G.R. No. 111141. March 6, 1998.
* repurchase the same, petitioner reacquired the property by way of sale9 on August 24, 1962
MARIO Z. TITONG, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (4th
Division), VICTORICO LAURIO and ANGELES LAURIO, respondents.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
ROMERO, J.:
Like a priceless treasure coveted by many, but capable of ownership by only one, this 20,592
square-meter parcel of land located at Barrio Titong, Masbate, Masbate is claimed by two
contestants in this petition for review on certiorari. Unfortunately, legal title over the property
can be vested in only one of them.
The case originated from an action for quieting of title filed by petitioner Mario Titong. The
Regional Trial Court of Masbate, Masbate, Branch 441 ruled in favor of private respondents,
Victorico Laurio and Angeles Laurio, adjudging them as the true and lawful owners of the
disputed land. Affirmed on appeal to the Court of Appeals, petitioner comes to us for a
favorable reversal.
Petitioner alleges that he is the owner of an unregistered parcel of land with an area of
3.2800 hectares, more or less, surveyed as Lot No. 3918, and declared for taxation purposes
in his name. He claims that on three separate occasions in September 1983, private
respondents, with their hired laborers, forcibly entered a portion of the land containing an
area of approximately two (2) hectares, and began plowing the same under pretext of
ownership. Private respondents denied this allegation, and averred that the disputed property
formed part of the 5.5-hectare agricultural land which they had purchased from their
predecessor-in-interest,2 Pablo Espinosa on August 10, 1981.
In his testimony, petitioner identified Espinosa as his adjoining owner,3 asserting that no
controversy had sprouted between them for twenty years until the latter sold Lot No. 3479 to
private respondent Victorico Laurio.4 This was corroborated by Ignacio Villamor, who had
worked on the land even before its sale to Espinosa in 1962. The boundary between the land
sold to Espinosa and what remained of petitioner’s property was the old Bugsayon river.
When petitioner employed Bienvenido Lerit as his tenant in 1962, he instructed Lerit to
change the course of the old river and direct the flow of water to the lowland at the southern
portion of petitioner’s property, thus converting the old river into a riceland.
For his part, private respondent anchors his defense on the following facts: He denied
petitioner’s claim of ownership, recounting that the area and boundaries of the disputed land
remained unaltered during the series of conveyances prior to its coming into his hands.
According to him, petitioner first declared the land for taxation purposes under Tax
Declaration No. 2916,6 which showed that the land had an area of 5.5 hectares and was
bounded on the North by the Bugsayon River; on the East by property under the ownership of
Lucio Lerit; on the South by property owner by Potenciano Zaragoza; and on the West by
property owned by Agapito de la Cruz.7 Private Respondent then alleges that, on December
21, 1960, petitioner sold this property to Concepcion Verano vda. de Cabug, after which Tax
Declaration No. 53398 was issued in her favor. In compliance with their mutual agreement to
and then declared it for taxation purposes in his name under Tax Declaration No. 5720.10
However, the property remained in petitioner’s hands for only four (4) days because, on
August 28, 1962, he sold it to Espinosa11 who then declared it in his name under Tax
Declaration No. 12311.12 Consequently, the property became a part of the estate of Pablo
Espinosa’s wife, the late Segundina Liao Espinosa. On August 10, 1981, her heirs executed
an instrument denominated as “Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Simultaneous Sale”
whereby the 5.5-hectare property under Tax Declaration No. 12311 was sold to private
respondent13 in consideration of the amount of P5,000.00. Thereafter, Tax Declaration No.
12738 was issued in the name of private respondent. In all these conveyances, the area and
boundaries of the property remained exactly the same as those appearing in Tax Declaration
No. 2916 under petitioner’s name.
It was proved at the proceedings in the court a quo that two (2) surveys were made of the
disputed property. The first survey14 was made for petitioner, while the second was the
relocation survey ordered by the lower court. As anticipated, certain discrepancies between
the two surveys surfaced. Thus, contrary to petitioner’s allegation in his complaint that he is
the owner of only 3.2800 hectares, he was actually claiming 5.9789 hectares, the total areas
of Lot Nos. 3918, 3918-A and 3606. On the other hand, Lot No. 3479 pertaining to Espinosa,
was left with only an area of 4.1841 hectares instead of the 5.5 hectares sold by petitioner to
him. Apprised of the discrepancy, private respondent filed a protest15 before the Bureau of
Lands against the first survey, likewise filing a case for alteration of boundaries before the
municipal trial court, the proceedings of which, however, were suspended because of the
instant case.
Private respondent testified that petitioner is one of the four heirs of his mother, Leonida
Zaragoza. In the Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale of Estate of the deceased Leonida
Zaragoza,17 the heirs adjudicated unto themselves the 3.6hectare property of the deceased.
The property involved is described in the instrument as having been declared under Tax
Declaration No. 330118 and as bounded on the North by Victor Verano, on the East by
Benigno Titong, on the South by the Bugsayon River and on the West by Benigno Titong. On
September 9, 1969, Tax Declaration No. 8723 was issued to petitioner for his corresponding
share in the estate.
However, instead of reflecting only .9000 hectare as his rightful share in the extrajudicial
settlement19 petitioner’s share was bloated to 2.4 hectares. It therefore appeared to private
respondent that petitioner encroached upon his (Laurio’s) property and declared it a part of
his inheritance.
The boundaries were likewise altered so that it was bounded on the North by Victor Verano,
on the East by Benigno Titong, on the South by property owner Espinosa, and on the West
by property owner Adolfo Titong.21 Private respondent accordingly denied that petitioner had
diverted the course of the Bugsayon River after he had repurchased the land from
Concepcion Verano vda. de Cabug because the land was immediately sold to Espinosa
shortly thereafter.
The lower court rendered a decision in favor of private respondents, declaring him as the true
and absolute owner of the litigated property and ordering petitioner to respect private
1
respondents’ title and ownership over the property and to pay attorney’s fees, litigation
expenses, costs and moral damages.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the decision. On motion for
reconsideration, the same was denied for lack of merit. Hence, this petition for review on
certiorari.
At the outset, we hold that the instant petition must be denied for the reason that the lower
court should have outrightly dismissed the complaint for quieting of title. The remedy of
quieting of title may be availed of under the circumstances enumerated in the Civil Code:
“ART. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by
reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid
or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may
be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title.
An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real property or
any interest therein.”
Under this provision, a claimant must show that there is an instrument, record, claim,
encumbrance or proceeding which constitutes or casts a cloud, doubt, question or shadow
upon the owner’s title to or interest in real property.24 The ground or reason for filing a
complaint for quieting of title must therefore be “an instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or
proceeding.” Under the maxim expresio unius est exclusio alterius, these grounds are
exclusive so that other reasons outside of the purview of these reasons may not be
considered valid for the same action.
Had the lower court thoroughly considered the complaint filed, it would have had no other
course of action under the law but to dismiss it. The complaint failed to allege that an
“instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding” beclouded the plaintiff’s title over the
property involved. Petitioner merely alleged that the defendants (respondents herein),
together with their hired laborers and without legal justification, forcibly entered the southern
portion of the land of the plaintiff and plowed the same.
He then proceeded to claim damages and attorney’s fees. He prayed that, aside from issuing
a writ or preliminary injunction enjoining private respondents and their hired laborers from
intruding into the land, the court should declare him “the true and absolute owner” thereof.
Hence, through his allegations, what petitioner imagined as clouds cast on his title to the
property were private respondents’ alleged acts of physical intrusion into his purported
property. Clearly, the acts alleged may be considered grounds for an action for forcible entry
but definitely not one for quieting of title.
When the issues were joined by the filing of the answer to the complaint, it would have
become apparent to the court that the case was a boundary dispute. The answer alleged,
among other matters, that petitioner, “in bad faith, surreptitiously, maliciously and fraudulently
had the land in question included in the survey of his land which extends to the south only as
far as the Bugsayon River which is the visible and natural and common boundary between
the properties.”26 Moreover, during the hearing of the case, petitioner proved that it was
actually a boundary dispute by evidence showing what he considered as the boundary of his
property which private respondents perceived as actually encroaching on their property. In
this regard, the following pronouncements of the Court are apropos:
“x x x (T)he trial court (and likewise the respondent Court) cannot, in an action for quieting of
title, order the determination of the boundaries of the claimed property, as that would be
tantamount to awarding to one or some of the parties the disputed property in an action
where the sole issue is limited to whether the instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or
proceeding involved constitutes a cloud upon the petitioners’ interest or title in and to said
property. Such determination of boundaries is appropriate in adversarial proceedings where
possession or ownership may properly be considered and where evidence aliunde, other than
the ‘instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding’ itself, may be introduced. An
action for forcible entry, whenever warranted by the period prescribed in Rule 70, or for
recovery of possession de facto, also within the prescribed period, may be availed of by the
petitioners, in which proceeding the boundary dispute may be fully threshed out.”27
Nonetheless, even if the complaint below were to be considered as a valid one for quieting of
title, still, the instant petition for review on certiorari must fail.
As a general rule, findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are binding and conclusive upon
this Court. Such factual findings shall not be disturbed normally unless the same are palpably
unsupported by the evidence on record or the judgment itself is based on a misapprehension
of facts.28 Upon an examination of the records, the Court finds no evident reason to depart
from the general rule.
The courts below correctly held that when petitioner “sold, ceded, transferred and conveyed”
the 5.5-hectare land in favor of Pablo Espinosa, his rights of ownership and possession
pertaining thereto ceased and these were transferred to the latter. In the same manner,
Espinosa’s rights of ownership over the land ceased and were transferred to private
respondent upon its sale to the latter. This finds justification in the Civil Code, as follows:
“ART. 1458. By the contract of sale one of the contracting parties obligates himself to transfer
the ownership of and to deliver a determinate thing, and the other to pay therefor a price
certain in money or its equivalent.
A contract of sale may be absolute or conditional.”
In other words, a sale is a contract transferring dominion and other real rights in the thing
sold.29 In the case at bar, petitioner’s claim of ownership must of necessity fail because he
has long abdicated his rights over the land when he sold it to private respondent’s
predecessor-in-interest.
Petitioner’s claim that he acquired ownership over the disputed land through possession for
more than twenty (20) years is likewise unmeritorious. While Art. 1134 of the Civil Code
provides that “(o)wnership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired by
ordinary prescription through possession of ten years,” this provision of law must be read in
conjunction with Art. 1117 of the same Code. This article states that “x x x (o)rdinary
acquisitive prescription of things requires possession in good faith and with just title for the
time fixed by law.” Hence, a prescriptive title to real estate is not acquired by mere
possession thereof under claim of ownership for a period of ten years unless such
possession was acquired con justo titulo y buena fe (with color of title and good faith).30 The
good faith of the possessor consists in the reasonable belief that the person from whom he
received the thing was the owner thereof, and could transmit his ownership.31 For purposes
of prescription, there is just title when the adverse claimant came into possession of the
2
property through one of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or other
real rights but the grantor was not the owner or could not transmit any right.
