LEGAL ETHICS DIGESTERS | ANDRIN, CABASAG, ODCHIGUE
TOPIC: CANON 7 - CANON 9
1. IN RE: MELING BM NO. 1154
Principles:
● BM 1209 - The Court ​held that good moral character is what
a person really is, as distinguished from good reputation or
from the opinion generally entertained of him, the estimate
in which he is held by the public in the place where he is
known. Moral character is not a subjective term but one
which corresponds to objective reality. The standard of
personal and professional integrity is not satisfied by such
conduct as it merely enables a person to escape the penalty of
criminal law. Good moral character includes at least common
honesty.
​ anon 7 - Duty to uphold the dignity of the legal
Case Topic: C
profession
Petitioner:
Atty. MELENDREZ
● Petitioner who filed against Haron Meling from taking the
2002 Bar Exam and impose upon him disciplinary penalty as
a member of the Shari’a Bar to the OBC (Office of the Bar
Confidant).
Respondent:
HARON MELING
● Member of the Shari’a Bar.
FACTS:
● MELENDREZ ALLEGED: ​Meling has 3 pending criminal
cases in which he did not diclose in Meling’s petition to take
the bar, one which involves him and his wife, by uttering
defamatory words against him in front of media practitioners
and hitting his wife causing injury to the latter. And that,
Meling have been using the title “Attorney” in his
communications as Secretary to the Mayor of Cotabato
despite him not being a member of the Bar.
● MELING ANSWERED: He did not disclose the criminal
case because he was advised not to by a retired judge who has
his former professor. He denies charges of acts against moral
turpitude because for him the three cases that arose in one
incident are closed and terminated. As to the title of
“Attorney”, he admits the alleged act.
● OBC RECOMMENDED: That the non-disclosure of the
criminal case was also answerable under Rule 7.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. That there is no showing
that Meling is involved in the practice of law, he may be liable
for indirect contempt. OBC recommended that Meling be not
allowed to take the Lawyer’s Oath and sign the Roll of
Attorneys.
ISSUES:
1. WON Meling is not allowed to take the Lawyer’s oath and
Sign the roll of Attorneys in the event that he passes the bar
exam.
2. WON Meling be impose sanctions as a member of the Shari’a
Bar
RULING:
1. The court concurred with the findings and recommendation
of OBC. But, Meling did not pass the bar so it is already
moot and academic.
2. Practice of law, whether regular or Shari’a Court, is not a
matter of right but merely a privilege bestowed who are not
only learned in the law but also known to possess good
moral character. The requirement of good moral character
is not only a condition precedent to admission of law, its
continued possession is also essential for remaining in the
practice of law. M​ eling’s concealment of the fact that there
are three (3) pending criminal cases against him speaks of
his lack of the requisite good moral character and results in
the forfeiture of the privilege bestowed upon him as a
member of the Shari’a Bar. The judiciary has no place for
dishonest officers of the court, such as Meling in this case.
Meling is hereby suspended for his membership.
2. RULE 139-A
Sec. 1. Organization. — There is hereby organized an official national
body to be known as the "Integrated Bar of the Philippines," composed
of all persons whose names now appear or may hereafter be included in
the Roll of Attorneys of the SC.
Sec. 2. Purposes. — The fundamental purposes of the IBP
shall be to elevate the standards of the legal profession,
improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to
discharge its public responsibility more effectively.
Sec. 3. Regions. — The Philippines is hereby divided into nine Regions
of the IBP, to wit: Northern Luzon, Central Luzon, Greater Manila,
Southern Luzon, Bicolandia, Eastern Visayas, Western Visayas, Eastern
Mindanao, Western Mindanao
In the event of the creation of any new province, the Board of
Governors shall, with the approval of the SC, determine the Region to
which the said province shall belong.
Sec. 4. Chapters. — A Chapter of the IBP shall be organized in every
province. Except as hereinbelow provided, every city shall be
considered part of the province within which it is geographically
situated.
A separate Chapter shall be organized in each of the following political
subdivisions or areas;The subprovince of Aurora; Each congressional
district of the City of Manila; Quezon City; Caloocan City, Malabon and
Navotas; Pasay City, Makati, Mandaluyong and San Juan del Monte;
Cebu City; and Zamboanga City and Basilan City.
Unless he otherwise registers his preference for a particular Chapter, a
lawyer shall be considered a member of the Chapter of the province,
city, political subdivision or area where his office, or, in the absence
thereof, his residence is located. In no case shall any lawyer be a
member of more than one Chapter.
Each Chapter shall have its own local government as provided for by
uniform rules to be prescribed by the Board of Governors and approved
by the SC, the provisions of Sec. 19 of this Rule notwithstanding.
Chapters belonging to the same Region may hold regional conventions
on matters and problems of common concern.
Sec. 5. House of Delegates. — The IBP shall have a House of Delegates
of not more than one hundred twenty members who shall be
apportioned among all the Chapters as nearly as may be according to
the number of their respective members, but each Chapter shall have at
least one Delegate. On or before December 31, 1974, and every four
years thereafter, the Board of Governors shall make an apportionment
of Delegates.
The term of the office of Delegate shall begin on the date of the opening
of the annual convention of the House and shall end on the day
immediately preceding the date of the opening of the next succeeding
annual convention. No person may be a Delegate for more than two
terms.
The House shall hold an annual convention at the call of the Board of
Governors at any time during the month of April of each year for the
election of Governor, the reading and discussion of reports including
the annual report of the Board of Governors, the transaction of such
other business as may be referred to it by the Board, and the
consideration of such additional matters as may be requested in writing
by at least twenty Delegates. Special conventions of the House may be
called by the Board of Governors to consider only such matters as the
LEGAL ETHICS DIGESTERS | ANDRIN, CABASAG, ODCHIGUE
Board shall indicate. A majority of the Delegates who have registered
for a convention, whether annual or special, shall constitute a quorum
to do business.
Sec. 6. Board of Governors. — The IBP shall be governed by a Board of
Governors. Nine Governors shall be elected by the House of Delegates
from the nine Regions on the representation basis of one Governor
from each Region. Each Governor shall be chosen from a list of
nominees submitted by the Delegates from the Region, provided that
not more than one nominee shall come from any Chapter. The
President and the Executive Vice President, if chosen by the Governors
from outside of themselves as provided in Sec. 7 of this Rule, shall ipso
facto become members of the Board.
The members of the Board shall hold office for a term of one year from
the date of their election and until their successors shall have been duly
elected and qualified. No person may be a Governor for more than two
terms.
The Board shall meet regularly once every three months, on such date
and such time and place as it shall designate. A majority of all the
members of the Board shall constitute a quorum to do business. Special
meetings may be called by the President or by five members of the
Board.
Subject to the approval of the SC, the Board shall adopt ByLaws and
promulgate Canons of Professional Responsibility for all members of
the IBP. The ByLaws and the Canons may be amended by the SC motu
propio or upon the recommendation of the Board of Governors.
The Board shall prescribe such other rules and regulations as may be
necessary and proper to carry out the purposes of the IBP as well as the
provisions of this Rule.
Sec. 7. Officers. — The IBP shall have a President and an Executive Vice
President who shall be chosen by the Governors immediately after the
latter's election, either from among themselves or from other members
of the IBP, by the vote of at least five Governors. Each of the regional
members of the Board shall be ex officio Vice President for the Region
which he represents.
The President and the Executive Vice President shall hold office for a
term of one year from the date of their election and until their
successors shall have duly qualified. The Executive Vice President shall
automatically become the President for the next succeeding full term.
The Presidency shall rotate from year to year among all the nine
Regions in such order or rotation as the Board of Governors shall
prescribe. No person shall be President or Executive Vice President of
the IBP for more than one term.
The IBP shall have a Secretary, a Treasurer, and such other officers and
employees as may be required by the Board of Governors, to be
appointed by the President with the consent of the Board, and to hold
office at the pleasure of the Board or for such terms as it may fix. Said
officers and employees need not be members of the IBP.
Sec. 8. Vacancies. — In the event the President is absent or unable to
act, his duties shall be performed by the Executive Vice President; and
in the event of the death, resignation, or removal of the President, the
Executive Vice President shall serve as Acting President during the
remainder of the term of the office thus vacated. In the event of the
death, resignation, removal, or disability of both the President and the
Executive Vice President, the Board of Governors shall elect an Acting
President to hold office until the next succeeding election or during the
period of disability.
The filling of vacancies in the House of Delegates, Board of Governors,
and all other positions of Officers of the IBP shall be as provided in the
ByLaws. Whenever the term of an office or position is for a fixed period,
the person chosen to fill a vacancy therein shall serve only for the
unexpired term.
Sec. 9. Membership dues. — Every member of the IBP shall
pay such annual dues as the Board of Governors shall
determine with the approval of the SC. A fixed sum
equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the collection from each
Chapter shall be set aside as a Welfare Fund for disabled
members of the Chapter and the compulsory heirs of
deceased members thereof.
