G.R. No. 189121. July 31, 2013.* * SECOND DIVISION.
AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON, JENNETH QUIAZON and MARIA JENNIFER
QUIAZON, petitioners, vs. MA. LOURDES BELEN, for and in behalf of MARIA
LOURDES ELISE QUIAZON, respondent.
Remedial Law; Special Proceedings; Letters of Administration; Under
Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of
administration of the estate of a decedent should be filed in the Regional
Trial Court of the province where the decedent resides at the time of his
death.—Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for
letters of administration of the estate of a decedent should be filed in the
RTC of the province where the decedent resides at the time of his death:
Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled.—If the decedent is an
inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or
an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and
his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance [now Regional Trial Court]
in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an
inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance [now Regional
Trial Court] of any province in which he had estate. The court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by
a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or
of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding,
except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want
of jurisdiction appears on the record. (Emphasis supplied). The term
“resides” connotes ex vi termini “actual residence” as distinguished from
“legal residence or domicile.” This term “resides,” like the terms “residing”
and “residence,” is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the
object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the
application of venue statutes and rules — Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised
Rules of Court is of such nature — residence rather than domicile is the
significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word “domicile” still it is
construed as meaning residence and not
_______________
707
VOL. 702, JULY 31, 2013 707
Garcia-Quiazon vs. Belen
domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between
the terms “residence” and “domicile” but as generally used in statutes
fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning
as the term “inhabitant.” In other words, “resides” should be viewed or
understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical
habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies
physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. Venue for ordinary
civil actions and that for special proceedings have one and the same
meaning. As thus defined, “residence,” in the context of venue
provisions, means nothing more than a person’s actual residence or place
of abode, provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency.
Civil Law; Husband and Wife; Marriages; Void Marriage; In a void
marriage, it was though no marriage has taken place, thus, it cannot be the
source of rights.—Likewise unmeritorious is petitioners’ contention that
the Court of Appeals erred in declaring Amelia’s marriage to Eliseo as void
ab initio. In a void marriage, it was though no marriage has taken place,
thus, it cannot be the source of rights. Any interested party may attack the
marriage directly or collaterally. A void marriage can be questioned even
beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage. It must be pointed out
that at the time of the celebration of the marriage of Eliseo and Amelia,
the law in effect was the Civil Code, and not the Family Code, making the
ruling in Niñal v. Bayadog, 328 SCRA 122 (2000), applicable four-square to
the case at hand. In Niñal, the Court, in no uncertain terms, allowed
therein petitioners to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of their
father’s marriage to therein respondent after the death of their father, by
contradistinguishing void from voidable marriages, to wit: [C]onsequently,
void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but
voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties
and not after death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring
will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. That is why the
action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages
where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can
assail it but any proper interested party may attack a void marriage.709
VOL. 702, JULY 31, 2013 709
Garcia-Quiazon vs. Belen
Remedial Law; Special Proceedings; Letters of Administration; Section 2 of
Rule 79 provides that a petition for Letters of Administration must be filed
by an interested person; An “interested party,” in estate proceedings, is one
who would be benefited in the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a
claim against the estate, such as a creditor.—Upon the other hand, Section
2 of Rule 79 provides that a petition for Letters of Administration must be
filed by an interested person, thus: Sec. 2. Contents of petition for letters
of administration.—A petition for letters of administration must be filed
by an interested person and must show, so far as known to the petitioner:
(a) The jurisdictional facts; (b) The names, ages, and residences of the
heirs, and the names and residences of the creditors, of the decedent; (c)
The probable value and character of the property of the estate; (d) The
name of the person for whom letters of administration are prayed. But no
defect in the petition shall render void the issuance of letters of
administration. An “interested party,” in estate proceedings, is one who
would be benefited in the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim
against the estate, such as a creditor. Also, in estate proceedings, the
phrase “next of kin” refers to those whose relationship with the decedent
is such that they are entitled to share in the estate as distributees.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the
Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Heinrich V. Garena for petitioners.
PEREZ, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed pursuant to Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court, primarily assailing the 28 November 2008 Decision
rendered by the Ninth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
88589,1 the decretal portion of which states:
_______________
1 Penned by Associate Justice Ramon R. Garcia with Associate Justices
Josefina Guevarra Salonga and Magdangal M. De Leon, concurring. CA
Rollo, pp. 94-106.
710
710 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Garcia-Quiazon vs. Belen
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby
DENIED. The assailed Decision dated March 11, 2005, and
the Order dated March 24, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 275, Las Piñas City are AFFIRMED in toto.2
The Facts
This case started as a Petition for Letters of Administration of the Estate of
Eliseo Quiazon (Eliseo), filed by herein respondents who are Eliseo’s
common-law wife and daughter. The petition was opposed by herein
petitioners Amelia Garcia-Quiazon (Amelia) to whom Eliseo was married.
Amelia was joined by her children, Jenneth Quiazon (Jenneth) and Maria
Jennifer Quiazon (Jennifer).
Eliseo died intestate on 12 December 1992.
On 12 September 1994, Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon (Elise), represented
by her mother, Ma. Lourdes Belen (Lourdes), filed a Petition for Letters of
Administration before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City.3 In
her Petition docketed as SP Proc. No. M-3957, Elise claims that she is the
natural child of Eliseo having been conceived and born at the time when
her parents were both capacitated to marry each other. Insisting on the
legal capacity of Eliseo and Lourdes to marry, Elise impugned the validity of
Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia by claiming that it was bigamous for having
been contracted during the subsistence of the latter’s marriage with one
Filipito Sandico (Filipito). To prove her filiation to the decedent, Elise,
among others, attached to the Petition for Letters of Administration her
Certificate of Live Birth4 signed by Eliseo as her father. In the same
petition, it was alleged that Eliseo left real properties worth P2,040,000.00
and personal properties worth P2,100,000.00.
_______________
2 Id., at p. 105.
3 Special Proceeding No. M-3957. Records, Vol. I, pp. 1-9.
4 Id., at p. 10.
711
VOL. 702, JULY 31, 2013 711
Garcia-Quiazon vs. Belen
In order to preserve the estate of Eliseo and to prevent the dissipation of
its value, Elise sought her appointment as administratrix of her late father’s
estate.
Claiming that the venue of the petition was improperly laid, Amelia,
together with her children, Jenneth and Jennifer, opposed the issuance of
the letters of administration by filing an Opposition/Motion to Dismiss.5
The petitioners asserted that as shown by his Death Certificate,6 Eliseo
was a resident of Capas, Tarlac and not of Las Piñas City, at the time of his
death. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court,7 the
petition for settlement of decedent’s estate should have been filed in
Capas, Tarlac and not in Las Piñas City. In addition to their claim of
improper venue, the petitioners averred that there are no factual and legal
bases for Elise to be appointed administratrix of Eliseo’s estate.
In a Decision8 dated 11 March 2005, the RTC directed the issuance of
Letters of Administration to Elise upon posting the necessary bond. The
lower court ruled that the venue of the petition was properly laid in Las
Piñas City, thereby discrediting the position taken by the petitioners that
Eliseo’s
_______________
5 Id., at pp. 40-44.
6 Id., at p. 11.
7 Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled.—If the decedent is
an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen
or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted,
and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance [now Regional Trial
Court] in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if
he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance [now
Regional Trial Court] of any province in which he had estate. The court first
taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall
exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction
assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the
decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or
proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or
when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.
8 Penned by Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda. CA Rollo, pp. 33-38.
712
712 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Garcia-Quiazon vs. Belen
last residence was in Capas, Tarlac, as hearsay. The dispositive of the RTC
decision reads:
Having attained legal age at this time and there being no
showing of any disqualification or incompetence to serve as
administrator, let letters of administration over the estate
of the decedent Eliseo Quiazon, therefore, be issued to
petitioner, Ma. Lourdes Elise Quiazon, after the approval by
 this Court of a bond in the amount of P100,000.00 to be
posted by her.9
On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto in the 28
November 2008 Decision10 rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 88589. In validating the findings of the RTC, the Court of Appeals
held that Elise was able to prove that Eliseo and Lourdes lived together as
husband and wife by establishing a common residence at No. 26
Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City, from 1975 up to the
time of Eliseo’s death in 1992. For purposes of fixing the venue of the
settlement of Eliseo’s estate, the Court of Appeals upheld the conclusion
reached by the RTC that the decedent was a resident of Las Piñas City. The
petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Court of
Appeals in its Resolution11 dated 7 August 2009.
The Issues
The petitioners now urge Us to reverse the assailed Court of Appeals
Decision and Resolution on the following grounds:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING
THAT ELISEO QUIAZON WAS A RESIDENT OF LAS PIÑAS AND
THEREFORE[,] THE PETITION
_______________
9 Id., at p. 38.
10 Id., at pp. 94-106.
11 Id., at pp. 118-119.
713
VOL. 702, JULY 31, 2013 713
Garcia-Quiazon vs. Belen
FOR LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION WAS PROPERLY FILED
WITH THE [RTC] OF LAS PIÑAS[;]
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING
THAT AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON WAS NOT LEGALLY
MARRIED TO ELISEO QUIAZON DUE TO PREEXISTING
MARRIAGE[;] [AND]
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT
ELISE QUIAZON HAS NOT SHOWN ANY INTEREST IN THE
PETITION FOR LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION[.]12
The Court’s Ruling
We find the petition bereft of merit.
Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of
administration of the estate of a decedent should be filed in the RTC of the
province where the decedent resides at the time of his death:
Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled.—If the
decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of
his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be
proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate
settled, in the Court of First Instance [now Regional Trial
Court] in the province in which he resides at the time of his
death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the
Court of First Instance [now Regional Trial Court] of any
province in which he had estate. The court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent,
shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.
The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on
the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of
his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding,
except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or
_______________
12 Rollo, pp. 32-33.
714
714 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Garcia-Quiazon vs. Belen
when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.
(Emphasis supplied).
The term “resides” connotes ex vi termini “actual residence” as
distinguished from “legal residence or domicile.” This term “resides,” like
the terms “residing” and “residence,” is elastic and should be interpreted
in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is
employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules — Section 1, Rule
73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature — residence rather than
domicile is the significant factor.13 Even where the statute uses the word
“domicile” still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the
technical sense.14 Some cases make a distinction between the terms
“residence” and “domicile” but as generally used in statutes fixing venue,
the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term
“inhabitant.”15 In other words, “resides” should be viewed or
understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical
habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode.16 It signifies
physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat.17 Venue for ordinary
civil actions and that for special proceedings have one and the same
meaning.18 As thus defined, “residence,” in the context of venue
provisions, means nothing more than a person’s actual residence or place
of abode, provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency.19
_______________
13 Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. L-40502 and L-42670, 29
November 1976, 74 SCRA 189, 199.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Jao v. Court of Appeals, 432 Phil. 160, 170; 382 SCRA 407, 417 (2002).
19 Id.
715
VOL. 702, JULY 31, 2013 715
Garcia-Quiazon vs. Belen
Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the Court of Appeals cannot be
faulted for affirming the ruling of the RTC that the venue for the
settlement of the estate of Eliseo was properly laid in Las Piñas City. It is
evident from the records that during his lifetime, Eliseo resided at No. 26
Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City. For this reason, the
venue for the settlement of his estate may be laid in the said city.
In opposing the issuance of letters of administration, the petitioners harp
on the entry in Eliseo’s Death Certificate that he is a resident of Capas,
Tarlac where they insist his estate should be settled. While the recitals in
death certificates can be considered proofs of a decedent’s residence at
the time of his death, the contents thereof, however, is not binding on the
courts. Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found that Eliseo had been
living with Lourdes, deporting themselves as husband and wife, from 1972
up to the time of his death in 1995. This finding is consistent with the fact
that in 1985, Eliseo filed an action for judicial partition of properties
against Amelia before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 106, on the ground
that their marriage is void for being bigamous.20 That Eliseo went to the
extent of taking his marital feud with Amelia before the courts of law
renders untenable petitioners’ position that Eliseo spent the final days of
his life in Tarlac with Amelia and her children. It disproves rather than
supports petitioners’ submission that the lower courts’ findings arose from
an erroneous appreciation of the evidence on record. Factual findings of
the trial court, when affirmed by the appellate court, must be held to be
conclusive and binding upon this Court.21
_______________ It was emphasized in Niñal that in a void marriage, no marriage has taken
place and it cannot be the source of rights, such that any interested party
20 Quiazon v. Garcia, Civil Case No. Q-43712. Records, Vol. II, pp. 234-240. may

21 Golden (Iloilo) Delta Sales Corporation v. Pre-Stress International _______________

Corporation, G.R. No. 176768, 12 January 2009, 576 SCRA 23, 35; Seaoil
Petroleum Corporation v. Autocorp Group, G.R. No. 164326, 17 October 2008, 569 SCRA 387, 394; Ejercito v. M.R. Vargas
Construction, G.R. No. 172595, 10 April 2008, 551 SCRA 97, 106.
716
716 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 22 Juliano-Llave v. Republic, G.R. No. 169766, 30 March 2011, 646 SCRA
Garcia-Quiazon vs. Belen 637, 656-657 citing Niñal v. Bayadog, 384 Phil. 661, 673; 328 SCRA 122,
134 (2000).
Likewise unmeritorious is petitioners’ contention that the Court of Appeals
erred in declaring Amelia’s marriage to Eliseo as void ab initio. In a void 23 Id.
marriage, it was though no marriage has taken place, thus, it cannot be the
source of rights. Any interested party may attack the marriage directly or 24 Id., at p. 673; p. 134.
collaterally. A void marriage can be questioned even beyond the lifetime of
the parties to the marriage.22 It must be pointed out that at the time of 717
the celebration of the marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, the law in effect was VOL. 702, JULY 31, 2013 717
the Civil Code, and not the Family Code, making the ruling in Niñal v. Garcia-Quiazon vs. Belen
Bayadog23 applicable four-square to the case at hand. In Niñal, the Court,
in no uncertain terms, allowed therein petitioners to file a petition for the
attack the marriage directly or collaterally without prescription, which
declaration of nullity of their father’s marriage to therein respondent after
may be filed even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage.25
the death of their father, by contradistinguishing void from voidable
marriages, to wit:
Relevant to the foregoing, there is no doubt that Elise, whose successional
rights would be prejudiced by her father’s marriage to Amelia, may impugn
[C]onsequently, void marriages can be questioned even
the existence of such marriage even after the death of her father. The said
after the death of either party but voidable marriages can
marriage may be questioned directly by filing an action attacking the
be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not
validity thereof, or collaterally by raising it as an issue in a proceeding for
after death of either, in which case the parties and their
the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse, such as in the case at
offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly
bar. Ineluctably, Elise, as a compulsory heir,26 has a cause of action for the
valid. That is why the action or defense for nullity is
declaration of the absolute nullity of the void marriage of Eliseo and
imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the action
Amelia, and the death of either party to the said marriage does not
prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail
extinguish such cause of action.
it but any proper interested party may attack a void
marriage.24
Having established the right of Elise to impugn Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia,
we now proceed to determine whether or not the decedent’s marriage to
Amelia is void for being bigamous.
Contrary to the position taken by the petitioners, the existence of a
previous marriage between Amelia and Filipito was sufficiently established
by no less than the Certificate of Marriage issued by the Diocese of Tarlac
and signed by the officiating priest of the Parish of San Nicolas de
Tolentino in Capas, Tarlac. The said marriage certificate is a competent
evidence of marriage and the certification from the National Archive that
no information relative to the said marriage
_______________
25 Id.
26 New Civil Code. Art. 961. In default of the testamentary heirs, the law
vests the inheritance, in accordance with the rules hereinafter set forth, in
the legitimate and illegitimate relatives of the deceased, in the surviving
spouse, and in the State.
New Civil Code. Art. 988. In the absence of legitimate descendants or
ascendants, the illegitimate children shall succeed to the entire estate of
the deceased.
718
718 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Garcia-Quiazon vs. Belen
exists does not diminish the probative value of the entries therein. We
take judicial notice of the fact that the first marriage was celebrated more
than 50 years ago, thus, the possibility that a record of marriage can no
longer be found in the National Archive, given the interval of time, is not
completely remote. Consequently, in the absence of any showing that such
marriage had been dissolved at the time Amelia and Eliseo’s marriage was
solemnized, the inescapable conclusion is that the latter marriage is
bigamous and, therefore, void ab initio.27
Neither are we inclined to lend credence to the petitioners’ contention
that Elise has not shown any interest in the Petition for Letters of
Administration.
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court lays down the preferred
persons who are entitled to the issuance of letters of administration, thus:
Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration
granted.—If no executor is named in the will, or the
executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or
fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration
shall be granted:
_______________
27 Old Civil Code. Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any
person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any
person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its
performance, unless:
(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the
time of the second marriage without the spouse present having news of
the absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though he has been absent for
less than seven years, is generally considered as dead and believed to be
so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent
marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to Articles 390
and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases
until declared null and void by a competent court.
719
VOL. 702, JULY 31, 2013 719
Garcia-Quiazon vs. Belen
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be,
or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to
 such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of
kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to
serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be,
or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be
incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or
next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of
the person to apply for administration or to request that
administration be granted to some other person, it may be
granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if
competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to
serve, it may be granted to such other person as the court
may select.
Upon the other hand, Section 2 of Rule 79 provides that a petition for
Letters of Administration must be filed by an interested person, thus:
Sec. 2. Contents of petition for letters of
administration.—A petition for letters of administration
must be filed by an interested person and must show, so far
as known to the petitioner:
(a) The jurisdictional facts;
(b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs,
and the names and residences of the creditors, of
the decedent;
(c) The probable value and character of the
property of the estate;
(d) The name of the person for whom letters of
administration are prayed.
But no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance
of letters of administration.
An “interested party,” in estate proceedings, is one who would be
benefited in the estate, such as an heir, or one who
720
720 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Garcia-Quiazon vs. Belen
has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. Also, in estate
proceedings, the phrase “next of kin” refers to those whose relationship
with the decedent is such that they are entitled to share in the estate as
distributees.28
In the instant case, Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited
by the distribution of Eliseo’s estate, is deemed to be an interested party.
With the overwhelming evidence on record produced by Elise to prove her
filiation to Eliseo, the petitioners’ pounding on her lack of interest in the
administration of the decedent’s estate, is just a desperate attempt to
sway this Court to reverse the findings of the Court or Appeals. Certainly,
the right of Elise to be appointed administratix of the estate of Eliseo is on
good grounds. It is founded on her right as a compulsory heir, who, under
the law, is entitled to her legitime after the debts of the estate are
satisfied.29 Having a vested right in the distribution of Eliseo’s estate as
one of his natural children, Elise can rightfully be considered as an
interested party within the purview of the law.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals assailed 28 November 2008 Decision and
7 August 2009 Resolution, are AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio (Chairperson), Brion, Del Castillo and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.
_______________
28 Solinap v. Locsin, Jr., 423 Phil. 192, 199; 371 SCRA 711, 719 (2001).

29 New Civil Code. Art. 961. In default of the testamentary heirs, the law
vests the inheritance, in accordance with the rules hereinafter set forth, in
the legitimate and illegitimate relatives of the deceased, in the surviving
spouse, and in the State.

New Civil Code. Art. 988. In the absence of legitimate descendants or

ascendants, the illegitimate children shall succeed to the entire estate of
the deceased.

721
VOL. 702, JULY 31, 2013 721
Garcia-Quiazon vs. Belen

Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed in toto.

Notes.—In a petition for the issuance of letters of administration,

settlement, and distribution of estate, the applicants seek to establish the
fact of death of the decedent and later to be duly recognized as among the
decedent’s heirs, which would allow them to exercise their right to
participate in the settlement and liquidation of the estate of the decedent.
(Montañer vs. Shari’a District Court, Fourth Shari’a Judicial District, Marawi
City, 576 SCRA 746 [2009])

The appointment of a special administrator is an interlocutory or

preliminary order to the main case for the grant of letters of
administration in a testate or intestate proceeding. (Manungas vs. Loreto,
655 SCRA 734 [2011])

——o0o——
© Copyright 2020 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved
G.R. No. 118671. January 29, 1996.*
THE ESTATE OF HILARIO M. RUIZ, EDMOND RUIZ, Executor, petitioner, vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS (Former Special Sixth Division), MARIA PILAR
RUIZ-MONTES, MARIA CATHRYN RUIZ, CANDICE ALBERTINE RUIZ, MARIA
ANGELINE RUIZ and THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF PASIG, BRANCH 156, respondents.
Succession; Support; Allowances for support under Section 3 of Rule 83
should not be limited to the “minor or incapacitated” children of the
deceased—the law is rooted on the fact that the right and duty to support,
especially the right to education, subsist even beyond the age of
majority.—It is settled that allowances for support under Section 3 of Rule
83 should not be limited to the “minor or incapacitated” children of the
deceased. Article 188 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the substantive
law in force at the time of the testator’s death, provides that during the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the deceased’s legitimate spouse
and children, regardless of their age, civil status or gainful employment,
are entitled to provisional support from the funds of the estate. The law is
rooted on the fact that the right and duty to support, especially the right to
education, subsist even beyond the age of majority.
____________________________
* hitherto been paid, much less ascertained. The estate tax is one of those
SECOND DIVISION.
542
542 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Estate of Hilario M. Ruiz vs. Court of Appeals
Same; Same; Grandchildren are not entitled to provisional support from the
funds of the decedent’s estate.—Be that as it may, grandchildren are not
entitled to provisional support from the funds of the decedent’s estate.
The law clearly limits the allowance to “widow and children” and does not
extend it to the deceased’s grandchildren, regardless of their minority or
incapacity. It was error, therefore, for the appellate court to sustain the
probate court’s order granting an allowance to the grandchildren of the
testator pending settlement of his estate.
Same; Settlement of Estates; Conditions before distribution of estate
properties can be made.—In settlement of estate proceedings, the
distribution of the estate properties can only be made: (1) after all the
debts, funeral charges, expenses of administration, allowance to the
widow, and estate tax have been paid; or (2) before payment of said
obligations only if the distributees or any of them gives a bond in a sum
fixed by the court conditioned upon the payment of said obligations within
such time as the court directs, or when provision is made to meet those
obligations.
Same; Same; Taxation; The estate tax is one of those obligations that must
be paid before distribution of the estate, and if not paid, the rule requires
that the distributees post a bond or make such provisions as to meet the
said tax obligation in proportion to their respective shares in the
inheritance.—In the case at bar, the probate court ordered the release of
the titles to the Valle Verde property and the Blue Ridge apartments to the
private respondents after the lapse of six months from the date of first
publication of the notice to creditors. The questioned order speaks of
“notice” to creditors, not payment of debts and obligations. Hilario Ruiz
allegedly left no debts when he died but the taxes on his estate had not
obligations that must be paid before distribution of the estate. If not yet
paid, the rule requires that the distributees post a bond or make such
provisions as to meet the said tax obligation in proportion to their
respective shares in the inheritance. Notably, at the time the order was
issued the properties of the estate had not yet been inventoried and
appraised.
Same; Same; Wills; Probate of Wills; The probate of a will is conclusive as
to its due execution and extrinsic validity and settles only the question of
whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely
543
 VOL. 252, JANUARY 29, 1996 543
Estate of Hilario M. Ruiz vs. Court of Appeals
executed it in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law—questions
as to intrinsic validity may still be raised even after the will has been
authenticated.—It was also too early in the day for the probate court to
order the release of the titles six months after admitting the will to
probate. The probate of a will is conclusive as to its due execution and
extrinsic validity and settles only the question of whether the testator,
being of sound mind, freely executed it in accordance with the formalities
prescribed by law. Questions as to the intrinsic validity and efficacy of the
provisions of the will, the legality of any devise or legacy may be raised
even after the will has been authenticated.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Executors and Administrators; The right of an
executor or administrator to the possession and management of the real
and personal properties of the deceased is not absolute and can only be
exercised “so long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts and
expenses of administration.”—Still and all, petitioner cannot correctly
claim that the assailed order deprived him of his right to take possession of
all the real and personal properties of the estate. The right of an executor
or administrator to the possession and management of the real and
personal properties of the deceased is not absolute and can only be
exercised “so long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts and
expenses of administration.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Trusts; An heir’s right of ownership over
the properties of the decedent is merely inchoate as long as the estate has
not been fully settled and partitioned; An executor is a mere trustee of the
estate—the funds of the estate in his hands are trust funds and he is held
to the duties and responsibilities of a trustee of the highest order.—
Petitioner must be reminded that his right of ownership over the
properties of his father is merely inchoate as long as the estate has not
been fully settled and partitioned. As executor, he is a mere trustee of his
father’s estate. The funds of the estate in his hands are trust funds and he
is held to the duties and responsibilities of a trustee of the highest order.
He cannot unilaterally assign to himself and possess all his parents’
properties and the fruits thereof without first submitting an inventory and
appraisal of all real and personal properties of the deceased, rendering a
true account of his administration, the expenses of administration, the
amount of the obligations and estate tax, all of which are subject
544
544 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Estate of Hilario M. Ruiz vs. Court of Appeals
to a determination by the court as to their veracity, propriety and justness.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Henedino M. Brondial for petitioner.
De Jesus & Associates for private respondents.
PUNO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to annul and set aside the
decision dated November 10, 1994 and the resolution dated January 5,
1995 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 33045.
The facts show that on June 27, 1987, Hilario M. Ruiz1 executed a
holographic will naming as his heirs his only son, Edmond Ruiz, his adopted
daughter, private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes, and his three
granddaughters, private respondents Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine and
Maria Angeline, all children of Edmond Ruiz. The testator bequeathed to
his heirs substantial cash, personal and real properties and named Edmond
Ruiz executor of his estate.2
On April 12, 1988, Hilario Ruiz died. Immediately thereafter, the cash
component of his estate was distributed among Edmond Ruiz and private
respondents in accordance with the decedent’s will. For unbeknown
reasons, Edmond, the named executor, did not take any action for the
probate of his father’s holographic will.
On June 29, 1992, four years after the testator’s death, it was private
respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes who filed before the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 156, Pasig, a petition for the probate and approval of Hilario
Ruiz’s will and for the
____________________________
1
Predeceased by his wife who died on August 4, 1986.
2
Annex “D” to the Petition, Rollo, pp. 46-60.
545
VOL. 252, JANUARY 29, 1996
Estate of Hilario M. Ruiz vs. Court of Appeals
issuance of letters testamentary to Edmond Ruiz.3 Surprisingly, Edmond
opposed the petition on the ground that the will was executed under
undue influence.
On November 2, 1992, one of the properties of the estate—the house and
lot at No. 2 Oliva Street, Valle Verde IV, Pasig which the testator
bequeathed to Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria Angeline 4—
was leased out by Edmond Ruiz to third persons.
On January 19, 1993, the probate court ordered Edmond to deposit with
the Branch Clerk of Court the rental deposit and payments totalling
P540,000.00 representing the one-year lease of the Valle Verde property.
In compliance, on January 25, 1993, Edmond turned over the amount of
P348,583.56, representing the balance of the rent after deducting
P191,416.14 for repair and maintenance expenses on the estate.5
In March 1993, Edmond moved for the release of P50,000.00 to pay the
real estate taxes on the real properties of the estate. The probate court
approved the release of P7,722.00.6
On May 14, 1993, Edmond withdrew his opposition to the probate of the
will. Consequently, the probate court, on May 18, 1993, admitted the will
to probate and ordered the issuance of letters testamentary to Edmond
conditioned upon the filing of a bond in the amount of P50,000.00. The
letters testamentary were issued on June 23, 1993.
On July 28, 1993, petitioner Testate Estate of Hilario Ruiz, with Edmond
Ruiz as executor, filed an “Ex-Parte Motion for Release of Funds.” It prayed
for the release of the rent payments deposited with the Branch Clerk of
Court. Respondent Montes opposed the motion and concurrently filed a
“Motion for Release of Funds to Certain Heirs” and “Motion for Issu-
____________________________
545
3
SP Proc. No. 10259.
4
Holographic Will, p. 10; Rollo, p. 55.
5
Comment to the Petition, pp. 8-9; Rollo, pp. 97-98.
6
Reply to Comment, p. 2; Rollo, p. 114.
546
546 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Estate of Hilario M. Ruiz vs. Court of Appeals
ance of Certificate of Allowance of Probate Will.” Montes prayed for the
release of the said rent payments to Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine and
Maria Angeline and for the distribution of the testator’s properties,
specifically the Valle Verde property and the Blue Ridge apartments, in
accordance with the provisions of the holographic will.
On August 26, 1993, the probate court denied petitioner’s motion for
release of funds but granted respondent Montes’ motion in view of
petitioner’s lack of opposition. It thus ordered the release of the rent
payments to the decedent’s three granddaughters. It further ordered the
delivery of the titles to and possession of the properties bequeathed to the
three granddaughters and respondent Montes upon the filing of a bond of
P50,000.00.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration alleging that he actually filed his
opposition to respondent Montes’ motion for release of rent payments
which opposition the court failed to consider. Petitioner likewise reiterated
his previous motion for release of funds.
On November 23, 1993, petitioner, through counsel, manifested that he
was withdrawing his motion for release of funds in view of the fact that the
lease contract over the Valle Verde property had been renewed for
another year.7
Despite petitioner’s manifestation, the probate court, on December 22,
1993, ordered the release of the funds to Edmond but only “such amount
as may be necessary to cover the expenses of administration and
allowances for support” of the testator’s three granddaughters subject to
collation and deductible from their share in the inheritance. The court,
however, held in abeyance the release of the titles to respondent Montes
and the three granddaughters until the lapse of six months from the date
of first publication of the notice to creditors. 8 The court stated thus:
____________________________
7
Comment, Annex “1”; Rollo, p. 110.
8
Petition, Annex “C”; Rollo, p. 45.
547
VOL. 252, JANUARY 29, 1996 547
Estate of Hilario M. Ruiz vs. Court of Appeals
“x x x
After consideration of the arguments set forth thereon by the parties, the
court resolves to allow Administrator Edmond M. Ruiz to take possession
of the rental payments deposited with the Clerk of Court, Pasig Regional
Trial Court, but only such amount as may be necessary to cover the
expenses of administration and allowances for support of Maria Cathryn
Veronique, Candice Albertine and Maria Angeli, which are subject to
collation and deductible from the share in the inheritance of said heirs and
insofar as they exceed the fruits or rents pertaining to them.
As to the release of the titles bequeathed to petitioner Maria Pilar Ruiz-
Montes and the above-named heirs, the same is hereby reconsidered and
held in abeyance until the lapse of six (6) months from the date of first
publication of Notice to Creditors.
WHEREFORE, Administrator Edmond M. Ruiz is hereby ordered to submit
an accounting of the expenses necessary for administration including
provisions for the support of Maria Cathryn Veronique Ruiz, Candice
Albertine Ruiz and Maria Angeli Ruiz before the amount required can be
withdrawn and cause the publication of the notice to creditors with
reasonable dispatch.9
Petitioner assailed this order before the Court of Appeals. Finding no grave
abuse of discretion on the part of respondent judge, the appellate court
dismissed the petition and sustained the probate court’s order in a
decision dated November 10, 199410 and a resolution dated January 5,
1995.11 Hence, this petition.
Petitioner claims that:
“THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
AFFIRMING AND CONFIRMING THE ORDER OF RESPONDENT REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF PASIG, BRANCH 156, DATED DECEMBER 22,
____________________________
9
Id.; Emphasis as copied.
10
CA-G.R. SP No. 3045, Annex “A” to the Petition; Rollo, pp. 36-42.
11
Id., Annex “B” to the Petition; Rollo, p. 44.
548
548 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Estate of Hilario M. Ruiz vs. Court of Appeals
1993, WHICH WHEN GIVEN DUE COURSE AND IS EFFECTED WOULD: (1)
DISALLOW THE EXECUTOR/ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF THE LATE
HILARIO M. RUIZ TO TAKE POSSESSION OF ALL THE REAL AND PERSONAL
PROPERTIES OF THE ESTATE; (2) GRANT SUPPORT, DURING THE PENDENCY
OF THE SETTLEMENT OF AN ESTATE, TO CERTAIN PERSONS NOT ENTITLED
THERETO; AND (3) PREMATURELY PARTITION AND DISTRIBUTE THE ESTATE
PURSUANT TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE HOLOGRAPHIC WILL EVEN BEFORE
ITS INTRINSIC VALIDITY HAS BEEN DETERMINED, AND DESPITE THE
EXISTENCE OF UNPAID DEBTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF THE ESTATE.” 12
The issue for resolution is whether the probate court, after admitting the
will to probate but before payment of the estate’s debts and obligations,
has the authority: (1) to grant an allowance from the funds of the estate
for the support of the testator’s grandchildren; (2) to order the release of
the titles to certain heirs; and (3) to grant possession of all properties of
the estate to the executor of the will.
On the matter of allowance, Section 3 of Rule 83 of the Revised Rules of
Court provides:
“Sec. 3. Allowance to widow and family.—The widow and minor or
incapacitated children of a deceased person, during the settlement of the
estate, shall receive therefrom under the direction of the court, such
allowance as are provided by law.”
Petitioner alleges that this provision only gives the widow and the minor or
incapacitated children of the deceased the right to receive allowances for
support during the settlement of estate proceedings. He contends that the
testator’s three granddaughters do not qualify for an allowance because
they are not incapacitated and are no longer minors but of legal age,
married and gainfully employed. In addition, the provision expressly states
“children” of the deceased which excludes the latter’s grandchildren.
____________________________
12
Petition, p. 8; Rollo, p. 17.
549
VOL. 252, JANUARY 29, 1996 549
Estate of Hilario M. Ruiz vs. Court of Appeals
It is settled that allowances for support under Section 3 of Rule 83 should
not be limited to the “minor or incapacitated” children of the deceased.
Article 18813 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the substantive law in
force at the time of the testator’s death, provides that during the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the deceased’s legitimate spouse
and children, regardless of their age, civil status or gainful employment,
are entitled to provisional support from the funds of the estate. 14 The law
is rooted on the fact that the right and duty to support, especially the right
to education, subsist even beyond the age of majority.15
Be that as it may, grandchildren are not entitled to provisional support
from the funds of the decedent’s estate. The law clearly limits the
allowance to “widow and children” and does not extend it to the
deceased’s grandchildren, regardless of their minority or incapacity. 16 It
was error, therefore, for the appellate court to sustain the probate court’s
order granting an allowance to the grandchildren of the testator pending
settlement of his estate.
Respondent courts also erred when they ordered the release of the titles
of the bequeathed properties to private respondents six months after the
date of first publication of notice to creditors. An order releasing titles to
properties of the estate amounts to an advance distribution of the estate
which is allowed only under the following conditions:
____________________________
13
“Art. 188. From the common mass of property support shall be given to
the surviving spouse and to the children during the liquidation of the
inventoried property and until what belongs to them is delivered; but from
this shall be deducted that amount received for support which exceeds
fruits or rents pertaining to them.”
Article 188 is now Article 133 of the Family Code.
14
Santero v. Court of First Instance of Cavite, 153 SCRA 728 [1987].
15
Id., pp. 733-734; Article 290, Civil Code of the Philippines.
16
Babao v. Villavicencio, 44 Phil. 921 [1922].
550
550 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Estate of Hilario M. Ruiz vs. Court of Appeals
“Sec. 2. Advance distribution in special proceedings.—Notwithstanding a
pending controversy or appeal in proceedings to settle the estate of a
decedent, the court may, in its discretion and upon such terms as it may
deem proper and just, permit that such part of the estate as may not be
affected by the controversy or appeal be distributed among the heirs or
legatees, upon compliance with the conditions set forth in Rule 90 of these
Rules.”17
And Rule 90 provides that:
“Section 1. When order for distribution of residue made.—When the debts,
funeral charges, and expenses of administration, the allowance to the
widow, and inheritance tax, if any, chargeable to the estate in accordance
with law, have been paid, the court, on the application of the executor or
administrator, or of a person interested in the estate, and after hearing
upon notice, shall assign the residue of the estate to the persons entitled to
the same, naming them and the proportions, or parts, to which each is
entitled, and such persons may demand and recover their respective
shares from the executor or administrator, or any other person having the
same in his possession. If there is a controversy before the court as to who
are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares
to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be
heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above-
mentioned has been made or provided for, unless the distributees, or any of
them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the
payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs.”18
In settlement of estate proceedings, the distribution of the estate
properties can only be made: (1) after all the debts, funeral charges,
expenses of administration, allowance to the widow, and estate tax have
been paid; or (2) before payment of said obligations only if the distributees
or any of them gives a bond in a sum fixed by the court conditioned upon
the pay-
____________________________
17
Revised Rules of Court, Rule 109, Section 2.
18
Emphasis supplied.
551
VOL. 252, JANUARY 29, 1996 551
Estate of Hilario M. Ruiz vs. Court of Appeals

ment of said obligations within such time as the court directs, or when
provision is made to meet those obligations. 19
In the case at bar, the probate court ordered the release of the titles to the
Valle Verde property and the Blue Ridge apartments to the private
respondents after the lapse of six months from the date of first publication
of the notice to creditors. The questioned order speaks of “notice” to
creditors, not payment of debts and obligations. Hilario Ruiz allegedly left
no debts when he died but the taxes on his estate had not hitherto been
paid, much less ascertained. The estate tax is one of those obligations that
must be paid before distribution of the estate. If not yet paid, the rule
requires that the distributees post a bond or make such provisions as to
meet the said tax obligation in proportion to their respective shares in the
inheritance.20 Notably, at the time the order was issued the properties of
the estate had not yet been inventoried and appraised.
It was also too early in the day for the probate court to order the release of
the titles six months after admitting the will to probate. The probate of a
will is conclusive as to its due execution and extrinsic validity21 and settles
only the question of whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely
executed it in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law.22
Questions as to the intrinsic validity and efficacy of the provisions of the
will, the legality of any devise or legacy may be raised even after the will
has been authenticated.23
____________________________
19
Castillo v. Castillo, 124 Phil. 485 [1966]; Edmands v. Philippine Trust Co.,
87 Phil. 405 [1952].
20
Prieto v. Valdez, 95 Phil. 46 [1954].
21
Rule 75, Section 1.
22
Acain v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 155 SCRA 100 [1987]; Pastor v.
Court of Appeals, 122 SCRA 885 [1983]; Maninang v. Court of Appeals, 114
SCRA 478 [1982].
23
Maninang v. Court of Appeals, supra; Sumilang v. Ramagosa, 21 SCRA
1369 [1967]; Cacho v. Udan, 13 SCRA 693 [1965]; Montanano v. Suesa, 14
Phil. 676, 679-680 [1909].
552
552 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Estate of Hilario M. Ruiz vs. Court of Appeals
The intrinsic validity of Hilario’s holographic will was controverted by
petitioner before the probate court in his Reply to Montes’ Opposition to
his motion for release of funds24 and his motion for reconsideration of the
August 26, 1993 order of the said court.25 Therein, petitioner assailed the
distributive shares of the devisees and legatees inasmuch as his father’s
will included the estate of his mother and allegedly impaired his legitime as
an intestate heir of his mother. The Rules provide that if there is a
controversy as to who are the lawful heirs of the decedent and their
distributive shares in his estate, the probate court shall proceed to hear
and decide the same as in ordinary cases.26
Still and all, petitioner cannot correctly claim that the assailed order
deprived him of his right to take possession of all the real and personal
properties of the estate. The right of an executor or administrator to the
possession and management of the real and personal properties of the
deceased is not absolute and can only be exercised “so long as it is
necessary for the payment of the debts and expenses of administration.” 27
Section 3 of Rule 84 of the Revised Rules of Court explicitly provides:
“Sec. 3. Executor or administrator to retain whole estate to pay debts, and
to administer estate not willed.—An executor or administrator shall have
the right to the possession and management of the real as well as the
personal estate of the deceased so long as it is necessary for the payment
of the debts and expenses for administration.”28
When petitioner moved for further release of the funds deposited with the
clerk of court, he had been previously
____________________________
24
Reply to Opposition of Funds and Opposition to Omnibus Motion, pp. 1-
3; Rollo, pp. 69-71.
25
Motion for Reconsideration, p. 14; Rollo, p. 66.
26
Rule 90, Section 1, paragraph 1; Pimentel v. Palanca, 5 Phil. 436 [1905]; II
Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, 88 [1989].
27
Mananquil v. Villegas, 189 SCRA 335 [1990].
28
Emphasis supplied.
553
VOL. 252, JANUARY 29, 1996 553
Estate of Hilario M. Ruiz vs. Court of Appeals
granted by the probate court certain amounts for repair and maintenance
expenses on the properties of the estate, and payment of the real estate
taxes thereon. But petitioner moved again for the release of additional
funds for the same reasons he previously cited. It was correct for the
probate court to require him to submit an accounting of the necessary
expenses for administration before releasing any further money in his
favor.
It was relevantly noted by the probate court that petitioner had deposited
with it only a portion of the one-year rental income from the Valle Verde
property. Petitioner did not deposit its succeeding rents after renewal of
the lease.29 Neither did he render an accounting of such funds.
Petitioner must be reminded that his right of ownership over the
properties of his father is merely inchoate as long as the estate has not
been fully settled and partitioned.30 As executor, he is a mere trustee of his
father’s estate. The funds of the estate in his hands are trust funds and he
is held to the duties and responsibilities of a trustee of the highest order. 31
He cannot unilaterally assign to himself and possess all his parents’
properties and the fruits thereof without first submitting an inventory and
appraisal of all real and personal properties of the deceased, rendering a
true account of his administration, the expenses of administration, the
amount of the obligations and estate tax, all of which are subject to a
determination by the court as to their veracity, propriety and justness. 32
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 33045 affirming the order dated December 22, 1993 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch
____________________________
29
Comment to the Petition, p. 9; Rollo, p. 98.
30
Salvador v. Sta. Maria, 20 SCRA 603 [1967].
31
Noel v. Court of Appeals, 240 SCRA 78, 89 [1995]; 3 Martin, Rules of
Court of the Philippines, 545-546 [1986] citing 21 Am. Jur. 370-371.
32
Rule 81, Section 1; Rule 85, Sections 1 to 9.
554
554 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Estate of Hilario M. Ruiz vs. Court of Appeals
156, Pasig in SP Proc. No. 10259 are affirmed with the modification that
those portions of the order granting an allowance to the testator’s
grandchildren and ordering the release of the titles to the private
respondents upon notice to creditors are annulled and set aside.
Respondent judge is ordered to proceed with dispatch in the proceedings
below.
SO ORDERED.

Regalado (Chairman), Romero and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Judgment and resolution affirmed with modification.

Notes.—Trust is a fiduciary relationship with respect to property which

involves the existence of equitable duties imposed upon the holder of the
title to the property to deal with it for the benefit of another. (Huang vs.
Court of Appeals, 236 SCRA 420 [1994])

While courts in probate proceedings are generally limited to pass only

upon the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated, in exceptional
cases, courts are not powerless to do what the situation constrains them
to do, and pass upon certain provisions of the will. (Ajero vs. Court of
Appeals, 236 SCRA 488 [1994])

——o0o——

555

© Copyright 2020 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.