Petitioners have not satisfactorily met the requirements of good faith and just title. As aptly
observed by the trial court, the plaintiff’s admitted acts of converting the boundary line
(Bugsayon River) into a ricefield and thereafter claiming ownership thereof were acts
constituting deprivation of the rights of others and therefore “tantamount to bad faith.”33 To
allow petitioner to benefit from his own wrong would run counter to the maxim ex dolo malo
non oritur actio (no man can be allowed to found a claim upon his own wrongdoing).
Extraordinary acquisitive prescription cannot similarly vest ownership over the property upon
petitioner. Art. 1137 of the Civil Code states that “(o)wnership and other real rights over
immovables prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years,
without need of title or of good faith.” Petitioner’s alleged possession in 1962 up to September
1983 when private respondents entered the property in question spanned twenty-one (21)
years. This period of time is short of the thirty-year requirement mandated by Art. 1137.
Petitioner basically anchors his claim over the property on the survey plan prepared upon his
request,34 the tax declaration in his name,35 the commissioner’s report on the relocation
survey,36 and the survey plan.37 Respondent court correctly held that these documents do
not conclusively demonstrate petitioner’s title over Lot Nos. 3918-A and 3606.
A survey is the act by which the quantity of a parcel of land is ascertained and also a paper
containing a statement of courses, distances, and quantity of land.38 A survey under a
proprietary title is not a conveyance. It is an instrument sui generis in the nature of a partition;
a customary mode in which a proprietor has set off to himself in severalty a part of the
common estate.39 Therefore, a survey, not being a conveyance, is not a mode of acquiring
ownership. A fortiori, petitioner cannot found his claim on the survey plan reflecting a
subdivision of land because it is not conclusive as to ownership as it may refer only to a
delineation of possession.
Furthermore, the plan was not verified and approved by the Bureau of Lands in accordance
with Sec. 28, paragraph 5 of Act No. 2259, the Cadastral Act, as amended by Sec. 1862 of
Act No. 2711. Said law ordains that private surveyors send their original field notes,
computations, reports, surveys, maps and plots regarding a piece of property to the Bureau of
Lands for verification and approval.41 A survey plan not verified and approved by said
Bureau is nothing more than a private writing, the due execution and authenticity of which
must be proven in accordance with Sec. 20 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. The
circumstance that the plan was admitted in evidence without any objection as to its due
execution and authenticity does not signify that the courts shall give probative value therefor.
To admit evidence and not to believe it subsequently are not contradictory to each other. This
Court cannot alter the conclusions of the Court of Appeals on the credibility accorded to
evidence presented by the parties.
Similarly, petitioner’s tax declaration issued under his name is not even persuasive evidence
of his claimed ownership over the land in dispute. A tax declaration, by itself, is not
considered conclusive evidence of ownership.43 It is merely an indicium of a claim of
ownership.44 Because it does not by itself give title, it is of little value in proving one’s
ownership. Moreover, the incompatibility in petitioner’s tax declaration and the
commissioner’s report as regards the area of his claimed property is much too glaring to be
ignored. Tax Declaration No. 8717 states that petitioner’s property has an area of 3.2800
hectares while the totality of his claim according to the commissioned geodetic engineer’s
survey amounts to 4.1385 hectares. There is therefore a notable discrepancy of 8,585 square
meters. On the other hand, private respondent’s claimed property, as borne out by Tax
Declaration No. 12738, totals 5.5 hectares, a more proximate equivalent of the 5.2433hectare
property as shown by the commissioner’s report.
There is also nothing in the commissioner’s report that substantiates petitioner’s claim that
the disputed land was inside his property. Petitioner capitalizes on the lower court’s statement
in its decision46 that “as reflected in the commissioner’s report dated May 23, 1984 (Exhibit
3-3-A), the area claimed is inside lot 3918 of the defendants (Exhibit 2)”47 or the private
respondents. A careful reading of the decision would show that this statement is found in the
summary of defendants’ (herein private respondents) evidence. Reference to Lot No. 3918
may, therefore, be attributed to mere oversight as the lower court even continues to state the
defendants’ assertion that the 2-hectare land is part of their 5.5hectare property. Hence, it is
not amiss to conclude that either petitioner misapprehended the lower court’s decision or he
is trying to contumaciously mislead or worse, deceive this Court.
With respect to the awards of moral damages of P10,000.00 and attorney’s fees of
P2,000.00, the Court finds no cogent reason to delete the same. Jurisprudence is replete with
rulings to the effect that where fraud and bad faith have been established, the award of moral
damages is in order.48 This pronouncement finds support in Art. 2219 (10) of the Civil Code
allowing the recovery of moral damages for acts enumerated in Art. 21 of the same Code.
This article states that “(a)ny person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner
that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.” The moral damages are hereby increased to P30,000.00. We agree with the
respondent court in holding that the award of attorney’s fees is justified because petitioner
filed a clearly unfounded civil action.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED and the
questioned Decision of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED. This Decision is immediately
executory. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (C.J., Chairman), Kapunan and Purisima, JJ., concur.
Petition denied; Questioned decision affirmed.
Note.—Tax receipts and declaration of ownership for taxation when coupled with proof of
actual possession of the property can be the basis of claim of ownership through prescription.
(Heirs of Placido Miranda vs. Court of Appeals, 255 SCRA 368 [1996])
——o0o——
3
[No. 40177. March 15, 1934]
Li SENG GIAP & Co., applicant and appellant, vs. THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS,
oppositor and appellee.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur. Villareal, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
Manly & Reyes for appellant.
Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.
DlAZ, J.:
On August 16, 1932, Li Seng Giap & Co., a partnership composed of individuals who are not
citizens of the Philippine Islands nor of the United States, but aliens, instituted these
proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, for the registration in its name in
the registry of deeds, of the three parcels of land described in the plans Exhibits A and B, and
technical descriptions attached to its application, in accordance with the provisions of Act No.
496 and of Chapter VIII or Title II of Act No. 2874.
The Director of Lands filed an opposition to the said application alleging as his grounds that
the three parcels of land in question were public lands belonging to the Government of the
United States under the administration and control of the Government of the Philippine
Islands, and that, being an alien, the applicant partnership cannot invoke the benefits of the
provisions of section 45 of the said Act No. 2874. The aforecited section is contained in
Chapter VIII of Title II of the said Act invoked by the applicant. The Director of Lands has
made no reference to Act No. 496 in his opposition for the reason that the Act in question
merely prescribes, in general terms, the manner or procedure to be followed by an applicant
in the obtainment of the certificate of title applied for, or in the denial or issuance thereof, as
the case may be, by the court or by the Government agencies therein mentioned.
After the trial, the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur rendered judgment therein
denying the application of the applicant partnership on the ground that it is an alien, and
holding, at the same time, that the parcels of land it sought to register in its name are a
portion of the public domain. The said applicant took exception to and appealed from such
judgment, claiming that the trial court committed the following alleged errors, to wit:
I. The trial court erred in holding that the applicant, Li Seng Giap & Co. being a partnership
made up of individuals who are neither citizens of the Philippine Islands nor of the United
States, is not entitled, for this reason, to register the land described in its application under
the provisions of the Land Registration Act.
II. The lower court also erred in declaring the land described in the application a part of the
public domain.
III. The lower court also erred in denying the applicant's motion for reconsideration as well as
its motion for new trial.
It is unnecessary to discuss the nature of the three parcels of land in question. The record
shows that they are agricultural lands which at present contain coconut trees, abaca and
cacao with which they have been planted for over forty years. The coconut trees there on
range from one to forty years in age. The said three parcels had likewise been cultivated and
had actually been occupied for many years during the Spanish regime by several natives of
the Province of Camarines Sur, named Inocencio Salon, Lazaro Ceron, Margarita Labordes,
Doroteo Quitales and Cornelio Vargas. The occupation or possession thereof by the above-
named persons was under claim of ownership but neither the exact date when such
possession began nor the circumstances under which they acquired the property in question
has been determined. However, it seems certain that such occupation began some fifty-five
years ago and continued without interruption from that time until said persons decide to sell
them to Sebastian Palanca who is also an alien like the herein applicant. Neither is there
anything of record to show when the sale was made but it also seems certain that it took
place during the Spanish regime. Sebastian Palanca continued in possession of the aforesaid
three parcels of land from the time he acquired them in the manner hereinbefore stated until
July 22, 1930, when he sold them to the herein applicant-appellant. However, before selling
them and while he was in possession thereof under claim of ownership, as alleged, he failed
to obtain a gratuitous title or even a mere possessory information therefor, which would serve
to protect his claim of ownership, by taking advantage of the benefits afforded by the Royal
Decree of February 13, 1894, which was promulgated in the Philippines and published in
the Gaceta de Manila, No. 106, of April 17th of the same year.
The pertinent parts of said decree, which are also articles 1, 19 and 21 of the Maura Law, and
which had been in force in the Philippines during the last years of the Spanish regime and
continued to be so until the enactment of the Public Land Act and the amendments thereto,
read as follows:
ARTICLE 1. All uncultivated lands, soil, earth, and mountains not included in the following
exceptions shall be considered alienable public lands: First, those which have become
subjected to private ownership and have a legitimate owner. Second, those which belong to
the forest zones which the State deems wise to reserve for reasons of public utility.
xxx xxx xxx
ART. 19. Possessors of alienable public lands under cultivation who have not obtained nor
applied for composition on the date this decree shall be published in the Gaceta de Manila,
may obtain a gratuitous title of property, by means of a possessory information in conformity
with the law of civil procedure and the mortgage law whenever they establish any of the
following conditions:
First. Having, or having had, them under cultivation without interruption during the preceding
six years.
4
Second. Having had possession of them for twelve consecutive years, and having had them
under cultivation until the date of the information, and for three years before that date.
Third. Having had them in possession ostensibly and without interruption, for thirty or more
years, although the land is not under cultivation.
xxx xxx xxx
ART. 21. A term of one year, without grace, is granted order to perfect the informations
referred to in articles 19 and 20.
Article 80 of the regulations for the carrying out of the Royal Decree above-mentioned
provided as follows:
ART. 80. By virtue of the provision of article 21 of the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894, the
inextensible period for carrying out the informations referred to in the two preceding articles,
shall be counted as on the 17th day of April, 1895.
Upon the expiration of this period the right of cultivator and possessors to the obtainment of
free title shall lapse, and the full property right in the land shall revert to the State or, in a
proper case, to the public domain.
Therefore, there can be no doubt but that under the last aforecited article the three parcels of
land in question reverted to the State as property of the public domain upon the expiration of
the period specified therein, by reason of negligence on the part of the possessors thereof.