Sec. 10. Effect of nonpayment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of
Sec. 12 of this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six
months shall warrant suspension of membership in the IBP, and
default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal
of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.
Sec. 11. Voluntary termination of membership; reinstatement. — A
member may terminate his membership by filing a written notice to
that effect with the Secretary of the IBP, who shall immediately bring
the matter to the attention of the SC. Forthwith he shall cease to be a
member and his name shall be stricken by the Court from the Roll of
Attorneys. Reinstatement may be made by the Court in accordance with
rules and regulations prescribed by the Board of Governors and
approved by the Court.
Sec. 12. Grievance procedures. — The Board of Governors shall provide
in the ByLaws for grievance procedures for the enforcement and
maintenance of discipline among all the members of the IBP, but no
action involving the suspension or disbarment of a member or the
removal of his name from the Roll of Attorneys shall be effective
without the final approval of the SC.
Sec. 13. Nonpolitical Bar. — The IBP shall be strictly nonpolitical, and
every activity tending to impair this basic feature is strictly prohibited
and shall be penalized accordingly. No lawyer holding an elective,
judicial, quasijudicial, or prosecutory office in the Government or any
political subdivision or instrumentality thereof shall be eligible for
election of appointment to any position in the IBP or any Chapter
thereof shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his position as of
the moment he files his certificate of candidacy for any elective public
office or accepts appointment to any judicial, quasijudicial, or
prosecutory office in the Government or any political subdivision or
instrumentality thereof.
Sec. 14. Positions honorary. — Except as may be specifically authorized
or allowed by the SC, no Delegate or Governor and no national or local
Officer or committee member shall receive any compensation,
allowance or emolument from the funds of the IBP for any service
rendered therein or be entitled to reimbursement for any expense
incurred in the discharge of his functions.
Sec. 15. Fiscal matters. — The Board of Governors shall administer the
funds of the IBP and shall have the power to make appropriations and
disbursements therefrom. It shall cause proper Books of Accounts to be
kept and Financial Statements to be rendered and shall see to it that
the proper audit is made of all accounts of the IBP and all the Chapters
thereof.
Sec. 16. Journal. — The Board of Governors shall cause to be published
a quarterly Journal of the IBP, free copies of which shall be distributed
to every member of the IBP.
Sec. 17. Voluntary Bar associations. — All voluntary Bar associations
now existing or which may hereafter be formed may coexist with the
IBP but shall not operate at crosspurposes therewith.
Sec. 18. Amendments. — This Rule may be amended by the SC motu
propio or upon the recommendation of the Board of Governors or any
Chapter of the IBP.
Sec. 19. Organizational period. — The Commission on Bar Integration
shall organize the local Chapters and toward this end shall secure the
assistance of the Department of Justice and of all Judges throughout
the Philippines. All Chapter organizational meetings shall be held on
Saturday, February 17, 1973. In every case, the Commission shall cause
proper notice of the date, time and place of the meeting called to
organize a Chapter shall constitute a quorum for the purpose, including
the election of a President, a Vice President, a Secretary, a Treasurer,
LEGAL ETHICS DIGESTERS | ANDRIN, CABASAG, ODCHIGUE
and five Directors.
The Commission shall initially fix the number of Delegates and
apportion the same among all the Chapters as nearly as may be in
proportion to the number of their respective members, but each
Chapter shall have at least one Delegate. The President of each Chapter
shall concurrently be its Delegate to the House of Delegates. The Vice
President shall be his alternate, except where the Chapter is entitled to
have more than one Delegate, in which case the Vice President shall
also be a Delegate.
The Board of Directors of the Chapter shall in proper cases elect
additional as well as alternate Delegates.
The House of Delegates shall convene in the City of Manila on
Saturday, March 17, 1973 for the Purpose of electing a Board of
Governors. The Governors shall immediately assume office and
forthwith meet to elect the Officers of the IBP. The Officers so chosen
shall immediately assume their respective positions.
Sec. 20. Effectivity. — This Rule shall take effect on January 16, 1973.
3. IN RE: EDILON
Principles:
● All legislation directing the integration of the Bar have been
uniformly and universally sustained as a valid exercise of
the police power over an important profession.
● The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a
privilege moreover clothed with public interest because a
lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but
also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to
the nation, and takes part in one of the most important
functions of the State — the administration of justice — as
an officer of the court. The practice of law being clothed
with public interest, the holder of this privilege must submit
to a degree of control for the common good, to the extent of
the interest he has created.
● As the U. S. Supreme Court through Mr. Justice
Roberts explained, the expression "affected with a public
interest" is the equivalent of "subject to the exercise of the
police power"
Case Topic: C ​ anon 7 - Duty to uphold the dignity of the legal
profession
Petitioner:
● IBP ​- IBP recommended the removal for the Marcial Edillon
because of the refusal to pay his membership dues.
Respondent:
● MARCIAL EDILON
FACTS:
● IBP BOG ​adopted a resolution recommending the removal
of Atty. Edillon for his stubborn refusal to pay his dues. The
court required Edilon’s comment. Edilion stood his ground.
● RESPONDENT ARGUMENT: That the Sec. of the IBP
Rules constitutes an invasion of constitutional rights in the
sense that he is being compelled as a pre-condition to
maintaining his status as a lawyer of good standing, to be a
member of the IBP, and to pay the corresponding dues, and
because of this he is being deprived ofthe rights of liberty and
property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence the
IBP By-laws are void and of no legal force and effect. At the
same time, Edilion questions the jurisdiction of the court
contending that it is not a justiciable case triable by the court
but is administrative in nature.
ISSUES:
1. WON Court has the power to compel to become a member of
the IBP. Hence, it is unconstitutional because it impinges
constitutional right or freedom.
2. WON the provision of the mandatory payment of
membership is void.
3. WON the enforcement of the penalty provisions would
amount to a deprivation of property without due process and
hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights
4. WON the SC has jurisdiction to strike the nae of a lawyer
from its roll of attorneys
RULING:
1. To compel is not violative. He became a member of the bar
when he passed the bar. The IBP only provides an official
organization for lawyers. It does not compel anyone for he is
free to attend or not to attend meetings. The only compulsion
is payment of annual dues. The compulsion here is the
exercise of the State’s police power.
2. No because it is apparent that the reasonable fee is imposed
as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying
out its objectives and purposes of integration.
3. It is clear that under the police power of the State and under
the necessary powers of the granted to the court, the
respondents right to practice law before the courts of the
country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and
inquiry. ​And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory
measure is recognized, then a penalty designed to enforce its
payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by
payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary.
4. The matters of admission, suspension, disbarment, and
reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and
supervision have been and are indisputably recognized as
inherent to the judicial functions and responsibilities.
Conclusion reached is that the provisions of Rule of Court 139-A and of
the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines complained of are
neither unconstitutional nor illegal.
4. Soliman Santos vs. Atty. Francisco Llamas
Principles:
● Only a duly admitted member of the bar "who is in good and
regular standing, is entitled to practice law.”
● Default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall
warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar,
and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground
for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from
the Roll of Attorneys.
Case Topic: ​Canon 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support the activities
of the Integrated Bar.
Petitioner: Soliman Santos
- claims that the respondent has misled the court about his
standing in the IBP by using the same IBP O.R. number in
his pleadings of at least six years and therefore liable for his
actions
Respondent: Atty. Francisco Llamas
- Claims that he is only engaged in a "limited" practice and
that he believes in good faith that he is exempt from the
payment of taxes, such as income tax, under R.A. No. 7432,
as a senior citizen since 1992.
FACTS:
● As a member of the Bar, Santos alleged that Atty. Francisco
R. Llamas who, for a number of years now, has not indicated
the proper PTR and IBP O.R. Nos. and data (date & place of
issuance) in his pleadings.
● He only indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" but has been using this
for at least three years already and has not indicated any PTR
for payment of professional tax.
● Track Record of Atty. Llamas:
1. his dismissal as Pasay City Judge per Supreme Court
LEGAL ETHICS DIGESTERS | ANDRIN, CABASAG, ODCHIGUE
Admin.
2. his conviction for estafa per Decision dated June 30, 1994
( on appeal)
● The Supreme Court dismissal decision was set aside and
reversed and the respondent was even promoted from City
Judge of Pasay City to Regional Trial Court Judge of Makati,
● Also as pointed out, the decision in Crim. Case No. 11787 was
appealed to the Court of Appeals and is still pending.
● Respondent being a Senior Citizen since 1992, is legally
exempt under Section 4 of Rep. Act 7432 which took effect in
1992, in the payment of taxes, income taxes as an example.
Being thus exempt, he honestly believes in view of his
detachment from a total practice of law, but only in a limited
practice, the subsequent payment by him of dues with the
Integrated Bar is covered by such exemption. In fact, he
never exercised his rights as an IBP member to vote and be
voted upon.
