 1144, but
the four-year period as held by the CA, to be computed from the discovery of the fraud - since
respondents discovered the fraud only in 1998; and that the factual issues raised by petitioners
have been passed upon by the CA, and are thus not reviewable at this stage.
Our Ruling
The Court denies the Petition.
The present action involves a situation where one heir was able - through the expedient of an
extrajudicial settlement that was written in a language that is not understood by one of her co-heirs
- to secure a share in the estate of her parents that was greater than that of her siblings, in
violation of the principle in succession that heirs should inherit in equal shares.
Thus, Antonia - represented in this case by her surviving heirs ·- received two lots as against her
siblings, including respondent Concepcion, who respectively received only one lot each in the
subject 940-square-meter property. This she was able to achieve through the subject 1986 deed
of extrajudicial settlement - which was written in English, a language that was not known to and
understood by Concepcion given that she finished only Grade 3 elementary education. With the
help of Amparo, Antonia was able to secure Concepcion's consent and signature without the
benefit of explaining the contents of the subject deed of extrajudicial settlement. For this reason,
Concepcion did not have adequate knowledge of the contents and ramifications of the subject
deed of extrajudicial settlement; she was left unaware of the sharing arrangement contained
therein, and realized it only when Antonia attempted to subdivide the subject property in 1998, and
the plan of subdivision survey was shown to Concepcion - which revealed that Antonia obtained
two lots. Consequently, Concepcion filed Civil Case No. 1380-98 SM on August 17, 1998.
In short, this is a simple case of exc1usion in legal succession, where coheirs were effectively
deprived of their rightful share to the estate of their parents - who died without a will - by virtue of a
defective deed of extrajudicial settlement or partition which granted a bigger share to one of the
heirs and was prepared in such a way that the other heirs would be effectively deprived of
discovering and knowing its contents.
Under the law, "[t]he children of the deceased shall always inherit from him in their own right,
dividing the inheritance in equal shares."16 In this case, two of Concepcion's co-heirs renounced
their shares in the subject property; their shares therefore accrued to the remaining co-heirs, in
equal shares as well.17
In Bautista v. Bautista,18 it was held that -
SpecPro Rule 74
As gathered from the above-quoted portion of its decision, the Court of Appeals applied the
prescriptive periods for annulment on the ground of fraud and for reconveyance of property under
a constructive trust.
The extra-judicial partition executed by Teofilos co-heirs was invalid, however. So Segura v.
Segura19 instructs:
x x x The partition in the present case was invalid because it excluded six of the nine heirs who
were entitled to equal shares in the partitioned property. Under the rule, 'no extra-judicial
settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice
thereof.' As the partition was a total nullity and did not affect the excluded heirs, it was not correct
for the trial court to hold that their right to challenge the partition had prescribed after two years x x
x xx xx
The deed of extra-judicial partition in the case at bar being invalid, the action to have it annulled
does not prescribe.
The above pronouncement was reiterated in Neri v. Heirs of Hadji Yusop Uy,20 where the Court
ruled:
Hence, in the execution of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale
in favor of spouses Uy, all the heirs of Anunciacion should have participated. Considering that
Eutropia and Victoria were admittedly excluded and that then minors Rosa and Douglas were not
properly represented therein, the settlement was not valid and binding upon them and
consequently, a total nullity.
Section l, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. - x x x
The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published in a newspaper of
general circulation in the manner provided in the next succeeding section; but no extrajudicial
settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice
thereof. x x x
The effect of excluding the heirs in the settlement of estate was further elucidated in Segura v.
Segura, thus:
It is clear that Section 1 of Rule 74 does not apply to the partition in question which was null and
void as far as the plaintiffs were concerned.1aшphi1 The rule covers only valid partitions. The
partition in the present case was invalid because it excluded six of the rune heirs who were
entitled to equal shares in the partitioned prope1ty. Under the rule 'no extrajudicial settlement shall
be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof.' As the
partition was a total nullity and did not affect the excluded heirs, it was not correct for the trial court
to hold that their right to challenge the partition had prescribed after two years from its execution...
However, while the settlement of the estate is null ru1d void, the subsequent sale of the subject
properties made by Enrique and his children, Napoleon, Alicia and Visminda, in favor of the
respondents is valid but only with respect to their proportionate shares therein. It cannot be denied
that these heirs have acquired their respective shares in the properties of Anunciacion from the
moment of her death and that, as owners thereof: they can very well sell their undivided share in
the estate.
On the issue of prescription, the Court agrees with petitioners that the present action has not
prescribed in so far as it seeks to annul the extrajudicial settlement of the estate. Contrary to the
ruling of the CA the prescriptive period of 2 years provided in Section 1 Rule 74 of the Rules of
Court reckoned from the execution of the extrajudicial settlement finds no application to petitioners
Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas, who were deprived of their lawful participation in the subject
estate. Besides an action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not
prescribe' in accordance with Article 1410 of the Civil Code. (Citations omitted)
Then again, in The Roman Catholic Bishop of Tuguegarao v. Prudencio,21 the above
pronouncements were echoed, thus:
Considering that respondents-appellees have neither knowledge nor participation in the Extra-
Judicial, the same is a total nullity. It is not binding upon them. Thus, in Neri v. Heirs of Hadji
Yusop Uy, which involves facts analogous to the present case, we ruled that:
[I]n the execution of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale in favor
of spouses Uy, all the heirs of Anunciacion should have participated. Considering that Eutropia
and Victoda were admittedly excluded and that then minors Rosa and Douglas were not properly
represented therein, the settlement was not valid and binding upon them and consequently, a total
nullity.
xxx
The effect of excluding the heirs in the settlement of estate was further elucidated in Segura v.
Segura, thus:
It is clear that Section 1 of Rule 74 docs not apply to the partition in question which was null and
void as far as the plaintiffs were concerned. The rule covers only valid partitions. The partition in
SpecPro Rule 74
the present case was invalid because it excluded six of the nine heirs who were entitled to equal
shares in the partitioned property. Under the rule 'no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon
any person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof.' As the partition was a total
nullity and did not affect the excluded heirs, it was not correct for the trial court to hold that their
right to challenge the partition had prescribed after two years from its execution x x x (Emphasis
supplied; citations omitted)

Thus, while the CA was correct in ruling in favor of Concepcion and setting aside the subject deed
of extrajudicial settlement, it erred in appreciating and ruling that the case involved fraud - thus
applying the four-year prescriptive period - when it should have simply held that the action for the
declaration of nullity of the defective deed of extrajudicial settlement does not prescribe, under the
circumstances, given that the same was a total nullity. Clearly, the issue of literacy is relevant to
the extent that Concepcion was effectively deprived of her true inheritance, and not so much that
she was defrauded.

With the foregoing disposition, the other issues raised by the petitioners are deemed resolved.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The subject July 31, 1986 Extrajudicial Settlement of
Estate is hereby DECLARED NULL AND VOID, and thus ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Costs
against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
SpecPro Rule 74
Republic of the Philippines 3. A parcel of land (Lot 2960), situated at Andagao, Kalibo, Aklan, with the area of 4,012
SUPREME COURT square meters, bounded on the NE by Lot 2957-J; on the SE by Lot 2961-H; on the SW
Manila by Lot 2660; and on the NW by Lot 2656, covered by OCT No. (23813) RO-1563, under
ARP/TD No. 01782 in the name of Diega Regalado with assessed value of ₱4,820.00.4
SECOND DIVISION
Sometime in September of 1972, petitioner Francisco Tayco and his sister Consolacion Tayco
G.R. No. 168692 December 13, 2010 executed a document called Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of the Deceased Diega
Regalado with Confirmation of Sale of Shares,5 transferring their shares on the abovementioned
FRANCISCO TAYCO, substituted by LUCRESIA TAYCO and NOEL TAYCO, Petitioners, properties to their sister Concepcion Tayco-Flores. The said document was notarized and, on
vs. March 16, 1991, Concepcion Tayco-Flores and Consolacion Tayco executed the Confirmation of
Heirs Of Concepcion Tayco-Flores, namely: LUCELI F. DIAZ, RONELE F. BESA, MONELE Quitclaim of Shares in Three (3) Parcels of Land.6
FLORES, PERLA FLORES, RUPERTO FLORES, WENCESLAO FLORES, PURISIMA FLORES,
and FELIPE FLORES, Respondents. Consolacion Tayco died on December 25, 1996 and Concepcion Tayco-Flores died on January
14, 1997. Thereafter, petitioner Francisco Tayco filed a case for nullity of documents and partition
DECISION with damages with the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan claiming that the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of
the Estate of the Deceased Diega Regalado with Confirmation of Sale of Shares and the
PERALTA, J.: Confirmation of Quitclaim of Shares in three (3) Parcels of Land are null and void; thus, he is still
entitled to his original shares in the parcels of land. According to him, the Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement was executed at that time, because Concepcion Tayco-Flores was in need of money
For this Court's consideration is a petition for review on certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of
and wanted the properties to be mortgaged in a bank. He claimed that the mortgage did not push
Court seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals' Decision 2 dated November 17, 2004 and the
through and that he requested his sister to cancel the said Deed, to which the latter ensured that
reinstatement of the Regional Trial Court's Decision3 dated October 2, 2001.
the same document had no effect. However, he further claimed that without his knowledge and
consent, her sisters Concepcion and Consolacion executed another document entitled
The records contain the following facts:
Confirmation of Quitclaim of Shares in three (3) Parcels of Land in order to have the tax
declarations and certificates of title covering those three parcels of land transferred in the name of
Upon the death of the spouses Fortunato Tayco and Diega Regalado, their children, petitioner Concepcion. He also alleged that he came to know of the said facts only when he had the property
Francisco Tayco, Concepcion Tayco-Flores and Consolacion Tayco inherited the following parcels surveyed for the purpose of partition and some of the heirs of Concepcion objected to the said
of land: survey.

1. A parcel of land (Lot 1902pt.), situated at Buswang New, Kalibo, Aklan with the area of The RTC ruled in favor of petitioner Francisco Tayco, the dispositive portion of the decision reads:
9,938 square meters, bounded on the NE by Lots 1848 & 1905; on the SE by Lots 1903 &
1904; on the NW by Lots 1895, 1887, 1890 and 1808, covered by OCT No. (24360) RO-
WHEREFORE, the Court finds that the preponderance of evidence tilts in favor of the plaintiff and
1569 under ARP/TD No. 01025 in the name of Diega Regalado with assessed value of
judgment is hereby rendered:
₱15,210.00;

a) Declaring the document entitled, Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of the Deceased
2. A parcel of land (Lot 1896), situated at Buswang New, Kalibo, Aklan, with the area of
Diega Regalado with Confirmation of Sale of Shares (Annex A, Complaint), and the
2,123 square meters, bounded on the NE by Lot 1898-C; on the SE by Lot 1897; on the
document entitled Confirmation of Quitclaim of Shares in Three (3) Parcels of Land
SW by New Provincial Road; and on the NW by Lot 1893, covered by OCT No. (24101)
(Annex B, Complaint), as null and void;
RO-1570, under ARP/TD No. 01087 & 01088 in the name of Diega Regalado with
assessed value of ₱6,910.00; and
b) Declaring the three (3) parcels of land subject of the above documents to be co-owned
by the plaintiff (½ share) and defendants (½ share);
SpecPro Rule 74
c) Ordering the parties to submit to the court a Project of Partition indicating the specific
portion allotted to them within 30 days from receipt of this decision; in case of
disagreement, the Court shall order the sale of all the three (3) parcels with the proceeds
to be divided equally between plaintiff on the one hand and the defendants on the other;
d) Ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiff the sum of ₱10,000.00 representing
litigation expenses, and ₱5,000.00 as attorney's fees, plus cost.
e) The claim for moral and exemplary damages are hereby denied.
SO ORDERED.7
In ruling that the assailed documents were null and void, the RTC ratiocinated that the extrajudicial
settlement is a simulated document to make it appear that Concepcion Tayco-Flores was the
owner of the properties, so that it would be easy for her to use the same as a collateral for a
prospective loan and as evidence disclosed that the intended loan with any financial institution did
not materialize, hence, the document had no more effect. Consequently, according to the trial
court, since the first document was simulated and had no force and effect, the second document
had no more purpose and basis.
The respondent-heirs appealed the decision of the RTC to the Court of Appeals, and on
November 17, 2004, the latter reversed the former's ruling, disposing it in the following manner:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us
REVERSING the assailed decision of the lower court and a new one entered declaring
defendants-appellants absolute owners of Lot Nos. 1902, 1896 and 2620. The complaint of
plaintiff-appellee is dismissed.
SO ORDERED.8
In reversing the trial court's findings, the CA reasoned out that the genuineness and due execution
of the Extrajudicial Settlement was not disputed and was duly signed by the parties and notarized.
It added that the recital of the provisions of the said document is clear that it is an extrajudicial
settlement of the estate of deceased Diega Regalado and that petitioner and his sister
Consolacion confirmed the sale of their shares to Concepcion.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,9 but was denied10 by the same court. Thus, the
present petition.
The petitioner raised this lone issue:
CAN THE DEED OF EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED
DIEGA REGALADO WITH CONFIRMATION OF SALE OF SHARES DIVEST CO-HEIR AND CO-
OWNER FRANCISCO TAYCO OF HIS SHARES IN THE THREE (3) PARCELS OF LAND IN
QUESTION?11
Under question is the validity of the document that contains the extrajudicial settlement of the
estate of the deceased, Diega Regalado. The trial court ruled that it is null and void based on its
assessment of the facts, while the CA adjudged it valid based on its examination of the said
document. Under Section 1, Rule 45, providing for appeals by certiorari before the Supreme
Court, it is clearly enunciated that only questions of law may be set forth. 12 Questions of fact may
not be raised unless the case falls under any of the following exceptions:13
(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of
discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of
fact are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of
the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee;
(7) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set
forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondent; and (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of
evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.
This case clearly falls under one of the exceptions and after a careful review of the facts of the
case, this Court finds the petition meritorious.
Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court provides:
If the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented
by their judicial or legal representatives duly authorized for the purpose, the parties may, without
securing letters of administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of
a public instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may
do so in an ordinary action for partition. x x x.
The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published in a newspaper of
general circulation in the manner provided in the next succeeding section; but no extrajudicial
settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice
thereof.
xxxx
SpecPro Rule 74
Notarization of the deed of extrajudicial settlement has the effect of making it a public
document14 that can bind third parties. However, this formal requirement appears to be
superseded by the substantive provision of the Civil Code that states:
ART. 1082. Every act which is intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or
devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a
compromise, or any other transaction.
By this provision, it appears that when a co-owner sells his inchoate right in the co-ownership, he
expresses his intention to "put an end to indivision among (his) co-heirs." Partition among co-
owners may thus be evidenced by the overt act of a co-owner of renouncing his right over the
property regardless of the form it takes. x x x15
The trial court, after a keen determination of the facts involved in the case, clearly articulated its
findings as to the inconclusiveness of the required publication and the notarization of the
document purportedly containing the extrajudicial settlement in question, thus:
At the outset, the document, Exhibit A, was executed at Lezo, Aklan which is about ten kilometers
from Kalibo where all the parties are residents. Defendant had to hire a tricycle from Kalibo to
bring the parties to Lezo. Assuming that a certain Engr. Reynaldo Lopez was helping the
defendants at that time in this transaction, he is also a resident of Kalibo, Aklan which is the center
of Aklan where almost all the lawyers have their offices. Engr. Lopez has also his office here. Why
would he still recommend the execution of this document particularly in Lezo and before that
particular alleged Notary Public? This sounds incredible.
Defendants alleged that the document was published in a newspaper of general circulation of
Aklan but no affidavit of such publication was presented. Only an alleged receipt from Engr. Lopez
was presented (Exh. 2) but does not prove its purpose.16
The above findings of fact of the trial court must be accorded respect. It is a hornbook doctrine
that the findings of fact of the trial court are entitled to great weight on appeal and should not be
disturbed except for strong and valid reasons, because the trial court is in a better position to
examine the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying. It is not a function of this Court to analyze
and weigh evidence by the parties all over again.17
Anent the true intent of the signatories of the questioned document appearing to be an
extrajudicial settlement of an estate, the trial court found the following facts:
Plaintiff alleged that Exhibit A was executed just to accommodate his sister Concepcion Tayco to
be able to offer as collateral the property in order to raise money for the marriage of her son
Ruperto Flores. But the property was never encumbered because it was then Martial Law (TSN,
10/14/98, pp. 3-4; 5/6/99, pp. 5-6). This testimony of the plaintiff was never rebutted or denied by
the defendant, Ruperto Flores, who himself testified for the defendants. In fact, he even admitted
that he got married after the execution of Exhibit A (TSN, 2/16/01, pp. 15-16). This allegation by
the plaintiff, therefore, must stand.
Defendants argue that if their intention was to mortgage the property in raising money, there was
no need for the execution of Exhibit A but only a Special Power of Attorney would suffice. This
would be the quickest way if the bank would be amenable, but the latter would be more protected
if the title of the property are already transferred in the name of the mortgagor. For them, it has
only to rely on the certificate of tile if it decides to deal with it.18
An extrajudicial settlement is a contract and it is a well-entrenched doctrine that the law does not
relieve a party from the effects of a contract, entered into with all the required formalities and with
full awareness of what he was doing, simply because the contract turned out to be a foolish or
unwise investment.19 However, in the construction or interpretation of an instrument, the intention
of the parties is primordial and is to be pursued.20 If the terms of a contract are clear and leave no
doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall
control.21 If the contract appears to be contrary to the evident intentions of the parties, the latter
shall prevail over the former.22 The denomination given by the parties in their contract is not
conclusive of the nature of the contents.23 In this particular case, the trial court, based on its
appreciation of the pieces of evidence presented, rightfully concluded that the intent of the
signatories was contrary to the questioned document's content and denomination.1avvphi1
Furthermore, the trial court, before stating its final conclusion as to the nullity of the document in
question, correctly discussed the lack of consideration in so far as that part of the document which
embodies the confirmation of the sale of shares of siblings Francisco and Consolacion to
Concepcion. Thus:
The consideration of ₱50.00 for a 1/3 share of about 16,000 sq. meters real property in Kalibo,
Aklan even way back in 1972 is definitely way below the market value. Even if we take into
consideration the filial love between siblings (Jocson v. CA, 170 SCRA 233), still, the difference
between the market value then and the purchase price is very great. Even for a market value of
₱1,000.00, a consideration of ₱50.00 only plus filial love would still be greatly disproportionate.
Certainly, the 1/3 share of plaintiff exceeds ₱1,000.00. The filial love between siblings may
affect the discrepancy only if the difference between the market value over the selling price
is slight. (ibid.). It would appear, therefore, that Exhibit A is merely a simulated document to make
it appear that Concepcion Tayco-Flores is the owner of the properties so that it will be easy for her
to use the same as collateral for a prospective loan. Should the encumbrance not materialize or if
it did after the obligation thereunder has been paid, the document shall become null and void and
without effect. As the evidence disclosed that the intended loan with any financial institution did
not materialize, hence, immediately thereafter, the document had no more effect.24
SpecPro Rule 74
As to the other questioned document or the Confirmation of Quitclaim of Shares in Three Parcels
of Land, the nullity of the first document renders it void because its effectivity is anchored on the
validity of the first document. The Confirmation of Quitclaim of Shares in Three Parcels of Land
came into fruition merely to confirm the existence of the first document. It was executed on March
16, 1991, when petitioner Francisco Tayco was still alive. Nevertheless, the said document was
signed only by Consolacion and Concepcion, which prompted the trial court to make the following
observations:

As to Exhibit B, it is surprising why only the two sisters participated in its execution while the
plaintiff who is still very much alive and also a resident of New Buswang, Kalibo, Aklan was
excluded. This document is a confirmation of the execution of Exhibit A where the plaintiff is a
party. The plaintiff would have also been made a party to this document so that he could have
confirmed the sale of his share had it been so. Could it be, therefore, that defendants did not want
the plaintiff to know this document so that they can obtain the transfer of the titles and the tax
declarations in their names without his knowledge? Unfortunately, however, plaintiff accidentally
discovered the transfer when he tried to survey the property for ultimate partition.25

