1. ABBAS vs. ABBAS G.R. No.

183896 January 30, 2013 Void ab initio Marriage, Marriage License

as a Formal Requisite of a Valid Marriage
FACTS:

Petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas, a Pakistani, met Gloria, a Filipino, in Taiwan in 1991 and they got married there
in 1992.

Later, Gloria filed bigamy cases against him. As advised bt his counsel, he went to the Municipal Civil Registrar
of Carmona, Cavite, where their Marriage License was issued, to get certification on whether or not there was
a marriage license. There, he was asked to show a copy of their marriage contract wherein the marriage
license number could be found. It appeared that the marriage license number appearing in their marriage
contract was the number of another marriage license issued to Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan.

The RTC held that no valid marriage license was issued in favor of Gloria and Syed. Hence, their marriage was
declared void ab initio.

On appeal, the CA gave credence to Gloria’s arguments, and granted her appeal.

It gave weight to the fact that Syed had admitted to having signed the marriage contract. The CA also
considered that the parties had comported themselves as husband and wife, and that Syed only instituted his
petition after Gloria had filed a case against him for bigamy.

Syed’s MR was denied.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a valid marriage license had been issued for Syed and Gloria.

RULING:

The petition is meritorious.

The pertinent provisions that would apply to this particular case are Articles 3, 4 and 35(3) of the Family Code,
which read as follows:

Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:

(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;

(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and

(3) A marriage ceremony

xxxx

Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except
as stated in Article 35(2).

A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable as provided in Article 45.

An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties
responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:

xxxx

(3) Those solemnized without a license, except those covered by the preceding Chapter.

We find the RTC to be correct in this instance.

Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual marriage license, or a copy thereof, and relied on the marriage
contract as well as the testimonies of her witnesses to prove the existence of said license. While Syed was
able to secure a certification that there was no marriage license.

In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals such certification was allowed, as permitted by Sec. 29, Rule 132
of the Rules of Court, which reads:

SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. – A written statement signed by an officer having the custody of an official
record or by his deputy that after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the
records of his office, accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that the
records of his office contain no such record or entry.

The Court held in that case that the certification issued by the civil registrar enjoyed probative value, as his
duty was to maintain records of data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.

The law must be applied. As the marriage license, a formal requisite, is clearly absent, the marriage of Gloria
and Syed is void ab initio.

2. Ancheta vs. Guersey-Dalaygon, GR No. 139868 June 8, 2006

Facts:

2 American citizens have resided in the Philippines. They have an adopted daughter. The wife died and left a
will where she left her entire estate to her husband. 2 years after the wife's death, the husband married a
Candelaria. 4 years after, Richard died and left a will where he left his entire estate to Candelaria except for
some of his shares in a company which he left to his adopted daughter. Audrey’s will was admitted to probate
in CFI Rizal. Inventory was taken on their conjugal properties. Ancheta, as the administrator, filed for a partition
of the first wife's estate. The will was also admitted in a court in her native land (Maryland).

Issue: Whether or not the properties in issue should be governed by the law where the property is situated

Ruling:

Yes, properties in issue should be governed by the law where the property is situated. However, since the first
wife is a foreign national, the intrinsic validity of her will is governed by her national law. The national law of the
person who made the will shall regulate whose succession is in consideration whatever the nature of the
property and regardless of the country where the property maybe found (Art 16 CC). The first wife's properties
may be found in the Philipppines, however the successional rights over those properties are governed by the
national law of the testator.
 3. NOEL B. BACCAY, Petitioner, vs. MARIBEL C. BACCAY and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondents.

FACTS: Maria and Jose are married. The man contended that the wife refused to consummate their marriage
by refusing to have sexual intercourse with him during the marriage. He alleged that their last intercourse was
prior to their marriage. He contended that the wife was suffering from psychological incapacity.

ISSUE: Is the argument meritorious?

xxx

HELD: No, the argument is unmeritorious. Refusal of the wife to have sex with her husband is not a sign of
psychological incapacity.

The husband’s evidence merely established that the wife refused to have sexual intercourse with him after
their marriage, and that she left him after their quarrel when he confronted her about her alleged miscarriage.
He failed to prove the root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity and establish the requirements of
gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. There must be proof that the psychological disorder renders her
“truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage.”

Psychological incapacity must be more than just a “difficulty,” a “refusal,” or a “neglect” in the performance of
some marital obligations. An unsatisfactory marriage is not a null and void marriage. In Marcos v. Marcos, it
was ruled that Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the
marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness
afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to
deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to
assume. (G.R. No. 173138; December 1, 2010)

4. SALLY GO-BANGAYAN vs. BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR. CASE DIGEST [G.R. No. 201061, July 3,
2013, CARPIO, J.]
TOPIC: Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage (Article 148)

DOCTRINE: Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of marriage. Thus, only the properties
acquired by them through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them
in common in proportion to their respective contributions, in accord with Article 148.

FACTS: Benjamin and Sally developed a romantic relationship in 1979. Sally’s father was against the
relationship. Sally brought Benjamin to an office in Santolan, Pasig City where they signed a purported
marriage contract. Sally, knowing Benjamin’s marital status, assured him that the marriage contract would not
be registered. Sally filed criminal actions for bigamy and falsification of public documents against Benjamin,
using their simulated marriage contract as evidence. Benjamin, in turn, filed a petition for declaration of a non-
existent marriage and/or declaration of nullity of marriage before the trial court on the ground that his marriage
to Sally was bigamous and that it lacked the formal requisites to a valid marriage. Benjamin also asked the trial
court for the partition of the properties he acquired with Sally in accordance with Article 148 of the Family
Code, for his appointment as administrator of the properties during the pendency of the case, and for the
declaration of Bernice and Bentley as illegitimate children. A total of 44 registered properties became the
subject of the partition before the trial court. Aside from the seven properties enumerated by Benjamin in his
petition, Sally named 37 properties in her answer.

The trial court ruled that the marriage was not recorded with the local civil registrar and the National Statistics
Office because it could not be registered due to Benjamin’s subsisting marriage with Azucena. The trial court
ruled that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was not bigamous.

ISSUES:

Whether the marriage between Benjamin and Sally are void for not having a marriage license

Whether Art. 148 should govern Benjamin and Sally’s property relations

Whether bigamy was committed by the petitioner

HELD:

YES.

We see no inconsistency in finding the marriage between Benjamin and Sally null and void ab initio and, at the
same time, non-existent. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage solemnized without a license, except
those covered by Article 34 where no license is necessary, “shall be void from the beginning.” In this case, the
marriage between Benjamin and Sally was solemnized without a license. It was duly established that no
marriage license was issued to them and that Marriage License No. N-07568 did not match the marriage
license numbers issued by the local civil registrar of Pasig City for the month of February 1982. The case
clearly falls under Section 3 of Article 35which made their marriage void ab initio. The marriage between
Benjamin and Sally was also non-existent. Applying the general rules on void or inexistent contracts under
Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts which are absolutely simulated or fictitious are “inexistent and void
from the beginning.” Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err in sustaining the trial court’s ruling that the marriage
between Benjamin and Sally was null and void ab initio and non-existent.

YES.

The property relations of Benjamin and Sally is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code which states: Art.
148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties acquired by both of the
parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their
contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply
to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.

If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the
absolute community of conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith
is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph
of the preceding Article.

The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith.
Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of marriage. Thus, only the properties acquired by them
through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions. Thus, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly
excluded the 37 properties being claimed by Sally which were given by Benjamin’s father to his children as
advance inheritance. Sally’s Answer to the petition before the trial court even admitted that “Benjamin’s late
father himself conveyed a number of properties to his children and their respective spouses which included
Sally x x x.”

As regards the seven remaining properties, we rule that the decision of the CA is more in accord with the
evidence on record. Only the property covered by TCT No. 61722 was registered in the names of Benjamin
and Sally as spouses. The properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 were in the name of Benjamin with
the descriptive title “married to Sally.” The property covered by CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were registered in the
name of Sally with the descriptive title “married to Benjamin” while the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656
and 253681 were registered in the name of Sally as a single individual. We have ruled that the words “married
to” preceding the name of a spouse are merely descriptive of the civil status of the registered owner. Such
words do not prove co-ownership. Without proof of actual contribution from either or both spouses, there can
be no co-ownership under Article 148 of the Family Code.

5. NENITA BIENVENIDO, petitioner v.

HON. COURT OF APPEALS, LUISITA CAMACHO and
LUIS FAUSTINO C. CAMACHO, respondents.
G.R. No. 111717. October 24, 1994.
FACTS:

On October 3, 1942, Aurelio Camacho married Consejo Velasco. Twenty years after, without his marriage
being dissolved, he contracted another marriage with respondent Luisita Camacho. In 1967, Aurelio met
petitioner Nenita Bienvenido, who he lived with from 1968 until at the time of his death in 1989. Sometime in
1982, Aurelio bought a house and lot which was registered in his name. 2 years after, he executed a deed of
sale of the property in favor of petitioner Nenita, the TCT was issued in her name. After the death of Aurelio,
respondent brought a petition before the RTC seeking the annulment of the sale of the property of petitioner.
Petitioner answered and claimed that she and Aurelio purchased the property in question using their joint funds
and that she was a purchaser in good faith.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the marriage between Aurelio and Luisita is void.