​ hether or not Atty. Llamas :
ISSUES:​ W
1. Is exempt from paying his IBP dues
2. violated the Code of Professional Responsibility
(CPR)
RULING:
1. The law cited is not applicable in the present case. In fact,
respondent admitted that he is still in the practice of law
when he alleged that the "undersigned since 1992 have
publicly made it clear per his Income tax Return up to the
present time that he had only a limited practice of law."
Respondent is not exempt from paying his yearly dues to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines. He can engage in the
practice of law only by paying his dues, and it does not
matter that his practice is "limited." R.A. No. 7432
exemption does not include payment of membership or
association dues.
2. By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and
thereby misrepresenting to the public and the courts that he
had paid his IBP dues to the Rizal Chapter, respondent is
guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Respondent's failure to pay his IBP dues and his
misrepresentation in the pleadings he filed in court indeed
merit the most severe penalty. However, in view of
respondent's advanced age, his express willingness to pay his
dues and plea for a more temperate application of the law, 8
we believe the penalty of one year suspension from the
practice of law or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is
later, is appropriate.
| Labiano's connection to his office. Respondent committed an
5. Pedro Linsangan vs. Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino
Principles:
● Canons of the CPR are rules of conduct all lawyers must
adhere to, including the manner by which a lawyer's services
are to be made known.
● This rule proscribes "ambulance chasing" (the solicitation of
almost any kind of legal business by an attorney, personally
or through an agent in order to gain employment) 17 as a
measure to protect the community from barratry and
champerty.
​ anon 8 - Duty of Professional Courtesy
Case Topic: C
- A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy and candor
toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid
harassing tactics against opposing counsel
Petitioner: Pedro Linsangan
Respondent: Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino
FACTS:
● Pedro Linsangan of the Linsangan Linsangan & Linsangan
Law Office filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty.
Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation of clients and
encroachment of professional services.
● Complainant alleged that the respondent convinced his
clients to transfer legal representation. The Respondent
promised them financial assistance and expeditious
collection on their claims. To induce them to hire his
services, he persistently called them and sent them text
messages.
● Complainant presented the sworn affidavit of James
Gregorio attesting that Labiano tried to prevail upon him to
sever his lawyer-client relations with complainant and utilize
respondent's services instead, in exchange for a loan of
P50,000. He also attached "respondent's" calling card.
● Respondent, in his defense, denied knowing Labiano and
authorizing the printing and circulation of the said calling
card.
● The Commission on Bar Discipline, in its report and
recommendation, found that the respondent had encroached
on the professional practice of the complainant, violating
Rule 8.02 10 and other canons 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR).
● Moreover, he contravened the rule against soliciting cases for
gain, personally or through paid agents or brokers as stated
in Section 27, Rule 138 12 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUES: ​Whether it is an encroachment on the professional practice
of Labiano, thereby violating rule 8.02 which provides that, “A lawyer
shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional
employment of another lawyer.
RULING:
● We adopt the findings of the IBP on the unethical conduct of
respondent but we modify the recommended penalty. The
complaint before us is rooted on the alleged intrusion by
respondent into complainant's professional practice in
violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR. And the means employed
by respondent in furtherance of the said misconduct
themselves constituted distinct violations of ethical rules.
Canons of the CPR are rules of conduct all lawyers must
adhere to, including the manner by which a lawyer's services
are to be made known.
● With regard to respondent's violation of Rule 8.02 of the
CPR, settled is the rule that a lawyer should not steal another
lawyer's client nor induce the latter to retain him by a
promise of better service, good result or reduced fees for his
services. Again the Court notes that respondent never denied
having these seafarers in his client list nor receiving benefits
from Labiano's "referrals". Furthermore, he never denied
unethical, predatory overstep into another's legal practice.
He cannot escape liability under Rule 8.02 of the CPR.
● Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for violating Rules 1.03, 2.03,
8.02 and 16.04 and Canon 3 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period
of one year effective immediately from receipt of this
resolution. He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the
same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more
severely.
6. Atty. Edita Noe-Lacsamana vs. Atty. Yolando
Busmente
Principles: T ​ he lawyer's duty to prevent, or at the very least not to
assist in, the unauthorized practice of law is founded on public interest
and policy. Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to
those individuals found duly qualified in education and character.
​ anon 9- Duty to shun unauthorized practice of law
Case Topic: C
- A lawyer shall not directly or indirectly assist in the
unauthorized practice of law
Petitioner: Atty. Noe-Lacasamana
Respondent: Atty. Busmente
LEGAL ETHICS DIGESTERS | ANDRIN, CABASAG, ODCHIGUE
FACTS:
● Noe-Lacsamana alleged in her complaint that she was the
counsel for Irene Bides, the plaintiff in Civil Case No.
SCA-2481 before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City,
Branch 167, while Busmente was the counsel for the
defendant Imelda B. Ulaso (Ulaso).
● Noe-Lacsamana alleged that Ulaso's deed of sale over the
property subject of Civil Case No. SCA-2481 was annulled,
which resulted in the filing of an ejectment case before the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), where Busmente appeared
as counsel.
● Another case for falsification was filed against Ulaso where
Busmente also appeared as counsel. Noe-Lacsamana alleged
that one Atty. Elizabeth Dela Rosa or Atty. Liza Dela Rosa
(Dela Rosa) would accompany Ulaso in court, projecting
herself as Busmente's collaborating counsel.
● Noe-Lacsamana further alleged that the court orders and
notices specified Dela Rosa as Busmente's collaborating
counsel. Noe-Lacsamana alleged that upon verification with
this Court and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, she
discovered that Dela Rosa was not a lawyer.
● Busmente alleged that Dela Rosa was a law graduate and was
his paralegal assistant for a few years and that Dela Rosa's
employment with him ended in 2000 but Dela Rosa was able
to continue misrepresenting herself as a lawyer with the help
of Regine Macasieb (Macasieb), Busmente's former
secretary.
● Busmente alleged that he did not represent Ulaso in Civil
Case No. 9284 and that his signature in the Answer
presented as proof by Noe-Lacsamana was forged.
● The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) found
that Dela Rosa was not a lawyer and that she represented
Ulaso as Busmente's collaborating counsel in Civil Case No.
9284. The IBP-CBD noted that while Busmente claimed that
Dela Rosa no longer worked for him since 2000, there was
no proof of her separation from employment.
ISSUES: ​Whether Busmente is guilty of directly or indirectly assisting
Dela Rosa in her illegal practice of law that warrants his suspension
from the practice of law
RULING:
● The court agreed with the IBP. The Court ruled that the term
"practice of law" implies customarily or habitually holding
oneself out to the public as a lawyer for compensation as a
source of livelihood or in consideration of his services. The
Court further ruled that holding one's self out as a lawyer
may be shown by acts indicative of that purpose, such as
identifying oneself as attorney, appearing in court in
representation of a client, or associating oneself as a partner
of a law office for the general practice of law.
● The lawyer's duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist
in, the unauthorized practice of law is founded on public
interest and policy. Public policy requires that the practice of
law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in
education and character. The permissive right conferred on
the lawyer is an individual and limited privilege subject to
withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral
and professional conduct.
● The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client, and
the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those
unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary
control of the Court.
● The canons and ethics of the profession enjoin him not to
permit his professional services or his name to be used in aid
of, or to make possible the unauthorized practice of law by,
any agency, personal or corporate.
● There was sufficient evidence to prove that Busmente was
guilty of violation of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. We agree with the recommendation of the
IBP, modifying the recommendation of the IBP-CBD, that
Busmente should be suspended from the practice of law for
six months.
TOPIC: CANON 10 - CANON 13
7. NATASHA HUEYSUWAN-FLORIDO, complainant,
vs. ATTY. JAMES BENEDICT C. FLORIDO,
respondent. [A.C. No. 5624. January 20, 2004.]
Principles:
Candor and fairness are demanded of every lawyer. T ​ he
burden cast on the judiciary would be intolerable if it could not take at
face value what is asserted by counsel. The time that will have to be
devoted just to the task of verification of allegations submitted could
easily be imagined. Even with due recognition then that counsel is
expected to display the utmost zeal in the defense of a client's cause, it
must never be at the expense of the truth.
Case Topic: Canon 10 – Duty of candor, fairness, and good
faith to the courts
This is an administrative complaint for the disbarment of respondent
Atty. James Benedict C. Florido and his eventual removal from the Roll
of Attorneys for allegedly violating his oath as a lawyer "by
manufacturing, flaunting and using a spurious and bogus Court of
Appeals Resolution/Order."
Petitioner:N​ ATASHA HUEYSUWAN-FLORIDO
● Complainant filed the instant complaint alleging that
respondent violated his attorney's oath by manufacturing,
flaunting and using a spurious Court of Appeals' Resolution
in and outside a court of law. Furthermore, respondent
abused and misused the privilege granted to him by the
Supreme Court to practice law in the country.