To reiterate, in the exercise of the Supreme Court’s power of review, this Court is not a trier of
facts, and unless there are excepting circumstances, it does not routinely undertake the re-
examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial of the case. 26 The
CA, therefore, erred in disregarding the factual findings of the trial court without providing any
substantial evidence to support its own findings.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is hereby GRANTED. Consequently, the Court
of Appeals' Decision dated November 17, 2004 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 9, dated October 2, 2001,
is UPHELD and REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.
SpecPro Rule 74
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 161220 July 30, 2008
SPOUSES GORGONIO BENATIRO and COLUMBA CUYOS-BENATIRO substituted by their
heirs, namely: Isabelita, Renato, Rosadelia and Gorgonio, Jr., surnamed Benatiro, and
SPOUSES RENATO C. BENATIRO and ROSIE M. BENATIRO, Respondents,
vs.
HEIRS OF EVARISTO CUYOS, namely: Gloria Cuyos-Talian, Patrocenia Cuyos-Mijares,
Numeriano Cuyos, and Enrique Cuyos, represented by their attorney-in-fact, Salud
Cuyos, Respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by
petitioners seeking to annul the Decision1 dated July 18, 2003 of the Court of Appeals (CA) and its
Resolution2 dated November 13, 2003 denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration issued in
CA-G.R. SP No. 65630.3
Spouses Evaristo Cuyos and Agatona Arrogante Cuyos were blessed with nine children, namely:
Francisco, Victoria, Columba, Lope, Salud, Gloria, Patrocenia, Numeriano, and Enrique. On
August 28, 1966, Evaristo died leaving six parcels of land located in Tapilon, Daanbantayan, Cebu
covered by Tax Declaration (TD) Nos. 000725, 000728, 000729, 000730, 000731, 000732, all
under the name of Agatona Arrogante.
On July 13, 1971, one of the heirs, Gloria Cuyos-Talian (respondent Gloria) represented by Atty.
Victor Elliot Lepiten (Atty. Lepiten), filed before the Court of First Instance (CFI) now Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Cebu, Branch XI, a petition4 for Letters of Administration, docketed as Special
Proceeding (SP) No. 24-BN entitled "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Evaristo Cuyos, Gloria
Cuyos-Talian, petitioner." The petition was opposed by Gloria’s brother, Francisco, who was
represented by Atty. Jesus Yray (Atty. Yray).
In the hearing held on January 30, 1973, both parties together with their respective counsels
appeared. Both counsels manifested that the parties had come to an agreement to settle their
case. The trial court on even date issued an Order5 appointing Gloria as administratrix of the
estate. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, letters of administration of the estate of the late Evaristo Cuyos and including the
undivided half accruing to his spouse Agatona Arrogante who recently died is hereby issued in
favor of Mrs. Gloria Cuyos Talian who may qualify as such administratrix after posting a nominal
bond of ₱1,000.00.6
Subsequently, in the Order7 dated December 12, 1975, the CFI stated that when the Intestate
Estate hearing was called on that date, respondent Gloria and her brother, oppositor Francisco,
together with their respective counsels, appeared; that Atty. Yray, Francisco’s counsel, manifested
that the parties had come to an agreement to settle the case amicably; that both counsels
suggested that the Clerk of Court, Atty. Andres C. Taneo (Atty. Taneo), be appointed to act as
Commissioner to effect the agreement of the parties and to prepare the project of partition for the
approval of the court. In the same Order, the Court of First Instance (CFI) appointed Atty. Taneo
and ordered him to make a project of partition within 30 days from December 12, 1975 for
submission and approval of the court.
In his Commissioner's Report8 dated July 29, 1976, Atty. Taneo stated that he issued subpoenae
supplemented by telegrams to all the heirs to cause their appearance on February 28 and 29,
1976 in Tapilon, Daanbantayan, Cebu, where the properties are located, for a conference or
meeting to arrive at an agreement; that out of the nine heirs, only respondents Gloria, Salud and
Enrique Cuyos failed to attend; that per return of the service, these three heirs could not be
located in their respective given addresses; that since some of the heirs present resided outside
the province of Cebu, they decided to go ahead with the scheduled meeting.
Atty. Taneo declared in his Report that the heirs who were present:
1. Agreed to consider all income of the properties of the estate during the time that
Francisco Cuyos, one of the heirs, was administering the properties of the estate (without
appointment from the Court) as having been properly and duly accounted for.
2. Agreed to consider all income of the properties of the estate during the administration
of Gloria Cuyos Talian, (duly appointed by the Court) also one of the heirs as having been
properly and duly accounted for.
3. Agreed to consider all motions filed in this proceedings demanding an accounting from
Francisco Cuyos and Gloria Cuyos Talian, as having been withdrawn.
4. Agreed not to partition the properties of the estate but instead agreed to first sell it for
the sum of ₱40,000.00 subject to the condition that should any of the heirs would be in a
position to buy the properties of the estate, the rest of the eight (8) heirs will just receive
only Four Thousand Pesos (₱4,000.00) each.
SpecPro Rule 74
5. Agreed to equally divide the administration expenses to be deducted from their
respective share of ₱4,000.00.9
The Report further stated that Columba Cuyos-Benatiro (Columba), one of the heirs, informed all
those present in the conference of her desire to buy the properties of the estate, to which
everybody present agreed, and considered her the buyer. Atty. Taneo explained that the delay in
the submission of the Report was due to the request of respondent Gloria that she be given
enough time to make some consultations on what was already agreed upon by the majority of the
heirs; that it was only on July 11, 1976 that the letter of respondent Gloria was handed to Atty.
Taneo, with the information that respondent Gloria was amenable to what had been agreed upon,
provided she be given the sum of ₱5,570.00 as her share of the estate, since one of properties of
the estate was mortgaged to her in order to defray their father's hospitalization.
Quoting the Commissioner’s Report, the CFI issued the assailed Order10 dated December 16,
1976, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the terms and conditions agreed upon by the heirs to be in order, the same
being not contrary to law, said compromise agreement as embodied in the report of the
commissioner is hereby approved. The Court hereby orders the Administratrix to execute the deed
of sale covering all the properties of the estate in favor of Columba Cuyos Benatiro after the
payment to her of the sum of ₱36,000.00. The said sum of money shall remain in custodia legis,
but after all the claims and administration expenses and the estate taxes shall have been paid for,
the remainder shall, upon order of the Court, be divided equally among the heirs. 11
The CFI disapproved the claim of respondent Gloria for the sum of ₱5,570.00, as the same had
been allegedly disregarded by the heirs present during the conference.
In an Order12 dated January 11, 1978, the CFI appointed Lope Cuyos (Cuyos) as the new
administrator of the estate, purportedly on the basis of the motion to relieve respondent Gloria, as
it appeared that she was already residing in Central Luzon and her absence was detrimental to
the early termination of the proceedings.
On May 25, 1979, administrator Cuyos executed a Deed of Absolute Sale13 over the six parcels of
land constituting the intestate estate of the late Evaristo Cuyos in favor of Columba for a
consideration of the sum of ₱36,000.00.
Sometime in February 1998, the heirs of Evaristo Cuyos, namely: Gloria Cuyos-Talian, Patrocenia
Cuyos-Mijares, Numeriano Cuyos and Enrique Cuyos, represented by their attorney-in-fact, Salud
Cuyos (respondents), allegedly learned that Tax Declaration Nos. 000725, 000728, 000729,
000730, 000731 and 000732, which were all in the name of their late mother Agatona Arrogante,
were canceled and new Tax Declaration Nos., namely, 20-14129, 20-14130, 20-141131, 20-
14132, 2014133 and 20-14134, were issued in Columba’s name; and that later on, Original
Certificates of Titles covering the estate of Evaristo Cuyos were issued in favor of Columba; that
some of these parcels of land were subsequently transferred to the names of spouses Renato C.
Benatiro and Rosie M. Benatiro, son and daughter-in-law, respectively, of petitioners Gorgonio
and Columba, for which transfer certificates of title were subsequently issued; that they
subsequently discovered the existence of the assailed CFI Order dated December 16, 1976 and
the Deed of Absolute Sale dated May 25, 1979.
Respondents filed a complaint against petitioner Gorgonio Benatiro before the Commission on the
Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP) of the Department of Justice, which on June 13, 2000
dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.14
Salud Cuyos brought the matter for conciliation and mediation at the barangay level, but was
unsuccessful.15
On July 16, 2001, Salud Cuyos, for herself and in representation 16 of the other heirs of Evaristo
Cuyos, namely: Gloria, Patrocenia, Numeriano,17 and Enrique, filed with the CA a petition for
annulment of the Order dated December 16, 1976 of the CFI of Cebu, Branch XI, in SP No. 24-BN
under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court. They alleged that the CFI Order dated December 16, 1976
was null and void and of no effect, the same being based on a Commissioner's Report, which was
patently false and irregular; that such report practically deprived them of due process in claiming
their share of their father's estate; that Patrocenia Cuyos-Mijares executed an affidavit, as well as
the unnotarized statement of Gloria stating that no meeting ever took place for the purpose of
discussing how to dispose of the estate of their parents and that they never received any payment
from the supposed sale of their share in the inheritance; that the report was done in close
confederacy with their co-heir Columba, who stood to be benefited by the Commissioner's
recommendation, should the same be approved by the probate court; that since the report was a
falsity, any order proceeding therefrom was invalid; that the issuance of the certificates of titles in
favor of respondents were tainted with fraud and irregularity, since the CFI which issued the
assailed order did not appear to have been furnished a copy of the Deed of Absolute Sale; that the
CFI was not in custodia legis of the consideration of the sale, as directed in its Order so that it
could divide the remainder of the consideration equally among the heirs after paying all the
administration expenses and estate taxes; that the intestate case had not yet been terminated as
the last order found relative to the case was the appointment of Lope as administrator vice Gloria;
that they never received their corresponding share in the inheritance; and that the act of
petitioners in manifest connivance with administrator Lope amounted to a denial of their right to
the property without due process of law, thus, clearly showing that extrinsic fraud caused them to
be deprived of their property.
Herein petitioners contend that respondents' allegation that they discovered the assailed order
dated December 16, 1976 only in February 1998 was preposterous, as respondents were
represented by counsel in the intestate proceedings; thus, notice of Order to counsel was notice to
client; that this was only a ploy so that they could claim that they filed the petition for annulment
SpecPro Rule 74
within the statutory period of four (4) years; that they have been in possession of the six parcels of
land since May 25, 1979 when the same was sold to them pursuant to the assailed Order in the
intestate proceedings; that no extrinsic fraud attended the issuance of the assailed order; that
Numeriano executed an affidavit in which he attested to having received his share of the sale
proceeds on May 18, 1988; that respondents were estopped from assailing the Order dated
December 16, 1976, as it had already attained the status of finality.
On July 18, 2003, the CA granted the petition and annulled the CFI order, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING REASONS, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly,
the Order issued by the Court of First Instance of Cebu Branch XI dated December 16, 1976 as
well as the Certificates of Title issued in the name of Columba Cuyos-Benatiro and the
subsequent transfer of these Titles in the name of spouses Renato and Rosie Benatiro are hereby
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Further, SP Proc. Case No. 24-BN is hereby ordered reopened and
proceedings thereon be continued.18
The CA declared that the ultimate fact that was needed to be established was the veracity and
truthfulness of the Commissioner’s Report, which was used by the trial court as its basis for
issuing the assailed Order. The CA held that to arrive at an agreement, there was a need for all
the concerned parties to be present in the conference; however, such was not the scenario since
in their separate sworn statements, the compulsory heirs of the decedent attested to the fact that
no meeting or conference ever happened among them; that although under Section 3(m), Rule
133 on the Rules of Evidence, there is a presumption of regularity in the performance of an official
duty, the same may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence to prove the contrary.
The CA noted some particulars that led it to conclude that the conference was not held
accordingly, to wit: (1) the Commissioner’s Report never mentioned the names of the heirs who
were present in the alleged conference but only the names of those who were absent, when the
names of those who were present were equally essential, if not even more important, than the
names of those who were absent; (2) the Report also failed to include any proof of conformity to
the agreement from the attendees, such as letting them sign the report to signify their consent as
regards the agreed mechanisms for the estate’s settlement; (3) there was lack or absence of
physical evidence attached to the report indicating that the respondents were indeed properly
notified about the scheduled conference. The CA then concluded that due to the absence of the
respondents' consent, the legal existence of the compromise agreement did not stand on a firm
ground.
The CA further observed that although it appeared that notice of the report was given to Atty.
Lepiten and Atty. Yray, lawyers of Gloria and Francisco Cuyos, respectively, the same cannot be
taken as notice to the other heirs of Evaristo Cuyos; that a lawyer’s authority to compromise
cannot be simply presumed, since what was required was the special authority to compromise on
behalf of his client; that a compromise agreement entered into by a person not duly authorized to
do so by the principal is void and has no legal effect, citing Quiban v. Butalid;19 that being a void
compromise agreement, the assailed Order had no legal effect.
Thus, the CA ruled that the Certificates of Titles obtained by herein petitioners were procured
fraudulently; that the initial transfer of the properties to Columba Cuyos-Benatiro by virtue of a
Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Lope Cuyos was clearly defective, since the compromise
agreement which served as the basis of the Deed of Absolute Sale was void and had no legal
effect.
The CA elaborated that there was no showing that Columba paid the sum of ₱36,000.00 to the
administrator as consideration for the sale, except for the testimony of Numeriano Cuyos admitting
that he received his share of the proceeds but without indicating the exact amount that he
received; that even so, such alleged payment was incomplete and was not in compliance with the
trial court’s order for the administratix to execute the deed of sale covering all properties of the
estate in favor of Columba Cuyos-Benatiro after the payment to the administratrix of the sum of
₱36,000.00; that said sum of money shall remain in custodia legis, but after all the claims and
administration expenses and the estate taxes shall have been paid for, the remainder shall, upon
order of the Court, be divided equally among the heirs.
Moreover, the CA found that the copy of the Deed of Sale was not even furnished the trial court
nor was said money placed under custodia legis as agreed upon; that the Certification dated
December 9, 1998 issued by the Clerk of Court of Cebu indicated that the case had not yet been
terminated and that the last Order in the special proceeding was the appointment of Lope Cuyos
as the new administrator of the estate; thus, the transfer of the parcels of land, which included the
execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale, cancellation of Tax Declarations and the issuance of new
Tax Declarations and Transfer Certificates of Title, all in favor of petitioners, were tainted with
fraud. Consequently, the CA concluded that the compromise agreement, the certificates of title
and the transfers made by petitioners through fraud cannot be made a legal basis of their
ownership over the properties, since to do so would result in enriching them at the expense of the
respondents; and that it was also evident that the fraud attendant in this case was one of extrinsic
fraud, since respondents were denied the opportunity to fully litigate their case because of the
scheme utilized by petitioners to assert their claim.
Hence, herein petition raising the following issues:
Whether or not annulment of order under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court was a proper remedy
where the aggrieved party had other appropriate remedies, such as new trial, appeal, or petition
for relief, which they failed to take through their own fault.
Whether or not the Court of Appeals misapprehended the facts when it annulled the 24 year old
Commissioner's Report of the Clerk of Court - an official act which enjoys a strong presumption of
SpecPro Rule 74
regularity - based merely on belated allegations of irregularities in the performance of said official
act.
Whether or not upon the facts as found by the Court of Appeals in this case, extrinsic fraud existed
which is a sufficient ground to annul the lower court's order under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court. 20
Subsequent to the filing of their petition, petitioners filed a Manifestation that they were in
possession of affidavits of waiver and desistance executed by the heirs of Lope Cuyos 21 and
respondent Patrocenia Cuyos-Mijares22 on February 17, 2004 and December 17, 2004,
respectively. In both affidavits, the affiants stated that they had no more interest in
prosecuting/defending the case involving the settlement of the estate, since the subject estate
properties had been bought by their late sister Columba, and they had already received their
share of the purchase price. Another heir, respondent Numeriano Cuyos, had also earlier
executed an Affidavit23 dated December 13, 2001, stating that the subject estate was sold to
Columba and that she had already received her share of the purchase price on May 18, 1988. In
addition, Numeriano had issued a certification24 dated May 18, 1988, which was not refuted by any
of the parties, that he had already received ₱4,000.00 in payment of his share, which could be the
reason why he refused to sign the Special Power of Attorney supposedly in favor of Salud Cuyos
for the filing of the petition with the CA.
The issue for resolution is whether the CA committed a reversible error in annulling the CFI Order
dated December 16, 1976, which approved the Commissioner’s Report embodying the alleged
compromise agreement entered into by the heirs of Evaristo and Agatona Arrogante Cuyos.
We rule in the negative.
The remedy of annulment of judgment is extraordinary in character25 and will not so easily and
readily lend itself to abuse by parties aggrieved by final judgments. Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 47
impose strict conditions for recourse to it, viz.:
Section 1. Coverage. — This Rule shall govern the annulment by the Court of Appeals of
judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts for which the
ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no
longer available through no fault of the petitioner.
Section 2. Grounds for annulment. — The annulment may be based only on the grounds of
extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
Extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground if it was availed of, or could have been availed of, in a
motion for new trial or petition for relief.
Although Section 2 of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court provides that annulment of a final judgment or
order of an RTC may be based "only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction,"
jurisprudence recognizes denial of due process as additional .ground therefor.26
An action to annul a final judgment on the ground of fraud will lie only if the fraud is extrinsic or
collateral in character.27 Extrinsic fraud exists when there is a fraudulent act committed by the
prevailing party outside of the trial of the case, whereby the defeated party was prevented from
presenting fully his side of the case by fraud or deception practiced on him by the prevailing
party.28 Fraud is regarded as extrinsic where it prevents a party from having a trial or from
presenting his entire case to the court, or where it operates upon matters pertaining not to the
judgment itself but to the manner in which it is procured. The overriding consideration when
extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party
from having his day in court. 29
While we find that the CA correctly annulled the CFI Order dated December 16, 1976, we find that
it should be annulled not on the ground of extrinsic fraud, as there is no sufficient evidence to hold
Atty. Taneo or any of the heirs guilty of fraud, but on the ground that the assailed order is void for
lack of due process.
Clerk of Court Taneo was appointed to act as Commissioner to effect the agreement of the heirs
and to prepare the project of partition for submission and approval of the court. Thus, it was
incumbent upon Atty. Taneo to set a time and place for the first meeting of the heirs. In his
Commissioner’s Report, Atty. Taneo stated that he caused the appearance of all the heirs of
Evaristo Cuyos and Agatona Arrogante Cuyos in the place, where the subject properties were
located for settlement, by sending them subpoenae supplemented by telegrams for them to attend
the conference scheduled on February 28 to 29, 1976. It was also alleged that out of the nine
heirs, only six attended the conference; however, as the CA aptly found, the Commissioner did not
state the names of those present, but only those heirs who failed to attend the conference,
namely: respondents Gloria, Salud and Enrique who, as stated in the Report, based on the return
of service, could not be located in their respective given addresses.
However, there is nothing in the records that would establish that the alleged subpoenae,
supplemented by telegrams, for the heirs to appear in the scheduled conference were indeed sent
to the heirs. In fact, respondent Patrocenia Cuyos-Mijares, one of the heirs, who was presumably
present in the conference, as she was not mentioned as among those absent, had executed an
affidavit30 dated December 8, 1998 attesting, to the fact that she was not called to a meeting nor
was there any telegram or notice of any meeting received by her. While Patrocenia had executed
on December 17, 2004 an Affidavit of Waiver and Desistance31 regarding this case, it was only for
the reason that the subject estate properties had been bought by their late sister Columba, and
that she had already received her corresponding share of the purchase price, but there was
nothing in the affidavit that retracted her previous statement that she was not called to a meeting.
SpecPro Rule 74
Respondent Gloria also made an unnotarized statement32 that there was no meeting held. Thus,
the veracity of Atty. Taneo’s holding of a conference with the heirs was doubtful.
Moreover, there was no evidence showing that the heirs indeed convened for the purpose of
arriving at an agreement regarding the estate properties, since they were not even required to sign
anything to show their attendance of the alleged meeting. In fact, the Commissioner's Report,
which embodied the alleged agreement of the heirs, did not bear the signatures of the alleged
attendees to show their consent and conformity thereto.
It bears stressing that the purpose of the conference was for the heirs to arrive at a compromise
agreement over the estate of Evaristo Cuyos. Thus, it was imperative that all the heirs must be
present in the conference and be heard to afford them the opportunity to protect their interests.
Considering that no separate instrument of conveyance was executed among the heirs embodying
their alleged agreement, it was necessary that the Report be signed by the heirs to prove that a
conference among the heirs was indeed held, and that they conformed to the agreement stated in
the Report.
Petitioners point out that the Commissioner was an officer of the court and a disinterested party
and that, under Rule 133, Section 3(m) of the Rules on Evidence, there is a presumption that
official duty has been regularly performed.
While, under the general rule, it is to be presumed that everything done by an officer in connection
with the performance of an official act in the line of his duty was legally done, such presumption
may be overcome by evidence to the contrary. We find the instances mentioned by the CA, such
as absence of the names of the persons present in the conference, absence of the signatures of
the heirs in the Commissioner's Report, as well as absence of evidence showing that respondents
were notified of the conference, to be competent proofs of irregularity that rebut the presumption.
Thus, we find no reversible error committed by the CA in ruling that the conference was not held
accordingly and in annulling the assailed order of the CFI.
Petitioners attached a Certification33 dated August 7, 2003 issued by the Officer In Charge (OIC),
Branch Clerk of Court of the RTC, Branch 11, to show that copies of the Commissioner’s Report
were sent to all the heirs, except Salud and Enrique, as well as to Attys. Lepiten and Yray as
enumerated in the Notice found at the lower portion of the Report with the accompanying registry
receipts.34
In Cua v. Vargas,35 in which the issue was whether heirs were deemed constructively notified of
and bound by an extra-judicial settlement and partition of the estate, regardless of their failure to
participate therein, when the extra-judicial settlement and partition has been duly published, we
held:
The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 is an ex parte proceeding. The rule plainly
states, however, that persons who do not participate or had no notice of an extrajudicial
settlement will not be bound thereby. It contemplates a notice that has been sent out or
issued before any deed of settlement and/or partition is agreed upon (i.e., a notice calling
all interested parties to participate in the said deed of extrajudicial settlement and
partition), and not after such an agreement has already been executed as what happened in
the instant case with the publication of the first deed of extrajudicial settlement among
heirs.
The publication of the settlement does not constitute constructive notice to the heirs who had no
knowledge or did not take part in it because the same was notice after the fact of execution. The
requirement of publication is geared for the protection of creditors and was never intended to
deprive heirs of their lawful participation in the decedent's estate. In this connection, the records of
the present case confirm that respondents never signed either of the settlement documents,
having discovered their existence only shortly before the filing of the present complaint. Following
Rule 74, these extrajudicial settlements do not bind respondents, and the partition made without
their knowledge and consent is invalid insofar as they are concerned36 (Emphasis supplied)
Applying the above-mentioned case by analogy, what matters is whether the heirs were indeed
notified before the compromise agreement was arrived at, which was not established, and not
whether they were notified of the Commissioner's Report embodying the alleged agreement
afterwards.
We also find nothing in the records that would show that the heirs were called to a hearing to
validate the Report. The CFI adopted and approved the Report despite the absence of the
signatures of all the heirs showing conformity thereto. The CFI adopted the Report despite the
statement therein that only six out of the nine heirs attended the conference, thus, effectively
depriving the other heirs of their chance to be heard. The CFI's action was tantamount to a
violation of the constitutional guarantee that no person shall be deprived of property without due
process of law. We find that the assailed Order dated December 16, 1976, which approved a void
Commissioner's Report, is a void judgment for lack of due process.
We are not persuaded by petitioners’ contentions that all the parties in the intestate estate
proceedings in the trial court were duly represented by respective counsels, namely, Atty. Lepiten
for petitioners-heirs and Atty. Yray for the oppositors-heirs; that when the heirs agreed to settle the
case amicably, they manifested such intention through their lawyers, as stated in the Order dated
January 30, 1973; that an heir in the settlement of the estate of a deceased person need not hire
his own lawyer, because his interest in the estate is represented by the judicial administrator who
retains the services of a counsel; that a judicial administrator is the legal representative not only of
the estate but also of the heirs, legatees, and creditors whose interest he represents; that when
the trial court issued the assailed Order dated December 16, 1976 approving the Commissioner's
Report, the parties’ lawyers were duly served said copies of the Order on December 21, 1976 as
SpecPro Rule 74
shown by the Certification37 dated August 7, 2003 of the RTC OIC, Clerk of Court; that notices to
lawyers should be considered notices to the clients, since, if a party is represented by counsel,
service of notices of orders and pleadings shall be made upon the lawyer; that upon receipt of
such order by counsels, any one of the respondents could have taken the appropriate remedy
such as a motion for reconsideration, a motion for new trial or a petition for relief under Rule 38 at
the proper time, but they failed to do so without giving any cogent reason for such failure.
While the trial court's order approving the Commissioner’s Report was received by Attys. Yray and
Lepiten, they were the lawyers of Gloria and Francisco, respectively, but not the lawyers of the
other heirs. As can be seen from the pleadings filed before the probate court, Atty. Lepiten was
Gloria’s counsel when she filed her Petition for letters of administration, while Atty. Yray was
Francisco’s lawyer when he filed his opposition to the petition for letters of administration and his
Motion to Order administrarix Gloria to render an accounting and for the partition of the estate.
Thus, the other heirs who were not represented by counsel were not given any notice of the
judgment approving the compromise. It was only sometime in February 1998 that respondents
learned that the tax declarations covering the parcels of land, which were all in the name of their
late mother Agatona Arrogante, were canceled; and new Tax Declarations were issued in
Columba’s name, and Original Certificates of Titles were subsequently issued in favor of Columba.
Thus, they could not have taken an appeal or other remedies.
Considering that the assailed Order is a void judgment for lack of due process of law, it is no
judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right or of any obligation.38
In Nazareno v. Court of Appeals,39 we stated the consequences of a void judgment, thus:
A void judgment never acquires finality. Hence, while admittedly, the petitioner in the case at
bar failed to appeal timely the aforementioned decision of the Municipal Trial Court of Naic, Cavite,
it cannot be deemed to have become final and executory. In contemplation of law, that void
decision is deemed non-existent. Thus, there was no effective or operative judgment to appeal
from. In Metropolitan Waterworks & Sewerage System vs. Sison, this Court held that:
x x x [A] void judgment is not entitled to the respect accorded to a valid judgment, but may be
entirely disregarded or declared inoperative by any tribunal in which effect is sought to be given to
it. It is attended by none of the consequences of a valid adjudication. It has no legal or binding
effect or efficacy for any purpose or at any place. It cannot affect, impair or create rights. It is not
entitled to enforcement and is, ordinarily, no protection to those who seek to enforce. All
proceedings founded on the void judgment are themselves regarded as invalid. In other words, a
void judgment is regarded as a nullity, and the situation is the same as it would be if there were no
judgment. It, accordingly, leaves the parties litigants in the same position they were in before the
trial.
Thus, a void judgment is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right nor of any
obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect.
Hence, it can never become final and any writ of execution based on it is void: "x x x it may be
said to be a lawless thing which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored
wherever and whenever it exhibits its head."40 (Emphasis supplied)
The CFI's order being null and void, it may be assailed anytime, collaterally or in a direct action or
by resisting such judgment or final order in any action or proceeding whenever it is invoked,
unless barred by laches.41 Consequently, the compromise agreement and the Order approving it
must be declared null and void and set aside.
We find no merit in petitioners' claim that respondents are barred from assailing the judgment after
the lapse of 24 years from its finality on ground of laches and estoppel.
Section 3, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court provides that an action for annulment of judgment based
on extrinsic fraud must be filed within four years from its discovery and, if based on lack of
jurisdiction, before it is barred by laches or estoppel.
The principle of laches or "stale demands" ordains that the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable
and unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence could or should have
been done earlier, or the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warrants a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to
assert it.42
There is no absolute rule as to what constitutes laches or staleness of demand; each case is to be
determined according to its particular circumstances.43 The question of laches is addressed to the
sound discretion of the court and, being an equitable doctrine, its application is controlled by
equitable considerations. It cannot be used to defeat justice or perpetrate fraud and injustice. It is
the better rule that courts, under the principle of equity, will not be guided or bound strictly by the
statute of limitations or the doctrine of laches when to be so, a manifest wrong or injustice would
result.44
In this case, respondents learned of the assailed order only sometime in February 1998 and filed
the petition for annulment of judgment in 2001. Moreover, we find that respondents' right to due
process is the paramount consideration in annulling the assailed order. It bears stressing that an
action to declare the nullity of a void judgment does not prescribe.45
Finally, considering that the assailed CFI judgment is void, it has no legal and binding effect, force
or efficacy for any purpose. In contemplation of law, it is non-existent. Hence, the execution of the
Deed of Sale by Lope in favor of Columba pursuant to said void judgment, the issuance of titles
pursuant to said Deed of Sale, and the subsequent transfers are void ab initio. No reversible error
was thus committed by the CA in annulling the judgment.
SpecPro Rule 74
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the Decision dated July 18, 2003 and Resolution dated
November 13, 2003 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. The Regional Trial Court, Branch XI,
Cebu and the Heirs of Evaristo Cuyos are DIRECTED to proceed with SP Proceedings Case No.
24-BN for the settlement of the Estate of Evaristo Cuyos.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
SpecPro Rule 74
FIRST DIVISION tackled during trial. Nevertheless, to answer Dujali's allegations, Buot attached to her comment a
copy of the necrological services program11 where she was listed as one of Gregorio's heirs, a
October 2, 2017 certification12 from the municipal mayor that she is Gregorio's child, and a copy of the Amended
Extrajudicial Settlement13 dated July 4, 2001 which includes both Buot and Dujali as Gregorio's
G.R. No. 199885 heirs. Notably, this Amended Extrajudicial Settlement pertained to parcels of land not included in
the list of properties annexed in Buot's petition.
JESUSA DUJALI BUOT, Petitioner
vs. On May 3, 2011, the RTC denied Dujali's motion to dismiss. It agreed with Buot that the issues
ROQUE RASAY DUJALI, Respondent raised by Dujali are evidentiary matters that should be addressed during trial.14