HELD:

That exception involved by respondent in accordance with Art. 83 of the NCC refers to the subsequent
marriage of the abandoned spouse and not the remarriage of the deserting spouse, after the seven year period
has lapsed; That this exception cannot be invoked because it was Aurelio who had left his first wife.
Since Aurelio had a valid, subsisting marriage to Consejo, his subsequent marriage to respondent Luisita was
void for being bigamous. There is no basis for holding that the property in question was property of
the conjugal partnership of Luisita and Aurelio because there was no such partnership in the first place. Until
otherwise shown in an appropriate action, the sale to petitioner must be presumed.

6. AVELINO CASUPANAN and ROBERTO CAPITULO, petitioners, vs. MARIO LLAVORE LAROYA,
respondent.
Facts :
The two vehicle, driven by the respondent Laroya and the petitioner Capitulo and Avelino had an accident. As
a result two cases were filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Laroya filed a criminal case against
Casupanan for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property. On the other hand, Casupanan and
Capitulo filed a civil case against Laroya for quasi-delict.

ISSUE:

Whether an accused in a pending criminal case for reckless imprudence can validly file, simultaneously and
independently, a separate civil action for quasi-delict against the private complainant in the criminal case.

Ruling:

Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, the independent civil action in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the
Civil Code is not deemed instituted with the criminal action but may be filed separately by the offended party
even without reservation. Thus, the offended party can file two separate suits for the same act or omission.
The first a criminal case where the civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto is deemed instituted, and the
other a civil case for quasi-delict – without violating the rule on non-forum shopping. The two cases can
proceed simultaneously and independently of each other.

Similarly, the accused can file a civil action for quasi-delict for the same act or omission he is accused of in the
criminal case.

To disallow the accused from filing a separate civil action for quasi-delict, while refusing to recognize his
counterclaim in the criminal case, is to deny him due process of law, access to the courts, and equal protection
of the law.

Thus, the civil action based on quasi-delict filed separately by Casupanan and Capitulo is proper. The order of
dismissal on the ground of forum-shopping is erroneous.

8. CORPUZ V. TIROL STO. TOMAS AND THE SOLICITOR GENERAL

G.R. No. 186571, [11 August 2010]

FACTS:

Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz is a naturalized Canadian citizen who married respondent Daisylyn Tirol Sto.
Tomas but subsequently left for Canada due to work and other professional commitments. When he returned
to the Philippines, he discovered that Sto. Tomas was already romantically involved with another man.
This brought about the filing of a petition for divorce by Corpuz in Canada which was eventually granted by the
Court Justice of Windsor, Ontario, Canada. A month later, the divorce decree took effect. Two years later,
Corpuz has fallen in love with another Filipina and wished to marry her. He went to Civil Registry Office of
Pasig City to register the Canadian divorce decree on his marriage certificate with Sto. Tomas. However,
despite the registration, an official of National Statistics Office informed Corpuz that the former marriage still
subsists under the Philippine law until there has been a judicial recognition of the Canadian divorce decree by
a competent judicial court in view of NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982. Consequently, he filed a petition for
judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of dissolution of marriage with the RTC. However, the
RTC denied the petition reasoning out that Corpuz cannot institute the action for judicial recognition of the
foreign divorce decree because he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It was provided further that Sto. Tomas
was the proper party who can institute an action under the principle of Article 26 of the Family Code which
capacitates a Filipino citizen to remarry in case the alien spouse obtains a foreign divorce decree. Hence, this
petition.

ISSUE:
Whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code grants aliens like Corpuz the right to institute a
petition for judicial recognition of a foreign divorce decree?

HELD:

Petition GRANTED. RTC Decision REVERSED.

The Supreme Court qualifies the above conclusion – i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens -with the complementary statement that this conclusion is not
sufficient basis to dismiss Gerbert’s petition before the RTC. In other words, the unavailability of the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest
to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree.

The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the alien’s national law have been
duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert,
pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments. A
remand, at the same time, will allow other interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and overcome a
petitioner’s presumptive evidence of aright by proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party, collusion,
fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to state, every precaution must be taken to ensure conformity
with our laws before a recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once recognized, shall have the effect of
res judicata between the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.

9.Spouses Custodio vs. CA, GR No. 116100 February 9, 1996

Facts:

Mabasa owns a parcel of land with a 2 door apartment. The property is surrounded by other immovables.
When Mabasa bought the land, there were tenants who were occupying the property. One of the tenants
vacated the land. Mabasa saw that thhere had been built an adobe fence in the apartment in the first
passageway that made it narrower. The fence was constructed by the Santoses. Morato constructed her fence
and extended it to the entire passageway, therefore, the passageay was enclosed. The case was broguth to
the trial court and ordered the custodios and the Santoses to give Mabasa a permanet ingress and eggress to
the punlic street and asked Mabasa to pay Custodios and Santoses for damages.

Issue:

Whether or not Mabasa has the right to demand for a right of way

Ruling:

Yes, Mabasa has the right to demand for a right of way. A person has a right to the natural use and enjoyment
of his own property, according to his pleasure, for all the purposes to which such property is usually applied. As
a general rule, therefore, there is no cause of action for acts done by one person upon his own property in a
lawful and proper manner, although such acts incidentally cause damage or an unavoidable loss to another, as
such damage or loss is damnum absque injuria. When the owner of property makes use thereof in the general
and ordinary manner in which the property is used, such as fencing or enclosing the same as in this case,
nobody can complain of having been injured, because the inconvenience arising from said use can be
considered as a mere consequence of community life

10. G.R. No. 168785 HERALD BLACK DACASIN, Petitioner Vs SHARON DEL MUNDO DACASIN

Facts: Petitioner Herald Dacasin (petitioner), American, and respondent Sharon Del Mundo Dacasin
(respondent), Filipino, were married in Manila in April 1994. They have one daughter, Stephanie, born on 21
September 1995. In June 1999, respondent sought and obtained from the Circuit Court, 19th Judicial Circuit,
Lake County, Illinois (Illinois court) a divorce decree against petitioner. In its ruling, the Illinois court dissolved
the marriage of petitioner and respondent, awarded to respondent sole custody of Stephanie and retained
jurisdiction over the case for enforcement purposes. On 28 January 2002, petitioner and respondent executed
in Manila a contract (Agreement) for the joint custody of Stephanie. The parties chose Philippine courts as
exclusive forum to adjudicate disputes arising from the Agreement. Respondent undertook to obtain from the
Illinois court an order “relinquishing” jurisdiction to Philippine courts. In 2004, petitioner sued respondent in the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 60 (trial court) to enforce the Agreement. Petitioner alleged that in
violation of the Agreement, respondent exercised sole custody over Stephanie. Respondent sought the
dismissal of the complaint for, among others, lack of jurisdiction because of the Illinois court’s retention of
jurisdiction to enforce the divorce decree.

Issue: Is whether the trial court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of petitioner’s suit and enforce the
Agreement on the joint custody of the parties’ child.

Rulings: Subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by law. At the time petitioner filed his suit in the trial court,
statutory law vests on Regional Trial Courts exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions incapable of
pecuniary estimation. An action for specific performance, such as petitioner’s suit to enforce the Agreement on
joint child custody, belongs to this species of actions.[ Thus, jurisdiction-wise, petitioner went to the right court.
The Agreement is not only void ab initio for being contrary to law, it has also been repudiated by the mother
when she refused to allow joint custody by the father. The Agreement would be valid if the spouses have not
divorced or separated because the law provides for joint parental authority when spouses live together.
However, upon separation of the spouses, the mother takes sole custody under the law if the child is below
seven years old and any agreement to the contrary is void. Thus, the law suspends the joint custody regime for
(1) children under seven of (2) separated or divorced spouses. Simply put, for a child within this age bracket
(and for commonsensical reasons), the law decides for the separated or divorced parents how best to take
care of the child and that is to give custody to the separated mother. Indeed, the separated parents cannot
contract away the provision in the Family Code on the maternal custody of children below seven years
anymore than they can privately agree that a mother who is unemployed, immoral, habitually drunk, drug
addict, insane or afflicted with a communicable disease will have sole custody of a child under seven as these
are reasons deemed compelling to preclude the application of the exclusive maternal custody regime under the
second paragraph of Article 213. There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of
the States of the United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For
instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. What he is
contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to
local law and public policy. We reiterated Van Dorn in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera to dismiss criminal complaints for
adultery filed by the alien divorcee (who obtained the foreign divorce decree) against his former Filipino spouse
because he no longer qualified as “offended spouse” entitled to file the complaints under Philippine procedural
rules. Thus, it should be clear by now that a foreign divorce decree carries as much validity against the alien
divorcee in this jurisdiction as it does in the jurisdiction of the alien’s nationality, irrespective of who obtained
the divorce.
11. Topic: CONDONATION/PARDON (Art. 60 FC)

JOSE DE OCAMPO vs. SERAFINA FLORENCIANO

Facts:

Plaintiff and defendant were married in April 5, 1938. They begot several children who are now living with
plaintiff. In March, 1951, plaintiff discovered on several occasions that his wife was betraying his trust by
maintaining illicit relations with one Jose Arcalas. Having found the defendant carrying marital relations with
another man plaintiff sent her to Manila in June 1951 to study beauty culture, where she stayed for one year.
Again, plaintiff discovered that while in the said city defendant was going out with several other men, aside
from Jose Arcalas. Towards the end of June, 1952, when defendant had finished studying her course, she left
plaintiff and since then they had lived separately.