​ TTY. JAMES BENEDICT C. FLORIDO
Respondent: A
● Respondent claims that he acted in good faith in invoking the
Court of Appeals Resolution which he honestly believed to be
authentic.
FACTS:
● Sometime in the middle of December 2001, respondent went
to complainant's residence in Tanjay City, Negros Oriental
and demanded that the custody of their two minor children
be surrendered to him. He showed complainant a photocopy
of an alleged Resolution issued by the Court of Appeals
which supposedly granted his motion for temporary child
custody.
● Complainant asked respondent for the original copy of the
alleged resolution of the Court of Appeals, but respondent
failed to give it to her.
● In the mid-morning of January 15, 2002, while complainant
was with her children in the ABC Learning Center in Tanjay
City, respondent, accompanied by armed men, suddenly
arrived and demanded that she surrender to him the
custody of their children. He threatened to forcefully take
them away with the help of his companions, whom he
claimed to be agents of the National Bureau of
Investigation.
● In order to diffuse the tension, complainant agreed to allow
the children to sleep with respondent for one night on
condition that he would not take them away from Tanjay
City. This agreement was entered into in the presence of
Tanjay City Chief of Police Juanito Condes and NBI
LEGAL ETHICS DIGESTERS | ANDRIN, CABASAG, ODCHIGUE
Investigator Roger Sususco, among others.
● In the early morning of January 16, 2002, complainant
received information that a van arrived at the hotel where
respondent and the children were staying to take them to
Bacolod City. Complainant rushed to the hotel and took the
children to another room, where they stayed until later in
the morning.
● On the same day, respondent filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Dumaguete City, Branch 31, a verified petition for
the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus asserting his right to
custody of the children on the basis of the alleged Court of
Appeals' Resolution.
● Complainant verified the authenticity of the Resolution and
obtained a certification dated January 18, 2002 from the
Court of Appeals stating that no such resolution ordering
complainant to surrender custody of their children to
respondent had been issued.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the respondent can be held administratively liable for
his reliance on and attempt to enforce a spurious Resolution of the
Court of Appeals.
RULING:
As pointed out by the Investigating Commissioner, the assailed
Resolution was presented by respondent on at least two occasions:
1. in his Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus docketed as
Special Proc. Case No. 3898, 7 which he filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Dumaguete City;
2. when he sought the assistance of the Philippine National Police
(PNP) of Tanjay City to recover custody of his minor children
from complainant. Since it was respondent who used the
spurious Resolution, he is presumed to have participated in its
fabrication.
Moreover, the records show that respondent used offensive language
in hispleadings in describing complainant and her relatives. A ​ respondent-spouses Jose Seelin and Lilia Sevilla Seelin filed
lawyer's language should be forceful but dignified,
emphatic but respectful as befitting an advocate and in
keeping with the dignity of the legal profession. The lawyer's
arguments whether written or oral should be gracious to both court
and opposing counsel and should be of such words as may be properly
addressed by one gentleman to another. By calling complainant, a
"sly manipulator of truth" as well as a "vindictive congenital
​ ardly measures to the sobriety of speech
prevaricator", h
demanded of a lawyer.
Respondent's actions ​erode the public perception of the legal
profession. ​They constitute gross misconduct and the sanctions for
such malfeasance is prescribed by Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court which states:
SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court,
grounds therefore. — A member of the bar may be ​disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the
oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or
​ illful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party
for a w
without authority to do so.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, Atty. James
Benedict C. Florido is SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for a period of two (2) years.
8. ETERNAL GARDENS MEMORIAL PARK
CORPORATION , petitioner, vs COURT OF APPEALS
and SPS. LILIA SEVILLA and JOSE SEELIN,
respondents. [G.R. No. 123698. August 5, 1998.]
Principles:
ATTORNEYS; BOUND TO EXERT EVERY EFFORT TO
ASSIST IN SPEEDY AND EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE. — While lawyers owe entire devotion to the interest of
their clients and zeal in the defense of their client's right, they should
not forget that ​they are officers of the court, bound to exert
every effort to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice . They should not, therefore, misuse the
rules of procedure to defeat the ends of justice or unduly delay a case,
impede the execution of a judgment or misuse court processes.
Case Topic:
Canon 10 – Duty of candor, fairness, and good faith to the
courts
​ TERNAL
Petitioner: E GARDENS MEMORIAL PARK
CORPORATION
● Petitioner is the transferee of a lot subject of a complaint for
quieting of title and declaration of nullity between private
respondents and Central Dyeing and Finishing Corporation.
● When a writ of possession/break open order was issued by
the trial court, petitioner opposed the same contending that
it was a buyer in good faith and not impleaded as party.
​ OURT OF APPEALS and SPS. LILIA SEVILLA
Respondent: C
and JOSE SEELIN
FACTS:
● The case started on May 18, 1981 when private
a complaint against Central Dyeing & Finishing
Corporation (Central Dyeing for brevity) for quieting of
title and for declaration of nullity of Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT No. 205942) issued in the name of said
corporation, docketed as Civil Case No. C-9297, before the
Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City.
● On August 24, 1989, the trial court rendered judgment -
declaring the defendant's Certificate of Title No. 205942
null and void.
● The aforesaid decision was affirmed 3 by respondent Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 25989 on June 25, 1991 and
eventually upheld by this Court in G.R. No. L-101819 on
November 25, 1991. Said dismissal became final on March
5, 1992.
● The RTC decision, having become final and executory,
private respondents moved for execution which was
granted by the lower court. Accordingly, a writ of execution
of the decision was issued.
● Subsequently, private respondents filed an Urgent
Manifestation and Motion for an Immediate Writ of
Possession/Break Open Order. The motion was opposed by
herein petitioner Eternal Gardens Memorial Park
Corporation contending that it is not submitting to the
jurisdiction of the trial court; that it is completely unaware
of the suit between private respondents and Central
Dyeing; that it is the true and registered owner of the lot
having bought the same from Central Dyeing; and that it
LEGAL ETHICS DIGESTERS | ANDRIN, CABASAG, ODCHIGUE
was a buyer in good faith.
● Later, the trial court held that the judgment was binding on
petitioner, being the successor-in-interest of defendant
Central Dyeing pursuant to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the
Revised Rules of Court. Before the appellate court, Eternal
Garden’s petition was dismissed.
● Desperately needing a favorable judgment, petitioner, for
the second time, filed a petition for certiorari which was
dismissed by the appellate court holding that the trial
court’s decision had long become final and executory.
ISSUES:
Whether attorneys are bound to exert every effort to assist in speedy
and efficient administration of justice.
RULING:
YES.
A note of caution. ​This case has again delayed the execution of a
final judgment for seventeen (17) years to the prejudice of the
private respondents. ​In the meantime, that petitioner has thwarted
execution, interment on the disputed lot has long been going on, so that
by the time this case is finally terminated, the whole lot shall have
already been filled with tombstones, leaving nothing for private
respondents, the real owners of the property. T ​ his is a mockery of
justice.
We note that while lawyers owe entire devotion to the interest of their
clients and zeal in the defense of their client's right, ​they should not
forget that they are officers of the court, bound to exert every
effort to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of
justice.
They should not, therefore, misuse the rules of procedure to
defeat the ends of justice or unduly delay a case, impede the
execution of a judgment or misuse court processes.​ In Banogan
et al. vs. Cerna, et al., 21 we ruled:
"As officers of the court, ​lawyers have a responsibility to assist
in the proper administration of justice.​ They do not discharge
this duty by filing pointless petitions that only add to the workload of
the judiciary, especially this Court, which is burdened enough as it is. A
judicious study of the facts and the law should advise them when a case
such as this, should not be permitted to be filed to merely clutter the
already congested judicial dockets. ​They do not advance the cause
of law or their clients by commencing litigations that for
sheer lack of merit do not deserve the attention of the
courts."
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
9. IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDING FOR
DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY. VICENTE
RAUL ALMACEN in L-27654, ANTONIO H. CALERO
vs. VIRGINIA Y. YAPTINCHAY. [G.R. No. L-27654.
February 18, 1970.]
Principles:
Well-recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of
the court and as a citizen, to criticize in properly respectful terms and
through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges.
The power to exclude persons from the practice of law is but a
necessary incident of the power to admit persons to said practice. By
constitutional precept, this power is vested exclusively in this Court.
The vicious language used and the scurrilous innuendoes they carried
far transcend the permissible bounds of legitimate criticism. They
could never serve any purpose but to gratify the spite of an irate
attorney, attract public attention to himself and, more important of
all, bring this Court and its members into disrepute and destroy public
confidence in them to the detriment of the orderly administration of
justice.
It is not a whit less than a classic example of gross misconduct, gross
violation of the lawyer's oath and gross transgression of the Canons of
Legal Ethics. As such, it cannot be allowed to go unrebuked.