G.R. No. 150175. February 5, 2007.*
ERLINDA PILAPIL and HEIRS OF DONATA ORTIZ BRIONES, namely: ESTELA,
ERIBERTO AND VIRGILIO SANTOS, ANA SANTOS CULTURA, ELVIRA
SANTOS INOCENTES, ERNESTO MENDOZA, RIZALINA SANTOS, ADOLFO
MENDOZA and PACITA MENDOZA, petitioners, vs. HEIRS OF MAXIMINO
R. BRIONES, namely: SILVERIO S. BRIONES, PETRA BRIONES, BONIFACIO
CABAHUG, JR., ANITA TRASMONTE, CIRILITA FORTUNA, CRESENCIA
BRIONES, FUGURACION MEDALLE and MERCEDES LAGBAS, respondents.
Remedial Law; Civil Law; Settlement of Estate; The settlement of estate
whether testate or intestate is a proceeding in rem and that the publication
in the newspaper of the filing of the application and of the date set for the
hearing of the same in the manner prescribed by law is a notice to the
whole world of the existence of the proceedings and of the hearing on the
date and time indicated in the publication.—While it is true that since the
CFI was not informed that Maximino still had surviving siblings and so the
court was not able to order that these siblings be given personal notices of
the intestate
_______________
*
THIRD DIVISION.
198
198 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Pilapil vs. Heirs of Maximino R. Briones
proceedings, it should be borne in mind that the settlement of estate,
whether testate or intestate, is a proceeding in rem, and that the
publication in the newspapers of the filing of the application and of the
date set for the hearing of the same, in the manner prescribed by law, is a
notice to the whole world of the existence of the proceedings and of the
hearing on the date and time indicated in the publication. The publication
requirement of the notice in newspapers is precisely for the purpose of
informing all interested parties in the estate of the deceased of the
existence of the settlement proceedings, most especially those who were
not named as heirs or creditors in the petition, regardless of whether such
omission was voluntarily or involuntarily made.
Same; Same; Same; The manner by which the CFI judge conducted the
proceedings enjoys the presumption of regularity, and encompassed in
such proceedings is the order of publication of the notice of the intestate
proceedings.—This Court cannot stress enough that the CFI Order was the
result of the intestate proceedings instituted by Donata before the trial
court. As this Court pointed out in its earlier Decision, the manner by which
the CFI judge conducted the proceedings enjoys the presumption of
regularity, and encompassed in such presumption is the order of
publication of the notice of the intestate proceedings. A review of the
records fails to show any allegation or concrete proof that the CFI also
failed to order the publication in newspapers of the notice of the intestate
proceedings and to require proof from Donata of compliance therewith.
Neither can this Court find any reason or explanation as to why Maximino’s
siblings could have missed the published notice of the intestate
proceedings of their brother.
Same; Same; Trusts; Prescription; It is already settled in jurisprudence that
an implied trust as opposed to an express trust is subject to prescription
and laches.—Assuming, for the sake of argument, that Donata’s
misrepresentation constitutes fraud that would impose upon her the
implied trust provided in Article 1456 of the Civil Code, this Court still
cannot sustain respondents’ contention that their right to recover their
shares in Maximino’s estate is imprescriptible. It is already settled in
jurisprudence that an implied trust, as opposed to an express trust, is
subject to prescription and laches.
199
VOL. 514, FEBRUARY 5, 2007 199
Pilapil vs. Heirs of Maximino R. Briones
Same; Same; Same; Same; The general rule is that an action for
reconveyance of real property based on implied trust prescribes ten years
from registration and/or issuance of the title to the property.—Prescription 200
of the action for reconveyance of the disputed properties based on implied
trust is governed by Article 1144 of the New Civil Code. Since an implied 200 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
trust is an obligation created by law (specifically, in this case, by Article Pilapil vs. Heirs of Maximino R. Briones
1456 of the New Civil Code), then respondents had 10 years within which
to bring an action for reconveyance of their shares in Maximino’s
which is a question of inequity in permitting a claim to be enforced, applies
properties. The next question now is when should the ten-year prescriptive
independently of prescription, which is a question of time. Prescription is
period be reckoned from. The general rule is that an action for
statutory; laches is equitable. Laches is defined as the failure to assert a
reconveyance of real property based on implied trust prescribes ten years
right for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, warranting a
from registration and/or issuance of the title to the property, not only
presumption that the party entitled to assert it has either abandoned or
because registration under the Torrens system is a constructive notice of
declined to assert it. This equitable defense is based upon grounds of
title, but also because by registering the disputed properties exclusively in
public policy, which requires the discouragement of stale claims for the
her name, Donata had already unequivocally repudiated any other claim to
peace of society.
the same.
Same; Annulment of Judgments; Fraud; Prescription; An action to annul an
Same; Same; Same; Same; The rule on non-prescription of action for
order or judgment based on fraud must be brought within four years from
partition of property owned in common does not apply to the case at
the discovery of the fraud.—Nonetheless, this Court also points out that an
bar.—Even though respondents’ Complaint before the RTC in Civil Case No.
action to annul an order or judgment based on fraud must be brought
CEB-5794 also prays for partition of the disputed properties, it does not
within four years from the discovery of the fraud. If it is conceded that the
make their action to enforce their right to the said properties
respondents came to know of Donata’s fraudulent acts only in 1985,
imprescriptible. While as a general rule, the action for partition among co-
during the course of the RTC proceedings which they instituted for the
owners does not prescribe so long as the coownership is expressly or
settlement of Maximino’s estate, then their right to file an action to annul
impliedly recognized, as provided for in Article 494, of the New Civil Code,
the CFI Order, dated 15 January 1960, in Special Proceedings No. 928-R
it bears to emphasize that Donata had never recognized respondents as
(earlier instituted by Donata for the settlement of Maximino’s estate), has
co-owners or co-heirs, either expressly or impliedly. Her assertion before
likewise prescribed by present time.
the CFI in Special Proceedings No. 928-R that she was Maximino’s sole heir
necessarily excludes recognition of some other co-owner or co-heir to the
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION of a decision of the Supreme Court.
inherited properties; Consequently, the rule on non-prescription of action
for partition of property owned in common does not apply to the case at
bar. The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Laches; The defense of
laches which is a question of inequity in permitting a claim to be enforced
applies independently of prescription which is a question of time; Laches
Defined.—Other than prescription of action, respondents’ right to recover
possession of the disputed properties, based on implied trust, is also
barred by laches. The defense of laches,
Senining, Belcina, Atup & Entise Law Office for petitioners.
Almase, Suarez and Almase-Martinez Law Office collaborating counsel
for petitioners.
Amiel A. Vicente and Reales Law Office for respondents.
 1
Amador F. Brioso, Jr. collaborating counsel for respondents. Penned by Associate Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario with Chief Justice
Artemio V. Panganiban, Associate Justices Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, and
201 Romeo J. Callejo, concurring; Rollo, pp. 286305.

2
VOL. 514, FEBRUARY 5, 2007 201 Id., at pp. 304-305.
Pilapil vs. Heirs of Maximino R. Briones
3
Id., at pp. 306-315.
RESOLUTION
4
Id., at pp. 320-336.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
5
Id., at pp. 338-343.
1
On 10 March 2006, this Court promulgated its Decision in the above-
6
entitled case, ruling in favor of the petitioners. The dispositive portion 2 Id., at pp. 345-346.
reads as follows:
7
Id., at pp. 348-363.
“IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 55194, dated 31 August 2001, affirming the 202
Decision of the Cebu City RTC in Civil Case No. CEB5794, dated 28
September 1986, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE; and the Complaint 202 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
for partition, annulment, and recovery of possession filed by the heirs of Pilapil vs. Heirs of Maximino R. Briones
Maximino in Civil Case No. CEB5794 is hereby DISMISSED.”
and Supplemental Reply8 to the petitioners’ Opposition to respondents’
On 10 May 2006, a Motion for Reconsideration3 of the foregoing Decision Motion for Reconsideration. Finally, petitioners filed a Rejoinder9 to the
was filed by Atty. Celso C. Reales of the Reales Law Office on behalf of the respondents’ Reply and Supplemental Reply on 5 July 2006.
respondents, heirs of Maximino R. Briones. On 19 May 2006, petitioners
Erlinda Pilapil and the other co-heirs of Donata Ortiz Vda. de Briones,
The facts of the case, as recounted in the Decision,10 are as follows—
through counsel, filed an Opposition to Respondents’ Motion for
Reconsideration,4 to which the respondents filed a Rejoinder5 on 23 May
“Petitioners are the heirs of the late Donata Ortiz-Briones (Donata),
2006. Thereafter, Atty. Amador F. Brioso, Jr. of the Canto Brioso Arnedo
consisting of her surviving sister, Rizalina Ortiz-Aguila (Rizalina); Rizalina’s
Law Office entered his appearance as collaborating counsel for the
daughter, Erlinda Pilapil (Erlinda); and the other nephews and nieces of
respondents.6 Atty. Brioso then filed on 11 June 2006 and 16 June 2006,
Donata, in representation of her two other sisters who had also passed
respectively, a Reply7
away. Respondents, on the other hand, are the heirs of the late Maximino
Briones (Maximino), composed of his nephews and nieces, and
_______________
grandnephews and grandnieces, in representation of the deceased siblings
of Maximino.
xxxx
Maximino was married to Donata but their union did not produce any
children. When Maximino died on 1 May 1952, Donata instituted intestate
proceedings to settle her husband’s estate with the Cebu City Court of First
Instance (CFI), 14th Judicial District, designated as Special Proceedings No.
928-R. On 8 July 1952, the CFI issued Letters of Administration appointing
Donata as the administratrix of Maximino’s estate. She submitted an
Inventory of Maximino’s properties, which included, among other things,
the following parcels of land x x x.
xxxx
The CFI would subsequently issue an Order, dated 2 October 1952,
awarding ownership of the aforementioned real properties to Donata. On
27 June 1960, Donata had the said CFI Order recorded in the Primary Entry
Book of the Register of Deeds, and by virtue thereof, received new TCTs,
covering the said properties, now in her name.
Donata died on 1 November 1977. Erlinda, one of Donata’s nieces,
instituted with the RTC a petition for the administration of
_______________
8
Id., at pp. 364-378.
9
Id., at pp. 342-356.
10
Id., at pp. 287-293.
203
VOL. 514, FEBRUARY 5, 2007 203
Pilapil vs. Heirs of Maximino R. Briones
the intestate estate of Donata. Erlinda and her husband, Gregorio, were
appointed by the RTC as administrators of Donata’s intestate estate.
Controversy arose among Donata’s heirs when Erlinda claimed exclusive
ownership of three parcels of land, covered by TCTs No. 21542, 21545, and
58684, based on two Deeds of Donation, both dated 15 September 1977,
allegedly executed in her favor by her aunt Donata. The other heirs of
Donata opposed Erlinda’s claim. This Court, however, was no longer
informed of the subsequent development in the intestate proceedings of
the estate of Donata; and as far as this Petition is concerned, all the heirs
of Donata, including Erlinda, appear to be on the same side.
On 21 January 1985, Silverio Briones (Silverio), a nephew of Maximino,
filed a Petition with the RTC for Letters of Administration for the intestate
estate of Maximino, which was initially granted by the RTC. The RTC also
issued an Order, dated 5 December 1985, allowing Silverio to collect
rentals from Maximino’s properties. But then, Gregorio filed with the RTC a
Motion to Set Aside the Order, dated 5 December 1985, claiming that the
said properties were already under his and his wife’s administration as part
of the intestate estate of Donata. Silverio’s Letters of Administration for
the intestate estate of Maximino was subsequently set aside by the RTC.
On 3 March 1987, the heirs of Maximino filed a Complaint with the RTC
against the heirs of Donata for the partition, annulment, and recovery of
possession of real property, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-5794. They
later filed an Amended Complaint, on 11 December 1992. They alleged
that Donata, as administratrix of the estate of Maximino, through fraud
and misrepresentation, in breach of trust, and without the knowledge of
the other heirs, succeeded in registering in her name the real properties
belonging to the intestate estate of Maximino.
xxxx
After trial in due course, the RTC rendered its Decision, dated 8 April 1986,
in favor of the heirs of Maximino x x x.
xxxx
x x x [T]he RTC declared that the heirs of Maximino were entitled to 1/2 of
the real properties covered by TCTs No. 21542, 21543, 21544, 21545,
21546, and 58684. It also ordered Erlinda to reconvey to the heirs of
Maximino the said properties and to render an accounting of the fruits
thereof.
204
204 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Pilapil vs. Heirs of Maximino R. Briones
The heirs of Donata appealed the RTC Decision, dated 8 April 1986, to the
Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, in its Decision, promulgated on 31
August 2001, affirmed the RTC Decision, x x x.
xxxx
Unsatisfied with the afore-quoted Decision of the Court of Appeals, the
heirs of Donata filed the present Petition, x x x.”
In its Decision, dated 10 March 2006, this Court found the Petition
meritorious and, reversing the Decisions of the Court of Appeals and the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), dismissed the Complaint for partition,
annulment, and recovery of possession of real property filed by the heirs
of Maximino in Civil Case No. CEB-5794. This Court summed up its
findings,11 thus—
“In summary, the heirs of Maximino failed to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that Donata managed, through fraud, to have the real properties,
belonging to the intestate estate of Maximino, registered in her name. In
the absence of fraud, no implied trust was established between Donata
and the heirs of Maximino under Article 1456 of the New Civil Code.
Donata was able to register the real properties in her name, not through
fraud or mistake, but pursuant to an Order, dated 2 October 1952, issued
by the CFI in Special Proceedings No. 928-R. The CFI Order, presumed to be
fairly and regularly issued, declared Donata as the sole, absolute, and
exclusive heir of Maximino; hence, making Donata the singular owner of
the entire estate of Maximino, including the real properties, and not
merely a co-owner with the other heirs of her deceased husband. There
being no basis for the Complaint of the heirs of Maximino in Civil Case No.
CEB-5794, the same should have been dismissed.”
Respondents move for the reconsideration of the Decision of this Court
raising still the arguments that Donata committed fraud in securing the
Court of First Instance Order, dated 2 October 1952, which declared her as
the sole heir of her deceased husband Maximino and authorized her to
have Maxi-
_______________
11
Id., at p. 304.
205
VOL. 514, FEBRUARY 5, 2007 205
Pilapil vs. Heirs of Maximino R. Briones
mino’s properties registered exclusively in her name; that respondents’
right to succession to the disputed properties was transmitted or vested
from the moment of Maximino’s death and which they could no longer be
deprived of; that Donata merely possessed and held the properties in trust
for her co-heirs/owners; and that, by virtue of this Court’s ruling in Quion
v. Claridad 12 and Sevilla, et al. v. De Los Angeles,13 respondents’ action to
recover title to and possession of their shares in Maximino’s estate, held in
trust for their benefit by Donata, and eventually, by petitioners as the
latter’s successors-in-interest, is imprescriptible. Respondents also
advance a fresh contention that the CFI Order, dated 2 October 1952,
being based on the fraudulent misrepresentation of Donata that she was
Maximino’s sole heir, was a void order, which produced no legal effect.
Lastly, respondents asseverate that, by relying on certain procedural
presumptions in its Decision, dated 10 March 2006, this Court has
sacrificed their substantive right to succession, thus, making justice
“subservient to the dictates of mere procedural fiats.”14
While this Court is persuaded to reexamine and clarify some points in its proof to the contrary, the Court accorded to Special Proceedings No. 928-R
previous Decision in this case, it does not find any new evidence or the presumptions of regularity and validity. Reproduced below are the
argument that would adequately justify a change in its previous position. relevant portions15 of the Decision—

On the finding of fraud “At the onset, it should be emphasized that Donata was able to secure the
TCTs covering the real properties belonging to the estate of Maximino by
As this Court declared in its Decision, the existence of any trust relations virtue of a CFI Order, dated 2 October 1952. It is undisputed that the said
between petitioners and respondents shall be examined in the light of CFI Order was issued by the CFI in Special Proceedings No. 928-R,
Article 1456 of the New Civil Code, which provides that, “[i]f property is instituted by Donata herself, to settle the intestate estate of Maximino.
acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of The petitioners, heirs of Donata, were unable to present a copy of the CFI
law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person Order, but this is not surprising considering that it was issued 35 years
from whom the property comes.” Hence, the foremost prior to the filing by the heirs of Maximino of their Complaint in Civil Case
No. CEB-5794 on 3 March 1987. The existence of such CFI Order,
_______________ nonetheless, cannot be denied. It was recorded in the Primary Entry Book
of the Register of Deeds on 27 June 1960, at 1:10 p.m., as Entry No. 1714.
12 It was annotated on the TCTs covering the real properties as having
74 Phil. 100 (1943).
declared Donata the sole, absolute, and exclusive heir of Maximino. The
13
non-presentation of the actual CFI Order was not fatal to the cause of the
97 Phil. 875 (1955).
heirs of Donata considering that its authenticity and contents were never
questioned. The allegation of fraud by the heirs of Maximino did not
14
Rollo, p. 359. pertain to the CFI Order, but to the manner or procedure by which it was
issued in favor of Donata. Moreover, the non-presentation of the CFI
206 Order, contrary to the declaration by the RTC, does not amount to a willful
suppression of evidence that
206 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Pilapil vs. Heirs of Maximino R. Briones _______________

15
question to be answered is still whether an implied trust under Article Id., at pp. 296-300.
1456 of the New Civil Code had been sufficiently established in the present
case. 207

In the Decision, this Court ruled in the negative, since there was VOL. 514, FEBRUARY 5, 2007 207
insufficient evidence to establish that Donata committed fraud. It should Pilapil vs. Heirs of Maximino R. Briones
be remembered that Donata was able to secure certificates of title to the
disputed properties by virtue of the CFI Order in Special Proceedings No.
would give rise to the presumption that it would be adverse to the heirs of
928-R (the proceedings she instituted to settle Maximino’s intestate
Donata if produced. x x x.
estate), which declared her as Maximino’s sole heir. In the absence of
xxxx
The CFI Order, dated 2 October 1952, issued in Special Proceedings No.
928-R, effectively settled the intestate estate of Maximino by declaring
Donata as the sole, absolute, and exclusive heir of her deceased husband.
The issuance by the CFI of the said Order, as well as its conduct of the
entire Special Proceedings No. 928-R, enjoy the presumption of validity
pursuant to the Section 3(m) and (n) of Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of
Court, reproduced below—
SEC. 3. Disputable presumptions.—The following presumptions are
satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by
other evidence:
xxxx
(m) That official duty has been regularly performed;
(n) That a court, or judge acting as such, whether in the Philippines or
elsewhere, was acting in the lawful exercise of jurisdiction.
By reason of the foregoing provisions, this Court must presume, in the
absence of any clear and convincing proof to the contrary, that the CFI in
Special Proceedings No. 928-R had jurisdiction of the subject matter and
the parties, and to have rendered a judgment valid in every respect; and it
could not give credence to the following statements made by the Court of
Appeals in its Decision.
xxxx
There was totally no evidentiary basis for the foregoing pronouncements.
First of all, the Petition filed by Donata for Letters of Administration in
Special Proceedings No. 928-R before the CFI was not even referred to nor
presented during the course of the trial of Civil Case No. CEB-5794 before
the RTC. How then could the Court of Appeals make a finding that Donata
willfully excluded from the said Petition the names, ages, and residences of
the other heirs of Maximino? Second, there was also no evidence showing
that the CFI actually failed to send notices of Special Proceedings No. 928-R
to the heirs of Maximino or that it did not require presentation of proof of
service of such notices. It should be remembered that there stands a
presumption that the CFI Judge had regularly performed his duties in
Special Proceedings No. 928-R, which included sending out of notices and
requiring the presentation of proof of service of such
208
208 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Pilapil vs. Heirs of Maximino R. Briones
notices; and, the heirs of Maximino did not propound sufficient evidence
to debunk such presumption. They only made a general denial of
knowledge of Special Proceedings No. 928-R, at least until 1985. There was
no testimony or document presented in which the heirs of Maximino
categorically denied receipt of notice from the CFI of the pendency of
Special Proceedings No. 928-R. The only evidence on record in reference to
the absence of notice of such proceedings was the testimony of Aurelia
Briones (Aurelia), one of the heirs of Maximino, x x x.
xxxx
Aurelia’s testimony deserves scant credit considering that she was not
testifying on matters within her personal knowledge. The phrase “I don’t
think” is a clear indication that she is merely voicing out her opinion on
how she believed her uncles and aunts would have acted had they
received notice of Special Proceedings No. 928R.”
It is worth noting that, in its foregoing ratiocination, the Court was
proceeding from an evaluation of the evidence on record, which did not
include an actual copy of the CFI Order in Special Proceedings No. 928-R.
Respondents only submitted a certified true copy thereof on 15 June 2006,
annexed to their Supplemental Reply to petitioners’ opposition to their
motion for reconsideration of this Court’s Decision. Respondents did not
offer any explanation as to why they belatedly produced a copy of the said
Order, but merely claimed to have been “fortunate enough to obtain a
copy” thereof from the Register of Deeds of Cebu.16
Respondents should be taken to task for springing new evidence so late
into the proceedings of this case. Parties should present all their available
evidence at the courts below so as to give the opposing party the
opportunity to scrutinize and challenge such evidence during the course of
the trial. However, given that the existence of the CFI Order in Special
Proceedings No. 928-R was never in issue and was, in fact, admitted by the
petitioners; that the copy submitted is a certi-
_______________
16
Id., at p. 369.
209
VOL. 514, FEBRUARY 5, 2007 209
Pilapil vs. Heirs of Maximino R. Briones
fied true copy of the said Order; and that the said Order may provide new
information vital to a just resolution of the present case, this Court is
compelled to consider the same as part of the evidence on record.
The CFI Order17 in question reads in full as—
“O R D E R
This is with reference to the Motion of the Administratrix, dated January 5,
1960, that she be declared the sole heir of her deceased husband,
Maximino Suico Briones, the latter having died without any legitimate
ascendant nor descendant, nor any legitimate brother or sister, nephews
or nieces.
At the hearing of this incident today, nobody appeared to resist the
motion, and based on the uncontradicted testimony of Donata G. Ortiz
that she was the nearest surviving relative of the deceased Maximino Suico
Briones at the time of the latter’s death, and pursuant to the pertinent
provisions of the new Civil Code of the Philippines, the Court hereby
declares the aforesaid Donata G. Ortiz the sole, absolute and exclusive heir
of the estate of the deceased Maximino Suico Briones, and she is hereby
entitled to inherit all the residue of this estate after paying all the
obligations thereof, which properties are those contained in the Inventory,
dated October 2, 1952.
Cebu City, January 15, 1960.”
From the contents of the afore-quoted Order, this Court is able to deduce
that the CFI Order was in fact issued on 15 January 1960 and not 2 October
1952, as earlier stated in the Decision. It was the inventory of properties,
submitted by Donata as administratrix of Maximino’s intestate estate,
which was dated 2 October 1952.18 Other than such observation, this Court
finds nothing in the CFI Order which could
_______________
17
Id., at p. 379.
18
When the Decision was promulgated on 10 March 2006, in the absence
of an actual copy of the CFI Order in question, this Court relied on the date
of issuance of the said Order as recorded in the Primary Entry Book of the
Register of Deeds.
210
210 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Pilapil vs. Heirs of Maximino R. Briones
change its original position in the Decision under consideration.
While it is true that since the CFI was not informed that Maximino still had
surviving siblings and so the court was not able to order that these siblings
be given personal notices of the intestate proceedings, it should be borne
in mind that the settlement of estate, whether testate or intestate, is a
proceeding in rem,19 and that the publication in the newspapers of the
filing of the application and of the date set for the hearing of the same, in
the manner prescribed by law, is a notice to the whole world of the
existence of the proceedings and of the hearing on the date and time
indicated in the publication. The publication requirement of the notice in
newspapers is precisely for the purpose of informing all interested parties
in the estate of the deceased of the existence of the settlement
proceedings, most especially those who were not named as heirs or
creditors in the petition, regardless of whether such omission was
voluntarily or involuntarily made.
This Court cannot stress enough that the CFI Order was the result of the
intestate proceedings instituted by Donata before the trial court. As this
Court pointed out in its earlier Decision, the manner by which the CFI judge
conducted the proceedings enjoys the presumption of regularity, and
encompassed in such presumption is the order of publication of the notice
of the intestate proceedings. A review of the records fails to show any
allegation or concrete proof that the CFI also failed to order the publication
in newspapers of the notice of the intestate proceedings and to require
proof from Donata of compliance therewith. Neither can this Court find
any reason or explanation as to why Maximino’s siblings could have missed
the published notice of the intestate proceedings of their brother.
_______________
19
Bautista v. De Guzman, 211 Phil. 26, 35; 125 SCRA 676, 684 (1983);
Varela v. Villanueva, 95 Phil. 248, 266-267 (1954); McMaster v. Reissman &
Co., 68 Phil. 142, 144 (1939).
211
VOL. 514, FEBRUARY 5, 2007 211
Pilapil vs. Heirs of Maximino R. Briones
In relying on the presumptions of the regular performance of official duty
and lawful exercise of jurisdiction by the CFI in rendering the questioned
Order, dated 15 January 1960, this Court is not, as counsel for respondents
allege, sacrificing the substantive right of respondents to their share in the
inheritance in favor of mere procedural fiats. There is a rationale for the
establishment of rules of procedure, as amply explained by this Court in De
Dios v. Court of Appeals 20—
“Procedural rules are designed to insure the orderly and expeditious
administration of justice by providing for a practical system by which the
parties to a litigation may be accorded a full and fair opportunity to
present their respective positions and refute each other’s submissions
under the prescribed requirements, conditions and limitations. Adjective
law is not the counterfoil of substantive law. In fact, there is a symbiotic
relationship between them. By complying faithfully with the Rules of
Court, the bench and the bar are better able to discuss, analyze and
understand substantive rights and duties and consequently to more
effectively protect and enforce them. The other alternative is judicial
anarchy.”
Thus, compliance with the procedural rules is the general rule, and
abandonment thereof should only be done in the most exceptional
circumstances. The presumptions relied upon by this Court in the instant
case are disputable presumptions, which are satisfactory, unless
contradicted or overcome by evidence. This Court finds that the evidence
presented by respondents failed to overcome the given presumptions.
Although Donata may have alleged before the CFI that she was her
husband’s sole heir, it was not established that she did so knowingly,
maliciously and in bad faith, so as for this Court to conclude that she
indeed committed fraud. This Court again brings to the fore the delay by
which respondents filed the present case, when the principal actors
involved, particularly, Donata and Maximino’s siblings, have already
_______________
20
G.R. No. 80491, 12 August 1992, 212 SCRA 519, 521.
212
212 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Pilapil vs. Heirs of Maximino R. Briones
passed away and their lips forever sealed as to what truly transpired
between them. On the other hand, Special Proceedings No. 928-R took
place when all these principal actors were still alive and each would have
been capable to act to protect his or her own right to Maximino’s estate.
Letters of Administration of Maximino’s estate were issued in favor of
Donata as early as 8 July 1952, and the CFI Order in question was issued
only on 15 January 1960. The intestate proceedings for the settlement of
Maximino’s estate were thus pending for almost eight years, and it is the
burden of the respondents to establish that their parents or grandparents,
Maximino’s surviving siblings, had absolutely no knowledge of the said
proceedings all these years. As established in Ramos v. Ramos,21 the
degree of proof to establish fraud in a case where the principal actors to
the transaction have already passed away is proof beyond reasonable
doubt, to wit—
“x x x But length of time necessarily obscures all human evidence; and as
it thus removes from the parties all the immediate means to
verify the nature of the original transactions, it operates by
way of presumption, in favor of innocence, and against
imputation of fraud. It would be unreasonable, after a great
length of time, to require exact proof of all the minute
circumstances of any transaction, or to expect a satisfactory
explanation of every difficulty, real or apparent, with which it
may be encumbered. The most that can fairly be expected, in
such cases, if the parties are living, from the frailty of memory,
and human infirmity, is, that the material facts can be given
with certainty to a common intent; and, if the parties are dead,
and the cases rest in confidence, and in parol agreements, the
most that we can hope is to arrive at probable conjectures, and
to substitute general presumptions of law, for exact knowledge.
Fraud, or breach of trust, ought not lightly to be imputed to
the living; for, the legal presumption is the other way; as to
the dead, who are not here to answer for themselves, it would
be the height of injustice and cruelty, to disturb their ashes,
and violate the sanctity of the grave,
_______________
21
G.R. No. L-19872, 3 December 1974, 61 SCRA 284, 305.
213
VOL. 514, FEBRUARY 5, 2007 213
Pilapil vs. Heirs of Maximino R. Briones
unless the evidence of fraud be clear, beyond a reasonable doubt (Prevost
vs. Gratz, 6 Wheat. [U.S.], 481, 498).
Moreover, even if Donata’s allegation that she was Maximino’s sole heir
does constitute fraud, it is insufficient to justify abandonment of the CFI
Order, dated 15 January 1960,22 considering the nature of intestate
proceedings as being in rem and the disputable presumptions of the
regular performance of official duty and lawful exercise of jurisdiction by
the CFI in rendering the questioned Order, dated 15 January 1960, in
Special Proceedings No. 928-R.
On prescription of the right to recover based on implied trust
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that Donata’s misrepresentation
constitutes fraud that would impose upon her the implied trust provided in
Article 1456 of the Civil Code, this Court still cannot sustain respondents’
contention that their right to recover their shares in Maximino’s estate is
imprescriptible. It is already settled in jurisprudence that an implied trust,
as opposed to an express trust, is subject to prescription and laches.
The case of Ramos v. Ramos 23 already provides an elucidating discourse on
the matter, to wit—
“Trusts are either express or implied. Express trusts are created by the
intention of the trustor or of the parties. Implied trusts
_______________
22
See Solivio v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 83484, 12 February 1990, 182
SCRA 119, 131), wherein this Court quoted that, “Failure to disclose to the
adversary, or to the court, matters which would defeat one’s own, claim or
defense is not such extrinsic fraud as will justify or require vacation of the
judgment.” (49 C.J.S. 489, citing Young v. Young, 2 SE 2d 622; First National
Bank & Trust Co. of King City v. Bowman, 15 SW 2d 842; Price v. Smith, 109
SW 2d 1144, 1149.)
23
158 Phil. 935, 950-952; 61 SCRA 284, 298-300 (1974).
214
214 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Pilapil vs. Heirs of Maximino R. Briones
come into being by operation of law” (Art. 1441, Civil Code). “No express
trusts concerning an immovable or any interest therein may be proven by
oral evidence. An implied trust may be proven by oral evidence” (Ibid; Arts.
1443 and 1457).
“No particular words are required for the creation of an express trust, it
being sufficient that a trust is clearly intended” (Ibid; Art. 1444; Tuason de
Perez vs. Caluag, 96 Phil. 981; Julio vs. Dalandan, L-19012, October 30,
1967, 21 SCRA 543, 546). “Express trusts are those which are created by
the direct and positive acts of the parties, by some writing or deed, or will,
or by words either expressly or impliedly evincing an intention to create a
trust” (89 C.J. S. 122).
“Implied trusts are those which, without being expressed, are deducible
from the nature of the transaction as matters of intent, or which are
superinduced on the transaction by operation of law as matters of equity,
independently of the particular intention of the parties” (89 C.J.S. 724).
They are ordinarily subdivided into resulting and constructive trusts (89
C.J.S. 722).
“A resulting trust is broadly defined as a trust which is raised or created by
the act or construction of law, but in its more restricted sense it is a trust
raised by implication of law and presumed always to have been
contemplated by the parties, the intention as to which is to be found in the
nature of their transaction, but not expressed in the deed or instrument of
conveyance” (89 C.J.S. 725). Examples of resulting trusts are found in
Article 1448 to 1455 of the Civil Code. See Padilla vs. Court of Appeals, L-
31569, September 28, 1973, 53 SCRA 168, 179).
On the other hand, a constructive trust is a trust “raised by construction of
law, or arising by operation of law.” In a more restricted sense and as
contradistinguished from a resulting trust, a constructive trust is “a trust
not created by any words, either expressly or impliedly evincing a direct
intention to create a trust, but by the construction of equity in order to
satisfy the demands of justice. It does not arise by agreement or intention
but by operation of law.” (89 C.J.S. 726-727). “If a person obtains legal title
to property by fraud or concealment, courts of equity will impress upon
the title a so-called constructive trust in favor of the defrauded party.” A
constructive trust is not a trust in the technical sense (Gayondato vs.
Treasurer of the P.I., 49 Phil. 244; See Art. 1456, Civil Code).
There is a rule that a trustee cannot acquire by prescription the ownership
of property entrusted to him (Palma vs. Cristobal, 77
215
VOL. 514, FEBRUARY 5, 2007 215
Pilapil vs. Heirs of Maximino R. Briones
Phil. 712), or that an action to compel a trustee to convey property Salinas vs. Tuason, 55 Phil. 729. Compare with the rule regarding co-
registered in his name in trust for the benefit of the cestui qui trust does owners found in the last paragraph of Article 494, Civil Code; Casañas vs.
not prescribe (Manalang vs. Canlas, 94 Phil. 776; Cristobal vs. Gomez, 50 Rosello, 50 Phil. 97; Gerona vs. De Guzman, L-19060, May 29, 1964, 11
Phil. 810), or that the defense of prescription cannot be set up in an action SCRA 153, 157).
to recover property held by a person in trust for the benefit of another
(Sevilla vs. De los Angeles, 97 Phil. 875), or that property held in trust can 216
be recovered by the beneficiary regardless of the lapse of time (Marabilles
vs. Quito, 100 Phil. 64; Bancairen vs. Diones, 98 Phil. 122, 126; Juan vs. 216 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Zuñiga, 62 O.G. 1351; 4 SCRA 1221; Jacinto vs. Jacinto, L-17957, May 31, Pilapil vs. Heirs of Maximino R. Briones
1962. See Tamayo vs. Callejo, 147 Phil. 31, 37).
With respect to constructive trusts, the rule is different. The
That rule applies squarely to express trusts. The basis of the rule is that the
prescriptibility of an action for reconveyance based on constructive trust
possession of a trustee is not adverse. Not being adverse, he does not
is now settled (Alzona vs. Capunitan, L-10228, February 28, 1962, 4 SCRA
acquire by prescription the property held in trust. Thus, Section 38 of Act
450; Gerona vs. De Guzman, supra; Claridad vs. Henares, 97 Phil. 973;
190 provides that the law of prescription does not apply “in the case of a
Gonzales vs. Jimenez, L-19073, January 30, 1965, 13 SCRA 80; Boñaga vs.
continuing and subsisting trust” (Diaz vs. Gorricho and Aguado, 103 Phil.
Soler, 112 Phil. 651; J. M. Tuason & Co., vs. Magdangal, L-15539, January
261, 266; Laguna vs. Levantino, 71 Phil. 566; Sumira vs. Vistan, 74 Phil.
30, 1962, 4 SCRA 84). Prescription may supervene in an implied trust
138; Golfeo vs. Court of Appeals, 63 O.G. 4895, 12 SCRA 199; Caladiao vs.
(Bueno vs. Reyes, L-22587, April 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 1179; Fabian vs. Fabian,
Santos, 63 O.G. 1956, 10 SCRA 691).
L-20449, January 29, 1968; Jacinto vs. Jacinto, L-17957, May 31, 1962, 5
SCRA 371).
The rule of imprescriptibility of the action to recover property held in trust
may possibly apply to resulting trusts as long as the trustee has not
And whether the trust is resulting or constructive, its enforcement may be
repudiated the trust (Heirs of Candelaria vs. Romero, 109 Phil. 500, 502-3;
barred by laches (90 C.J.S. 887-889; 54 Am Jur. 449-450; Diaz vs. Gorricho
Martinez vs. Graño, 42 Phil. 35; Buencamino vs. Matias, 63 O.G. 11033, 16
and Aguado, supra; Compare with Mejia vs. Gampona, 100 Phil. 277).
SCRA 849).
[Emphases supplied.]

The rule of imprescriptibility was misapplied to constructive trusts

A present reading of the Quion24 and Sevilla25 cases, invoked by
(Geronimo and Isidoro vs. Nava and Aquino, 105 Phil. 145, 153. Compare
respondents, must be made in conjunction with and guided accordingly by
with Cuison vs. Fernandez and Bengzon, 105 Phil. 135, 139; De Pasion vs.
the principles established in the aforequoted case. Thus, while
De Pasion, 112 Phil. 403, 407).
respondents’ right to inheritance was transferred or vested upon them at
the time of Maximino’s death, their enforcement of said right by
Acquisitive prescription may bar the action of the beneficiary against the appropriate legal action may be barred by the prescription of the action.
trustee in an express trust for the recovery of the property held in trust
where (a) the trustee has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation
Prescription of the action for reconveyance of the disputed properties
amounting to an ouster of the cestui qui trust; (b) such positive acts of
based on implied trust is governed by Article 1144 of the New Civil Code,
repudiation have been made known to the cestui qui trust and (c) the
which reads—
evidence thereon is clear and conclusive (Laguna vs. Levantino, supra;
ART. 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from CEB-5794, only on 3 March 1987, almost 27 years after the registration of
the time the right of action accrues: the said properties in the name of Donata. Therefore, respondents’ action
for recovery of possession of the disputed properties had clearly
1. (1) Upon a written contract; prescribed.
2. (2) Upon an obligation created by law;
3. (3) Upon a judgment. Moreover, even though respondents’ Complaint before the RTC in Civil
Case No. CEB-5794 also prays for partition of the disputed properties, it
Since an implied trust is an obligation created by law (specifically, in this does not make their action to enforce their right to the said properties
case, by Article 1456 of the New Civil Code), imprescriptible. While as a general rule, the action for partition among co-
owners does not prescribe so long as the co-ownership is expressly or
_______________ impliedly recognized, as provided for in Article 494, of the New Civil Code,
it bears to emphasize that Donata had never recognized respondents as
24 co-owners or co-heirs, either ex-
Supra note 12.