On June 18, 1955, plaintiff surprised his wife in the act of having illicit relations with another man by the name
of Nelson Orzame. Plaintiff signified his intention of filing a petition for legal separation, to which defendant
manifested her conformity provided she is not charged with adultery in a criminal action. Accordingly, plaintiff a
petition for legal separation. Defendant poses as defense that plaintiff condoned her adulterous acts with
Nelson Orzame since plaintiff never sought for her after having discovered her adulterous acts.

Issue: Whether or not plaintiff condoned the acts of defendant.

Ruling:

We do not think plaintiff's failure actively to search for defendant and take her home (after the latter had left
him in 1952) constituted condonation or consent to her adulterous relations with Orzame. It will be
remembered that she "left" him after having sinned with Arcalas and after he had discovered her dates with
other men. Consequently, it was not his duty to search for her to bring her home. Hers was the obligation to
return.

Two decisions are cited wherein from apparently similar circumstances, this Court inferred the husband's
consent to or condonation of his wife's misconduct. However, upon careful examination, a vital difference will
be found: in both instances, the

husband had abandoned his wife; here it was the wife who "left" her husband.

Wherefore, finding no obstacles to the aggrieved husband's petition we hereby reverse the appealed decision
and decree a legal separation between these spouse, all the consequent effects.

12. Topic: EFFECTS

ALAIN M. DIÑO vs. MA. CARIDAD L. DIÑO

Facts:

Alain M. Diño and Ma. Caridad L. Diño were childhood friends and sweethearts. They started living together in
1984 until they decided to separate in 1994. In 1996, petitioner and respondent decided to live together again.
On 14 January 1998, they were married before Mayor Vergel Aguilar of Las Piñas City. Petitioner filed an
action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against respondent. Extrajudicial service of summons was effected
upon respondent who, at the time of the filing of the petition, was already living in the United States of America.
Despite receipt of the summons, respondent did not file an answer to the petition within the reglementary
period. Petitioner later learned that respondent filed a petition for divorce/dissolution of her marriage with
petitioner, which was granted by the Superior Court of California on 25 May 2001. Petitioner also learned that
on 5 October 2001, respondent married a certain Manuel V. Alcantara. The Office of the Las Piñas prosecutor
found that there were no indicative facts of collusion between the parties and the case was set for trial on the
merits. Dr. Nedy L. Tayag (Dr. Tayag), a clinical psychologist, submitted a psychological report establishing
that respondent was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder which was deeply ingrained in her system
since her early formative years. Dr. Tayag found that respondent's disorder was long-lasting and by nature,
incurable. In its 18 October 2006 Decision, the trial court granted the petition on the ground that respondent
was psychologically incapacited to comply with the essential marital obligations at the time of the celebration of
the marriage.

Issue: Whether or not the trial court made mistake when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage
shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties' properties.

Ruling:

Yes, petitioner's marriage to respondent was declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code and not under
Article 40 or 45. What governs the liquidation of properties owned in common by petitioner and respondent are
the rules on co-ownership. The property relations of parties in a void marriage during the period of cohabitation
are governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. The rules on co-ownership apply and the
properties of the spouses should be liquidated in accordance

with the Civil Code provisions on co-ownership. Partition may be made by agreement between the parties or
by judicial proceedings. It is not necessary to liquidate the properties of the spouses in the same proceeding
for declaration of nullity of marriage.

13. Topic: PREJUDICIAL QUESTION

DONATO vs. LUNA

An information for bigamy against herein petitioner was filed. It is alleged that petitioner married Rosalindo
Maluping on June 30, 1978, he however married for the second time with Paz Abayan on September 26, 1978.
Prior to the trial for the criminal case, petitioner filed a motion to suspend on grounds of a prejudicial question.
He claims that the civil case for the nullity of his second marriage is a prejudicial question.

Issue: Whether or not the civil case for nullity of marriage is a prejudicial question to the criminal case of
bigamy.

Ruling:

The issue of the nullity of the marriage in the civil case is not determinative of petitionerʼs guilt or innocence in
the crime of bigamy. It is noteworthy that the complaint for annulment of the second marriage on the ground
that her consent was obtained through deceit was filed by Paz Abayan, the second wife. He who contracts a
second marriage before a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for
bigamy. The case for annulment of marriage can only be considered as a prejudicial question to the bigamy
case against the accused only if it is proved that the petitionerʼs consent to marriage was obtained through
duress, violence or intimidation. Such is not the case at bar. Petitioner merely raised the issue of prejudicial
question to evade the prosecution of the criminal case. Records reveal that prior to petitionerʼs second
marriage he had been living with private respondent as husband and wife for more than five years. He only
came up with the story that his consent to the marriage was secured through force, threat and intimidation one
year from the solemnization of the second marriage.

19. Topic: WHO MUST PAY SUPPORT

LIM VS LIM
Facts:

In 1979, respondent Cheryl S. Lim (Cheryl) married Edward Lim (Edward), son of petitioners. Cheryl bore
Edward three children, respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III. Cheryl, Edward and their
children resided at the house of petitioners in Forbes Park, Makati City, together with Edwardʼs ailing
grandmother, Chua Giak and her husband Mariano Lim (Mariano). Edwardʼs family business, which provided
him with a monthly salary of P6,000, shouldered the family expenses. Cheryl had no steady source of income.

On 14 October 1990, Cheryl abandoned the Forbes Park residence, bringing the children with her (then all
minors), after a violent confrontation with Edward whom she caught with the in-house midwife of Chua Giak in
what the trial court described "a very compromising situation." Cheryl, for herself and her children, sued
petitioners, Edward, Chua Giak and Mariano (defendants) in the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch
140 (trial court) for support. The trial court ordered Edward to provide monthly support of P6,000 pendente lite.

Issue: Whether petitioners are concurrently liable with Edward to provide support to respondents.

Ruling:

By statutory and jurisprudential mandate,the liability of ascendants to provide legal support to their
descendants is beyond cavil. Petitioners themselves admit as much –they limit their petition to the narrow
question of when their liability is triggered, not if they are liable. Relying on provisions found in Title IX of the
Civil Code, as amended, on Parental Authority, petitioners theorize that their liability is activated only upon
default of parental authority, conceivably either by its termination or suspension during the childrenʼs minority.
Because at the time respondents sued for support, Cheryl and Edward exercised parental authority over their
children, petitioners submit that the obligation to support the latterʼs offspring ends with them.

21. G.R. No. 184454 August 3, 2011

CO GIOK LUN, as substituted by his legal heirs namely: MAGDALENA D. CO, MILAGROS D. CO,
BENJAMIN D. CO, ALBERT D. CO, ANGELITA C. TENG, VIRGINIA C. RAMOS, CHARLIE D. CO, and
ELIZABETH C. PAGUIO, Petitioners,
vs.
JOSE CO, as substituted by his legal heirs namely: ROSALINA CO, MARLON CO, JOSEPH CO, FRANK
CO, ANTONIO CO, NELSON CO, ROLAND CO, JOHNSON CO, CORAZON CO, ADELA CO, SERGIO CO,
PAQUITO CO, JOHN CO, NANCY CO, and TERESITA CO, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is a petition1 for review on certiorari assailing the Decision2 dated 23 April 2008 and
Resolution3 dated 10 September 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV. No. 85920.

The Facts

This case involves two lots allegedly co-owned by two brothers, petitioner Co Giok Lun (Lun) and Co Bon
Fieng (Fieng), the father of respondent Jose Co (Co). The lots, which are situated in Sorsogon province, one in
the town of Gubat and the other in the town of Barcelona, are described as:

Gubat Property
A parcel of commercial/residential land, located at Poblacion, Gubat, Sorsogon, containing an area of 720.68
square meters, more or less, bounded on the North by Angel Camara, on the East by Rodolfo Rocha, on the
South by Guariña Street and on the West by Zulueta Street declared under Tax Declaration No. 11379 in the
name of Co Bon Fieng and assessed at ₱12,370.00.4

Barcelona Property

Terreno cocal radicada en el sitio de Telegrafo barrio de Luneta, Barcelona, Sorsogon, I. F. cabida de sesenta
y cinco (65 a.) lindates por Norte Hertrudes Casulla, por sur Antonio Evasco, por Este con los manglares y por
Oeste Atanacio Espera y Eugenio Esteves.

