Beruflich Dokumente
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906514-19
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 140 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 01/31/2020
Petitioners-Intervenors,
-against-
Respondents.
Keith J. Starlin, an attorney admitted to practice in the State of New York, affirms the
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proceeding pursuant to CPLR § 2201 pending the outcome of Respondents’ appeal to the Appellate
Division, Third Department of this Court’s January 8, 2020 Decision, Order and Judgment
3. Pursuant to CPLR § 2201, “the court in which an action is pending may grant a stay
of proceedings in a proper case, upon such terms as may be just.” "[A] court has broad discretion
to grant a stay in order to avoid the risk of inconsistent adjudications, application of proof and
potential waste of judicial resources." Matter of Tenenbaum, 81 A.D.3d 738, 739 (2d Dept. 2011)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Grounds for a stay include "further[ing] the
furthering the goals of comity and uniformity." Matter of Adirondack Wild: Friends of the Forest
Preserve v. New York State Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation, 2019 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 5358 * 20 –
21 (Sup. Ct. Warren County October 8, 2019), citing, Concord Assoc., L.P. v. EPT Concord, LLC,
101 A.D.3d 1574, 1575 (3rd Dept. 2012). "Where determination of a related, pending proceeding
'may dispose of or limit issues involved in [a pending] action,' a stay is proper." Matter of
Adirondack Wild, supra at * 21, citing, McCarthy v. Kerrigan, 59 Misc.3d 872, 885 (Sup. Ct.
4. In its January 8, 2020 Decision, Order and Judgment (“Decision”) the Court granted
Petitioners’ motion for a preliminary injunction based largely on a legal conclusion as to the merits,
finding that the Respondents appear to have violated the “separation of powers doctrine” in
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The Council's decision to exempt tobacco- and menthol-flavored e-liquids from the
strictures of the emergency regulation evinces an intent to "construct[ ] a regulatory
scheme . . based solely upon economic and social concerns" by "weigh[ing] the goal of
promoting health against its social cost and . . . reach[ing] a suitable compromise" (Id. at
12).
Equally indicative of a violation of the separation of powers doctrine is that the Council
"did not merely fill in the details of broad legislation describing the over-all policies to be
implemented" but instead "wrote on a clean slate, creating its own comprehensive set of
rules without benefit of legislative guidance" (ld. at 13). The emergency regulation is less
an effort at filling in the blanks left by broad legislation and more an attempt to set a State
policy strictly limiting the availability of vaping products in New York. This is action
reserved constitutionally to the Legislature and not to the executive branch (nor, for that
matter, to the judiciary).
The parallels between the present case and Matter of New York Statewide Coalition of
Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v New York City Department of Health and Mental
Hygiene, (23 NY3d 681 [2014]), are striking. ln Matter of Statewide Coalition, the New
York City Board of Health, … [t]he Court stated, "By choosing between public policy
ends . . . the Board of Health engaged in law-making beyond its regulatory authority" (23
NY3d at 699). Likewise, in the present case, the Council appears to have exceeded the
scope of its authority by having adopted an emergency regulation that embodies the
policy-based trade-off between the competing ends of limiting the attraction of vaping
products to minors and allowing former or current combustible cigarette smokers the
option to continue to consume tobacco- and menthol-flavored eliquids.
The carve-outs discussed earlier were not incorporated into the emergency regulation
because scientists or medical professionals had determined that tobacco- and menthol-
flavored e-liquids were not harmful. Rather, the emergency regulation is a statement of
public policy and not the product of biomedical research. Accordingly, the deference for
administrative action in highly technical areas is not available to respondents here.
6. Thus, the Court has already essentially held that in its view, Respondents will not
prevail in this matter. Respondents respectfully disagree with the Court’s January 8, 2020
Decision, and interpretation of the law and facts set forth therein, and respectfully assert that
further clarification from the Appellate Division on issues regarding the “separation of powers
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doctrine”, cases such as Matter of New York Statewide Coalition of Hispanic Chambers of
Commerce and their application to the facts of the present matter is necessary for further briefing
and proceedings to prove meaningful. The issues are ripe for review by the Appellate Division,
and the Appellate Division’s resolution of the issues would be largely dispositive of the
proceeding. It is anticipated that, at the very least, a decision from the Third Department on the
Respondents’ appeal of the January 8, 2020 Decision will provide necessary clarification and
guidance needed to afford the parties a full and fair opportunity to brief issues relevant to the merits
of this action in an efficient and meaningful manner. As it stands now, barring a stay pending
clarification from the Appellate Division on the law and its application to the facts relevant to the
merits of this proceeding, the parties will soon submit voluminous papers to this Court that are
largely duplicative of those previously submitted in support of and opposition to the motion for a
preliminary injunction, all while the parties and the Court await the outcome of an appeal in this
very matter that will likely render the papers submitted by one side or the other obsolete before
7. Notably, upon information and belief, the facts of this matter have already been
fully developed and further briefing will not lead to additional significant factual development.
8. Of further note, the preliminary injunction granted by this Court will remain in
effect while Respondents’ appeal is pending and thus the status quo will be preserved during that
time. While it is anticipated that Petitioners will argue that they may be prejudiced by a stay if the
Appellate Division vacates the preliminary injunction, any such decision by the Appellate Division
would not “prejudice” Petitioners since such a holding would establish that they were not entitled
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9. In addition, while, upon information and belief, the Third Department does not set
briefing schedules, and the Uniform Appellate Division Rules give six (6) months to perfect an
appeal, the Office of the Attorney General Appeals and Opinions Bureau plans on perfecting the
appeal in question within a matter of weeks and intends to then submit a motion for a calendar
preference on the argument of the appeal to ask that it be heard on an expedited basis.
10. Here, granting a stay of the underlying proceeding until the Appellate Division
issues a decision on Respondents’ appeal will avoid the risk of inconsistent adjudications (i.e.
between this Court on the underlying Petitions and the Appellate Division going forward); avoid
waste of judicial resources; further the interests of justice and prevent inequitable results by
allowing for needed clarification by the Appellate Division on the relevant law and its application
to the facts of this matter necessary to provide the parties with an opportunity to provide this Court
with meaningful briefing on an issue of significant importance going forward (i.e. briefing that
will not be rendered obsolete as soon as the Appellate Division renders a decision on Respondents’
appeal).
WHEREFORE, Respondents respectfully request that this Court stay this proceeding
pursuant to CPLR § 2201 pending an outcome of Respondents’ appeal of the Court’s January 8,
2020 Decision, Order and Judgment, together with such other and further relief as the Court deems
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