The applicant-appellant contends that under the provisions of section 54, paragraph 6, of Act
No. 926, it has necessarily acquired the right to have the corresponding certificate of title
issued to it upon registration of the said parcels of land in its name in the registry of deeds,
inasmuch as it had actually been in the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
thereof, under claim of ownership, not only by itself but also through Sebastian Palanca from
whom it had purchased them, for more than ten years prior to July 26, 1904, the date on
which the aforesaid Act went into effect, in accordance with the proclamation of the Governor-
General of the Philippine Islands of the same date.
The section invoked by the applicant-appellant reads as follows:
SEC. 54. The following-described persons or their legal successors in right, occupying public
lands in the Philippine Islands, or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but
whose titles to such lands have not been perfected, may apply to the Court of Land
Registration of the Philippine Islands for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a
certificate of title therefor to wit:
1. All persons who prior to the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States had
fulfilled all the conditions required by the Spanish laws and royal decrees of the Kingdom of
Spain for the purchase of public lands, including the payment of the purchase price, but who
failed to secure formal conveyance of title;
2. All persons who prior to the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States, having
applied for the purchase of public lands and having secured a survey, auction, and an award,
or a right to an award, of such lands, did not receive title therefor through no default upon
their part;
3. All persons who prior to the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States, having
applied for the purchase of public lands and having secured a survey and award of same, did
not, through negligence upon their part, comply with the conditions of full or any payment
therefor, but who after such survey and award shall have occupied the land adversely, except
as prevented by war or force majeure until the taking effect of this Act;
4. All persons who were entitled to apply and did apply for adjustment or composition of title
to lands against the Government under the Spanish laws and royal decrees in force prior to
the royal decree of February thirteenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-four, but who failed to
receive title therefor through no default upon their part;
5. All persons who were entitled to a gratuitous title to public lands by "possessory
proceedings" under the provisions of articles nineteen and twenty of the royal decree of the
King of Spain issued February thirteenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-four, and who, having
complied with all the conditions therein required, failed to receive the title therefor through no
default upon their part; and
6. All persons who by themselves or their predecessors in interest have been in the open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural public lands,
as defined by said Act of Congress of July first, nineteen hundred and two, under a bona fide
claim of ownership except as against the Government, for a period of ten years next
preceding the taking effect of this Act, except when prevented by war or force majeure, shall
be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a government
grant and to have received the same, and shall be entitled to a certificate of title to such land
under the provisions of this chapter.
All applicants for lands under paragraphs one, two, three, four and five of this section must
establish by proper official records or documents that such proceedings as are therein
required were taken and the necessary conditions complied with: Provided, however, That
such requirements shall not apply to the fact of adverse possession.
It may be noted that the case of the applicant does not come under paragraph 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5
of the aforecited section, which, by the way, conclusively shows that prior to the enactment of
Act No. 926, the said Maura Law was the last law which regulated the acquisition of alienable
public lands and the issuance of the corresponding title to those who could establish their
claim that they were entitled thereto. Being aware of this fact, the applicant has never invoked
said paragraphs. He merely confines himself to invoking the provisions of paragraph 6
thereof, in support of which he cites the rulings of this court in the cases of Tan Yungquip
vs. Director of Lands (42 Phil., 128) and of Central Capiz vs. Ramirez (40 Phil., 883).
In the former case, it was held that inasmuch as the applicant Tan Yungquip, who was a
Chinaman, had proven: That he had acquired the parcels of land which he sought to register
in his name, some by purchase and others by inheritance; that he and his predecessors in
5
interest had been in the open, peaceful, continuous and notorious possession of the same for
at least thirty years, and that such parcels of land were agricultural lands, therefore, he was
entitled to have them registered in his name under the provisions of the aforecited section 54
of Act No. 926, for the reason that he filed his application to that effect more than one year
prior to the enactment and enforcement of Act No. 2874. It was likewise held therein that the
matter should be decided in favor of said Tan Yungquip on the ground that no valid law could
be found, at least on that occasion, which prohibited the registration in his name in the
registry of deeds, of the parcels of land of which he claimed to be the owner.
In the latter case above cited, that is, the case of Central Capiz vs. Ramirez, it was likewise
held that lands held in private ownership constitute no part of the public domain and cannot,
therefore, come within the purview of said Act No. 2874 on the ground that said subject
(lands held in private ownership) is not embraced in any manner in the title of the Act, and
that the intent of the Legislature in enacting the same was to limit the application thereof
exclusively to lands of the public domain.
Although nothing has been said in the decision rendered in the aforecited case of Tan
Yungquip vs. Director of Lands to the effect that the application of the therein applicant
should be granted on the ground that the provisions of section 54 of Act No. 926, which were
therein under consideration and interpretation, do not distinguish between citizens of the
Philippine Islands or of the United States and aliens, however, the appellant contends that the
aforecited section has such scope and that the question raised in this case should be decided
under the latter interpretation.
We do not believe that the rulings it the aforecited two cases and that in the case
of Agari vs. Government of the Philippine Islands (42 Phil., 143), are decisive and applicable
to the case under consideration, on the ground that although it is true that Agari, who was the
applicant in the last case, was an alien, it was likewise true that the persons, from whom he
had acquired the land which he sought to register in his name in the registry of deeds during
the time Act No. 926 was still in force, were natives of the Philippine Islands, who, in turn, had
acquired it through their father, who was likewise a native of the Islands, by composition with
the State in accordance with the laws then in force; nor that, under the provisions of the
aforecited section 54 of Act No. 926, the applicant-appellant Li Seng Giap & Co. could have
succeeded in securing the certificate of title which it now seeks; in the first place, because the
three aforecited decisions refer to cases which are different from the one now under
consideration; in the second place, because said decisions were based on the supposition
that the parcels of land in question therein were of private ownership and at that time no law
was known to be in existence, which prohibited the registration of said parcels of land in the
registry of deeds, in the name of the aforesaid applicants Tan Yungquip, Central Capiz and
Agari, and in the third place because while Act No. 926 was still in force (it is no longer in
force, having been expressly repealed by section 128 of Act No. 2874, on December 28,
1919), it should have been interpreted in the light of the provisions of the Act of Congress of
July 1, 1902, commonly known as the Organic Law of the Philippine Islands, inasmuch as the
former had been approved under the authority of sections 13, 14, 15 and 62 of the latter Act.
The very title of Act No. 926 above referred to shows that one of the purposes for which it
was approved was to carry out the provisions of sections, 13, 14, 15 and 62 of the aforecited
Act of Congress, which title reads in part:
An Act . . . providing for the determination by the Philippines Court of Land Registration of all
proceedings for completion of imperfect titles and for the cancellation or confirmation of
Spanish concessions and grants in said Islands, as authorized by sections thirteen, fourteen,
fifteen, and sixty-two of the Act of Congress of July first, nineteen hundred and two, entitled
"An Act temporarily to provide for the administration of the affairs of civil government in the
Philippine Islands, and for other purposes".
Sections 14 and 15 of the aforesaid Act of Congress, which bear relation to the question
under consideration, provide as follows:
SEC. 14. That the government of the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized and empowered
to enact rules and regulations and to prescribe terms and conditions to enable persons to
perfect their title to public lands in said Islands, who, prior to the transfer of sovereignty from
Spain to the United States, had fulfilled all or some of the conditions required by the Spanish
laws and royal decrees of the Kingdom of Spain for the acquisition of legal title thereto, yet
failed to secure conveyance of title; and the Philippine Commission is authorized to issue
patents, without compensation, to any native of said Islands, conveying the title to any tract of
land not more than sixteen hectares in extent, which were public lands and had been actually
occupied by such native or his ancestors prior to and on the thirteenth of August, eighteen
hundred and ninety-eight.
s. SEC. 15. That the Government of the Philippine Islands in hereby authorized and
empowered, on such terms as it may prescribe, by general legislation, to provide for the
granting or sale and conveyance to actual occupants and settlers and other citizens of said
Islands such parts and portions of the public domain, other than timber and mineral lands, of
the United States in said Islands as it may deem wise, not exceeding sixteen hectares to any
one person and for the sale and conveyance of not more than one thousand and twenty-four
hectares to any corporation or association of persons: Provided, that the grant or sale of such
lands, whether the purchase price be paid at once or in partial payments, shall be conditioned
upon actual and continued occupancy, improvement, and cultivation of the premises sold for
a period of not less than five years, during which time the purchaser or grantee cannot
alienate or encumber said land or the title thereto; but such restriction shall not apply to
transfers of rights and title of inheritance under the laws for the distribution of the estates of
decedents.
It may be noted that both of the above-cited sections provide that gratuitous title to property
may be issued only to natives of the Philippine Islands who are in possession of the
necessary qualifications specified therein. It may therefore be inferred from the foregoing that
Act No. 926 could not have a different scope from that given it by the aforecited Act of
Congress and, therefore, the phrase "all persons" employed in paragraph 6 of section 54 of
the former Act should be understood to mean only citizens of the Philippine Islands or citizens
of the United States or of any insular possession thereof.
6
The parcels of land involved in this case, which as hereinbefore stated, have reverted to the enforcement of the provisions of the first organic law of the country and those of the Jones
State after April 17, 1895, by virtue of the Maura Law, not of private ownership. Neither were Law (section 9), to the effect that lands of the public domain should not be disposed of or
they so on or after the aforesaid date. The applicant herein did not show any title thereto alienated to persons who are not inhabitants or citizens of the Philippine Islands.
either by possessory proceedings or otherwise, which may be considered as having been
issued by the Government. The only basis on which it now claims the right to have them Wherefore, finding that the judgment appealed from is in accordance with the law, it is hereby
registered in its name is its alleged possession thereof together with that of Sebastian affirmed in toto, with the costs against the appellants. So ordered.
Palanca and of the former possessors, as if to say, that it is entitled to the registration thereof
in its name, inasmuch as the parcels of land in question already belong to it, having acquired
them by prescription through the continuous, open, exclusive and notorious possession
thereof, under claim of ownership, at least since the Spanish regime in the Philippine Islands.
However, the truth is that the law expressly provides that no public land may be acquired by
prescription, and that such mode of acquisition does not hold as against the Government.
This provision is contained precisely in the very law invoked by the applicant, that is section
54, paragraph 6, of Act No. 926. In the case of Ongsiaco vs. Magsilang (50 Phil., 380, 386),
this court said:

". . . in a controversy between private individuals, where the Government has not intervened,
and where it appears that the land has ceased to be of public domain and has come to be of
private ownership, a petitioner may obtain registration of land upon a title acquired by
adverse possession as against individual opponents. The same rule does not maintain with
respect to land claimed by the Government and as to which the Government is opposing." In
the case of Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Abad (56 Phil., 75, 80), this court,
deciding a question similar to the one raised herein by the appellant, said as follows:
"Subsection ( b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874 is not obnoxious to the constitutional provision
relied upon by the appellant, as depriving the appellant of property without due process of
law. That provision has reference to property to which the citizen has acquired a vested right.