Terreno cocalero ubicado en el barrio de Luneta, Barcelona, Sorsogon, I.F. cabida de una hectaria dies y ocho
areas y sesenta y ciete centiarias (1 hects. 18 hareas 67 centiareas) lindantes al Norte Cementerio Municipal
antes Eugenio Esteves, al Este Gabriel Gredoña y Laudia Asis, al Sur Amando Torilla y Florentino Mercader, y
al Oeste Carretera Provincial.

Terreno solar con doce ponos de coco situada en el barrio de Luneta, Barcelona, Sorsogon, I.F. cabida de dos
riales y quevalente a trienta y cuatro areas y un camarin de materiales fuertes y deficada dentro de la misma
lindante al Norte Camino para S. Antonio, al Sur Eugenio Esteves, al Este Carretera Provincial y al Oeste a los
herederos del defunto Feliciano Fontelar.5

Petitioners, the legal heirs of Lun who died on 12 January 1997, filed a complaint6 for partition and damages
against Co with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Gubat, Sorsogon, Branch 54.

Claim of Petitioners

Petitioners claimed that Lun and Fieng came to the Philippines from China in 1929. Lun allegedly acquired the
Gubat property from the ₱8,000.00 capital the brothers inherited from their father, Co Chaco (Chaco), before
Chaco returned to China in 1926 due to old age. The Gubat property was named under Fieng only since it has
been a common practice and custom in China that properties intended for the children are placed in the name
of the eldest child. The Barcelona property, on the other hand, was acquired by Chaco in 1923 while he was
still doing his business in Gubat.

Lun and Fieng set up a business, selling and trading of dry goods, called the Philippine Honest and Company.
Using the company’s funds, they rented the property of Crispina Rocha (Rocha), which was mortgaged and
finally sold to them in 1935. Later, from the income of the business, they acquired the two adjoining residential
and commercial lots which increased the size of the Gubat property to its present area of 720.68 square
meters.

In 1946, Lun and Fieng dissolved and liquidated the business. After receiving his share of ₱26,000 from the
liquidation, Lun established his own dry goods business called Shanghai Trading. Fieng, on the other hand,
entered into other businesses with different partners.

Petitioners claimed that Lun stayed at the Gubat property from the time he arrived in China in 1929. Lun was
the one who religiously paid for the realty taxes and made several repairs on the building to make the Gubat
property habitable. It was only sometime in 1946 when Lun and Fieng decided to divide the two lots. However,
the partition did not push through on the insistence of their mother, Po Kiat, who wanted to preserve and
maintain close family ties.

Petitioners also alleged that Lun prevented the Gubat property from being appropriated when the lot was used
by Fieng as a loan guarantee. Fieng incurred the ₱4,500 obligation from Erquiaga Corporation which Lun
assumed and paid without any contribution from respondents, specifically Co. After Fieng suffered financial
bankruptcy in Manila, he went back to Gubat. Upon the request of their mother, Lun lent his brother ₱30,000
which Fieng used to start up a business. However, until Fieng’s death on 8 July 1958, the amount which Lun
lent was never returned to him.
Lun even extended financial assistance to Co amounting to no less than ₱30,000 which remained unpaid.
Later, when Lun already refused to lend money to Co, the latter made himself the administrator of the Gubat
property without Lun’s knowledge. Thereafter, Co filed a case for unlawful detainer against Lun with the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Gubat, docketed as Civil Case No. 210. This case was decided by the MTC in
favor of Co but was reversed by the RTC in its Decision dated 28 April 1994. The RTC’s decision was later
affirmed by the CA and this Court.

Claim of Respondents

On the other hand, respondents, in their Amended Answer, maintained that the Gubat property is the exclusive
property of their father. They asserted that Fieng acquired the lot by purchase from Rocha in 1935 or nine
years after Chaco left for China in 1926. While Lun was still in China, Fieng and Rocha entered into an
agreement for the use of the lot where Fieng built a "camalig" and started his sari-sari store business. On 13
March 1929, Fieng and Rocha entered into another contract extending Fieng’s right to occupy the lot until 17
August 1938. On 16 March 1930, another extension was given until 19 August 1940. On 13 October 1935,
Fieng and Rocha executed a Deed of Absolute Sale where Rocha sold the lot to Fieng for ₱3,000. On 6
August 1936, Ireneo Rocha also sold a parcel of the adjoining land to Fieng which increased the size of the
Gubat property to its present area. Both documents had been properly notarized.

Fieng used the property not only as the family’s residence but also for business and trade purposes until his
death in 1958. It was even Fieng who had constructed the commercial building on the property in 1928. From
1937 to 1983, the land and tax declarations of the property was in the sole name of their father. In 1983, Co
became the administrator of the Gubat property and had the property declared in his own name in substitution
of his father without any objection from Lun.

Respondents denied that Lun and Fieng entered into any business together. Respondents claim that it was
only in 1956 or 1957 when Lun was taken in by Fieng, who was then ill and could not manage his general
merchandising business. Fieng allowed Lun to use the lower portion of the Gubat property and let him manage
his business and properties as administrator. Lun was in possession of the property even after Fieng’s death in
1958 because of the consent and tolerance of the respondents who were still young at that time.

Respondents further insisted that Chaco gave the Barcelona property to Fieng exclusively as advance
inheritance and denied that Co ever borrowed money from Lun. As a counterclaim, respondents asked for the
payment of rent for the use by Lun of the Gubat property, as well as moral damages, attorney’s fees and
litigation expenses.

The RTC’s Ruling

In a Decision7 dated 21 July 2004, the RTC decided the case in favor of petitioners. The RTC stated that the
documentary evidence presented in court showed that the Gubat property is indeed under Fieng’s name.
However, the chain of events prior to the purchase of the property and the evidence submitted by the
petitioners prove the presence of co-ownership. The dispositive portion of the decision states:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing and by preponderance of evidence, judgment is hereby rendered
that the Heirs of Co Chaco are pro indiviso owners of the Gubat and Barcelona properties which are to be
partitioned among these heirs. They are hereby directed to cause the survey of the property and to submit to
this Court the plan of partition for approval.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.8

The Court of Appeals’ Ruling

Respondents appealed to the CA. In a Decision dated 23 April 2008, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC
and ruled in favor of the respondents. The dispositive portion states:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Gubat, Sorsogon (Branch 54) in Civil Case No. 1601, is REVERSED. The order of the
trial court to cause the survey of the subject properties for the partition thereof is SET ASIDE. The subject
properties are declared exclusively owned by Co Bon Fieng, and now by his legal heirs, herein appellants.

SO ORDERED.9

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which the CA denied in a Resolution dated 10 September 2008.

Hence, this petition.

The Issue

The main issue is whether the CA erred in holding that no co-ownership existed between Lun and Fieng over
the Gubat and Barcelona properties and in declaring Fieng as the exclusive owner of both properties.

The Court’s Ruling

The petition lacks merit.

The original complaint filed by Lun involves an action for partition and damages. A division of property cannot
be ordered by the court unless the existence of co-ownership is first established. In Ocampo v. Ocampo,10 we
held that an action for partition will not lie if the claimant has no rightful interest over the property. Basic is the
rule that the party making an allegation in a civil case has the burden of proving it by a preponderance of
evidence.

Article 484 of the Civil Code which defines co-ownership, states:

Art. 484. There is co-ownership whenever the ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to different
persons. x x x

In the present case, petitioners insist that their predecessor-in-interest Lun co-owned the Gubat and Barcelona
properties with his brother Fieng. To prove co-ownership over the Gubat property, petitioners presented: (1)
tax declarations from 1929 to 1983 under the name of Fieng but paid by Lun; (2) the renewal certificate from
Malayan Insurance Company Inc.; (3) the insurance contract; and (4) the statements of account from Supreme
Insurance Underwriters which named Lun as administrator of the property. Likewise, to prove their right over
the Barcelona property as legal heirs under intestate succession, petitioners presented a Deed of Sale dated
24 August 1923 between Chaco, as buyer, and Gabriel Gredona and Engracia Legata, as sellers, involving a
price consideration of ₱1,200.

On the other hand, respondents presented notarized documents: (1) Deed of Sale dated 13 October 1935, and
(2) Sale of Real Property dated 6 August 1936 showing that the former owners of the Gubat property entered
into a sale transaction with Fieng, as buyer and Lun, as a witness to the sale. They also presented tax
declarations in the name of Fieng from 1937 to 1958. After Fieng’s death, Co declared the Gubat property in
his name in the succeeding tax declarations. Likewise, the respondents presented documents proving the
declaration of the Barcelona property in the name of Co.

After a careful scrutiny of the records, we hold that the evidence of petitioners were insufficient or immaterial to
warrant a positive finding of co-ownership over the Gubat and Barcelona properties. The CA correctly
observed that petitioners failed to substantiate with reasonable certainty that (1) Chaco gave Fieng a start-up
capital of ₱8,000 to be used by Lun and Fieng in setting up a business, (2) that the Philippine Honest and
Company was a partnership between Lun and Fieng, and (3) that the Deed of Sale dated 24 August 1923
involving the Barcelona property is sufficient to establish co-ownership. Also, petitioners were not able to prove
the existence of the alleged Chinese custom of placing properties in the name of the eldest child as provided
under Article 1211 of the Civil Code.