25 _______________
Supra note 13.
26
Marquez v. Court of Appeals, 360 Phil. 843, 849-850; 300 SCRA 653, 658
217
(1998).
VOL. 514, FEBRUARY 5, 2007 217 27
Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Land Registration
Pilapil vs. Heirs of Maximino R. Briones
Act, Section 31.

then respondents had 10 years within which to bring an action for

218
reconveyance of their shares in Maximino’s properties. The next question
now is when should the ten-year prescriptive period be reckoned from.
218 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
The general rule is that an action for reconveyance of real property based
on implied trust prescribes ten years from registration and/or issuance of Pilapil vs. Heirs of Maximino R. Briones
the title to the property,26 not only because registration under the Torrens
system is a constructive notice of title,27 but also because by registering pressly or impliedly.28 Her assertion before the CFI in Special Proceedings
the disputed properties exclusively in her name, Donata had already No. 928-R that she was Maximino’s sole heir necessarily excludes
unequivocally repudiated any other claim to the same. recognition of some other co-owner or coheir to the inherited properties;
Consequently, the rule on non-prescription of action for partition of
By virtue of the CFI Order, dated 15 January 1960, in Special Proceedings property owned in common does not apply to the case at bar.
No. 928-R, Donata was able to register and secure certificates of title over
the disputed properties in her name on 27 June 1960. The respondents On laches as bar to recovery
filed with the RTC their Complaint for partition, annulment, and recovery
of possession of the disputed real properties, docketed as Civil Case No.
Other than prescription of action, respondents’ right to recover possession
of the disputed properties, based on implied trust, is also barred by laches.
The defense of laches, which is a question of inequity in permitting a claim
to be enforced, applies independently of prescription, which is a question
of time. Prescription is statutory; laches is equitable.29
Laches is defined as the failure to assert a right for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, warranting a presumption that the party
entitled to assert it has either abandoned or declined to assert it. This
equitable defense is based upon grounds of public policy, which requires
the discouragement of stale claims for the peace of society.30
This Court has already thoroughly discussed in its Decision the basis for
barring respondents’ action for recovery of the disputed properties
because of laches. This Court pointed out therein31 that—
“In further support of their contention of fraud by Donata, the heirs of
Maximino even emphasized that Donata lived along the same street as
some of the siblings of Maximino and, yet, she failed to inform them of the
CFI Order, dated [15 January 1960], in Special Proceedings No. 928-R, and
the issuance in her name of new TCTs
_______________
28
Vda. de Alberto v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 29759, 18 May 1989, 173
SCRA 436, 446-447.
29
Vda. de Rigonan v. Derecho, G.R. No. 159571, 15 July 2005, 463 SCRA
627, 647.
30
Id., at p. 648.
31
Rollo, pp. 300-301.
219
VOL. 514, FEBRUARY 5, 2007 219
Pilapil vs. Heirs of Maximino R. Briones
covering the real properties which belonged to the estate of Maximino.
This Court, however, appreciates such information differently. It actually
works against the heirs of Maximino. Since they only lived nearby,
Maximino’s siblings had ample opportunity to inquire or discuss with
Donata the status of the estate of their deceased brother. Some of the real
properties, which belonged to the estate of Maximino, were also located
within the same area as their residences in Cebu City, and Maximino’s
siblings could have regularly observed the actions and behavior of Donata
with regard to the said real properties. It is uncontested that from the time
of Maximino’s death on 1 May 1952, Donata had possession of the real
properties. She managed the real properties and even collected rental fees
on some of them until her own death on 1 November 1977. After Donata’s
death, Erlinda took possession of the real properties, and continued to
manage the same and collect the rental fees thereon. Donata and,
subsequently, Erlinda, were so obviously exercising rights of ownership
over the real properties, in exclusion of all others, which must have already
put the heirs of Maximino on guard if they truly believed that they still had
rights thereto.
The heirs of Maximino knew he died on 1 May 1952. They even attended
his wake. They did not offer any explanation as to why they had waited 33
years from Maximino’s death before one of them, Silverio, filed a Petition
for Letters of Administration for the intestate estate of Maximino on 21
January 1985. After learning that the intestate estate of Maximino was
already settled in Special Proceedings No. 928-R, they waited another two
years, before instituting, on 3 March 1987, Civil Case No. CEB-5794, the
Complaint for partition, annulment and recovery of the real property
belonging to the estate of Maximino. x x x”
Considering the circumstances in the afore-quoted paragraphs, as well as
respondents’ conduct before this Court, particularly the belated
submission of evidence and argument of new issues, respondents are
consistently displaying a penchant for delayed action, without any
proffered reason or justification for such delay.
It is well established that the law serves those who are vigilant and diligent
and not those who sleep when the law requires them to act. The law does
not encourage laches, indifference, negligence or ignorance. On the
contrary, for a
220
220 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Pilapil vs. Heirs of Maximino R. Briones
party to deserve the considerations of the courts, he must show that he is
not guilty of any of the aforesaid failings.32
On void judgment or order
Respondents presented only in their Reply and Supplemental Reply to the
petitioners’ Opposition to their Motion for Reconsideration the argument
that the CFI Order, dated 15 January 1960, in Special Proceedings No. 928-
R is void and, thus, it cannot have any legal effect. Consequently, the
registration of the disputed properties in the name of Donata pursuant to
such Order was likewise void.
This Court is unconvinced.
In the jurisprudence referred to by the respondents, 33 an order or
judgment is considered void when rendered by the court without or in
excess of its jurisdiction or in violation of a mandatory duty, circumstances
which are not present in the case at bar.
Distinction must be made between a void judgment and a voidable one,
thus—
“* * * A voidable judgment is one which, though not a mere nullity, is liable
to be made void when a person who has a right to proceed in the matter
takes the proper steps to have its invalidity declared. It always contains
some defect which may become fatal. It carries within it the means of its
own overthrow. But unless and until it is duly annulled, it is attended with
all the ordinary consequences of a legal judgment. The party against whom
it is given may escape its effect as a bar or an obligation, but only by a
proper appli
_______________
32
Vda. de Alberto v. Court of Appeals, supra note 28 at p. 450.
33
Republic v. Atlas Farms, Inc., 398 Phil. 1135; 345 SCRA 296 (2000);
Narciso v. Sta. Romana-Cruz, 385 Phil. 208; 328 SCRA 505 (2000); Ramos v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 42108, 29 December 1989, 180 SCRA 635;
Estoesta v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 74817, 8 November 1989, 179 SCRA
203; Caro v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-31426, 29 February 1988, 158
SCRA 270; Gomez v. Concepcion, 47 Phil. 717 (1925).
221
VOL. 514, FEBRUARY 5, 2007 221
Pilapil vs. Heirs of Maximino R. Briones
cation to have it vacated or reversed. Until that is done, it will be
efficacious as a claim, an estoppel, or a source of title. If no proceedings
are ever taken against it, it will continue throughout its life to all intents a
valid sentence. If emanating from a court of general jurisdiction, it will be
sustained by the ordinary presumptions of regularity, and it is not open to
impeachment in any collateral action. * * *”
But it is otherwise when the judgment is void. “A void judgment is in legal
effect no judgment. By it no rights are divested. From it no rights can be
obtained. Being worthless in itself, all proceedings founded upon it are
equally worthless. It neither binds nor bars any one. All acts performed
under it and all claims flowing out of it are void. The parties attempting to
enforce it may be responsible as trespassers. The purchaser at a sale by
virtue of its authority finds himself without title and without redress.”
(Freeman on Judgments, sec. 117, citing Campbell vs. McCahan, 41 Ill., 45;
Roberts vs. Stowers, 7 Bush, 295, Huls vs. Buntin, 47 Ill., 396; Sherrell vs.
Goodrum, 3 Humph., 418; Andrews vs. State, 2 Sneed, 549; Hollingsworth
vs. Bagley, 35 Tex., 345; Morton vs. Root, 2 Dill., 312; Commercial Bank of
Manchester vs. Martin, 9 Smedes & M., 613; Hargis vs. Morse, 7 Kan., 259.
See also Cornell vs. Barnes, 7 Hill, 35; Dawson and Another vs. Wells, 3 Ind.,
399; Meyer vs. Mintonye, 106 Ill., 414; Olson vs. Nunnally, 47 Kan., 391;
White vs. Foote L. & M. Co., 29 W. Va., 385.)
It is not always easy to draw the line of demarcation between a void
judgment and a voidable one, but all authorities agree that jurisdiction
over the subject-matter is essential to the validity of a judgment and that
want of such jurisdiction renders it void and a mere nullity. In the eye of
the law it is non-existent. (Fisher vs. Harnden, 1 Paine, 55; Towns vs.
Springer, 9 Ga., 130; Mobley vs. Mobley, 9 Ga., 247; Beverly and McBride
vs. Burke, 9 Ga., 440; Central Bank of Georgia vs. Gibson, 11 Ga., 453;
Johnson vs. Johnson, 30 Ill., 215; St. Louis and Sandoval Coal and Mining
Co. vs. Sandoval Coal and Mining Co., 111 Ill., 32; Swiggart vs. Harber, 4
Scam., 364; Miller vs. Snyder, 6 Ind., 1; Seely vs. Reid, 3 Greene [Iowa],
374.)34
_______________
34
Gomez v. Concepcion, id., at pp. 722-723.
222
222 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Pilapil vs. Heirs of Maximino R. Briones
The fraud and misrepresentation fostered by Donata on the CFI in Special
Proceedings No. 928-R did not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction over
the subject-matter of the case, namely, the intestate estate of Maximino.
Donata’s fraud and misrepresentation may have rendered the CFI Order,
dated 15 January 1960, voidable, but not void on its face. Hence, the said
Order, which already became final and executory, can only be set aside by
direct action to annul and enjoin its enforcement.35 It cannot be the
subject of a collateral attack as is being done in this case. Note that
respondents’ Complaint before the RTC in Civil Case No. CEB-5794 was one
for partition, annulment, and recovery of possession of the disputed
properties. The annulment sought in the Complaint was not that of the CFI
Order, dated 15 January 1960, but of the certificates of title over the
properties issued in Donata’s name. So until and unless respondents bring
a direct action to nullify the CFI Order, dated 15 January 1960, in Special
Proceedings No. 928-R, and attain a favorable judgment therein, the
assailed Order remains valid and binding.
Nonetheless, this Court also points out that an action to annul an order or
judgment based on fraud must be brought within four years from the
discovery of the fraud.36 If it is conceded that the respondents came to
know of Donata’s fraudulent acts only in 1985, during the course of the
RTC proceedings which they instituted for the settlement of Maximino’s
estate, then their right to file an action to annul the CFI Order, dated 15
January 1960, in Special Proceedings No. 928-R (earlier instituted by
Donata for the settlement of Maximino’s estate), has likewise prescribed
by present time.
In view of the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED.
_______________
35
Balangcad v. Justices of the Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 84888, 12
February 1992, 206 SCRA 169, 171.
36
Gallanosa v. Arcangel, G.R. No. L-29300, 21 June 1978, 83 SCRA 676,
686.
223
VOL. 514, FEBRUARY 5, 2007 223
First Aqua Sugar Traders, Inc. vs. Bank of the Philippine Islands
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago (Chairperson) and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
 Austria-Martinez, J., No Part.

Motion for Reconsideration denied.

Note.—An action for reconveyance based on an implied trust prescribes in

ten years. (Alfredo vs. Borras, 404 SCRA 145 [2003])

——o0o——

© Copyright 2020 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.

G.R. No. 133743. February 6, 2007.*
EDGAR SAN LUIS, petitioner, vs. FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, respondent.
G.R. No. 134029. February 6, 2007.*
RODOLFO SAN LUIS, petitioner, vs. FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS alias
FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, respondent.
Venue; In the case of Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals (74 SCRA 189 [1976]),
we laid down the doctrinal rule for determining residence—as
contradistinguished from domicile—of the decedent for purposes of fixing
the venue of settlement of his estate.—Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the
Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the estate of
Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the province “in
which he resides at the time of his death.” In the case of Garcia Fule v.
Court of Appeals, 74 SCRA 189 (1976), we laid down the doctrinal rule for
determining the residence—as contradistinguished from domicile—of the
decedent for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate.
Same; For purpose of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the residence
of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual
residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his
_______________
*
THIRD DIVISION.
295
VOL. 514, FEBRUARY 6, 2007 295
San Luis vs. San Luis
legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and
consistency.—It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that “residence,” for
purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo,
is synonymous with “domicile.” The rulings in Nuval and Romualdez are
inapplicable to the instant case because they involve election cases.
Needless to say, there is a distinction between “residence” for purposes of
election laws and “residence” for purposes of fixing the venue of actions.
In election cases, “residence” and “domicile” are treated as synonymous
terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one
has the intention of returning. However, for purposes of fixing venue
under the Rules of Court, the “residence” of a person is his personal, actual
or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may
not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides
therein with continuity and consistency. Hence, it is possible that a person
may have his residence in one place and domicile in another.
Family Code; Marriages; The Court stated that “the severance of the
marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses from each
other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the
other.”—This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, 174
SCRA 653 (1989), where the Court recognized the validity of a divorce
obtained abroad. In the said case, it was held that the alien spouse is not a
proper party in filing the adultery suit against his Filipino wife. The Court
stated that “the severance of the marital bond had the effect of
dissociating the former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of
one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other.”
Same; Same; Marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment between
two parties, cannot possibly be productive of any good to the society where
one is considered released from the marital bond while the other remains
bound to it.—When the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its
continuance intolerable to one of the parties and productive of no possible
good to the community, relief in some way should be obtainable.
Marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment between two parties,
cannot possibly be productive of any good to the society where one is
considered released from the marital bond while the other remains bound
to it. Such is the state of affairs where the alien spouse obtains a valid
divorce abroad against the Filipino spouse, as in this case.
296
296 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
San Luis vs. San Luis
Same; Same; Pleadings and Practice; In Garcia v. Recio, 366 SCRA 437 their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any property acquired during the
(2001), the Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and proving union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through
foreign law and divorce judgments. It held that presentation solely of the
divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due 297
execution must be presented.—Applying the above doctrine in the instant
case, the divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely VOL. 514, FEBRUARY 6, 2007 297
allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal San Luis vs. San Luis
personality to file the present petition as Felicisimo’s surviving spouse.
However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the
their joint efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to the co-owners shall be
validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of
presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven.
respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio,
366 SCRA 437 (2001), the Court laid down the specific guidelines for
pleading and proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It held that PETITIONS for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the
presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of Court of Appeals.
its authenticity and due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24
and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2)
a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the Manuel O. Chan, Jr. for petitioner Edgar San Luis.
document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be
(a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or Ariel Vista for petitioner Rodolfo San Luis.
consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz for respondent.
office.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Marriages; Co-ownership; Property; Any property acquired during the
union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint
Before us are consolidated petitions for review assailing the February 4,
efforts.—Respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a
1998 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 52647, which
direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation,
reversed and set aside the September 12, 19952 and January 31, 19963
the existence of which was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the
Resolutions of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 134 in SP.
validity of the divorce and Felicisimo’s capacity to remarry, but fails to
Proc. No. M3708; and its May 15, 1998 Resolution4 denying petitioners’
prove that her marriage with him was validly performed under the laws of
motion for reconsideration.
the U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-owner under Article 144 of
the Civil Code. This provision governs the property relations between
The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San
parties who live together as husband and wife without the benefit of
Luis (Felicisimo), who was the former governor of the Province of Laguna.
marriage, or their marriage is void from the beginning. It provides that the
property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first
or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born
In a coownership, it is not necessary that the property be acquired through
six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On
August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.
_______________
1
Rollo of G.R. No. 133743, pp. 45-66. Penned by Associate Justice Artemon
D. Luna and concurred in by Associate Justices Godardo A. Jacinto and
Roberto A. Barrios.
2
Records, pp. 335-338. Penned by Judge Paul T. Arcangel.
3 conjugal and exclusive, valued at P30,304,178.00 more or less; that the
Id., at pp. 391-393.
4
Rollo of G.R. No. 133743, p. 68. Penned by Associate Justice Artemon D.
Luna and concurred in by Associate Justices Demetrio G. Demetria and
Roberto A. Barrios.
298
298 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
San Luis vs. San Luis
Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin,
with whom he had a son, Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry
Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce 5 before the Family
Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of America (U.S.A.),
which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child
Custody on December 14, 1973.6
On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then
surnamed Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister of the
United Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. 7
He had no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from
the time of their marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992.
Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership
assets and the settlement of Felicisimo’s estate. On December 17, 1993,
she filed a petition for letters of administration8 before the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City, docketed as SP. Proc. No. M-3708 which was raffled
to Branch 146 thereof.
Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the time of
his death, the decedent was residing at 100 San Juanico Street, New
Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila; that the decedent’s surviving heirs
are respondent as legal spouse, his six children by his first marriage, and
son by his second marriage; that the decedent left real properties, both
decedent does not have any unpaid debts. Respondent prayed that the
conjugal partnership assets be liquidated and that letters of administration
be issued to her.
_______________
5
Records, p. 125.
6
Id., at p. 137.
7
Id., at p. 116.
8
Id., at pp. 1-5.
299
VOL. 514, FEBRUARY 6, 2007 299
San Luis vs. San Luis
On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of
Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss9 on the grounds of
improper venue and failure to state a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that
the petition for letters of administration should have been filed in the
Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimo’s place of residence prior to
his death. He further claimed that respondent has no legal personality to
file the petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the
latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee.
On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same grounds and joined her
brother Rodolfo in seeking the dismissal10 of the petition. On February 28,
1994, the trial court issued an Order11 denying the two motions to dismiss.
Unaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss, respondent filed on
March 5, 1994 her opposition 12 thereto. She submitted documentary
evidence showing that while Felicisimo exercised the powers of his public
office in Laguna, he regularly went home to their house in New Alabang
Village, Alabang, Metro Manila which they bought sometime in 1982.
Further, she presented the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family
Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove that the marriage of
Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been dissolved. Thus, she claimed that
Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her by virtue of paragraph 2, 13
Article 26 of the Family Code and the doctrine laid down in Van Dorn v.
Romillo, Jr. 14
_______________
9
Id., at pp. 10-24.
10
Id., at pp. 30-35.
11
Id., at p. 38.
12
Id., at pp. 39-138.
13
When a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
14
G.R. No. L-68470, October 8, 1985, 139 SCRA 139.
300
300 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
San Luis vs. San Luis
Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San Luis, separately
filed motions for reconsideration from the Order denying their motions to
dismiss.15 They asserted that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code
cannot be given retroactive effect to validate respondent’s bigamous
marriage with Felicisimo because this would impair vested rights in
derogation of Article 25616 of the Family Code.
On April 21, 1994, Mila, another daughter of Felicisimo from his first
marriage, filed a motion to disqualify Acting Presiding Judge Anthony E.
Santos from hearing the case.
On October 24, 1994, the trial court issued an Order17 denying the motions
for reconsideration. It ruled that respondent, as widow of the decedent,
possessed the legal standing to file the petition and that venue was
properly laid. Meanwhile, the motion for disqualification was deemed
moot and academic18 because then Acting Presiding Judge Santos was
substituted by Judge Salvador S. Tensuan pending the resolution of said
motion.
Mila filed a motion for inhibition19 against Judge Tensuan on November 16,
1994. On even date, Edgar also filed a motion for reconsideration 20 from
the Order denying their motion for reconsideration arguing that it does not
state the facts and law on which it was based.
On November 25, 1994, Judge Tensuan issued an Order21 granting the
motion for inhibition. The case was re-raffled to Branch 134 presided by
Judge Paul T. Arcangel.
_______________
15
See Records, pp. 155-158, 160-170 and 181-192.
16
This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or
impair vested rights or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or
other laws.
17
Records, p. 259.
18
Id., at p. 260.
19
Id., at pp. 262-267.
20
Id., at pp. 270-272.
21
Id., at p. 288.
301

VOL. 514, FEBRUARY 6, 2007 301
San Luis vs. San Luis
On April 24, 1995,22 the trial court required the parties to submit their
respective position papers on the twin issues of venue and legal capacity of
respondent to file the petition. On May 5, 1995, Edgar manifested 23 that
he is adopting the arguments and evidence set forth in his previous motion
for reconsideration as his position paper. Respondent and Rodolfo filed
their position papers on June 14,24 and June 20,25 1995, respectively.
On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of
administration. It held that, at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the
duly elected governor and a resident of the Province of Laguna. Hence, the
petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City.
It also ruled that respondent was without legal capacity to file the petition
for letters of administration because her marriage with Felicisimo was
bigamous, thus, void ab initio. It found that the decree of absolute divorce
dissolving Felicisimo’s marriage to Merry Lee was not valid in the
Philippines and did not bind Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen. It also
ruled that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be
retroactively applied because it would impair the vested rights of
Felicisimo’s legitimate children.
Respondent moved for reconsideration26 and for the disqualification27 of
Judge Arcangel but said motions were denied. 28
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside
the orders of the trial court in its assailed Decision dated February 4, 1998,
the dispositive portion of which states:
_______________
22
Id., at p. 301.
23
Id., at pp. 302-303.
24
Id., at pp. 306-311.
25
Id., at pp. 318-320.
26
Id., at pp. 339-349.
27
Id., at pp. 350-354.
28
Id., at pp. 391-393.
302
302 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
San Luis vs. San Luis
“WHEREFORE, the Orders dated September 12, 1995 and January 31, 1996
are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE; the Orders dated February 28 and
October 24, 1994 are REINSTATED; and the records of the case is
REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.”29
The appellante court ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of
Court, the term “place of residence” of the decedent, for purposes of fixing
the venue of the settlement of his estate, refers to the personal, actual or
physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode of a person as
distinguished from legal residence or domicile. It noted that although
Felicisimo discharged his functions as governor in Laguna, he actually
resided in Alabang, Muntinlupa. Thus, the petition for letters of
administration was properly filed in Makati City.
The Court of Appeals also held that Felicisimo had legal capacity to marry
respondent by virtue of paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code and the
rulings in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 30 and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera.31 It found
that the marriage between Felicisimo and Merry Lee was validly dissolved
by virtue of the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of
the First Circuit, State of Hawaii. As a result, under paragraph 2, Article 26,
Felicisimo was capacitated to contract a subsequent marriage with
respondent. Thus—
“With the well-known rule—express mandate of paragraph 2, Article 26, of
the Family Code of the Philippines, the doctrines in Van Dorn, Pilapil, and
the reason and philosophy behind the enactment of E.O. No. 227,—there
is no justiciable reason to sustain the individual view—sweeping
statement—of Judge Arc[h]angel, that “Article 26, par. 2 of the Family
Code, contravenes the basic policy of our state against divorce in any form
whatsoever.” Indeed, courts cannot deny what the law grants. All that the
courts should do is to give force and effect to the express mandate of the _______________
law. The foreign divorce having been obtained by the Foreigner on
December 14, 32
Parenthetically, it appears that the Court of Appeals proceeded from a
mistaken finding of fact because the records clearly show that the divorce
_______________ was obtained on December 14, 1973 (not December 14, 1992) and that the
marriage of Gov. San Luis with respondent was celebrated on June 20,
29
Rollo of G.R. No. 133743, p. 66. 1974. These events both occurred before the effectivity of the Family Code
30
Supra note 14. on August 3, 1988.
31
G.R. No. 80116, June 30, 1989, 174 SCRA 653.
303 33
Rollo of G.R. No. 133743, p. 65.
VOL. 514, FEBRUARY 6, 2007 303 34
See CA Rollo, pp. 309-322, 335-340, and 362-369.
San Luis vs. San Luis 35
Rollo of G.R. No. 133743, pp. 8-42.
36
Id., at p. 75.
37
1992,32 the Filipino divorcee, “shall x x x have capacity to remarry under 52 Phil. 645 (1928).
38
Philippine laws.” For this reason, the marriage between the deceased and G.R. No. 104960, September 14, 1993, 226 SCRA 408.
petitioner should not be denominated as “a bigamous marriage.” 304
304 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Therefore, under Article 130 of the Family Code, the petitioner as the San Luis vs. San Luis
surviving spouse can institute the judicial proceeding for the settlement of
the estate of the deceased. x x x”33 tion for letters of administration should have been filed in Sta. Cruz,
Laguna.
Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed separate motions for reconsideration 34
which were denied by the Court of Appeals. On July 2, 1998, Edgar Petitioners also contend that respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo was void
appealed to this Court via the instant petition for review on certiorari.35 and bigamous because it was performed during the subsistence of the
Rodolfo later filed a manifestation and motion to adopt the said petition latter’s marriage to Merry Lee. They argue that paragraph 2, Article 26
which was granted.36 cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair vested rights and
ratify the void bigamous marriage. As such, respondent cannot be
In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar and Rodolfo insist that the considered the surviving wife of Felicisimo; hence, she has no legal
venue of the subject petition for letters of administration was improperly capacity to file the petition for letters of administration.
laid because at the time of his death, Felicisimo was a resident of Sta. Cruz,
Laguna. They contend that pursuant to our rulings in Nuval v. Guray 37 and The issues for resolution: (1) whether venue was properly laid, and (2)
Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City,38 “residence” is synonymous with whether respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for
“domicile” which denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when letters of administration.
absent, one intends to return. They claim that a person can only have one
domicile at any given time. Since Felicisimo never changed his domicile, The petition lacks merit.
the peti-
Under Section 1,39 Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of
administration of the estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional
Trial Court of the province “in which he resides at the time of his death.” In
the case of Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals,40 we laid down the doctrinal
rule for determining the residence—as contradistinguished from
domicile—of the decedent for purposes of fixing the venue of the
settlement of his estate:
“[T]he term “resides” connotes ex vi termini “actual residence” as
distinguished from “legal residence or domicile.” This term “resides,” like
the terms “residing” and “residence,” is elastic and should be interpreted
in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is
employed. In the application of venue statutes and
_______________
39
SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons be settled.—If the
decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death,
whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of
administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance
in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, x x x.
(Underscoring supplied)
40
G.R. Nos. L-40502 & L-42670, November 29, 1976, 74 SCRA 189.
305
VOL. 514, FEBRUARY 6, 2007 305
San Luis vs. San Luis
rules – Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature –
residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the
statute uses the word “domicile” still it is construed as meaning residence
and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction
between the terms “residence” and “domicile” but as generally used in
statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same
meaning as the term “inhabitant.” In other words, “resides” should be
viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual
or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It
signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this
popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal
residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires
bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires
bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one’s
domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required though;
however, the residence must be more than temporary.”41 (Emphasis
supplied)
It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that “residence,” for purposes of
fixing the venue of the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo, is
synonymous with “domicile.” The rulings in Nuval and Romualdez are
inapplicable to the instant case because they involve election cases.
Needless to say, there is a distinction between “residence” for purposes of
election laws and “residence” for purposes of fixing the venue of actions.
In election cases, “residence” and “domicile” are treated as synonymous
terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one
has the intention of returning.42 However, for purposes of fixing venue
under the Rules of Court, the “residence” of a person is his personal, actual
or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may
not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile
_______________
41
Id., at pp. 199-200.
42
Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, supra note 38 at p. 415.
306
306 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
San Luis vs. San Luis
provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency.43 Hence, it is
possible that a person may have his residence in one place and domicile in
another.
In the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo was Trial Court50 which has territorial jurisdiction over Alabang, Muntinlupa.
domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, respondent proved that he also maintained The subject petition was filed on December 17, 1993. At that time,
a residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of his death. Muntinlupa was still a municipality and the branches of the Regional Trial
Respondent submitted in evidence the Deed of Absolute Sale44 dated Court of the National Capital Judicial Region which had territorial
January 5, 1983 showing that the deceased purchased the aforesaid jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then seated in Makati City as per
property. She also presented billing statements 45 from the Philippine Heart Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3.51 Thus, the subject petition
Center and Chinese General Hospital for the period August to December was validly filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
1992 indicating the address of Felicisimo at “100 San Juanico, Ayala
Alabang, Muntinlupa.” Respondent also presented proof of membership of Anent the issue of respondent Felicidad’s legal personality to file the
the deceased in the Ayala Alabang Village Association 46 and Ayala Country petition for letters of administration, we must first resolve the issue of
Club, Inc.,47 letter-envelopes48 from 1988 to 1990 sent by the deceased’s whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may validly
children to him at his Alabang address, and the deceased’s calling cards49 remarry under the Civil Code, considering that Felicidad’s marriage to
stating that his home/city address is at “100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the Family Code
Village, Muntinlupa” while his office/provincial address is in “Provincial took effect on August 3, 1988. In resolving this issue, we need not
Capitol, Sta. Cruz, Laguna.” retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code, particularly Art. 26,
par. (2) considering that there is sufficient jurisprudential basis allowing us
From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, to rule in the affirmative.
Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his
estate. Consequently, the subject petition for letters of administration was _______________
validly filed in the Regional
50
The Regional Trial Court and not the Municipal Trial Court had
_______________ jurisdiction over this case because the value of Gov. San Luis’ estate
exceeded P200,000.00 as provided for under B.P. Blg 129, Section 19(4).
43
See Boleyley v. Villanueva, 373 Phil. 141, 146; 314 SCRA 364, 368 (1999);
Dangwa Transportation Co. Inc. v. Sarmiento, G.R. No. L-22795, January 31, 51
SC Administrative Order No. 3 dated January 19, 1983 states in part:
1977, 75 SCRA 124, 128-129.
44
Records, pp. 76-78.
45
Id., at pp. 60-75. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 18 of B.P. Blg. 129, and Section 4 of
46
Id., at p. 79. the Executive Order issued by the President of the Philippines on January
47
Id., at p. 80. 17, 1983, declaring the reorganization of the Judiciary, the territorial
48
Id., at pp. 81-83. jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts in the National Capital Judicial
49 Region are hereby defined as follows:
Id., at p. 84.
307
VOL. 514, FEBRUARY 6, 2007 307 xxxx
San Luis vs. San Luis
5. Branches CXXXII to CL, inclusive, with seats at Makati—over the
municipalities of Las Piñas, Makati, Muntinlupa and Parañaque. x x x