DECISION Dujali filed a motion for reconsideration.15 He argued that under the Rules of Court and prevailing
jurisprudence, a party's lack of legal capacity to sue should be raised in a motion to dismiss.
JARDELEZA, J.: Further, he took issue with the existence of the Amended Extrajudicial Settlement. According to
him, when an estate has no debts, recourse to administration proceedings is allowed only when
there are good and compelling reasons. Where an action for partition (whether in or out of court) is
This is a petition for review on certiorari1under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner Jesusa
possible, the estate should not be burdened with an administration proceeding.
Dujali Buot (Buot) challenged the Orders of Branch 34 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Panabo
City, dated September 19, 20112 and December 8, 2011,3 dismissing her petition and denying her
subsequent motion for reconsideration, respectively. The RTC, in its Order dated September 19, 2011, granted Dujali's motion for reconsideration. It
held that under the law, there are only two exceptions to the requirement that the settlement of a
deceased's estate should be judicially administered--extrajudicial settlement and summary
Buot filed before the RTC a petition4 for letters of administration of the estate of deceased
settlement of an estate of small value.16 According to the RTC, in the case of Buot's petition,
Gregorio Dujali (Gregorio). In her petition, Buot alleged that she was a surviving heir, along with
administration has been barred by the fact that Gregorio's estate has already been settled
Roque Dujali, Constancia Dujali-Tiongson, Concepcion Dujali-Satiembre, Marilou Sales-Dujali,
extrajudicially as evidenced by the Amended Extrajudicial Settlement. It also noted that Gregorio
Marietonete Dujali, Georgeton Dujali, Jr. and Geomar Dujali, of Gregorio who died intestate. 5 Buot
had no creditors since Buot failed to allege it in her petition. 17 Since recourse to judicial
annexed6 to her petition a list of Gregorio's properties that are allegedly publicly known. She
administration of an estate that has no debt is allowed only when there are good reasons for not
claimed that since Gregorio's death, there had been no effort to settle his estate. Roque Dujali
resorting to extrajudicial settlement or action for partition, the RTC dismissed Buot's petition. Buot
(Dujali) purportedly continued to manage and control the properties to the exclusion of all the other
filed a motion for reconsideration which the RTC denied in its Order dated December 8, 2011.
heirs. Buot further alleged that Dujali for no justifiable reason denied her request to settle the
According to the RTC, not only was Buot's motion a second motion for reconsideration prohibited
estate.7 Thus, Buot asked that: (1) an administrator be appointed to preserve Gregorio's estate; (2)
under the Rules, there was also no sufficient reason to reverse its earlier dismissal of the
a final inventory of the properties be made; (3) the heirs be established; and (4) the net estate be
petition.18
ordered distributed in accordance with law among the legal heirs.8

Buot filed this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court challenging the
Dujali filed an opposition with motion to dismiss,9 arguing that Buot had no legal capacity to
RTC's Orders on pure questions of law. In her petition, Buot argues that her motion for
institute the proceedings. He asserted that despite Buot's claim that she was Gregorio's child with
reconsideration is not a prohibited second motion for reconsideration. Section 2 of Rule 52 of the
his first wife Sitjar Escalona, she failed to attach any document, such as a certificate of live birth or
Rules of Court states that a prohibited second motion for reconsideration is one filed by
a marriage certificate, to prove her filiation. Dujali, on the other hand, attached a certificate of
the same party. In this case, Buot's motion for reconsideration was her first, since the motion for
marriage between Gregorio and his mother Yolanda Rasay. This certificate also indicated that
reconsideration subject of the Order dated September 19, 2011 was filed by Dujali. She also
Gregorio had never been previously married to a certain Sitjar Escalona. Thus, as Buot failed to
argued that the Amended Extra judicial Settlement did not cover all of Gregorio's properties.19
prove that she is an heir, Dujali prayed that her petition be dismissed outright.

Further, Buot maintains that heirs are not precluded from instituting a petition for administration if
Buot filed her comment10 to Dujali's opposition with motion to dismiss. She argued that under the
they do not, for good reason, wish to pursue an ordinary action for partition. In her case, she
Rules of Court, only ultimate facts should be included in an initiatory pleading. The marriage
claims that there are good reasons justifying her recourse to administration proceedings: (1) the
certificate and certificate of live birth which Dujali demands are evidentiary matters that ought to be
SpecPro Rule 74
Amended Extrajudicial Settlement did not cover the entire estate; (2) there has been no effort to
partition the property; (3) Dujali seeks to challenge Buot' s status as an heir; (4) other heirs have
been deprived of the properties of the estate; and (5) other heirs, particularly Constancia Dujali
and Marilou Dujali, have already manifested that they are amenable to the appointment of an
administrator.20
In his comment,21 Dujali argues that Buot is not an interested person allowed to file a petition for
administration of the estate. While she claims to be Gregorio's heir, public documents, such as
Buot's certificate of live birth and the certificate of marriage between Gregorio and Yolanda Rasay,
reveal otherwise. Dujali also attached to his comment certain documents that appear to show that
there has been an extra judicial settlement of some of the prope1iies of the estate and that Buot
has already received her share from the proceeds of the sale of these properties by the true
heirs.22 Further, he explains that Buot was only allowed to participate in the Amended Extrajudicial
Settlement by Gregorio's legitimate heirs out of humanitarian considerations, not because she is a
true heir. All these, Dujali argues, clearly indicate that there is no good and compelling reason to
grant Buot's petition for administration.23
In her reply,24 Buot contends that the issue of whether she is a person interested in the estate is a
matter that should be raised during the trial by the RTC of her petition for administration.
We deny the petition.
First, we must emphasize that this is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court. This recourse to the Court covers only a review of questions of law. In this case, the
question of law presented before us is whether the RTC properly dismissed the petition for
administration on the ground that there has already been an extrajudicial settlement of certain
properties of the estate. An additional question of procedure raised here is whether the RTC was
correct in holding that Buot's motion for reconsideration should be denied as it is a prohibited
second motion for reconsideration.
All other issues raised in the pleadings before us are questions of fact that we cannot resolve at
this time. As we shall shortly explain in this Decision, these questions of fact ought to be resolved
by a trial court in the appropriate proceeding.
We will first rule on the procedural issue raised in the petition. In its Order dated September 19,
2011, the RTC held that Buot's motion for reconsideration is a second motion for reconsideration
prohibited under the Rules of Court. Thus, the motion was denied. We reviewed the motions filed
by the parties before the RTC and rule that the RTC erred in its finding.
When Buot filed her petition for administration, Dujali filed an opposition with a motion to
dismiss.1âwphi1 When the R TC denied his motion to dismiss, Dujali filed a motion for
reconsideration. This led to the RTC's issuance of the Order of September 19, 2011 granting
Dujali's motion for reconsideration and holding that Buot's petition for administration should be
dismissed. It was only at this point that Buot filed, for the first time, a motion seeking for
reconsideration of the Order which declared the dismissal of her petition for administration.
Clearly, this is not the motion for reconsideration contemplated in Section 2 of Rule 52 of the
Rules of Court which states:
Sec. 2. Second motion for reconsideration. - No second motion for reconsideration of a judgment
or final resolution by the same party shall be entertained.
Section 2 of Rule 52 is clear and leaves no room for interpretation. What it prohibits is a second
motion for reconsideration filed by the same party involving the same judgment or final resolution.
In the present case, Buot's motion for reconsideration was only her first motion challenging the
Order dismissing her petition for administration of Gregorio's estate. The RTC clearly erred in
denying her motion on the ground that it is a second motion for reconsideration prohibited under
the Rules.
Nevertheless, we rule that the RTC properly ordered the dismissal of Buot's petition for
administration.
When a person dies intestate, his or her estate may generally be subject to judicial administration
proceedings.25 There are, however, several exceptions. One such exception is provided for in
Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. This Section states:
Sec. I . Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. - If the decedent left no will and no
debts and the heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial or legal
representatives duly authorized for the purpose, the parties may, without securing letters of
administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument
filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary
action of partition. If there is only one heir, he may adjudicate to himself the entire estate by
means of an affidavit filed in the office of the register of deeds. The parties to an extrajudicial
settlement, whether by public instrument or by stipulation in a pending action for partition, or the
sole heir who adjudicates the entire estate to himself by means of an affidavit shall file,
simultaneously with and as a condition precedent to the filing of the public instrument, or
stipulation in the action for partition, or of the affidavit in the office of the register of deeds, a bond
with the said register of deeds, in an amount equivalent to the value of the personal property
involved as certified to under oath by the parties concerned and conditioned upon the payment of
any just claim that may be filed under Section 4 of this rule. It shall be presumed that the decedent
left no debts if no creditor files a petition for letters of administration within two (2) years after the
death of the decedent.
The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published in a newspaper of
general circulation in the manner provided in the next succeeding section; but no extrajudicial
SpecPro Rule 74
settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice
thereof
According to this provision, when the deceased left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of
age, the heirs may divide the estate among themselves without judicial administration. The heirs
may do so extrajudicially through a public instrument filed in the office of the Register of Deeds. In
case of disagreement, they also have the option to file an action for partition.
Section 1 of Rule 74, however, does not prevent the heirs from instituting administration
proceedings if they have good reasons for choosing not to file an action for partition. In Rodriguez,
et al. v. Tan, etc. and Rodriguez,26we said:
[S]ection 1 [of Rule 74] does not preclude the heirs from instituting administration proceedings,
even if the estate has no debts or obligation, if they do not desire to resort for good reasons to an
ordinary action of partition. While section 1 allows the heirs to divide the estate among themselves
as they may see fit, or to resort to an ordinary action of partition, it does not compel them to do so
if they have good reasons to take a different course of action. Said section is not mandatory or
compulsory as may be gleaned from the use made therein of the word may. If the intention were
otherwise the framer of the rule would have employed the word shall as was done in other
provisions that are mandatory in character.x x x27 (Italics in the original.)
Since such proceedings are always "long," "costly," "superfluous and unnecessary,"28 resort to
judicial administration of cases falling under Section 1, Rule 7 4 appears to have become the
exception rather than the rule. Cases subsequent to Rodriguez emphasized that "[w]here partition
is possible, either in or out of court, the estate should not be burdened with an administration
proceeding without good and compelling reasons."29
In Pereira v. Court of Appeals,30we had the opportunity to explain what the "good reason
exception" means. What constitutes good reason depends on the circumstances of each case. We
said:
"Again the petitioner argues that 'only when the heirs do not have any dispute as to the bulk of the
hereditary estate but only in the manner of partition does section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court
apply and that in this case the parties are at loggerheads as to the corpus of the hereditary estate
because respondents succeeded in sequestering some assets of the intestate. The argument is
unconvincing, because, as the respondent judge has indicated, questions as to what property
belonged to the deceased (and therefore to the heirs) may properly be ventilated in the partition
proceedings, especially where such property is in the hands of one heir."
In another case, We held that if the reason for seeking an appointment as administrator is merely
to avoid a multiplicity of suits since the heir seeking such appointment wants to ask for the
annulment of certain transfers of property, that same objective could be achieved in an action for
partition and the trial court is not justified in issuing letters of administration. In still another case,
We did not find so powerful a reason the argument that the appointment of the husband, a
usufructuary forced heir of his deceased wife, as judicial administrator is necessary in order for
him to have legal capacity to appear in the intestate proceedings of his wife's deceased mother,
since he may just adduce proof of his being a forced heir in 2 intestate proceedings of the
latter.31 (Citations omitted.)
Thus, in Pereira, we refused to allow administration proceedings where the only reason why the
appointment of an administrator was sought so that one heir can take possession of the estate
from the other heir. We held that this was not a compelling reason to order judicial administration.
We added that in cases like this, "the claims of both parties as to the properties left by the
deceased may be properly ventilated in simple partition proceedings where the creditors, should
there be any, are protected in any event."32
We have reviewed the reasons which Buot proffers to warrant the grant of her petition for letters of
administration and rule that these do not suffice to warrant the submission of Gregorio's estate to
administration proceedings. That the extrajudicial settlement in this case did not cover Gregorio's
entire estate is, by no means, a sufficient reason to order the administration of the estate. Whether
the extrajudicial settlement did in fact cover the entire estate and whether an extrajudicial
settlement that does not cover the entire estate may be considered valid do not automatically
create a compelling reason to order the administration of the estate. Parties seeking to challenge
an extrajudicial settlement of estate possess sufficient remedies under the law and procedural
rules. As to Buot's other allegations that: (1) there has been no effort to partition the estate; (2)
that Dujali challenges her status as an heir; (3) that other heirs have been deprived of the estate;
and (4) these heirs are amenable to the appointment of an administrator, we find that none of
these allegations actually prevent the filing of an ordinary action for partition. In fact, if it is indeed
true that there has been no effort to partition Gregorio's entire estate, the filing of an action for
partition before the proper court will leave his heirs with no choice but to proceed. An action for
partition is also the proper venue to ascertain Buot's entitlement to participate in the proceedings
as an heir.33 Not only would it allow for the full ventilation of the issues as to the properties that
ought to be included in the partition and the true heirs entitled to receive their portions of the
estate, it is also the appropriate forum to litigate questions of fact that may be necessary to
ascertain if partition is proper and who may participate in the proceedings.
WHEREFORE, this petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The Orders of Branch 34 of the
Regional Trial Court, Panabo City, dated September 19, 2011 and December 8, 2011
are AFFIRMED insofar as they ordered the dismissal of the petition for letters of administration.
SO ORDERED.
SpecPro Rule 74
SECOND DIVISION They alleged that they, together with the petitioners and their other cousins, were co-owners of the
subject property by virtue of their successional rights as heirs of Jayme.
[ G.R. No. 224849, June 06, 2018 ]
For clarity of the discussion, the heirs of Jayme and his wife, Telesfora Garzon, who both died
HEIRS OF ERNESTO MORALES, NAMELY: ROSARIO M. DANGSALAN, EVELYN M.
intestate, were their four (4) children:
SANGALANG, NENITA M. SALES, ERNESTO JOSE MORALES, JR., RAYMOND MORALES,
AND MELANIE MORALES, PETITIONERS, VS. ASTRID MORALES AGUSTIN,
1. Vicente Morales, who was survived by his children: (a) herein deceased defendant Ernesto
REPRESENTED BY HER ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, EDGARDO TORRES, RESPONDENT.
Morales (substituted by his heirs who are now petitioners herein); (b) Abraham Morales (also
deceased); (c) former plaintiff and, eventually, defendant Lydia Morales (now also deceased);
DECISION
and (d) original defendant Angelita Ragasa;
REYES, JR., J:
While the Court could not hold the bonds of familial relationships together through force, it could
2. Simeon Morales, who was survived by his children: (a) herein respondent Astrid Morales
hope to deter any further degradation of this sacred tie through law.
Agustin; (b) Leonides Morales; (c) Geraldine Morales-Gaspar; and (d) Odessa Morales;
The Case
3. Jose Morales, who was survived by his children: (a) Victoria Geron; (b) Vicente Morales; (c);
Gloria Villasenor; (d) Amalia Alejo; (e) Juliet Manuel; (f) Rommel Morales; and (g) Virgilio
Morales (now deceased);
Challenged before the Court via this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court is the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 101991, promulgated
4. Martina Morales-Enriquez, who was survived by her children: (a) Evelina Lopez; (b) Emeterio
on August 13, 2015, which affirmed the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 12 of
Enriquez; (c) Elizabeth Somera; and (d) Bernardita Alojipan.[7]
Laoag City, in Civil Case No. 14438-12, dated November 22, 2013. Likewise challenged is the
subsequent Resolution[3] of the CA promulgated on April 21, 2016, which upheld the earlier
decision.
In response to the respondent's complaint, the heirs of Jose Morales filed an answer, which
admitted the allegations in the complaint, and interposed no objection to the partition, "provided
The Facts
that their present positions on the subject property are respected."[8]