In contrast, respondents were able to show documents of sale from the original owners of the Gubat property
rendering the claim of custom as immaterial.12 Also, respondents sufficiently established that Fieng was the
registered owner of the Gubat and Barcelona properties while Lun was merely an administrator.

The relevant portions of the CA decision provide:

x x x As to the Gubat property, appellee (petitioner Co Giok Lun in this case) failed to establish the
following with reasonable certainty: a) that Co Chaco gave Co Bon Fieng P8,000.00 as business capital
for him and his brother; and b) that Philippine Honest and Company is a partnership between him and
Co Bon Fieng. Appellee’s testimony is that his father told him that the latter gave Co Bon Fieng P8,000.00 is
hearsay since he had no personal knowledge of the fact that Co Chaco gave Co Bon Fieng said amount. Even
if the trial court admitted said testimony, it remains without probative value. x x x Allegedly, this amount was
the contribution of appellee and Co Bon Fieng to the capital of their partnership – Philippine Honest and
Company. Nevertheless, by reason of appellee’s failure to prove the existence of this amount, the existence of
the partnership remains doubtful. Appellee present[ed] the certification of registration of the Philippine Honest
and Company to prove the existence of the partnership but the registration indicates only the name of Co Bon
Fieng as the owner thereof. Without the capital contribution and the partnership, appellee’s claim of co-
ownership over the Gubat property does not have any basis.

To further prove his claim of co-ownership over the Gubat property, appellee presents Tax Declarations
pertaining to the subject property from 1929 to 1983, renewal certificate from Malayan Insurance Company,
Inc., insurance contract and statements of accounts from Supreme Insurance Underwriters. These documents,
however, uniformly indicate Co Bon Fieng as the owner of the subject property and appellee as mere
administrator thereof. Too, appellee proffers utility bills and receipts indicating payment to Erquiaga, Inc., a
creditor of Co Bon Fieng, in support of his claim of co-ownership. These documents however, find no
relevance in this case. Appellee’s assumption of Co Bon Fieng’s liabilities and his payment of utilities without
getting any contribution from appellants are kind acts but certainly do not prove his claim of co-ownership.
Neither do the court declarations in Civil Case No. 210 prove appellee’s claim of co-ownership, for only issues
concerning possession were resolved in said unlawful detainer suit. Lastly, contrary to the claim of appellee,
the affidavit of Co Che Bee, which recognizes appellee as a co-owner of the subject property, cannot bind Co
Bon Fieng, for well-settled is the rule that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or
omission of another. Hence, appellee’s claim of co-ownership over the Gubat property must fail.

Concerning the Barcelona property, appellee proffers a deed of sale dated 24 August 1923 to support his claim
that he and Co Bon Fieng are co-owners thereof. Under said deed, the subject property was sold to Co Chaco.
Nevertheless, the deed proves just that – Co Chaco purchased the subject property. It does not establish
subsequent events or validly dispute the transfer of the subject property by Co Chaco to Co Bon Fieng.
Moreover, said document does not have any probative value to refute the real property tax declarations of the
subject property in the name of appellant Jose Co. This document is inadequate to establish co-ownership
between appellee and Co Bon Fieng over the Barcelona property.

In fine, appellee’s evidence in support of his claim is either insufficient or immaterial to warrant the finding that
the subject properties fall under the purview of co-ownership. Appellee failed to prove that he is a co-owner
of the subject properties.1awphil

In contrast, appellants offer convincing evidence that their father, Co Bon Fieng owns the subject properties
exclusively. In the "Deed of Sale" dated 13 October 1935 and the "Sale of Real Property" dated 6 August 1936,
the former owners of the Gubat property sold the same to Co Bon Fieng only. Although appellee’s signature
appears in the first document as a witness to its execution, there is no indication in said document or in the
other that he was purchasing the subject property together with Co Bon Fieng. Appellee interjects that the
foregoing deeds indicate Co Bon Fieng as the owner of the subject property because of the Chinese custom
that in similar transactions, the eldest son of the family is normally placed as the purchaser of a property.
Appellee, however, failed to prove this custom as a fact; hence cannot be given weight.

xxx

After purchasing the Gubat property, Co Bon Fieng declared the same in tax declarations from 1937 to 1958
as his property. After the death of Co Bon Fieng, appellant Jose Co declared the Gubat property in his name in
ensuing tax declarations over the same. As well, the Barcelona property is declared in the name of Jose Co.
The Barcelona property was even surveyed for the benefit of appellants, as heirs of Co Bon Fieng.

xxx

x x x Here, we find compelling reasons to reverse the findings of the trial court and hold that the subject
properties were owned exclusively by Co Bon Fieng, and now by his legal heirs.13

We see no reason to disturb the findings of the CA. Petitioners failed to substantiate their claim of co-
ownership over the Gubat and Barcelona properties. The action for partition cannot be acted upon since
petitioners failed to establish any rightful interest in the properties. Petitioners also failed to prove that co-
ownership existed between the parties’ predecessors-in-interest. Thus, respondents, as legal heirs of Fieng,
are entitled to the exclusive ownership of the Gubat and Barcelona properties.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 23 April 2008 and Resolution dated 10
September 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV. No. 85920.

SO ORDERED.

22. Malang v. Moson

G.R. No. 119064, 22 August 2000

FACTS:

Abdula contracted marriage with Aida and had 3 sons with her. Abdula then married for a second time with
Jubaida and no child was born out of that marriage. Abdula divorced Aida. Abdula then married Nayo and they
also had no child. Thereafter, he contracted another marriage with Mabay and had a daughter with her. Not
long after, Abdula married 3 other Muslim women but eventually divorced them. Abdula then married his 4th
wife Neng, excluding the wives he divorced. They were childless. Abdula died without leaving a will.

ISSUE:

What law governs?

RULING:

The Civil Code since the Muslim Code has not yet taken effect. Abdula died intestate on December 1993. It is
the Muslim Code which should determine the identification of the heirs in the order of intestate succession and
the respective shares of the heirs.
The Muslim Code took effect on February 4, 1977. If a Muslim died before the effectivity of the Muslim Code,
the order of succession shall be governed by the Civil Code. The status and capacity to succeed on the part of
the individual parties who entered into each and every marriage ceremony will depend upon the law in force at
the time of the performance of the marriage rite.

If the Muslim marriage took place during the effectivity of the Civil Code and before the effectivity of the Muslim
Code, he cannot marry again because under the Civil Code, only one marriage is valid. But when the marriage
took place when the Muslim Code has taken effect, subsequent marriages are allowed and valid.

The right of the spouses to inherit will depend on whether or not they have been validly married. If they are not
validly married, then they do not have successional rights over their partner. The status and capacity to
succeed of the children will depend upon the law in force at the time of conception or birth of the child. As to
property relations, it is the Civil Code that determines and governs the property relations of the marriages in
this case, for the reason that at the time of the celebration of the marriages in question, the Civil Code was the
only on marriage relations, including property relations between spouses, whether Muslim or non-Muslim.

23. G.R. No. 169454 , December 27, 2007

THE HEIRS OF MARCELINO DORONIO vs.HEIRS OF FORTUNATO DORONIO

FACTS:

Spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante, now both deceased, were the registered owners of a parcel of
land located at Asingan, Pangasinan covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 352. Marcelino Doronio
and Fortunato Doronio, now both deceased, were among their children and herein represented by their heirs,
petitioners and respondents respectively.

In 1919, a private deed of donation propter nuptias was executed by spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia
Gante in favor of Marcelino Doronio and the latter’s wife on the subject property which was occupied by both
parties for several decades. Petitioners now claim ownership of the land in view of the private deed of donation
propter nuptias in favor of their predecessors, Marcelino Doronio and wife.

Respondents, on the other hand, contends that they acquired one-half of the property covered by OCT No. 352
by tradition and/or intestate succession; that the deed of donation was null and void; that assuming that the
deed of donation was valid, only one-half of the property was actually donated to Marcelino Doronio and
Veronica Pico; and that respondents acquired ownership of the other half portion of the property by acquisitive
prescription and that the subject land is different from what was donated as the descriptions of the property
under OCT No. 352 and under the private deed of donation were different..

Petitioners filed before RTC in Urdaneta, Pangasinan a petition "For the Registration of a Private Deed of
Donation". Petition was granted and TCT 4481 issued to petitioners. Respondent’s MR denied. Respondents,
in turn, filed an action for reconveyance and damages with prayer for preliminary injunction against petitioner.
RTC ruled in favor of petitioner heirs of Marcelino Doronio. CA reversed RTC. Hence, this petition with
petitioners contending that the RTC no jurisdiction to hear the case since issues on Impairment of Legitime
Should Be Threshed Out in a Special Proceeding, Not in Civil Action for Reconveyance and Damages.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not issue on Impairment of Legitime Should properly be threshed out in Civil Action for
Reconveyance and Damages thus within the jurisdiction of RTC.
 2. Whether or not the Donation Propter Nuptias is valid.