308
308 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
San Luis vs. San Luis
The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 52 involved a marriage between a
foreigner and his Filipino wife, which marriage was subsequently dissolved
through a divorce obtained abroad by the latter. Claiming that the divorce
was not valid under Philippine law, the alien spouse alleged that his
interest in the properties from their conjugal partnership should be
protected. The Court, however, recognized the validity of the divorce and
held that the alien spouse had no interest in the properties acquired by the
Filipino wife after the divorce. Thus:
“In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the
marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce
dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the
United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:
“The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of
matrimony by a competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or
domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free them both from the
bond. The marriage tie, when thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind
either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown
to the law. When the law provides, in the nature of a penalty, that the
guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as well as the other, is still
absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage.”
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the
husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below
as petitioner’s husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As
he is bound by the Decision of his own country’s Court, which validly
exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate,
he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting
his right over the alleged conjugal property.”53
_______________
52
Supra note 14.
53
Id., at pp. 139, 143-144.
309
VOL. 514, FEBRUARY 6, 2007 309
San Luis vs. San Luis
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she
should no longer be considered married to the alien spouse. Further, she
should not be required to perform her marital duties and obligations. It
held:
“To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws,
petitioner has to be considered still married to private respondent and
still subject to a wife’s obligations under Article 109, et seq. of the Civil
Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with,
observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent.
The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to
conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own
country if the ends of justice are to be served.”54 (Emphasis added)
This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v. IbaySomera 55 where the
Court recognized the validity of a divorce obtained abroad. In the said
case, it was held that the alien spouse is not a proper party in filing the
adultery suit against his Filipino wife. The Court stated that “the severance
of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses from
each other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy
on the other.”56
Likewise, in Quita v. Court of Appeals,57 the Court stated that where a
Filipino is divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse, the ruling in Van Dorn
applies.58 Although decided on December 22, 1998, the divorce in the said
case was obtained in 1954 when the Civil Code provisions were still in
effect.
The significance of the Van Dorn case to the development of limited
recognition of divorce in the Philippines cannot be
_______________
54
Id., at p. 144.
55
Supra note 31.
56
Id., at p. 664.
57
G.R. No. 124862, December 22, 1998, 300 SCRA 406.
58
Id., at p. 414; See also Republic v. Orbecido III, G.R. No. 154380, October
5, 2005, 472 SCRA 114, 121.
310
310 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
San Luis vs. San Luis
denied. The ruling has long been interpreted as severing marital ties
between parties in a mixed marriage and capacitating the Filipino spouse
to remarry as a necessary consequence of upholding the validity of a
divorce obtained abroad by the alien spouse. In his treatise, Dr. Arturo M.
Tolentino cited Van Dorn stating that “if the foreigner obtains a valid
foreign divorce, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law.”59 In Garcia v. Recio,60 the Court likewise cited the
aforementioned case in relation to Article 26.61
In the recent case of Republic v. Orbecido III,62 the historical background
and legislative intent behind paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code
were discussed, to wit:
Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive
Order No. 209, otherwise known as the “Family Code,” which took effect
on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the
laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there
as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under
Articles 35, 37, and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code,
Executive Order No. 227 was likewise signed into law, amending Articles
26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second paragraph was added to
Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance
with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and
valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those
prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
_______________
59
Tolentino, Arturo M., Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code
of the Philippines, Vol. I, 1990 ed., p. 263.
60
G.R. No. 138322, October 2, 2001, 366 SCRA 437.
61
Id., at p. 447.
62
Supra note 58.
311
VOL. 514, FEBRUARY 6, 2007 311
San Luis vs. San Luis
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)
xxxx
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that
the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-
Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse
who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case
of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. The Van Dorn case involved a marriage
between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a
divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the
Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to
remarry under Philippine law.63 (Emphasis added)
As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation where
a divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse. With the
enactment of the Family Code and paragraph 2, Article 26 thereof, our
lawmakers codified the law already established through judicial precedent.
Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its
continuance intolerable to one of the parties and productive of no possible
good to the community, relief in some way should be obtainable. 64
Marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment between two parties,
cannot possibly be productive of any good to the society where one is
considered released from the marital bond while the other remains bound
to it. Such is the state of affairs where the alien spouse
_______________
63
Id., at pp. 119-121.
64
Goitia v. Campos Rueda, 35 Phil. 252, 254-255 (1916).
312
312 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
San Luis vs. San Luis
obtains a valid divorce abroad against the Filipino spouse, as in this case.
Petitioners cite Articles 1565 and 1766 of the Civil Code in stating that the
divorce is void under Philippine law insofar as Filipinos are concerned.
However, in light of this Court’s rulings in the cases discussed above, the
Filipino spouse should not be discriminated against in his own country if
the ends of justice are to be served.67 In Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate
Court,68 the Court stated:
“But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and
likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking
the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge should be to
discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the
law should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this
is never within the legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent,
in fact, for we presume the good motives of the legislature, is to render
justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in
consonance with justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we must
keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that, while generally valid,
may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case because of its
peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we are not bound, because
only of our nature and functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish
obedience to their language. What we do instead is find a balance
between the word and the will, that justice may be done even as the law is
obeyed.
_______________
65
ART. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status,
condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the
Philippines, even though living abroad.
66
ART. 17. x x x Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property,
and those which have for their object public order, public policy and good
customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a
foreign country.
67
Supra note 14 at p. 144.
68
G.R. No. L-72873, May 28, 1987, 150 SCRA 259.
313
VOL. 514, FEBRUARY 6, 2007 313
San Luis vs. San Luis
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly
apply the law as it is worded, yielding like robots to the literal command
without regard to its cause and consequence. “Courts are apt to err by
sticking too closely to the words of a law,” so we are warned, by Justice
Holmes again, “where these words import a policy that goes beyond
them.”
xxxx
More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice “as the constant
and perpetual wish to render every one his due.” That wish continues to
motivate this Court when it assesses the facts and the law in every case
brought to it for decision. Justice is always an essential ingredient of its
decisions. Thus when the facts warrants, we interpret the law in a way that
will render justice, presuming that it was the intention of the lawmaker, to
begin with, that the law be dispensed with justice.” 69
Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree
allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to
remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the
present petition as Felicisimo’s surviving spouse. However, the records
show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce
obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and
Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio,70 the Court laid
down the specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and
divorce judgments. It held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is
insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due execution must be
presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document
may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either
(1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer
having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the
Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by
the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Phil-
_______________
69
Id., at pp. 264-265, 268.
70
Supra note 60.
314
314 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
San Luis vs. San Luis
ippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record
is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.71
With regard to respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in
California, U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate
and the annotated text72 of the Family Law Act of California which
purportedly show that their marriage was done in accordance with the
said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial
notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved.73
Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further
reception of evidence on the divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and
the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in
1974, nevertheless, we find that the latter has the legal personality to file
the subject petition for letters of administration, as she may be considered
the coowner of Felicisimo as regards the properties that were acquired
through their joint efforts during their cohabitation.
Section 6,74 Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters of
administration may be granted to the surviving spouse of the decedent.
However, Section 2, Rule 79 thereof also provides in part:
_______________
71
Id., at pp. 448-449.
72
Records, pp. 118-124.
73
Supra note 60 at p. 451.
74
SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted.—If x x x a
person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or
both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving
husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent
and willing to serve; x x x.
315
VOL. 514, FEBRUARY 6, 2007 315
San Luis vs. San Luis
“SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration.—A petition for
letters of administration must be filed by an interested person and must
show, as far as known to the petitioner: x x x.”
An “interested person” has been defined as one who would be benefited
by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate,
such as a creditor. The interest must be material and direct, and not
merely indirect or contingent.75
In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person who
has a direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their
cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by petitioners. If she
proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimo’s capacity to remarry, but
fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly performed under the
laws of the U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-owner under Article
14476 of the Civil Code. This provision governs the property relations
between parties who live together as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void from the beginning. It
provides that the property acquired by either or both of them through
their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the
rules on co-ownership. In a co-ownership, it is not necessary that the
property be acquired through their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any
property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been
obtained through their joint efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to
_______________
75
Saguinsin v. Lindayag, 116 Phil. 1193, 1195; 6 SCRA 874, 876-877 (1962).
76
Article 144 of the Civil Code reads in full: When a man and a woman live
together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their marriage
is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them
through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be
governed by the rules on co-ownership.
316
316 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
San Luis vs. San Luis
the co-owners shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven.77
Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the divorce and
the marriage, the applicable provision would be Article 148 of the Family
Code which has filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code by expressly
regulating the property relations of couples living together as husband and
wife but are incapacitated to marry.78 In Saguid v. Court of Appeals,79 we
held that even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of property occurred
before the Family Code took effect, Article 148 governs. 80 The Court
described the property regime under this provision as follows:
“The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of
parties who are not legally capacitated to marry each other, but who
nonetheless live together as husband and wife, applies to properties
acquired during said cohabitation in proportion to their respective
contributions. Co-ownership will only be up to the extent of the proven
actual contribution of money, property or industry. Absent proof of the
extent thereof, their contributions and corresponding shares shall be
presumed to be equal.
xxxx
In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved
the issue of co-ownership of properties acquired by the parties to a
bigamous marriage and an adulterous relationship, respectively, we ruled
that proof of actual contribution in the acquisition of the property is
essential. x x x
As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as
determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an
affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by competent evidence and
reliance must be had on the strength of the party’s own
_______________
77
Valdes v. RTC, Br. 102, Quezon City, 328 Phil. 1289, 1297; 260 SCRA 221,
228 (1996).
78
Francisco v. Master Iron Works & Construction Corporation, G.R. No.
151967, February 16, 2005, 451 SCRA 494, 506.
79
G.R. No. 150611, June 10, 2003, 403 SCRA 678.
80
Id., at p. 686.
317
VOL. 514, FEBRUARY 6, 2007
San Luis vs. San Luis
evidence and not upon the weakness of the opponent’s defense. x x x” 81
In view of the foregoing, we find that respondent’s legal capacity to file the
subject petition for letters of administration may arise from her status as
the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner under Article 144 of the
Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
reinstating and affirming the February 28, 1994 Order of the Regional Trial
Court which denied petitioners’ motion to dismiss and its October 24, 1994
Order which dismissed petitioners’ motion for reconsideration is
AFFIRMED. Let this case be REMANDED to the trial court for further
proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr. and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
Petition denied, case remanded to trial court for further proceedings.
Notes.—Under the property regime of co-ownership, properties acquired
by both parties during their union in the absence of proof to the contrary
are presumed to have been obtained through the joint efforts of the
parties and will be owned by them in equal shares. (Gonzales vs. Gonzales,
478 SCRA 327 [2005])
Under the Family Code, if the properties are acquired during the marriage,
the presumption is that they are conjugal. (Villanueva vs. Court of Appeals,
427 SCRA 439 [2004])
317
 G.R. Nos. 208828-29. August 13, 2014.*
RICARDO C. SILVERIO, SR., petitioner, vs. RICARDO S. SILVERIO, JR., CITRINE
HOLDINGS, INC., MONICA P. OCAMPO and ZEE2 RESOURCES, INC.,
respondents.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Courts; Probate Courts; The probate court
having jurisdiction over properties under administration has the authority
not only to approve any disposition or conveyance, but also to annul an
unauthorized sale by the prospective heirs or administrator.—At the
outset, we emphasize that the probate court having jurisdiction over
properties under administration has the authority not only to approve any
disposition or conveyance, but also to annul an unauthorized sale by the
prospective heirs or administrator. Thus we held in Lee v. Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 85, 423 SCRA 497 (2004): Juliana Ortañez and
Jose Ortañez sold specific properties of the estate, without court approval.
It is well-settled that court approval is necessary for the validity of any
disposition of the decedent’s estate. In the early case of Godoy v. Orellano,
we laid down the rule that the sale of the property of the estate by an
administrator without the order of the probate court is void and passes no
title to the purchaser. And in the case of Dillena v. Court of Appeals, we
ruled that: x x x x It being settled that prop-
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
184
184 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Silverio, Sr. vs. Silverio, Jr.
erty under administration needs the approval of the probate court before
it can be disposed of, any unauthorized disposition does not bind the
estate and is null and void. As early as 1921 in the case of Godoy v.
Orellano (42 Phil. 347), We laid down the rule that a sale by an
administrator of property of the deceased, which is not authorized by the
probate court is null and void and title does not pass to the purchaser.
There is hardly any doubt that the probate court can declare null and void
the disposition of the property under administration, made by private
respondent, the same having been effected without authority from said
court. It is the probate court that has the power to authorize and/or
approve the sale (Sections 4 and 7, Rule 89), hence, a fortiori, it is said
court that can declare it null and void for as long as the proceedings had
not been closed or terminated. To uphold petitioner’s contention that the
probate court cannot annul the unauthorized sale, would render
meaningless the power pertaining to the said court. (Bonga v. Soler, 2
SCRA 755 [1961]). Our jurisprudence is therefore clear that (1) any
disposition of estate property by an administrator or prospective heir
pending final adjudication requires court approval and (2) any
unauthorized disposition of estate property can be annulled by the
probate court, there being no need for a separate action to annul the
unauthorized disposition.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the
Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Gille, Cruz and Monera Law Offices and Quisumbing, Torres for petitioner.
Poblador, Bautista & Reyes for respondent ZEE2 Resources.
R.M. Lee & Associates for respondents R. Silverio, Jr., Citrine Holdings, Inc.
and M. Ocampo.
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended, to reverse and
185
VOL. 733, AUGUST 13, 2014 185
Silverio, Sr. vs. Silverio, Jr.
set aside the Decision1 dated March 8, 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
insofar as C.A.-G.R. S.P. Nos. 121173 and 122024 are concerned, and
Resolution2 dated July 4, 2013 denying petitioner’s Motion for Partial
Reconsideration. The CA nullified the preliminary injunction issued by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City (“intestate court”), Branch 57 in
Sp. Proc. No. M-2629 and reversed said court’s Order dated August 18,
2011 declaring the sales and derivative titles over two properties subject of
intestate proceedings as null and void.
The factual and procedural antecedents of the case, as summarized by the
CA, are as follows:
The late Beatriz S. Silverio died without leaving a will on October 7, 1987.
She was survived by her legal heirs, namely: Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr.
(husband), Edmundo S. Silverio (son), Edgardo S. Silverio (son), Ricardo S.
Silverio, Jr. (son), Nelia S. Silverio-Dee (daughter), and Ligaya S. Silverio
(daughter). Subsequently, an intestate proceeding (SP. PROC. NO. M-2629)
for the settlement of her estate was filed by SILVERIO, SR.
In the course of the proceedings, the parties filed different petitions and
appeal challenging several orders of the intestate court that went all the
way up to the Supreme Court. To better understand the myriad of factual
and procedural antecedents leading to the instant consolidated case, this
court will resolve the petitions in seriatim.
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 20-50. Penned by Associate Justice Leoncia Real-Dimagiba,
with Associate Justices Ricardo R. Rosario and Marlene Gonzales-Sison,
concurring.
2 Id., at pp. 52-53.
186
186 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Silverio, Sr. vs. Silverio, Jr.
The Petitions
C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 121172
The first petition of the three consolidated petitions is C.A.-G.R. S.P. No.
121172 wherein petitioner, RICARDO S. SILVERIO, JR. (“SILVERIO, JR.”)
assails the Order of the intestate court dated 16 June 2011 reinstating
RICARDO SILVERIO, SR. (“SILVERIO, SR.”) as administrator to the estate of
the late Beatriz Silverio.
The administrator first appointed by the Court was EDGARDO SILVERIO
(“EDGARDO”), but by virtue of a Joint Manifestation dated 3 November
1999 filed by the heirs of BEATRIZ D. SILVERIO, the motion to withdraw as
administrator filed by EDGARDO was approved by the intestate court and
in his stead, SILVERIO, SR. was appointed as the new administrator.
Thereafter, an active exchange of pleadings to remove and appoint a new
administrator ensued between SILVERIO, SR. and SILVERIO, JR. The flip-
flopping appointment of administrator is summarized below:
In an Order dated 3 January 2005, SILVERIO, SR. was removed as
administrator and in his stead, SILVERIO, JR. was designated as the new
administrator. A motion for reconsideration was separately filed by
SILVERIO, SR. and Nelia Silverio-Dee (“SILVERIO-DEE”) and on 31 May 2005,
the intestate court issued an Omnibus Order affirming among others, the
Order of 3 January 2005. In the same Order, the intestate court also
granted the motion of SILVERIO, JR. to take his oath as administrator
effective upon receipt of the order and expunged the inventory report filed
by SILVERIO, SR.
On 12 December 2005 the intestate court acting on the motion filed by
SILVERIO, SR. recalled the Order granting letters of administration to
SILVERIO, JR. and reinstated SILVERIO, SR. as administrator. Then again,
the intestate court acting on the motion for partial consideration to the
Order dated 12 December 2005 filed by SILVERIO, JR. issued an Omnibus
Order dated 31 Octo-
187
VOL. 733, AUGUST 13, 2014 187
Silverio, Sr. vs. Silverio, Jr.
ber 2006 upholding the grant of Letters of Administration to SILVERIO, JR.
and removed SILVERIO, SR., ad administrator for gross violation of his
duties and functions under Section 1, Rule 81 of the Rules of Court.
SILVERIO, SR. moved for reconsideration of the above Order whereas
SILVERIO-DEE on the other hand, filed a Petition for Certiorari before the
Court of Appeals docketed as C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 97196. On 28 August 2008,
the Court of Appeals (Seventh Division) rendered a decision reinstating
SILVERIO, SR. as administrator, the decretal portion of the Order reads:
“WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The portions of the Omnibus
Order upholding the grant of letters of administration to and the taking of
an oath of administration by Ricardo Silverio, Jr., as well as the removal of
Ricardo Silverio, Sr. as administrator to the Estate of Beatriz Silverio, are
declared NULL and VOID. The writ of preliminary injunction earlier issued is
MADE PERMANENT in regard to the said portions. Respondent RTC is
ORDERED to reinstate Ricardo Silverio, Sr. as administrator to the Estate of
Beatriz Silverio. Costs against the Private Respondents.
SO ORDERED.”
SILVERIO, JR. filed a Petition for review on Certiorari before the Supreme
Court docketed as G.R. No. 185619 challenging the 28 Augsut 2008
decision of the Court of Appeals. On 11 February 2009, the Supreme Court
issued a resolution denying the petition for failure to sufficiently show any
reversible error in the assailed judgment to warrant the exercise by the
Court of discretionary appellate jurisdiction. Acting on SILVERIO, JR.’s
motion for reconsideration, the Supreme Court on 11 February 2011,
denied the motion with finality. An entry of judgment was made on 29
March 2011.
On 25 April 2011, SILVERIO, SR. filed before the intestate court, an urgent
motion to be reinstated as ad
188
188 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Silverio, Sr. vs. Silverio, Jr.
ministrator of the estate. Acting on the motion, the intestate court issued
the now challenged Order dated 16 June 2011, the pertinent portion of the
Order reads:
xxxx
“WHEREFORE, upon posting of a bond in the sum of TEN MILLION PESOS,
the same to be approved by this Court, Mr. Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. is hereby
ordered reinstated as the Administrator to the estate of the late Beatriz
Silverio and to immediately take his oath as such, and exercise his duties
and functions as are incumbent under the law upon the said position.
x x x.”
xxxx
C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 121173
xxxx
On 15 March 2011, heirs SILVERIO, JR., EDMUNDO and LIGAYA
represented by her legal guardian moved for the disqualification and/or
inhibition of JUDGE GUANLAO, JR. based on the following grounds: (1)
Absence of the written consent of all parties in interest allowing JUDGE
GUANLAO, JR. to continue hearing the case considering that he appeared
once as counsel in the intestate proceedings; (2) JUDGE GUANLAO, JR. has
shown bias and partiality in favor of SILVERIO, SR. by allowing the latter to
pursue several motions and even issued a TRO in violation of the rules
against forum shopping; (3) Heir LIGAYA’s Petition for Support and Release
of Funds for Medical Support has not been resolved; and (4) It is in the best
interest of all the heirs that the proceedings be presided and decided by
the cold neutrality of an impartial judge.
On 23 March 2011, JUDGE GUANLAO, JR. issued an order denying the
Motion for Disqualification and/or Inhibition. The movants filed a motion
for reconsidera
189
VOL. 733, AUGUST 13, 2014 189
Silverio, Sr. vs. Silverio, Jr.
tion but the same was denied in an order dated 14 June 2011. Hence, the
instant petition.
xxxx
C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 122024
xxxx
The intestate court in its Omnibus Order dated 31 October 2006, ordered
among others, the sale of certain properties belonging to the estate. The
portion of the order which is pertinent to the present petition reads:
“WHEREFORE, above premises considered, this Court for the foregoing
reasons resolves to grant the following:
(1) x x x
(2) x x x
(3) Allowing the sale of the properties located at (1) No. 82 Cambridge
Circle, Forbes Park, Makati City, covered by T.C.T. No. 137155 issued by
Register of Deeds of Makati City; (2) No. 3 Intsia Road, Forbes Park, Makati
City covered by T.C.T. No. 4137154 issued by the Register of Deeds of
Makati City; and (3) No. 19 Taurus St., Bel-Air Subd. Makati City covered by
TCT No. 137156 issued by the Register of Deeds of Makati City to partially
settle the intestate estate of the late Beatriz S. Silverio, and authorizing the
Administrator to undertake the proper procedure or transferring the titles
involved to the name of the estate; and
(4) To apply the proceeds of the sale mentioned in Number 3 above to
the payment of taxes, interests, penalties and other charges, if any, and to
distribute the residue among the heirs Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr., Ricardo S.
Silverio, Jr., Ligaya S. Silverio represented by Legal Guardian Nestor S. Dela
Merced II,
190
190 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Silverio, Sr. vs. Silverio, Jr.
Edmundo S. Silverio and Nelia S. Silverio-Dee in accordance with the law on
intestacy.
SO ORDERED.”
By virtue of the aforesaid Order, SILVERIO, JR. on 16 October 2007
executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of CITRINE HOLDINGS, Inc.
(“CITRINE”) over the property located at No. 3 Intsia Road, Forbes Park,
Makati City. CITRINE became the registered owner thereof on 06
September 2010 as evidenced by TCT No. 006-201000063.
A Deed of Absolute Sale was likewise executed in favor of Monica P.
Ocampo (notarized on September 16, 2010) for the lot located at No. 82
Cambridge Circle, Forbes Park, Makati City. On 23 December 2010, TCT No.
006-2011000050 was issued to Monica P. Ocampo. The latter subsequently
sold said property to ZEE2 Resources, Inc. (ZEE2) and TCT No. 006-
2011000190 was issued on 11 February 2011 under its name.
In the interim, or on 12 December 2006 SILVERIO-DEE filed a petition for
certiorari before the Court of Appeals docketed as C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 97196
with prayer for injunctive relief. As prayed for, the Court of Appeals issued
a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on 5 February 2007. On 4 July 2007,
the Court issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction conditioned upon the
posting of the bond in the amount of two million pesos (Php2,000,000.00).
SILVERIO-DEE posted the required bond on February 5, 2007 but in an
order dated 3 January 2008, the Court ruled that the bond posted by
SILVERIO-DEE failed to comply with A.M. No. 04-7-02-SC. The Court,
however, did not reverse the ruling granting the injunction but instead
ordered SILVERIO-DEE to comply with A.M. No. 04-7-02-SC. The Court also
increased the bond from two million to ten million. On 29 February 2008,
the Court issued a Resolution approving the ten million bond and issued
the Writ of Preliminary Injunction. Eventually, on 28 August 2008 the Court
of Appeals (Seventh Division) issued a decision reinstating SILVERIO, SR. as
administrator and declaring the Writ of
191
VOL. 733, AUGUST 13, 2014 191
Silverio, Sr. vs. Silverio, Jr.
Preliminary Injunction permanent in regard to the appointment of
administrator.
On 04 February 2011 SILVERIO, SR. filed an Urgent Application for the
Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order/Preliminary Prohibitory
Injunction (With Motion For the Issuance of Subpoena Ad Testificandum
and Subpoena Duces Tecum) praying among others, that a TRO be issued
restraining and/or preventing SILVERIO, JR., MONICA OCAMPO, CITRINE
HOLDINGS, INC. and their successors-in-interest from committing any act
that would affect the titles to the three properties.
On 14 February 2011, SILVERIO, SR. filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion (a) To
Declare as Null and Void the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 16 September
2010; (b) To cancel the Transfer Certificate of Title No. 006-2011000050;
and (c) To reinstate the Transfer Certificate of Title No. 2236121 in the
name of Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. and the Intestate Estate of the late Beatriz
S. Silverio.
On 28 February 2011 the Intestate Court issued an Order granting a
Temporary Restraining Order enjoining SILVERIO, JR., their agent or
anybody acting in their behalf from committing any act that would affect
the titles to the properties and enjoining the Register of Deeds of Makati
City from accepting, admitting, approving, registering, annotating or in any
way giving due course to whatever deeds, instruments or any other
documents involving voluntary or involuntary dealings which may have the
effect of transferring, conveying, encumbering, ceding, waiving, alienating,
or disposing in favor of any individual or any entity of the subject
properties. Subpoena ad testificandum and duces tecum was also issued by
the intestate court requiring SILVERIO, JR., MONICA OCAMPO and
ALEXANDRA GARCIA of CITRINE to testify and bring with them any books
and documents under their control to shed light on the circumstances
surrounding the transaction involving the properties in question.
192
192 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Silverio, Sr. vs. Silverio, Jr.
On 9 March 2011, SILVERIO, SR. filed a Supplement to the Urgent Omnibus
Motion dated 14 February 2011. On 18 August 2011, the intestate court
rendered the now assailed Order the decretal portion of the Order is
quoted hereunder:
“WHEREFORE, this Court hereby orders that:
1. The Deed of Absolute Sale dated 16 September 2010 as VOID;
2. The Transfer Certificate of Title No. 006-2011000050 in the name of
defendant MONICA OCAMPO or any of her successors-in-interest including
all derivative titles, as NULL AND VOID;
3. The Transfer Certificate of Title TCT No. 006-2011000190 in the name of
ZEE2 RESOURCES, INC. or any of its successors-in-interest including all
derivative titles, as NULL AND VOID;
4. (T)he Register of Deeds of Makati City to CANCEL Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 006-2011000050, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 006-
2011000190 and all of its derivative titles; and
5. Reinstating the Transfer Certificate of Title No. 2236121 in the name of
RICARDO C. SILVERIO, SR. AND THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE
BEATRIZ SILVERIO, and
AS TO THE INTSIA PROPERTY:
1. The Register of Deeds of Makati City to CANCEL Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 006-2010000063, in the name of CITRINE HOLDINGS, INC. and all
of its derivative titles; and
2. The reinstatement of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 223612 in the
name of
193
VOL. 733, AUGUST 13, 2014 193
Silverio, Sr. vs. Silverio, Jr.
RICARDO C. SILVERIO, SR. and the INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE BEATRIZ
SILVERIO.
SO ORDERED.”
x x x x3
The consolidated petitions for certiorari filed by respondent Ricardo S.
Silverio, Jr. (“Silverio, Jr.”) before the CA questioned the following
issuances of the intestate court: C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 121172 — Order dated
June 16, 2011 reinstating Silverio, Sr. as Administrator; C.A.-G.R. S.P. No.
121173 — (1) Order dated March 23, 2011 granting Silverio, Sr.’s
application for preliminary injunction enjoining Silverio, Jr. or anyone
acting on their behalf from committing any act that would affect the titles
to the subject properties and enjoining the Register of Deeds of Makati
City from accepting, admitting, approving, registering, annotating or in any
way giving due course to whatever deeds, instruments or any other
documents involving the Cambridge and Intsia properties, (2) Order dated
March 23, 2011 which denied Silverio, Jr.’s motion or disqualification
and/or inhibition of Judge Guanlao, Jr., and (3) Order dated June 14, 2011
denying the motion for reconsideration of the March 23, 2011 Order
(granting application for preliminary injunction); and in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No.
122024 — Order dated August 18, 2011 declaring the Deed of Absolute
Sale, TCT and all derivative titles over the Cambridge and Intsia properties
as null and void.
On March 8, 2013, the CA rendered its Decision, the fallo of which reads:
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing premises, the Court hereby disposes
and orders the following:
1. The petition in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 121172 is DENIED for lack of merit.
Accordingly, the 16 June 2011
_______________
3 Id., at pp. 22-42.
194
194 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Silverio, Sr. vs. Silverio, Jr.
Order of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 57 reinstating MR.
RICARDO C. SILVERIO, SR. as Administrator is AFFIRMED.
2. The petition in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 121173 is partly DENIED for lack of
merit insofar as it questions the 23 March 2011 Order denying RICARDO
SILVERIO, JR.’s Motion for Disqualification and/or Inhibition of Judge
Honorio E. Guanlao, Jr. The petition is partly GRANTED in that the
Preliminary Injunction issued by the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
Branch 57 is hereby declared NULL and VOID for being issued with grave
abuse of discretion.
3. The petition in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 122024 is GRANTED. Accordingly, the
18 August 2011 Order declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale, Transfer
Certificate of Title and all derivative titles over the Cambridge and Intsia
Property null and void is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.4
Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. (petitioner) filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration5 “insofar as its ruling in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 122024” praying
that the August 18, 2011 Order of the intestate court be affirmed. By
Resolution dated July 4, 2013, the CA denied his motion for partial
reconsideration.
Hence, this petition contending that the CA committed a reversible error in
upholding the validity of the Intsia and Cambridge properties upon the
ground that the intestate court cannot annul the sales as it has a limited
jurisdiction only and which does not include resolving issues of ownership.
It is asserted that the CA should not have stopped there and looked into
the nature of the properties sold, which formed part of the conjugal
partnership of Ricardo Silverio, Sr. and Beatriz S. Silverio.
_______________
4 Id., at pp. 49-50.
5 Id., at pp. 54-65.
195
VOL. 733, AUGUST 13, 2014 195
Silverio, Sr. vs. Silverio, Jr.
Petitioner seeks the reinstatement of the order of the intestate court
annulling the sales of the Cambridge and Intsia properties. In the
alternative, should the said sales be upheld, petitioner prays that this
Court (1) declare the sales to be valid only to the extent of 50% net
remainder share of the late Beatriz less the corresponding shares
therefrom of petitioner and the other legal compulsory heirs, and (2) order
respondent Silverio, Jr. to account for the proceeds of sales for distribution
of the residue among the legal/compulsory heirs.
In their Comment, respondents Silverio, Jr., Monica Ocampo and Citrine
Holdings, Inc. argued that the intestate court should not have ruled on the
validity of the sale of the subject properties to third parties after it itself
had authorized their disposal in partial settlement of the estate, especially
so when separate actions assailing the new titles issued to said third
parties were already instituted by petitioner.
As to the issue of alleged lack of prior consent of petitioner to the
aforesaid sales as the surviving spouses with a 50% conjugal share in the
subject properties, respondents point out that such is belied by the
October 31, 2006 Order of the intestate court, which clearly showed that
counsels of all the heirs were present at the hearing of June 16, 2006 and
no objection was made by them to the sale of the properties and the
partial settlement of the Estate of Beatriz S. Silverio, together with the
transfer of titles of these properties in the name of the Estate as prayed for
in petitioner’s Manifestation and Motion dated April 19, 2006. Petitioner
had not challenged or appealed the said order authorizing the sale of the
subject properties. Thus, it is too late in the day for petitioner to raise this
factual issue before this Court, not to mention that it cannot be ventilated
in the present appeal by certiorari as this Court is not a trier of facts.
Respondent ZEE2 Resources Corporation filed its Comment contending
that the intestate court improperly nullified the titles despite the fact that
the present registered owners, who are indispensable parties, were not
impleaded. Indeed, a
196
196 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Silverio, Sr. vs. Silverio, Jr.
Torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked and may be cancelled only in a
direct proceeding brought for the purpose. Respondent points out that
petitioner himself recognized that a direct action is required to annul a
Torrens title as he initially instituted two civil complaints before the RTC of
Makati City seeking to annul, among others, the TCT’s issued to
respondent Ocampo for the Cambridge property. After failing to secure
restraining orders in these two civil cases, petitioner filed in the intestate
court his Urgent Omnibus Motion dated February 14, 2011 to annul the
said titles, including that of ZEE2. In any case, respondent maintains that it
is a buyer of good faith and for value, of which the intestate court never
made a determination nor did the aforesaid Urgent Omnibus Motion and
Supplement to the Omnibus Motion dated March 4, 2011 contain
allegations indicating that respondent ZEE2 was not a buyer in good faith
and for value.
According to respondent ZEE2, petitioner’s act of filing a separate
complaint with application for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and
preliminary injunction on January 31, 2011 in another court (Civil Case No.
11-084 of the RTC of Makati City, Branch 143) constitutes willful and
deliberate forum shopping as the former also prayed similar primary reliefs
and setting up the alleged nullity of the subject deeds of absolute sale as
those raised in the Urgent Omnibus Motion and Supplement to the Urgent
Omnibus Motion filed in the intestate court.
At the outset, we emphasize that the probate court having jurisdiction
over properties under administration has the authority not only to approve
any disposition or conveyance, but also to annul an unauthorized sale by
the prospective heirs or administrator. Thus we held in Lee v. Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 85:6
_______________
6 467 Phil. 997, 1016-1017; 423 SCRA 497, 513-514 (2004).
197
VOL. 733, AUGUST 13, 2014 197
Silverio, Sr. vs. Silverio, Jr.
Juliana Ortañez and Jose Ortañez sold specific properties of the estate,
without court approval. It is well-settled that court approval is necessary
for the validity of any disposition of the decedent’s estate. In the early case
of Godoy v. Orellano, we laid down the rule that the sale of the property of
the estate by an administrator without the order of the probate court is
void and passes no title to the purchaser. And in the case of Dillena v.
Court of Appeals, we ruled that:
xxxx
It being settled that property under administration needs the approval of
the probate court before it can be disposed of, any unauthorized
disposition does not bind the estate and is null and void. As early as 1921
in the case of Godoy v. Orellano (42 Phil 347), We laid down the rule that a
sale by an administrator of property of the deceased, which is not
authorized by the probate court is null and void and title does not pass to
the purchaser.
There is hardly any doubt that the probate court can declare null and void
the disposition of the property under administration, made by private
respondent, the same having been effected without authority from said
court. It is the probate court that has the power to authorize and/or
approve the sale (Sections 4 and 7, Rule 89), hence, a fortiori, it is said
court that can declare it null and void for as long as the proceedings had
not been closed or terminated. To uphold petitioner’s contention that the
probate court cannot annul the unauthorized sale, would render
meaningless the power pertaining to the said court. (Bonga v. Soler, 2
SCRA 755). (italics ours)
Our jurisprudence is therefore clear that (1) any disposition of estate
property by an administrator or pro
198
198 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Silverio, Sr. vs. Silverio, Jr.
spective heir pending final adjudication requires court approval and (2) any
unauthorized disposition of estate property can be annulled by the
probate court, there being no need for a separate action to annul the
unauthorized disposition. (Emphasis supplied)
In this case, the sale of the subject properties was executed by
respondent Silverio, Jr. with prior approval of the intestate court under its
Omnibus Order dated October 31, 2006. Subsequently, however, the sale
was annulled by the said court on motion by petitioner.
In reversing the intestate court’s order annulling the sale of the subject
properties, the CA noted that said ruling is anchored on the fact that the
deeds of sale were executed at the time when the TRO and writ of
preliminary injunction issued in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 97196 was still in effect.
It then concluded that the eventual decision in the latter case making the
writ of preliminary injunction permanent only with respect to the
appointment of petitioner as administrator and not to the grant of
authority to sell mooted the issue of whether the sale was executed at the
time when the TRO and writ of preliminary injunction were in effect.
The CA’s ruling on this issue is hereunder quoted:
The more crucial question that needs to be addressed is: Whether the
authority to sell the properties in question granted under the October 31,
2006 Omnibus Order, was nullified by the decision of the Court of Appeals
in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 97196. A look at the dispositive portion of the decision
in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 97196 would lead us to reasonably conclude that the
grant of authority to sell is still good and valid. The fallo of the decision
reads:
“WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The portions of the Omnibus Order
upholding the grant of letters of administration to and the taking of an
oath of administration by Ricardo Silverio, Jr., as well
199
VOL. 733, AUGUST 13, 2014 199
Silverio, Sr. vs. Silverio, Jr.
as the removal of Ricardo Silverio, Sr. as administrator to the Estate of
Beatriz Silverio, are declared NULL and VOID. The writ of preliminary
injunction earlier issued is made permanent in regard to the said portions.
Respondent RTC is ORDERED to reinstate Ricardo Silverio, Sr. as
administrator of the Estate of Beatriz Silverio. Costs against the Private
Respondents.
SO ORDERED.”
The October 31, 2006 Omnibus Order of the testate [sic] court insofar as
it authorizes the sale of the three properties in question was not declared
by the Court of Appeals, Seventh Division as null and void. It is axiomatic
that it is the dispositive portion of the decision that finally invests rights
upon the parties, sets conditions for the exercise of those rights, and
imposes the corresponding duties or obligations.
From all the foregoing, We declare that it was grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the intestate court when it ordered the sale of the Cambridge
Property and Intsia Property as NULL and VOID citing as justification the
decision of the Court of Appeals, Seventh Division in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No.
97196. To reiterate, the injunction order which was made permanent by
the Court of Appeals (Seventh Division) was declared to be limited only
to the portion of the Omnibus Order that upheld the grant of letters of
administration by SILVERIO, JR. and the removal of SILVERIO, SR. as
administrator and nothing else.
Anent the preliminary injunction issued by the intestate court in its Order
dated 23 March 2011 and challenged by SILVERIO, JR. in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No.
121173, we find that it was issued with grave abuse of discretion as it was
directed against acts which were already [fait] accompli. The preliminary
injunction sought to: 1) restrain SILVERIO, JR., their agents, or anybody
acting in their behalf or any person from committing any act that would
affect the titles to the subject properties belonging
200
200 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Silverio, Sr. vs. Silverio, Jr.
to the Intestate Estate of the late Beatriz Silverio and (2) enjoining the
Register of Deeds of Makati City from accepting, admitting, approving,
registering, annotating or in any giving due course to whatever deeds,
instruments or any other documents involving voluntary or involuntary
dealings which may have the effect of transferring, conveying,
encumbering, ceding, waiving, alienating or disposing in favor of any
individual or any entity the above enumerated properties belonging to the
Intestate Estate of the late Beatriz Silverio. However, the records show
that when the preliminary injunction was issued on 23 March 2011 new
titles over the disputed properties were already issued to CITRINE
HOLDINGS, INC. and ZEE2 RESOURCES, INC.7 (Emphasis supplied)
We affirm the CA.
It bears to stress that the October 31, 2006 Omnibus Order was issued by
the intestate court acting upon pending motions filed by petitioner and
respondent Silverio, Jr., father and son, respectively, who are the central
figures in the now decade-old controversy over the Intestate Estate of the
late Beatriz S. Silverio. The intestate court flip-flopped in appointing as
administrator of the estate petitioner and respondent Silverio, Jr., their
personal conflicts becoming more evident to the intestate court as the
proceedings suffered delays. At the hearing of the urgent motion filed by
Edmundo Silverio to sell the subject properties and partially settle the
estate, the much awaited opportunity came when the heirs represented by
their respective counsels interposed no objection to the same.
While it is true that petitioner was eventually reinstated as Administrator
pursuant to the August 28, 2008 decision in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 97196
(petition for certiorari filed by Nelia Silverio-Dee), we agree with the CA
that the permanent injunction issued under the said decision, as explicitly
stated in
_______________
7 Rollo, pp. 47-49.
201
VOL. 733, AUGUST 13, 2014 201
Silverio, Sr. vs. Silverio, Jr.
its fallo, pertained only to the portions of the October 31, 2006 Omnibus
Order upholding the grant of letters of administration to and taking of an
oath of administration by respondent Silverio, Jr., as otherwise the CA
would have expressly set aside as well the directive in the same Omnibus
Order allowing the sale of the subject properties. Moreover, the CA
Decision attained finality only on February 11, 2011 when this Court
denied with finality respondent Silverio, Jr.’s motion for reconsideration of
the February 11, 2009 Resolution denying his petition for review (G.R. No.
185619).
The CA therefore did not err in reversing the August 18, 2011 Order of the
intestate court annulling the sale of the subject properties grounded solely
on the injunction issued in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 97196. Respondents Ocampo,
Citrine and ZEE2 should not be prejudiced by the flip-flopping appointment
of Administrator by the intestate court, having relied in good faith that the
sale was authorized and with prior approval of the intestate court under its
Omnibus Order dated October 31, 2006 which remained valid and
subsisting insofar as it allowed the aforesaid sale.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated March 8, 2013
and Resolution dated July 4, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. S.P.
Nos. 121173 and 122024 are AFFIRMED.
With costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno (CJ., Chairperson), Carpio,** Bersamin and Mendoza,*** JJ., concur.
Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed.
_______________
* * Designated additional member per Raffle dated August 11, 2014.
* ** Designated additional member per Special Order No. 1738 dated July
31, 2014.
202
202 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Silverio, Sr. vs. Silverio, Jr.
Notes.—Our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by
foreigners abroad although the same have not as yet been probated and
allowed in the countries of their execution. (Palaganas vs. Palaganas, 640
SCRA 538 [2011])
The rule is that as long as the order for the distribution of the estate has
not been complied with, the probate proceedings cannot be deemed
closed and terminated. (Sabidong vs. Solas, 699 SCRA 303 [2013])
——o0o——