It does not extend to privileges and inchoate rights which have never been asserted or
perfected. The contention of the appellant . . . is therefore without merit." There is no
justifiable reason for disturbing the holdings of this court in the aforecited two cases. On the
contrary, it is considered timely to reiterate them herein inasmuch as they decide the same
question.

The provisions of section 54 of Act No. 926 as well as those of section 45, paragraph ( b), of
Act No. 2874 should necessarily be so construed as not to permit aliens to obtain title to
lands in their favor. It should not be understood, however, that the constitutional guaranty that
no person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws, is violated thereby, because, as
this court has said in the case of In re Patterson (1 Phil., 93, 95, 96), "Unquestionably every
State has a fundamental right to its existence and development, as also to the integrity of its
territory and the exclusive and peaceable possession of its dominions which it may guard and
defend by all possible means against any attack . . . . Superior to the law which protects
personal liberty, and the agreements which exist between nations for their own interest and
for the benefit of their respective subjects is the supreme and fundamental right of each State
to self-preservation and the integrity of its dominion and its sovereignty." It is upon grounds of
public policy that the rights of individuals, particularly of aliens, cannot prevail against the
aforesaid right of the Government of the Philippine Islands. and more particularly when, as in
the present case, far from violating any constitutional law, it deals precisely with the

7
G.R. No. 92161. March 18, 1991.*
SIMPLICIO BINALAY, PONCIANO GANNABAN, NICANOR MACUTAY, DOMINGO
ROSALES, GREGORIO ARGONZA, EUSTAQUIO BAUA, FLORENTINO ROSALES,
TEODORO MABBORANG, PATRICIO MABBORANG and FULGENCIO MORA,
petitioners, vs. GUILLERMO MANALO and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
PETITION to review the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Josefin De Alban Law Office for petitioners.
FELICIANO, J.:
The late Judge Taccad originally owned a parcel of land situated in Tumauini, Isabela having
an estimated area of twenty (20) hectares. The western portion of this land bordering on the
Cagayan River has an elevation lower than that of the eastern portion which borders on the
national road. Through the years, the western portion would periodically go under the waters
of the Cagayan River as those waters swelled with the coming of the rains. The submerged
portion, however, would reappear during the dry season from January to August. It would
remain under water for the rest of the year, that is, from September to December during the
rainy season.
The ownership of the landholding eventually moved from one person to another. On 9 May
1959, respondent Guillermo Manalo acquired 8.65 hectares thereof from Faustina Taccad,
daughter of Judge Juan Taccad. The land sold was described in the Deed of Absolute Sale1
as follows:
“x x x a parcel of agricultural land in Balug, Tumauini, Isabela, containing an area of 8.6500
hectares, more or less; bounded on the North by Francisco Forto; on the East by National
Road; on South by Julian Tumolva; and on the West by Cagayan River; declared for taxation
under Tax Declaration No. 12681 in the name of Faustina Taccad, and assessed at P750.00.
x x x”
Later in 1964, respondent Manalo purchased another 1.80 hectares from Gregorio Taguba
who had earlier acquired the same from Judge Juan Taccad. The second purchase brought
the total acquisition of respondent Manalo to 10.45 hectares. The second piece of property
was more particularly described as follows:
“x x x a piece of agricultural land consisting of tobacco land, and containing an area of 18,000
square meters, more or less, bounded on the North by Balug Creek; on the South, by
Faustina Taccad (now Guillermo R. Manalo); on the East, by a Provincial Road; and on the
West, by Cagayan River assessed at P440.00, as tax Declaration No. 3152. x x x”2
During the cadastral survey conducted at Balug, Tumauini, Isabela on 21 October 1969, the
two (2) parcels of land belonging to respondent Manalo were surveyed and consolidated into
one lot, designated as Lot No. 307, Pls-964. Lot 307 which contains 4.6489 hectares
includes: (a) the whole of the 1.80 hectares acquired from Gregorio Taguba; and (b) 2.8489
hectares out of the 8.65 hectares purchased from Faustina Taccad. As the survey was
conducted on a rainy month, a portion of the land bought from Faustina Taccad then under
water was left unsurveyed and was not included in Lot 307.
The Sketch Plan3 submitted during the trial of this case and which was identified by
respondent Manalo shows that the Cagayan River running from south to north, forks at a
certain point to form two (2) branches—the western and the eastern branches—and then
unites at the other end, further north, to form a narrow strip of land. The eastern branch of the
river cuts through the land of respondent Manalo and is inundated with water only during the
rainy season. The bed of the eastern branch is the submerged or the unsurveyed portion of
the land belonging to respondent Manalo. For about eight (8) months of the year when the
level of water at the point where the Cagayan River forks is at its ordinary depth, river water
does not flow into the eastern branch. While this condition persists, the eastern bed is dry and
is susceptible to cultivation.
Considering that water flowed through the eastern branch of the Cagayan River when the
cadastral survey was conducted, the elongated strip of land formed by the western and the
eastern branches of the Cagayan River looked very much like an island. This strip of land
was surveyed on 12 December 1969.4 It was found to have a total area of 22.7209 hectares
and was designated as Lot 821 and Lot 822. The area of Lot 822 is 10.8122 hectares while
Lot 821 has an area of 11.9087 hectares. Lot 821 is located directly opposite Lot 307 and is
separated from the latter only by the eastern branch of the Cagayan River during the rainy
season and, during the dry season, by the exposed, dry river bed, being a portion of the land
bought from Faustina Taccad. Respondent Manalo claims that Lot 821 also belongs to him by
way of accretion to the submerged portion of the property to which it is adjacent.
Petitioners who are in possession of Lot 821, upon the other hand, insist that they own Lot
821. They occupy the outer edges of Lot 821 along the river banks, i.e., the fertile portions on
which they plant tobacco and other agricultural products. They also cultivate the western strip
of the unsurveyed portion during summer.5 This situation compelled respondent Manalo to
file a case for forcible entry against petitioners on 20 May 1969. The case was dismissed by
the Municipal Court of Tumauini, Isabela for failure of both parties to appear. On 15
December 1972, respondent Manalo again filed a case for forcible entry against petitioners.
The latter case was similarly dismissed for lack of jurisdiction by the Municipal Court of
Tumauini, Isabela.
On 24 July 1974, respondent Manalo filed a complaint6 before the then Court of First
Instance of Isabela, Branch 3 for quieting of title, possession and damages against
petitioners. He alleged ownership of the two (2) parcels of land he bought separately from
Faustina Taccad and Gregorio Taguba for which reason he prayed that judgment be entered
ordering petitioners to vacate the western strip of the unsurveyed portion. Respondent
Manalo likewise prayed that judgment be entered declaring him as owner of Lot 821 on which
he had laid his claim during the survey.
Petitioners filed their answer denying the material allegations of the complaint. The case was
then set for trial for failure of the parties to reach an amicable agreement or to enter into a
stipulation of facts.7 On 10 November 1982, the trial court rendered a decision with the
following dispositive portion:
“WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises, the Court renders judgment against the
defendants and in favor of the plaintiff and orders:
1. 1.
That plaintiff, Guillermo Manalo, is declared the lawful owner of the land in question,
8
 Lot No. 821, Pls-964 of Tumauini Cadastre, and which is more particularly described
in paragraph 2-b of the Complaint;
2. 2.
That the defendants are hereby ordered to vacate the premises of the land in
question, Lot No. 821, Pls-964 of Tumauini Cadastre, and which is more particularly
described in paragraph 2-b of the Complaint;
3. 3.
That the defendants are being restrained from entering the premises of the land in
question, Lot No. 821, Pls-964 of Tumauini Cadastre, and which is more particularly
described in paragraph 2-b of the Complaint; and
4. 4.
That there is no pronouncement as to attorney’s fees and costs.
SO ORDERED.”8
Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals which, however, affirmed the decision of the trial
court. They filed a motion for reconsideration, without success.
While petitioners insist that Lot 821 is part of an island surrounded by the two (2) branches of
the Cagayan River, the Court of Appeals found otherwise. The Court of Appeals concurred
with the finding of the trial court that Lot 821 cannot be considered separate and distinct from
Lot 307 since the eastern branch of the Cagayan River substantially dries up for the most part
of the year such that when this happens, Lot 821 becomes physically (i.e., by land)
connected with the dried up bed owned by respondent Manalo. Both courts below in effect
rejected the assertion of petitioners that the depression on the earth’s surface which
separates Lot 307 and Lot 821 is, during part of the year, the bed of the eastern branch of the
Cagayan River.
It is a familiar rule that the findings of facts of the trial court are entitled to great respect, and
that they carry even more weight when affirmed by the Court of Appeals.9 This is in
recognition of the peculiar advantage on the part of the trial court of being able to observe
first-hand the deportment of the witnesses while testifying. Jurisprudence is likewise settled
that the Court of Appeals is the final arbiter of questions of fact.10 But whether a conclusion
drawn from such findings of facts is correct, is a question of law cognizable by this Court.11
In the instant case, the conclusion reached by both courts below apparently collides with their
findings that periodically at the onset of and during the rainy season, river water flows through
the eastern bed of the Cagayan River. The trial court held:
“The Court believes that the land in controversy is of the nature and character of alluvion
(Accretion), for it appears that during the dry season, the body of water separating the same
land in controversy (Lot No. 821, Pls-964) and the two (2) parcels of land which the plaintiff
purchased from Gregorio Taguba and Justina Taccad Cayaba becomes a marshy land and is
only six (6) inches deep and twelve (12) meters in width at its widest in the northern tip (Exhs.
‘W’, ‘W-1’, ‘W-2’, ‘W-3’ and ‘W-4’). It has been held by our Supreme Court that ‘the owner of
the riparian land which receives the gradual deposits of alluvion, does not have to make an
express act of possession. The law does not require it, and the deposit created by the current
of the water becomes manifest’ (Roxas vs. Tuazon, 6 Phil. 408).”12
The Court of Apppeals adhered substantially to the conclusion reached by the trial court,
thus:
“As found by the trial court, the disputed property is not an island in the strict sense of the
word since the eastern portion of the said property claimed by appellants to be part of the
Cagayan River dries up during summer. Admittedly, it is the action of the heavy rains which
comes during rainy season especially from September to November which increases the
water level of the Cagayan river. As the river becomes swollen due to heavy rains, the lower
portion of the said strip of land located at its southernmost point would be inundated with
water. This is where the water of the Cagayan river gains its entry. Consequently, if the water
level is high the whole strip of land would be under water.”
In Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Colegio de San Jose, it was held that—
‘According to the foregoing definition of the words “ordinary” and “extra-ordinary,” the highest
depth of the waters of Laguna de Bay during the dry season is the ordinary one, and the
highest depth they attain during the extra-ordinary one (sic); inasmuch as the former is the
one which is regular, common, natural, which occurs always or most of the time during the
year, while the latter is uncommon, transcends the general rule, order and measure, and
goes beyond that which is the ordinary depth. If according to the definition given by Article 74
of the Law of Waters quoted above, the natural bed or basin of the lakes is the ground
covered by their waters when at their highest ordinary depth, the natural bed or basin of
Laguna de Bay is the ground covered by its waters when at their highest depth during the dry
season, that is up to the northeastern boundary of the two parcels of land in question.’
We find the foregoing ruling to be analogous to the case at bar. The highest ordinary level of
the waters of the Cagayan River is that attained during the dry season which is confined only
on the west side of Lot [821] and Lot [822]. This is the natural Cagayan river itself. The small
residual of water between Lot [821] and 307 is part of the small stream already in existence
when the whole of the late Judge Juan Taccad’s property was still susceptible to cultivation
and uneroded.”13
The Court is unable to agree with the Court of Appeals that Government of the Philippine
Islands vs. Colegio de San Jose14 is applicable to the present case. That case involved
Laguna de Bay; since Laguna de Bay is a lake, the Court applied the legal provisions
governing the ownership and use of lakes and their beds and shores, in order to determine
the character and ownership of the disputed property. Specifically, the Court applied the
definition of the natural bed or basin of lakes found in Article 74 of the Law of Waters of 3
August 1866. Upon the other hand, what is involved in the instant case is the eastern bed of
the Cagayan River.
We believe and so hold that Article 70 of the Law of Waters of 3 August 1866 is the law
applicable to the case at bar:
“Art. 70. The natural bed or channel of a creek or river is the ground covered by its waters
during the highest floods”. (Italics supplied)
We note that Article 70 defines the natural bed or channel of a creek or river as the ground
covered by its waters during the highest floods. The highest floods in the eastern branch of
the Cagayan River occur with the annual coming of the rains as the river waters in their
onward course cover the entire depressed portion. Though the eastern bed substantially dries
9
up for the most part of the year (i.e., from January to August), we cannot ignore the periodical
swelling of the waters (i.e., from September to December) causing the eastern bed to be
covered with flowing river waters.
The conclusion of this Court that the depressed portion is a river bed rests upon evidence of
record. Firstly, respondent Manalo admitted in open court that the entire area he bought from
Gregorio Taguba was included in Lot 307.15 If the 1.80 hectares purchased from Gregorio
Taguba was included in Lot 307, then the Cagayan River referred to as the western boundary
in the Deed of Sale transferring the land from Gregorio Taguba to respondent Manalo as well
as the Deed of Sale signed by Faustina Taccad, must refer to the dried up bed (during the dry
months) or the eastern branch of the river (during the rainy months). In the Sketch Plan
attached to the records of the case, Lot 307 is separated from the western branch of the
Cagayan River by a large tract of land which includes not only Lot 821 but also what this
Court characterizes as the eastern branch of the Cagayan River.
Secondly, the pictures identified by respondent Manalo during his direct examination depict
the depressed portion as a river bed. The pictures, marked as Exhibits “W” to “W-4”, were
taken in July 1973 or at a time when the eastern bed becomes visible.16 Thus, Exhibit “W-2”
which according to respondent Manalo was taken facing the east and Exhibit “W-3” which
was taken facing the west both show that the visible, dried up portion has a markedly lower
elevation than Lot 307 and Lot 821. It has dike-like slopes on both sides connecting it to Lot
307 and Lot 821 that are vertical upward and very prominent. This topographic feature is
compatible with the fact that a huge volume of water passes through the eastern bed
regularly during the rainy season. In addition, petitioner Ponciano Gannaban testified that one
had to go down what he called a “cliff” from the surveyed portion of the land of respondent
Manalo to the depressed portion. The cliff, as related by petitioner Gannaban, has a height of
eight (8) meters.17
The records do not show when the Cagayan River began to carve its eastern channel on the
surface of the earth. However, Exhibit “E”18 for the prosecution which was the Declaration of
Real Property standing in the name of Faustina Taccad indicates that the eastern bed already
existed even before the sale to respondent Manalo. The words “old bed” enclosed in
parentheses—perhaps written to make legitimate the claim of private ownership over the
submerged portion—is an implied admission of the existence of the river bed. In the
Declaration of Real Property made by respondent Manalo, the depressed portion assumed
the name Rio Muerte de Cagayan. Indeed, the steep dike-like slopes on either side of the
eastern bed could have been formed only after a prolonged period of time.
Now, then, pursuant to Article 420 of the Civil Code, respondent Manalo did not acquire
private ownership of the bed of the eastern branch of the river even if it was included in the
deeds of absolute sale executed by Gregorio Taguba and Faustina Taccad in his favor.
These vendors could not have validly sold land that constituted property of public dominion.
Article 420 of the Civil Code states:
“The following things are property of public dominion:
1. (1)
Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and
bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar
character;
2. (2)
Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for
some public service or for the development of the national wealth.” (Italics supplied)
Although Article 420 speaks only of rivers and banks, “rivers” is a composite term which
includes: (1) the running waters, (2) the bed, and (3) the banks.19 Manresa, in commenting
upon Article 339 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 from which Article 420 of the Philippine
Civil Code was taken, stressed the public ownership of river beds:
“La naturaleza especial de los rios, en punto a su disfrute general, hace que sea necesario
considerar en su relacion de dominio algo mas que sus aguas corrientes. En efecto, en todo
rio es preciso distinguir: 1. esta agua corriente; 2. el alveo o cauce, y 3. las riberas. Ahora
bien: son estas dos ultimas cosas siempre de dominio publico, como las aguas?
“Realmente, no puede imaginarse un rio sin alveo y sin ribera; de suerte que al decir el
Codigo civil que los rios son de dominio publico, parece que debe ir implicito el dominio
publico de aquellos tres elementos que integran el rio. Por otra parte, en cuanto a los alveos
o cauces tenemos la declaracion del art. 407, num. 1, donde dice: son de dominio publico ...
los rios y sus cauces naturales; declaracion que con lo que dispone el art. 34 de la ley de
[Aguas], segun el cual, son de dominio publico: 1. los alveos o cauces de los arroyos que no
se hallen comprendidos en el art. 33, y 2. los alveos o cauces naturales de los rios en la
extension que cubran sus aguas en las mayores crecidas ordinarias.”20 (Italics supplied)
The claim of ownership of respondent Manalo over the submerged portion is bereft of basis
even if it were alleged and proved that the Cagayan River first began to encroach on his
property after the purchase from Gregorio Taguba and Faustina Taccad. Article 462 of the
Civil Code would then apply divesting, by operation of law, respondent Manalo of private
ownership over the new river bed. The intrusion of the eastern branch of the Cagayan River
into his landholding obviously prejudiced respondent Manalo but this is a common occurrence
since estates bordering on rivers are exposed to floods and other evils produced by the
destructive force of the waters. That loss is compensated by, inter alia, the right of accretion
acknowledged by Article 457 of the Civil Code.21 It so happened that instead of increasing
the size of Lot 307, the eastern branch of the Cagayan River had carved a channel on it.
We turn next to the issue of accretion. After examining the records of the case, the Court
considers that there was no evidence to prove that Lot 821 is an increment to Lot 307 and the
bed of the eastern branch of the river. Accretion as a mode of acquiring property under Article
457 of the Civil Code requires the concurrence of three (3) requisites: (a) that the deposition
of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (b) that it be the result of the action of the
waters of the river (or sea); and (c) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to
the banks of rivers (or the sea coast).22 The Court notes that the parcels of land bought by
respondent Manalo border on the eastern branch of the Cagayan River. Any accretion formed
by this eastern branch which respondent Manalo may claim must be deposited on or attached
to Lot 307. As it is, the claimed accretion (Lot 821) lies on the bank of the river not adjacent to
Lot 307 but directly opposite Lot 307 across the river.
Assuming (arguendo only) that the Cagayan River referred to in the Deeds of Sale
transferring ownership of the land to respondent Manalo is the western branch, the decision
of the Court of Appeals and of the trial court are bare of factual findings to the effect that the
land purchased by respondent Manalo received alluvium from the action of the river in a slow
10
and gradual manner. On the contrary, the decision of the lower court made mention of in an appropriate action that may be instituted by the interested parties inter se. No
several floods that caused the land to reappear making it susceptible to cultivation. A sudden pronouncement as to costs.
and forceful action like that of flooding is hardly the alluvial process contemplated under SO ORDERED.
Article 457 of the Civil Code. It is the slow and hardly perceptible accumulation of soil
deposits that the law grants to the riparian owner. Fernan (C.J., Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
Besides, it is important to note that Lot 821 has an area of 11.91 hectares. Lot 821 is the Decision and resolution set aside.
northern portion of the strip of land having a total area of 22.72 hectares. We find it difficult to Note.—For accretion or alluvion to form part of registered land of riparian owner, the
suppose that such a sizable area as Lot 821 resulted from slow accretion to another lot of gradual alluvial deposits made by human intervention are excluded. (Republic vs. Court of
almost equal size. The total landholding purchased by respondent Manalo is 10.45 hectares Appeals, 132 SCRA 514.)
(8.65 hectares from Faustina Taccad and 1.80 hectares from Gregorio Taguba in 1959 and
1964, respectively), in fact even smaller than Lot 821 which he claims by way of accretion.
The cadastral survey showing that Lot 821 has an area of 11.91 hectares was conducted in
1969. If respondent Manalo’s contention were accepted, it would mean that in a span of only
ten (10) years, he had more than doubled his landholding by what the Court of Appeals and
the trial court considered as accretion. As already noted, there are steep vertical dike-like
slopes separating the depressed portion or river bed and Lot 821 and Lot 307. This
topography of the land, among other things, precludes a reasonable conclusion that Lot 821
is an increment to the depressed portion by reason of the slow and constant action of the
waters of either the western or the eastern branches of the Cagayan River.
We turn finally to the issue of ownership of Lot 821. Respondent Manalo’s claim over Lot 821
rests on accretion coupled with alleged prior possession. He alleged that the parcels of land
he bought separately from Gregorio Taguba and Faustina Taccad were formerly owned by
Judge Juan Taccad who was in possession thereof through his (Judge Taccad’s) tenants.
When ownership was transferred to him, respondent Manalo took over the cultivation of the
property and had it declared for taxation purposes in his name. When petitioners forcibly
entered into his property, he twice instituted the appropriate action before the Municipal Trial
Court of Tumauini, Isabela. Against respondent Manalo’s allegation of prior possession,
petitioners presented tax declarations standing in their respective names. They claimed
lawful, peaceful and adverse possession of Lot 821 since 1955.