HELD:

1. No. Issue regarding the impairment of legitime of Fortunato Doronio must be resolved in an action for
the settlement of estates of spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante. It may not be passed upon in
an action for reconveyance and damages. A probate court, in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction, is
the best forum to ventilate and adjudge the issue of impairment of legitime as well as other related
matters involving the settlement of estate.40

An action for reconveyance with damages is a civil action, whereas matters relating to settlement of the
estate of a deceased person such as advancement of property made by the decedent, partake of the
nature of a special proceeding. Special proceedings require the application of specific rules as provided
for in the Rules of Court.

Under Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, questions as to advancement made or alleged to have
been made by the deceased to any heir may be heard and determined by the court having jurisdiction
of the estate proceedings, and the final order of the court thereon shall be binding on the person raising
the questions and on the heir. While it may be true that the Rules used the word "may," it is
nevertheless clear that the same provision contemplates a probate court when it speaks of the "court
having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings ."Corollarily, the Regional Trial Court in the instant case,
acting in its general jurisdiction, is devoid of authority to render an adjudication and resolve the issue of
advancement of the real property .

Before any conclusion about the legal share due to a compulsory heir may be reached, it is necessary
that certain steps be taken first.43 The net estate of the decedent must be ascertained, by deducting all
payable obligations and charges from the value of the property owned by the deceased at the time of
his death; then, all donations subject to collation would be added to it. With the partible estate thus
determined, the legitime of the compulsory heir or heirs can be established; and only then can it be
ascertained whether or not a donation had prejudiced the legitimes.

2. No.1avvphi1 It is settled that only laws existing at the time of the execution of a contract are applicable
to it and not the later statutes, unless the latter are specifically intended to have retroactive effect.
Accordingly, the Old Civil Code applies in this case as the donation propter nuptias was executed in
1919, while the New Civil Code took effect only on August 30, 1950. Under the Old Civil Code,
donations propter nuptias must be made in a public instrument in which the property donated must be
specifically described.

In the instant case, the donation propter nuptias did not become valid since it is made in a private
instrument. Neither did it create any right because it was not made in a public instrument. 74 Hence, it
conveyed no title to the land in question to petitioners’ predecessors.

However, as of this time, direct reconveyance to any of the parties is not possible as it has not yet been
determined in a proper proceeding who among the heirs of spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia
Gante is entitled to it. It is still unproven whether or not the parties are the only ones entitled to the
properties of spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante. As earlier intimated, there are still things to
be done before the legal share of all the heirs can be properly adjudicated.

24. Medina vs. Koike

FACTS:
 Medina was married to Koike on on June 14, 2005 in Quezon City, Philippines. Their union bore
two children. On June 14, 2012, Medina and Michiyuki, pursuant to the laws of Japan, filed for
divorce before the Mayor of Ichinomiya City, Aichi Prefecture, Japan. They were divorced on even date as
appearing in the Divorce Certificate and the same was duly recorded in the Official Family Register of
Michiyuki Koike.
Seeking to have the said Divorce Certificate annotated on her Certificate of Marriage on file with the
Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City, Doreen filed on February 7, 2013 a petition for judicial recognition of
foreign divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry.
At the hearing, no one appeared to oppose the petition. On the other hand,
Medina presented several foreign documents, namely, "Certificate of Receiving/Certificate of Acceptance
of Divorce" and "Family Register of Michiyuki Koike" etc.
RTC denied Medina's petition, ruling that the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the
alien recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce must be proven in accordance with Sections
24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. The RTC ruled that while the divorce documents
presented were successfully proven to be public or official records of Japan, she nonetheless fell short of
proving the national law of her husband, particularly the existence of the law on divorce. Medina’s
testimony was insufficient since she was not presented a qualified expert witness nor was shown to have.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC erred in denying the petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce.

RULING:

At the outset, it bears stressing that Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our
courts cannot grant it. Considering that the validity of the divorce decree between Medina and Michiyuki, as
well as the existence of pertinent laws of Japan on the matter are essentially factual that calls for a re-
evaluation of the evidence presented before the RTC.
The resolution of factual issues is the function of the lower courts, whose findings on these matters
are received with respect and are in fact binding subject to certain exceptions. In this regard, it is settled
that appeals taken from judgments or final orders rendered by RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction
raising questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law should be brought to the Court of Appeals (CA)
in accordance with Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.

25. Mercado vs. Tan

August 1, 2000
PANGANIBAN, J.:
PERSONS Article 40 - Family Code

FACTS:
Dr. Vincent G. Mercado and Maria Consuelo Tan got married on June 27, 1991 in Bacolod City. A
Marriage Contract was duly executed and signed by them. Mercado entered in that document his status as
“single”. Unknown to Tan, Mercado was already married to Thelma Oliva. The first marriage was solemnized in
Cebu City on October 10, 1976. Oliva bore Mercado two children. Tan therefore filed a complaint for bigamy
(Art. 349, RPC) against Mercado in Bacolod City. Mercado, in his defense, said that his first marriage was
already declared null and void and that Tan had knowledge of his first marriage. The trial court ruled that
Mercado’s first marriage was still subsisting and was liable. On appeal, the CA affirmed the ruling of the trial
court.
ISSUE/S:

1. W/N the element of previous legal marriage is present in order to convict petitioner Mercado of bigamy.

HELD:

1. Yes. The element of previous legal marriage is present in this case. Under Article 40 of the Family
Code “The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the
basis solely of a final judgement declaring such previous marriage void”. In this case, petitioner
Mercado contracted a second marriage even though there was yet no judicial declaration of nullity in
his first marriage. In fact, he instituted the Petition to have the first marriage declared void only after
Tan had filed a complaint charging him of bigamy. By contracting a second marriage while the first was
still subsisting, Mercado is liable for bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.

26. TEODORA L. VDA. De Miranda and others, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. Feliciano IMPERIAL IMPERIAL
AND JUANA, defendants-appellees.
GR No. L-49090 February 28, 1947

FACTS: Defendants Feliciano and Juana Imperial barrowed from plaintiff Miranda the amount of P1,000; that
in consideration of this debt and to guarantee payment they executed verbal antichresis in favor of the latter. In
an action filed by Miranda against Imperial, the lower court in deciding based its finding in the judgment
delivered by the Court of Appeals in the case of Santa Rosa vs. Noble. Obtaining a negative judgment,
appellant has brought the present appeal claiming that the court erred in applying the case of Santa Rosa vs.
Noble alleging that cases decided by the court of appeals does not constitute precedent and hence may not be
applied in deciding cases.

ISSUE: Whether the decisions of the Court of Appeals constitute precedents.

HELD: Only the decisions of Supreme Court establish jurisprudence or doctrines in the jurisdiction. However,
this does not prevent that a conclusion or pronouncement of the Court of Appeals which covers a point of law
still undecided in our jurisprudence may serve as juridical guide to the inferior courts, and that such conclusion
or pronouncement be raised as a doctrine if, after it has been subjected to test in the crucible of analysis and
revision, this Supreme Court should find that it has merits and qualities sufficient for its consecration as a rule
of jurisprudence.

27. ENGRACE NIÑAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors BABYLINE NIÑAL, INGRID
NIÑAL, ARCHIE NIÑAL & PEPITO NIÑAL, JR., petitioners, vs . NORMA BAYADOG, respondent G.R. No.
133778, March 14, 2000

FACTS:
Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage were born herein
petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months
thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage
license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had
lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage
license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After their father’s death, petitioners filed a
petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for
lack of a marriage l icense . The case was filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the
second marriage would affect petitioner’s successional rights . The defendant contends that petitioners have
no cause of action since they are not among the persons who could file an action for "annulment of marriage" .

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs’ deceased father with defendant is null and void ab initio;
(2) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in asking for the declaration of the nullity
of marriage of their deceased father, Pepito G. Niñal, with her specially so when at the time of the filing of this
instant suit, their father Pepito G. Niñal is already dead; (3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from
assailing the validity of the second marriage after it was dissolved due to their father’s death.