G.R. No. 183053. October 10, 2012.*
EMILIO A.M. SUNTAY III, petitioner, vs. ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTAY,
respondent.
Remedial Law; Special Proceedings; Administrators; The paramount
consideration in the appointment of an administrator over the estate of a
decedent is the prospective administrator’s interest in the estate.―The
paramount consideration in the appointment of an administrator over the
estate of a decedent is the prospective administrator’s interest in the
estate. This is the same consideration which Section 6, Rule 78 takes into
account in establishing the order of preference in the appointment of
administrator for the estate. The rationale behind the rule is that those
who will reap the benefit of a wise, speedy and economical administration
of the estate, or, in the alternative, suffer the consequences of waste,
improvidence or mismanagement, have the highest interest and most
influential motive to administer the estate correctly. In all, given that the
rule speaks of an order of preference, the person to be appointed
administrator of a decedent’s estate must demonstrate not only an
interest in the estate, but an interest therein greater than any other
candidate.
Same; Same; Same; In a number of cases, the Supreme Court has
sanctioned the appointment of more than one administrator for the benefit
of the estate and those interested therein.―In a number of cases, we have
sanctioned the appointment of more than one administrator for the
benefit of the estate and those interested therein. We recognized that the
appointment of administrator of the estate of a decedent or the
determination of a person’s suitability for the office of judicial
administrator rests, to a great extent, in the sound judgment of the court
exercising the power of appointment. Under certain circumstances and for
various reasons well-settled in Philippine and American jurisprudence, we
have upheld the appointment of co-administrators: (1) to have the benefits
of their judgment and perhaps at all times to have different interests
represented; (2) where justice and equity demand that opposing parties or
factions be represented in the management of the estate of the deceased;
(3) where
_______________
* SPECIAL SECOND DIVISION.
440
440 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Suntay III vs. Cojuangco-Suntay
the estate is large or, from any cause, an intricate and perplexing one to
settle; (4) to have all interested persons satisfied and the representatives
to work in harmony for the best interests of the estate; and when a person
entitled to the administration of an estate desires to have another
competent person associated with him in the office.
Civil Law; Succession; Curtain Bar Rule; Article 992 of the Civil Code or the
curtain bar rule is inapplicable in resolving the issue of who is better
qualified to administer the estate of the decedent.―Once again, as we
have done in the Decision, we exercise judicial restraint: we uphold that
the question of who are the heirs of the decedent Cristina is not yet upon
us. Article 992 of the Civil Code or the curtain bar rule is inapplicable in
resolving the issue of who is better qualified to administer the estate of
the decedent.
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION of a decision of the Supreme Court.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
Honorato Y. Aquino for petitioner.
Estelito P. Mendoza for respondent.
RESOLUTION
PEREZ, J.:
The now overly prolonged, all-too familiar and too-much-stretched
imbroglio over the estate of Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay has continued. We
issued a Decision in the dispute as in Inter Caetera.1 We now find a need
to replace the decision.
Before us is a Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent Isabel
Cojuangco-Suntay (respondent Isabel) of our Deci-
_______________
1 The Papal Bull mentioned in our Decision of 16 June 2010 (Suntay III v.
Cojuangco-Suntay, G.R. No. 183053, 16 June 2010, 621 SCRA 142, 144).
441
VOL. 683, OCTOBER 10, 2012 441
Suntay III vs. Cojuangco-Suntay
sion2 in G.R. No. 183053 dated 16 June 2010, directing the issuance of
joint letters of administration to both petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay III
(Emilio III) and respondent. The dispositive portion thereof reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74949 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Letters of
Administration over the estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay shall
issue to both petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay III and respondent Isabel
Cojuangco-Suntay upon payment by each of a bond to be set by the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan, in Special Proceeding
Case No. 117-M-95. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan
is likewise directed to make a determination and to declare the heirs of
decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay according to the actual factual milieu
as proven by the parties, and all other persons with legal interest in the
subject estate. It is further directed to settle the estate of decedent
Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay with dispatch. No costs.3
We are moved to trace to its roots the controversy between the parties.
The decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay (Cristina) died intestate on 4 June
1990. Cristina was survived by her spouse, Dr. Federico Suntay (Federico)
and five grandchildren: three legitimate grandchildren, including herein
respondent, Isabel; and two illegitimate grandchildren, including petitioner
Emilio III, all by Federico’s and Cristina’s only child, Emilio A. Suntay (Emilio
I), who predeceased his parents.
The illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita, were both reared
from infancy by the spouses Federico and Cristina. Their legitimate
grandchildren, Isabel and her siblings, Margarita and Emilio II, lived with
their mother Isabel Cojuangco, following the separation of Isabel’s parents,
Emilio I and Isabel Co-
_______________
2 Penned by Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura (now retired)
with Associate Justices Antonio T. Carpio (Chairperson), Diosdado M.
Peralta, Roberto A. Abad and Jose Portugal Perez of the Second Division,
concurring. Rollo, pp. 231-246.
3 Id., at pp. 244-245.
442
442 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Suntay III vs. Cojuangco-Suntay
juangco. Isabel’s parents, along with her paternal grandparents, were
involved in domestic relations cases, including a case for parricide filed by
Isabel Cojuangco against Emilio I. Emilio I was eventually acquitted.
In retaliation, Emilio I filed a complaint for legal separation against his wife,
charging her among others with infidelity. The trial court declared as null
and void and of no effect the marriage of Emilio I and Isabel Cojuangco on
the finding that:
From February 1965 thru December 1965 plaintiff was confined in the
Veterans memorial Hospital. Although at the time of the trial of parricide
case (September 8, 1967) the patient was already out of the hospital[,] he
continued to be under observation and treatment.
It is the opinion of Dr. Aramil that the symptoms of the plaintiffs mental
aberration classified as schizophernia (sic) had made themselves manifest
even as early as 1955; that the disease worsened with time, until 1965
when he was actually placed under expert neuro-psychiatrist (sic)
treatment; that even if the subject has shown marked progress, the
remains bereft of adequate understanding of right and wrong.
There is no controversy that the marriage between the parties was
effected on July 9, 1958, years after plaintiffs mental illness had set in. This
fact would justify a declaration of nullity of the marriage under Article 85
of the Civil Code which provides:
Art. 95. (sic) A marriage may be annulled for any of the
following causes after (sic) existing at the time of the
marriage:
xxxx
(3) That either party was of unsound mind, unless
such party, after coming to reason, freely cohabited
with the other as husband or wife.
There is a dearth of proof at the time of the marriage defendant knew
about the mental condition of plaintiff; and there is proof that plaintiff
continues to be without sound reason. The charges in this very complaint
add emphasis to the findings of the neuro-
443
VOL. 683, OCTOBER 10, 2012 443
Suntay III vs. Cojuangco-Suntay
psychiatrist handling the patient, that plaintiff really lives more in fancy
than in reality, a strong indication of schizophernia (sic).4
Intent on maintaining a relationship with their grandchildren, Federico and
Isabel filed a complaint for visitation rights to spend time with Margarita,
Emilio II, and Isabel in the same special lower court. The Juvenile Domestic
Relations Court in Quezon City (JDRC-QC) granted their prayer for one hour
a month of visitation rights which was subsequently reduced to thirty
minutes, and ultimately stopped, because of respondent Isabel’s testimony
in court that her grandparents’ visits caused her and her siblings stress and
anxiety.5
On 27 September 1993, more than three years after Cristina’s death,
Federico adopted his illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita.
On 26 October 1995, respondent Isabel, filed before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Malolos, Bulacan, a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration over Cristina’s estate docketed as Special Proceeding Case
No. 117-M-95. Federico, opposed the petition, pointing out that: (1) as the
surviving spouse of the decedent, he should be appointed administrator of
the decedent’s estate; (2) as part owner of the mass of conjugal properties
left by the decedent, he must be accorded preference in the
administration thereof; (3) Isabel and her siblings had been alienated from
their grandparents for more than thirty (30) years; (4) the enumeration of
heirs in the petition was incomplete as it did not mention the other
children of his son, Emilio III and Nenita; (5) even before the death of his
wife, Federico had administered their conjugal properties, and thus, is
better situated to protect the integrity of the decedent’s estate; (6) the
probable value of the estate as
_______________
4 Suntay v. Cojuangco-Suntay, 360 Phil. 932, 936-937; 300 SCRA 760, 763-
764 (1998).
5 Rollo, pp. 43-44.
444
444 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Suntay III vs. Cojuangco-Suntay
stated in the petition was grossly overstated; and (7) Isabel’s allegation
that some of the properties are in the hands of usurpers is untrue.
Federico filed a Motion to Dismiss Isabel’s petition for letters of
administration on the ground that Isabel had no right of representation to
the estate of Cristina, she being an illegitimate grandchild of the latter as a
result of Isabel’s parents’ marriage being declared null and void. However,
in Suntay v. Cojuangco-Suntay, we categorically declared that Isabel and
her siblings, having been born of a voidable marriage as opposed to a void
marriage based on paragraph 3, Article 85 of the Civil Code, were
legitimate children of Emilio I, who can all represent him in the estate of
their legitimate grandmother, the decedent, Cristina.
Undaunted by the set back, Federico nominated Emilio III to administer the
decedent’s estate on his behalf in the event letters of administration issues
to Federico. Consequently, Emilio III filed an Opposition-In-Intervention,
echoing the allegations in his grandfather’s opposition, alleging that
Federico, or in his stead, Emilio III, was better equipped than respondent
to administer and manage the estate of the decedent, Cristina.
On 13 November 2000, Federico died.
Almost a year thereafter or on 9 November 2001, the trial court rendered
a decision appointing Emilio III as administrator of decedent Cristina’s
intestate estate:
WHEREFORE, the petition of Isabel Cojuangco[-]Suntay is DENIED and the
Opposition[-]in[-]Intervention is GRANTED.
Accordingly, the Intervenor, Emilio A.M. Suntay, III (sic) is hereby
appointed administrator of the estate of the decedent Cristina Aguinaldo
Suntay, who shall enter upon the execution of his trust upon the filing of a
bond in the amount of P200,000.00, conditioned as follows:
(1) To make and return within three (3) months, a true and complete
inventory;445
VOL. 683, OCTOBER 10, 2012 445
Suntay III vs. Cojuangco-Suntay
(2) To administer the estate and to pay and discharge all debts, legatees,
and charge on the same, or dividends thereon;
(3) To render a true and just account within one (1) year, and at any
other time when required by the court; and
(4) To perform all orders of the Court.
Once the said bond is approved by the court, let Letters of Administration
be issued in his favor.6
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the
RTC, revoked the Letters of Administration issued to Emilio III, and
appointed respondent as administratrix of the subject estate:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the assailed decision dated
November 9, 2001 of Branch 78, Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan in
SPC No. 117-M-95 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the letters of
administration issued by the said court to Emilio A.M. Suntay III, if any, are
consequently revoked. Petitioner Isabel Cojuangco[-]Suntay is hereby
appointed administratrix of the intestate estate of Cristina Aguinaldo
Suntay. Let letters of administration be issued in her favor upon her filing
of a bond in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand (P200,000.00) Pesos.7
As previously adverted to, on appeal by certiorari, we reversed and set
aside the ruling of the appellate court. We decided to include Emilio III as
co-administrator of Cristina’s estate, giving weight to his interest in
Federico’s estate. In ruling for co-administration between Emilio III and
Isabel, we considered that:
1. Emilio III was reared from infancy by the decedent, Cristina, and her
husband, Federico, who both acknowledged him as their grandchild;
_______________
6 Id., at p. 60.
7 Id., at p. 31.
446
446 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Suntay III vs. Cojuangco-Suntay
2. Federico claimed half of the properties included in the estate of the
decedent, Cristina, as forming part of their conjugal partnership of gains
during the subsistence of their marriage;
3. Cristina’s properties, forming part of her estate, are still commingled
with those of her husband, Federico, because her share in the conjugal
partnership remains undetermined and unliquidated; and
4. Emilio III is a legally adopted child of Federico, entitled to share in the
distribution of the latter’s estate as a direct heir, one degree from
Federico, and not simply in representation of his deceased illegitimate
father, Emilio I.
In this motion, Isabel pleads for total affirmance of the Court of Appeals’
Decision in favor of her sole administratorship based on her status as a
legitimate grandchild of Cristina, whose estate she seeks to administer.
Isabel contends that the explicit provisions of Section 6, Rule 78 of the
Rules of Court on the order of preference for the issuance of letters of
administration cannot be ignored and that Article 992 of the Civil Code
must be followed. Isabel further asserts that Emilio III had demonstrated
adverse interests and disloyalty to the estate, thus, he does not deserve to
become a co-administrator thereof.
Specifically, Isabel bewails that: (1) Emilio III is an illegitimate grandchild
and therefore, not an heir of the decedent; (2) corollary thereto, Emilio III,
not being a “next of kin” of the decedent, has no interest in the estate to
justify his appointment as administrator thereof; (3) Emilio III’s actuations
since his appointment as administrator by the RTC on 9 November 2001
emphatically demonstrate the validity and wisdom of the order of
preference in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court; and (4) there is no
basis for joint administration as there are no “opposing parties or factions
to be represented.”447
VOL. 683, OCTOBER 10, 2012 447
Suntay III vs. Cojuangco-Suntay
To begin with, the case at bar reached us on the issue of who, as between
Emilio III and Isabel, is better qualified to act as administrator of the
decedent’s estate. We did not choose. Considering merely his
demonstrable interest in the subject estate, we ruled that Emilio III should
likewise administer the estate of his illegitimate grandmother, Cristina, as a
co-administrator. In the context of this case, we have to make a choice and
therefore, reconsider our decision of 16 June 2010.
The general rule in the appointment of administrator of the estate of a
decedent is laid down in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted.―If no
executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are
incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies
intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be,
or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to
such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of
kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to
serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be,
or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be
incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or
next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of
the person to apply for administration or to request that
administration be granted to some other person, it may be
granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if
competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is not such creditor competent and willing to
serve, it may be granted to such other person as the court
may select.
Textually, the rule lists a sequence to be observed, an order of preference,
in the appointment of an administrator. This order of preference, which
categorically seeks out the surviving spouse, the next of kin and the
creditors in the appoint-
448
448 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Suntay III vs. Cojuangco-Suntay
ment of an administrator, has been reinforced in jurisprudence.8
The paramount consideration in the appointment of an administrator over
the estate of a decedent is the prospective administrator’s interest in the
estate.9 This is the same consideration which Section 6, Rule 78 takes into
account in establishing the order of preference in the appointment of
administrator for the estate. The rationale behind the rule is that those
who will reap the benefit of a wise, speedy and economical administration
of the estate, or, in the alternative, suffer the consequences of waste,
improvidence or mismanagement, have the highest interest and most
influential motive to administer the estate correctly.10 In all, given that the
rule speaks of an order of preference, the person to be appointed
administrator of a decedent’s estate must demonstrate not only an
interest in the estate, but an interest therein greater than any other
candidate.
To illustrate, the preference bestowed by law to the surviving spouse in
the administration of a decedent’s estate presupposes the surviving
spouse’s interest in the conjugal partnership or community property
forming part of the decedent’s estate.11 Likewise, a surviving spouse is a
compulsory heir of a decedent12 which evinces as much, if not more,
interest in administering the entire estate of a decedent, aside from her
_______________
8 Uy v. Court of Appeals, 519 Phil. 673; 484 SCRA 699 (2006); Angeles v.
Angeles-Maglaya, 506 Phil. 347; 469 SCRA 363 (2005); Valarao v. Pascual,
441 Phil. 226; 392 SCRA 695 (2002); Silverio, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, 364
Phil. 188; 304 SCRA 541 (1999).
9 Vda. de Dayrit v. Ramolete, G.R. No. L-59935, 30 September 1982, 117
SCRA 608, 612; Corona v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-59821, 30 August
1982, 116 SCRA 316, 320; Matias v. Gonzales, 101 Phil. 852, 858 (1957).
10 Gonzales v. Aguinaldo, G.R. No. 74769, 28 September 1990, 190 SCRA
112, 117-118.
11 See Articles 91 and 106 of the Family Code.
12 See Article 887, paragraph 3 of the Civil Code.
449
VOL. 683, OCTOBER 10, 2012 449
Suntay III vs. Cojuangco-Suntay
share in the conjugal partnership or absolute community property.
It is to this requirement of observation of the order of preference in the
appointment of administrator of a decedent’s estate, that the
appointment of co-administrators has been allowed, but as an exception.
We again refer to Section 6(a) of Rule 78 of the Rules of Court which
specifically states that letters of administration may be issued to both the
surviving spouse and the next of kin. In addition and impliedly, we can
refer to Section 2 of Rule 82 of the Rules of Court which say that “x x x
[w]hen an executor or administrator dies, resigns, or is removed, the
remaining executor or administrator may administer the trust alone, x x x.”
In a number of cases, we have sanctioned the appointment of more than
one administrator for the benefit of the estate and those interested
therein.13 We recognized that the appointment of administrator of the
estate of a decedent or the determination of a person’s suitability for the
office of judicial administrator rests, to a great extent, in the sound
judgment of the court exercising the power of appointment.14
Under certain circumstances and for various reasons well-settled in
Philippine and American jurisprudence, we have upheld the appointment
of co-administrators: (1) to have the benefits of their judgment and
perhaps at all times to have different interests represented;15 (2) where
justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be
represented in the management of the estate of the deceased; (3) where
the estate is large or, from any cause, an intricate and perplexing
_______________
13 Matias v. Gonzales; Corona v. Court of Appeals; Vda. de Dayrit v.
Ramolete, supra note 9.
14 Uy v. Court of Appeals, supra note 8 at p. 680; p. 705; Angeles v.
Angeles-Maglaya, supra note 8 at p. 365; p. 379; Valarao v. Pascual, supra
note 8 at p. 234; p. 701; Silverio, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 8 at pp.
210-211; p. 563.
15 Gonzales v. Aguinaldo, supra note 10 at pp. 118-119.
450
450 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Suntay III vs. Cojuangco-Suntay
one to settle;16 (4) to have all interested persons satisfied and the
representatives to work in harmony for the best interests of the estate;17
and when a person entitled to the administration of an estate desires to
have another competent person associated with him in the office.18
In the frequently cited Matias v. Gonzales, we dwelt on the appointment
of special co-administrators during the pendency of the appeal for the
probate of the decedent’s will. Pending the probate thereof, we
recognized Matias’ special interest in the decedent’s estate as universal
heir and executrix designated in the instrument who should not be
excluded in the administration thereof. Thus, we held that justice and
equity demands that the two (2) factions among the non-compulsory heirs
of the decedent, consisting of an instituted heir (Matias) and intestate
heirs (respondents thereat), should be represented in the management of
the decedent’s estate.19
Another oft-cited case is Vda. de Dayrit v. Ramolete, where we held that
“inasmuch as petitioner-wife owns one-half of the conjugal properties and
that she, too, is a compulsory heir of her husband, to deprive her of any
hand in the administration of the estate prior to the probate of the will
would be unfair to her proprietary interests.”20
Hewing closely to the aforementioned cases is our ruling in Ventura v.
Ventura21 where we allowed the appointment of the surviving spouse and
legitimate children of the decedent as co-administrators. However, we
drew a distinction between the heirs categorized as next of kin, the
nearest of kin in the category being preferred, thus:
_______________
16 Uy v. Court of Appeals, supra note 8 at p. 681; p. 707; Gabriel v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 101512, 7 August 1992, 212 SCRA 413, 423 citing
Copeland v. Shapley, 100 NE. 1080.
17 Gabriel v. Court of Appeals, id.
18 In re Fichter’s Estate, 279 N.Y.S. 597.
19 Supra note 9.
20 Supra note 9 at p. 612.
21 243 Phil. 952; 160 SCRA 810 (1988).
451
VOL. 683, OCTOBER 10, 2012 451
Suntay III vs. Cojuangco-Suntay
In the case at bar, the surviving spouse of the deceased Gregorio Ventura
is Juana Cardona while the next of kin are: Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura
and Maria and Miguel Ventura. The “next of kin” has been defined as
those persons who are entitled under the statute of distribution to the
decedent’s property [citations omitted]. It is generally said that “the
nearest of kin, whose interest in the estate is more preponderant, is
preferred in the choice of administrator. ‘Among members of a class the
strongest ground for preference is the amount or preponderance of
interest. As between next of kin, the nearest of kin is to be preferred.’”
[citations omitted]
As decided by the lower court and sustained by the Supreme Court,
Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura are the legitimate children of Gregorio
Ventura and his wife, the late Paulina Simpliciano. Therefore, as the
nearest of kin of Gregorio Ventura, they are entitled to preference over the
illegitimate children of Gregorio Ventura, namely: Maria and Miguel
Ventura. Hence, under the aforestated preference provided in Section 6 of
Rule 78, the person or persons to be appointed administrator are Juana
Cardona, as the surviving spouse, or Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura as
nearest of kin, or Juana Cardona and Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura in
the discretion of the Court, in order to represent both interests.22
(Emphasis supplied)
In Silverio, Sr. v. Court of Appeals,23 we maintained that the order of
preference in the appointment of an administrator depends on the
attendant facts and circumstances. In that case, we affirmed the legitimate
child’s appointment as special administrator, and eventually as regular
administrator, of the decedent’s estate as against the surviving spouse
who the lower court found unsuitable. Reiterating Sioca v. Garcia24 as
good law, we pointed out that unsuitableness for appointment as
administrator may consist in adverse interest of some kind or hostility to
those immediately interested in the estate.
_______________
22 Id., at pp. 962-963; p. 820.
23 Supra note 8.
24 44 Phil. 711 (1923).
452
452 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Suntay III vs. Cojuangco-Suntay
In Valarao v. Pascual,25 we see another story with a running theme of
heirs squabbling over the estate of a decedent. We found no reason to set
aside the probate court’s refusal to appoint as special co-administrator
Diaz, even if he had a demonstrable interest in the estate of the decedent
and represented one of the factions of heirs, because the evidence
weighed by the probate court pointed to Diaz’s being remiss in his previous
duty as co-administrator of the estate in the early part of his
administration. Surveying the previously discussed cases of Matias,
Corona, and Vda. de Dayrit, we clarified, thus:
Respondents cannot take comfort in the cases of Matias v. Gonzales,
Corona v. Court of Appeals, and Vda. de Dayrit v. Ramolete, cited in the
assailed Decision. Contrary to their claim, these cases do not establish an
absolute right demandable from the probate court to appoint special co-
administrators who would represent the respective interests of
squabbling heirs. Rather, the cases constitute precedents for the
authority of the probate court to designate not just one but also two or
more special co-administrators for a single estate. Now whether the
probate court exercises such prerogative when the heirs are fighting
among themselves is a matter left entirely to its sound discretion.
Furthermore, the cases of Matias, Corona and Vda. de Dayrit hinge upon
factual circumstances other than the incompatible interests of the heirs
which are glaringly absent from the instant case. In Matias this Court
ordered the appointment of a special co-administrator because of the
applicant’s status as the universal heir and executrix designated in the will,
which we considered to be a “special interest” deserving protection during
the pendency of the appeal. Quite significantly, since the lower court in
Matias had already deemed it best to appoint more than one special
administrator, we found grave abuse of discretion in the act of the lower
court in ignoring the applicant’s distinctive status in the selection of
another special administrator.
_______________
25 Supra note 8.
453
VOL. 683, OCTOBER 10, 2012
Suntay III vs. Cojuangco-Suntay
In Corona we gave “highest consideration” to the “executrix’s choice of
Special Administrator, considering her own inability to serve and the wide
latitude of discretion given her by the testatrix in her will,” for this Court to
compel her appointment as special co-administrator. It is also manifest
from the decision in Corona that the presence of conflicting interests
among the heirs therein was not per se the key factor in the designation of
a second special administrator as this fact was taken into account only to
disregard or, in the words of Corona, to “overshadow” the objections to
the appointment on grounds of “impracticality and lack of kinship.”
Finally in Vda. de Dayrit we justified the designation of the wife of the
decedent as special co-administrator because it was “our considered
opinion that inasmuch as petitioner-wife owns one-half of the conjugal
properties and that she, too, is a compulsory heir of her husband, to
deprive her of any hand in the administration of the estate prior to the
probate of the will would be unfair to her proprietary interests.” The
special status of a surviving spouse in the special administration of an
estate was also emphasized in Fule v. Court of Appeals where we held that
the widow would have more interest than any other next of kin in the
proper administration of the entire estate since she possesses not only the
right of succession over a portion of the exclusive property of the decedent
but also a share in the conjugal partnership for which the good or bad
administration of the estate may affect not just the fruits but more
critically the naked ownership thereof. And in Gabriel v. Court of Appeals
we recognized the distinctive status of a surviving spouse applying as
regular administrator of the deceased spouse’s estate when we counseled
the probate court that “there must be a very strong case to justify the
exclusion of the widow from the administration.”
Clearly, the selection of a special co-administrator in Matias, Corona and
Vda. de Dayrit was based upon the independent proprietary interests
and moral circumstances of the appointee that were not necessarily
related to the demand for representation being repeatedly urged by
respondents.26 (Emphasis supplied)
_______________
26 Id., at pp. 233-235.
454
453
454 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Suntay III vs. Cojuangco-Suntay
In Gabriel v. Court of Appeals, we unequivocally declared the mandatory
character of the rule on the order of preference for the issuance of letters
of administration:
Evidently, the foregoing provision of the Rules prescribes the order of
preference in the issuance of letters of administration, it categorically
seeks out the surviving spouse, the next of kin and the creditors, and
requires that sequence to be observed in appointing an administrator. It
would be a grave abuse of discretion for the probate court to imperiously
set aside and insouciantly ignore that directive without any valid and
sufficient reason therefor.27
Subsequently, in Angeles v. Angeles-Maglaya,28 we expounded on the
legal contemplation of a “next of kin,” thus:
Finally, it should be noted that on the matter of appointment of
administrator of the estate of the deceased, the surviving spouse is
preferred over the next of kin of the decedent. When the law speaks of
“next of kin,” the reference is to those who are entitled, under the statute
of distribution, to the decedent’s property; one whose relationship is such
that he is entitled to share in the estate as distributed, or, in short, an heir.
In resolving, therefore, the issue of whether an applicant for letters of
administration is a next of kin or an heir of the decedent, the probate court
perforce has to determine and pass upon the issue of filiation. A separate
action will only result in a multiplicity of suits. Upon this consideration, the
trial court acted within bounds when it looked into and pass[ed] upon the
claimed relationship of respondent to the late Francisco Angeles.29
Finally, in Uy v. Court of Appeals,30 we took into consideration the size of,
and benefits to, the estate should respondent therein be appointed as co-
administrator. We emphasized that where the estate is large or, from any
cause, an intricate
_______________
27 Supra note 16 at p. 420.
28 Supra note 8.
29 Id., at p. 365.
30 Supra note 8.
455
VOL. 683, OCTOBER 10, 2012 455
Suntay III vs. Cojuangco-Suntay
and perplexing one to settle, the appointment of co-administrators may be
sanctioned by law.
In our Decision under consideration, we zeroed in on Emilio III’s
demonstrable interest in the estate and glossed over the order of
preference set forth in the Rules. We gave weight to Emilio III’s
demonstrable interest in Cristina’s estate and without a closer scrutiny of
the attendant facts and circumstances, directed co-administration thereof.
We are led to a review of such position by the foregoing survey of cases.
The collected teaching is that mere demonstration of interest in the estate
to be settled does not ipso facto entitle an interested person to co-
administration thereof. Neither does squabbling among the heirs nor
adverse interests necessitate the discounting of the order of preference
set forth in Section 6, Rule 78. Indeed, in the appointment of administrator
of the estate of a deceased person, the principal consideration reckoned
with is the interest in said estate of the one to be appointed as
administrator.31 Given Isabel’s unassailable interest in the estate as one of
the decedent’s legitimate grandchildren and undoubted nearest “next of
kin,” the appointment of Emilio III as co-administrator of the same estate,
cannot be a demandable right. It is a matter left entirely to the sound
discretion of the Court32 and depends on the facts and the attendant
circumstances of the case.33
Thus, we proceed to scrutinize the attendant facts and circumstances of
this case even as we reiterate Isabel’s and her sibling’s apparent greater
interest in the estate of Cristina.
These considerations do not warrant the setting aside of the order of
preference mapped out in Section 6, Rule 78 of
_______________
31 Gonzales v. Aguinaldo, supra note 10 at p. 117.
32 Fernandez v. Maravilla, G.R. No. L-18799, 26 March 1965, 13 SCRA 416,
419-420.
33 Silverio, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 8 at p. 211; pp. 562-563.
456
456 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Suntay III vs. Cojuangco-Suntay
the Rules of Court. They compel that a choice be made of one over the
other.
1. The bitter estrangement and long-standing animosity between Isabel,
on the one hand, and Emilio III, on the other, traced back from the time
their paternal grandparents were alive, which can be characterized as
adverse interest of some kind by, or hostility of, Emilio III to Isabel who is
immediately interested in the estate;
2. Corollary thereto, the seeming impossibility of Isabel and Emilio III
working harmoniously as co-administrators may result in prejudice to the
decedent’s estate, ultimately delaying settlement thereof; and
3. Emilio III, for all his claims of knowledge in the management of
Cristina’s estate, has not looked after the estate’s welfare and has acted to
the damage and prejudice thereof.
Contrary to the assumption made in the Decision that Emilio III’s
demonstrable interest in the estate makes him a suitable co-administrator
thereof, the evidence reveals that Emilio III has turned out to be an
unsuitable administrator of the estate. Respondent Isabel points out that
after Emilio III’s appointment as administrator of the subject estate in
2001, he has not looked after the welfare of the subject estate and has
actually acted to the damage and prejudice thereof as evidenced by the
following:
1. Emilio III, despite several orders from the probate court for a complete
inventory, omitted in the partial inventories34 he filed therewith
properties of the estate35 including several parcels of land, cash, bank
deposits, jewelry, shares of
_______________
34 Annexes “3,” “5,” and “6,” of respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration.
Rollo, pp. 318-331.
35 Annex “4,” of respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration. Id., at p. 326.
457
VOL. 683, OCTOBER 10, 2012 457
Suntay III vs. Cojuangco-Suntay
stock, motor vehicles, and other personal properties, contrary to Section
1,36 paragraph a, Rule 81 of the Rules of Court.
2. Emilio III did not take action on both occasions against Federico’s
settlement of the decedent’s estate which adjudicated to himself a
number of properties properly belonging to said estate (whether wholly or
partially), and which contained a declaration that the decedent did not
leave any descendants or heirs, except for Federico, entitled to succeed to
her estate.37
In compliance to our Resolution dated 18 April 2012 requiring Emilio III to
respond to the following imputations of Isabel that:
1. [Emilio III] did not file an inventory of the assets until
November 14, 2002;
2. [T]he inventory [Emilio III] submitted did not include
several properties of the decedent;
3. [T]hat properties belonging to the decedent have found
their way to different individuals or persons; several
properties to Federico Suntay himself; and
4. [W]hile some properties have found their way to [Emilio
III], by reason of falsified documents;38
_______________
36 Section 1. Bond to be given issuance of letters. Amount.
Conditions.―Before an executor or administrator enters upon the
execution of his trust, and letters testamentary or of administration issue,
he shall give a bond, in such sum as the court directs, conditioned as
follows:
(a) To make and return to the court, within three (3) months, a true and
complete inventory of all goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the
deceased which shall come to his possession or knowledge or to the
possession of any other person for him;
37 Annexes “1,” and “2,” of respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration.
Rollo, pp. 318-321.
38 Id., at p. 407.
458
458 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Suntay III vs. Cojuangco-Suntay
Emilio III refutes Isabel’s imputations that he was lackadaisical in assuming
and performing the functions of administrator of Cristina’s estate:
1. From the time of the RTC’s Order appointing Emilio III as administrator,
Isabel, in her pleadings before the RTC, had vigorously opposed Emilio III’s
assumption of that office, arguing that “[t]he decision of the [RTC] dated 9
November 2001 is not among the judgments authorized by the Rules of
Court which may be immediately implemented or executed”;
2. The delay in Emilio III’s filing of an inventory was due to Isabel’s
vociferous objections to Emilio III’s attempts to act as administrator while
the RTC decision was under appeal to the Court of Appeals;
3. The complained partial inventory is only initiatory, inherent in the
nature thereof, and one of the first steps in the lengthy process of
settlement of a decedent’s estate, such that it cannot constitute a
complete and total listing of the decedent’s properties; and
4. The criminal cases adverted to are trumped-up charges where Isabel,
as private complainant, has been unwilling to appear and testify, leading
the Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 44 of Mamburao, Occidental
Mindoro, to warn the prosecutor of a possible motu proprio dismissal of
the cases.
While we can subscribe to Emilio III’s counsel’s explanation for the blamed
delay in the filing of an inventory and his exposition on the nature thereof,
partial as opposed to complete, in the course of the settlement of a
decedent’s estate, we do not find any clarification on Isabel’s accusation
that Emilio III had deliberately omitted properties in the inventory, which
properties of Cristina he knew existed and which he claims to be
knowledgeable about.
The general denial made by Emilio III does not erase his unsuitability as
administrator rooted in his failure to “make and return x x x a true and
complete inventory” which
459
VOL. 683, OCTOBER 10, 2012 459
Suntay III vs. Cojuangco-Suntay
became proven fact when he actually filed partial inventories before the
probate court and by his inaction on two occasions of Federico’s exclusion
of Cristina’s other compulsory heirs, herein Isabel and her siblings, from
the list of heirs.
As administrator, Emilio III enters into the office, posts a bond and
executes an oath to faithfully discharge the duties of settling the
decedent’s estate with the end in view of distribution to the heirs, if any.
This he failed to do. The foregoing circumstances of Emilio III’s omission
and inaction become even more significant and speak volume of his
unsuitability as administrator as it demonstrates his interest adverse to
those immediately interested in the estate of the decedent, Cristina.
In this case, palpable from the evidence on record, the pleadings, and the
protracted litigation, is the inescapable fact that Emilio III and respondent
Isabel have a deep aversion for each other. To our mind, it becomes highly
impractical, nay, improbable, for the two to work as co-administrators of
their grandmother’s estate. The allegations of Emilio III, the testimony of
Federico and the other witnesses for Federico and Emilio III that Isabel and
her siblings were estranged from their grandparents further drive home
the point that Emilio III bears hostility towards Isabel. More importantly, it
appears detrimental to the decedent’s estate to appoint a co-
administrator (Emilio III) who has shown an adverse interest of some kind
or hostility to those, such as herein respondent Isabel, immediately
interested in the said estate.
Bearing in mind that the issuance of letters of administration is simply a
preliminary order to facilitate the settlement of a decedent’s estate, we
here point out that Emilio III is not without remedies to protect his
interests in the estate of the decedent. In Hilado v. Court of Appeals,39 we
mapped out as among the allowable participation of “any interested
persons”
_______________
39 G.R. No. 164108, 8 May 2009, 587 SCRA 464.
460
460 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Suntay III vs. Cojuangco-Suntay
or “any persons interested in the estate” in either testate or intestate
proceedings:
xxxx
4. Section 640 of Rule 87, which allows an individual interested in the
estate of the deceased “to complain to the court of the concealment,
embezzlement, or conveyance of any asset of the decedent, or of evidence
of the decedent’s title or interest therein;”
5. Section 1041 of Rule 85, which requires notice of the time and place of
the examination and allowance of the Administrator’s account “to persons
interested”;
6. Section 7(b)42 of Rule 89, which requires the court to give notice “to
the persons interested” before it may hear and grant a petition
_______________
40 Section 6. Proceedings when property concealed, embezzled, or
fraudulently conveyed.―If an executor or administrator, heir, legatee,
creditor, or other individual interested in the estate of the deceased,
complains to the court having jurisdiction of the estate that a person is
suspected of having concealed, embezzled, or conveyed away any of the
money, goods, or chattels of the deceased, or that such person has in his
possession or has knowledge of any deed, conveyance, bond, contract, or
other writing which contains evidence of or tends to disclose the right,
title, interest, or claim of the deceased to real or personal estate, or the
last will and testament of the deceased, the court may cite such suspected
person to appear before it and may examine him on oath on the matter of
such complaint; and if the person so cited refuses to appear, or to answer
on such examination or such interrogatories as are put to him, the court
may punish him for contempt, and may commit him to prison until he
submits to the order of the court. The interrogatories put to any such
person, and his answers thereto, shall be in writing and shall be filed in the
clerk’s office.
41 Section 10. Account to be settled on notice.―Before the account of
an executor or administrator is allowed, notice shall be given to persons
interested of the time and place of examining and allowing the same; and
such notice may be given personally to such persons interested or by
advertisement in a newspaper or newspapers, or both, as the court directs.
42 Section 7. Regulations for granting authority to sell, mortgage, or
otherwise encumber estate. x x x.
461
VOL. 683, OCTOBER 10, 2012 461
Suntay III vs. Cojuangco-Suntay
seeking the disposition or encumbrance of the properties of the estate;
and
7. Section 1,43 Rule 90, which allows “any person interested in the
estate” to petition for an order for the distribution of the residue of the
estate of the decedent, after all obligations are either satisfied or provided
for.44
In addition to the foregoing, Emilio III may likewise avail of the remedy
found in Section 2, Rule 82 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
_______________
(a) x x x
(b) The court shall thereupon fix a time and place for hearing such
petition, and cause notice stating the nature of the petition, the reason for
the same, and the time and place of hearing, to be given personally or by
mail to the persons interested, and may cause such further notice to be
given, by publication or otherwise, as it shall deem proper.
43 Section 1. When order for distribution of residue made.―When the
debts, funeral charges, and expenses of administration, the allowance to
the widow, and inheritance tax, if any, chargeable to the estate in
accordance with law, have been paid, the court, on the application of the
executor or administrator, or of a person interested in the estate, and after
hearing upon notice, shall assign the residue of the estate to the persons
entitled to the same, naming them and the proportions, or parts, to which
each is entitled, and such persons may demand and recover their
respective shares from the executor or administrator, or any other person
having the same in his possession. If there is a controversy before the
court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to he
distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the
controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations
above-mentioned has been made or provided for, unless the distributes, or
any of them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned for
the payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs.
44 Hilado v. Court of Appeals, supra note 37 at pp. 472-473.
462
462 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Suntay III vs. Cojuangco-Suntay
Sec. 2. Court may remove or accept resignation of executor or
administrator. Proceedings upon death, resignation, or removal.―If an
executor or administrator neglects to render his account and settle the
estate according to law, or to perform an order or judgment of the court,
or a duty expressly provided by these rules, or absconds, or becomes
insane, or otherwise incapable or unsuitable to discharge the trust, the
court may remove him, or, in its discretion, may permit him to resign.
When an executor or administrator dies, resigns, or is removed, the
remaining executor or administrator may administer the trust alone,
unless the court grants letters to someone to act with him. If there is no
remaining executor or administrator, administration may be granted to
any suitable person.
Once again, as we have done in the Decision, we exercise judicial restraint:
we uphold that the question of who are the heirs of the decedent Cristina
is not yet upon us. Article 992 of the Civil Code or the curtain bar rule is
inapplicable in resolving the issue of who is better qualified to administer
the estate of the decedent.
Thus, our disquisition in the assailed Decision:
Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that judicial restraint impels us to
refrain from making a final declaration of heirship and distributing the
presumptive shares of the parties in the estates of Cristina and Federico,
considering that the question on who will administer the properties of the
long deceased couple has yet to be settled.
Our holding in Capistrano v. Nadurata on the same issue remains good
law:
[T]he declaration of heirs made by the lower court is
premature, although the evidence sufficiently shows who
are entitled to succeed the deceased. The estate had hardly
been judicially opened, and the proceeding has not as yet
reached the stage of distribution of the estate which must
come after the inheritance is liquidated.
Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court does not depart from the foregoing
admonition:463
VOL. 683, OCTOBER 10, 2012 463
Suntay III vs. Cojuangco-Suntay
Sec. 1. When order for distribution of residue is made.―x
x x. If there is a controversy before the court as to who are
the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the
distributive shares to which each person is entitled under
the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in
ordinary cases.
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the
obligations above mentioned has been made or provided
for, unless the distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a
sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment
of said obligations within such time as the court directs.45
Lastly, we dispose of a peripheral issue raised in the Supplemental
Comment46 of Emilio III questioning the Special Second Division which
issued the 18 April 2012 Resolution. Emilio III asseverates that “the
operation of the Special Second Division in Baguio is unconstitutional and
void” as the Second Division in Manila had already promulgated its
Decision on 16 June 2010 on the petition filed by him:
7. The question is: who created the Special Second Division in Baguio,
acting separately from the Second Division of the Supreme Court in
Manila? There will then be two Second Divisions of the Supreme Court:
one acting with the Supreme Court in Manila, and another Special Second
Division acting independently of the Second Division of the Supreme Court
in Manila.47
For Emilio III’s counsels’ edification, the Special Second Division in Baguio is
not a different division created by the Supreme Court.
The Second Division which promulgated its Decision on this case on 16
June 2010, penned by Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, now has a
different composition, with the advent of Justice Nachura’s retirement on
13 June 2011. Section 7, Rule 2 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court
provides:
_______________
45 Rollo, pp. 243-244.
46 Id., at pp. 442-445.
47 Id., at p. 443.
464
464 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Suntay III vs. Cojuangco-Suntay
Sec. 7. Resolutions of motions for reconsideration or clarification of
decisions or signed resolutions and all other motions and incidents
subsequently filed; creation of a Special Division.―Motions for
reconsideration or clarification of a decision or of a signed resolution and
all other motions and incidents subsequently filed in the case shall be
acted upon by the ponente and the other Members of the Division who
participated in the rendition of the decision or signed resolution.
If the ponente has retired, is no longer a Member of the Court, is
disqualified, or has inhibited himself or herself from acting on the motion
for reconsideration or clarification, he or she shall be replaced through
raffle by a new ponente who shall be chosen among the new Members of
the Division who participated in the rendition of the decision or signed
resolution and who concurred therein. If only one Member of the Court
who participated and concurred in the rendition of the decision or signed
resolution remains, he or she shall be designated as the new ponente.
If a Member (not the ponente) of the Division which rendered the decision
or signed resolution has retired, is no longer a Member of the Court, is
disqualified, or has inhibited himself or herself from acting on the motion
for reconsideration or clarification, he or she shall be replaced through
raffle by a replacement Member who shall be chosen from the other
Divisions until a new Justice is appointed as replacement for the retired
Justice. Upon the appointment of a new Justice, he or she shall replace the
designated Justice as replacement Member of the Special Division.
Any vacancy or vacancies in the Special Division shall be filled by raffle
from among the other Members of the Court to constitute a Special
Division of five (5) Members.
If the ponente and all the Members of the Division that rendered the
Decision or signed Resolution are no longer Members of the Court, the
case shall be raffled to any Member of the Court and the motion shall be
acted upon by him or her with the participation of the other Members of
the Division to which he or she belongs.
If there are pleadings, motions or incidents subsequent to the denial of the
motion for reconsideration or clarification, the case shall be acted upon by
the ponente on record with the participation of the other Members of the
Division to which he or she belongs at the
465
VOL. 683, OCTOBER 10, 2012 465
Suntay III vs. Cojuangco-Suntay
time said pleading, motion or incident is to be taken up by the Court.
(Emphasis supplied)
As regards the operation thereof in Baguio City, such is simply a change in
venue for the Supreme Court’s summer session held last April.48
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Our
Decision in G.R. No. 183053 dated 16 June 2010 is MODIFIED. Letters of
Administration over the estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay shall
solely issue to respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay upon payment of a
bond to beset by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan, in
Special Proceeding Case No. 117-M-95. The Regional Trial Court, Branch
78, Malolos, Bulacan is likewise directed to settle the estate of decedent
Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay with dispatch. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio (Chairperson), Sereno (C.J.),** Peralta and Abad, JJ., concur.
Motion for Reconsideration partially granted, judgment modified.
Notes.―It has long been settled that the selection or removal of special
administrators is not governed by the rules regarding the selection or
removal of regular administrators—the probate court may appoint or
remove special administrators based on grounds other than those
enumerated in the Rules at its discretion. (Ocampo vs. Ocampo, 623 SCRA
559 [2010])
_______________
48 See Resolution dated 9 February 2012, A.M. No. 12-2-7-SC Re: 2012
Summer Session in Baguio City.
** Per raffle dated 4 July 2011.
466
466 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Suntay III vs. Cojuangco-Suntay
The property rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the
inheritance of a person are transmitted to another through the decedent’s
death. (Republic vs. Marcos-Manotoc, 665 SCRA 367 [2012])
――o0o――
G.R. No. 149926. February 23, 2005.*
UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. EDMUND SANTIBAÑEZ
and FLORENCE SANTIBAÑEZ ARIOLA, respondents.
Civil Law; Settlement of Estate; Jurisdictions; Well-settled is the rule that a
probate court has the jurisdiction to determine all the properties of the
deceased, to determine whether they should or should not be included in
the inventory or list of properties to be administered.—Well-settled is the
rule that a probate court has the jurisdiction to determine all the
properties of the deceased, to determine whether they should or should
not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered.
The said court is primarily concerned with the administration, liquidation
and distribution of the estate.
Same; Same; Wills; Partition; In our jurisdiction, the rule is that there can
be no valid partition among the heirs until after the will has been
probated.—In our jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no valid
partition among the heirs until after the will has been probated: In testate
succession, there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the
will has been probated. The law enjoins the probate of a will and the public
requires it, because unless a will is probated and notice thereof given to
the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his property by will
may be rendered nugatory. The authentication of a will decides no other
question than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the
compliance with those requirements or solemnities which the law
prescribes for the validity of a will.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Every act intended to put an end to indivision
among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition
although it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise or any
other transaction.—It must be stressed that the probate proceeding had
already acquired jurisdiction over all the properties of the deceased,
including the three (3) tractors. To dispose of them in any way without the
probate court’s approval is
_______________
*
SECOND DIVISION.
229
VOL. 452, FEBRUARY 23, 2005 229
Union Bank of the Philippines vs. Santibañez
tantamount to divesting it with jurisdiction which the Court cannot allow.
Every act intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees
or devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it should purport to be a
sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any other transaction. Thus, in
executing any joint agreement which appears to be in the nature of an
extra-judicial partition, as in the case at bar, court approval is imperative,
and the heirs cannot just divest the court of its jurisdiction over that part
of the estate.
Same; Same; Same; Filing of a money claim against the decedent’s estate
in the probate court is mandatory.—The filing of a money claim against the
decedent’s estate in the probate court is mandatory. As we held in the
vintage case of Py Eng Chong v. Herrera: . . . This requirement is for the
purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased by informing the
executor or administrator of the claims against it, thus enabling him to
examine each claim and to determine whether it is a proper one which
should be allowed. The plain and obvious design of the rule is the speedy
settlement of the affairs of the deceased and the early delivery of the
property to the distributees, legatees, or heirs. The law strictly requires the
prompt presentation and disposition of the claims against the decedent’s
estate in order to settle the affairs of the estate as soon as possible, pay off
its debts and distribute the residue.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Miguel G. Padernal for petitioner U.B.P.
Roberto Cal Catolico for respondents.
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Court which seeks the reversal of the Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals dated May 30, 2001 in
_______________
1
Penned by Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes with Associate Justices
Eubulo G. Verzola (deceased), and Marina L. Buzon, concurring.
230
230 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Union Bank of the Philippines vs. Santibañez
CA-G.R. CV No. 48831 affirming the dismissal2 of the petitioner’s complaint
in Civil Case No. 18909 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City,
Branch 63.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On May 31, 1980, the First Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC) and
Efraim M. Santibañez entered into a loan agreement3 in the amount of
P128,000.00. The amount was intended for the payment of the purchase
price of one (1) unit Ford 6600 Agricultural All-Purpose Diesel Tractor. In
view thereof, Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a promissory note in
favor of the FCCC, the principal sum payable in five equal annual
amortizations of P43,745.96 due on May 31, 1981 and every May 31st
thereafter up to May 31, 1985.
On December 13, 1980, the FCCC and Efraim entered into another loan
agreement,4 this time in the amount of P123,156.00. It was intended to
pay the balance of the purchase price of another unit of Ford 6600
Agricultural All-Purpose Diesel Tractor, with accessories, and one (1) unit
Howard Rotamotor Model AR 60K. Again, Efraim and his son, Edmund,
executed a promissory note for the said amount in favor of the FCCC. Aside
from such promissory note, they also signed a Continuing Guaranty
Agreement5 for the loan dated December 13, 1980.
Sometime in February 1981, Efraim died, leaving a holographic will.6
Subsequently in March 1981, testate proceedings commenced before the
RTC of Iloilo City, Branch 7, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 2706. On
April 9, 1981, Edmund, as one of the heirs, was appointed as the special
administrator of the estate of the decedent.7 During the pend-
_______________
2 10
Penned by Presiding Judge Julio R. Logarta.
3 11
Records, pp. 8-12.
4 12
Id., at pp. 13-18.
5 13
Id., at pp. 19-20.
6
Exhibit “7”.
7
Annex “A” of the Answer, Records, p. 48.
231
VOL. 452, FEBRUARY 23, 2005 231
Union Bank of the Philippines vs. Santibañez
ency of the testate proceedings, the surviving heirs, Edmund and his sister
Florence Santibañez Ariola, executed a Joint Agreement8 dated July 22,
1981, wherein they agreed to divide between themselves and take
possession of the three (3) tractors; that is, two (2) tractors for Edmund
and one (1) tractor for Florence. Each of them was to assume the
indebtedness of their late father to FCCC, corresponding to the tractor
respectively taken by them.
On August 20, 1981, a Deed of Assignment with Assumption of Liabilities 9
was executed by and between FCCC and Union Savings and Mortgage
Bank, wherein the FCCC as the assignor, among others, assigned all its
assets and liabilities to Union Savings and Mortgage Bank.
Demand letters10 for the settlement of his account were sent by petitioner
Union Bank of the Philippines (UBP) to Edmund, but the latter failed to
heed the same and refused to pay. Thus, on February 5, 1988, the
petitioner filed a Complaint11 for sum of money against the heirs of Efraim
Santibañez, Edmund and Florence, before the RTC of Makati City, Branch
150, docketed as Civil Case No. 18909. Summonses were issued against
both, but the one intended for Edmund was not served since he was in the
United States and there was no information on his address or the date of
his return to the Philippines.12 Accordingly, the complaint was narrowed
down to respondent Florence S. Ariola.
On December 7, 1988, respondent Florence S. Ariola filed her Answer 13
and alleged that the loan documents did not bind her since she was not a
party thereto. Considering that the joint agreement signed by her and her
brother Edmund was not approved by the probate court, it was null and
void;
_______________
8
Exhibit “A”.
9
Exhibit “G”.
Exhibits “E” and “F”.
Records, p. 1.
See Sheriff ’s Return of Service, Id., at p. 39.
Records, p. 42.
232
232 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Union Bank of the Philippines vs. Santibañez
hence, she was not liable to the petitioner under the joint agreement.
On January 29, 1990, the case was unloaded and re-raffled to the RTC of
Makati City, Branch 63.14 Consequently, trial on the merits ensued and a
decision was subsequently rendered by the court dismissing the complaint
for lack of merit. The decretal portion of the RTC decision reads:
“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the complaint for
lack of merit.15
The trial court found that the claim of the petitioner should have been filed
with the probate court before which the testate estate of the late Efraim
Santibañez was pending, as the sum of money being claimed was an
obligation incurred by the said decedent. The trial court also found that
the Joint Agreement apparently executed by his heirs, Edmund and
Florence, on July 22, 1981, was, in effect, a partition of the estate of the
decedent. However, the said agreement was void, considering that it had
not been approved by the probate court, and that there can be no valid
partition until after the will has been probated. The trial court further
declared that petitioner failed to prove that it was the now defunct Union
Savings and Mortgage Bank to which the FCCC had assigned its assets and
liabilities. The court also agreed to the contention of respondent Florence
S. Ariola that the list of assets and liabilities of the FCCC assigned to Union
Savings and Mortgage Bank did not clearly refer to the decedent’s account.
Ruling that the joint agreement executed by the heirs was null and void,
the trial court held that the petitioner’s cause of action against respondent
Florence S. Ariola must necessarily fail.
_______________
14
Id., at p. 83.
15
Id., at p. 522.
233
VOL. 452, FEBRUARY 23, 2005 233
Union Bank of the Philippines vs. Santibañez
The petitioner appealed from the RTC decision and elevated its case to the
Court of Appeals (CA), assigning the following as errors of the trial court:
1. 1. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE JOINT
AGREEMENT (EXHIBIT “A”) SHOULD BE APPROVED BY
THE PROBATE COURT.
2. 2. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE
CAN BE NO VALID PARTITION AMONG THE HEIRS UNTIL
AFTER THE WILL HAS BEEN PROBATED.
3. 3. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE
DEFENDANT HAD WAIVED HER RIGHT TO HAVE THE
CLAIM RE-LITIGATED IN THE ESTATE PROCEEDING.16
The petitioner asserted before the CA that the obligation of the deceased
had passed to his legitimate children and heirs, in this case, Edmund and
Florence; the unconditional signing of the joint agreement marked as
Exhibit “A” estopped respondent Florence S. Ariola, and that she cannot
deny her liability under the said document; as the agreement had been
signed by both heirs in their personal capacity, it was no longer necessary
to present the same before the probate court for approval; the property
partitioned in the agreement was not one of those enumerated in the
holographic will made by the deceased; and the active participation of the
heirs, particularly respondent Florence S. Ariola, in the present ordinary
civil action was tantamount to a waiver to re-litigate the claim in the estate
proceedings.
On the other hand, respondent Florence S. Ariola maintained that the
money claim of the petitioner should have been presented before the
probate court.17
The appellate court found that the appeal was not meritorious and held
that the petitioner should have filed its claim
_______________
16
CA Rollo, p. 43.
17
Id., at p. 76.
234
234 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Union Bank of the Philippines vs. Santibañez
with the probate court as provided under Sections 1 and 5, Rule 86 of the
Rules of Court. It further held that the partition made in the agreement
was null and void, since no valid partition may be had until after the will
has been probated. According to the CA, page 2, paragraph (e) of the
holographic will covered the subject properties (tractors) in generic terms
when the deceased referred to them as “all other properties.” Moreover,
the active participation of respondent Florence S. Ariola in the case did not
amount to a waiver. Thus, the CA affirmed the RTC decision, viz.:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 63, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.”18
In the present recourse, the petitioner ascribes the following errors to the
CA:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE JOINT
AGREEMENT SHOULD BE APPROVED BY THE PROBATE COURT.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE CAN BE NO VALID
PARTITION AMONG THE HEIRS OF THE LATE EFRAIM SANTIBAÑEZ UNTIL
AFTER THE WILL HAS BEEN PROBATED.
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE RESPONDENT
HAD WAIVED HER RIGHT TO HAVE THE CLAIM RE-LITIGATED IN THE ESTATE
PROCEEDING.
_______________
18
Rollo, p. 30.
235
VOL. 452, FEBRUARY 23, 2005 235
Union Bank of the Philippines vs. Santibañez
IV.
RESPONDENTS CAN, IN FACT, BE HELD JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE
WITH THE PRINCIPAL DEBTOR THE LATE EFRAIM SANTIBAÑEZ ON THE
STRENGTH OF THE CONTINUING GUARANTY AGREEMENT EXECUTED IN
FAVOR OF PETITIONER-APPELLANT UNION BANK.
V.
THE PROMISSORY NOTES DATED MAY 31, 1980 IN THE SUM OF
P128,000.00 AND DECEMBER 13, 1980 IN THE AMOUNT OF P123,000.00
CATEGORICALLY ESTABLISHED THE FACT THAT THE RESPONDENTS BOUND
THEMSELVES JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH THE LATE DEBTOR
EFRAIM SANTIBAÑEZ IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER UNION BANK.19
The petitioner claims that the obligations of the deceased were
transmitted to the heirs as provided in Article 774 of the Civil Code; there
was thus no need for the probate court to approve the joint agreement
where the heirs partitioned the tractors owned by the deceased and
assumed the obligations related thereto. Since respondent Florence S.
Ariola signed the joint agreement without any condition, she is now
estopped from asserting any position contrary thereto. The petitioner also
points out that the holographic will of the deceased did not include nor
mention any of the tractors subject of the complaint, and, as such was
beyond the ambit of the said will. The active participation and resistance of
respondent Florence S. Ariola in the ordinary civil action against the
petitioner’s claim amounts to a waiver of the right to have the claim
presented in the probate proceedings, and to allow any one of the heirs
who executed the joint agreement to escape liability to pay the value of
the tractors under consideration would be equivalent to allowing the said
heirs to enrich themselves to the damage and prejudice of the petitioner.
_______________
19
Id., at pp. 7-8.
236
236 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Union Bank of the Philippines vs. Santibañez
The petitioner, likewise, avers that the decisions of both the trial and
appellate courts failed to consider the fact that respondent Florence S.
Ariola and her brother Edmund executed loan documents, all establishing
the vinculum juris or the legal bond between the late Efraim Santibañez
and his heirs to be in the nature of a solidary obligation. Furthermore, the
Promissory Notes dated May 31, 1980 and December 13, 1980 executed by
the late Efraim Santibañez, together with his heirs, Edmund and
respondent Florence, made the obligation solidary as far as the said heirs
are concerned. The petitioner also proffers that, considering the express
provisions of the continuing guaranty agreement and the promissory notes
executed by the named respondents, the latter must be held liable jointly
and severally liable thereon. Thus, there was no need for the petitioner to
file its money claim before the probate court. Finally, the petitioner
stresses that both surviving heirs are being sued in their respective
personal capacities, not as heirs of the deceased.
In her comment to the petition, respondent Florence S. Ariola maintains
that the petitioner is trying to recover a sum of money from the deceased
Efraim Santibañez; thus the claim should have been filed with the probate
court. She points out that at the time of the execution of the joint
agreement there was already an existing probate proceedings of which the
petitioner knew about. However, to avoid a claim in the probate court
which might delay payment of the obligation, the petitioner opted to
require them to execute the said agreement.
According to the respondent, the trial court and the CA did not err in
declaring that the agreement was null and void. She asserts that even if
the agreement was voluntarily executed by her and her brother Edmund, it
should still have been subjected to the approval of the court as it may
prejudice the estate, the heirs or third parties. Furthermore, she had not
waived any rights, as she even stated in her answer in the court a quo that
the claim should be filed with the probate
237
VOL. 452, FEBRUARY 23, 2005 237
Union Bank of the Philippines vs. Santibañez
court. Thus, the petitioner could not invoke or claim that she is in estoppel.
Respondent Florence S. Ariola further asserts that she had not signed any
continuing guaranty agreement, nor was there any document presented as
evidence to show that she had caused herself to be bound by the
obligation of her late father.
The petition is bereft of merit.
The Court is posed to resolve the following issues: a) whether or not the
partition in the Agreement executed by the heirs is valid; b) whether or not
the heirs’ assumption of the indebtedness of the deceased is valid; and c)
whether the petitioner can hold the heirs liable on the obligation of the
deceased.
At the outset, well-settled is the rule that a probate court has the
jurisdiction to determine all the properties of the deceased, to determine
whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of
properties to be administered.20 The said court is primarily concerned with
the administration, liquidation and distribution of the estate. 21 In our
jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no valid partition among the heirs
until after the will has been probated:
In testate succession, there can be no valid partition among the heirs until
after the will has been probated. The law enjoins the probate of a will and
the public requires it, because unless a will is probated and notice thereof
given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his property
by will may be rendered nugatory. The authentication of a will decides no
other question than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator and
the compliance with
_______________
20
See Ortega v. Court of Appeals, 153 SCRA 96 (1987); See also Morales v.
Court of First Instance of Cavite, Br. V, 146 SCRA 373 (1986).
21
See De la Cruz v. Camon, 16 SCRA 886 (1966).
238
238 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Union Bank of the Philippines vs. Santibañez
those requirements or solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity
of a will.22
This, of course, presupposes that the properties to be partitioned are the
same properties embraced in the will.23 In the present case, the deceased,
Efraim Santibañez, left a holographic will24 which contained, inter alia, the
provision which reads as follows:
1. (e) All other properties, real or personal, which I own and
may be discovered later after my demise, shall be
distributed in the proportion indicated in the
immediately preceding paragraph in favor of Edmund
and Florence, my children.
We agree with the appellate court that the above-quoted is an all-
encompassing provision embracing all the properties left by the decedent
which might have escaped his mind at that time he was making his will,
and other properties he may acquire thereafter. Included therein are the
three (3) subject tractors. This being so, any partition involving the said
tractors among the heirs is not valid. The joint agreement25 executed by
Edmund and Florence, partitioning the tractors among themselves, is
invalid, specially so since at the time of its execution, there was already a
pending proceeding for the probate of their late father’s holographic will
covering the said tractors.
It must be stressed that the probate proceeding had already acquired
jurisdiction over all the properties of the deceased, including the three (3)
tractors. To dispose of them in any way without the probate court’s
approval is tantamount to divesting it with jurisdiction which the Court
cannot allow.26 Every act intended to put an end to indivision among
_______________
22
Vda. de Kilayko v. Tengco, 207 SCRA 600 (1992).
23
Ralla v. Untalan, 172 SCRA 858 (1989).
24
Exhibit “7”.
25
Exhibit “A”.
26
See Sandoval v. Santiago, 83 Phil. 784 (1949).
239
VOL. 452, FEBRUARY 23, 2005 239
Union Bank of the Philippines vs. Santibañez
co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it
should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any other
transaction.27 Thus, in executing any joint agreement which appears to be
in the nature of an extrajudicial partition, as in the case at bar, court
approval is imperative, and the heirs cannot just divest the court of its
jurisdiction over that part of the estate. Moreover, it is within the
jurisdiction of the probate court to determine the identity of the heirs of
the decedent.28 In the instant case, there is no showing that the signatories
in the joint agreement were the only heirs of the decedent. When it was
executed, the probate of the will was still pending before the court and the
latter had yet to determine who the heirs of the decedent were. Thus, for
Edmund and respondent Florence S. Ariola to adjudicate unto themselves
the three (3) tractors was a premature act, and prejudicial to the other
possible heirs and creditors who may have a valid claim against the estate
of the deceased.
The question that now comes to fore is whether the heirs’ assumption of
the indebtedness of the decedent is binding. We rule in the negative.
Perusing the joint agreement, it provides that the heirs as parties thereto
“have agreed to divide between themselves and take possession and use
the abovedescribed chattel and each of them to assume the indebtedness
corresponding to the chattel taken as herein after stated which is in favor
of First Countryside Credit Corp.”29 The assumption of liability was
conditioned upon the happening of an event, that is, that each heir shall
take possession and use of their respective share under the agreement. It
was made dependent on the validity of the partition, and that they were to
assume the indebtedness corresponding to the chattel that they were each
to receive. The partition being invalid as earlier discussed, the heirs in
effect did not receive any such
_______________
27
Article 1082, New Civil Code.
28
See Reyes v. Ysip, 97 Phil. 11 (1955).
29
See Exhibit 7.
240
240 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Union Bank of the Philippines vs. Santibañez
tractor. It follows then that the assumption of liability cannot be given any
force and effect.
The Court notes that the loan was contracted by the decedent. The
petitioner, purportedly a creditor of the late Efraim Santibañez, should
have thus filed its money claim with the probate court in accordance with
Section 5, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides:
Section 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not filed barred;
exceptions.—All claims for money against the decedent, arising from
contract, express or implied, whether the same be due, not due, or
contingent, all claims for funeral expenses for the last sickness of the
decedent, and judgment for money against the decedent, must be filed
within the time limited in the notice; otherwise they are barred forever,
except that they may be set forth as counterclaims in any action that the
executor or administrator may bring against the claimants. Where an
executor or administrator commences an action, or prosecutes an action
already commenced by the deceased in his lifetime, the debtor may set
forth by answer the claims he has against the decedent, instead of
presenting them independently to the court as herein provided, and
mutual claims may be set off against each other in such action; and if final
judgment is rendered in favor of the defendant, the amount so determined
shall be considered the true balance against the estate, as though the
claim had been presented directly before the court in the administration
proceedings. Claims not yet due, or contingent, may be approved at their
present value.
The filing of a money claim against the decedent’s estate in the probate
court is mandatory.30 As we held in the vintage case of Py Eng Chong v.
Herrera:31
. . . This requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate of the
deceased by informing the executor or administrator of the claims against
it, thus enabling him to examine each claim and to determine whether it is
a proper one which should be allowed. The
_______________
30
See De Bautista v. De Guzman, 125 SCRA 676 (1983).
31
70 SCRA 130 (1976).
241
VOL. 452, FEBRUARY 23, 2005 241
Union Bank of the Philippines vs. Santibañez
plain and obvious design of the rule is the speedy settlement of the affairs
of the deceased and the early delivery of the property to the distributees,
legatees, or heirs. ‘The law strictly requires the prompt presentation and
disposition of the claims against the decedent's estate in order to settle
the affairs of the estate as soon as possible, pay off its debts and distribute
the residue.32
Perusing the records of the case, nothing therein could hold private
respondent Florence S. Ariola accountable for any liability incurred by her
late father. The documentary evidence presented, particularly the
promissory notes and the continuing guaranty agreement, were executed
and signed only by the late Efraim Santibañez and his son Edmund. As the
petitioner failed to file its money claim with the probate court, at most, it
may only go after Edmund as co-maker of the decedent under the said
promissory notes and continuing guaranty, of course, subject to any
defenses Edmund may have as against the petitioner. As the court had not
acquired jurisdiction over the person of Edmund, we find it unnecessary to SO ORDERED.
delve into the matter further. Puno (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Tinga and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
We agree with the finding of the trial court that the petitioner had not Petition denied, assailed decision affirmed.
sufficiently shown that it is the successor-in-interest of the Union Savings Note.—Every act intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and
and Mortgage Bank to which the FCCC assigned its assets and liabilities. 33 legatees or devisees would be a partition although it would purport to be a
The petitioner in its complaint alleged that “by virtue of the Deed of sale, an exchange, a compromise, a donation or an extrajudicial settlement
Assignment dated August 20, 1981 executed by and between First (Non vs. Court of Appeals, 325 SCRA 652 [2000])
Countryside Credit Corporation and Union Bank of the Philippines” . . .34 ——o0o——
However, the documentary evidence35 clearly reflects that the parties in _______________
the deed of assignment with assumption of liabilities were the FCCC, and
the Union Savings and Mortgage Bank, with the conformity of Bancom
Philippine Holdings, Inc. Nowhere can the petitioner’s participation therein
as a party be found. Furthermore, no documentary or
_______________
32
Ibid.
33
See Exhibit “G”.
34
Records, p. 4.
35
Exhibit “G”.
242
242 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Union Bank of the Philippines vs. Santibañez
testimonial evidence was presented during trial to show that Union
Savings and Mortgage Bank is now, in fact, petitioner Union Bank of the
Philippines. As the trial court declared in its decision:
. . . [T]he court also finds merit to the contention of defendant that plaintiff
failed to prove or did not present evidence to prove that Union Savings
and Mortgage Bank is now the Union Bank of the Philippines. Judicial
notice does not apply here. “The power to take judicial notice is to [be]
exercised by the courts with caution; care must be taken that the requisite
notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be
promptly resolved in the negative.” (Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 107
SCRA 504).36
This being the case, the petitioner’s personality to file the complaint is
wanting. Consequently, it failed to establish its cause of action. Thus, the
trial court did not err in dismissing the complaint, and the CA in affirming
the same. .
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby DENIED. The
assailed Court of Appeals Decision is AFFIRMED. No costs.
 GR. No. 156407, January 15, 2014
THELMA M. ARANAS, Petitioner, v. TERESITA V. MERCADO, FELIMON V.
MERCADO, CARMENCITA M. SUTHERLAND, RICHARD V. MERCADO, MA.
TERESITA M. ANDERSON, AND FRANKLIN L. MERCADO, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The probate court is authorized to determine the issue of ownership of
properties for purposes of their inclusion or exclusion from the inventory
to be submitted by the administrator, but its determination shall only be
provisional unless the interested parties are all heirs of the decedent, or
the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to
the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third
parties are not impaired. Its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or
collateral to the settlement and distribution of the estate, such as the
determination of the status of each heir and whether property included in
the inventory is the conjugal or exclusive property of the deceased spouse.
Antecedents
Emigdio S. Mercado (Emigdio) died intestate on January 12, 1991, survived
by his second wife, Teresita V. Mercado (Teresita), and their five children,
namely: Allan V. Mercado, Felimon V. Mercado, Carmencita M. Sutherland,
Richard V. Mercado, and Maria Teresita M. Anderson; and his two children
by his first marriage, namely: respondent Franklin L. Mercado and
petitioner Thelma M. Aranas (Thelma).
Emigdio inherited and acquired real properties during his lifetime. He
owned corporate shares in Mervir Realty Corporation (Mervir Realty) and
Cebu Emerson Transportation Corporation (Cebu Emerson). He assigned
his real properties in exchange for corporate stocks of Mervir Realty, and
sold his real property in Badian, Cebu (Lot 3353 covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 3252) to Mervir Realty.
On June 3, 1991, Thelma filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cebu City
a petition for the appointment of Teresita as the administrator of
Emigdio’s estate (Special Proceedings No. 3094–CEB).1 The RTC granted the
petition considering that there was no opposition. The letters of
administration in favor of Teresita were issued on September 7, 1992.
As the administrator, Teresita submitted an inventory of the estate of
Emigdio on December 14, 1992 for the consideration and approval by the
RTC. She indicated in the inventory that at the time of his death, Emigdio
had “left no real properties but only personal properties” worth
P6,675,435.25 in all, consisting of cash of P32,141.20; furniture and
fixtures worth P20,000.00; pieces of jewelry valued at P15,000.00; 44,806
shares of stock of Mervir Realty worth P6,585,585.80; and 30 shares of
stock of Cebu Emerson worth P22,708.25.2
Claiming that Emigdio had owned other properties that were excluded
from the inventory, Thelma moved that the RTC direct Teresita to amend
the inventory, and to be examined regarding it. The RTC granted Thelma’s
motion through the order of January 8, 1993.
On January 21, 1993, Teresita filed a compliance with the order of January
8, 1993,3 supporting her inventory with copies of three certificates of
stocks covering the 44,806 Mervir Realty shares of stock;4 the deed of
assignment executed by Emigdio on January 10, 1991 involving real
properties with the market value of P4,440,651.10 in exchange for 44,407
Mervir Realty shares of stock with total par value of P4,440,700.00;5 and
the certificate of stock issued on January 30, 1979 for 300 shares of stock
of Cebu Emerson worth P30,000.00.6
On January 26, 1993, Thelma again moved to require Teresita to be
examined under oath on the inventory, and that she (Thelma) be allowed
30 days within which to file a formal opposition to or comment on the
inventory and the supporting documents Teresita had submitted.
On February 4, 1993, the RTC issued an order expressing the need for the
parties to present evidence and for Teresita to be examined to enable the
court to resolve the motion for approval of the inventory.7cralawred
On April 19, 1993, Thelma opposed the approval of the inventory, and
asked leave of court to examine Teresita on the inventory.
With the parties agreeing to submit themselves to the jurisdiction of the
court on the issue of what properties should be included in or excluded
from the inventory, the RTC set dates for the hearing on that
issue.8cralawlawlibrary
Ruling of the RTC
After a series of hearings that ran for almost eight years, the RTC issued on
March 14, 2001 an order finding and holding that the inventory submitted
by Teresita had excluded properties that should be included, and
accordingly ruled:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing premises and considerations, the
Court hereby denies the administratrix’s motion for approval of inventory.
The Court hereby orders the said administratrix to re–do the inventory of
properties which are supposed to constitute as the estate of the late
Emigdio S. Mercado by including therein the properties mentioned in the
last five immediately preceding paragraphs hereof and then submit the
revised inventory within sixty (60) days from notice of this order.
The Court also directs the said administratrix to render an account of her
administration of the estate of the late Emigdio S. Mercado which had
come to her possession. She must render such accounting within sixty (60)
days from notice hereof.
SO ORDERED.9ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
On March 29, 2001, Teresita, joined by other heirs of Emigdio, timely
sought the reconsideration of the order of March 14, 2001 on the ground
that one of the real properties affected, Lot No. 3353 located in Badian,
Cebu, had already been sold to Mervir Realty, and that the parcels of land
covered by the deed of assignment had already come into the possession
of and registered in the name of Mervir Realty. 10 Thelma opposed the
motion.
On May 18, 2001, the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration, 11 stating
that there was no cogent reason for the reconsideration, and that the
movants’ agreement as heirs to submit to the RTC the issue of what
properties should be included or excluded from the inventory already
estopped them from questioning its jurisdiction to pass upon the issue.
Decision of the CA
Alleging that the RTC thereby acted with grave abuse of discretion in
refusing to approve the inventory, and in ordering her as administrator to
include real properties that had been transferred to Mervir Realty,
Teresita, joined by her four children and her stepson Franklin, assailed the
adverse orders of the RTC promulgated on March 14, 2001 and May 18,
2001 by petition for certiorari, stating:
I
THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
JURISDICTION (sic) AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
HOLDING THAT THE REAL PROPERTY WHICH WAS SOLD BY THE LATE
EMIGDIO S. MERCADO DURING HIS LIFETIME TO A PRIVATE CORPORATION
(MERVIR REALTY CORPORATION) BE INCLUDED IN THE INVENTORY OF THE
ESTATE OF THE LATE EMIGDIO S. MERCADO.
II
THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
JURISDICTION (sic) AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
HOLDING THAT REAL PROPERTIES WHICH ARE IN THE POSSESSION OF AND
ALREADY REGISTERED IN THE NAME (OF) PRIVATE CORPORATION (MERVIR
REALTY CORPORATION) BE INCLUDED IN THE INVENTORY OF THE ESTATE
OF THE LATE EMIGDIO S. MERCADO.
III
THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS ARE NOW ESTOPPED FROM QUESTIONING
ITS JURISDICTION IN PASSING UPON THE ISSUE OF WHAT PROPERTIES
SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE INVENTORY OF THE ESTATE OF THE LATE
EMIGDIO MERCADO.12
On May 15, 2002, the CA partly granted the petition for certiorari,
disposing as follows:13
WHEREFORE, FOREGOING PREMISES CONSIDERED, this petition
is GRANTED partially. The assailed Orders dated March 14, 2001 and May
18, 2001 are hereby reversed and set aside insofar as the inclusion of
parcels of land known as Lot No. 3353 located at Badian, Cebu with an area
of 53,301 square meters subject matter of the Deed of Absolute Sale dated
November 9, 1989 and the various parcels of land subject matter of the
Deeds of Assignment dated February 17, 1989 and January 10, 1991 in the
revised inventory to be submitted by the administratrix is concerned
and affirmed in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.
The CA opined that Teresita, et al. had properly filed the petition
for certiorari because the order of the RTC directing a new inventory of
properties was interlocutory; that pursuant to Article 1477 of the Civil
Code, to the effect that the ownership of the thing sold “shall be
transferred to the vendee” upon its “actual and constructive delivery,” and
to Article 1498 of the Civil Code, to the effect that the sale made through a
public instrument was equivalent to the delivery of the object of the sale,
the sale by Emigdio and Teresita had transferred the ownership of Lot No.
3353 to Mervir Realty because the deed of absolute sale executed on
November 9, 1989 had been notarized; that Emigdio had thereby ceased
to have any more interest in Lot 3353; that Emigdio had assigned the
parcels of land to Mervir Realty as early as February 17, 1989 “for the
purpose of saving, as in avoiding taxes with the difference that in the Deed
of Assignment dated January 10, 1991, additional seven (7) parcels of land
were included”; that as to the January 10, 1991 deed of assignment,
Mervir Realty had been “even at the losing end considering that such
parcels of land, subject matter(s) of the Deed of Assignment dated
February 12, 1989, were again given monetary consideration through
shares of stock”; that even if the assignment had been based on the deed
of assignment dated January 10, 1991, the parcels of land could not be
included in the inventory “considering that there is nothing wrong or
objectionable about the estate planning scheme”; that the RTC, as an
intestate court, also had no power to take cognizance of and determine
the issue of title to property registered in the name of third persons or
corporation; that a property covered by the Torrens system should be
afforded the presumptive conclusiveness of title; that the RTC, by
disregarding the presumption, had transgressed the clear provisions of law
and infringed settled jurisprudence on the matter; and that the RTC also
gravely abused its discretion in holding that Teresita, et al. were estopped
from questioning its jurisdiction because of their agreement to submit to
the RTC the issue of which properties should be included in the inventory.
The CA further opined as follows:
In the instant case, public respondent court erred when it ruled that
petitioners are estopped from questioning its jurisdiction considering that
they have already agreed to submit themselves to its jurisdiction of
determining what properties are to be included in or excluded from the
inventory to be submitted by the administratrix, because actually, a
reading of petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration dated March 26, 2001
filed before public respondent court clearly shows that petitioners are not
questioning its jurisdiction but the manner in which it was exercised for
which they are not estopped, since that is their right, considering that
there is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of limited
jurisdiction when it issued the assailed Order dated March 14, 2001
denying the administratrix’s motion for approval of the inventory of
properties which were already titled and in possession of a third person
that is, Mervir Realty Corporation, a private corporation, which under the
law possessed a personality distinct and separate from its stockholders,
and in the absence of any cogency to shred the veil of corporate fiction,
the presumption of conclusiveness of said titles in favor of Mervir Realty
Corporation should stand undisturbed.
Besides, public respondent court acting as a probate court had no
authority to determine the applicability of the doctrine of piercing the veil
of corporate fiction and even if public respondent court was not merely
acting in a limited capacity as a probate court, private respondent
nonetheless failed to adjudge competent evidence that would have
justified the court to impale the veil of corporate fiction because to
disregard the separate jurisdictional personality of a corporation, the
wrongdoing must be clearly and convincingly established since it cannot be
presumed.14
On November 15, 2002, the CA denied the motion for reconsideration of
Teresita, et al.15
Issue
Did the CA properly determine that the RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in directing the
inclusion of certain properties in the inventory notwithstanding that such
properties had been either transferred by sale or exchanged for corporate
shares in Mervir Realty by the decedent during his lifetime?
Ruling of the Court
The appeal is meritorious.
I interlocutory order may be the subject of an appeal, but only after a
Was certiorari the proper recourse
to assail the questioned orders of the RTC?
The first issue to be resolved is procedural. Thelma contends that the
resort to the special civil action for certiorari to assail the orders of the RTC
by Teresita and her co–respondents was not proper.
Thelma’s contention cannot be sustained.
The propriety of the special civil action for certiorari as a remedy depended
on whether the assailed orders of the RTC were final or interlocutory in
nature. In Pahila–Garrido v. Tortogo,16 the Court distinguished
between final and interlocutory orders as follows:
The distinction between a final order and an interlocutory order is well
known. The first disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates
a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing more to be done except
to enforce by execution what the court has determined, but the latter does
not completely dispose of the case but leaves something else to be
decided upon. An interlocutory order deals with preliminary matters and
the trial on the merits is yet to be held and the judgment rendered. The
test to ascertain whether or not an order or a judgment is interlocutory or
final is: does the order or judgment leave something to be done in the trial
court with respect to the merits of the case? If it does, the order or
judgment is interlocutory; otherwise, it is final.
The order dated November 12, 2002, which granted the application for the
writ of preliminary injunction, was an interlocutory, not a final, order, and
should not be the subject of an appeal. The reason for disallowing an
appeal from an interlocutory order is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a
single action, which necessarily suspends the hearing and decision on the
merits of the action during the pendency of the appeals. Permitting
multiple appeals will necessarily delay the trial on the merits of the case
for a considerable length of time, and will compel the adverse party to
incur unnecessary expenses, for one of the parties may interpose as many
appeals as there are incidental questions raised by him and as there are
interlocutory orders rendered or issued by the lower court. An
judgment has been rendered, with the ground for appealing the order
being included in the appeal of the judgment itself.
The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an
appropriate special civil action under Rule 65, provided that the
interlocutory order is rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion. Then is certiorari under Rule 65 allowed to be
resorted to.
The assailed order of March 14, 2001 denying Teresita’s motion for the
approval of the inventory and the order dated May 18, 2001 denying her
motion for reconsideration were interlocutory. This is because the
inclusion of the properties in the inventory was not yet a final
determination of their ownership. Hence, the approval of the inventory
and the concomitant determination of the ownership as basis for inclusion
or exclusion from the inventory were provisional and subject to revision at
anytime during the course of the administration proceedings.
In Valero Vda. De Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals,17 the Court, in affirming
the decision of the CA to the effect that the order of the intestate court
excluding certain real properties from the inventory was interlocutory and
could be changed or modified at anytime during the course of the
administration proceedings, held that the order of exclusion was not a final
but an interlocutory order “in the sense that it did not settle once and for
all the title to the San Lorenzo Village lots.” The Court observed there that:
The prevailing rule is that for the purpose of determining whether a certain
property should or should not be included in the inventory, the probate
court may pass upon the title thereto but such determination is not
conclusive and is subject to the final decision in a separate action
regarding ownership which may be instituted by the parties (3 Moran’s
Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Edition, pages 448–9 and
473; Lachenal vs. Salas, L–42257, June 14, 1976, 71 SCRA 262, 266).18 (Bold
emphasis supplied)
To the same effect was De Leon v. Court of Appeals,19 where the Court
declared that a “probate court, whether in a testate or intestate
proceeding, can only pass upon questions of title provisionally,” and
reminded, citing Jimenez v. Court of Appeals, that the “patent reason is the
probate court’s limited jurisdiction and the principle that questions of title
or ownership, which result in inclusion or exclusion from the inventory of
the property, can only be settled in a separate action.” Indeed, in the cited
case of Jimenez v. Court of Appeals,20 the Court pointed out:
All that the said court could do as regards the said properties is determine
whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of
properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is a dispute as
to the ownership, then the opposing parties and the administrator have
to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting
claims of title because the probate court cannot do so. (Bold emphasis
supplied)
On the other hand, an appeal would not be the correct recourse for
Teresita, et al. to take against the assailed orders. The final judgment
rule embodied in the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 41, Rules of
Court,21 which also governs appeals in special proceedings, stipulates that
only the judgments, final orders (and resolutions) of a court of law “that
completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when
declared by these Rules to be appealable” may be the subject of an appeal
in due course. The same rule states that an interlocutory order or
resolution (interlocutory because it deals with preliminary matters, or that
the trial on the merits is yet to be held and the judgment rendered) is
expressly made non–appealable.
Multiple appeals are permitted in special proceedings as a practical
recognition of the possibility that material issues may be finally
determined at various stages of the special proceedings. Section 1, Rule
109 of the Rules of Court enumerates the specific instances in which
multiple appeals may be resorted to in special proceedings, viz:
Section 1. Orders or judgments from which appeals may be taken. – An
interested person may appeal in special proceedings from an order or
judgment rendered by a Court of First Instance or a Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court, where such order or judgment:
(a) Allows or disallows a will;
(b) Determines who are the lawful heirs of a deceased person, or the
distributive share of the estate to which such person is entitled;
(c) Allows or disallows, in whole or in part, any claim against the estate of a
deceased person, or any claim presented on behalf of the estate in offset
to a claim against it;
(d) Settles the account of an executor, administrator, trustee or guardian;
(e) Constitutes, in proceedings relating to the settlement of the estate of a
deceased person, or the administration of a trustee or guardian, a final
determination in the lower court of the rights of the party appealing,
except that no appeal shall be allowed from the appointment of a special
administrator; and
(f) Is the final order or judgment rendered in the case, and affects the
substantial rights of the person appealing, unless it be an order granting or
denying a motion for a new trial or for reconsideration.
Clearly, the assailed orders of the RTC, being interlocutory, did not come
under any of the instances in which multiple appeals are permitted.
II
Did the RTC commit grave abuse of discretion
in directing the inclusion of the properties
in the estate of the decedent?
In its assailed decision, the CA concluded that the RTC committed grave
abuse of discretion for including properties in the inventory
notwithstanding their having been transferred to Mervir Realty by Emigdio
during his lifetime, and for disregarding the registration of the properties
in the name of Mervir Realty, a third party, by applying the doctrine of
piercing the veil of corporate fiction.
Was the CA correct in its conclusion?
The answer is in the negative. It is unavoidable to find that the CA, in
reaching its conclusion, ignored the law and the facts that had fully
warranted the assailed orders of the RTC.
Under Section 6(a), Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, the letters of
administration may be granted at the discretion of the court to the
surviving spouse, who is competent and willing to serve when the person
dies intestate. Upon issuing the letters of administration to the surviving
spouse, the RTC becomes duty–bound to direct the preparation and
submission of the inventory of the properties of the estate, and the
surviving spouse, as the administrator, has the duty and responsibility to
submit the inventory within three months from the issuance of letters of
administration pursuant to Rule 83 of the Rules of Court, viz:
Section 1. Inventory and appraisal to be returned within three months. –
Within three (3) months after his appointment every executor or
administrator shall return to the court a true inventory and appraisal of all
the real and personal estate of the deceased which has come into his
possession or knowledge. In the appraisement of such estate, the court
may order one or more of the inheritance tax appraisers to give his or their
assistance.
The usage of the word all in Section 1, supra, demands the inclusion of all
the real and personal properties of the decedent in the
inventory.22 However, the word all is qualified by the phrase which has
come into his possession or knowledge, which signifies that the properties
must be known to the administrator to belong to the decedent or are in
her possession as the administrator. Section 1 allows no exception, for the
phrase true inventory implies that no properties appearing to belong to the
decedent can be excluded from the inventory, regardless of their being in
the possession of another person or entity.
The objective of the Rules of Court in requiring the inventory and appraisal
of the estate of the decedent is “to aid the court in revising the accounts
and determining the liabilities of the executor or the administrator, and in
making a final and equitable distribution (partition) of the estate and
otherwise to facilitate the administration of the estate.”23 Hence, the RTC
that presides over the administration of an estate is vested with wide
discretion on the question of what properties should be included in the
inventory. According to Peralta v. Peralta,24 the CA cannot impose its
judgment in order to supplant that of the RTC on the issue of which
properties are to be included or excluded from the inventory in the
absence of “positive abuse of discretion,” for in the administration of the
estates of deceased persons, “the judges enjoy ample discretionary
powers and the appellate courts should not interfere with or attempt to
replace the action taken by them, unless it be shown that there has been a
positive abuse of discretion.”25 As long as the RTC commits no patently
grave abuse of discretion, its orders must be respected as part of the
regular performance of its judicial duty.
There is no dispute that the jurisdiction of the trial court as an intestate
court is special and limited. The trial court cannot adjudicate title to
properties claimed to be a part of the estate but are claimed to belong to
third parties by title adverse to that of the decedent and the estate, not by
virtue of any right of inheritance from the decedent. All that the trial court
can do regarding said properties is to determine whether or not they
should be included in the inventory of properties to be administered by
the administrator. Such determination is provisional and may be still
revised. As the Court said in Agtarap v. Agtarap:26
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a
probate court or an intestate court, relates only to matters having to do
with the probate of the will and/or settlement of the estate of deceased
persons, but does not extend to the determination of questions of
ownership that arise during the proceedings. The patent rationale for this
rule is that such court merely exercises special and limited jurisdiction. As
held in several cases, a probate court or one in charge of estate
proceedings, whether testate or intestate, cannot adjudicate or determine
title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are claimed
to belong to outside parties, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from
the deceased but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate.
All that the said court could do as regards said properties is to determine
whether or not they should be included in the inventory of properties to
be administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, there poses no
problem, but if there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the
opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action before a court
exercising general jurisdiction for a final determination of the conflicting
claims of title.
However, this general rule is subject to exceptions as justified by
expediency and convenience.
First, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or a
testate proceeding the question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the
inventory of a piece of property without prejudice to final determination
of ownership in a separate action. Second, if the interested parties are all
heirs to the estate, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or
the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court
and the rights of third parties are not impaired, then the probate court is
competent to resolve issues on ownership. Verily, its jurisdiction extends
to matters incidental or collateral to the settlement and distribution of the
estate, such as the determination of the status of each heir and whether
the property in the inventory is conjugal or exclusive property of the
deceased spouse.27 (Italics in the original; bold emphasis supplied)
It is clear to us that the RTC took pains to explain the factual bases for its
directive for the inclusion of the properties in question in its assailed order
of March 14, 2001, viz:
In the first place, the administratrix of the estate admitted that Emigdio
Mercado was one of the heirs of Severina Mercado who, upon her death,
left several properties as listed in the inventory of properties submitted in
Court in Special Proceedings No. 306–R which are supposed to be divided
among her heirs. The administratrix admitted, while being examined in
Court by the counsel for the petitioner, that she did not include in the
inventory submitted by her in this case the shares of Emigdio Mercado in
the said estate of Severina Mercado. Certainly, said properties constituting
Emigdio Mercado’s share in the estate of Severina Mercado should be
included in the inventory of properties required to be submitted to the
Court in this particular case.
In the second place, the administratrix of the estate of Emigdio Mercado
also admitted in Court that she did not include in the inventory shares of
stock of Mervir Realty Corporation which are in her name and which were
paid by her from money derived from the taxicab business which she and
her husband had since 1955 as a conjugal undertaking. As these shares of
stock partake of being conjugal in character, one–half thereof or of the
value thereof should be included in the inventory of the estate of her
husband.
In the third place, the administratrix of the estate of Emigdio Mercado
admitted, too, in Court that she had a bank account in her name at Union
Bank which she opened when her husband was still alive. Again, the
money in said bank account partakes of being conjugal in character, and
so, one–half thereof should be included in the inventory of the properties
constituting as estate of her husband.
In the fourth place, it has been established during the hearing in this case
that Lot No. 3353 of Pls–657–D located in Badian, Cebu containing an area
of 53,301 square meters as described in and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 3252 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of
Cebu is still registered in the name of Emigdio S. Mercado until now. When
it was the subject of Civil Case No. CEB–12690 which was decided on
October 19, 1995, it was the estate of the late Emigdio Mercado which
claimed to be the owner thereof. Mervir Realty Corporation never
intervened in the said case in order to be the owner thereof. This fact was
admitted by Richard Mercado himself when he testified in Court. x x x So
the said property located in Badian, Cebu should be included in the
inventory in this case.
Fifthly and lastly, it appears that the assignment of several parcels of land
by the late Emigdio S. Mercado to Mervir Realty Corporation on January
10, 1991 by virtue of the Deed of Assignment signed by him on the said
day (Exhibit N for the petitioner and Exhibit 5 for the administratrix) was a
transfer in contemplation of death. It was made two days before he died
on January 12, 1991. A transfer made in contemplation of death is one
prompted by the thought that the transferor has not long to live and made
in place of a testamentary disposition (1959 Prentice Hall, p. 3909). Section
78 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977 provides that the gross
estate of the decedent shall be determined by including the value at the
time of his death of all property to the extent of any interest therein of
which the decedent has at any time made a transfer in contemplation of
death. So, the inventory to be approved in this case should still include the
said properties of Emigdio Mercado which were transferred by him in
contemplation of death. Besides, the said properties actually appeared to
be still registered in the name of Emigdio S. Mercado at least ten (10)
months after his death, as shown by the certification issued by the Cebu
City Assessor’s Office on October 31, 1991 (Exhibit O). 28
Thereby, the RTC strictly followed the directives of the Rules of Court and
the jurisprudence relevant to the procedure for preparing the inventory by
the administrator. The aforequoted explanations indicated that the
directive to include the properties in question in the inventory rested on
good and valid reasons, and thus was far from whimsical, or arbitrary, or
capricious.
Firstly, the shares in the properties inherited by Emigdio from Severina
Mercado should be included in the inventory because Teresita, et al. did
not dispute the fact about the shares being inherited by Emigdio.
Secondly, with Emigdio and Teresita having been married prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code in August 3, 1988, their property regime was
the conjugal partnership of gains.29 For purposes of the settlement of
Emigdio’s estate, it was unavoidable for Teresita to include his shares in
the conjugal partnership of gains. The party asserting that specific property
acquired during that property regime did not pertain to the conjugal
partnership of gains carried the burden of proof, and that party must prove
the exclusive ownership by one of them by clear, categorical, and
convincing evidence.30 In the absence of or pending the presentation of
such proof, the conjugal partnership of Emigdio and Teresita must be
provisionally liquidated to establish who the real owners of the affected
properties were,31 and which of the properties should form part of the
estate of Emigdio. The portions that pertained to the estate of Emigdio
must be included in the inventory.
Moreover, although the title over Lot 3353 was already registered in the
name of Mervir Realty, the RTC made findings that put that title in dispute.
Civil Case No. CEB–12692, a dispute that had involved the ownership of Lot
3353, was resolved in favor of the estate of Emigdio, and Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 3252 covering Lot 3353 was still in Emigdio’s name.
Indeed, the RTC noted in the order of March 14, 2001, or ten years after
his death, that Lot 3353 had remained registered in the name of Emigdio.
Interestingly, Mervir Realty did not intervene at all in Civil Case No. CEB–
12692. Such lack of interest in Civil Case No. CEB–12692 was susceptible of
various interpretations, including one to the effect that the heirs of
Emigdio could have already threshed out their differences with the
assistance of the trial court. This interpretation was probable considering
that Mervir Realty, whose business was managed by respondent Richard,
was headed by Teresita herself as its President. In other words, Mervir
Realty appeared to be a family corporation.
Also, the fact that the deed of absolute sale executed by Emigdio in favor
of Mervir Realty was a notarized instrument did not sufficiently justify the
exclusion from the inventory of the properties involved. A notarized deed
of sale only enjoyed the presumption of regularity in favor of its execution,
but its notarization did not per se guarantee the legal efficacy of the
transaction under the deed, and what the contents purported to be. The
presumption of regularity could be rebutted by clear and convincing
evidence to the contrary.32 As the Court has observed in Suntay v. Court of
Appeals:33
x x x. Though the notarization of the deed of sale in question vests in its
favor the presumption of regularity, it is not the intention nor the function
of the notary public to validate and make binding an instrument never, in
the first place, intended to have any binding legal effect upon the parties
thereto. The intention of the parties still and always is the primary
consideration in determining the true nature of a contract. (Bold
emphasis supplied)
It should likewise be pointed out that the exchange of shares of stock of
Mervir Realty with the real properties owned by Emigdio would still have
to be inquired into. That Emigdio executed the deed of assignment two
days prior to his death was a circumstance that should put any interested
party on his guard regarding the exchange, considering that there was a
finding about Emigdio having been sick of cancer of the pancreas at the
time.34 In this regard, whether the CA correctly characterized the exchange
as a form of an estate planning scheme remained to be validated by the
facts to be established in court.
The fact that the properties were already covered by Torrens titles in the
name of Mervir Realty could not be a valid basis for immediately excluding
them from the inventory in view of the circumstances admittedly
surrounding the execution of the deed of assignment. This is because:
The Torrens system is not a mode of acquiring titles to lands; it is merely a
system of registration of titles to lands. However, justice and equity
demand that the titleholder should not be made to bear the unfavorable
effect of the mistake or negligence of the State’s agents, in the absence of
proof of his complicity in a fraud or of manifest damage to third persons.
The real purpose of the Torrens system is to quiet title to land and put a
stop forever to any question as to the legality of the title, except claims
that were noted in the certificate at the time of registration or that may
arise subsequent thereto. Otherwise, the integrity of the Torrens system
shall forever be sullied by the ineptitude and inefficiency of land
registration officials, who are ordinarily presumed to have regularly
performed their duties.35
Assuming that only seven titled lots were the subject of the deed of
assignment of January 10, 1991, such lots should still be included in the
inventory to enable the parties, by themselves, and with the assistance of
the RTC itself, to test and resolve the issue on the validity of the
assignment. The limited jurisdiction of the RTC as an intestate court might
have constricted the determination of the rights to the properties arising
from that deed,36 but it does not prevent the RTC as intestate court from
ordering the inclusion in the inventory of the properties subject of that
deed. This is because the RTC as intestate court, albeit vested only with
special and limited jurisdiction, was still “deemed to have all the necessary
powers to exercise such jurisdiction to make it effective.” 37
Lastly, the inventory of the estate of Emigdio must be prepared and
submitted for the important purpose of resolving the difficult issues of
collation and advancement to the heirs. Article 1061 of the Civil
Code required every compulsory heir and the surviving spouse, herein
Teresita herself, to “bring into the mass of the estate any property or right
which he (or she) may have received from the decedent, during the
lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in
order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each
heir, and in the account of the partition.” Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of
Court also provided that any advancement by the decedent on the legitime
of an heir “may be heard and determined by the court having jurisdiction
of the estate proceedings, and the final order of the court thereon shall be
binding on the person raising the questions and on the heir.” Rule 90
thereby expanded the special and limited jurisdiction of the RTC as an
intestate court about the matters relating to the inventory of the estate of
the decedent by authorizing it to direct the inclusion of properties donated
or bestowed by gratuitous title to any compulsory heir by the decedent. 38
The determination of which properties should be excluded from or
included in the inventory of estate properties was well within the authority
and discretion of the RTC as an intestate court. In making its
determination, the RTC acted with circumspection, and proceeded under
the guiding policy that it was best to include all properties in the
possession of the administrator or were known to the administrator to
belong to Emigdio rather than to exclude properties that could turn out in
the end to be actually part of the estate. As long as the RTC commits no
patent grave abuse of discretion, its orders must be respected as part of
the regular performance of its judicial duty. Grave abuse of
discretion means either that the judicial or quasi–judicial power was
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility, or that the respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a
positive duty, or virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in
contemplation of law, such as when such judge, tribunal or board
exercising judicial or quasi–judicial powers acted in a capricious or
whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.39
In light of the foregoing, the CA’s conclusion of grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the RTC was unwarranted and erroneous.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review
on certiorari; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on May
15, 2002; REINSTATES the orders issued on March 14, 2001 and May 18,
2001 by the Regional Trial Court in Cebu; DIRECTS the Regional Trial Court
in Cebu to proceed with dispatch in Special Proceedings No. 3094–CEB
entitled Intestate Estate of the late Emigdio Mercado, Thelma Aranas,
petitioner, and to resolve the case; and ORDERS the respondents to pay
the costs of suit.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 187524. August 5, 2015.*
SPOUSES MARIA BUTIONG and FRANCISCO VILLAFRIA, substituted by DR.
RUEL B. VILLAFRIA, petitioners, vs. MA. GRACIA RIÑOZA PLAZO and MA. FE
RIÑOZA ALARAS, respondents.
Remedial Law; Special Proceedings; Settlement of Estate of Deceased
Persons; The general rule is that when a person dies intestate, or, if testate,
failed to name an executor in his will or the executor so named is
incompetent, or refuses the trust, or fails to furnish the bond required by
the Rules of Court, then the decedent’s estate shall be judicially
administered and the competent court shall appoint a qualified
administrator in the order established in Section 6 of Rule 78 of the Rules of
Court.—It must be recalled that the general rule is that when a person dies
intestate, or, if testate, failed to name an executor in his will or the
executor so named is incompetent, or refuses the trust, or fails to furnish
the bond required by the Rules of Court, then the decedent’s estate shall
be judicially administered and the competent court shall appoint a
qualified administrator in the order established in Section 6 of Rule 78 of
the Rules of Court. An exception to this rule, however, is found in the
aforequoted Section 1 of Rule 74 wherein the heirs of a decedent, who left
no will and no debts due from his estate, may divide the estate either
extrajudicially or in an ordinary action for partition without submitting the
same for judicial administration nor applying for the appointment of an
administrator by the court. The reason is that where the deceased dies
without pending obligations, there is no necessity for the appointment of
an administrator to administer the estate for them and to deprive the real
owners of their possession to which they are immediately entitled.
Same; Same; Same; Partition; Unless and until the issue of co-ownership is
definitively resolved, it would be premature to effect a partition of an
estate.—Indeed, an action for partition does not preclude the settlement
of the issue of ownership. In fact, the determination as to the existence of
the same is necessary in the resolution
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
228
228 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Butiong vs. Plazo
of an action for partition, as held in Municipality of Biñan v. Garcia, 180
SCRA 576 (1989): The first phase of a partition and/or accounting suit is
taken up with the determination of whether or not a co-ownership in
fact exists, and a partition is proper (i.e., not otherwise legally proscribed)
and may be made by voluntary agreement of all the parties interested in
the property. This phase may end with a declaration that plaintiff is not
entitled to have a partition either because a co-ownership does not exist,
or partition is legally prohibited. It may end, on the other hand, with an
adjudgment that a co-ownership does in truth exist, partition is proper in
the premises and an accounting of rents and profits received by the
defendant from the real estate in question is in order. x x x The second
phase commences when it appears that “the parties are unable to agree
upon the partition” directed by the court. In that event[,] partition shall be
done for the parties by the [c]ourt with the assistance of not more than
three (3) commissioners. This second stage may well also deal with the
rendition of the accounting itself and its approval by the [c]ourt after the
parties have been accorded opportunity to be heard thereon, and an
award for the recovery by the party or parties thereto entitled of their just
share in the rents and profits of the real estate in question. x x x. An action
for partition, therefore, is premised on the existence or nonexistence of
co-ownership between the parties. Unless and until the issue of co-
ownership is definitively resolved, it would be premature to effect a
partition of an estate.
Same; Civil Procedure; Regional Trial Courts; Jurisdiction; Since the action
herein was not merely for partition and recovery of ownership but also for
annulment of title and documents, the action is incapable of pecuniary
estimation and thus cognizable by the Regional Trial Court (RTC).—Under
Section 1 of Republic Act No. 7691 (RA 7691), amending Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129, the RTC shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil
actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary
estimation. Since the action herein was not merely for partition and
recovery of ownership but also for annulment of title and documents, the
action is incapable of pecuniary estimation and thus cognizable by the RTC.
Hence, considering that the trial court clearly had jurisdiction in rendering
its decision, the instant petition for annulment of judgment must
necessarily fail.
229
VOL. 765, AUGUST 5, 2015 229
Butiong vs. Plazo
Same; Same; Judgments; Immutability of Final Judgments; A judgment
which has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, hence,
may no longer be modified in any respect except to correct clerical errors or
mistakes, all the issues between the parties being deemed resolved and laid
to rest.—Indeed, a judgment which has acquired finality becomes
immutable and unalterable, hence, may no longer be modified in any
respect except to correct clerical errors or mistakes, all the issues between
the parties being deemed resolved and laid to rest. It is a fundamental
principle in our judicial system and essential to an effective and efficient
administration of justice that, once a judgment has become final, the
winning party be, not through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of
the verdict. Exceptions to the immutability of final judgment are allowed
only under the most extraordinary of circumstances. Yet, when petitioner
is given more than ample opportunity to be heard, unbridled access to the
appellate courts, as well as unbiased judgments rendered after a
consideration of evidence presented by the parties, as in the case at hand,
the Court shall refrain from reversing the rulings of the courts below in the
absence of any showing that the same were rendered with fraud or lack of
jurisdiction.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the
Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Edilberto B. Cosca for petitioners.
Ma. Gracia De V. Ronoza-Plazo for respondents.
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision1 and
Resolution,2 dated March 13, 2009 and April
_______________
1 Penned by Associate Justice Myrna Dimaranan Vidal, with Associate
Justices Martin S. Villarama, Jr. (now Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court) and Rosalina Asuncion-Vicente, concurring; Rollo, pp. 38-48.
2 Id., at p. 50.
230
230 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Butiong vs. Plazo
23, 2009, respectively, of the Court Appeals (CA) in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No.
107347, which affirmed the Judgment3 dated October 1, 2001 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Nasugbu, Batangas, Branch 14, in Civil Case
No. 217.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On November 16, 1989, Pedro L. Riñoza died intestate, leaving several
heirs, including his children with his first wife, respondents Ma. Gracia R.
Plazo and Ma. Fe Alaras, as well as several properties including a resort
covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) No. 51354 and No. 51355,
each with an area of 351 square meters, and a family home, the land on
which it stands is covered by TCT Nos. 40807 and 40808, both located in
Nasugbu, Batangas.4
In their Amended Complaint for Judicial Partition with Annulment of Title
and Recovery of Possession5 dated September 15, 1993, respondents
alleged that sometime in March 1991, they discovered that their coheirs,
Pedro’s second wife, Benita Tenorio and other children, had sold the
subject properties to petitioners, spouses Francisco Villafria and Maria
Butiong, who are now deceased and substituted by their son, Dr. Ruel B.
Villafria, without their knowledge and consent. When confronted about
the sale, Benita acknowledged the same, showing respondents a
document she believed evidenced receipt of her share in the sale, which,
however, did not refer to any sort of sale but to a previous loan obtained
by Pedro and Benita from a bank.6 The document actually evidenced
receipt from Banco Silangan of the amount of P87,352.62 releasing her and
her late husband’s indebtedness therefrom.7 Upon inquiry, the Register of
Deeds of Nasugbu informed respondents that he has no record of any
transac-
_______________
3 Penned by Judge Antonio A. De Sagun; id., at pp. 83-118.
4 Id., at p. 121.
5 Id., at pp. 51-75.
6 Id., at p. 122.
7 Id., at p. 62.