If respondent Manalo had proved prior possession, it was limited physically to Lot 307 and
the depressed portion or the eastern river bed. The testimony of Dominga Malana who was a
tenant for Justina Taccad did not indicate that she was also cultivating Lot 821. In fact, the
complaints for forcible entry lodged before the Municipal Trial Court of Tumauini, Isabela
pertained only to Lot 307 and the depressed portion or river bed and not to Lot 821. In the
same manner, the tax declarations presented by petitioners conflict with those of respondent
Manalo. Under Article 477 of the Civil Code, the plaintiff in an action for quieting of title must
at least have equitable title to or interest in the real property which is the subject matter of the
action. The evidence of record on this point is less than satisfactory and the Court feels
compelled to refrain from determining the ownership and possession of Lot 821, adjudging
neither petitioners nor respondent Manalo as owner(s) thereof.
WHEREFORE, the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No.
04892 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent Manalo is hereby declared the owner of Lot 307.
The regularly submerged portion or the eastern bed of the Cagayan River is hereby
DECLARED to be property of public dominion. The ownership of Lot 821 shall be determined

11
G.R. No. L-46410 October 30, 1981
ERNESTO BALBIN, JOSE ORIÑA, MAURICIO NARAG, ROSA STA. MA. SYTAMCO,
BASILIO SYTAMCO, LEOCADIO SYTAMCO, AMADO V. REYES, LYDIA V. REYES and
APOLINARIO REYES, petitioners, vs. PEDRO C. MEDALLA and JOSEFINA MEDALLA
and LINO BARBOSA, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Mamburao, Occidental
Mindoro, respondents.
DE CASTRO, J.:
Petition for certiorari for the review of the decision of the Court of First Instance of Occidental
Mindoro, Branch I, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. that the lands in controversy be, as they are hereby declared as the
private properties of the plaintiffs with the right of immediate possession;
2. that the Free Patents Nos. HV-85975, RV-86191, HV-85977, HV-85976,
HV-85978, HV-85974, EV-85432, EV-94632 and EV- 58631, and the
corresponding Original Certification of Titles Nos. P-3088, P-3089, P-3087,
P-4010, P-4011, P-3084, P-919, P-4060 and P-920 be, as they are hereby
declared null and void and therefor should be cancelled;
3. that defendants, ERNESTO BALBIN the HRS. of MAURICIO NARAG and
JOSE ORINA shall pay the plaintiffs as damages, the sum of TWO
HUNDRED (P200.00 PESOS per hectare possessed and cultivated by them
from the year 1963 until the possession of the property in question has been
duly surrendered to the plaintiffs, with interest at the rate of 6% per annum,
from the date of this decision, and because said defendants must have paid
the corresponding land taxes due them from the said date (1963), whatever
amounts paid by them from said date to the present should correspondingly
be deducted from the total amount of damages herein awarded to plaintiffs;
however, defendants, ROSA STA. MA. SYTAMCO, BASILIO SYTAMCO,
LEOCADIO SYTAMCO, AMADO V. REYES, LYDIA REYES and
APOLINARIO REYES, shall not pay any amount to plaintiffs as damages as
they are not in actual possession and cultivation of the area respectively
claimed by them and
4. that the defendants shall further pay the amount of ?2,000.00 as attorney's
fees and cost of the suit.
The following facts, quoting from private respondents' brief, are not disputed:
Private respondents on June 19, 1962, purchased from the heirs of Juan
Ladao, a large parcel of agricultural land situated at Sitios of Bacong,
Tambunakan and Ibunan, Barrio Balansay Mamburao, Occidental, Mindoro.
Said respondents on June 14, 1963, filed an application for registration of
title of the said parcel of land. They utilized as evidence of ownership, the
Deed of Sale executed in their favor by the heirs of the late Juan Ladao
(Exhibit "F" thereof) the Informacion Posesoria issued in the name of Juan
Ladao Exhibit "H" in the LRC Case) together with the tax declaration and tax
receipts for said land covering the period from May 26, 1904, to January 27,
1962 (Exhibits I to I-28 of said LRC Case) the private respondents, after the
sale, declared it for taxation purposes (Exhibits G and G-1) of said LRC
Case), and have continuously been paying the corresponding taxes up to the
present; the application for registration of title aforesaid was opposed by
petitioners on the ground that they were previously issued Original
Certificates of title thru either Homestead or Free Patent grants. Petitioner
Rosa Sta. Maria Sytamco was issued Original Certificate of Title No. P-3088
(Exhibit "1" on June 26, 1963, under Homestead Patent No. HV-85975;
Basilio Sytamco was issued Original Certificate of Title No. P-3089 (Exhibit
"2" on June 26, 1963, under Homestead Patent No. HV-86191; Leocadio
Sytamco was issued Original Certificate of Title No. P-3087 (Exhibit "3" on
June 26, 1963, under Homestead Patent No. HV-85977; Lydia Reyes was
issued Original Certificate of Title No. P- 4010 (Exhibit "4" on September 30,
1963), under Homestead Patent No. HV-85978; Amado Reyes was issued
Original Certificate of Title No. P-4011 (Exhibit "5" on September 30, 1963),
under Homestead Patent No. V-85976; Apolinario Reyes was issued Original
Certificate of Title No. P-3084 (Exhibit "6") on June 18, 1963, under
Homestead Patent No. V-85974; Ernesto Balbin was issued Original
Certificate of Title No. P-919 (Exhibit "7"), under Free Patent No. V-58633;
Mauricio Narag was issued Original Certificate of Title No. P-4060 (Exhibit
118") on October 14, 1959, under Free Patent No. V-94632-1 Jose Orina
was issued Original Certificate of Title No. P-920 (Exhibit "9") on April 3,
1957 under Free Patent No. V-58631. 1
It appears that before the filing of the present action for reconveyance and annulment of titles
on August 30, 1973, land registration proceedings had been instituted by private respondents
covering the same lands involved in the aforesaid action. Petitioners herein filed opposition to
the application, but because of the reservation of private respondents to file a separate action
for the cancellation of the original certificates of title issued to petitioners herein, the land
registration court abstained from ruling on the petitioners' opposition.
In the pre-trial of the ordinary action from which the present petition stemmed, the following
stipulation of facts 2 was entered into:
1. That the parcels of land subject matter of the instant case are Identified as
Lot Nos. 979, 980, 981, 982, 983, 984, 1013, 1016 and 1006, as shown in
12
 plans Ap-10864 and Ap-10866; that these lots enumerated are embraced in
Pls-21, Mamburao Public Subdivision;
2. That the herein petitioners were among the oppositors in Land
Registration Case No. N-44, filed before the court (CFI Occidental Mindoro,
Branch I, Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro) on June 14,1963 by spouses
Pedro C. Medalla and Josefina O. Medalla;
3. That the opposition of petitioners is based on the ground that the aforesaid
lots respectively titled in their names are included in the land subject matter
of the Land Registration Case No. N-44;
4. That in the Decision rendered by the court in Land Registration Case No.
N-44 dated May 7, 1969 giving due course to the applicants' petition for
registration of title, the opposition of the petitioners were not resolved in view
of the reservation made by the applicants to file appropriate actions for the
cancellation of petitioners' homestead or patent titles.
5. That the land subject matter of the instant case are titled in the name of
petitioners and included in plans AP-10864 and Ap-10866, which plans were
submitted as evidence in the said Land Registration Case No. N-44, and that
the basis of herein respondents' claim in the instant case is the possessory
information title of Juan Ladao, registered on May 25, 1895 before the
Register of Deeds of the Province of Occidental Mindoro.
Petitioners made the following assignment of errors: 3
I. That the respondent judge of the court a quo erred in holding the validity of
the possessory information title of Juan Ladao, consequently, erroneously
holding that the parcels of land covered by certificate of titles of petitioners
are private properties of private respondents.
II. That respondent judge of the court a quo erred in holding that private
respondents' cause of action has not prescribed.
III. The respondent judge of the court a quo erred in holding that private
respondents have personality and capacity to institute the action, considering
that the land in controversy were public lands at the time of issuance of
respective patents and titles of petitioners.
IV. The respondent judge of the court a quo erred in holding that the lower
court has jurisdiction over the nature and cause of action of private
respondents.
The first question to be resolved relates to the validity of the possessory information title of
Juan Ladao as raised in the first assignment of error because petitioners' title to the land
based on their respective homestead or free patents is valid or not, depending on whether the
land so disposed of under the Public Land Act has not yet been segregated from the public
domain and passed into private ownership at the time of the issuance of the patents. 4
As found uncontroverted by the lower court, there exists an Information Posesoria in the
name of Juan Ladao from whom private respondents Medalla bought the land. It is also an
admitted fact, at least impliedly, same being not denied in petitioners' answer to the complaint,
that the Informacion Posesoria was registered on May 25, 1896. What petitioners assail is the
validity of the registration which they claim to have been done beyond the period of one year
from April 17, 1894 to April 17, 1895, as allegedly required by the Royal Decree of February
13, 1894 otherwise known as the Maura Law. The provision invoked by petitioners is Article
21 of the aforementioned decree which reads:
Art. 21. A term of one year, without grace, is granted in order to perfect the
information referred to in Articles 19 and 20.
After the expiration of this period, the right of the cultivators and possessors
to obtain a gratuitous title shall be extinguished; the full ownership of the land
shag be restored to the State, or in a proper case to the community of
neighbors, and the said possessors and cultivators or their predecessors in
interest by a universal title shall only be entitled to the right of redemption, if
the land had been sold within the five years subsequent to the lapse of the
period.
The possessors not included within the provisions of this Chapter shall only
acquire for some time the ownership of the alienable lands of the royal
patrimony, in accordance with the common law.
It is the petitioners' contention that pursuant to the aforecited provision, all grants of Spanish
titles to lands including possessory information titles must be registered within a period of one
(1) year to be counted from April 17, 1894 until April 17, 1895, in accordance with Article 80
of the rules and regulations implementing said Royal Decree of February 13, 1894; that this
requirement of the law finds support in the cases of Baltazar vs. Insular Government, 40 Phil.
267 and Romero v. Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 814 from which petitioners quoted the following.
All such titles covered by possessory information title during the Spanish
Regime and not registered within the non-extendible period of one year as
provided for in the Maura Law or the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894, it
reverts to the State or in a proper case to the public domain. (Emphasis
supplied).
Petitioners further contend that inasmuch as the possessory information title of respondents,
in the name of the late Juan Ladao, was registered only on May 25, 1895 or 38 days from the
13
last day of the one-year period as provided in the Maura Law, the same was patently nun and
void, and the land covered by said possessory information title reverted to the State or to the
public domain of the government.