HELD:
As to the first issue, YES. The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of
the Family Code (FC), the applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect
at the time of their celebration. A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil
Code, the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) in relation to Article
58. However, a marriage license is dispensed with, as provided in Article 76 of the Civil Code, referring to the
marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife
for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage..
In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent’s marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived with each
other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepito’s first
marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed.
Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent
had started living with each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year
period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union
that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a
subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that when they
lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the
marriage even where there was actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot
make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as "husband and wife".
Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the exception to the
requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such element.
The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the personality to file a petition to declare their father’s
marriage void after his death?: A marriage that is annulable is valid until otherwise declared by the court;
whereas a marriage that is void ab initio is considered as having never to have taken place and cannot be the
source of rights. The first can be generally ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription while the
other can never be ratified. A voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding
while a void marriage can be attacked collaterally. Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after
the death of either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not
after death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been
perfectly valid. That is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where
the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may
attack a void marriage. Void marriages have no legal effects except those declared by law concerning the
properties of the alleged spouses, regarding co-ownership or ownership through actual joint contribution, and
its effect on the children born to such void marriages as provided in Article 50 in relation to Article 43 and 44 as
well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the Family Code. On the contrary, the property regime governing voidable
marriages is generally conjugal partnership and the children conceived before its annulment are legitimate.
Their marriage was void hence it is deemed as if it never existed at all and the death of either extinguished
nothing.
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity of
a marriage. "A void marriage does not require a judicial decree to restore the parties to their original rights or to
make the marriage void. "Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so far as concerns the
conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is as though no marriage had ever taken place. And therefore, being
good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage may
be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court between any parties at any time, whether before or after
the death of either or both the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the facts rendering such marriage
void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-existent by the courts." It is not like a voidable marriage which
cannot be collaterally attacked except in direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the parties so that on
the death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio . But Article 40 of the Family
Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though
void, before a party can enter into a second marriage and such absolute nullity can be based only on a final
judgment to that effect. For the same reason, the law makes either the action or defense for the declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage imprescriptible. Corollarily, if the death of either party would extinguish the cause of
action or the ground for defense, then the same cannot be considered imprescriptible.
Other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity.
For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child,
settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case, the court may pass upon the validity of
marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination
of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final
judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause "on the
basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that
such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.
The court granted the petition, reversed the decision made by the lower court, and ordered the reinstatement
of the case.

28. ONG VS CA

FACTS:

Teodora Ong is the wife of Ramon Ong, petitioner. She conducted her own logging business and to acquire or
make some development for her business she loaned 2,827.83 from Francisco Boix, private respondent. Due
to mismanagement, she failed to pay her obligation. Boix filed a complaint, based on the promissory notes
issued by Teodora. Judgment was rendered in favor of Boix, he then moved to execute the judgment.

The Sheriff of Camarines Norte (private co-respondent) levied and attached a parcel of land. An auction sale
was held and Boix was adjudged the highest bidder and a writ of possession was issued. Ramon filed a motion
with the CFI of Manila to quash the writ of possession and was denied. He then brought the case to the CA to
annul the auction sale, alleging that the property is conjugal and thus could not be held liable for personal
debts contracted by the wife.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the property was subject to the payment of the debts of the wife.

HELD:

Yes. After all whatever profits are earned by the wife from her business go to the conjugal partnership. It would
only be just and equitable that the obligations contracted by the wife in connection with her business may also
be chargeable not only against her paraphernal property but also against the conjugal property of the spouse.

It is stated in Article 70 that in case of insufficiency or absence of said income of fruits, such obligations shall
be satisfied from their separate properties.

29. Patricio VS. Dario

G.R. No. 170829

FACTS:

On July 5, 1987, Marcelino V. Dario died intestate. He was survived by his wife, petitioner Perla G. Patricio and
their two sons, Marcelino Marc Dario and private respondent Marcelino G. Dario III. Among the properties he
left was a parcel of land with a residential house and a pre-school building.
Thereafter, petitioner and Marcelino Marc formally advised private respondent of their intention to partition the
subject property and terminate the co-ownership. Private respondent refused to partition the property hence
petitioner and Marcelino Marc instituted an action for partition before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
which was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-01-44038 and raffled to Branch 78.

Private respondent claims that the subject property which is the family home duly constituted by spouses
Marcelino and Perla Dario cannot be partitioned while a minor beneficiary is still living therein namely, his 12-
year-old son, who is the grandson of the decedent.

ISSUE:

W/N the family home cannot be partitioned on the grounds that a minor-beneficiary is still residing therein.

HELD:

No. Three requisites must concur before a minor beneficiary is entitled to the benefits of Art. 159: (1) the
relationship enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family Code; (2) they live in the family home, and (3) they are
dependent for legal support upon the head of the family.

Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV satisfied the first two requisites. However, on the third requisite, Marcelino
Lorenzo R. Dario IV cannot demand support from his paternal grandmother. Thus, the obligation to support
under Art. 199 which outlines the order of liability for support is imposed first upon the shoulders of the closer
relatives and only in their default is the obligation moved to the next nearer relatives and so on. It is his father
whom he is dependent on legal support, and who must now establish his own family home separate and
distinct from that of his parents, being of legal age.

30. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v GUILLERMO FLORENDO ALIAS IMONG G.R. No. 136845, 08
October 2003, BELLOSILLO MMBautista TOPIC: BURDEN OF PROOF

FACTS:

28 August 1996 at around 2:30 in the afternoon Erlinda and Imong were having an argument. After Erlinda
was heard to have told Imong to go to sleep, the latter all of a sudden and without any provocation hacked
Erlinda with a bolo in the head and other parts of her body. The victim could only exclaim, "Patayennak met ni
Imong ngen (Imong is going to kill me)!"

Appellant's father Agustin Florendo witnessed this incident. Agustin sought help from his immediate
neighbor, Ernesto Anical, and told him, "Kasano Erning, patayen yen met ni Imong ni baketnan (How is this
Erning, Imong is killing his wife)!"

Appellant ran to the house of the barangay captain after hacking his wife. He was found there holding a
bloodied bolo, his hands and feet dripping with blood. Felipe advised appellant to yield his bolo but the latter
did not respond. This prompted Felipe to grab his hand and take away his bolo. When Barangay Captain
Godofredo Apuya arrived, he asked appellant why his hand and feet were covered with blood but the latter did
not answer.

2 September 1996 appellant was committed at the Abra Provincial Jail. During his confinement, he was
observed to be having difficulty in sleeping. He could not eat during meal times. Most of the time he would
stand in his cell without talking to anyone. The Provincial Warden then requested a psychiatric examination of
appellant to determine whether he was fit to be arraigned.
 On 17 October 1996 appellant was supposed to be arraigned but he appeared without counsel and
remained unresponsive to the questions propounded to him. The TC referred appellant to the Baguio General
Hospital and Medical Center (BGHMC) for psychiatric evaluation. He was admitted and managed as a case of
schizophrenic psychosis, paranoid type (schizophreniform disorder).

At the pre-trial conference, appellant admitted killing his wife but put up the defense of insanity to claim
exemption from criminal liability.

Agustin Florendo attested that his son was not in his proper senses on the day of the incident and repeated
on cross-examination that appellant was crazy and had been behaving strangely for one (1) year before the
incident. Other witnesses (brgy. Capt , Tanod, and Neighbor) said that 1) (3) months prior to the incident, he
saw him singing, dancing and clapping his hands in their yard 2) on the day of the incident appellant was not in
his right senses as he saw him sharpening his bolo with his eyes red and looking very sharp 3) him ten (10)
days before the incident singing and talking to himself.

But before the trial could prosper, the presiding judge received a letter from the provincial warden asking for
the recommitment of appellant to the BGHMC because of his unstable mental condition. Upon the assurance
of Dr. Caducoy he was eventually allowed to testify.

In his testimony he claimed he did not recall the hacking incident but recalled seeing his children days before
the incident; that he was brought by the authorities to jail; he thumb marked a form given in jail; and came to
know of his wife’s death when his father told him while he was in jail and that he did not know the Brgy. Capt
when he was asked about his wife’s affair.

TC: held that the crime committed was parricide it did not consider insanity as a defense and held that
witnesses’ testimony indicated a mental abnormality and no expert witness was presented to testify on his
insanity.

Appellant Florendo now contends that the trial court erred in not acquitting him on the ground of insanity; for
appreciating cruelty instead as an aggravating circumstance in the commission of the crime

ISSUE + RULING: WON ACCUSED SHOULD BE ACQUITTED BASED ON INSANITY.

No. The Onus Probandi rests upon him who invokes insanity as a defense. He must prove it through clear and
convincing evidence.

The issue of insanity is a question of fact for insanity is a condition of the mind, not susceptible of the usual
means of proof. Establishing the insanity of an accused requires opinion testimony which may be given by a
witness who is intimately acquainted with appellant, or who has rational basis to conclude that appellant was
insane based on the witness' own perception of appellant, or who is qualified as an expert, such as a
psychiatrist

The 4 witnesses of the prosecution were one in alleging that the appellant lost his mind because they saw him
acting oddly. Crazy is not the same as non compos mentis there must be a total deprivation of freedom of the
will. The observations that appellant manifested unusual behavior does not constitute sufficient proof of his
insanity because not every aberration of the mind or mental deficiency constitutes insanity hence exempting.

It is also well-settled that an inquiry into the mental state of an accused should relate to the period immediately
before or at the very moment that the felony is committed.

The medical findings of the BGHMC, which diagnosed appellant's mental disorder as schizophrenic psychosis,
paranoid type, refer to appellant's treatment after the incident happened. It is bereft of any proof that appellant
was completely deprived of intelligence or discernment at the time or at the very moment he killed his wife. It is
inconclusive as to whether he was insane at the time immediately preceding or at the very moment of the
killing.