231
VOL. 765, AUGUST 5, 2015 231
Butiong vs. Plazo
tion involving the subject properties, giving them certified true copies of
the titles to the same. When respondents went to the subject properties,
they discovered that 4 out of the 8 cottages in the resort had been
demolished. They were not, however, able to enter as the premises were
padlocked.
Subsequently, respondents learned that on July 18, 1991, a notice of an
extrajudicial settlement of estate of their late father was published in a
tabloid called Balita. Because of this, they caused the annotation of their
adverse claims over the subject properties before the Register of Deeds of
Nasugbu and filed their complaint praying, among others, for the
annulment of all documents conveying the subject properties to the
petitioners and certificates of title issued pursuant thereto.8
In their Answer,9 petitioners denied the allegations of the complaint on
the ground of lack of personal knowledge and good faith in acquiring the
subject properties. In the course of his testimony during trial, petitioner
Francisco further contended that what they purchased was only the
resort.10 He also presented an Extra-Judicial Settlement with
Renunciation, Repudiations and Waiver of Rights and Sale which provides,
among others, that respondents’ coheirs sold the family home to the
spouses Rolando and Ma. Cecilia Bondoc for P1 million as well as a Deed of
Sale whereby Benita sold the resort to petitioners for P650,000.00.11
On October 1, 2001, the trial court nullified the transfer of the subject
properties to petitioners and spouses Bondoc due to irregularities in the
documents of conveyance offered by petitioners as well as the
circumstances surrounding the execution of the same. Specifically, the
Extra-Judicial Settlement was notarized by a notary public who was not
duly
_______________
8 Id., at p. 123.
9 Id., at pp. 80-82.
10 Id., at p. 124.
11 Id.
232
232 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Butiong vs. Plazo
commissioned as such on the date it was executed.12 The Deed of Sale
was undated, the date of the acknowledgment therein was left blank, and
the typewritten name “Pedro Riñoza, Husband” on the left side of the
document was not signed.13 The trial court also observed that both
documents were never presented to the Office of the Register of Deeds for
registration and that the titles to the subject properties were still in the
names of Pedro and his second wife Benita. In addition, the supposed
notaries and buyers of the subject properties were not even presented as
witnesses who supposedly witnessed the signing and execution of the
documents of conveyance.14 On the basis thereof, the trial court ruled in
favor of respondents, in its Judgment, the pertinent portions of its fallo
provide:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
as follows:
xxxx
4. a) Declaring as a nullity the “Extra-Judicial Settlement with
Renunciation, Repudiation and Waiver of Rights and Sale” (Exh. “1,”
Villafria) notarized on December 23, 1991 by Notary Public Antonio G.
Malonzo of Manila, Doc. No. 190, Page No. 20, Book No. IXII, Series of
1991.
b) Declaring as a nullity the Deed of Absolute Sale (Exh. “2,” Villafria),
purportedly executed by Benita T. Riñoza in favor of spouses Francisco
Villafria and Maria Butiong, purportedly notarized by one Alfredo de
Guzman, marked Doc. No. 1136, Page No. 141, Book No. XXX, Series of
1991.
c) Ordering the forfeiture of any and all improvements introduced by
defendants Francisco Villafria and Maria Butiong in the properties covered
by TCT No. 40807, 40808, 51354 and 51355 of the Register of Deeds for
Nasugbu, Batangas.
_______________
12 Id., at p. 104.
13 Id., at p. 112.
14 Id., at p. 107.
233
VOL. 765, AUGUST 5, 2015 233
Butiong vs. Plazo
5. Ordering defendant Francisco Villafria and all persons, whose
occupancy within the premises of the four (4) parcels of land described in
par. 4-c above is derived from the rights and interest of defendant Villafria,
to vacate its premises and to deliver possession thereof, and all
improvements existing thereon to plaintiffs, for and in behalf of the estate
of decedent Pedro L. Riñoza.
6. Declaring the plaintiffs and the defendants-heirs in the Amended
Complaint to be the legitimate heirs of decedent Pedro L. Riñoza, each in
the capacity and degree established, as well as their direct successors-in--
interest, and ordering the defendant Registrar of Deeds to issue the
corresponding titles in their names in the proportion established by law,
pro indiviso, in TCT Nos. 40807, 40808, 51354, 51355 and 40353 (after
restoration) within ten (10) days from finality of this Decision, upon
payment of lawful fees, except TCT No. 40353, which shall be exempt from
all expenses for its restoration.
With no costs.
SO ORDERED.15
On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial court’s Judgment in its Decision16
dated October 31, 2006 in the following wise:
The person before whom the resort deed was acknowledged, Alfredo de
Guzman, was not commissioned as a notary public from 1989 to July 3,
1991, the date the certification was issued. Such being the case, the
resort deed is not a public document and the presumption of regularity
accorded to public documents will not apply to the same. As laid down in
Tigno, et al. v. Aquino, et al.:
_______________
15 Id., at pp. 116-118.
16 Penned by Associate Justice Normandie B. Pizarro, with Associate
Justices Rosalinda Asuncion-Vicente and Aurora Santiago-Lagman,
concurring; id., at pp. 120-137.
234
234 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Butiong vs. Plazo
The validity of a notarial certification necessarily derives from the authority
of the notarial officer. If the notary public does not have the capacity to
notarize a document, but does so anyway, then the document should be
treated as unnotarized. The rule may strike as rather harsh, and perhaps
may prove to be prejudicial to parties in good faith relying on the proferred
authority of the notary public or the person pretending to be one. Still, to
admit otherwise would render merely officious the elaborate process
devised by this Court in order that a lawyer may receive a notarial
commission. Without such a rule, the notarization of a document by a
duly-appointed notary public will have the same legal effect as one
accomplished by a nonlawyer engaged in pretense.
The notarization of a document carries considerable legal effect.
Notarization of a private document converts such document into a public
one, and renders it admissible in court without further proof of its
authenticity. Thus, notarization is not an empty routine; to the contrary, it
engages public interest in a substantial degree and the protection of that
interest requires preventing those who are not qualified or authorized to
act as notaries public from imposing upon the public and the courts and
administrative offices generally.
Parenthetically, the settlement/family home deed cannot be considered
a public document. This is because the following cast doubt on the
document’s authenticity, to wit:
1.) The date of its execution was not indicated;
235
VOL. 765, AUGUST 5, 2015 235
Butiong vs. Plazo
2.) The amount of consideration was superimposed;
3.) It was not presented to the Registry of Deeds of Nasugbu, Batangas
for annotation; and
4.) Not even the supposed notary public, Alfredo de Guzman, or the
purported buyer, the Spouses Rolando and Ma. Cecilia Bondoc, were
presented as witnesses.
Concededly, the absence of notarization in the resort deed and/or the
lacking details in the settlement/family home deed did not necessarily
invalidate the transactions evidenced by the said documents. However,
since the said deeds are private documents, perforce, their due execution
and authenticity becomes subject to the requirement of proof under the
Rules on Evidence, Section 20, Rule 132 of which provides:
Sec. 20. Proof of private document.—Before any private document
offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and
authenticity must be proved either:
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the
maker.
The Complaining Heirs insist that the settlement/family home and the
resort deed are void as their signatures thereon are forgeries as opposed
to the Villafrias who profess the deeds’ enforceability. After the
Complaining Heirs presented proofs in support of their claim that their
signatures were forged, the burden then fell upon the Villafrias to
disprove the same, or conversely, to prove the authenticity and due
execution of the said deeds. The Villafrias failed in this regard.
As aforestated, the Villafrias did not present as witnesses (a) the notary
public who purportedly notarized the questioned instrument, (b) the wit-
236
236 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Butiong vs. Plazo
nesses who appear[ed] in the instruments as eyewitnesses to the signing,
or (c) an expert to prove the authenticity and genuineness of all the
signatures appearing on the said instruments. Verily, the rule that,
proper foundation must be laid for the admission of documentary
evidence; that is, the identity and authenticity of the document must be
reasonably established as a prerequisite to its admission, was prudently
observed by the lower court when it refused to admit the
settlement/family home and the resort deeds as their veracity are
doubtful.17
Aggrieved, petitioners, substituted by their son Ruel Villafria, filed a
Motion for Reconsideration dated November 24, 2006 raising the trial
court’s lack of jurisdiction. It was alleged that when the Complaint for
Judicial Partition with Annulment of Title and Recovery of Possession was
filed, there was yet no settlement of Pedro’s estate, determination as to
the nature thereof, nor was there an identification of the number of
legitimate heirs. As such, the trial court ruled on the settlement of the
intestate estate of Pedro in its ordinary jurisdiction when the action filed
was for Judicial Partition. Considering that the instant action is really one
for settlement of intestate estate, the trial court, sitting merely in its
probate jurisdiction, exceeded its jurisdiction when it ruled upon the issues
of forgery and ownership. Thus, petitioner argued that said ruling is void
and has no effect for having been rendered without jurisdiction. The
Motion for Reconsideration was, however, denied by the appellate court
on February 26, 2007.
On appeal, this Court denied on June 20, 2007, petitioner’s Petition for
Review on Certiorari for submitting a verification of the petition, a
certificate of non-forum shopping and an affidavit of service that failed to
comply with the 2004 Rules
237
VOL. 765, AUGUST 5, 2015 237
Butiong vs. Plazo
on Notarial Practice regarding competent evidence of affiant’s identities.18
In its Resolution19 dated September 26, 2007, this Court also denied
petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration in the absence of any compelling
reason to warrant a modification of the previous denial. Thus, the June 20,
2007 Resolution became final and executory on October 31, 2007 as
certified by the Entry of Judgment issued by the Court.20
On January 16, 2008, the Court further denied petitioner’s motion for
leave to admit a second motion for reconsideration of its September 26,
2007 Resolution, considering that the same is a prohibited pleading under
Section 2, Rule 52, in relation to Section 4, Rule 56 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended. Furthermore, petitioner’s letter dated
December 18, 2007 pleading the Court to take a second look at his petition
for review on certiorari and that a decision thereon be rendered based
purely on its merits was noted without action.21
Unsatisfied, petitioner wrote a letter dated March 24, 2008 addressed to
then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno praying that a decision on the case be
rendered based on the merits and not on formal requirements “as he
stands to lose everything his parents had left him just because the
verification against non-forum shopping is formally defective.” However, in
view of the Entry of Judgment having been made on October 31, 2007, the
Court likewise noted said letter without action.22
On November 27, 2008, the RTC issued an Order issuing a Partial Writ of
Execution of its October 1, 2001 Decision with respect to the portions
disposing of petitioner’s claims as affirmed by the CA.
_______________
18 Id., at p. 186.
19 Id., at p. 182.
20 Id., at p. 186.
21 Id., at p. 183.
22 Id., at p. 185.
238
238 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Butiong vs. Plazo
The foregoing notwithstanding, petitioner filed, on February 11, 2009, a
Petition for Annulment of Judgment and Order before the CA assailing the
October 1, 2001 Decision as well as the November 27, 2008 Order of the
RTC on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. In its Decision
dated March 13, 2009, however, the CA dismissed the petition and
affirmed the rulings of the trial court in the following wise:
Although the assailed Decision of the Court a quo has already become
final and executory and in fact entry of judgment was issued on 31
October 2007, supra, nevertheless, to put the issues to rest, We deem it
apropos to tackle the same.
The Petitioner argues that the assailed Decision and Order of the Court a
quo, supra, should be annulled and set aside on the grounds of extrinsic
fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
We are not persuaded.
xxxx
Section 2 of the Rules as stated above provides that the annulment of a
judgment may “be based only on grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction.” In RP v. The Heirs of Sancho Magdato, the High Tribunal
stressed that:
There is extrinsic fraud when “the unsuccessful party had been prevented
from exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by
his opponent, as by keeping him away from court, ... or where the
defendant never had knowledge of the suit, being kept in ignorance by
the acts of the plaintiff; ...”
Otherwise put, extrinsic or collateral fraud pertains to such fraud which
prevents the aggrieved party from having a trial or presenting his case to
the court, or is used to procure the judgment without fair submission of
the controversy. This refers to acts intended to keep the
239
VOL. 765, AUGUST 5, 2015 239
Butiong vs. Plazo
unsuccessful party away from the courts as when there is a false promise
of compromise or when one is kept in ignorance of the suit.
The pivotal issues before Us are: (1) whether there was a time during the
proceedings below that the Petitioners ever prevented from exhibiting
fully their case, by fraud or deception, practiced on them by
Respondents, and (2) whether the Petitioners were kept away from the
court or kept in ignorance by the acts of the Respondent?
We find nothing of that sort. Instead, what We deduced as We carefully
delved into the evidentiary facts surrounding the instant case as well as
the proceedings below as shown in the 36-page Decision of the Court a
quo, is that the Petitioners were given ample time to rebut the
allegations of the Respondents and had in fact addressed every detail of
Respondent’s cause of action against them. Thus, Petitioners’ allegation
of the Court a quo’s lack of jurisdiction is misplaced.
Our pronouncement on the matter finds support in the explicit ruling of
the Supreme Court in Sps. Santos, et al. v. Sps. Lumbao, thus:
It is elementary that the active participation of a party in a case pending
against him before a court is tantamount to recognition of that court’s
jurisdiction and willingness to abide by the resolution of the case which
will bar said party from later on impugning the court’s jurisdiction.
In fine, under the circumstances obtaining in this case the Petitioners are
stopped from assailing the Court a quo’s lack of jurisdiction.
Too, We do not find merit in the Petitioners’ second issue, supra.
240
240 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
 Butiong vs. Plazo
As mentioned earlier, entry of judgment had already been made on the
assailed Decision and Order as early as 31 October 2007.
xxxx
It maybe that the doctrine of finality of judgments permits certain
equitable remedies such as a petition for annulment. But the rules are
clear. The annulment by the Court of Appeals of judgments or final
orders and resolutions in civil actions of the Regional Trial Courts is
resorted to only where the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal,
petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available
through no fault of the petitioner, supra.
If Petitioners lost their chance to avail themselves of the appropriate
remedies or appeal before the Supreme Court, that is their own look out.
The High Tribunal has emphatically pointed out in Mercado, et al. v.
Security Bank Corporation, thus:
A principle almost repeated to satiety is that “an action for annulment of
judgment cannot and is not a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal.” A
party must have first availed of appeal, a motion for new trial or a
petition for relief before an action for annulment can prosper. Its obvious
rationale is to prevent the party from benefiting from his inaction or
negligence. Also, the action for annulment of judgment must be based
either on (a) extrinsic fraud or (b) lack of jurisdiction or denial of due
process. Having failed to avail of the remedies and there being a clear
showing that neither of the grounds was present, the petition must be
dismissed. Only a disgruntled litigant would find such legal disposition
unacceptable.23
_______________
23 Id., at pp. 44-47. (Emphases ours)
241
VOL. 765, AUGUST 5, 2015 241
Butiong vs. Plazo
When the appellate court denied Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration
in its Resolution dated April 23, 2009, petitioner filed the instant Petition
for Review on Certiorari on June 10, 2009, invoking the following ground:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT RULING
THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 14, NASUGBU, BATANGAS,
ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN ENTERTAINING THE SPECIAL
PROCEEDING FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE OF PEDRO RIÑOZA AND
THE CIVIL ACTION FOR ANNULMENT OF TITLE OF THE HEIRS AND THIRD
PERSONS IN ONE PROCEEDING.24
Petitioner asserts that while the complaint filed by respondents was
captioned as “Judicial Partition with Annulment of Title and Recovery of
Possession,” the allegations therein show that the cause of action is
actually one for settlement of estate of decedent Pedro. Considering that
settlement of estate is a special proceeding cognizable by a probate court
of limited jurisdiction while judicial partition with annulment of title and
recovery of possession are ordinary civil actions cognizable by a court of
general jurisdiction, the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction in entertaining
the latter while it was sitting merely in its probate jurisdiction. This is in
view of the prohibition found in the Rules on the joinder of special civil
actions and ordinary civil actions.25 Thus, petitioner ar-
_______________
24 Id., at p. 21.
25 Section 5, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 5. Joinder of causes of action.—A party may in one pleading
assert, in the alternative or otherwise, as many causes of action as he may
have against an opposing party, subject to the following conditions:
(a) The party joining the causes of action shall comply with the rules on
joinder of parties;
242
242 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Butiong vs. Plazo
gued that the ruling of the trial court is void and has no effect for having
been rendered in without jurisdiction.
Petitioner also reiterates the arguments raised before the appellate court
that since the finding of forgery relates only to the signature of
respondents and not to their coheirs who assented to the conveyance, the
transaction should be considered valid as to them. Petitioner also denies
the findings of the courts below that his parents are builders in bad faith
for they only took possession of the subject properties after the execution
of the transfer documents and after they paid the consideration on the
sale.
The petition is bereft of merit.
Petitioner maintains that since respondents’ complaint alleged the
following causes of action, the same is actually one for settlement of
estate and not of judicial partition:
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
1. That Pedro L. Riñoza, Filipino and resident of Nasugbu, Batangas at the
time of his death, died intestate on November 16, 1989. Copy of his death
certificate is hereto attached as Annex “A”;
2. That Plaintiffs together with the Defendants enumerated from
paragraphs 2-A to 2-J are the only known heirs of the above mentioned
decedent. The plaintiffs and the Defendants Rolando, Rafael, Antonio,
Angelito, Lorna all surnamed Riñoza, and Myrna R.
_______________
(b) The joinder shall not include special civil actions or actions governed
by special rules;
(c) Where the causes of action are between the same parties but pertain
to different venues or jurisdictions, the joinder may be allowed in the
Regional Trial Court provided one of the causes of action falls within the
jurisdiction of said court and the venue lies therein; and
(d) Where the claims in all the causes action are principally for recovery
of money, the aggregate amount claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction.
243
VOL. 765, AUGUST 5, 2015 243
Butiong vs. Plazo
Limon or Myrna R. Rogador, Epifanio Belo and Ma. Theresa R. Demafelix
are the decedent’s legitimate children with his first wife, while Benita
Tenorio Riñoza, is the decedent’s widow and Bernadette Riñoza, the
decedent’s daughter with said widow. As such, said parties are co-owners
by virtue of an intestate inheritance from the decedent, of the properties
enumerated in the succeeding paragraph;
3. That the decedent left the following real properties all located in
Nasugbu, Batangas:
xxxx
16. That the estate of decedent Pedro L. Riñoza has no known legal
indebtedness;
17. That said estate remains undivided up to this date and it will be to
the best interest of all heirs that same be partitioned judicially.26
Petitioner is mistaken. It is true that some of respondents’ causes of action
pertaining to the properties left behind by the decedent Pedro, his known
heirs, and the nature and extent of their interests thereon, may fall under
an action for settlement of estate. However, a complete reading of the
complaint would readily show that, based on the nature of the suit, the
allegations therein, and the reliefs prayed for, the action is clearly one for
judicial partition with annulment of title and recovery of possession.
Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court provides:
RULE 74
Summary Settlement of Estate
Section 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs.—If the
decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, or the
minors are represented by their judicial or legal representatives duly
_______________
26 Rollo, pp. 22-23. (Emphases ours)
244
244 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Butiong vs. Plazo
authorized for the purpose, the parties may without securing letters of
administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by
means of a public instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds,
and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of
partition. If there is only one heir, he may adjudicate to himself the entire
estate by means of an affidavit filled in the office of the register of deeds.
The parties to an extrajudicial settlement, whether by public instrument or
by stipulation in a pending action for partition, or the sole heir who
adjudicates the entire estate to himself by means of an affidavit shall file,
simultaneously with and as a condition precedent to the filing of the public
instrument, or stipulation in the action for partition, or of the affidavit in
the office of the register of deeds, a bond with the said register of deeds,
in an amount equivalent to the value of the personal property involved as
certified to under oath by the parties concerned and conditioned upon the
payment of any just claim that may be filed under Section 4 of this rule. It
shall be presumed that the decedent left no debts if no creditor files a
petition for letters of administration within two (2) years after the death of
the decedent.
The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be
published in a newspaper of general circulation in the manner provided in
the next succeeding section; but no extrajudicial settlement shall be
binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice
thereof.27
In this relation, Section 1, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. Complaint in action for partition of real estate.—A person
having the right to compel the partition of real estate may do so as
provided in this Rule, setting forth in his complaint the nature and extent
of his title and an adequate description of the
_______________
27 Emphases ours.
245
VOL. 765, AUGUST 5, 2015 245
Butiong vs. Plazo
real estate of which partition is demanded and joining as defendants all
other persons interested in the property.28
As can be gleaned from the foregoing provisions, the allegations of
respondents in their complaint are but customary, in fact, mandatory, to a
complaint for partition of real estate. Particularly, the complaint alleged:
(1) that Pedro died intestate; (2) that respondents, together with their
coheirs, are all of legal age, with the exception of one who is represented
by a judicial representative duly authorized for the purpose; (3) that the
heirs enumerated are the only known heirs of Pedro; (4) that there is an
account and description of all real properties left by Pedro; (5) that Pedro’s
estate has no known indebtedness; and (6) that respondents, as rightful
heirs to the decedent’s estate, pray for the partition of the same in
accordance with the laws of intestacy. It is clear, therefore, that based on
the allegations of the complaint, the case is one for judicial partition. That
the complaint alleged causes of action identifying the heirs of the
decedent, properties of the estate, and their rights thereto, does not
perforce make it an action for settlement of estate.
It must be recalled that the general rule is that when a person dies
intestate, or, if testate, failed to name an executor in his will or the
executor so named is incompetent, or refuses the trust, or fails to furnish
the bond required by the Rules of Court, then the decedent’s estate shall
be judicially administered and the competent court shall appoint a
qualified administrator in the order established in Section 6 of Rule 78 of
the Rules of Court.29 An exception to this rule, however, is found in the
aforequoted Section 1 of Rule 74 wherein the heirs of a decedent, who left
no will and no debts due from his
_______________
28 Emphasis ours.
29 Avelino v. Court of Appeals, 385 Phil. 1014, 1020; 329 SCRA 369, 374-
375 (2000), citing Utulo v. Pasion Vda. de Garcia, 66 Phil. 302, 305 (1938).
246
246 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Butiong vs. Plazo
estate, may divide the estate either extrajudicially or in an ordinary action
for partition without submitting the same for judicial administration nor
applying for the appointment of an administrator by the court.30 The
reason is that where the deceased dies without pending obligations, there
is no necessity for the appointment of an administrator to administer the
estate for them and to deprive the real owners of their possession to
which they are immediately entitled.31
In this case, it was expressly alleged in the complaint, and was not
disputed, that Pedro died without a will, leaving his estate without any
pending obligations. Thus, contrary to petitioner’s contention, respondents
were under no legal obligation to submit the subject properties of the
estate to a special proceeding for settlement of intestate estate, and are,
in fact, encouraged to have the same partitioned, judicially or
extrajudicially, by Pereira v. Court of Appeals:32
Section 1, Rule 74 of the Revised Rules of Court, however, does not
preclude the heirs from instituting administration proceedings, even if the
estate has no debts or obligations, if they do not desire to resort for good
reasons to an ordinary action for partition. While Section 1 allows the heirs
to divide the estate among themselves as they may see fit, or to resort to
an ordinary action for partition, the said provision does not compel them
to do so if they have good reasons to take a different course of action. It
should be noted that recourse to an administration proceeding even if the
estate has no debts is sanctioned only if the heirs have good reasons for
not resorting to an action for partition. Where partition
_______________
30 Id., at p. 1021; p. 376; Torres v. Torres, 119 Phil. 444, 447; 10 SCRA 185,
188 (1964).
31 Guico v. Bautista, 110 Phil. 584, 586 (1960), citing Bondad v. Bondad,
34 Phil. 232 (1916); Fule v. Fule, 46 Phil. 317 (1924); Macalinao v. Valdez,
95 Phil. 318 (1954); 50 Off. Gaz., 3041; Intestate Estate of Rufina Mercado
v. Magtibay, 96 Phil. 383 (1954).
32 255 Phil. 863; 174 SCRA 154 (1989).
247
VOL. 765, AUGUST 5, 2015 247
Butiong vs. Plazo
is possible, either in or out of court, the estate should not be burdened
with an administration proceeding without good and compelling reasons.
Thus, it has been repeatedly held that when a person dies without
leaving pending obligations to be paid, his heirs, whether of age or not,
are not bound to submit the property to a judicial administration, which
is always long and costly, or to apply for the appointment of an
administrator by the Court. It has been uniformly held that in such case
the judicial administration and the appointment of an administrator are
superfluous and unnecessary proceedings.33
Thus, respondents committed no error in filing an action for judicial
partition instead of a special proceeding for the settlement of estate as the
same is expressly permitted by law. That the complaint contained
allegations inherent in an action for settlement of estate does not mean
that there was a prohibited joinder of causes of action for questions as to
the estate’s properties as well as a determination of the heirs, their status
as such, and the nature and extent of their titles to the estate, may also be
properly ventilated in partition proceedings alone.34 In fact, a complete
inventory of the estate may likewise be done during the partition
proceedings, especially since the estate has no debts.35 Indeed, where the
more expeditious remedy of partition is available to the heirs, then they
may not be compelled to submit to administration proceedings, dispensing
of the risks of delay and of the properties being dissipated.36
_______________
33 Id., at p. 868; pp. 159-160. (Emphases ours; citations omitted)
34 Id. at p. 869; p. 161, citing Monserrat v. Ibañez, No. L-3369, May 24,
1950.
35 Avelino v. Court of Appeals, supra note 29 at p. 1022; p. 376.
36 Id.
248
248 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Butiong vs. Plazo
Moreover, the fact that respondents’ complaint also prayed for the
annulment of title and recovery of possession does not strip the trial court
off of its jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. Asking for the annulment
of certain transfers of property could very well be achieved in an action for
partition,37 as can be seen in cases where courts determine the parties’
rights arising from complaints asking not only for the partition of estates
but also for the annulment of titles and recovery of ownership and
possession of property.38 In fact, in Bagayas v. Bagayas,39 wherein a
complaint for annulment of sale and partition was dismissed by the trial
court due to the impropriety of an action for annulment as it constituted a
collateral attack on the certificates of title of the respondents therein, this
Court found the dismissal to be improper in the following manner:
In Lacbayan v. Samoy, Jr. (Lacbayan) which is an action for partition
premised on the existence or nonexistence of co-ownership between the
parties, the Court categorically pronounced that a resolution on the issue
of ownership does not subject the Torrens title issued over the disputed
realties to a collateral attack. It must be borne in mind that what cannot
be collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and not the title itself. As
pronounced in Lacbayan:
There is no dispute that a Torrens certificate of title cannot be collaterally
attacked, but that rule is not material to the case at bar. What cannot be
collaterally attacked is
_______________
37 Pereira v. Court of Appeals, supra note 32 at p. 869; pp. 160-161, citing
Intestate Estate of Mercado v. Magtibay, 96 Phil. 383 (1953).
38 Genesis Investment, Inc. v. Heirs of Ceferino Ebarasabal, G.R. No.
181622, November 20, 2013, 710 SCRA 399; Heirs of Juanita Padilla v.
Magdua, 645 Phil. 140; 630 SCRA 573 (2010); and Reillo v. San Jose, 607
Phil. 446; 589 SCRA 458 (2009).
39 G.R. Nos. 187308 & 187517, September 18, 2013, 706 SCRA 73.
249
VOL. 765, AUGUST 5, 2015 249
Butiong vs. Plazo
the certificate of title and not the title itself. The certificate referred to is
that document issued by the Register of Deeds known as the TCT. In
contrast, the title referred to by law means ownership which is, more
often than not, represented by that document. Petitioner apparently
confuses title with the certificate of title. Title as a concept of ownership
should not be confused with the certificate of title as evidence of such
ownership although both are interchangeably used. (Emphases supplied)
Thus, the RTC erroneously dismissed petitioner’s petition for annulment
of sale on the ground that it constituted a collateral attack since she was
actually assailing Rogelio and Orlando’s title to the subject lands and not
any Torrens certificate of title over the same.
Indeed, an action for partition does not preclude the settlement of the
issue of ownership. In fact, the determination as to the existence of the
same is necessary in the resolution of an action for partition, as held in
Municipality of Biñan v. Garcia:40
The first phase of a partition and/or accounting suit is taken up with the
determination of whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists, and a
partition is proper (i.e., not otherwise legally proscribed) and may be
made by voluntary agreement of all the parties interested in the property.
This phase may end with a declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to have
a partition either because a co-ownership does not exist, or partition is
legally prohibited. It may end, on the other hand, with an adjudgment that
a co-ownership does in truth exist, partition is proper in the premises and
an accounting of rents and profits received by the defendant from the real
estate in question is in order. x x x
_______________
40 G.R. No. 69260, December 22, 1989, 180 SCRA 576.
250
250 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Butiong vs. Plazo
The second phase commences when it appears that “the parties are
unable to agree upon the partition” directed by the court. In that event[,]
partition shall be done for the parties by the [c]ourt with the assistance of
not more than three (3) commissioners. This second stage may well also
deal with the rendition of the accounting itself and its approval by the
[c]ourt after the parties have been accorded opportunity to be heard
thereon, and an award for the recovery by the party or parties thereto
entitled of their just share in the rents and profits of the real estate in
question. x x x.41
An action for partition, therefore, is premised on the existence or non-
existence of co-ownership between the parties.42 Unless and until the
issue of co-ownership is definitively resolved, it would be premature to
effect a partition of an estate.43
In view of the foregoing, petitioner’s argument that the trial court acted
without jurisdiction in entertaining the action of settlement of estate and
annulment of title in a single proceeding is clearly erroneous for the instant
complaint is precisely one for judicial partition with annulment of title and
recovery of possession, filed within the confines of applicable law and
jurisprudence. Under Section 144 of Republic Act No.
_______________
41 Id., at pp. 584-585. (Emphasis ours; citations omitted)
42 Lacbayan v. Samoy, Jr., 661 Phil. 307, 316; 645 SCRA 677, 688 (2011).
43 Id.
44 Section 1 of Republic Act No. 7691 provides:
Section 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as
the “Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980,” is hereby amended to read as
follows:
“Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases.—Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction.
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of
pecuniary estimation;
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real
property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of
251
VOL. 765, AUGUST 5, 2015 251
Butiong vs. Plazo
7691 (RA 7691),45 amending Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the RTC shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil actions in which the
subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation. Since the
action herein was not merely for partition and recovery of ownership but
also for annulment of title and documents, the action is incapable of
pecuniary estimation and thus cognizable by the RTC. Hence, considering
that the trial court clearly had jurisdiction in rendering its decision, the
instant petition for annulment of judgment must necessarily fail.
Note that even if the instant action was one for annulment of title alone,
without the prayer for judicial partition, the requirement of instituting a
separate special proceeding for the determination of the status and rights
of the respondents as putative heirs may be dispensed with, in light of the
fact that the parties had voluntarily submitted the issue to the trial court
and had already presented evidence regarding the issue of heirship.46 In
Portugal v. Portugal-Beltran,47 the Court explained:
In the case at bar, respondent, believing rightly or wrongly that she was
the sole heir to Portugal’s estate, executed on February 15, 1988
_______________
the property involved exceeds Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) or, for
civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful
detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred
upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts. x x x.”
45 An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, Amending for the
Purpose Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, Otherwise Known as the “Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980.” Approved on 25 March 1994.
46 Heirs of Gabatan v. Court of Appeals, 600 Phil. 112; 581 SCRA 70
(2009).
47 504 Phil. 456; 467 SCRA 184 (2005).
252
252 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Butiong vs. Plazo
the questioned Affidavit of Adjudication under the second sentence of
Rule 74, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court. Said rule is an exception
to the general rule that when a person dies leaving a property, it should
be judicially administered and the competent court should appoint a
qualified administrator, in the order established in Sec. 6, Rule 78 in case
the deceased left no will, or in case he did, he failed to name an executor
therein.
xxxx
It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property of the
intestate estate of Portugal is the Caloocan parcel of land, to still subject
it, under the circumstances of the case, to a special proceeding which
could be long, hence, not expeditious, just to establish the status of
petitioners as heirs is not only impractical; it is burdensome to the estate
with the costs and expenses of an administration proceeding. And it is
superfluous in light of the fact that the parties to the civil case — subject
of the present case, could and had already in fact presented evidence
before the trial court which assumed jurisdiction over the case upon the
issues it defined during pretrial.
In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no
compelling reason to still subject Portugal’s estate to administration
proceedings since a determination of petitioners’ status as heirs could be
achieved in the civil case filed by petitioners, the trial court should
proceed to evaluate the evidence presented by the parties during the
trial and render a decision thereon upon the issues it defined during
pretrial, x x x.48
Thus, in view of the clarity of respondents’ complaint and the causes of
action alleged therein, as well as the fact that the trial court, in arriving at
its decision, gave petitioner more
_______________
48 Id., at pp. 469-471; pp. 198-200. (Emphases ours)
253
VOL. 765, AUGUST 5, 2015 253
Butiong vs. Plazo
than ample opportunity to advance his claims, petitioner cannot now be
permitted to allege lack of jurisdiction just because the judgment rendered
was adverse to them. To repeat, the action filed herein is one for judicial
partition and not for settlement of intestate estate. Consequently, that
respondents also prayed for the annulment of title and recovery of
possession in the same proceeding does not strip the court off of its
jurisdiction for asking for the annulment of certain transfers of property
could very well be achieved in an action for partition.
As for petitioner’s contention that the sale must be considered valid as to
the heirs who assented to the conveyance as well as their allegation of
good faith, this Court does not find any compelling reason to deviate from
the ruling of the appellate court. As sufficiently found by both courts
below, the authenticity and due execution of the documents on which
petitioner’s claims are based were inadequately proven. They were
undated, forged, and acknowledged before a notary public who was not
commissioned as such on the date they were executed. They were never
presented to the Register of Deeds for registration. Neither were the
supposed notaries and buyers of the subject properties presented as
witnesses.
While it may be argued that Benita, one of the coheirs to the estate,
actually acknowledged the sale of the resort, the circumstances
surrounding the same militate against the fact of its occurrence. Not only
was the Deed of Sale supposedly executed by Benita undated and
unsigned by Pedro, but the document she presented purportedly
evidencing her receipt of her share in the sale, did not refer to any sort of
sale but to a previous loan obtained by Pedro and Benita from a bank.
Moreover, credence must be given on the appellate court’s observations
as to petitioners’ actuations insofar as the transactions alleged herein are
concerned. First, they were seemingly uncertain as to the number and/or
identity of the prop-
254
254 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Butiong vs. Plazo
erties bought by them.49 In their Answer, they gave the impression that
they bought both the resort and the family home and yet, during trial,
Francisco Villafria claimed they only bought the resort. In fact, it was only
then that they presented the subject Extra-Judicial Settlement and Deed of
Sale.50 Second, they never presented any other document which would
evidence their actual payment of consideration to the selling heirs.51
Third, in spite of the blatant legal infirmities of the subject documents of
conveyance, petitioners still took possession of the properties, demolished
several cottages, and introduced permanent improvements thereon.
In all, the Court agrees with the appellate court that petitioners failed to
adequately substantiate, with convincing, credible and independently
verifiable proof, their claim that they had, in fact, purchased the subject
properties. The circumstances surrounding the purported transfers cast
doubt on whether they actually took place. In substantiating their claim,
petitioners relied solely on the Extra-Judicial Settlement and Deed of Sale,
who utterly failed to prove their authenticity and due execution. They
cannot, therefore, be permitted to claim absolute ownership of the subject
lands based on the same.
Neither can they be considered as innocent purchasers for value and
builders in good faith. Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that
the land the latter is building on is one’s own without knowledge of any
defect or flaw in one’s title.52 However, in view of the manifest defects in
the instru-
_______________
49 Rollo, p. 130.
50 Id., at p. 131.
51 Id.
52 Cua v. Vargas, 326 Phil. 1082, 1094; 506 SCRA 374, 387 (2006), citing
Ongsitco v. Court of Appeals, 325 Phil. 1069, 1077; 255 SCRA 703, 710
(1996), quoting Pleasantville Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals,
323 Phil. 12, 22; 253 SCRA 10, 18 (1996), and Floreza v. De Evangelista, 185 55 Id.
Phil. 85, 91; 96 SCRA 130, 136 (1980).