Case Topic:
Canon 11 — A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect
due to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on
similar conduct by others
Petitioner: ​ATTY. VICENTE RAUL ALMACEN
Atty. Almacen gave vent to his disappointment by filing his "Petition to
Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title," already adverted to — a
pleading that is interspersed from beginning to end with the insolent,
contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory remarks
hereinbefore reproduced, against this Court as well as its individual
members, a behavior that is as unprecedented as it is Unprofessional.
​ IRGINIA Y. YAPTINCHAY
Respondent: V
FACTS:
● Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen filed a “P ​ etition to Surrender
the Lawyer’s Certificate of Title”​ to the Supreme Court
as a sign of his protest as against to what he call a tribunal
“peopled by people who are calloused to our pleas for
justice…”.
● He also expressed strong words as against the judiciary like
“justice… is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb.” .
● The petition rooted from the case he lost due to the absence
of time and place in his motion in the trial court. His appeal
was dismissed in the Court of Appeals by reason of
jurisprudence. In a petition for certiorari in the Supreme
Court, it was again dismissed thru a minute resolution.
● With the disappointments, he thought of this sacrificial
move. He claimed that this petition to surrender his title is
only in trust, and that he may obtain the title again as soon
as he regained confidence in the justice system.
● As a veteran lawyer, he should have known that a motion
for reconsideration which failed to notify the opposing party
of the time and place of trial is a mere scrap of paper and
will not be entertained by the court. He has only himself to
blame and he is the reason why his client lost.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the utterances and actuations of Atty. Almacen here in
question are properly the object of disciplinary sanctions.
RULING:
Yes. The High Court regarded said criticisms as uncalled for;
that such is insolent, contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and
derogatory.
LEGAL ETHICS DIGESTERS | ANDRIN, CABASAG, ODCHIGUE
Courts thus treat with forbearance and restraint a lawyer who vigorously
assails their actuations. For courageous and fearless advocates are the
strands that weave durability into the tapestry of justice. Hence, as
citizen and officer of the court, every lawyer is expected not
only to exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to
expose the shortcomings and indiscretions of courts and
judges.
Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. They should and expect critical
evaluation of their performance. For like the executive and the legislative
branches, the judiciary is rooted in the soil of democratic society,
nourished by the periodic appraisal of the citizens whom it is expected to
serve.
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall
be bona fide and shall not spill over the walls of decency and
propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand,
and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other.
Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the
duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects
a lawyer to disciplinary action.
For, membership in the Bar imposes upon a person obligations and
duties which are not mere flux and ferment. His investiture into the legal
profession places upon his shoulders no burden more basic, more
exacting and more imperative than that of respectful behavior toward the
courts. He vows solemnly to conduct himself "with all good
fidelity . . . to the courts;" a​nd the Rules of Court constantly remind
him "to observe and maintain the respect due to courts of
justice and judicial officers." ​The first canon of legal ethics enjoins
him "to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude, not
for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office,
but for the maintenance of its supreme importance."
The sole objective of this proceeding is to preserve the purity of the legal
profession, by removing or suspending a member whose misconduct has
proved himself unfit to continue to be entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney.
Undoubtedly, this is well within our authority to do. By constitutional
mandate, ours is the solemn duty, amongst others, to determine the rules
for admission to the practice of law. Inherent in this prerogative is
the corresponding authority to discipline and exclude from the
practice of law those who have proved themselves unworthy of
continued membership in the Bar.
That the misconduct committed by Atty. Almacen is of considerable
gravity cannot be overemphasized. However, heeding the stern
injunction that disbarment should never be decreed where a lesser
sanction would accomplish the end desired, and believing that it may not
perhaps be futile to hope that in the sober light of some future day, Atty.
Almacen will realize that abrasive language never fails to do disservice to
an advocate and that in every effervescence of candor there is ample
room for the added glow of respect, it is our view that suspension will
suffice under the circumstances.
The merit of this choice is best shown by the fact that it will then be left
to Atty. Almacen to determine for himself how long or how short that
suspension shall last. For, at any time after the suspension becomes
effective he may prove to this Court that he is once again fit to resume
the practice of law.
ACCORDINGLY, IT IS THE SENSE of the Court that Atty.
Vicente Raul Almacen be, as he is hereby, suspended from the
practice of law until further orders, the suspension to take
effect immediately.
10. WICKER V. ARCANGEL
Principles: (​ in bullet form if possible)
Case Topic: ​(Ex. Canon Chorbs. A Petition for blah blah blah)
Petitioner:
Respondent:
FACTS:
Kelly Wicker, with his wife Wynee Dieppe and the Tectonics Asia
Architects and Engineering Co., brought suit in the Regional Trial Court of
Makati against the LFS Enterprises, Inc. and others, for the annulment of
certain deeds by which a house and lot at Forbes Park, which the plaintiffs
claimed they had purchased, was allegedly fraudulently titled in the name
of the defendant LFS Enterprises and later sold by the latter to
codefendant Jose Poe. The presiding judge was the subject of a derogatory
motion for inhibition by the petitioner through counsel. Petitioner alleged
that the judge was recruited for the case by a lawyer and that his partiality
and integrity were doubtful. Incensed by this motion, the judge issued an
order directing plaintiff and counsel to show cause why they should not be
cited for contempt for the „malicious, derogatory and contemptuous
allegations in the motion. And finding the explanation not satisfactory, the
judge issued an order citing them in contempt to suffer five (5) days of
imprisonment and P100 fine each. They filed a motion for reconsideration
which was denied. Then petitioners submitted their profuse apologies to
the trial judge but thereafter submitted another pleading belittling the
intellectual competence of the judge to the effect that he simply cannot do
in the RTC of Makati.
ISSUES:
Whether respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in
holding petitioners liable for direct contempt
RULING:
It is important to point out this distinction because in case of indirect or
constructive contempt, the contemnor ​may be punished only "[a]fter
charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the
accused to be heard by himself or counsel," whereas in case of direct
contempt, the ​respondent may be summarily adjudged in contempt.​
Moreover, the judgment in cases of ​indirect contempt is appealable​,
whereas in cases of ​direct contempt only judgments of contempt by
MTCs, MCTCs and MeTCs are appealable.​
Consequently, it was unnecessary in this case for respondent judge to
hold a hearing. Hence even if petitioners are right about the nature of the
case against them by contending that it involves indirect contempt, they
have no ground for complaint since they were afforded a hearing before
they were held guilty of contempt.
The contempt power ought not to be utilized for the purpose of merely
satisfying an inclination to strike back at a party for showing less than
full respect for the dignity of the court. Consistent with the foregoing
principles and based on the abovementioned facts, the Court sustains
Judge Arcangel's finding that ​petitioners are guilty of contempt.
Allegations are derogatory to the integrity and honor of respondent judge
and constitute an unwarranted criticism of the administration of justice
in this country. They suggest that lawyers, if they are well connected, can
manipulate the assignment of judges to their advantage. The truth is that
the assignments of Judges Arcangel and Capulong were made by this
Court, by virtue of Administrative Order No. 154-93, precisely "in the
interest of an efficient administration of justice and pursuant to Sec. 5
(3), Art. VIII of the Constitution."10 This is a matter of record which
could have easily been verified by Atty. Rayos. After all, as he claims, he
LEGAL ETHICS DIGESTERS | ANDRIN, CABASAG, ODCHIGUE
"deliberated" for two months whether or not to file the offending motion
for inhibition as his client allegedly asked him to do. In extenuation of his
own liability, Atty. Rayos claims he merely did what he had been bidden
to do by his client of whom he was merely a "mouthpiece." He was just
"lawyering" and "he cannot be gagged," even if the allegations in the
motion for the inhibition which he prepared and filed were false since it
was his client who verified the same.
Atty. Rayos, however, cannot evade responsibility for the allegations in
question. ​As a lawyer, he is not just an instrument of his client​. His
client came to him for professional assistance in the representation of a
cause, and while he owed him whole souled devotion, there were bounds
set by his responsibility as a lawyer which he could not overstep. 11 Even
a hired gun cannot be excused for what Atty. Rayos stated in the motion.
Based on Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Rayos
bears as much responsibility for the contemptuous allegations in the
motion for inhibition as his client.
Atty. Rayos' duty to the courts is not secondary to that of his client. The
Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins him to ​"observe and
maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and [to]
insist on similar conduct by others" 12 and ​"not [to] attribute to a Judge
motives not supported by the record or have materiality to the case."
Be that as it may, the Court believes that consistent with the rule that the
power to cite for contempt must be exercised for preservative rather than
vindictive principle we think that the jail sentence on petitioners may be
dispensed with while vindicating the dignity of the court. In the case of
petitioner Kelly Wicker there is greater reason for doing so considering
that the particularly offending allegations in the motion for inhibition do
not appear to have come from him but were additions made by Atty.