On the other hand, Ernesto Morales, as one of the heirs of Vicente Morales, filed an Answer with
The respondent, Astrid Morales Agustin, is a grandchild of Jayme Morales (Jayme), who was the
Motion to Dismiss and Compulsory Counter-claims. He alleged that herein respondent has no
registered owner of a parcel of land with improvements, designated as Lot No. 9217-A, and
cause of action against the petitioners because: (1) the proper remedy should not be a complaint
located at Barangay Sto. Tomas, Laoag City.[4] The subject property is covered by Transfer
for partition but an action for the settlement of the intestate estate of Jayme and his wife; and (2)
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-37139, more particularly described as follows:
herein respondent has no more right of participation over the subject property because the same
has long been conveyed to Ernesto Morales (as substituted by herein petitioners) by the
A parcel of land (Lot 9217-A, Psd-01-062563, being a portion of Lot 9217, Cad. 195, Laoag
respondent's parents, Simeon and Leonila Morales.[9]
Cadastre, L.R.C. Rec. No. 1212), situated at Brgy. Sto. Tomas, City of Laoag, Prov. of Ilocos
Norte, Island of Luzon. Bounded on the SE., along Line 1-2 by A.M. Regidor St. (8.00 m.w.); on
Meanwhile, per the Order of the RTC dated April 22, 2009, summons to the heirs of Martina
the SW., along line 2-3 by Provincial Road (15.00 m.w.); on the NW., along line 3-4 by Lot 9217-B
Morales-Enriquez, who were at that time residing abroad, were allowed to be served
of the subd. plan; on the NE., along line 4-1 by Lot 9218, Cad. 195, Laoag Cadastre. Beginning at
personally.[10] They were subsequently declared to be in default.[11] In response, one of Martina
a point marked "1" of Lot 9217-A on plan, being N. 51 deg. 18' E., 154.84 m. from BLIM No. 2,
Morales-Enriquez's heirs, Emeterio Enriquez, filed a Motion to Dismiss and alleged that the RTC
Cad. 195, Laoag Cadastre.[5]
did not acquire jurisdiction over his person because he was not furnished with a copy of the
Amended Complaint.[12]
The respondent initiated the instant complaint, originally together with Lydia Morales,[6] another
In the hearing dated February 8, 2012, the RTC heard the testimony of the respondent. There
one of Jayme's grandchildren and the respondent's cousin, for the partition of Jayme's property.
being no other witnesses to be presented, the respondent manifested that she was ready to
SpecPro Rule 74
submit her formal offer of exhibits.[13]
After a protracted hearing on motions and other incidents of the case, the RTC rendered its
decision on November 22, 2013 via a summary judgment in favor of herein respondent, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING DISQUISITIONS, the Court finds
preponderance of evidence in favor of the plaintiffs and judgment is hereby rendered:
(1) Decreeing the partition of Lot No. 9217-A above-stated in the following mannfer (sic) and
proportion of one-fourth (1/4) share each each (sic) of the direct heirs of the late spouses Jayme
Morales and Telesfora Garzon, namely: (1) Vicente Morales, who was succeeded by right of
representation by his children Ernesto Morales (duly substituted by his heirs), Abraham Morales,
Angelina Ragasa and Lydia Morales; (2) Simeon Morales, who was succeeded by right of
representation by his children Odessa A. Morales, Geraldine Morales Gaspar, Leonides A.
Morales and Astrid A. Morales-Agustin; (3) Jose Morales who was succeeded by right of
representation by his children, Ronnel Morales, Morales, (sic) Victoria Morales, Vicente Morales,
Manuel Morales, Gloria Morales, Virgilio Morales, Amelia Morales and Juliet Morales; (4) Martina
Morales, who was succeeded by right of representation by her children, Emeterio Morales-
Enriquez, Evelina Morales Enriquez-Lopez, Elizabeth Morales Enriquez-Somera and Bernardita
Morales Enriquez-Alojipan;
(2) Adjudicating in favor of the above-named heirs by right representation (sic) their respective
one-fourth (1/4) share each of the group of heirs by right of representation over the above-stated
Lot No. 9217-A; and
(3) Ordering the parties to submit their common project of partition of the subject lot with utmost
dispatch for approval by the Court;
(4) To pay the cost of the suit.
SO ORDERED.[14]
The RTC ruled that: (1) the estate of a deceased who died intestate may be partitioned without
need of any settlement or administration proceeding;[15] and (2) the RTC properly and lawfully
rendered summary judgment despite the absence of any motion from any of the parties praying for
the application of the rules thereon.[16]
Aggrieved, the petitioners elevated the case to the CA, which thereafter dismissed the appeal and
affirmed the RTC Decision on August 13, 2015.
The CA opined that the settlement of the entire estate of the late spouses Jayme and Telesfora is
"of no moment in the instant case of partition"[17] because the respondent was "asserting her right
as a co-owner of the subject property by virtue of her successional right from her deceased father
Simeon Morales, who was once a co-owner of the said property, and not from Jayme and
Telesfora Morales."[18]
Further, the CA ruled that an action for partition under Rule 69 of the Rules of Court is an action
quasi in rem, and thus, "jurisdiction over the impleaded defendants-heirs is not required since the
trial court has jurisdiction over the res or the subject property which is the subject matter of the
action for partition."[19]
Finally, the CA ruled that summary judgment in this case is proper despite the absence of any
motion from any of the parties. In support hereto, the CA ratiocinated that the parties prayed for
resolution of all "pending motions/incidents" during the hearing on September 18, 2013, and
acceded to the RTC pronouncement therein that its resolution "shall be considered as a decision
in the said case for partition."[20]
The fallo of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 12, Laoag City dated November 22, 2013 is AFFIRMED.
Despite the petitioners' motion for reconsideration, the CA affirmed its decision via a Resolution
dated April 21, 2016.[21]
Hence, this petition.
The Issues
The petitioners anchor their prayer for the reversal of the CA decision and resolution based on the
following grounds:
(1) THE [CA] SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE
TRIAL COURT WERE VOID CONSIDERING THAT NOT ALL THE DEFENDANTS WHO
ARE INDISPENSABLE PARTIES WERE EVER SERVED WITH SUMMONS IN VIOLATION
OF DUE PROCESS.
(2) THE [CA] MANIFESTLY ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE NECESSITY OF HAVING
THE ESTATE OF THE PARTIES' INTESTATE PREDECESSORS (i.e. SPOUSES JAYME
AND TELESFORA MORALES) BE DETERMINED AND SETTLED FIRST BEFORE THE
DISTRIBUTION AND/OR PARTITION OF ANY OF THE PROPERTIES WHICH FORM PART
SpecPro Rule 74
OF SAID ESTATE.
(3) THE [CA] MOST UTTERLY ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF THE
TRIAL COURT ALTHOUGH IT WAS UNDISPUTABLY RENDERED WITHOUT ANY PRIOR
MOTION AND HEARING THEREFOR, AND IN THE FACE OF PENDING INCIDENTS
WHICH INCLUDE THE: (a) MOTION TO DISMISS OF DEFENDANT EMITERIO ENRIQUEZ
ON THE GROUND OF LACK OF JURISDICTION OVER HIS PERSON ROOTED ON THE
LACK OF SUMMONS SERVED UPON HIM, (b) THE NON-SERVICE OF SUMMONS TO
DEFENDANT ANGELITA RAGASA, AND (c) THE MOTION TO WITHDRAW AS COUNSEL
FOR THE PLAINTIFF (HEREIN RESPONDENT).[22]
In essence, the Court is called upon to rule on the following issues: (1) whether or not the partition
of the subject property is proper despite the absence of the settlement of the estate of the
deceased registered owner thereof; (2) whether or not the RTC could motu proprio apply the rule
on Summary Judgment; and (3) whether or not the RTC could validly render a decision even in the
absence of proof of proper service of summons to some of the real parties in interest in a quasi in
rem proceeding.
The Court's Ruling
After a careful perusal of the arguments presented and the evidence submitted, the Court finds
partial merit in the petition.
First, on the Procedural Issue of Improper Service of Summons
The petitioners question the acquisition by the RTC of the jurisdiction to decide on the instant
case. After a judicious study of the relevant factual antecedents, the Court rules against the
petitioner and in favor of the findings of the RTC and the CA.
The partition of real estate is an action quasi in rem.[23] Jurisprudence is replete with
pronouncements that, for the court to acquire jurisdiction in actions quasi in rem, it is necessary
only that it has jurisdiction over the res. In the case of Macasaet vs. Co, Jr.,[24] the Court stated
that "[j]urisdiction over the defendant in an action in rem or quasi in rem is not required, and the
court acquires jurisdiction over an action as long as it acqmres jurisdiction over the res that is the
subject matter of the action."[25]
In the case of De Pedro v. Romansan Development Corporation,[26] the Court clarified that while
this is so, "to satisfy the requirements of due process, jurisdiction over the parties in in rem and
quasi in rem actions is required."[27] Thus, regardless of the nature of the action, proper service of
summons is imperative and that a decision rendered without proper service of summons suffers a
defect in jurisdiction.[28]
According to De Pedro, the court may acquire jurisdiction over the thing by actually or
constructively seizing or placing it under the court's custody.[29] In the landmark case of El Banco
Español Filipino vs. Palanca,[30] the Court has already ruled that:
Jurisdiction over the property which is the subject of the litigation may result either from a seizure
of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into the actual custody of the law, or it
may result from the institution of legal proceedings wherein, under special provisions of
law, the power of the court over the property is recognized and made effective. (Emphasis
supplied)
In this case, the filing of the complaint before the RTC which sought to partition the subject
property effectively placed the latter under the power of the court. On this front, none of the parties
challenged the RTC's jurisdiction.
But more than this, in compliance with De Pedro, there is in this case proper service of summons
to the defendants. In no uncertain terms, the CA found that: (1) the heirs of Vicente Morales
received summons, filed an Answer, and actively participated in the trial; (2) the heirs of Jose
Morales filed their Answer and admitted to the allegations in the complaint; and (3) the heirs of
Martina Morales were duly served with summons, copies of the complaint, and actively
participated in the trial.[31]
Even the trial court authoritatively concluded the same in saying that:
As borne out from the record of the case, Summons and a copy of the Complaint was served upon
and received by defendant Emeterio Enriquez in Virginia Beach on June 25, 2009 as per verified
Affidavit of Service of one Nancy G. Wood. Defendant Bernardita Alojipan in Trenton, MI received
on July 4, 2009 a copy each of Summons and Complaint as per verified Affidavit of Service of one
Herb Alexander. Defendant Elizabeth Somera received in Hanover Dirk, Illinois on June 27, 2009
a copy each of the Summons and of the Complaint as per verified Affidavit of Service of one
George Pierce and defendant Evelina Lopez received in Trenton, Michigan on July 4, 2009 a copy
each of Summons and Complaint as per verified Affidavit of Service issued by Herb Alexander.[32]
None of the petitioners' submissions are sufficient to justify the Court's deviation from these factual
findings by the CA, which affirmed the jurisdiction of the RTC. By necessary implication, therefore,
the Court must perforce rule against the petitioners on this ground.
Second, on the Issue of Summary Judgment
SpecPro Rule 74
A summary judgment in this jurisdiction is allowed by Rule 35 of the Rules of Court.[33] According
to the case of Wood Technology Corporation, et al. vs. Equitable Banking Corporation,[34] it is a
procedure aimed at weeding out sham claims or defenses at an early stage of the litigation. It is
granted to settle expeditiously a case if, on motion of either party, there appears from the
pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits that no important issues of fact are involved,
except the amount of damages.[35] Thus, said the Court in the case of Viajar vs. Judge
Estenzo,[36] as cited in Caridao, etc., et al. vs. Hon. Estenzo, etc., et al:[37]
Relief by summary judgment is intended to expedite or promptly dispose of cases where
the facts appear undisputed and certain from the pleadings, depositions, admissions and
affidavits. But if there be a doubt as to such facts and there be an issue or issues of fact joined by
the parties, neither one of them can pray for a summary judgment. Where the facts pleaded by the
parties are disputed or contested, proceedings for a summary judgment cannot take the place of a
trial.[38] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
A reading of the foregoing would reveal that, in the application of the rules on summary
judgments, the proper inquiry would be whether the affirmative defenses offered by herein
petitioners before the trial court constitute genuine issues of fact requiring a full-blown trial.[39] In
other words, the crucial question is: are the issues raised by petitioners not genuine so as to justify
a summary judgment?[40]
In Evangelista vs. Mercator Finance Corp.,[41] the Court has already defined a genuine issue as an
issue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence, as distinguished from an issue which is
fictitious or contrived,[42] set up in bad faith and patently unsubstantial so as not to constitute a
genuine issue for trial.[43] According to Spouses Pascual vs. First Consolidated Rural Bank (Bohol),
Inc.,[44] where the facts pleaded by the parties are disputed or contested, proceedings for a
summary judgment cannot take the place of a trial.
More, the propriety of issuing a summary judgment springs not only from the lack of a genuine
issue which is raised by either party, but also from the observance of the procedural guidelines for
the rendition of such judgment. Thus, in Caridao, the Court nullified the summary judgment issued
by the trial court when the rules on summary judgment was applied despite the absence of a
motion from the respondent asking for the application thereof. The Court said:
And that is not all, The (sic) nullity of the assailed Summary Judgment stems not only from the
circumstances that such kind of a judgment is not proper under the state of pleadings obtaining in
the instant case, but also from the failure to comply with the procedural guidelines for the rendition
of such a judgment. Contrary to the requirements prescribed by the Rules, no motion for a
summary judgment was filed by private respondent. Consequently, no notice or hearing for
the purpose was ever conducted by the trial court. The trial court merely required the parties to
submit their affidavits and exhibits, together with their respective memoranda, and without
conducting any hearing, although the parties presented opposing claims of ownership and
possession, hastily rendered a Summary Judgment. The trial court was decidedly in error in
cursorily issuing the said Judgment.[45] (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Still, in the more recent case of Calubaquib et al. vs. Republic of the Phils.,[46] the Court once more
was asked to determine the propriety of the summary judgment rendered by the trial court judge in
the absence of any motion filed by the parties for that purpose. In that case, the trial court judge
opined that "the basic facts of the case were undisputed"[47] and that, even after the parties' refusal
to file a motion for summary judgment, the trial court rendered a judgment sans trial. In ruling for
the nullity of such issued judgment, the Court said that:
The filing of a motion and the conduct of a hearing on the motion are therefore
important because these enable the court to determine if the parties' pleadings, affidavits and
exhibits in support of, or against, the motion are sufficient to overcome the opposing papers and
adequately justify the finding that, as a matter of law, the claim is clearly meritorious or there is no
defense to the action.[48] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Even in the pre-trial stage of a case, a motion for the application of summary judgment
is necessary. In the recent case of Spouses Pascual vs. First Consolidated Rural Bank (BOHOL),
Inc.,[49] Justice Bersamin pointed out that:
To be clear, the rule only spells out that unless the motion for such judgment has earlier been
filed, the pre-trial may be the occasion in which the court considers the propriety of
rendering judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment. If no such motion was earlier
filed, the pre-trial judge may then indicate to the proper party to initiate the rendition of
such judgment by filing the necessary motion. Indeed, such motion is required by either Rule
34 (Judgment on the Pleadings) or Rule 35 (Summary Judgment) of the Rules of Court. The pre-
trial judge cannot motu proprio render the judgment on the pleadings or summary
judgment. In the case of the motion for summary judgment, the adverse party is entitled to
counter the motion.[50] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied, citations omitted)
Indeed, Calubaquib even proceeded further in saying that the "non-observance of the procedural
requirements of filing a motion and conducting a hearing on the said motion warrants the setting
aside of the summary judgment."[51]
On the basis of the foregoing disquisitions, the Court now focuses its attention to the factual milieu
surrounding the present case. To begin with, the Court is of the opinion that the petitioners, from
the beginning of the proceedings, have already submitted an issue of fact that definitively calls for
the presentation of evidence. They have, for all intents and purposes, presented a genuine issue
that should have foreclosed the rendition of a summary judgment.
SpecPro Rule 74
Particularly, while the petitioners have not questioned the fact that the subject property belonged
to their progenitor, Jayme, they have, however, asserted that herein respondent has "no more
right of participation" over the same.[52] The Answer with Motion to Dismiss and Compulsory
Counter-Claims claimed that:
7.4 Astrid Morales Agustin has no more right or participation – Plaintiff's supposed share in the
property, together with her siblings, have long been conveyed to herein defendant Ernesto
Morales by said plaintiff's own parents, the late Simeon Morales and Leonila Morales. Thus,
plaintiff has no more footing to demand partition of the lot for her benefit. x x x.[53]
In fact, the original respondent in this case, the father of herein petitioners, attached in his
pleading "several handwritten receipts showing payment of their share to the property, then called
'camarin.'"[54]
In the RTC decision, the trial judge hastily dismissed this argument and asserted that:
The alleged written documents of debt of plaintiffs' parents Simeon Morales and Leonila Albano
Morales are not genuine issue of material facts because these documents have no effect on the
partition of the subject lot, not debts of the intestate estate of the spouses Jayme Morales and
Telesfora Garzon and they are not binding upon the plaintiffs herein.[55]
In affirming this decision, the CA even opined that the issue raised by herein petitioners is "of no
moment in the instant case of partition"[56] because the respondent was "asserting her right as a
co-owner of the subject property by virtue of her successional right from her deceased father
Simeon Morales, who was once a co-owner of the said property, and not from Jayme and
Telesfora Morales."[57]
These opinions, however, are reversible errors on the part of both the trial court and the CA. The
question of who shall inherit which part of the property and in what proportion is in the province of
the partition of the estate of a deceased. That an heir disposed of his/her aliquot portion in favor of
another heir is a matter that should be fully litigated on in a partition proceeding—as in this case.
In the case of Intestate Estate of Josefa Tangco, et al. vs. De Borja,[58] the Court has already ruled
that an heir to an inheritance could dispose of his/her hereditary rights to whomever he/she
chooses. This is because:
[A]s a hereditary share in a decedent's estate is transmitted or vested immediately from the
moment of the death of such causante or predecessor in interest, there is no legal bar to a
successor (with requisite contracting capacity) disposing of her or his hereditary share immediately
after such death, even if the actual extent of such share is not determined until the subsequent
liquidation of the estate.[59]
Further, still according to Intestate Estate of Josefa Tangco, this alienation by the heirs of their
aliquot portion of the inheritance is recognized by no less than the Civil Code, viz:
[A]nd as already shown, that eventual share she owned from the time of Francisco's death and the
Court of Nueva Ecija could not bar her selling it. As owner of her undivided hereditary share,
Tasiana could dispose of it in favor of whomsoever she chose. Such alienation is expressly
recognized and provided for by article 1088 of the present Civil Code:
Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the partition, any or
all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the
price of the sale, provided they do so within the period of one month from the time they were
notified in writing of the sale of the vendor.
If a sale of a hereditary right can be made to a stranger, then a fortiori sale thereof to a
coheir could not be forbidden."[60] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In yet another case, Alejandrino vs. Court of Appeals,[61] the Court has ruled that "when a co-
owner sells his inchoate right in the co-ownership, he expresses his intention to 'put an end to
indivision among (his) co-heirs.' Partition among co-owners may thus be evidenced by the overt
act of a co-owner of renouncing his right over the property regardless of the form it takes."[62] The
Court based this assertion on Article 1082 of the Civil Code, which states that:
Art. 1082. Every act which is intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or
devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a
compromise, or any other transaction. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Thus, when the petitioners herein asserted that the respondent has "no more right of participation"
over the subject property because the successional rights of the respondent's parents over the
same has already been conveyed to the petitioners' father, the petitioners tendered a genuine
issue. They were in fact stating that the respondent's parents exercised their right to sell,
exchange, or compromise their undivided inchoate share of their inheritance from Jayme, and, as
the Court ruled in Alejandrino, the respondent's parents intended a partition of the property as
defined in Article 1079 of the Civil Code.[63]
The truthfulness of this allegation, however, could only be ascertained through the presentation of
evidence during trial, and not in a summary judgment.
More, the RTC did not only commit reversible error by rendering a summary judgment despite the
presence of a genuine issue, it also committed reversible error by applying the rules on summary
SpecPro Rule 74
judgment despite the absence of any motion from any of the parties that prayed for the rule's
application.
In their Motion for Reconsideration on the RTC decision, the petitioners argued that none of the
parties prayed for the issuance of a summary judgment. They further averred that the "unilateral
declaration of the trial court that the resolution supposedly on the pending motions/incidents will
also be considered as the resolution of the partition case cannot take the place of the required
motion and hearing."[64] In fact, they were adamant in clarifying that:
12.3. The supposed reiteration by the trial Court of its declaration that the "pending
motions/incidents" were considered submitted for resolution as embodied in its Order dated
October 29, 2013 could not have warranted the motu proprio summary judgment. To begin with,
the appellee herself in her Appellee's Brief, concedes that what were submitted for resolution
during the October 29, 2013 hearing were the same pending motions as stated earlier, and could
not have been the case of partition itself. It can be culled even from the assailed Decision of the
trial Court itself that what were submitted for resolution were the then pending incidents and not
the main case for partition itself.[65] (Citations omitted)
In their petition, the petitioners reiterated this assertion, to wit:
27. To the clear understanding of the parties including Atty. Cortes, the pending incidents at the
time were the Motion to Dismiss filed by defendant Emeterio Enriquez questioning the
jurisdiction of the trial court over him for lack of service of summons; the Opposition thereto filed
by herein respondent; the Reply of Emeterio Enriquez to the opposition of the
appellee; the Rejoinder to the reply; and the Motion to Withdraw filed by therein counsel of
herein respondent.
28. Unpredictably and beyond the expectation of the defendants including herein
petitioners, the trial court rendered a summary judgment as embodied in its Decision dated
22 November 2013. The presiding judge and ponente of said decision soon retired on March
2014.[66]
Even the respondent did not deny the petitioners' allegation that no motion was filed to apply the
rules on summary judgment. In addition, in its decision, the trial court itself admitted to having
issued the same motu proprio, as none of the parties herein moved for such summary judgment. It
stated that:
x x x [S]ummary judgment maybe (sic) rendered in this case upon the own initiative of the Court
as none of the parties moved for such summary judgment to be rendered in this instant
case despite the glaring and apparent existence of no genuine issue on material facts, sham
defenses had been put by the defense or mere general denial of the cause of action for partition
judicially demanded by the plaintiffs had been alleged by the defendants.[67] (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, that the trial court rendered a summary judgment despite the absence of any motion calling
for its application was in clear contravention of the established rules of procedure. To be sure, on
the strength of the Court's unequivocal pronouncements
in Caridao,[68] Viajar,[69] Calubaquib,[70] and Pascual,[71] which require the observance of the
procedural guidelines for the rendition of summary judgments, the RTC committed reversible error,
and the RTC and CA decisions must perforce be annulled and set aside.
On the Issue of Partition and the Settlement of Estate
On the basis of the discourse above, there should have been no further necessity to discuss the
final issue herein presented. Nonetheless, for the guidance of the RTC in resolving the instant
case, a discussion of the nature of the partition is in order.
The petitioners argue that an administration proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased is a condition that has to be met before any partition of the estate and any distribution
thereof to the heirs could be effected.
While the Court does not agree with this assertion by the petitioners, the Court, nonetheless,
agrees that the trial court should have collated Jayme's other properties, if any, prior to the
promulgation of any judgment of partition in accordance with the laws on Succession.
Generally, an action for partition may be seen to simultaneously present two issues: first, there is
the issue of whether the plaintiff is indeed a co-owner of the property sought to be partitioned; and
second, assuming that the plaintiff successfully hurdles the first issue, there is the secondary issue
of how the property is to be divided between the plaintiff and defendants, i.e., what portion should
go to which co-owner.[72]
The Court must emphasize, however, that this definition does not take into account the difference
between (1) an action of partition based on the successional rights of the heirs of a decedent, and
(2) an ordinary action of partition among co-owners. While oftentimes interchanged with one
another, and although in many ways similar, these two partitions draw legal basis from two
different sets of legal provisions in the Civil Code of the Philippines (Civil Code).[73]
To begin with, the laws governing the partition of inheritance draws basis from Article 777 of the
Civil Code, which states that the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the
death of the decedent. As such, from that moment, the heirs, legatees, and devisees' successional
rights are vested, and they are considered to own in common the inheritance left by the decedent.
Under the law, partition of the inheritance may only be effected by (1) the heirs themselves
SpecPro Rule 74
extrajudicially, (2) by the court in an ordinary action for partition, or in the course of administration
proceedings, (3) by the testator himself, and (4) by the third person designated by the testator.[74]
A reading of the enumeration set above would reveal instances when the appointment of an
executor or administrator is dispensed with. One is through the execution of a public instrument by
the heirs in an extrajudicial settlement of the estate.[75] Another, which is the focal point of this
case, is through the ordinary action of partition.[76]
According to Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, the heirs may resort to an ordinary action of partition of
the estate of the deceased if they disagree as to the exact division of the estate, and only "[i]f the
decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented by
their judicial or legal representatives duly authorized for the purpose."[77]
The ordinary action for partition therefore is meant to take the place of the special proceeding on
the settlement of the estate. The reason is that, if the deceased dies without pending obligations,
there is no necessity for the appointment of an administrator to administer the estate for the heirs
and the creditors, much less, the necessity to deprive the real owners of their possession to which
they are immediately entitled.[78]
Thus, an action for partition with regard to the inheritance of the heirs should conform to the law
governing the partition and distribution of the estate, and not only to the law governing ordinary
partition. These pertinent provisions of the law could be found in Title IV (Succession), Chapter 4
(Provisions Common to Testate and Intestate Successions), Section 6 (Partition and Distribution
of the Estate) of the Civil Code.[79]
Particularly, according to Article 1078 of the Civil Code, where there are two or more heirs, the
whole estate of the decedent is owned in common by such heirs, subject to the payment of debts
of the deceased.[80] Partition, the Civil Code adds, is the separation, division and assignment of a
thing held in common among those to whom it may belong.[81] Thus, every act which is intended to
put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition,
although it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any other transaction. [82]
In addition, and on account of this partition, Article 1061 of the Civil Code requires the parties to
collate the properties of the decedent which they may have received by way of gratuitous title prior
to the former's death, to wit:
Article 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into
the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have received from the decedent,
during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may
be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the
partition. (1035a) (Emphasis supplied)
On the procedural aspect, the partition of the estate based on the successional rights of the heirs,
as herein mentioned, is required by Rule 74 of the Rules of Court (Summary Settlement of Estate)
to follow the rules on "ordinary action of partition." This pertains to Rule 69 (Partition), Section 13
of the same rules, which states that:
Section 13. Partition of personal property. — The provisions of this Rule shall apply to
partitions of estates composed of personal property, or of both real and personal property, in so
far as the same may be applicable. (13) (Emphasis supplied)
Once legally partitioned, each heir is conferred with the exclusive ownership of the property, which
was adjudicated to him/her.[83]
In contrast, an ordinary partition of co-owned property, specifically of real property, is governed by
Title III of the Civil Code on Co-ownership.
Article 484 of the Civil Code provides that there is co-ownership whenever the ownership of an
undivided thing or right belongs to different persons.[84] It further provides that no co-owner shall be
obliged to remain in the co-ownership; each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the
thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned.[85] This partition may be made by
agreement between the parties, or by judicial proceedings,[86] which, like the procedural aspect of
the partition by virtue of successional rights, is governed by Rule 69 of the Rules of Court.
Thus, while both partitions make use of Rule 69 as the procedural rule that would govern
the manner of partition, the foregoing disquisitions explicitly elaborate that the bases of the
ownership are different, and the subject matters concerned are also different—one speaks of the
partition of the estate to distribute the inheritance to the heirs, legatees, or devisees, whereas the
other speaks of partition of any undivided thing or right to distribute to the co-owners thereof.
In the case at hand, the parties are the heirs of the late Jayme Morales. The land being sought to
be divided was a property duly registered under Jayme's name. Necessarily, therefore, the
partition invoked by the respondents is the partition of the estate of the deceased Jayme.
As such, when the petitioners alleged in their answer that there is yet another property that needs
to be partitioned among the parties, they were actually invoking the Civil Code provisions, not on
Co-ownership, but on Succession, which necessarily includes Article 1061 of the Civil Code—the
provision on collation. It is therefore proper for the trial court to have delved into this issue
presented by the petitioner instead of disregarding the same and limiting itself only to that singular
property submitted by the respondent for partition. As the case of Gulang vs. Court of
Appeals[87] said:
In case the defendants assert in their Answer exclusive title in themselves adversely to the
plaintiff, the court should not dismiss the plaintiff's action for partition but, on the contrary
SpecPro Rule 74
and in the exercise of its general jurisdiction, resolve the question of whether the plaintiff is co-
owner or not.[88] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Nonetheless, lest it be misunderstood, the law does not prohibit partial partition. In fact, the Court,
in administration proceedings, have allowed partition for special instances. But the Court should
caution that this power should be exercised sparingly. This is because a partial partition and
distribution of the estate does not put to rest the question of the division of the entire
estate. In the case of Gatmaitan vs. Medina,[89] Justice J.B.L. Reyes warned:

The lower court, we believe, erred in rendering the order appealed from. A partial distribution of
the decedent's estate pending the final termination of the testate or intestate proceedings
should as much as possible be discouraged by the courts and, unless in extreme cases,
such form of advances of inheritance should not be countenanced. The reason for this strict
rule is obvious — courts should guard with utmost zeal and jealousy the estate of the decedent to
the end that the creditors thereof be adequately protected and all the rightful heirs assured of their
shares in the inheritance.[90] (Emphasis supplied)

In this case, the Court is of the opinion that there is no cogent reason to render the partition of one
of Jayme's properties and totally ignore the others, if any. Absent any circumstance that would
warrant the partial partition and distribution of Jayme's estate, the prudent remedy is to settle the
entirety of the estate in the partition proceedings in the court a quo. Besides, as stated by the
Court in Gulang, it is quite unnecessary to require the plaintiff to file another action, separate and
independent from that of partition originally instituted.[91] This would entail wastage of additional
time and resources, which could already be avoided through consolidated proceedings in the
court a quo.

In sum, the factual milieu of this case presents questions of facts which are crucial in the complete
resolution of the controversy. The Court finds sufficiency in the trial court's decision with regard to
the summons directed against the warring heirs—as submitted by the respondent, but also finds
error in the trial court's refusal to delve into the genuine issue concerning the partition of the
subject property—as submitted by the petitioners. In the end, only a full-blown trial on the merits of
each of the parties' claims—and not a mere summary judgment—could write finis on this family
drama.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 101991 dated August 13, 2015 and April 21, 2016, respectively, are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is ORDERED REMANDED to the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 12, of Laoag City for further proceedings. The trial court judge is ORDERED to hear
the case with dispatch.