Petitioners' contention is without merit. Examining closely the two cases invoked by
petitioners, nowhere in said cases can be found the aforecited passages quoted by the
petitioners. These cases did not even speak of registration as a requisite for the validity of
possessory information title obtained for purposes of Royal Decree of February 13, 1894 or
the Maura Law. What was actually stated in the two aforecited cases are the following
A possessory information proceeding instituted in accordance with the
provisions of the Mortgage Law in force on July 14, 1893 neither constitutes
nor is clothed with the character of a gratuitous title to property, referred to in
Section 19 of the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894, which provides that in
order that an information may be valid for the purpose of the said Royal
Decree and produce the effects of a title of ownership, it is indispensable
what it be instituted within the unextended period of one year fixed in
sections 19 and 20 of the said Royal Decree (Aguinaldo de Romero vs.
Director of Land 39 Phil. 814).
The time within which advantage could be taken of the Maura Law expired
on April 17, 1895. Almeida obtained dominion over 526 hectares of lands on
June 9, 1895. The possessory information for 815 hectares was issued to
Almeida on December 14, 1896 Almeida was thus not in possession until
after the expiration of the period specified by the Maura Law for the issuance
of possessory titles and his possessory information was of even a later date
and made to cover a large excess of land. Under these conditions, the
possessory information could not even furnish, as in other cases, prima facie
evidence of the fact that at the time of the execution the claimant was in
possession, which it would be possible to convert into ownership by
uninterrupted possession for the statutory period. (Baltazar vs. Insular
Government 40 Phil. 267).
From the foregoing, it is made clear that what was required is merely the institution of a
possessory information proceeding within the one-year period as provided in the Royal
Decree of February 13, 1894 or the Maura Law. This fact is bolstered by the commentaries of
Prof. Francisco Venture in his book Land Titles and Deeds, a book widely used by law
practitioners and in the law schools. 5 Thus —
A distinction should be made between the informacion posesoria issued in
accordance with Articles 390, 391, and 392 of the Spanish Mortgage Law in
connection with Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Royal Decree of February 13,
1894 and the informacion posesoria issued in accordance with Articles 390,
391 and 392 of said law without regard to the aforementioned decree. The
former was the basis of a gratuitous title of ownership which was issued upon
application of the grantee and the possessory title provided he complied with
the requisites prescribed by Articles 19 and 21 of the aforesaid decree and
Articles 81 and 82 of the Chapter IV of the Regulations for the execution of
the same decree. The requisites to be fulfilled and steps to be taken are as
follows:
1. The holder of the land must prove possession or cultivation of the land
under the conditions presented by Article 19 of the said decree.
2. The holder of the land had to institute the possessory information
proceeding within one year from the date (April 1 7, 1894) of the publication
of the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894 (Article 21, Royal Decree of
February 13, 1894) (Emphasis supplied).
3. After obtaining the informacion posesoria, the holder of the land had to file
a petition with the General Director of Civil Administration, attaching thereto a
certified copy of the informacion posesoria asking for the issuance in his
name of a gratuitous title of ownership. If the said office was satisfied that the
applicant fulfilled the conditions prescribed by the law, a gratuitous title of
ownership was issued to him. Such title oftentimes called composicion
gratuita was to be registered in the Registry of Property of the province
where the land was located. ... (pp. 30-31).
Even Section 21 of the Maura Law invoked by petitioners themselves does not speak of
registration, but merely perfection of information title, which, as already discuss may be done
by instituting possessory information proceedings within the said one-year period fixed by the
aforementioned Royal Decree of February 13, 1894, possibly ending in the registration of the
title, depending on the evidence presented.
In the case at bar, it is admitted and uncontroverted that there exists an informacion
posesoria registered on May 25, 1895 in the name of Juan Ladao. This registration of the
informacion posesoria must have followed as the result or outcome of a possessory
information proceeding instituted by the late Juan Ladao in accordance with Section 19 of the
said Royal Decree of February 13, 1894, and commenced within the one year period,
pursuant to Section 21 of the same decree. Otherwise, if this were not so, no registration of
the said informacion posesoria might have been effected in the Registry of Deeds of the
Province of Occidental Mindoro, for if the registration thereof on May 25, 1895 was violative
of the decree, for being beyond the one-year period from April 17, 1894 to April 17, 1895, the
Register of Deeds would certainly not have performed an illegal act.
Moreover, registration of title usually follows a specified proceeding. The registration is the
act of a government official and may not be controlled by the private party applying for
registration of his title. What is under his control is the commencement or the institution of the
prescribed proceeding for the perfection of his title for which he may be penalized for
tardiness of compliance. The institution of the proper proceeding is clearly what is required to
14
be done within the one-year period by the party seeking to perfect his title, not the registration
thereof, if found legally warranted. By its nature, therefore, registration may not necessarily
be within the same one-year period. If the required proceedings are instituted, as they have to
be before the corresponding title may be issued and registered, the registration may be
possible of accomplishment only after the one-year period, considering the number of
proceedings that might have been instituted within the non-extendible period of one year.
This is what apparently happened in the instant case with the proceeding to perfect the title
commenced within the one-year period, but the registration of the possessory information title
done thereafter, or on May 25, 1895, after the prescribed proceeding which is naturally
featured with the requisite notice and hearing. 6
The next question relates to the issue of prescription as raised in the second assignment of
error.
It is the contention of petitioners that the present action for reconveyance has already
prescribed. They developed this theory in their Reply to Rejoinder 7 to Motion to Dismiss, as
follows:
Even granting for the sake of argument that plaintiffs' possessory information
title is valid and effective, the cause of action for reconveyance had already
prescribed because such action can only be instituted within four (4) years
after discovery of the alleged fraud. (Sec. 55, Act 496; Vera vs. Vera, 47 O.G.
5060; Tayao vs. Robles, 7 4 Phil. 114) I t will be noted from plaintiffs'
complaint that the patent of Ernesto Balbin and Jose Orina were issued on
December 6, 1956 so that if any action for reconveyance at all could be
instituted against the two defendants, the same should be instituted before or
during the period of four years or up to 6 December, 1960. According to the
complaint, the patents of Rosa Sta. Ma. Sytamco, Basilio Sytamco and
Leocadio Sytamco were issued on 17 April 1959, so that if any action for
reconveyance can lie against them, the same should be instituted within four
years or up to 17 April, 1963. In so far as the free patent of Amado V. Reyes,
Lydia Reyes and Apolinario Reyes, it appears that said patents were issued
on 3 March, 1959, so that if any action for reconveyance should be filed, it
should be on or before March 3, 1963. And lastly, the patent of Mauricio
Narag was issued on 14 October, 1959, so that if any action for
reconveyance should be instituted, the same should be filed on or before
October 14, 1963.
Plaintiffs' complaint was filed only on August 30, 1973, or more than 14 years
had already elapsed from the date of the issuance of the respective titles of
the defendants. Consequently, the action for reconveyance of land titled in
the names of defendants had already prescribed.
An action for reconveyance of real property resulting from fraud may be barred by the statute
of limitations, which requires that the action shall be filed within four (4) years from the
discovery of the fraud. Such discovery is deemed to have taken place when the petitioners
herein were issued original certificate of title through either homestead or free patent grants,
for the registration of said patents constitute constructive notice to the whole world. 8
In the case at bar, the latest patent was issued on October 14, 1959. There is, therefore,
merit in petitioner's contention that "if any action for reconveyance should be commenced, the
same should be filed on or before October 14, 1963. But private respondents' complaint for
reconveyance and annulment of titles with damages was filed only on August 30, 1973, or
more than 14 years had already elapsed from the date of the issuance of the respective titles
of the defendants. Consequently, the action for reconveyance of land titled in the names of
defendants (petitioners herein) had already prescribed."
Even from the viewpoint of acquisitive prescription, petitioners have acquired title to the nine
lots in question by virtue of possession in concept of an owner. Petitioners herein were given
either free patent or homestead patent, and original certificates of title in their names issued
to them, the latest on October 14, 1959. Said public land patents must have been issued after
the land authorities had found out, after proper investigation, that petitioners were in actual
possession of the nine lots in question, particularly in the case of the free patents. If
petitioners were in actual possession of the nine lots, then the heirs of Ladao and the Medalla
spouses were never in actual possession of the said lots. If the Medalla spouses were not in
actual possession of the nine lots, the alleged possessory information would not justify the
registration of the said nine lots in the names of the Medallas.
A possessory information has to be confirmed in a land registration proceeding, as required in
Section 19 of Act No. 496. "A possessory information alone, without a showing of actual,
public and adverse possession of the land under claim of ownership, for a sufficient period of
time, in accordance with the law, is ineffective as a mode of acquiring title under Act No.
496." 9 Although converted into a title of absolute ownership, an informacion posesoria may
still be lost by prescription. 10
On the other hand, the Torrens Titles issued to the petitioners on the basis of the homestead
patents and free patents obtained by them had become indefeasible. 11
It would result from what has been said on the two main assignments of errors that petitioners
herein have a better right to the land in question than the Medalla spouses.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from should be reversed and the complaint of the
Medallas should be, as it is hereby dismissed with costs against appellees.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-17652 June 30, 1962
15
IGNACIO GRANDE, ET AL., petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, DOMINGO
CALALUNG, and ESTEBAN CALALUNG, respondents.
BARRERA, J.:
This is an appeal taken by petitioners Ignacio, Eulogia, Alfonso, Eulalia, and Sofia Grande,
from the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 25169-R) reversing that of the Court
of First Instance of Isabela (Civil Case No. 1171), and dismissing petitioners' action against
respondents Domingo and Esteban Calalung, to quiet title to and recover possession of a
parcel of land allegedly occupied by the latter without petitioners' consent.
The facts of the case, which are undisputed, briefly are: Petitioners are the owners of a parcel
of land, with an area of 3.5032 hectares, located at barrio Ragan, municipality of Magsaysay
(formerly Tumauini), province of Isabela, by inheritance from their deceased mother Patricia
Angui (who inherited it from her parents Isidro Angui and Ana Lopez, in whose name said
land appears registered, as shown by Original Certificate of Title No. 2982, issued on June 9,
1934). Said property is identified as Lot No. 1, Plan PSU-83342. When it was surveyed for
purposes of registration sometime in 1930, its northeastern boundary was the Cagayan River
(the same boundary stated in the title). Since then, and for many years thereafter, a gradual
accretion on the northeastern side took place, by action of the current of the Cagayan River,
so much so, that by 1958, the bank thereof had receded to a distance of about 105 meters
from its original site, and an alluvial deposit of 19,964 square meters (1.9964 hectares), more
or less, had been added to the registered area (Exh. C-1).
On January 25, 1958, petitioners instituted the present action in the Court of First Instance of
Isabela against respondents, to quiet title to said portion (19,964 square meters) formed by
accretion, alleging in their complaint (docketed as Civil Case No. 1171) that they and their
predecessors-in-interest, were formerly in peaceful and continuous possession thereof, until
September, 1948, when respondents entered upon the land under claim of ownership.