Rayos. In addition, Wicker is advanced in years (80) and in failing health
(suffering from angina), a fact Judge Arcangel does not dispute. Wicker
may have indeed been the recipient of such a remark although he could
not point a court employee who was the source of the same. At least he
had the grace to admit his mistake both as to the source and truth of said
information.
11. UP
Principles:
● On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the
Bar to abstain from all offensive personalityand to advance
no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or
witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with
which he is charged. In keeping with the dignity of the legal
profession, a lawyer’s language even in his pleadings must
be dignified
● Applying by analogy the Court’s past treatment of the "free
speech" defense in other bar discipline cases, academic
freedom cannot be successfully invoked by respondents in
this case. The implicit ruling in the jurisprudence discussed
above is that the constitutional right to freedom of
expression of members of the Bar may be circumscribed by
their ethical duties as lawyers to give due respect to the
courts and to uphold the public’s faith in the legal profession
and the justice system. To our mind, the reason that
freedom of expression may be so delimited in the case of
lawyers applies with greater force to the academic freedom
of law professors.
Case Topic: ​(Ex. Canon Chorbs. A Petition for blah blah blah)
Petitioner:
Respondent:
FACTS:
● The ponencia of Associate Justice Mariano del Castillo
(Justice Del Castillo) in Vinuya, et al. v. Executive Secretary
(G.R. No. 162230) was promulgated. On May 31, 2010, the
counsel for Vinuya, et al. (the "Malaya Lolas"), filed a Motion
for Reconsideration of the Vinuya decision, raising solely the
following grounds:
○ I. Our own constitutional and
jurisprudential histories reject this Honorable
Courts’ (sic) assertion that the Executive’s foreign
policy prerogatives are virtually unlimited;
precisely, under the relevant jurisprudence and
constitutional provisions, such prerogatives are
proscribed by international human rights and
humanitarian standards, including those provided
for in the relevant international conventions of
which the Philippines is a party.
○ II. This Honorable Court has confused diplomatic
protection with the broader, if fundamental,
responsibility of states to protect the human rights
of its citizens – especially where the rights asserted
are subject of erga omnes obligations and pertain
to jus cogens norms.
● Counsel for the Malaya Lolas, Attys. H. Harry L. Roque, Jr.
(Atty. Roque) and Romel Regalado Bagares (Atty. Bagares),
filed a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration in G.R. No.
162230, where they posited for the first time their charge of
plagiarism as one of the grounds for reconsideration of the
Vinuya decision. They also claimed that "[i]n this
controversy, the evidence bears out the fact not only of
extensive plagiarism but of (sic) also of twisting the true
intents of the plagiarized sources by the ponencia to suit the
arguments of the assailed Judgment for denying the
Petition."
● Justice Del Castillo wrote to his colleagues on the Court in
reply to the charge of plagiarism contained in the
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration.
● The Court formed the Committee on Ethics and Ethical
Standards (the Ethics Committee) pursuant to Section 13,
Rule 2 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court. In an En
Banc Resolution also dated July 27, 2010, the Court referred
the July 22, 2010 letter of Justice Del Castillo to the Ethics
Committee. The matter was subsequently docketed as A.M.
No. 10-7-17-SC.
● A statement dated July 27, 2010, entitled "Restoring
Integrity: A Statement by the Faculty of the University of the
Philippines College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism
and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court" (the
Statement), was posted in Newsbreak’s website and on Atty.
Roque’s blog. A report regarding the statement also appeared
on various on-line news sites, such as the GMA News TV and
the Sun Star sites, on the same date. The statement was
likewise posted at the University of the Philippines College of
Law’s bulletin board allegedly on August 10, 2010 and at said
college’s website. On August 11, 2010, Dean Leonen
submitted a copy of the Statement of the University of the
Philippines College of Law Faculty (UP Law faculty) to the
Court, through Chief Justice Renato C. Corona (Chief Justice
Corona). Thereafter, various authors wrote the Court
regarding the alleged plagiarism of their works
ISSUES: ​W/N the professors violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility ​Whether lawyers who are also law professors can
invoke academic freedom as a defense in an administrative
proceeding for intemperate statements tending to pressure the Court
or influence the outcome of a case or degrade the courts.
RULING: The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates: CANON
8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor
toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics
against opposing counsel. Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his
professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or
otherwise improper.CANON 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain
the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist
on similar conduct by others.Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from
LEGAL ETHICS DIGESTERS | ANDRIN, CABASAG, ODCHIGUE
scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the
Courts. To be sure, the adversarial nature of our legal system has
tempted members of the bar to use strong language in pursuit of their
duty to advance the interests of their clients. However, while a lawyer
is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm
does not justify the use of offensive and abusive language. Language
abounds with countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but
respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not
offensive.
Even if the Court was willing to accept respondents’
proposition in the Common Compliance that their issuance
of the Statement was in keeping with their duty to
"participate in the development of the legal system by
initiating or supporting efforts in law reform and in the
improvement of the administration of justice" under Canon 4
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, ​we cannot agree that
they have fulfilled that same duty in keeping with the demands of
Canons 1, 11 and 13 to give due respect to legal processes and the
courts, and to avoid conduct that tends to influence the courts.
Members of the Bar cannot be selective regarding which canons to
abide by given particular situations. With more reason that law
professors are not allowed this indulgence, since they are expected to
provide their students exemplars of the Code of Professional
Responsibility as a whole and not just their preferred portions thereof
The Court finds that there was indeed a lack of observance of fidelity
and due respect to the Court, particularly when respondents knew fully
well that the matter of plagiarism in the Vinuya decision and the merits
of the Vinuya decision itself, at the time of the Statement’s issuance,
were still both sub judice or pending final disposition of the Court.
These facts have been widely publicized. On this point, respondents
allege that at the time the Statement was first drafted on July 27, 2010,
they did not know of the constitution of the Ethics Committee and they
had issued the Statement under the belief that this Court intended to
take no action on the ethics charge against Justice Del Castillo. Still,
there was a significant lapse of time from the drafting and printing of
the Statement on July 27, 2010 and its publication and submission to
this Court in early August when the Ethics Committee had already been
convened. If it is true that the respondents’ outrage was fueled by their
perception of indifference on the part of the Court then, when it
became known that the Court did intend to take action, there was
nothing to prevent respondents from recalibrating the Statement to
take this supervening event into account in the interest of fairness.
In a democracy, members of the legal community are hardly expected
to have monolithic views on any subject, be it a legal, political or social
issue. Even as lawyers passionately and vigorously propound their
points of view they are bound by certain rules of conduct for the legal
profession. This Court is certainly not claiming that it should be
shielded from criticism. All the Court demands is the same respect and
courtesy that one lawyer owes to another under established ethical
standards. All lawyers, whether they are judges, court employees,
professors or private practitioners, are officers of the Court and have
voluntarily taken an oath, as an indispensable qualification for
admission to the Bar, to conduct themselves with good fidelity towards
the courts. There is no exemption from this sworn duty for law
professors, regardless of their status in the academic community or the
law school to which they belong.
WHEREFORE, this administrative matter is decided as follows:
(1) With respect to Prof. Vasquez, after favorably noting his
submission, the Court finds his Compliance to be satisfactory. (2) The
Common Compliance of 35 respondents, is found UNSATISFACTORY.
These 35 respondent law professors are reminded of their lawyerly
duty, under Canons 1, 11 and 13 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, to give due respect to the Court and to refrain from
intemperate and offensive language tending to influence the Court on
pending matters or to denigrate the Court and the administration of
justice and warned that the same or similar act in the future shall be
dealt with more severely. (3) The separate Compliance of Dean
Marvic M.V.F. Leonen regarding the charge of violation of Canon 10 is
found UNSATISFACTORY. He is further ADMONISHED to be more
mindful of his duty, as a member of the Bar, an officer of the Court, and
a Dean and professor of law, to observe full candor and honesty in his
dealings with the Court and warned that the same or similar act in the
future shall be dealt with more severely. (4) Prof. Lynch, who is not a
member of the Philippine bar, is excused from these proceedings.
However, he is reminded that while he is engaged as a professor in a
Philippine law school he should strive to be a model of responsible and
professional conduct to his students even without the threat of sanction
from this Court. (5) Finally, respondents’ requests for a hearing and for
access to the records of A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC are denied for lack of
merit.
12. NUNEZ V. RICAFORT
Principles: (​ in bullet form if possible)
Case Topic: C ​ anon 12 – Duty to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice
Petitioner: ​Soledad Nunez
Respondent: R ​ omulo Ricafort
FACTS:
● An administrative complaint was by Soledad Nuñez, a
septuagenarian represented by her attorney-in-fact Ananias
B. Co, Jr., seeking the disbarment of Atty. Romulo Ricafort
on the ground of grave misconduct.