SO ORDERED.
SpecPro Rule 74
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 115181 March 31, 2000
MARIA SOCORRO AVELINO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ANGELINA AVELINO, SHARON AVELINO, ANTONIO AVELINO, JR.,
TRACY AVELINO, PATRICK MICHAEL AVELINO and MARK ANTHONY
AVELINO, respondents.
RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
February 16, 1994 in CA-G.R. SP No. 31574 as well as its Resolution dated April 28, 1994
denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. The assailed Decision affirmed the Order of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 78, in Sp. Proc. No. Q-91-10441 converting
petitioner's petition for the issuance of letters of administration to an action for judicial partition.
Petitioner Maria Socorro Avelino is a daughter and compulsory heir of the late Antonio Avelino,
Sr., and his first wife private respondent Angelina Avelino.
The other private respondents, Sharon, Antonio Jr., Tracy, Patrick and Mark Anthony all surnamed
Avelino are likewise compulsory heirs of Avelino, Sr. Sharon, an American, is the second wife of
Avelino Sr. The other private respondents are siblings of petitioner Ma. Socorro.
The records reveal that on October 24, 1991, Ma. Socorro filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 78, docketed as SP Proc. No. Q-91-10441, a petition for the issuance of
letters of administration of the estate of Antonio Avelino, Sr., who died intestate on April 10, 1989.
She asked that she be appointed the administrator of the estate.
On December 3, 1992, Angelina, and the siblings filed their opposition by filing a motion to convert
the said judicial proceedings to an action for judicial partition which petitioner duly opposed.
On February 16, 1993, public respondent judge issued the assailed Order which reads:
Acting on the "Motion to Convert Proceedings to Action for Judicial Partition", considering
that the petitioner is the only heir not amenable to a simple partition, and all the other
compulsory heirs manifested their desire for an expeditious settlement of the estate of the
deceased Antonio Avelino, Sr., the same is granted.
WHEREFORE, the petition is converted into judicial partition of the estate of deceased
Antonio Avelino, Sr. The parties are directed to submit a complete inventory of all the real
and personal properties left by the deceased. Set the hearing of the judicial partition on
APRIL 13, 1993, at 8:30 o'clock in the morning. Notify all the parties and their counsel of
this assignment.
SO ORDERED.1
On March 17, 1993, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied in an Order
dated June 16, 1993.
On July 23, 1993, Ma. Socorro filed before the Court of Appeals, a petition for certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus alleging grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the trial court, in granting private respondents' motion to convert the
judicial proceeding for the issuance of letters of administration to an action for judicial partition. Her
petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 31574.
On February 18, 1994, the respondent appellate court rendered the assailed decision, stating that
the "petition is DENIED DUE COURSE" and accordingly dismissed. 2
On March 1, 1994, petitioner duly moved for reconsideration, but it was denied on April 28, 1994.
Hence, this petition. Petitioner assigns the following errors:
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE LOWER COURT'S FINDING
THAT PARTITION IS PROPER UNDER THE PREMISES.
ADMINISTRATION SHOULD BE THE PROPER REMEDY PENDING THE
DETERMINATION OF THE CHARACTER AND EXTENT OF THE DECEDENT'S
ESTATE.3
For resolution, we find that given the circumstances in this case, the sole issue here is whether
respondent appellate court committed an error of law and gravely abused its discretion in
upholding the trial court's finding that a partition is proper.
Petitioner submits that: First, no partition of the estate is possible in the instant case as no
determination has yet been made of the character and extent of the decedent's estate. She points
to the Court's ruling in Arcilles v. Montejo, 26 SCRA 197 (1969), where we held that when the
SpecPro Rule 74
existence of other properties of the decedent is a matter still to be reckoned with, administration
proceedings are the proper mode of resolving the same.4 In addition, petitioner contends that the
estate is in danger of being depleted for want of an administrator to manage and attend to it.
Second, petitioner insists that the Rules of Court does not provide for conversion of a motion for
the issuance of letters of administration to an action for judicial partition. The conversion of the
motion was, thus, procedurally inappropriate and should be struck down for lack of legal basis.
When a person dies intestate, or, if testate, failed to name an executor in his will or the executor
so named is incompetent, or refuses the trust, or fails to furnish the bond required by the Rules of
Court, then the decedent's estate shall be judicially administered and the competent court shall
appoint a qualified administrator in the order established in Section 6 of Rule 78. 5 The exceptions
to this rule are found in Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 746 which provide:
Sec. 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. — If the decedent left no will
and no debts and the heirs are all of age or the minors are represented by their judicial or
legal representatives duly authorized for the purpose, the parties may, without securing
letters of administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of
a public instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree,
they may do so in an ordinary action of partition. . .
Sec. 2. Summary settlement of estates of small value. — Whenever the gross value of
the estate of a deceased person, whether he died testate or intestate, does not exceed
ten thousand pesos, and that fact if made to appear to the Regional Trial Court having
jurisdiction of the estate by the petition of an interested person and upon hearing, which
shall be held not less than one (1) month nor more than three (3) months from the date of
the last publication of a notice which shall be published once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province, and after such
other notice to interested persons as the court may direct, the court may proceed
summarily, without the appointment of an executor or administrator, and without delay, to
grant, if proper, allowance of the will, if any there be, to determine who are the persons
legally entitled to participate in the estate and to apportion and divide it among them after
the payment of such debts of the estate as the court shall then find to be due; and such
persons, in their own right, if they are lawful age and legal capacity, or by their guardians
or trustees legally appointed and qualified, if otherwise, shall thereupon be entitled to
receive and enter into the possession of the portions of the estate so awarded to them
respectively. The court shall make such order as may be just respecting the costs of the
proceedings, and all orders and judgments made or rendered in the course thereof shall
be recorded in the office of the clerk, and the order of partition or award, if it involves real
estate, shall be recorded in the proper register's office.1awp++i1
The heirs succeed immediately to all of the rights and properties of the deceased at the moment of
the latter's death.7 Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, allows heirs to divide the estate
among themselves without need of delay and risks of being dissipated. When a person dies
without leaving pending obligations, his heirs, are not required to submit the property for judicial
administration, nor apply for the appointment of an administrator by the court.8
We note that the Court of Appeals found that in this case "the decedent left no debts and the heirs
and legatees are all of age."9 With this finding, it is our view that Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of
Court should apply.
In a last-ditch effort to justify the need for an administrator, petitioner insists that there is nothing to
partition yet, as the nature and character of the estate have yet to be determined. We find,
however, that a complete inventory of the estate may be done during the partition proceedings,
especially since the estate has no debts. Hence, the Court of Appeals committed no reversible
error when it ruled that the lower court did not err in converting petitioner's action for letters of
administration into an action for judicial partition.
Nor can we sustain petitioner's argument that the order of the trial court converting an action for
letters of administration to one for judicial partition has no basis in the Rules of Court, hence
procedurally infirm. The basis for the trial court's order is Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court.
It provides that in cases where the heirs disagree as to the partition of the estate and no
extrajudicial settlement is possible, then an ordinary action for partition may be resorted to, as in
this case. We have held that where the more expeditious remedy of partition is available to the
heirs, then the heirs or the majority of them may not be compelled to submit to administration
proceedings. 10 The trial court appropriately converted petitioner's action for letters of
administration into a suit for judicial partition, upon motion of the private respondents. No
reversible error may be attributed to the Court of Appeals when it found the trial court's action
procedurally in order.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit, and the assailed decision and resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 31574 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.1âwphi1.nêt
SpecPro Rule 74
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 229775, March 11, 2019
LILIBETH ESPINAS-LANUZA, ONEL ESPINAS, AS HEIRS OF LEOPOLDO ESPINAS, AND
THE MUNICIPAL ASSESSOR OF DARAGA, ALBAY, PETITIONERS, v. FELIX LUNA, JR.,
ARMANDO VELASCO AND ANTONIO VELASCO, AS HEIRS OF SIMON VELASCO,
RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
J. REYES, JR., J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari are the June 13, 2016 Decision1 and the January
26, 2017 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 104306 which affirmed the
December 2, 2014 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Legazpi City, Branch 1 in Civil
Case No. 10955, a case for annulment of extrajudicial settlement.
The Antecedents
During his lifetime, Simon Velasco (Simon) was the owner of several properties including the land
covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 20630, situated in Namantao, Daraga, Albay
(subject property). Simon had four children, namely, Heriberto Velasco (Heriberto), Genoviva
Velasco (Genoviva),4 Felisa Velasco (Felisa),5 and Juan Velasco (Juan). Felix Luna, Jr. (Felix), is
the son of Genoviva, while Armando Velasco and Antonio Velasco are the children of Heriberto
(collectively, respondents).
Respondents allege that Juan and Felisa, through deceit, connivance, and misrepresentation,
executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale dated May 14, 1966, which adjudicated the
subject property to Leopoldo Espinas (Leopoldo), son of Felisa. They further contend that they
discovered the fraud in 2010 when they came to know that Tax Declaration No. 02-040-0147 was
issued in Leopoldo's name.
In their defense, Lilibeth Espinas-Lanuza and Onel Espinas (petitioners), children of Leopoldo,
argue that when Simon died intestate, his children agreed to partition his estate such that the
property situated in Magogon, Camalig, Albay went to Genoviva and the parcel of land located in
Ting-ting, Taloto, Camalig, Albay went to Heriberto. On the other hand, the subject property was
the joint share of Juan and Felisa who subsequently executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement
and Sale on May 14, 1966, conveying the subject property to Leopoldo.
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision dated December 2, 2014, the RTC ruled that the co-owners of Simon's properties
were his children, Genoviva, Felisa, Juan and Heriberto. It held that as co-owners of the subject
property, Felisa and Juan enjoyed full ownership of their portions and they had the right to alienate
the same. The trial court added that the sale by Felisa and Juan of their respective undivided
shares in the co-ownership was valid and the vendee, Leopoldo, became the owner of the shares
sold to him. It concluded that the heirs of Heriberto and Genoviva were co-owners of Leopoldo in
the subject property. The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, the evidence for the [petitioners] not having been preponderant on their claim, the
court rules in favor of the [respondents] and now declare that [respondents] FELIX LUNA, JR.,
ARMANDO VELASCO and ANTONIO VELASCO, are co-owners with [petitioners] LILIBETH
ESPINAS-LANUZA and ONEL ESPINAS, of Cadastral Lot No. 13507 situated in the
Municipality of Daraga, Albay.
By whatever manner Cadastral Lot No. 13507 is listed for tax purposes in the Office of the
Municipal Assessor of Daraga, Albay the same does not alter the fact that it is a parcel of land in
co-ownership.
Defendants' counterclaim is dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.6
The CA Ruling
In a Decision dated June 13, 2016, the CA adjudged that Heriberto and Genoviva were excluded
in the execution of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement entered into by Juan and Felisa as there
was no showing that Heriberto and Genoviva were already deceased when the deed was
executed. It noted that the extrajudicial settlement adjudicated and sold properties which still
formed part of the estate of Simon and were, therefore, co-owned by his heirs. The appellate court
emphasized that under Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, no extrajudicial settlement shall
be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof. It opined
that fraud had been committed against the excluded heirs, thus, the Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement and Sale must be annulled. The CA disposed the case in this wise:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.7
Petitioners moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated
January 26, 2017. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari, wherein petitioners raised the
following errors:
 SpecPro Rule 74
I. THE [CA] ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN UPHOLDING THE
FINDINGS OF THE RTC-ALBAY, BRANCH 1 THAT FELIX LUNA, JR., ARMANDO
VELASCO AND ANTONIO VELASCO ARE CO-OWNERS WITH [PETITIONERS] LILIBETH
ESPINAS-LANUZA AND ONEL ESPINAS OF CADASTRAL LOT NO. 13507 SITUATED IN
THE MUNICIPALITY OF DARAGA, ALBAY[;]
II. THAT THE [CA] ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN IGNORING THE
ACTUAL PARTITION ALREADY DONE BY GENOVIVA, HERIBERTO, FELISA AND JUAN,
ALL SURNAMED VELASCO LONG BEFORE THE SALE OF LOT NO. 13507 IN FAVOR OF
LEOPOLDO ESPINAS ON MAY 14, 1966[; and]
III. THAT THE [CA] ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT IGNORED
THE PRESENCE OF LACHES AND PRESCRIPTION IN PETITIONERS' FAVOR ALLEGING
FRAUD HAS BEEN COMMITTED AGAINST THE EXCLUDED HEIRS.8
Petitioners argue that all of Simon's children were given their respective hereditary shares from
the estate; that the property situated in Magogon, Camalig, Albay went to Genoviva, while the
property situated in Ting-ting, Taloto, Camalig, Albay went to Heriberto; that the subject property
was given to Juan and Felisa as their share in the estate; that Juan and Felisa knew that their
brother and sister had already been given their due shares in the estate of Simon, thus, when they
sold the subject property to Leopoldo, they no longer deemed it necessary to have Genoviva and
Heriberto sign the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale; that the land given to Juan and
Felisa was under the name of Simon, thus, they had to execute a deed of extrajudicial settlement
in order to transfer the subject property to Leopoldo; that the distribution of Simon's properties
shows that there had been a partition; that the heirs of Simon had been in possession of their
respective hereditary shares; and that Genoviva and Heriberto never questioned the ownership of
Juan and Felisa during their lifetime nor the sale made in favor of Leopoldo. 9
In their Comment,10 respondents counter that a deed of extrajudicial partition executed without
including some of the heirs, who had no knowledge of and consent to the same, is fraudulent and
vicious; and that after the death of Simon, his children never partitioned his estate.
In their Reply,11 petitioners contend that "a parol partition may also be sustained on the ground
that the parties thereto have acquiesced in and ratified the partition by taking possession in
severalty, exercising acts of ownership with respect thereto, or otherwise recognizing the
existence of the partition:"12 that for more than 44 years, no one among the heirs of Simon ever
bothered to question Leopoldo's open possession of the subject property which was the joint
hereditary share of Felisa and Juan; that Leopoldo's open and notorious possession of the subject
property for 44 years supports the presumption that there was already an actual partition among
the heirs of Simon.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
Partition is the separation, division and assignment of a thing held in common among those to
whom it may belong.13 It may be effected extrajudicially by the heirs themselves through a public
instrument filed before the register of deeds.14
However, as between the parties, a public instrument is neither constitutive nor an inherent
element of a contract of partition.15 Since registration serves as constructive notice to third
persons, an oral partition by the heirs is valid if no creditors, are affected. 16 Moreover, even the
requirement of a written memorandum under the statute of frauds does not apply to partitions
effected by the heirs where no creditors are involved considering that such transaction is not a
conveyance of property resulting in change of ownership but merely a designation and
segregation of that part which belongs to each heir.17
Every act which is intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is
deemed to be a partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or
any other transaction.18 Furthermore, in Hernandez v. Andal,19 the Court explained that:
On general principle, independent and in spite of the statute of frauds, courts of equity have
enforced oral partition when it has been completely or partly performed.
Regardless of whether a parol partition or agreement to partition is valid and enforceable at law,
equity will in proper cases, where the parol partition has actually been consummated by the taking
of possession in severalty and the exercise of ownership by the parties of the respective portions
set off to each, recognize and enforce such parol partition and the rights of the parties thereunder.
Thus, it has been held or stated in a number of cases involving an oral partition under which the
parties went into possession, exercised acts of ownership, or otherwise partly performed the
partition agreement, that equity will confirm such partition and in a proper case decree title in
accordance with the possession in severalty.
In numerous cases it has been held or stated that parol partitions may be sustained on the ground
of estoppel of the parties to assert the rights of a tenant in common as to parts of land divided by
parol partition as to which possession in severalty was taken and acts of individual ownership
were exercised. And a court of equity will recognize the agreement and decree it to be valid and
effectual for the purpose of concluding the right of the parties as between each other to hold their
respective parts in severalty.
A parol partition may also be sustained on the ground that the parties thereto have acquiesced in
and ratified the partition by taking possession in severalty, exercising acts of ownership with
respect thereto, or otherwise recognizing the existence of the partition.
A number of cases have specifically applied the doctrine of part performance, or have stated that
a part performance is necessary, to take a parol partition out of the operation of the statute of
frauds. It has been held that where there was a partition in fact between tenants in common, and a
SpecPro Rule 74
part performance, a court of equity would have regard to and enforce such partition agreed to by
the parties.
In Maglucot-Aw v. Maglucot,20 the Court declared, viz.:
Partition may be inferred from circumstances sufficiently strong to support the presumption. Thus,
after a long possession in severalty, a deed of partition may be presumed. It has been held that
recitals in deeds, possession and occupation of land, improvements made thereon for a long
series of years, and acquiescence for 60 years, furnish sufficient evidence that there was an
actual partition of land either by deed or by proceedings in the probate court, which had been lost
and were not recorded.
In the case at bar, it has been shown that upon the death of Simon, his children, Genoviva,
Heriberto, Juan and Felisa, orally partitioned the estate among themselves, with each one of them
possessing their respective shares and exercising acts of ownership. Respondents did not dispute
that the property situated in Magogon, Camalig, Albay went to Genoviva while the property
situated in Ting-ting, Taloto, Camalig, Albay went to Heriberto. Further, they did not raise any
objection to the fact that the subject property was given to Juan and Felisa as their share in
Simon's estate. It must be emphasized that no one among the children of Simon disturbed
the status quo which has been going on from the year 1966. To be sure, Genoviva and Heriberto
were not without knowledge that the subject property was transferred to Leopoldo and that the
latter had introduced improvements thereon. They could have easily questioned the transfer, but
they chose to remain silent precisely because they were already given their respective shares in
the estate. Hence, it can be gleaned unerringly that the heirs of Simon agreed to orally partition his
estate among themselves, as evinced by their possession of the inherited premises, their
construction of improvements thereon, and their having declared in their names for taxation
purposes their respective shares. Actual possession and exercise of dominion over definite
portions of the property in accordance with an alleged partition are considered strong proof of an
oral partition.21
In addition, a possessor of real estate property is presumed to have title thereto unless the
adverse claimant establishes a better right.22 Also, under Article 541 of the Civil Code, one who
possesses in the concept of an owner has in his favor the legal presumption that he possesses
with a just title, and he cannot be obliged to show or prove it. Moreover, Article 433 of the Civil
Code provides that actual possession under a claim of ownership raises a disputable presumption
of ownership. Here, aside from respondents' bare claim that they are co-owners of the subject
property, they failed to adduce proof that the heirs of Simon did not actually partition his estate.
Finally, laches has set in against respondents, precluding their right to recover the subject
property. In De Vera-Cruz v. Miguel,23 the Court declared:
Laches has been defined as such neglect or omission to assert a right, taken in conjunction with
lapse of time and other circumstances causing prejudice to an adverse party, as will operate as a
bar in equity. It is a delay in the assertion of a right which works disadvantage to another because
of the inequity founded on some change in the condition or relations of the property or parties. It is
based on public policy which, for the peace of society, ordains that relief will be denied to a stale
demand which otherwise could be a valid claim. It is different from and applies independently of
prescription. While prescription is concerned with the fact of delay, laches is concerned with the
effect of delay. Prescription is a matter of time; laches is principally a question of inequity of
permitting a claim to be enforced, this inequity being founded on some change in the condition of
the property or the relation of the parties. Prescription is statutory; laches is not. Laches applies in
equity, whereas prescription applies at law. Prescription is based on a fixed time, laches is not.
Laches means the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do
that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting the presumption that the party
entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert it. (Citations omitted)
The elements of laches are: (1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or one under whom he
claims, giving rise to the situation that led to the complaint and for which the complaint seeks a
remedy; (2) delay in asserting the complainant's rights, having had knowledge or notice of the
defendant's conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit; (3) lack of
knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the right on
which he bases his suit; and (4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded
to the complainant, or the suit is not held barred.24
In this case, there is no question on the presence of the first element of laches. The object of
respondents' complaint before the trial court was to annul the extrajudicial settlement in order to
recover their shares in the subject property, which is presently in the hands of petitioners. The
second element of delay is also present in the case at bar. Respondents' suit was instituted in
2010, 44 years after the property was conveyed to Leopoldo in 1966. Again, respondents'
predecessors-in-interest, Genoviva and Heriberto, could not have been unaware of Leopoldo's
open and continuous possession of the subject property. The third element is also present in this
case. Petitioners had no inkling of respondents' intent to possess the subject property considering
that Simon's children never contested the conveyance of the subject property to Leopoldo. As to
the fourth element of laches, it goes without saying that petitioners will be prejudiced if
respondents' complaint is accorded relief, or not held barred. Needless to say, laches has set in
against respondents, precluding their right to recover the subject property.
Accordingly, considering that Felisa and Juan already owned the subject property at the time they
sold the same to Leopoldo on May 14, 1966, having been assigned such property pursuant to the
oral partition of the estate of Simon effected by his heirs, petitioners are entitled to actual
possession thereof.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The June 13, 2016 Decision and the January 26, 2017
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 104306 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
A new judgment is hereby entered:
SpecPro Rule 74

1) Declaring the land covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 20630, situated in
Namantao, Daraga, Albay as the share of Juan Velasco and Felisa Velasco in the estate of
Simon Velasco; and

2) Declaring petitioners as lawful possessors of the property covered by Original Certificate of

Title (OCT) No. 20630, situated in Namantao, Daraga, Albay by virtue of the Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale executed by Juan Velasco and Felisa Velasco in favor of
Leopoldo Espinas, petitioners' predecessor-in-interest.