Petitioners also asked for damages corresponding to the value of the fruits of the land as well
as attorney's fees and costs. In their answer (dated February 18, 1958), respondents claim
ownership in themselves, asserting that they have been in continuous, open, and undisturbed
possession of said portion, since prior to the year 1933 to the present.
After trial, the Court of First Instance of Isabela, on May 4, 1959, rendered a decision
adjudging the ownership of the portion in question to petitioners, and ordering respondents to
vacate the premises and deliver possession thereof to petitioners, and to pay to the latter
P250.00 as damages and costs. Said decision, in part, reads:
It is admitted by the parties that the land involved in this action was formed by the
gradual deposit of alluvium brought about by the action of the Cagayan River, a
navigable river. We are inclined to believe that the accretion was formed on the
northeastern side of the land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 2982 after
the survey of the registered land in 1931, because the surveyors found out that the
northeastern boundary of the land surveyed by them was the Cagayan River, and not
the land in question. Which is indicative of the fact that the accretion has not yet
started or begun in 1931. And, as declared by Pedro Laman, defendant witness and
the boundary owner on the northwest of the registered land of the plaintiffs, the
accretion was a little more than one hectare, including the stony portion, in 1940 or
1941. Therefore, the declarations of the defendant Domingo Calalung and his
witness, Vicente C. Bacani, to the effect that the land in question was formed by
accretion since 1933 do not only contradict the testimony of defendants' witness
Pedro Laman, but could not overthrow the incontestable fact that the accretion with
an area of 4 hectare more or less, was formed in 1948, reason for which, it was only
declared in that same year for taxation purposes by the defendants under Tax Dec.
No. 257 (Exh. "2") when they entered upon the land. We could not give credence to
defendants' assertion that Tax Dec. No. 257 (Exh. "2") cancelled Tax Dee. No. 28226
(Exh. "1"), because Exh. "2" says that "tax under this declaration begins with the year
1948. But, the fact that defendants declared the land for taxation purposes since
1948, does not mean that they become the owner of the land by mere occupancy, for
it is a new provision of the New Civil Code that ownership of a piece of land cannot
be acquired by occupation (Art. 714, New Civil Code). The land in question being an
accretion to the mother or registered land of the plaintiffs, the accretion belongs to
the plaintiffs (Art. 457, New Civil Code; Art. 366, Old Civil Code). Assuming arguendo,
that the accretion has been occupied by the defendants since 1948, or earlier, is of
no moment, because the law does not require any act of possession on the part of
the owner of the riparian owner, from the moment the deposit becomes manifest
(Roxas v. Tuason, 9 Phil. 408; Cortez v. City of Manila, 10 Phil. 567). Further, no act
of appropriation on the part of the reparian owner is necessary, in order to acquire
ownership of the alluvial formation, as the law does not require the same (3 Manresa,
C.C., pp. 321-326).
This brings us now to the determination of whether the defendants, granting that they
have been in possession of the alluvium since 1948, could have acquired the
property by prescription. Assuming that they occupied the land in September, 1948,
but considering that the action was commenced on January 25, 1958, they have not
been in possession of the land for ten (10) years; hence, they could not have
acquired the land by ordinary prescription (Arts. 1134 and 1138, New Civil Code).
Moreover, as the alluvium is, by law, part and parcel of the registered property, the
same may be considered as registered property, within the meaning of Section 46 of
Act No. 496: and, therefore, it could not be acquired by prescription or adverse
possession by another person.
Unsatisfied, respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals, which rendered, on September
14, 1960, the decision adverted to at the beginning of this opinion, partly stating:
That the area in controversy has been formed through a gradual process of alluvium,
which started in the early thirties, is a fact conclusively established by the evidence
for both parties. By law, therefore, unless some superior title has supervened, it
should properly belong to the riparian owners, specifically in accordance with the rule
of natural accession in Article 366 of the old Civil Code (now Article 457), which
16
provides that "to the owner of lands adjoining the banks of rivers, belongs the
accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters."
The defendants, however, contend that they have acquired ownership through
prescription. This contention poses the real issue in this case. The Court a quo, has
resolved it in favor of the plaintiffs, on two grounds: First, since by accession, the land
in question pertains to the original estate, and since in this instance the original
estate is registered, the accretion, consequently, falls within the purview of Section
46 of Act No. 496, which states that "no title to registered land in derogation to that of
the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession"; and,
second, the adverse possession of the defendant began only in the month of
September, 1948, or less than the 10-year period required for prescription before the
present action was instituted.
As a legal proposition, the first ground relied upon by the trial court, is not quite
correct. An accretion to registered land, while declared by specific provision of the
Civil Code to belong to the owner of the land as a natural accession thereof, does
not ipso jure become entitled to the protection of the rule of imprescriptibility of title
established by the Land Registration Act. Such protection does not extend beyond
the area given and described in the certificate. To hold otherwise, would be
productive of confusion. It would virtually deprive the title, and the technical
description of the land given therein, of their character of conclusiveness as to the
identity and area of the land that is registered. Just as the Supreme Court, albeit in a
negative manner, has stated that registration does not protect the riparian owner
against the erosion of the area of his land through gradual changes in the course of
the adjoining stream (Payatas Estate Development Co. v. Tuason, 53 Phil. 55), so
registration does not entitle him to all the rights conferred by Land Registration Act, in
so far as the area added by accretion is concerned. What rights he has, are declared
not by said Act, but by the provisions of the Civil Code on accession: and these
provisions do not preclude acquisition of the addition area by another person through
prescription. This Court has held as much in the case of Galindez, et al. v. Baguisa,
et al., CA-G.R. No. 19249-R, July 17, 1959.
We now proposed to review the second ground relied upon by the trial court,
regarding the length of time that the defendants have been in possession. Domingo
Calalung testified that he occupied the land in question for the first time in 1934, not
in 1948 as claimed by the plaintiffs. The area under occupancy gradually increased
as the years went by. In 1946, he declared the land for purposes of taxation (Exhibit
1). This tax declaration was superseded in 1948 by another (Exhibit 2), after the
name of the municipality wherein it is located was changed from Tumauini to
Magsaysay. Calalung's testimony is corroborated by two witnesses, both owners of
properties nearby. Pedro Laman, 72 years of age, who was Municipal president of
Tumauini for three terms, said that the land in question adjoins his own on the south,
and that since 1940 or 1951, he has always known it to be in the peaceful possession
of the defendants. Vicente C. Bacani testified to the same effect, although, he said
that the defendants' possession started sometime in 1933 or 1934. The area thereof,
he said, was then less than one hectare.
We find the testimony of the said witnesses entitled to much greater weight and
credence than that of the plaintiff Pedro Grande and his lone witness, Laureana
Rodriguez. The first stated that the defendants occupied the land in question only in
1948; that he called the latter's attention to the fact that the land was his, but the
defendants, in turn, claimed that they were the owners, that the plaintiffs did not file
an action until 1958, because it was only then that they were able to obtain the
certificate of title from the surveyor, Domingo Parlan; and that they never declared
the land in question for taxation purposes or paid the taxes thereon. Pedro Grande
admitted that the defendants had the said land surveyed in April, 1958, and that he
tried to stop it, not because he claimed the accretion for himself and his co-plaintiffs,
but because the survey included a portion of the property covered by their title. This
last fact is conceded by the defendants who, accordingly, relinquished their
possession to the part thus included, containing an area of some 458 square
meters.1äwphï1.ñët
The oral evidence for the defendants concerning the period of their possession —
from 1933 to 1958 — is not only preponderant in itself, but is, moreover, supported
by the fact that it is they and not the plaintiffs who declared the disputed property for
taxation, and by the additional circumstance that if the plaintiff had really been in prior
possession and were deprived thereof in 1948, they would have immediately taken
steps to recover the same. The excuse they gave for not doing so, namely, that they
did not receive their copy of the certificate of title to their property until 1958 for lack
of funds to pay the fees of the surveyor Domingo Parlan, is too flimsy to merit any
serious consideration. The payment of the surveyor's fees had nothing to do with
their right to obtain a copy of the certificate. Besides, it was not necessary for them to
have it in their hands, in order to file an action to recover the land which was legally
theirs by accession and of which, as they allege, they had been illegally deprived by
the defendants. We are convinced, upon consideration of the evidence, that the latter,
were really in possession since 1934, immediately after the process of alluvion
started, and that the plaintiffs woke up to their rights only when they received their
copy of the title in 1958. By then, however, prescription had already supervened in
favor of the defendants.
It is this decision of the Court of Appeals which petitioners seek to be reviewed by us.
The sole issue for resolution in this case is whether respondents have acquired the alluvial
property in question through prescription.
There can be no dispute that both under Article 457 of the New Civil Code and Article 366 of
the old, petitioners are the lawful owners of said alluvial property, as they are the registered
owners of the land which it adjoins. The question is whether the accretion becomes
automatically registered land just because the lot which receives it is covered by a Torrens
title thereby making the alluvial property imprescriptible. We agree with the Court of Appeals
that it does not, just as an unregistered land purchased by the registered owner of the
adjoining land does not, by extension, become ipso facto registered land. Ownership of a
piece of land is one thing, and registration under the Torrens system of that ownership is
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quite another. Ownership over the accretion received by the land adjoining a river is governed
by the Civil Code. Imprescriptibility of registered land is provided in the registration law.
Registration under the Land Registration and Cadastral Acts does not vest or give title to the
land, but merely confirms and thereafter protects the title already possessed by the owner,
making it imprescriptible by occupation of third parties. But to obtain this protection, the land
must be placed under the operation of the registration laws wherein certain judicial
procedures have been provided. The fact remain, however, that petitioners never sought
registration of said alluvial property (which was formed sometime after petitioners' property
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 2982 was registered on June 9, 1934) up to the
time they instituted the present action in the Court of First Instance of Isabela in 1958. The
increment, therefore, never became registered property, and hence is not entitled or subject
to the protection of imprescriptibility enjoyed by registered property under the Torrens system.
Consequently, it was subject to acquisition through prescription by third persons.

The next issue is, did respondents acquire said alluvial property through acquisitive
prescription? This is a question which requires determination of facts: physical possession
and dates or duration of such possession. The Court of Appeals, after analyzing the evidence,
found that respondents-appellees were in possession of the alluvial lot since 1933 or 1934,
openly, continuously and adversely, under a claim of ownership up to the filing of the action in
1958. This finding of the existence of these facts, arrived at by the Court of Appeals after an
examination of the evidence presented by the parties, is conclusive as to them and can not
be reviewed by us.

The law on prescription applicable to the case is that provided in Act 190 and not the
provisions of the Civil Code, since the possession started in 1933 or 1934 when the pertinent
articles of the old Civil Code were not in force and before the effectivity of the new Civil Code
in 1950. Hence, the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the respondents acquired alluvial
lot in question by acquisitive prescription is in accordance with law.

The decision of the Court of Appeals under review is hereby affirmed, with costs against the
petitioners. So ordered.

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