● Sometime in October 1982, Soledad authorized Atty. Ricafort
to sell her two parcels of land located in Legazpi City for
P​40,000. She agreed to the lawyer 10% of the price as
commission. Atty. Ricafort succeeded in selling the lots, but
despite Soledad’s repeated demands, he did not turn over the
proceeds of the sale. This forced Soledad to file an action for
a sum of money before the RTC, Quezon City.
● The court rendered its decision ordering the Atty. to pay
Soledad the sum of ​P​16,000 as principal obligation, with at
the legal rate from the date of the commencement of the
action.
● An appeal to the CA was made. However, the appeal was
dismissed for failure to pay the required docket fee within the
reglementary period despite notice.
● Soledad filed a motion for the issuance of an alias writ of
execution. But it appears that only a partial satisfaction of the
P​16,000 judgment was made, leaving ​P​13,800 unsatisfied. In
payment for the latter, Atty. issued four postdated checks but
was dishonored because the account against which they were
drawn was closed.
● Hence, Soledad was forced to file four criminal complaints
for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 before the MTC, Quezon City.
● In a joint affidavit, Atty. Ricafort admitted having drawn and
issued said four postdated checks in favor of Soledad.
Allegedly believing in good faith that said checks had already
been encashed by Soledad, he subsequently closed his
checking account in China Banking Corporation, Legazpi
City, from which said four checks were drawn. He was not
notified that the checks were dishonored. Had he been
notified, he would have made the necessary arrangements
with the bank.
● The court required Atty. to comment on the complaint. But
he never did despite the favorable action on his three
motions for extension of time to file the comment. His failure
to do so compelled Soledad to file a motion to cite Atty. in
contempt on the ground that his strategy to file piecemeal
motions for extension of time to submit the comment
“smacks of a delaying tactic scheme that is unworthy of a
member of the bar and a law dean.”
● The IBP findings show that the Atty. had no intention to
“honor” the money judgment against him. It recommended
that Atty. be declared “guilty of misconduct in his dealings
with complainant” and be suspended from the practice of law
for at least one year and pay the amount of the checks issued
to the complainant.
LEGAL ETHICS DIGESTERS | ANDRIN, CABASAG, ODCHIGUE
ISSUES:
Whether or not Atty. Romulo Ricafort is guilty of grave misconduct in
his dealings with complainant.
RULING:
YES. There is a blatant violation of Rule 1:01 of Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides:
A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest and immoral or
deceitful conduct. By violating Rule 1:01 of Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, Atty. diminished public confidence in the
law and the lawyers. Instead of promoting such confidence and respect,
he miserably failed to live up to the standards of the legal profession.
His act of issuing bad checks in satisfaction of the alias writ of
execution for money judgment rendered by the trial court was a clear
attempt to defeat the ends of justice. His failure to make good the
checks despite demands and the criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg.
22 showed his continued defiance of judicial processes, which he, as an
officer of the court, was under continuing duty to uphold. To further
demonstrate his very low regard for the courts and judicial processes,
he even had the temerity of making a mockery of the court’s generosity
to him. We granted his three motions for extension of time to file his
comment on the complaint in this case. Yet, not only did he fail to file
the comment, he as well did not even bother to explain such failure
notwithstanding our resolution declaring him as having waived the
filing of the comment. To the SC, Atty. openly showed a high degree of
irresponsibility amounting to willful disobedience to its lawful orders.
Atty. Ricafort then knowingly and willfully violated Rules 12.04 and
12:03 of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility stating
that:
Lawyers should avoid any action that would unduly delay a case,
impede the execution of a judgment or misuse court processes; and that
lawyers, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings,
memoranda or briefs, should not let the period lapse without
submitting the same or offering an explanation for their failure to do
so. The SC indefinitely suspended Atty. Ricafort from the practice of
law and directed to pay Soledad P13,800.
13. Santiago vs. Rafanan
Principles:
● A lawyer is not disqualified from being a witness, except
only in certain cases pertaining to privileged
communication arising from an attorney-client
relationship.
Case Topic: ​Canon 12 - Duty to assist in a speedy and efficient
administration of the trial.
Petitioner:
● Jonar Santiago​, an employee of the BJMP who filed a
petition for disbarment of Atty. Rafanan. Filed with hte
Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP
Respondent:
● Atty. Edison Rafanan
FACTS:
● Santiago filed a complaint against Rafanan chargung him
with gross misconduct in office under Sec 27 of Rule 128,
violation of Canons 1.01, 1.02, and 1.03 of the CPR.
● Complaint alleged that respondent in notarizing documents
violated provisions of the Revised Administrative Code. That
he executed an affidavit in favor of his client and offered the
same evidence in case wherein he was actively representing
his client. That after the hearing disarmed complainant and
uttered insulting words.
● Rafanan in his answer admitted having administered the
oath believing it was allowed. That lawyers could testify on
behalf of their clients on substantial matters in cases where
testimony is essential to the ends of justice. That it was
complainant who threatened and harassed him and that het
case was initiated for a purpose to harass him because he was
counsel of Brgy. Cap Ramos in cases filed by the Ombudsman
against the BJMP.
ISSUES:
1. WON he is guilty of notarial law?
2. WON lawyer can stand as witness to his clients?
RULING:
1. Yes. He violated the Notarial law for not making the proper
notation and entering the details of the notarized documents.
The Notarial law is explicit on the obligations and duties of
notaries public and these formalities are mandatory and
cannot be simply neglected. They are required to certify that
the party to every document acknowledged before them has
presented the proper evidence certificate (or exemption of
the residence tax); and to enter its number, place of issue,
and the date as part of the certification. They are also
required to keep a notarial register; to enter therein all
instruments notarized by them. Defense says it is a common
practice but court says it is inexcusable to say that just
because others were doing so. Being swayed is not a
justification of breaking the law.
2. Yes. A lawyer can stand in the witness court. A lawyer is not
disqualified from being a witness in court, except only in
certain cases pertaining to privileged communications arising
from attorney-client relationship. The difficulty posed upon
lawyers by the task of disassociating their relationship to
their clients as witnesses from that as an advocate. Note: A
witness must only say what happened. Only the truth. As
compared to the lawyer who will use all remedies and arsenal
for his clients to win the case. It is difficult to distinguish the
fairness and impartiality of a disinterested witness from zeal
of an advocate. That is why preference is to refrain from
testifying as witness unless they absolutely have to and if they
do so, they should withdraw from active management of the
case. In the case at bar, Rafanan can be made liable because
it is the duty of the lawyer to assert every remedy and defense
that is authorized by law for the benefit of the client of his life
and liberty, if they fail to display a good defense.
3. No harassment on the part of Rafanan. Mere allegation is
never equivalent to proof.
14. LANTORIA V. ATTY. BUNYI
Principles: (​ in bullet form if possible)
Case Topic: ​Canon 13 - Duty not to influence judges.
Petitioner:
Respondent:
FACTS:
● This is an administrative complaint filed by Cesar L.
Lantoria, seeking disciplinary action against respondent
Irineo L. Bunyi, member of the Philippine Bar, on the ground
that respondent Bunyi allegedly committed acts of "graft and
corruption, dishonesty and conduct unbecoming of a
member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and
corruption of the judge and bribery", in connection with
respondent's handling of Civil Case Nos. 81, 83 and 88 then
pending before the Municipal Court of Experanza, Agusan
del Sur, presided over by Municipal Judge Vicente Galicia in
which respondent Bunyi was the counsel of one of the
parties, namely, Mrs. Constancia Mascarinas.
● Respondent Bunyi alleged that Mrs. Constancia M.
Mascarinas of Manila was the owner of d farm located in
Esperanza, Agusan del Sur, and that herein complainant
Lantoria was the manager and supervisor of said farm,
receiving as such a monthly allowance. ​2 It appears that the
complaint in Civil Case Nos. 81, 83 and 88 sought to eject the
LEGAL ETHICS DIGESTERS | ANDRIN, CABASAG, ODCHIGUE
squatters from the aforementioned farm. ​3 These cases were
assigned to the Municipal Court of Esperanza, Agusan del
Bur, the acting municipal judge of which was the Honorable
Vicente Galicia (who was at the same time the regular judge
of the municipal court of Bayugan, Agusan del Sur
● Respondent admitted the existence of the letter but
explained the contents thereof as follows:
a) the said letter of June 1, 1974, is self-explanatory and speaks for
itself, that if ever the same was written by the Respondent, it was due to
the insistence of the Complainant thru his several letters received, that
the decisions in question be drafted or prepared for Judge Galicia,
b) Thirdly, in the same letter, the decisions as prepared were in the
form of drafts, as in fact, the letter mentioned subject to suggestion or
correction to change or modify for the better by Judge Galicia (Second
paragraph, ​Ibid)​ ;
c) Fourthly, in the some letter, Responding (sic) even apologized for
the delay in sending the same to the Complainant and expressed his
gratitude for his assistance in attending to the cases involved
● The Court referred the case to the Solicitor General for
investigation, report and recommendation. On 21 July 1980,
the Solicitor General submitted his report to the Court,
Hence, in his report, the Solicitor General found that
respondent is guilty of highly unethical and unprofessional
conduct for failure to perform his duty, as an officer of the
court, to help promote the independence of the judiciary and
to refrain from engaging in acts which would influence
judicial determination of a litigation in which he is counsel.