SO ORDERED.
SpecPro Rule 74
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 155733 January 27, 2006
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATES OF THE DECEASED JOSEFA DELGADO
AND GUILLERMO RUSTIA CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA and other HEIRS OF
LUIS DELGADO, namely, HEIRS OF CONCHA VDA. DE AREVALO, HEIRS OF LUISA
DELGADO VDA. DE DANAO, ANGELA DELGADO ARESPACOCHAGA, TERESA DELGADO
PERLAS, CAROLINA DELGADO-ARESPACOCHAGA, RODOLFO DELGADO, BENJAMIN
DELGADO, GLICERIA DELGADO and CLEOFAS DELGADO; and HEIRS OF GORGONIO
DELGADO, namely, RAMON DELGADO CAMPO, CARLOS DELGADO CAMPO, CLARITA
DELGADO CAMPO-REIZA, YOLANDA DELGADO ENCINAS, FELISA DELGADO CAMPO-
ENCINAS and MELINDA DELGADO CAMPO-MADARANG, Petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF MARCIANA RUSTIA VDA. DE DAMIAN, namely, GUILLERMO R. DAMIAN and
JOSE R. DAMIAN; HEIRS OF HORTENCIA RUSTIA CRUZ, namely, TERESITA CRUZ-SISON,
HORACIO R. CRUZ, JOSEFINA CRUZ-RODIL, AMELIA CRUZ-ENRIQUEZ and FIDEL R.
CRUZ, JR.; HEIRS OF ROMAN RUSTIA, SR., namely, JOSEFINA RUSTIA ALBANO,
VIRGINIA RUSTIA PARAISO, ROMAN RUSTIA, JR., SERGIO RUSTIA, FRANCISCO RUSTIA,
LETICIA RUSTIA-MIRANDA; and GUILLERMINA RUSTIA, as Oppositors;1 and GUILLERMA
RUSTIA, as Intervenor,2 Respondents.3
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners seek to reinstate the May 11, 1990 decision of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 55,4 in SP Case No. 97668, which was reversed
and set aside by the Court of Appeals in its decision5 dated October 24, 2002.
FACTS OF THE CASE
This case concerns the settlement of the intestate estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa
Delgado.6 The main issue in this case is relatively simple: who, between petitioners and
respondents, are the lawful heirs of the decedents. However, it is attended by several collateral
issues that complicate its resolution.
The claimants to the estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado may be divided into two
groups: (1) the alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado, consisting of her half- and full-blood siblings,
nephews and nieces, and grandnephews and grandnieces, and (2) the alleged heirs of Guillermo
Rustia, particularly, his sisters,7 his nephews and nieces,8 his illegitimate child,9 and the de
facto adopted child10 (ampun-ampunan) of the decedents.
The alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado
The deceased Josefa Delgado was the daughter of Felisa11 Delgado by one Lucio Campo. Aside
from Josefa, five other children were born to the couple, namely, Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba,
and Gorgonio, all surnamed Delgado. Felisa Delgado was never married to Lucio Campo, hence,
Josefa and her full-blood siblings were all natural children of Felisa Delgado.
However, Lucio Campo was not the first and only man in Felisa Delgado’s life. Before him was
Ramon Osorio12 with whom Felisa had a son, Luis Delgado. But, unlike her relationship with Lucio
Campo which was admittedly one without the benefit of marriage, the legal status of Ramon
Osorio’s and Felisa Delgado’s union is in dispute.
The question of whether Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio ever got married is crucial to the
claimants because the answer will determine whether their successional rights fall within the ambit
of the rule against reciprocal intestate succession between legitimate and illegitimate relatives. 13 If
Ramon Osorio and Felisa Delgado had been validly married, then their only child Luis Delgado
was a legitimate half-blood brother of Josefa Delgado and therefore excluded from the latter’s
intestate estate. He and his heirs would be barred by the principle of absolute separation between
the legitimate and illegitimate families. Conversely, if the couple were never married, Luis Delgado
and his heirs would be entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado’s intestate estate, as they would all
be within the illegitimate line.
Petitioners allege that Ramon Osorio and Felisa Delgado were never married. In support thereof,
they assert that no evidence was ever presented to establish it, not even so much as an allegation
of the date or place of the alleged marriage. What is clear, however, is that Felisa retained the
surname Delgado. So did Luis, her son with Ramon Osorio. Later on, when Luis got married,
his Partida de Casamiento14 stated that he was "hijo natural de Felisa Delgado" (the natural child
of Felisa Delgado),15 significantly omitting any mention of the name and other circumstances of his
father.16 Nevertheless, oppositors (now respondents) insist that the absence of a record of the
alleged marriage did not necessarily mean that no marriage ever took place.
Josefa Delgado died on September 8, 1972 without a will. She was survived by Guillermo Rustia
and some collateral relatives, the petitioners herein. Several months later, on June 15, 1973,
Guillermo Rustia executed an affidavit of self-
adjudication of the remaining properties comprising her estate.
The marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado
Sometime in 1917, Guillermo Rustia proposed marriage to Josefa Delgado 17 but whether a
marriage in fact took place is disputed. According to petitioners, the two eventually lived together
as husband and wife but were never married. To prove their assertion, petitioners point out that no
SpecPro Rule 74
record of the contested marriage existed in the civil registry. Moreover, a baptismal certificate
naming Josefa Delgado as one of the sponsors referred to her as "Señorita" or unmarried woman.
The oppositors (respondents here), on the other hand, insist that the absence of a marriage
certificate did not of necessity mean that no marriage transpired. They maintain that Guillermo
Rustia and Josefa Delgado were married on June 3, 1919 and from then on lived together as
husband and wife until the death of Josefa on September 8, 1972. During this period spanning
more than half a century, they were known among their relatives and friends to have in fact been
married. To support their proposition, oppositors presented the following pieces of evidence:
1. Certificate of Identity No. 9592 dated [December 1, 1944] issued to Mrs. Guillermo J.
Rustia by Carlos P. Romulo, then Resident Commissioner to the United States of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines;
2. Philippine Passport No. 4767 issued to Josefa D. Rustia on June 25, 1947;
3. Veterans Application for Pension or Compensation for Disability Resulting from Service
in the Active Military or Naval Forces of the United States- Claim No. C-4, 004, 503 (VA
Form 526) filed with the Veterans Administration of the United States of America by Dr.
Guillermo J. Rustia wherein Dr. Guillermo J. Rustia himself [swore] to his marriage to
Josefa Delgado in Manila on 3 June 1919;18
4. Titles to real properties in the name of Guillermo Rustia indicated that he was married
to Josefa Delgado.
The alleged heirs of Guillermo Rustia
Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado never had any children. With no children of their own, they
took into their home the youngsters Guillermina Rustia Rustia and Nanie Rustia. These children,
never legally adopted by the couple, were what was known in the local dialect as ampun-
ampunan.
During his life with Josefa, however, Guillermo Rustia did manage to father an illegitimate
child,19 the intervenor-respondent Guillerma Rustia, with one Amparo Sagarbarria. According to
Guillerma, Guillermo Rustia treated her as his daughter, his own flesh and blood, and she enjoyed
open and continuous possession of that status from her birth in 1920 until her father’s demise. In
fact, Josefa Delgado’s obituary which was prepared by Guillermo Rustia, named the intervenor-
respondent as one of their children. Also, her report card from the University of Santo Tomas
identified Guillermo Rustia as her parent/guardian.20
Oppositors (respondents here) nonetheless posit that Guillerma Rustia has no interest in the
intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia as she was never duly acknowledged as an illegitimate child.
They contend that her right to compulsory acknowledgement prescribed when Guillermo died in
1974 and that she cannot claim voluntary acknowledgement since the documents she presented
were not the authentic writings prescribed by the new Civil Code.21
On January 7, 1974, more than a year after the death of Josefa Delgado, Guillermo Rustia filed a
petition for the adoption22 of their ampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia. He stated under oath "[t]hat
he ha[d] no legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children or natural children by legal
fiction."23 The petition was overtaken by his death on February 28, 1974.
Like Josefa Delgado, Guillermo Rustia died without a will. He was survived by his sisters Marciana
Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia-Cruz, and by the children of his predeceased brother
Roman Rustia Sr., namely, Josefina Rustia Albano, Virginia Rustia Paraiso, Roman Rustia, Jr.,
Sergio Rustia, Francisco Rustia and Leticia Rustia Miranda.24
ANTECEDENT PROCEEDINGS
On May 8, 1975, Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao, the daughter of Luis Delgado, filed the original
petition for letters of administration of the intestate estates of the "spouses Josefa Delgado and
Guillermo Rustia" with the RTC of Manila, Branch 55.25 This petition was opposed by the following:
(1) the sisters of Guillermo Rustia, namely, Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia
Rustia-Cruz;26 (2) the heirs of Guillermo Rustia’s late brother, Roman Rustia, Sr., and (3)
the ampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia Rustia. The opposition was grounded on the theory that
Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao and the other claimants were barred under the law from inheriting
from their illegitimate half-blood relative Josefa Delgado.
In November of 1975, Guillerma Rustia filed a motion to intervene in the proceedings, claiming she
was the only surviving descendant in the direct line of Guillermo Rustia. Despite the objections of
the oppositors (respondents herein), the motion was granted.
On April 3, 1978, the original petition for letters of administration was amended to state that Josefa
Delgado and Guillermo Rustia were never married but had merely lived together as husband and
wife.
On January 24, 1980, oppositors (respondents herein) filed a motion to dismiss the petition in the
RTC insofar as the estate of Guillermo Rustia was concerned. The motion was denied on the
ground that the interests of the petitioners and the other claimants remained in issue and should
be properly threshed out upon submission of evidence.
On March 14, 1988, Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa substituted for her sister, Luisa
Delgado vda. de Danao, who had died on May 18, 1987.
SpecPro Rule 74
On May 11, 1990, the RTC appointed Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa as administratrix of
both estates.27 The dispositive portion of the decision read:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, petitioner and her co-claimants to the estate of the late
Josefa Delgado listed in the Petitions, and enumerated elsewhere in this Decision, are hereby
declared as the only legal heirs of the said Josefa Delgado who died intestate in the City of Manila
on September 8, 1972, and entitled to partition the same among themselves in accordance with
the proportions referred to in this Decision.
Similarly, the intervenor Guillerma S. Rustia is hereby declared as the sole and only surviving heir
of the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia, and thus, entitled to the entire estate of the said decedent, to the
exclusion of the oppositors and the other parties hereto.
The Affidavit of Self-Adjudication of the estate of Josefa Delgado executed by the late Guillermo J.
Rustia on June 15, 1973 is hereby SET ASIDE and declared of no force and effect.
As the estates of both dece[d]ents have not as yet been settled, and their settlement [is]
considered consolidated in this proceeding in accordance with law, a single administrator therefor
is both proper and necessary, and, as the petitioner Carlota Delgado Vda. de dela Rosa has
established her right to the appointment as administratrix of the estates, the Court hereby
APPOINTS her as the ADMINISTRATRIX of the intestate estate of the decedent JOSEFA
DELGADO in relation to the estate of DR. GUILLERMO J. RUSTIA.
Accordingly, let the corresponding LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION issue to the petitioner
CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA upon her filing of the requisite bond in the sum of
FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00).
Finally, oppositor GUILLERMINA RUSTIA RUSTIA is hereby ordered to cease and desist from her
acts of administration of the subject estates, and is likewise ordered to turn over to the appointed
administratix all her collections of the rentals and income due on the assets of the estates in
question, including all documents, papers, records and titles pertaining to such estates to the
petitioner and appointed administratix CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA, immediately
upon receipt of this Decision. The same oppositor is hereby required to render an accounting of
her actual administration of the estates in controversy within a period of sixty (60) days from
receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.28
On May 20, 1990, oppositors filed an appeal which was denied on the ground that the record on
appeal was not filed on time.29 They then filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus30 which was
dismissed by the Court of Appeals.31 However, on motion for reconsideration and after hearing the
parties’ oral arguments, the Court of Appeals reversed itself and gave due course to oppositors’
appeal in the interest of substantial justice.32
In a petition for review to this Court, petitioners assailed the resolution of the Court of Appeals, on
the ground that oppositors’ failure to file the record on appeal within the reglementary period was a
jurisdictional defect which nullified the appeal. On October 10, 1997, this Court allowed the
continuance of the appeal. The pertinent portion of our decision33 read:
As a rule, periods prescribed to do certain acts must be followed. However, under exceptional
circumstances, a delay in the filing of an appeal may be excused on grounds of substantial justice.
xxx xxx xxx
The respondent court likewise pointed out the trial court’s pronouncements as to certain matters of
substance, relating to the determination of the heirs of the decedents and the party entitled to the
administration of their estate, which were to be raised in the appeal, but were barred absolutely by
the denial of the record on appeal upon too technical ground of late filing.
xxx xxx xxx
In this instance, private respondents’ intention to raise valid issues in the appeal is apparent and
should not have been construed as an attempt to delay or prolong the administration proceedings.
xxx xxx xxx
A review of the trial court’s decision is needed.
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the Court hereby AFFIRMS the Resolution
dated November 27, 1991 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 23415, for
the APPROVAL of the private respondents’ Record on Appeal and the CONTINUANCE of the
appeal from the Manila, Branch LV Regional Trial Court’s May 11, 1990 decision.
SO ORDERED.
Acting on the appeal, the Court of Appeals34 partially set aside the trial court’s decision. Upon
motion for reconsideration,35 the Court of Appeals amended its earlier decision.36 The dispositive
portion of the amended decision read:
SpecPro Rule 74
With the further modification, our assailed decision is RECONSIDERED and VACATED.
Consequently, the decision of the trial court is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new one is
hereby RENDERED declaring: 1.) Dr. Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado Rustia to have been
legally married; 2.) the intestate estate of Dr. Guillermo Rustia, Jacoba Delgado-Encinas and the
children of Gorgonio Delgado (Campo) entitled to partition among themselves the intestate estate
of Josefa D. Rustia in accordance with the proportion referred to in this decision; 3.) the
oppositors-appellants as the legal heirs of the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia and thereby entitled to
partition his estate in accordance with the proportion referred to herein; and 4.) the intervenor-
appellee Guillerma S. Rustia as ineligible to inherit from the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia; thus
revoking her appointment as administratrix of his estate.
A presumption is an inference of the existence or non-existence of a fact which courts are
permitted to draw from proof of other facts. Presumptions are classified into presumptions of law
and presumptions of fact. Presumptions of law are, in turn, either conclusive or disputable.37
Rule 131, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. — The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted,
but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
xxx xxx xxx

The letters of administration of the intestate estate of Dr. Guillermo Rustia in relation to the (aa) That a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a
intestate estate of Josefa Delgado shall issue to the nominee of the oppositors-appellants upon lawful contract of marriage;
his or her qualification and filing of the requisite bond in the sum of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND
PESOS (P500,000.00).
xxx xxx xxx

Oppositor-appellant Guillermina Rustia Rustia is hereby ordered to cease and desist from her acts
In this case, several circumstances give rise to the presumption that a valid marriage existed
of administration of the subject estates and to turn over to the appointed administrator all her
between Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. Their cohabitation of more than 50 years cannot
collections of the rentals and incomes due on the assets of the estates in question, including all
be doubted. Their family and friends knew them to be married. Their reputed status as husband
documents, papers, records and titles pertaining to such estates to the appointed administrator,
and wife was such that even the original petition for letters of administration filed by Luisa
immediately upon notice of his qualification and posting of the requisite bond, and to render an
Delgado vda. de Danao in 1975 referred to them as "spouses."
accounting of her (Guillermina Rustia Rustia) actual administration of the estates in controversy
within a period of sixty (60) days from notice of the administrator’s qualification and posting of the
Yet, petitioners maintain that Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia had simply lived together as
bond.
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. They make much of the absence of a record of
the contested marriage, the testimony of a witness38 attesting that they were not married, and a
The issue of the validity of the affidavit of self-adjudication executed by Dr. Guillermo Rustia on
baptismal certificate which referred to Josefa Delgado as "Señorita" or unmarried woman.39
June 15, 1973 is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings to determine the extent of
the shares of Jacoba Delgado-Encinas and the children of Gorgonio Delgado (Campo) affected by
We are not persuaded.
the said adjudication.