256
255 256 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
VOL. 765, AUGUST 5, 2015 255 Butiong vs. Plazo
Butiong vs. Plazo SO ORDERED
ments conveying their titles, petitioners should have been placed on
guard. Yet, they still demolished several cottages and constructed
improvement on the properties. Thus, their claim of good faith cannot be Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson), Perez,** Leonen*** and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.
given credence. Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed.
Indeed, a judgment which has acquired finality becomes immutable and Note.—In an action for annulment of title, the complaint must contain the
unalterable, hence, may no longer be modified in any respect except to following allegations: (1) that the contested land was privately owned by
correct clerical errors or mistakes, all the issues between the parties being the plaintiff prior to the issuance of the assailed certificate of title to the
deemed resolved and laid to rest.53 It is a fundamental principle in our defendant; and (2) that the defendant perpetuated a fraud or committed a
judicial system and essential to an effective and efficient administration of mistake in obtaining a document of title over the parcel of land claimed by
justice that, once a judgment has become final, the winning party be, not the plaintiff. (Limos vs. Odones, 628 SCRA 288 [2010])
through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict.54
Exceptions to the immutability of final judgment are allowed only under Fraud and misrepresentation, as grounds for cancellation of patent and
the most extraordinary of circumstances.55 Yet, when petitioner is given annulment of title, should never be presumed. (Galang vs. Reyes, 678 SCRA
more than ample opportunity to be heard, unbridled access to the 523 [2012])
appellate courts, as well as unbiased judgments rendered after a
consideration of evidence presented by the parties, as in the case at hand,
the Court shall refrain from reversing the rulings of the courts below in the
absence of any showing that the same were rendered with fraud or lack of
jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED. The
Decision and Resolution, dated March 13, 2009 and April 23, 2009,
respectively, of the Court Appeals in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 107347, which
affirmed the Judgment dated October 1, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court of
Nasugbu, Batangas, Branch 14, in Civil Case No. 217, insofar as it concerns
the resort covered by Transfer Certificates of Title No. 51354 and No.
51355, and family home covered by TCT Nos. 40807 and 40808, are
AFFIRMED.
_______________
53 Ram’s Studio and Photographic Equipment, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 400
Phil. 542, 550; 346 SCRA 691, 697 (2000).
54 Selga v. Brar, 673 Phil. 581, 597; 658 SCRA 108, 125 (2011).
G.R. No. 177099 June 8, 2011
EDUARDO G. AGTARAP, Petitioner,
vs.
SEBASTIAN AGTARAP, JOSEPH AGTARAP, TERESA AGTARAP, WALTER DE
SANTOS, and ABELARDO DAGORO, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 177192
SEBASTIAN G. AGTARAP, Petitioner,
vs.
EDUARDO G. AGTARAP, JOSEPH AGTARAP, TERESA AGTARAP, WALTER
DE SANTOS, and ABELARDO DAGORO, Respondents.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before us are the consolidated petitions for review on certiorari of
petitioners Sebastian G. Agtarap (Sebastian)1 and Eduardo G. Agtarap
(Eduardo),2 assailing the Decision dated November 21, 20063 and the
Resolution dated March 27, 20074 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CV No. 73916.
The antecedent facts and proceedings—
On September 15, 1994, Eduardo filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 114, Pasay City, a verified petition for the judicial settlement of the
estate of his deceased father Joaquin Agtarap (Joaquin). It was docketed as
Special Proceedings No. 94-4055.
The petition alleged that Joaquin died intestate on November 21, 1964 in
Pasay City without any known debts or obligations. During his lifetime,
Joaquin contracted two marriages, first with Lucia Garcia (Lucia),5 and
second with Caridad Garcia (Caridad). Lucia died on April 24, 1924. Joaquin
and Lucia had three children—Jesus (died without issue), Milagros, and
Jose (survived by three children, namely, Gloria,6 Joseph, and Teresa7).
Joaquin married Caridad on February 9, 1926. They also had three
children—Eduardo, Sebastian, and Mercedes (survived by her daughter
Cecile). At the time of his death, Joaquin left two parcels of land with
improvements in Pasay City, covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT)
Nos. 873-(38254) and 874-(38255). Joseph, a grandson of Joaquin, had
been leasing and improving the said realties and had been appropriating
for himself ₱26,000.00 per month since April 1994.
Eduardo further alleged that there was an imperative need to appoint him
as special administrator to take possession and charge of the estate assets
and their civil fruits, pending the appointment of a regular administrator.
In addition, he prayed that an order be issued (a) confirming and declaring
the named compulsory heirs of Joaquin who would be entitled to
participate in the estate; (b) apportioning and allocating unto the named
heirs their aliquot shares in the estate in accordance with law; and (c)
entitling the distributees the right to receive and enter into possession
those parts of the estate individually awarded to them.
On September 26, 1994, the RTC issued an order setting the petition for
initial hearing and directing Eduardo to cause its publication.
On December 28, 1994, Sebastian filed his comment, generally admitting
the allegations in the petition, and conceding to the appointment of
Eduardo as special administrator.
Joseph, Gloria, and Teresa filed their answer/opposition. They alleged that
the two subject lots belong to the conjugal partnership of Joaquin with
Lucia, and that, upon Lucia’s death in April 1924, they became the pro
indiviso owners of the subject properties. They said that their residence
was built with the exclusive money of their late father Jose, and the
expenses of the extensions to the house were shouldered by Gloria and
Teresa, while the restaurant (Manong’s Restaurant) was built with the
exclusive money of Joseph and his business partner. They opposed the
appointment of Eduardo as administrator on the following grounds: (1) he
is not physically and mentally fit to do so; (2) his interest in the lots is
minimal; and (3) he does not possess the desire to earn. They claimed that
the best interests of the estate dictate that Joseph be appointed as special
or regular administrator.
On February 16, 1995, the RTC issued a resolution appointing Eduardo as
regular administrator of Joaquin’s estate. Consequently, it issued him
letters of administration.
On September 16, 1995, Abelardo Dagoro filed an answer in intervention,
alleging that Mercedes is survived not only by her daughter Cecile, but also
by him as her husband. He also averred that there is a need to appoint a
special administrator to the estate, but claimed that Eduardo is not the
person best qualified for the task.
After the parties were given the opportunity to be heard and to submit
their respective proposed projects of partition, the RTC, on October 23,
2000, issued an Order of Partition,8 with the following disposition—
In the light of the filing by the heirs of their respective proposed projects of
partition and the payment of inheritance taxes due the estate as early as
1965, and there being no claim in Court against the estate of the deceased,
--
the estate of JOAQUIN AGTARAP is now consequently – ripe – for
distribution among the heirs minus the surviving spouse Caridad Garcia BUILDING II (Lot # 745-B-2) --------------------------- 320,000.00
who died on August 25, 1999. --
Considering that the bulk of the estate property were acquired during the
existence of the second marriage as shown by TCT No. (38254) and TCT No. Building Improvements -------------------------------- 97,500.00
(38255) which showed on its face that decedent was married to Caridad ------
Garcia, which fact oppositors failed to contradict by evidence other than
their negative allegations, the greater part of the estate is perforce Restaurant ------------------------------------------------- 80,000.00
accounted by the second marriage and the compulsory heirs thereunder. -----
The Administrator, Eduardo Agtarap rendered a true and just accounting of TOTAL ------------------------------------------------------- ₱847,500.00
his administration from his date of assumption up to the year ending --
December 31, 1996 per Financial and Accounting Report dated June 2,
1997 which was approved by the Court. The accounting report included TOTAL NET WORTH ------------------------------------- ₱14,177,500.00
the income earned and received for the period and the expenses incurred ----
in the administration, sustenance and allowance of the widow. In
WHEREFORE, the net assets of the estate of the late JOAQUIN AGTARAP
accordance with said Financial and Accounting Report which was duly
with a total value of ₱14,177,500.00, together with whatever interest from
approved by this Court in its Resolution dated July 28, 1998 – the deceased
bank deposits and all other incomes or increments thereof accruing after
JOAQUIN AGTARAP left real properties consisting of the following:
the Accounting Report of December 31, 1996, after deducting therefrom
I LAND:
the compensation of the administrator and other expenses allowed by the
Two lots and two buildings with one garage quarter located at #3030
Court, are hereby ordered distributed as follows:
Agtarap St., Pasay City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 38254
TOTAL ESTATE – ₱14,177,500.00
and 38255 and registered with the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City, Metro
CARIDAD AGTARAP – ½ of the estate as her conjugal share –
Manila, described as follows:
₱7,088,750.00, the other half of ₱7,088,750.00 – to be divided among the
LOT ZONAL compulsory heirs as follows:
TCT NO. AREA/SQ.M. AMOUNT
NO. VALUE
1) JOSE (deceased) - ₱1,181,548.30
38254 745-B- 1,335 sq. m. ₱5,000.00 ₱6,675,000.00
2) MILAGROS (deceased) - ₱1,181,548.30
1
3) MERCEDES (deceased) - ₱1,181,548.30
38255 745-B- 1,331 sq. m. ₱5,000.00 ₱6,655,000.00
2 4) SEBASTIAN - ₱1,181,548.30
TOTAL--------------------------------------------------------- ₱13,330,000.0 5) EDUARDO - ₱1,181,548.30
---- 0
6) CARIDAD - ₱1,181,548.30
II BUILDINGS AND IMPROVEMENTS:
BUILDING I (Lot # 745-B-1) ---------------------------- ₱350,000.00 The share of Milagros Agtarap as compulsory heir in the amount of
₱1,181,548.30 and who died in 1996 will go to Teresa Agtarap and Joseph
Agtarap, Walter de Santos and half brothers Eduardo and Sebastian - Agtarap
Agtarap in equal proportions. ₱295,364.57 – as compulsory heir of
TERESA AGTARAP - ₱236,291.66 ₱531,656.23 Jose Agtarap