The Solicitor General recommended that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1)
year. He filed with the Court the corresponding complaint
against respondent.
● In his answer to the complaint filed by the Solicitor General,
respondent manifested that in the future he would be more
careful in observing his duties as a lawyer, and in upholding
the provisions of the canons of professional ethics.
ISSUES:​ :​ ​Whether or not Bunyi is guilty of unethical conduct.
RULING: ​We find merit in the recommendation of the Solicitor
General that respondent, by way of disciplinary action, deserves
suspension from the practice of law.
The subject letters indeed indicate that respondent had previous
communication with Judge Galicia regarding the preparation of the
draft decisions in Civil Case Nos. 81, 83, and 88, and which he in fact
prepared. Although nothing in the records would show that respondent
got the trial court judge's consent to the said preparation for a favor or
consideration, the acts of respondent nevertheless amount to conduct
unbecoming of a lawyer and an officer of the Court. Clearly, respondent
violated Canon No. 3 of the Canons of Professional Ethics (which were
enforced at the time respondent committed the acts admitted by him),
which provides as follows:
3. Attempts to exert personal influence on the court
Marked attention and unusual hospitality on the part of a lawyer to a
judge, uncalled for by the personal relations of the parties, subject both
the judge and the lawyer to misconstructions of motive and should be
avoided. A lawyer should not communicate or argue privately with the
judge as to the merits of a pending cause and deserves rebuke and
denunciation for any device or attempt to gain from a judge special
personal consideration or favor. A self-respecting independence in the
discharge of professional duty, without denial or diminution of the
courtesy and respect due the judge's station, is the only proper
foundation for cordial personal and official relations between bench
and bar.
In the new Code of Professional Responsibility a lawyer's attempt to
influence the court is rebuked, as shown in Canon No. 13 and Rule
13.01, which read:
CANON 13 — A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and
refrain from any impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the
appearance of influencing the court.
Rule 13.01 — A lawyer shall not extend extraordinary attention or
hospitality to, nor seek opportunity for, cultivating familiarity with
judges.
Therefore, this Court finds respondent guilty of unethical practice in
attempting to influence the court where he had pending civil case.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Irineo L. Bunyi is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year from
the date of notice hereof. Let this decision be entered in the bar records
of the respondent and the Court Administrator is directed to inform the
different courts of this suspension.
15. ESTRADA V. SANDIGANBAYAN
Principles: ​Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
mandates that the lawyer should observe and maintain the respect due
to the courts and judicial officers and, indeed, should insist on similar
conduct bothers. In liberally imputing sinister and devious motives and
questioning the impartiality, integrity, and authority of the members of
the Court, Atty. Paguia has only succeeded in seeking to impede,
obstruct and pervert the dispensation of justice.
Case Topic: ​Canon 13 - Duty not to influence judges.
Petitioner: Alan Paguia,​ a counsel for Estrada in light with EDSA
2
Respondent: S ​ andiganbayan
FACTS:
● Attorney Alan F. Paguia, as counsel for Estrada, averred that
the respondent justices have violated Rule5.10 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct by attending the EDSA 2 Rally and by
authorizing the assumption of Vice-President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo to the Presidency in violation of the 1987
Constitution. Rule 5.10. A judge is entitled to entertain
personal views on political questions. But to avoid suspicion
of political partisanship, a judge shall not make political
speeches, contribute to party funds, publicly endorse
candidates for political office or participate in other partisan
political activities.
● Also, petitioner contended that the justices have prejudged a
case that would assail the legality of the act taken by
President Arroyo. The subsequent decision of the Court in
Estrada v. Arroyo (353 SCRA 452and356 SCRA 108) is,
petitioner states, a patent mockery of justice and due process.
● According to Atty. Paguia, during the hearing of his Mosyong
Pangrekonsiderasyon on 11 June 2003, the three justices of
the Special Division of the Sandiganbayan made manifest
their bias and partiality against this client.
● Thus, he averred, Presiding Justice Minita V. ChicoNazario
supposedly employed foul and disrespectful language when
she blurted out, Magmumukha naman kaming gago, and
Justice TeresitaLeonardoDe Castro characterized the motion
as insignificant even before the prosecution could file its
comments or opposition thereto, (Rollo, p. 12.) remarking in
open court that to grant Estrada’s motion would result in
chaos and disorder. Prompted by the alleged bias and partial
attitude of theSandiganbayan justices, Attorney Paguia filed,
on 14 July 2003, a motion for their disqualification.
● The petitioner also asked the Court to include in its Joint
Resolution the TRUTH of the acts of Chief JusticeDavide, et
al., last January 20, 2001 in: a) going to EDSA 2;b)
authorizing the proclamation of Vice-President Arroyo as
President on the ground of permanent disability even
without proof of compliance with the corresponding
constitutional conditions, e.g., written declaration by either
the President or majority of his cabinet; and c) actually
proclaiming Vice-President Arroyo on that same ground of
LEGAL ETHICS DIGESTERS | ANDRIN, CABASAG, ODCHIGUE

permanent disability. on pain of disciplinary sanction, to become mindful of his grave

● In a letter, dated 30 June 2003, addressed to Chief Justice responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court. Apparently,
Hilario G. Davide, Jr., and Associate JusticeArtemio V. he has chosen not to at all take heed. WHEREFORE, Attorney Alan
Panganiban, he has demanded, in a clearly disguised form of Paguia is hereby indefinitely suspended from the practice of law,
forum shopping, for several advisory opinions on matters effective upon his receipt hereof, for conduct unbecoming a lawyer and
pending before the Sandiganbayan. an officer of the Court
● Subsequently, the court ruled that the instant petition
assailing the foregoing orders must be DISMISSED for gross
insufficiency in substance and for utter lack of merit. The NEXT DEADLINE: FEB 12, 2020
Sandiganbayan committed no grave abuse of discretion, an
indispensable requirement to warrant a recourse to the
extraordinary relief of petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.
● In a resolution, dated 08 July 2003, the Court strongly
warned Attorney Alan Paguia, on pain of disciplinary
sanction, to desist from further making, directly or indirectly,
similar submissions to this Court or to its Members.
● Unmindful of the well-meant admonition to him by the
Court, Attorney Paguia appears to persist on end. In fact, on
the 7th September 2003 issue of the Daily Tribune, Atty.
Paguia wrote to say
● What is the legal effect of that violation of President Estradas
right to due process of law? It renders the decision in Estrada
vs. Arroyo unconstitutional and void. The rudiments of fair
play were not observed. There was no fair play since it
appears that when President Estrada filed his petition, Chief
Justice Davide and his fellow justices had already committed
to the other party GMA with a judgment already made and
waiting to be formalized after the litigants shall have
undergone the charade of a formal hearing. After the justices
had authorized the proclamation of GMA as president, can
they be expected to voluntarily admit the unconstitutionality
of their own act?

ISSUES: ​WON Atty. Paguia committed a violation of the Code of

Professional Responsibility.

RULING:

Criticism or comment made in good faith on the correctness or

wrongness, soundness or unsoundness, of a decision of the Court would
be welcome for, if well-founded, and such reaction can enlighten the
court and contribute to the correction of an error if committed. (In Re
Sotto, 82 Phil 595.) However, Attorney Paguiahas not limited his
discussions to the merits of his client’s case within the judicial forum.
Indeed, he has repeated his assault on the Court in both broadcast and
print media. Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
prohibits a member of the bar from making such public statements on
any pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a
party. By his acts, Attorney Paguia may have stoked the fires of public
dissension and posed a potentially dangerous threat to the
administration of justice.

It should be clear that the phrase partisan political activities, in its

statutory context, relates to acts designed to cause the success or the
defeat of a particular candidate or candidates who have filed certificates
of candidacy to a public office in an election. The taking of an oath of
office by any incoming President of the Republic before the Chief
Justice of the Philippines is a traditional official function of the Highest
Magistrate. The assailed presence of other justices of the Court at such
an event could be no different from their appearance in such other
official functions as attending the Annual State of the Nation Address
by the President of the Philippines before the Legislative Department.
The Supreme Court does not claim infallibility; but it will not
countenance any wrongdoing nor allow the erosion of our people’s faith
in the judicial system, let alone, by those who have been privileged by it
to practice law in the Philippines.

Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that the

lawyer should observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and
judicial officers and, indeed, should insist on similar conduct bothers.
In liberally imputing sinister and devious motives and questioning the
impartiality, integrity, and authority of the members of the Court, Atty.
Paguia has only succeeded in seeking to impede, obstruct and pervert
the dispensation of justice. The Court has already warned Atty. Paguia,