In compliance with SC’s Resolution, an evaluation of the psychological and psychiatric condition was
conducted by tge SC Clinic Services at the National State Penitentiary. The neuro-psychiatric evaluation report
disclosed that appellant was suffering from psychosis or insanity, classified as chronic schizophrenia, paranoid
type. It divulged further that "prior to the onset of the overt psychotic symptoms, appellant manifested unusual
behavior prior to the commission of the crime of parricide described as fearfulness, irritability, suspiciousness
and jealousy or preoccupation with the fidelity of his wife. In retrospect, this group of symptoms could have
possibly been the prodromal phase heralding the onset of the psychotic illness." The report revealed that
symptoms of appellant's mental illness were conceivably manifested prior to the date of the crime and that
substantial evidence was lacking to conclude that his abnormal behavior was due to the use of drugs or any
prohibited substance.

As can be gleaned from the reports, appellant could only be undergoing the percursory stages of a disease
prior to and at the time of the killing. It is, therefore, beyond cavil that assuming that he had some form of
mental illness by virtue of the premonitory symptoms of schizophrenia, it did not totally deprive him of
intelligence. The presence of his reasoning faculties, which enabled him to exercise sound judgment and
satisfactorily articulate certain matters such as his jealousy over the supposed infidelity of his wife, sufficiently
discounts any intimation of insanity when he committed the dastardly crime.

Even if cruelty is proved, it cannot be appreciated against appellant to raise the penalty to death as this was
not alleged in the Information. Under Sec. 9, Rule 110, of The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which
took effect on 1 December 2000, aggravating circumstances must be alleged in the information or complaint,
otherwise, they cannot be properly appreciated. Being favorable to appellant, this procedural rule must be
given retroactive application.

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the conviction of accused-appellant GUILLERMO FLORENDO alias IMONG of

parricide under Art. 246 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by Sec. 5, of RA 7659, is AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that he should suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, instead of death. He is further
ordered to pay the heirs of his wife, the deceased Erlinda Ragudo Florendo, the amount of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity for her death, and to pay the costs.

40. G.R. No. L-6335 July 31, 1954

GLICERIA ROSETE, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF ZAMBALES, SIMPLICIO YAP and CORAZON YAP, defendants-appellants.

Ricardo N. Agbunag for appellants.

Jorge A. Pascua for appellee.

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

In criminal case No. 2897 for murder of the Court of First Instance of Zambales, Epifanio Fularon was
convicted and sentenced to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P2,000.

On February 10, 1949, to satisfy said indemnity, a writ of execution was issued and the sheriff levied upon four
parcels of land belonging to the conjugal partnership of Epifanio Fularon and Gliceria Rosete. These parcels of
land were sold at public auction as required by the rules for the sum of P1,385.00, leaving an unsatisfied
balance of P739.34.
On March 8, 1950, Gliceria Rosete redeemed two of the four parcels of land which were sold at public auction
for the sum of P879.20, the sheriff having executed in her favor the corresponding deed of repurchase.

On April 10, 1950, an alias execution was issued to satisfy the balance of the indemnity and the sheriff levied
upon the two parcels of land which were redeemed by Gliceria Rosete and set a date for their sale. Prior to the
arrival of this date, however, Gliceria Rosete filed a case for conjunction to restrain the sheriff from carrying out
the sale praying at the same time for a writ of preliminary injunction. This writ was issued upon the filing of the
requisite bond but was later dissolved upon a motion filed by defendants who put up counter-bond.

The dissolution of the injunction enabled the sheriff to carry out the sale as originally scheduled and the
property was sold to one Raymundo de Jesus for the sum of P970. This development prompted the plaintiff to
amend her complaint by praying therein, among other things, that the sale carried out by the sheriff be
declared null and void. After due trial, wherein the parties practically agreed on the material facts pertinent to
the issue, the court rendered decision declaring the sale null and void. The defendants appealed, and the case
was certified to this court on the plea that the appeal involves purely questions of law.

The question to be decided is whether the sale made by the sheriff on May 9, 1950 of the two parcels of land
which were redeemed by Gliceria Rosete in the exercise of her right of redemption is valid it appearing that
they formed part of the four parcels of land belonging to the conjugal partnership which were originally sold to
satisfy the same judgment of indemnity awarded in the criminal case. The lower court declared the sale null
and void on the strength of the ruling laid down in the case of Lichauco vs. Olegario, 43 Phil., 540, and this
finding is now disputed by the appellants.

In the case above adverted to, Lichauco obtained a judgment against Olegario for the sum of P72,766.37. To
satisfy this judgment, certain real estate belonging to Olegario was levied in execution and at the sale Lichauco
bid for it for the sum of P10,000. Olegario, on the same day, sold his right of redemption to his cousin
Dalmacio. Later, Lichauco asked for an alias writ of execution and the sheriff proceeded with the sale of the
right of redemption of Olegario whereat Lichauco himself bid for the sum of P10,000. As Lichauco failed to
register the sale owing to the fact that the sale executed by Olegario in favor of his cousin was already
recorded, Lichauco brought the matter to court to test the validity of the latter sale. One of the issues raised
was, "Whether or not Faustino Lichauco, as an execution creditor and purchaser at the auction in question was
entitled, after his judgment had thus been executed but not wholly satisfied, to have it executed again by
levying upon the right of redemption over said properties." The court ruled that this cannot be done for it would
render nugatory and means secured by law to an execution debtor to avoid the sale of his property made at an
auction under execution. Said this Court:

We, therefore, find that the plaintiff, as a judgment creditor, was not, and is not, entitled, after an
execution has been levied upon the real properties in question by virtue of the judgment in his favor, to
have another execution levied upon the same properties by virtue of the same judgment to reach the
right of redemption which the execution debtor and his privies retained over them.

Inasmuch as the Lichauco case refers to the levy and sale of the right of redemption belonging to a judgment
debtor and not to the levy of the very property which has been the subject of execution for the satisfaction of
the same judgment, it is now contended that it cannot be considered as a precedent in the present case for
here the second levy was effected on the same property subject of the original execution. But this argument
falls on its own weight when we consider the following conclusion of the court, "... what we wish to declare is
that a judgment by virtue of which a property is sold at public auction can have no further effect on such
property." (Emphasis supplied)

Nevertheless, when this case came up for discussion some members of the Court expressed doubt as to the
applicability of the Lichauco case considering that it does not decide squarely whether the same property may
be levied on an alias execution if it is reacquired by the judgment debtor in the exercise of his right of
redemption and as on this matter the requisite majority could not be obtained the injury turned to another issue
which for purposes of this case is sufficient to decide the controversy.
The issue is: Since it appears that plaintiff redeemed the two parcels of land in question with money obtained
by her from her father, has the property become paraphernal and as such is beyond the reach of further
execution?

We are of the opinion that the question should be answered in the affirmative for the following reasons:

(a) Gliceria Rosete, the wife, redeemed the property, not in behalf of her husband, but as successor in interest
in the whole or part of the property, it being then conjugal. The term "successor in interest" appearing in
subdivision (a), Section 25, Rule 39, includes, according to Chief Justice Moran, "one who succeeds to the
interest of the debtor by operation of law" or "the wife as regards her husband's homestead by reason of the
fact that some portion of her husband's title passes to her (Comments on the Rules of Court, 1952 ed., Vol. 1,
pp. 841-842); and (b) a property is deemed to belong exclusively to the wife (1) when acquired by her by-right
of redemption, and (2) with money belonging exclusively to her (Article 1396, old Civil Code).

The interest which a wife has in conjugal property in this jurisdiction may be likened to that of a wife in a
homestead in American jurisdiction. That interest is known as "inchoate right of dower", or a "contingent
interest." By virtue of this inchoate right, a wife has a right of redemption of a homestead as successor in
interest of her husband. Thus, in Hepfner vs. Urton, 12 Pac., 486, it was held that by the declaration of
homestead by the husband of the property sold a portion of his title passed to his wife, and "she had the right
of residence thereon with him and the family during their joint lives, with some rights in case she should survive
him. She had a right of redemption as his successor in interest." (Emphasis supplied) In Taylor vs. Taylor, 92
So., 109, where a mortgage was executed on a homestead and the husband refused to pay the indebtedness,
it was held that "the wife's "inchoate right of dower", which is more than a possibility and may well be
denominated a contingent interest, was a sufficient interest in the lands to confer the right of equitable
redemption under the mortgage." And in Malone vs. Nelson, et al., 167 So., 714, it was declared that "the right
of the wife of redeem is rested upon her interest — inchoate right of dower — a right subject to a monetary
valuation." These authorities have persuasive effect considering the source of our rule on the matter.

The property in question has therefore become the exclusive property of the plaintiff. She has acquired it by
right of redemption as successor in interest of her husband. It has ceased to be the property of the judgment
debtor. It can no longer therefore be the subject of execution under a judgment exclusively affecting the
personal liability of the latter. The conclusion reached by the lower court on this matter is therefore not
warranted by law.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is modified as follows: the sale of the two parcels of land executed by
the sheriff on May 9, 1950 in favor of Raymundo de Jesus for P970 is hereby declared null and void, and the
deed of repurchase executed by the sheriff in favor of the plaintiff on March 8, 1950 is hereby revived and
maintained. The rest of the decision is declared without effect. No pronouncement as to costs.