First, although a marriage contract is considered a primary evidence of marriage, its absence is
Hence, this recourse.
not always proof that no marriage in fact took place.40 Once the presumption of marriage arises,
other evidence may be presented in support thereof. The evidence need not necessarily or directly
The issues for our resolution are:
establish the marriage but must at least be enough to strengthen the presumption of marriage.
Here, the certificate of identity issued to Josefa Delgado as Mrs. Guillermo Rustia, 41 the passport
1. whether there was a valid marriage between Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado; issued to her as Josefa D. Rustia,42 the declaration under oath of no less than Guillermo Rustia
that he was married to Josefa Delgado43 and the titles to the properties in the name of "Guillermo
2. who the legal heirs of the decedents Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado are; Rustia married to Josefa Delgado," more than adequately support the presumption of marriage.
These are public documents which are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.44 No clear
3. who should be issued letters of administration. and convincing evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption of the truth of the recitals therein
was presented by petitioners.
The marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado
SpecPro Rule 74
Second, Elisa vda. de Anson, petitioners’ own witness whose testimony they primarily relied upon
to support their position, confirmed that Guillermo Rustia had proposed marriage to Josefa
Delgado and that eventually, the two had "lived together as husband and wife." This again could
not but strengthen the presumption of marriage.
Third, the baptismal certificate45 was conclusive proof only of the baptism administered by the
priest who baptized the child. It was no proof of the veracity of the declarations and statements
contained therein,46 such as the alleged single or unmarried ("Señorita") civil status of Josefa
Delgado who had no hand in its preparation.
Petitioners failed to rebut the presumption of marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. In
this jurisdiction, every intendment of the law leans toward legitimizing matrimony. Persons dwelling
together apparently in marriage are presumed to be in fact married. This is the usual order of
things in society and, if the parties are not what they hold themselves out to be, they would be
living in constant violation of the common rules of law and propriety. Semper praesumitur pro
matrimonio. Always presume marriage.47
The Lawful Heirs Of Josefa Delgado
To determine who the lawful heirs of Josefa Delgado are, the questioned status of the cohabitation
of her mother Felisa Delgado with Ramon Osorio must first be addressed.
As mentioned earlier, presumptions of law are either conclusive or disputable. Conclusive
presumptions are inferences which the law makes so peremptory that no contrary proof, no matter
how strong, may overturn them.48 On the other hand, disputable presumptions, one of which is the
presumption of marriage, can be relied on only in the absence of sufficient evidence to the
contrary.
Little was said of the cohabitation or alleged marriage of Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio. The
oppositors (now respondents) chose merely to rely on the disputable presumption of marriage
even in the face of such countervailing evidence as (1) the continued use by Felisa and Luis (her
son with Ramon Osorio) of the surname Delgado and (2) Luis Delgado’s and Caridad
Concepcion’s Partida de Casamiento49 identifying Luis as "hijo natural de Felisa Delgado" (the
natural child of Felisa Delgado).50
All things considered, we rule that these factors sufficiently overcame the rebuttable presumption
of marriage. Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio were never married. Hence, all the children born
to Felisa Delgado out of her relations with Ramon Osorio and Lucio Campo, namely, Luis and his
half-blood siblings Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, Gorgonio and the decedent Josefa, all
surnamed Delgado,51 were her natural children.52
Pertinent to this matter is the following observation:
Suppose, however, that A begets X with B, and Y with another woman, C; then X and Y would be
natural brothers and sisters, but of half-blood relationship. Can they succeed each other
reciprocally?
The law prohibits reciprocal succession between illegitimate children and legitimate children of the
same parent, even though there is unquestionably a tie of blood between them. It seems that to
allow an illegitimate child to succeed ab intestato (from) another illegitimate child begotten with a
parent different from that of the former, would be allowing the illegitimate child greater rights than a
legitimate child. Notwithstanding this, however, we submit that
succession should be allowed, even when the illegitimate brothers and sisters are only of the half-
blood. The reason impelling the prohibition on reciprocal successions between legitimate and
illegitimate families does not apply to the case under consideration. That prohibition has for its
basis the difference in category between illegitimate and legitimate relatives. There is no such
difference when all the children are illegitimate children of the same parent, even if begotten with
different persons. They all stand on the same footing before the law, just like legitimate children of
half-blood relation. We submit, therefore, that the rules regarding succession of legitimate brothers
and sisters should be applicable to them. Full blood illegitimate brothers and sisters should receive
double the portion of half-blood brothers and sisters; and if all are either of the full blood or of the
half-blood, they shall share equally.53
Here, the above-named siblings of Josefa Delgado were related to her by full-blood, except Luis
Delgado, her half-brother. Nonetheless, since they were all illegitimate, they may inherit from each
other. Accordingly, all of them are entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado.
We note, however, that the petitioners before us are already the nephews, nieces, grandnephews
and grandnieces of Josefa Delgado. Under Article 972 of the new Civil Code, the right of
representation in the collateral line takes place only in favor of the children of brothers and sisters
(nephews and nieces). Consequently, it cannot be exercised by grandnephews and
grandnieces.54 Therefore, the only collateral relatives of Josefa Delgado who are entitled to
partake of her intestate estate are her brothers and sisters, or their children who were still alive at
the time of her death on September 8, 1972. They have a vested right to participate in the
inheritance.55 The records not being clear on this matter, it is now for the trial court to determine
who were the surviving brothers and sisters (or their children) of Josefa Delgado at the time of her
death. Together with Guillermo Rustia,56 they are entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado in
accordance with Article 1001 of the new Civil Code:57
Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the
latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to
the other one-half.
SpecPro Rule 74
Since Josefa Delgado had heirs other than Guillermo Rustia, Guillermo could not have validly
adjudicated Josefa’s estate all to himself. Rule 74, Section 1 of the Rules of Court is clear.
Adjudication by an heir of the decedent’s entire estate to himself by means of an affidavit is
allowed only if he is the sole heir to the estate:
SECTION 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. – If the decedent left no will
and no debts and the heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial or legal
representatives duly authorized for the purpose, the parties may, without securing letters of
administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument
filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary
action of partition. If there is only one heir, he may adjudicate to himself the estate by means
of an affidavit filed in the office of the register of deeds. x x x (emphasis supplied)
The Lawful Heirs Of Guillermo Rustia
Intervenor (now co-respondent) Guillerma Rustia is an illegitimate child58 of Guillermo Rustia. As
such, she may be entitled to successional rights only upon proof of an admission or recognition of
paternity.59 She, however, claimed the status of an acknowledged illegitimate child of Guillermo
Rustia only after the death of the latter on February 28, 1974 at which time it was already the new
Civil Code that was in effect.
Under the old Civil Code (which was in force till August 29, 1950), illegitimate children absolutely
had no hereditary rights. This draconian edict was, however, later relaxed in the new Civil Code
which granted certain successional rights to illegitimate children but only on condition that they
were first recognized or acknowledged by the parent.
Under the new law, recognition may be compulsory or voluntary.60 Recognition is compulsory in
any of the following cases:
(1) in cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when the period of the offense coincides
more or less with that of the conception;
(2) when the child is in continuous possession of status of a child of the alleged father (or
mother)61 by the direct acts of the latter or of his family;
(3) when the child was conceived during the time when the mother cohabited with the
supposed father;
62
(4) when the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the defendant is his father.
On the other hand, voluntary recognition may be made in the record of birth, a will, a statement
before a court of record or in any authentic writing.63
Intervenor Guillerma sought recognition on two grounds: first, compulsory recognition through the
open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child and second, voluntary
recognition through authentic writing.
There was apparently no doubt that she possessed the status of an illegitimate child from her birth
until the death of her putative father Guillermo Rustia. However, this did not constitute
acknowledgment but a mere ground by which she could have compelled acknowledgment through
the courts.64 Furthermore, any (judicial) action for compulsory acknowledgment has a dual
limitation: the lifetime of the child and the lifetime of the putative parent. 65 On the death of either,
the action for compulsory recognition can no longer be filed.66 In this case, intervenor Guillerma’s
right to claim compulsory acknowledgment prescribed upon the death of Guillermo Rustia on
February 28, 1974.
The claim of voluntary recognition (Guillerma’s second ground) must likewise fail. An authentic
writing, for purposes of voluntary recognition, is understood as a genuine or indubitable writing of
the parent (in this case, Guillermo Rustia). This includes a public instrument or a private writing
admitted by the father to be his.67 Did intervenor’s report card from the University of Santo Tomas
and Josefa Delgado’s obituary prepared by Guillermo Rustia qualify as authentic writings under
the new Civil Code? Unfortunately not. The report card of intervenor Guillerma did not bear the
signature of Guillermo Rustia. The fact that his name appears there as intervenor’s
parent/guardian holds no weight since he had no participation in its preparation. Similarly, while
witnesses testified that it was Guillermo Rustia himself who drafted the notice of death of Josefa
Delgado which was published in the Sunday Times on September 10, 1972, that published
obituary was not the authentic writing contemplated by the law. What could have been admitted as
an authentic writing was the original manuscript of the notice, in the handwriting of Guillermo
Rustia himself and signed by him, not the newspaper clipping of the obituary. The failure to
present the original signed manuscript was fatal to intervenor’s claim.
The same misfortune befalls the ampun-ampunan, Guillermina Rustia Rustia, who was never
adopted in accordance with law. Although a petition for her adoption was filed by Guillermo Rustia,
it never came to fruition and was dismissed upon the latter’s death. We affirm the ruling of both the
trial court and the Court of Appeals holding her a legal stranger to the deceased spouses and
therefore not entitled to inherit from them ab intestato. We quote:
Adoption is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem, which [created] between two persons a
relationship similar to that which results from legitimate paternity and filiation. Only an adoption
made through the court, or in pursuance with the procedure laid down under Rule 99 of the Rules
of Court is valid in this jurisdiction. It is not of natural law at all, but is wholly and entirely artificial.
To establish the relation, the statutory requirements must be strictly carried out, otherwise, the
SpecPro Rule 74
adoption is an absolute nullity. The fact of adoption is never presumed, but must be affirmatively
[proven] by the person claiming its existence.68
Premises considered, we rule that two of the claimants to the estate of Guillermo Rustia, namely,
intervenor Guillerma Rustia and the ampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia Rustia, are not lawful
heirs of the decedent. Under Article 1002 of the new Civil Code, if there are no descendants,
ascendants, illegitimate children, or surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the
entire estate of the deceased. Therefore, the lawful heirs of Guillermo Rustia are the remaining
claimants, consisting of his sisters,69 nieces and nephews.70
Entitlement To Letters Of Administration
An administrator is a person appointed by the court to administer the intestate estate of the
decedent. Rule 78, Section 6 of the Rules of Court prescribes an order of preference in the
appointment of an administrator:
Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. – If no executor is named in the will,
or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give a bond, or a person
dies intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the
discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin,
requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person
selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow or next of kin,
neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to
request that the administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one
or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such
other person as the court may select.
In the appointment of an administrator, the principal consideration is the interest in the estate of
the one to be appointed.71 The order of preference does not rule out the appointment of co-
administrators, specially in cases where
justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the management of
the estates,72 a situation which obtains here.
It is in this light that we see fit to appoint joint administrators, in the persons of Carlota
Delgado vda. de de la Rosa and a nominee of the nephews and nieces of Guillermo Rustia. They
are the next of kin of the deceased spouses Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia, respectively.
WHEREFORE, the petition (which seeks to reinstate the May 11, 1990 decision of the RTC
Manila, Branch 55) is hereby DENIED. The assailed October 24, 2002 decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED with the following modifications:
1. Guillermo Rustia’s June 15, 1973 affidavit of self-adjudication is hereby ANNULLED.
2. the intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia shall inherit half of the intestate estate of Josefa
Delgado. The remaining half shall pertain to (a) the full and half-siblings of Josefa
Delgado who survived her and (b) the children of any of Josefa Delgado’s full- or half-
siblings who may have predeceased her, also surviving at the time of her death. Josefa
Delgado’s grandnephews and grandnieces are excluded from her estate. In this
connection, the trial court is hereby ordered to determine the identities of the relatives of
Josefa Delgado who are entitled to share in her estate.
3. Guillermo Rustia’s estate (including its one-half share of Josefa Delgado’s estate) shall
be inherited by Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz (whose
respective shares shall be per capita) and the children of the late Roman Rustia, Sr. (who
survived Guillermo Rustia and whose respective shares shall be per stirpes). Considering
that Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz are now deceased, their
respective shares shall pertain to their estates.
4. Letters of administration over the still unsettled intestate estates of Guillermo Rustia
and Josefa Delgado shall issue to Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa and to a nominee
from among the heirs of Guillermo Rustia, as joint administrators, upon their qualification
and filing of the requisite bond in such amount as may be determined by the trial court.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
SpecPro Rule 74
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 204029 June 4, 2014
AVELINA ABARIENTOS REBUSQUILLO [substituted by her heirs, except Emelinda R.
Gualvez] and SALVADOR A. OROSCO, Petitioners,
vs.
SPS. DOMINGO and EMELINDA REBUSQUILLO GUALVEZ and the CITY ASSESSOR OF
LEGAZPI CITY, Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 assailing the Decision 1 and
Resolution2 dated March 30, 2012 and September 25, 2012, respectively, of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 93035, which reversed and set aside the Decision dated January 20,
2009 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 4 in Legazpi City, in Civil Case No. 10407.
The antecedent facts may be summarized as follows:
On October 26, 2004, petitioners Avelina Abarientos Rebusquillo (Avelina) and Salvador Orosco
(Salvador) filed a Complaint for annulment and revocation of an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication
dated December 4, 2001 and a Deed of Absolute Sale dated February 6, 2002 before the court a
quo. In it, petitioners alleged that Avelina was one of the children of Eulalio Abarientos (Eulalio)
and Victoria Villareal (Victoria). Eulalio died intestate on July 3, 1964, survived by his wife Victoria,
six legitimate children, and one illegitimate child, namely: (1) Avelina Abarientos-Rebusquillo,
petitioner in this case; (2) Fortunata Abarientos-Orosco, the mother of petitioner Salvador; (3)
Rosalino Abarientos; (4) Juan Abarientos; (5) Feliciano Abarientos; (6) Abraham Abarientos; and
(7) Carlos Abarientos. His wife Victoria eventually died intestate on June 30, 1983.
On his death, Eulalio left behind an untitled parcel of land in Legazpi City consisting of two
thousand eight hundred sixty-nine(2,869) square meters, more or less, which was covered by Tax
Declaration ARP No. (TD) 0141.
In 2001, Avelina was supposedly made to sign two (2) documents by her daughter Emelinda
Rebusquillo-Gualvez (Emelinda) and her son-in-law Domingo Gualvez (Domingo), respondents in
this case, on the pretext that the documents were needed to facilitate the titling of the lot. It was
only in 2003, so petitioners claim, that Avelina realized that what she signed was an Affidavit of
Self-Adjudication and a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of respondents.
As respondents purportedly ignored her when she tried to talk to them, Avelina sought the
intervention of the RTC to declare null and void the two (2) documents in order to reinstate
TD0141 and so correct the injustice done to the other heirs of Eulalio.
In their answer, respondents admitted that the execution of the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and
the Deed of Sale was intended to facilitate the titling of the subject property. Paragraph 9 of their
Answer reads:
Sometime in the year 2001, [petitioner] Avelina together with the other heirs of Eulalio Abarientos
brought out the idea to [respondent] Emelinda Rebusquillo-Gualvez to have the property
described in paragraph 8 of the complaint registered under the Torrens System of Registration. To
facilitate the titling of the property, so that the same could be attractive to prospective buyers, it
was agreed that the property’s tax declaration could be transferred to [respondents] Spouses
[Emelinda] R. Gualvez and Domingo Gualvez who will spend all the cost of titling subject to
reimbursement by all other heirs in case the property is sold; That it was agreed that all the heirs
will be given their corresponding shares on the property; That pursuant to said purpose Avelina
Abarientos-Rebusquillo with the knowledge and consent of the other heirs signed and executed an
Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of [respondents] Gualvez. In
fact, [petitioner] Avelina Rebusquillo was given an advance sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
(₱50,000.00) by [respondent] spouses and all the delinquent taxes paid by [respondents]. 3
After trial, the RTC rendered its Decision dated January 20, 2009 annulling the Affidavit of Self-
Adjudication and the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Avelina on the grounds that (1) with
regard to the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication, she was not the sole heir of her parents and was not
therefore solely entitled to their estate; and (2) in the case of the Deed of Absolute Sale, Avelina
did not really intend to sell her share in the property as it was only executed to facilitate the titling
of such property. The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered, as follows:
1. The subject Affidavit of Self-Adjudication of the Estate of the Deceased Spouses
Eulalio Abarientos and Victoria Villareal, dated December 4, 2001 as well as the subject
Deed of Absolute Sale, notarized on February 6, 2002, covering the property described in
par. 8 of the Amended Complaint are hereby ordered ANNULLED;
2. That defendant City Assessor’s Officer of Legazpi City is hereby ordered to CANCEL
the Tax Declaration in the name of private [respondents] spouses Gualvez under ARP
SpecPro Rule 74
No. 4143 and to REINSTATE the Tax Declaration under ARP No. 0141 in the name of
Eulalio Abarientos;
3. By way of restitution, [petitioner] Avelina Abarientos Rebusquillo is hereby ordered to
return or refund to [respondents] spouses Domingo Gualvez and Emelinda Gualvez, the
₱50,000.00 given by the latter spouses to the former.4
Assailing the trial court’s decision, respondents interposed an appeal with the CA arguing that the
Deed of Sale cannot be annulled being a public document that has for its object the creation and
transmission of real rights over the immovable subject property. The fact that Avelina’s testimony
was not offered in evidence, so respondents argued, the signature on the adverted deed remains
as concrete proof of her agreement to its terms. Lastly, respondents contended that the Complaint
filed by petitioners Avelina and Salvador before the RTC is not the proper remedy provided by law
for those compulsory heirs unlawfully deprived of their inheritance.
Pending the resolution of respondents’ appeal, Avelina died intestate on September 1, 2009
leaving behind several living heirs5 including respondent Emelinda.
In its Decision dated March 30, 2012, the appellate court granted the appeal and reversed and set
aside the Decision of the RTC. The CA held that the RTC erred in annulling the Affidavit of Self-
Adjudication simply on petitioners’ allegation of the existence of the heirs of Eulalio, considering
that issues on heirship must be made in administration or intestate proceedings, not in an ordinary
civil action. Further, the appellate court observed that the Deed of Absolute Sale cannot be
nullified as it is a notarized document that has in its favor the presumption of regularity and is
entitled to full faith and credit upon its face.
Aggrieved by the CA’s Decision, petitioner Avelina, as substituted by her heirs except respondent
Emelinda, and petitioner Salvador are now before this Court ascribing reversible error on the part
of the appellate court.
We find merit in the instant petition.
It has indeed been ruled that the declaration of heirship must be made in a special proceeding, not
in an independent civil action. However, this Court had likewise held that recourse to
administration proceedings to determine who heirs are is sanctioned only if there is a good and
compelling reason for such recourse.6 Hence, the Court had allowed exceptions to the rule
requiring administration proceedings as when the parties in the civil case already presented their
evidence regarding the issue of heirship, and the RTC had consequently rendered judgment upon
the issues it defined during the pre-trial.7 In Portugal v. Portugal-Beltran,8 this Court held:
In the case at bar, respondent, believing rightly or wrongly that she was the sole heir to Portugal’s
estate, executed on February 15, 1988 the questioned Affidavit of Adjudication under the second
sentence of Rule 74, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court. Said rule is an exception to the
general rule that when a person dies leaving a property, it should be judicially administered and
the competent court should appoint a qualified administrator, in the order established in Sec. 6,
Rule 78 in case the deceased left no will, or in case he did, he failed to name an executor therein.
Petitioners claim, however, to be the exclusive heirs of Portugal. A probate or intestate court, no
doubt, has jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of a deceased.
It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property of the intestate estate of Portugal
is the Caloocan parcel of land to still subject it, under the circumstances of the case, to a special
proceeding which could be long, hence, not expeditious, just to establish the status of petitioners
as heirs is not only impractical; it is burdensome to the estate with the costs and expenses of an
administration proceeding. And it is superfluous in light of the fact that the parties to the civil case -
subject of the present case, could and had already in fact presented evidence before the trial court
which assumed jurisdiction over the case upon the issues it defined during pre-trial.
In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no compelling reason to still
subject Portugal’s estate to administration proceedings since a determination of petitioners’ status
as heirs could be achieved in the civil case filed by petitioners, the trial court should proceed to
evaluate the evidence presented by the parties during the trial and render a decision thereon upon
the issues it defined during pre-trial x x x. (emphasis supplied)
Similar to Portugal, in the present case, there appears to be only one parcel of land being claimed
by the contending parties as the inheritance from Eulalio. It would be more practical, as Portugal
teaches, to dispense with a separate special proceeding for the determination of the status of
petitioner Avelina as sole heir of Eulalio, especially in light of the fact that respondents spouses
Gualvez admitted in court that they knew for a fact that petitioner Avelina was not the sole heir of
Eulalio and that petitioner Salvador was one of the other living heirs with rights over the subject
land. As confirmed by the RTC in its Decision, respondents have stipulated and have thereby
admitted the veracity of the following facts during the pre-trial:
IV – UNCONTROVERTED FACTS: (Based on the stipulation of facts in the Pre-Trial Order)
A. x x x
B. [Petitioners] and private [respondents] spouses Gualvez admitted the following facts:
1. Identity of the parties;
2. Capacity of the [petitioners] and private [respondents] to sue and be sued;
SpecPro Rule 74
3. [Petitioner] Avelina Abarientos-Rebusquilllo is not the only surviving heir of deceased
spouses Eulalio and Victoria Abarientos;
4. Petitioner Salvador Orosco is a co-owner/possessor of a portion of the subject
property;
5. Fortunata Abarientos-Orosco is the sister of Avelina Abarientos;
6. [Respondent] Emelinda Rebusquillo-Gualves is a daughter of [petitioner] Avelina A.
Rebusquillo;
7. [Petitioner] Avelina Rebusquillo was born on Nov. 10, 1923;
8. The existence of Affidavit of Self-Adjudication of Estate of the Deceased and Deed of
Absolute Sale executed by [petitioner] Avelina A. Rebusquillo on the subject
property.9 (emphasis supplied)
In light of the admission of respondents spouses Gualvez, it is with more reason that a resort to
special proceeding will be but an unnecessary superfluity. Accordingly, the court a quo had
properly rendered judgment on the validity of the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by
Avelina. As pointed out by the trial court, an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication is only proper when the
affiant is the sole heir of the decedent. The second sentence of Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of
Court is patently clear that self-adjudication is only warranted when there is only one heir:
Section 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. –– x x x If there is only one heir,
he may adjudicate to himself the entire estate by means of an affidavit filed in the office of the
register of deeds. x x x (emphasis supplied)
As admitted by respondents, Avelina was not the sole heir of Eulalio. In fact, as admitted by
respondents, petitioner Salvador is one of the co-heirs by right of representation of his mother.
Without a doubt, Avelina had perjured herself when she declared in the affidavit that she is "the
only daughter and sole heir of spouses EULALIO ABARIENTOS AND VICTORIA
VILLAREAL."10 The falsity of this claim renders her act of adjudicating to herself the inheritance
left by her father invalid. The RTC did not, therefore, err in granting Avelina’s prayer to declare the
affidavit null and void and so correct the wrong she has committed.
In like manner, the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Avelina in favor of respondents was
correctly nullified and voided by the RTC. Avelina was not in the right position to sell and transfer
the absolute ownership of the subject property to respondents. As she was not the sole heir of
Eulalio and her Affidavit of Self-Adjudication is void, the subject property is still subject to partition.
Avelina, in fine, did not have the absolute ownership of the subject property but only an aliquot
portion. What she could have transferred to respondents was only the ownership of such aliquot
portion. It is apparent from the admissions of respondents and the records of this case that
Avelina had no intention to transfer the ownership, of whatever extent, over the property to
respondents. Hence, the Deed of Absolute Sale is nothing more than a simulated contract.
The Civil Code provides:
Art. 1345. Simulation of a contract may be absolute or relative. The former takes place when the
parties do not intend to be bound at all; the latter, when the parties conceal their true agreement.
(emphasis supplied)
Art. 1346. An absolutely simulated or fictitious contract is void. A relative simulation, when it does
not prejudice a third person and is not intended for any purpose contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order or public policy binds the parties to their real agreement.
In Heirs of Policronio Ureta Sr. v. Heirs of Liberato Ureta,11 this Court explained the concept of the
simulation of contracts:
In absolute simulation, there is a colorable contract but it has no substance as the parties have no
intention to be bound by it. The main characteristic of an absolute simulation is that the apparent
contract is not really desired or intended to produce legal effect or in any way alter the juridical
situation of the parties. As a result, an absolutely simulated or fictitious contract is void, and the
parties may recover from each other what they may have given under the contract. However, if the
parties state a false cause in the contract to conceal their real agreement, the contract is relatively
simulated and the parties are still bound by their real agreement. Hence, where the essential
requisites of a contract are present and the simulation refers only to the content or terms of the
contract, the agreement is absolutely binding and enforceable between the parties and their
successors in interest. (emphasis supplied)
In the present case, the true intention of the parties in the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale
is immediately apparent from respondents’ very own Answer to petitioners’ Complaint. As
respondents themselves acknowledge, the purpose of the Deed of Absolute Sale was simply to
"facilitate the titling of the [subject] property," not to transfer the ownership of the lot to them.
Furthermore, respondents concede that petitioner Salvador remains in possession of the property
and that there is no indication that respondents ever took possession of the subject property after
its supposed purchase. Such failure to take exclusive possession of the subject property or, in the
alternative, to collect rentals from its possessor, is contrary to the principle of ownership and is a
clear badge of simulation that renders the whole transaction void.12
Contrary to the appellate court’s opinion, the fact that the questioned Deed of Absolute Sale was
reduced to writing and notarized does not accord it the quality of incontrovertibility otherwise
provided by the parole evidence rule. The form of a contract does not make an otherwise
SpecPro Rule 74
simulated and invalid act valid. The rule on parole evidence is not, as it were, ironclad. Sec. 9,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides the exceptions:

Section 9. Evidence of written agreements. – x x x

However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of written
agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading:

(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement;

(b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the
parties thereto;

(c) The validity of the written agreement; or

(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors in interest
after the execution of the written agreement.

The term "agreement" includes wills. (emphasis supplied)

The failure of the Deed of Absolute Sale to express the true intent and agreement of the
contracting parties was clearly put in issue in the present case. Again, respondents themselves
admit in their Answer that the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and the Deed of Absolute Sale were
only executed to facilitate the titling of the property. The RTC is, therefore, justified to apply the
exceptions provided in the second paragraph of Sec. 9, Rule 130 to ascertain the true intent of the
parties, which shall prevail over the letter of the document. That said, considering that the Deed of
Absolute Sale has been shown to be void for being absolutely simulated, petitioners are not
precluded from presenting evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the written
agreement.13

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated March 30, 2012 and the
Resolution dated September 25, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 93035 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated January 20, 2009 in Civil Case No.
10407 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),Branch 4 in Legazpi City is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.