JOSEPH AGTARAP - ₱236,291.66 HEIRS OF THE SECOND MARRIAGE:

a) CARIDAD AGTARAP - died on August 25, 1999
WALTER DE SANTOS - ₱236,291.66
₱7,088,750.00 - as conjugal share
SEBASTIAN AGTARAP - ₱236,291.66
₱1,181,458.30 - as compulsory heir
EDUARDO AGTARAP - ₱236,291.66
Jose Agtarap died in 1967. His compulsory heirs are as follows:
COMPULSORY HEIRS: Total of ₱8,270,208.30

1) GLORIA – (deceased) – represented by Walter de Santos – b) SEBASTIAN ₱1,181,458.38 – as compulsory heir

AGTARAP -
- ₱295,364.57 ₱ 236,291.66 – share from Milagros

2) JOSEPH AGTARAP - ₱295,364.57 c) EDUARDO AGTARAP ₱1,181,458.38 – as compulsory heir

-
3) TERESA AGTARAP - ₱295,364.57 ₱ 236,291.66 – share from Milagros

4) PRISCILLA AGTARAP - ₱295,364.57 d) MERCEDES - as represented by Abelardo Dagoro as

Hence, Priscilla Agtarap will inherit ₱295,364.57.
Adding their share from Milagros Agtarap, the following heirs of the first
marriage stand to receive the total amount of:
HEIRS OF THE FIRST MARRIAGE:
1avvphi1
1) JOSEPH AGTARAP - ₱236,291.66 – share from Milagros
Agtarap
₱295,364.57 – as compulsory heir of
₱531,656.23 Jose Agtarap
2) TERESA AGTARAP - ₱236,291.66 – share from Milagros
Agtarap
₱295,364.57 – as compulsory heir of
₱531,656.23 Jose Agtarap
the
surviving spouse of a compulsory heir
₱1,181,458.38
REMAINING HEIRS OF CARIDAD AGTARAP:
1) SEBASTIAN AGTARAP
2) EDUARDO AGTARAP
MERCEDES AGTARAP (Predeceased Caridad Agtarap)
In sum, Sebastian Agtarap and Eduardo Agtarap stand to inherit:
SEBASTIAN ₱4,135,104.10 – share from Caridad
– ₱1,181,458.30 Garcia
₱ 236,291.66 - as compulsory heir
- share from Milagros
₱5,522,854.06

3) WALTER DE SANTOS ₱236,291.66 – share from Milagros EDUARDO – ₱4,135,104.10 – share from Caridad
 ₱1,181,458.30 Garcia
₱ 236,291.66 – as compulsory heir
– share from Milagros
₱5,522,854.06
SO ORDERED.9
Eduardo, Sebastian, and oppositors Joseph and Teresa filed their
respective motions for reconsideration.
On August 27, 2001, the RTC issued a resolution10 denying the motions for
reconsideration of Eduardo and Sebastian, and granting that of Joseph and
Teresa. It also declared that the real estate properties belonged to the
conjugal partnership of Joaquin and Lucia. It also directed the modification
of the October 23, 2000 Order of Partition to reflect the correct sharing of
the heirs. However, before the RTC could issue a new order of partition,
Eduardo and Sebastian both appealed to the CA.
On November 21, 2006, the CA rendered its Decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads—
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeals are DISMISSED for
lack of merit. The assailed Resolution dated August 27, 2001 is AFFIRMED
and pursuant thereto, the subject properties (Lot No. 745-B-1 [TCT No.
38254] and Lot No. 745-B-2 [TCT No. 38255]) and the estate of the late
Joaquin Agtarap are hereby partitioned as follows:
The two (2) properties, together with their improvements, embraced by
TCT No. 38254 and TCT No. 38255, respectively, are first to be distributed
among the following:
Lucia Mendietta - ½ of the property. But since she is deceased, her share
shall be inherited by Joaquin, Jesus, Milagros and Jose in equal shares.
Joaquin Agtarap - ½ of the property and ¼ of the other half of the property
which pertains to Lucia Mendietta’s share.
Jesus Agtarap - ¼ of Lucia Mendietta’s share. But since he is already
deceased (and died without issue), his inheritance shall, in turn, be
acquired by Joaquin Agtarap.
Milagros Agtarap - ¼ of Lucia Mendietta’s share. But since she died in 1996
without issue, 5/8 of her inheritance shall be inherited by Gloria
(represented by her husband Walter de Santos and her daughter
Samantha), Joseph Agtarap and Teresa Agtarap, (in representation of
Milagros’ brother Jose Agtarap) and 1/8 each shall be inherited by
Mercedes (represented by her husband Abelardo Dagoro and her daughter
Cecile), Sebastian Eduardo, all surnamed Agtarap.
Jose Agtarap - ¼ of Lucia Mendietta’s share. But since he died in 1967, his
inheritance shall be acquired by his wife Priscilla, and children Gloria
(represented by her husband Walter de Santos and her daughter
Samantha), Joseph Agtarap and Teresa in equal shares.
Then, Joaquin Agtarap’s estate, comprising three-fourths (3/4) of the
subject properties and its improvements, shall be distributed as follows:
Caridad Garcia - 1/6 of the estate. But since she died in 1999, her share
shall be inherited by her children namely Mercedes Agtarap (represented
by her husband Abelardo Dagoro and her daughter Cecilia), Sebastian
Agtarap and Eduardo Agtarap in their own right, dividing the inheritance in
equal shares.
Milagros Agtarap - 1/6 of the estate. But since she died in 1996 without
issue, 5/8 of her inheritance shall be inherited by Gloria (represented by
her husband Walter de Santos and her daughter Samantha), Joseph
Agtarap and Teresa Agtarap, (in representation of Milagros’ brother Jose
Agtarap) and 1/8 each shall be inherited by Mercedes (represented by her
husband Abelardo Dagoro and her daughter Cecile), Sebastian and
Eduardo, all surnamed Agtarap.
Jose Agtarap - 1/6 of the estate. But since he died in 1967, his inheritance
shall be acquired by his wife Priscilla, and children Gloria (represented by
her husband Walter de Santos and her daughter Samantha), Joseph
Agtarap and Teresa Agtarap in equal shares.
Mercedes Agtarap - 1/6 of the estate. But since she died in 1984, her
inheritance shall be acquired by her husband Abelardo Dagoro and her
daughter Cecile in equal shares.
Sebastian Agtarap - 1/6 of the estate.
Eduardo Agtarap - 1/6 of the estate.
SO ORDERED.11
Aggrieved, Sebastian and Eduardo filed their respective motions for
reconsideration.
In its Resolution dated March 27, 2007, the CA denied both motions.
Hence, these petitions ascribing to the appellate court the following errors:
G.R. No. 177192
1. – The Court of Appeals erred in not considering the
aforementioned important facts12 which alter its Decision;
 2. – The Court of Appeals erred in not considering the necessity of
hearing the issue of legitimacy of respondents as heirs;
3. – The Court of Appeals erred in allowing violation of the law
and in not applying the doctrines of collateral attack, estoppel,
and res judicata.13
G.R. No. 177099
THE COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER TWELFTH DIVISION) DID NOT ACQUIRE
JURISDICTION OVER THE ESTATE OF MILAGROS G. AGTARAP AND ERRED IN
DISTRIBUTING HER INHERITANCE FROM THE ESTATE OF JOAQUIN
AGTARAP NOTWITHSTANDING THE EXISTENCE OF HER LAST WILL AND
TESTAMENT IN VIOLATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF PRECEDENCE OF TESTATE
PROCEEDINGS OVER INTESTATE PROCEEDINGS.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER TWELFTH DIVISION) ERRED IN
DISMISSING THE DECISION APPEALED FROM FOR LACK OF MERIT AND IN
AFFIRMING THE ASSAILED RESOLUTION DATED AUGUST 27, 2001 OF THE
LOWER COURT HOLDING THAT THE PARCELS OF LAND COVERED BY TCT
NO. 38254 AND TCT (NO.) 38255 OF THE REGISTRY OF DEEDS FOR THE CITY
OF PASAY BELONG TO THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF JOAQUIN
AGTARAP MARRIED TO LUCIA GARCIA MENDIETTA NOTWITHSTANDING
THEIR REGISTRATION UNDER THEIR EXISTING CERTIFICATES OF TITLE AS
REGISTERED IN THE NAME OF JOAQUIN AGTARAP, CASADO CON CARIDAD
GARCIA. UNDER EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE, THE PROBATE COURT HAS NO
POWER TO DETERMINE THE OWNERSHIP OF THE PROPERTY DESCRIBED IN
THESE CERTIFICATES OF TITLE WHICH SHOULD BE RESOLVED IN AN
APPROPRIATE SEPARATE ACTION FOR A TORRENS TITLE UNDER THE LAW IS
ENDOWED WITH INCONTESTABILITY UNTIL IT HAS BEEN SET ASIDE IN THE
MANNER INDICATED IN THE LAW ITSELF.14
As regards his first and second assignments of error, Sebastian contends
that Joseph and Teresa failed to establish by competent evidence that they
are the legitimate heirs of their father Jose, and thus of their grandfather
Joaquin. He draws attention to the certificate of title (TCT No. 8026) they
submitted, stating that the wife of their father Jose is Presentacion Garcia,
while they claim that their mother is Priscilla. He avers that the marriage
contracts proffered by Joseph and Teresa do not qualify as the best
evidence of Jose’s marriage with Priscilla, inasmuch as they were not
authenticated and formally offered in evidence. Sebastian also asseverates
that he actually questioned the legitimacy of Joseph and Teresa as heirs of
Joaquin in his motion to exclude them as heirs, and in his reply to their
opposition to the said motion. He further claims that the failure of
Abelardo Dagoro and Walter de Santos to oppose his motion to exclude
them as heirs had the effect of admitting the allegations therein. He points
out that his motion was denied by the RTC without a hearing.
With respect to his third assigned error, Sebastian maintains that the
certificates of title of real estate properties subject of the controversy are
in the name of Joaquin Agtarap, married to Caridad Garcia, and as such are
conclusive proof of their ownership thereof, and thus, they are not subject
to collateral attack, but should be threshed out in a separate proceeding
for that purpose. He likewise argues that estoppel applies against the
children of the first marriage, since none of them registered any objection
to the issuance of the TCTs in the name of Caridad and Joaquin only. He
avers that the estate must have already been settled in light of the
payment of the estate and inheritance tax by Milagros, Joseph, and Teresa,
resulting to the issuance of TCT No. 8925 in Milagros’ name and of TCT No.
8026 in the names of Milagros and Jose. He also alleges that res judicata is
applicable as the court order directing the deletion of the name of Lucia,
and replacing it with the name of Caridad, in the TCTs had long become
final and executory.
In his own petition, with respect to his first assignment of error, Eduardo
alleges that the CA erroneously settled, together with the settlement of
the estate of Joaquin, the estates of Lucia, Jesus, Jose, Mercedes, Gloria,
and Milagros, in contravention of the principle of settling only one estate
in one proceeding. He particularly questions the distribution of the estate
of Milagros in the intestate proceedings despite the fact that a proceeding
was conducted in another court for the probate of the will of Milagros,
bequeathing all to Eduardo whatever share that she would receive from
Joaquin’s estate. He states that this violated the rule on precedence of
testate over intestate proceedings.
Anent his second assignment of error, Eduardo contends that the CA
gravely erred when it affirmed that the bulk of the realties subject of this
case belong to the first marriage of Joaquin to Lucia, notwithstanding that
the certificates of title were registered in the name of Joaquin Agtarap
casado con ("married to") Caridad Garcia. According to him, the RTC, acting
as an intestate court with limited jurisdiction, was not vested with the
power and authority to determine questions of ownership, which properly
belongs to another court with general jurisdiction.
 The Court’s Ruling
As to Sebastian’s and Eduardo’s common issue on the ownership of the
subject real properties, we hold that the RTC, as an intestate court, had
jurisdiction to resolve the same.
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a
probate or an intestate court, relates only to matters having to do with the
probate of the will and/or settlement of the estate of deceased persons,
but does not extend to the determination of questions of ownership that
arise during the proceedings.15 The patent rationale for this rule is that
such court merely exercises special and limited jurisdiction. 16 As held in
several cases,17 a probate court or one in charge of estate proceedings,
whether testate or intestate, cannot adjudicate or determine title to
properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are claimed to
belong to outside parties, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the
deceased but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate. All
that the said court could do as regards said properties is to determine
whether or not they should be included in the inventory of properties to
be administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, there poses no
problem, but if there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the
opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action before a court
exercising general jurisdiction for a final determination of the conflicting
claims of title.
However, this general rule is subject to exceptions as justified by
expediency and convenience.
First, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or a
testate proceeding the question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the
inventory of a piece of property without prejudice to the final
determination of ownership in a separate action.18 Second, if the
interested parties are all heirs to the estate, or the question is one of
collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of
jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties are not
impaired, then the probate court is competent to resolve issues on
ownership.19 Verily, its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or
collateral to the settlement and distribution of the estate, such as the
determination of the status of each heir and whether the property in the
inventory is conjugal or exclusive property of the deceased spouse. 20
We hold that the general rule does not apply to the instant case
considering that the parties are all heirs of Joaquin and that no rights of
third parties will be impaired by the resolution of the ownership issue.
More importantly, the determination of whether the subject properties
are conjugal is but collateral to the probate court’s jurisdiction to settle the
estate of Joaquin.1auuphi1
It should be remembered that when Eduardo filed his verified petition for
judicial settlement of Joaquin’s estate, he alleged that the subject
properties were owned by Joaquin and Caridad since the TCTs state that
the lots were registered in the name of Joaquin Agtarap, married to
Caridad Garcia. He also admitted in his petition that Joaquin, prior to
contracting marriage with Caridad, contracted a first marriage with Lucia.
Oppositors to the petition, Joseph and Teresa, however, were able to
present proof before the RTC that TCT Nos. 38254 and 38255 were derived
from a mother title, TCT No. 5239, dated March 17, 1920, in the name of
FRANCISCO VICTOR BARNES Y JOAQUIN AGTARAP, el primero casado con
Emilia Muscat, y el Segundo con Lucia Garcia Mendietta (FRANCISCO
VICTOR BARNES y JOAQUIN AGTARAP, the first married to Emilia Muscat,
and the second married to Lucia Garcia Mendietta).21 When TCT No. 5239
was divided between Francisco Barnes and Joaquin Agtarap, TCT No.
10864, in the name of Joaquin Agtarap, married to Lucia Garcia Mendietta,
was issued for a parcel of land, identified as Lot No. 745 of the Cadastral
Survey of Pasay, Cadastral Case No. 23, G.L.R.O. Cadastral Record No.
1368, consisting of 8,872 square meters. This same lot was covered by TCT
No. 5577 (32184)22 issued on April 23, 1937, also in the name of Joaquin
Agtarap, married to Lucia Garcia Mendietta.
The findings of the RTC and the CA show that Lucia died on April 24, 1924,
and subsequently, on February 9, 1926, Joaquin married Caridad. It is
worthy to note that TCT No. 5577 (32184) contained an annotation, which
reads—
Ap-4966 – NOTA: Se ha enmendado el presente certificado de titulo, tal
como aparece, tanchando las palabras "con Lucia Garcia Mendiet[t]a" y
poniendo en su lugar, entre lineas y en tinta encarnada, las palabras "en
segundas nupcias con Caridad Garcia", en complimiento de un orden de
fecha 28 de abril de 1937, dictada por el Hon. Sixto de la Costa, juez del
Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Rizal, en el expediente cadastal No. 23,
G.L.R.O. Cad. Record No. 1368; copia de cual orden has sido presentada
con el No. 4966 del Libro Diario, Tomo 6.0 y, archivada en el Legajo T-No.
32184.
Pasig, Rizal, a 29 abril de 1937.23
Thus, per the order dated April 28, 1937 of Hon. Sixto de la Costa,
presiding judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, the phrase con Lucia
Garcia Mendiet[t]a was crossed out and replaced by en segundas nuptias
con Caridad Garcia, referring to the second marriage of Joaquin to Caridad.
It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that prior to the replacement of Caridad’s
name in TCT No. 32184, Lucia, upon her demise, already left, as her estate,
one-half (1/2) conjugal share in TCT No. 32184. Lucia’s share in the
property covered by the said TCT was carried over to the properties
covered by the certificates of title derivative of TCT No. 32184, now TCT
Nos. 38254 and 38255. And as found by both the RTC and the CA, Lucia
was survived by her compulsory heirs – Joaquin, Jesus, Milagros, and Jose.
Section 2, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court provides that when the marriage is
dissolved by the death of the husband or the wife, the community
property shall be inventoried, administered, and liquidated, and the debts
thereof paid; in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased
spouse, and if both spouses have died, the conjugal partnership shall be
liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings of either. Thus, the RTC
had jurisdiction to determine whether the properties are conjugal as it had
to liquidate the conjugal partnership to determine the estate of the
decedent. In fact, should Joseph and Teresa institute a settlement
proceeding for the intestate estate of Lucia, the same should be
consolidated with the settlement proceedings of Joaquin, being Lucia’s
spouse.24 Accordingly, the CA correctly distributed the estate of Lucia, with
respect to the properties covered by TCT Nos. 38254 and 38255 subject of
this case, to her compulsory heirs.
Therefore, in light of the foregoing evidence, as correctly found by the RTC
and the CA, the claim of Sebastian and Eduardo that TCT Nos. 38254 and
38255 conclusively show that the owners of the properties covered therein
were Joaquin and Caridad by virtue of the registration in the name of
Joaquin Agtarap casado con (married to) Caridad Garcia, deserves scant
consideration. This cannot be said to be a collateral attack on the said
TCTs. Indeed, simple possession of a certificate of title is not necessarily
conclusive of a holder’s true ownership of property.25 A certificate of title
under the Torrens system aims to protect dominion; it cannot be used as
an instrument for the deprivation of ownership.26 Thus, the fact that the
properties were registered in the name of Joaquin Agtarap, married to
Caridad Garcia, is not sufficient proof that the properties were acquired
during the spouses’ coverture.27 The phrase "married to Caridad Garcia" in
the TCTs is merely descriptive of the civil status of Joaquin as the
registered owner, and does not necessarily prove that the realties are their
conjugal properties.28
Neither can Sebastian’s claim that Joaquin’s estate could have already
been settled in 1965 after the payment of the inheritance tax be upheld.
Payment of the inheritance tax, per se, does not settle the estate of a
deceased person. As provided in Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court—
SECTION 1. When order for distribution of residue made. -- When the
debts, funeral charges, and expenses of administration, the allowance to
the widow, and inheritance tax, if any, chargeable to the estate in
accordance with law, have been paid, the court, on the application of the
executor or administrator, or of a person interested in the estate, and after
hearing upon notice, shall assign the residue of the estate to the persons
entitled to the same, naming them and the proportions, or parts, to which
each is entitled, and such persons may demand and recover their
respective shares from the executor or administrator, or any other person
having the same in his possession. If there is a controversy before the
court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the
distributive share to which each person is entitled under the law, the
controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above
mentioned has been made or provided for, unless the distributees, or any
of them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the
payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs.
Thus, an estate is settled and distributed among the heirs only after the
payment of the debts of the estate, funeral charges, expenses of
administration, allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax. The records
of these cases do not show that these were complied with in 1965.
As regards the issue raised by Sebastian on the legitimacy of Joseph and
Teresa, suffice it to say that both the RTC and the CA found them to be the
legitimate children of Jose. The RTC found that Sebastian did not present
clear and convincing evidence to support his averments in his motion to
exclude them as heirs of Joaquin, aside from his negative allegations. The
RTC also noted the fact of Joseph and Teresa being the children of Jose was
never questioned by Sebastian and Eduardo, and the latter two even
admitted this in their petitions, as well as in the stipulation of facts in the
August 21, 1995 hearing.29 Furthermore, the CA affirmed this finding of
fact in its November 21, 2006 Decision.30
Also, Sebastian’s insistence that Abelardo Dagoro and Walter de Santos are
not heirs to the estate of Joaquin cannot be sustained. Per its October 23,
2000 Order of Partition, the RTC found that Gloria Agtarap de Santos died
on May 4, 1995, and was later substituted in the proceedings below by her
husband Walter de Santos. Gloria begot a daughter with Walter de Santos,
Georgina Samantha de Santos. The RTC likewise noted that, on September
16, 1995, Abelardo Dagoro filed a motion for leave of court to intervene,
alleging that he is the surviving spouse of Mercedes Agtarap and the father
of Cecilia Agtarap Dagoro, and his answer in intervention. The RTC later
granted the motion, thereby admitting his answer on October 18,
1995.31 The CA also noted that, during the hearing of the motion to
intervene on October 18, 1995, Sebastian and Eduardo did not interpose
any objection when the intervention was submitted to the RTC for
resolution.32
Indeed, this Court is not a trier of facts, and there appears no compelling
reason to hold that both courts erred in ruling that Joseph, Teresa, Walter
de Santos, and Abelardo Dagoro rightfully participated in the estate of
Joaquin. It was incumbent upon Sebastian to present competent evidence
to refute his and Eduardo’s admissions that Joseph and Teresa were heirs
of Jose, and thus rightful heirs of Joaquin, and to timely object to the
participation of Walter de Santos and Abelardo Dagoro. Unfortunately,
Sebastian failed to do so. Nevertheless, Walter de Santos and Abelardo
Dagoro had the right to participate in the estate in representation of the
Joaquin’s compulsory heirs, Gloria and Mercedes, respectively. 33
This Court also differs from Eduardo’s asseveration that the CA erred in
settling, together with Joaquin’s estate, the respective estates of Lucia,
Jesus, Jose, Mercedes, and Gloria. A perusal of the November 21, 2006 CA
Decision would readily show that the disposition of the properties related
only to the settlement of the estate of Joaquin. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule
90 of the Rules of Court, as cited above, the RTC was specifically granted
jurisdiction to determine who are the lawful heirs of Joaquin, as well as
their respective shares after the payment of the obligations of the estate,
as enumerated in the said provision. The inclusion of Lucia, Jesus, Jose,
Mercedes, and Gloria in the distribution of the shares was merely a
necessary consequence of the settlement of Joaquin’s estate, they being
his legal heirs.
However, we agree with Eduardo’s position that the CA erred in
distributing Joaquin’s estate pertinent to the share allotted in favor of
Milagros. Eduardo was able to show that a separate proceeding was
instituted for the probate of the will allegedly executed by Milagros before
the RTC, Branch 108, Pasay City.34 While there has been no showing that
the alleged will of Milagros, bequeathing all of her share from Joaquin’s
estate in favor of Eduardo, has already been probated and approved,
prudence dictates that this Court refrain from distributing Milagros’ share
in Joaquin’s estate.
It is also worthy to mention that Sebastian died on January 15, 2010, per
his Certificate of Death.35 He is survived by his wife Teresita B. Agtarap
(Teresita) and his children Joaquin Julian B. Agtarap (Joaquin Julian) and
Ana Ma. Agtarap Panlilio (Ana Ma.).
Henceforth, in light of the foregoing, the assailed November 21, 2006
Decision and the March 27, 2007 Resolution of the CA should be affirmed
with modifications such that the share of Milagros shall not yet be
distributed until after the final determination of the probate of her
purported will, and that Sebastian shall be represented by his compulsory
heirs.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 177192 is DENIED for lack of merit,
while the petition in G.R. No. 177099 is PARTIALLY GRANTED, such that the
Decision dated November 21, 2006 and the Resolution dated March 27,
2007 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED with the following
MODIFICATIONS: that the share awarded in favor of Milagros Agtarap shall
not be distributed until the final determination of the probate of her will,
and that petitioner Sebastian G. Agtarap, in view of his demise on January
15, 2010, shall be represented by his wife Teresita B. Agtarap and his
children Joaquin Julian B. Agtarap and Ana Ma. Agtarap Panlilio.
These cases are hereby remanded to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 114,
Pasay City, for further proceedings in the settlement of the estate of
Joaquin Agtarap. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 146006. February 23, 2004.*
JOSE C. LEE AND ALMA AGGABAO, in their capacities as President and
Corporate Secretary, respectively, of Philippine International Life
Insurance Company, and FILIPINO LOAN ASSISTANCE GROUP, petitioners,
vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY BRANCH 85 presided by
JUDGE PEDRO M. AREOLA, BRANCH CLERK OF COURT JANICE Y. ANTERO,
DEPUTY SHERIFFS ADENAUER G. RIVERA and PEDRO L. BORJA, all of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City Branch 85, MA. DIVINA ENDERES
claiming to be Special Administratrix, and other persons/public officers
acting for and in their behalf, respondents.
Succession; Settlement of Estates; Probate Proceedings; Where the
appropriation of estate properties is invalid, the subsequent sale thereof to
a third party without court approval is likewise invalid.–From the above
decision, it is clear that Juliana Ortañez, and her three sons, Jose, Rafael
and Antonio, all surnamed Ortañez, invalidly entered into a memorandum
of agreement extrajudicially partitioning the intestate estate among
themselves, despite their, knowledge that there were other heirs or
claimants to the estate and before final settlement of the estate by the
intestate court. Since the appropriation of the estate properties by Juliana
Ortañez and her children (Jose, Rafael and Antonio Ortañez) was invalid,
the subsequent sale thereof by Juliana and Jose to a third party (FLAG),
without court approval, was likewise void.
Same; Same; Same; An heir can only alienate such portion of the estate
that may be alloted to him in the division of the estate by the probate or
intestate court after final adjudication, that is, after all debtors shall have
been paid or the devisees or legatees shall have been given their shares.–
An heir can sell his right, interest, or participation in the property under
administration under Art. 533 of the Civil Code which provides that
possession of hereditary property is deemed transmitted to the heir
without interruption from the moment of death of the decedent.
However, an heir can only alienate such portion of the estate that may be
allotted to him in the division of the estate by the probate or intestate
court after final adjudication, that is, after all debtors shall have been paid
or the devisees or legatees shall have been given their shares. This means
that an heir may only sell his ideal or undivided share in the estate, not any
specific property therein. In the present case, Juliana Ortañez and Jose
Ortañez sold specific properties of the estate (1,014 and 1,011 shares of
stock in Philin-
_______________
*
THIRD DIVISION.
498
498 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Lee vs. Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Br. 85
terlife) in favor of petitioner FLAG. This they could not lawfully do pending
the final adjudication of the estate by the intestate court because of the
undue prejudice it would cause the other claimants to the estate, as what
happened in the present case.
Same; Same; Same; The sale of the property of the estate by an
administrator without the order of the probate court is void and passes no
title to the purchaser, and any unauthorized disposition of estate property
can be annulled by the probate court, there being no need for a separate
action to annul the unauthorized disposition.–Juliana Ortañez and Jose
Ortañez sold specific properties of the estate, without court approval. It is
well-settled that court approval is necessary for the validity of any
disposition of the decedent’s estate. In the early case of Godoy vs. Orellano
we laid down the rule that the sale of the property of the estate by an
administrator without the order of the probate court is void and passes no
title to the purchaser. x x x Our jurisprudence is therefore clear that (1) any
disposition of estate property by an administrator or prospective heir
pending final adjudication requires court approval and (2) any
unauthorized disposition of estate property can be annulled by the
probate court, there being no need for a separate action to annul the
unauthorized disposition.
Same; Same; Same; The intestate court has the power to execute its order
with regard to the nullity of an unauthorized sale of estate property,
otherwise its power to annul the unauthorized or fraudulent disposition of
estate property would be meaningless.–The question now is: can the
intestate or probate court execute its order nullifying the invalid sale? We
see no reason why it cannot. The intestate court has the power to execute
its order with regard to the nullity of an unauthorized sale of estate
property, otherwise its power to annul the unauthorized or fraudulent
disposition of estate property would be meaningless. In other words,
enforcement is a necessary adjunct of the intestate or probate court’s
power to annul unauthorized or fraudulent transactions to prevent the
dissipation of estate property before final adjudication.
Same; Same; Same; Where the issue is the effect of the sale made by the
decedent's heirs without the required approval of the intestate court, not
with the issue of inclusion or exclusion of properties in the inventory of the
estate, the determination thereon by the intestate court is not merely
provisional.–We are not dealing here with the issue of inclusion or
exclusion, of properties in the inventory of the estate because there is no
question that, from the very start, the Philinterlife shares of stock were
owned by the decedent, Dr. Juvencio Ortañez. Rather, we are concerned
here with the effect of the sale made by the decedent’s heirs, Juliana
Ortañez and Jose Ortañez, without the required approval of the intestate
court. This being so, the contention of petitioners that the determination
of the intestate
499
VOL. 423, FEBRUARY 23, 2004 499
Lee vs. Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Br. 85
court was merely provisional and should have been threshed out in a
separate proceeding is incorrect.
Same; Same; Same; The title of a purchaser of an estate property can be
struck down by the intestate court after a clear showing of the nullity of the
alienation.–The petitioners Jose Lee and Alma Aggabao next contend that
the writ of execution should not be executed against them because they
were not notified, nor they were aware, of the proceedings nullifying the
sale of the shares of stock. We are not persuaded. The title of the
purchaser like herein petitioner FLAG can be struck down by the intestate
court after a clear showing of the nullity of the alienation. This is the logical
consequence of our ruling in Godoy and in several subsequent cases. The
sale of any property of the estate by an administrator or prospective heir
without order of the probate or intestate court is void and passes no title
to the purchaser. Thus, in Juan Lao, et al. vs. Hon. Melencio Geneto, G.R.
No. 56451, June 19, 1985, we ordered the probate court to cancel the
transfer certificate of title issued to the vendees at the instance of the
administrator after finding that the sale of real property under probate
proceedings was made without the prior approval of the court.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Acosta, Aguirre & Fernandez Law Firm for petitioners.
Picazo, Buyco, Tan, Fider and Santos for respondents.
CORONA, J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to
reverse and set aside the decision1 of the Court of Appeals, First Division,
dated July 26, 2000, in CA-G.R. 59736, which dismissed the petition for
certiorari filed by petitioners Jose C. Lee and Alma Aggabao (in their
capacities as president and secretary, respectively, of Philippine
International Life Insurance Company) and Filipino Loan Assistance Group.
The antecedent facts follow.
_______________
1
Penned by Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, concurred in by
Associate Justices Salome A. Montoya (Chairman of the First Division) and
Romeo Callejo, Sr. (now Associate Justice of the Supreme Court).
500
500 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Lee vs. Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Br. 85
Dr. Juvencio P. Ortañez incorporated the Philippine International Life
Insurance Company, Inc. on July 6, 1956. At the time of the company’s
incorporation, Dr. Ortañez owned ninety percent (90%) of the subscribed
capital stock.
On July 21, 1980, Dr. Ortañez died. He left behind a wife (Juliana Salgado
Ortañez), three legitimate children (Rafael, Jose and Antonio Ortañez) and
five illegitimate children by Ligaya Novicio (herein private respondent Ma.
Divina Ortañez-Enderes and her siblings Jose, Romeo, Enrico Manuel and
Cesar, all surnamed Ortañez).2
On September 24, 1980, Rafael Ortañez filed before the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch (now Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City) a petition for letters of administration of the intestate estate of Dr.
Ortañez, docketed as SP. Proc. Q-30884 (which petition to date remains
pending at Branch 85 thereof).
Private respondent Ma. Divina Ortañez-Enderes and her siblings filed an
opposition to the petition for letters of administration and, in a
subsequent urgent motion, prayed that the intestate court appoint a
special administrator.
On March 10, 1982, Judge Ernani Cruz Paño, then presiding judge of
Branch 85, appointed Rafael and Jose Ortañez joint special administrators
of their father’s estate. Hearings continued for the appointment of a
regular administrator (up to now no regular administrator has been
appointed).
As ordered by the intestate court, special administrators Rafael and Jose
Ortañez submitted an inventory of the estate of their father which
included, among other properties, 2,0293 shares of stock in Philippine
International Life Insurance Company (hereafter Philinterlife), representing
50.725% of the company’s outstanding capital stock.
On April 15, 1989, the decedent’s wife, Juliana S. Ortañez, claiming that
she owned 1,0144 Philinterlife shares of stock as her conjugal share in the
estate, sold said shares with right to repurchase in favor of herein
petitioner Filipino Loan Assistance Group
_______________
2
Recognized by the decedent, Dr. Juvencio P. Ortañez and declared by the
intestate court as lawful heirs of Dr. Ortañez in its resolution dated
September 22, 2000; Rollo, pp. 203-214.
3
Inventory and Accounting of Properties of the Estate; Rollo, p. 572.
4
Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase; Rollo, pp. 55-56.
501
VOL. 423, FEBRUARY 23, 2004 501
Lee vs. Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Br. 85
(FLAG), represented by its president, herein petitioner Jose C. Lee. Juliana
Ortañez failed to repurchase the shares of stock within the stipulated
period, thus ownership thereof was consolidated by petitioner FLAG in its
name.
On October 30, 1991, Special Administrator Jose Ortañez, acting in his
personal capacity and claiming that he owned the remaining 1,0115
Philinterlife shares of stocks as his inheritance share in the estate, sold said
shares with right to repurchase also in favor of herein petitioner FLAG,
represented by its president, herein petitioner Jose C. Lee. After one year,
petitioner FLAG consolidated in its name the ownership of the Philinterlife
shares of stock when Jose Ortañez failed to repurchase the same.
It appears that several years before (but already during the pendency of
the intestate proceedings at the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 85), Juliana Ortañez and her two children, Special Administrators
Rafael and Jose Ortañez, entered into a memorandum of agreement dated
March 4, 1982 for the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Dr. Juvencio
Ortañez, partitioning the estate (including the Philinterlife shares of stock)
among themselves. This was the basis of the number of shares separately
sold by Juliana Ortañez on April 15, 1989 (1,014 shares) and by Jose
Ortañez on October 30, 1991 (1,011 shares) in favor of herein petitioner
FLAG.
On July 12, 1995, herein private respondent Ma. Divina Ortañez-Enderes
and her siblings (hereafter referred to as private respondents Enderes, et
al.) filed a motion for appointment of special administrator of Philinterlife
shares of stock. This move was opposed by Special Administrator Jose
Ortañez.
On November 8, 1995, the intestate court granted the motion of private
respondents Enderes, et al. and appointed private respondent Enderes
special administratrix of the Philinterlife shares of stock.
On December 20, 1995, Special Administratrix Enderes filed an urgent
motion to declare void ab initio the memorandum of agreement dated
March 4, 1982. On January 9, 1996, she filed a motion to declare the
partial nullity of the extrajudicial settlement of the decedent’s estate.
These motions were opposed by Special Administrator Jose Ortañez.
_______________
5
Deed of Sale of Shares of Stock; Rollo, pp. 57-58.
502
502 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Lee vs. Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Br. 85
On March 22, 1996, Special Administratrix Enderes filed an urgent motion
to declare void ab initio the deeds of sale of Philinterlife shares of stock,
which move was again opposed by Special Administrator Jose Ortañez.
On February 4, 1997, Jose Ortañez filed an omnibus motion for (1) the
approval of the deeds of sale of the Philinterlife shares of stock and (2) the
release of Ma. Divina Ortañez-Enderes as special administratrix of the
Philinterlife shares of stock on the ground that there were no longer any
shares of stock for her to administer.
On August 11, 1997, the intestate court denied the omnibus motion of
Special Administrator Jose Ortañez for the approval of the deeds of sale for
the reason that:
Under the Godoy case, supra, it was held in substance that a sale of a
property of the estate without an Order of the probate court is void and
passes no title to the purchaser. Since the sales in question were entered
into by Juliana S. Ortañez and Jose S. Ortañez in their personal capacity
without prior approval of the Court, the same is not binding upon the
Estate.
WHEREFORE, the OMNIBUS MOTION for the approval of the sale of
Philinterlife shares of stock and release of Ma. Divina Ortañez-Enderes as
Special Administratrix is hereby denied.6
On August 29, 1997, the intestate court issued another order granting the
motion of Special Administratrix Enderes for the annulment of the March
4, 1982 memorandum of agreement or extrajudicial partition of estate.
The court reasoned that:
In consonance with the Order of this Court dated August 11, 1997
DENYING the approval of the sale of Philinterlife shares of stocks and
release of Ma. Divina Ortañez-Enderes as Special Administratrix, the
“Urgent Motion to Declare. Void Ab Initio Memorandum of Agreement”
dated December 19, 1995. . . is hereby impliedly partially resolved insofar
as the transfer/waiver/renunciation of the Philinterlife shares of stock are
concerned, in particular, No. 5, 9(c), 10(b) and 11(d)(ii) of the
Memorandum of Agreement.
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby declares the Memorandum of Agreement
dated March 4, 1982 executed by Juliana S. Ortañez, Rafael S. Ortañez and
Jose S. Ortañez as partially void ab initio insofar as the
_______________
6
Rollo, pp. 39-41.
503
VOL. 423, FEBRUARY 23, 2004 503
Lee vs. Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Br. 85
transfer/waiver/renunciation of the Philinterlife shares of stocks are
concerned.7
Aggrieved by the above-stated orders of the intestate court, Jose Ortañez
filed, on December 22, 1997, a petition for certiorari in the Court of
Appeals. The appellate court denied his petition, however, ruling that
there was no legal justification whatsoever for the extrajudicial partition of
the estate by Jose Ortañez, his brother Rafael Ortañez and mother Juliana
Ortañez during the pendency of the settlement of the estate of Dr.
Ortañez, without the requisite approval of the intestate court, when it was
clear that there were other heirs to the estate who stood to be prejudiced
thereby. Consequently, the sale made by Jose Ortañez and his mother
Juliana Ortañez to FLAG of the shares of stock they invalidly appropriated
for themselves, without approval of the intestate court, was void.8
Special Administrator Jose Ortañez filed a motion for reconsideration of
the Court of Appeals decision but it was denied. He elevated the case to
the Supreme Court via petition for review under Rule 45 which the
Supreme Court dismissed on October 5, 1998, on a technicality. His motion
for reconsideration was denied with finality on January 13, 1999. On
February 23, 1999, the resolution of the Supreme Court dismissing the
petition of Special Administrator Jose Ortañez became final and was
subsequently recorded in the book of entries of judgments.
Meanwhile, herein petitioners Jose Lee and Alma Aggabao, with the rest of
the FLAG-controlled board of directors, increased the authorized capital
stock of Philinterlife, diluting in the process the 50.725% controlling
interest of the decedent, Dr. Juvencio Ortañez, in the insurance company.9
This became the subject of a separate action at the Securities and
Exchange Commission filed by private respondent-Special Administratrix
Enderes against petitioner Jose Lee and other members of the FLAG-
controlled board of Philinterlife on November 7, 1994. Thereafter, various
cases were filed by Jose Lee as president of Philinterlife and Juliana
Ortañez and her sons against private respondent-Special Administratrix
Enderes in
_______________
7
Cited in the decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 23, 1998 in CA-
G.R. SP No. 46842, p. 3; Rollo, p. 240.
8
Rollo, pp. 238-258.
9
Rollo, p. 709.
504
504 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Lee vs. Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Br. 85
the SEC and civil courts.10 Somehow, all these cases were connected to the
core dispute on the legality of the sale of decedent Dr. Ortañez’s
Philinterlife shares of stock to petitioner FLAG, represented by its
president, herein petitioner Jose Lee who later became the president of
Philinterlife after the controversial sale.
On May 2, 2000, private respondent-Special Administratrix Enderes and
her siblings filed a motion for execution of the Orders of the intestate
court dated August 11 and August 29, 1997 because the orders of the
intestate court nullifying the sale (upheld by the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court) had long became final. Respondent-Special Administratrix
Enderes served a copy of the motion to petitioners Jose Lee and Alma
Aggabao as president and secretary, respectively, of Philinterlife,11 but
petitioners ignored the same.
On July 6, 2000, the intestate court granted the motion for execution, the
dispositive portion of which read:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, let a writ of execution issue as
follows:
1. 1. Confirming the nullity of the sale of the 2,029
Philinterlife shares in the name of the Estate of Dr.
Juvencio Ortañez to Filipino Loan Assistance Group
(FLAG);
2. 2. Commanding the President and the Corporate
Secretary of Philinterlife to reinstate in the stock and
transfer book of Philinterlife the 2,029 Philinterlife shares
of stock in the name of the Estate of Dr. Juvencio P.
Ortañez as the owner thereof without prejudice to other
claims for violation of pre-emptive rights pertaining to
the said 2,029 Philinterlife shares;
3. 3. Directing the President and the Corporate Secretary of
Philinterlife to issue stock certificates of Philinterlife for
2,029 shares in the name of the Estate of Dr. Juvencio P.
Ortañez as the owner thereof without prejudice to other
claims for violations of preemptive rights pertaining to
the said 2,029 Philinterlife shares and,
4. 4. Confirming that only the Special Administratrix, Ma.
Divina Ortañez-Enderes, has the power to exercise all the
rights appurtenant to the said shares, including the right
to vote and to receive dividends.
5. 5. Directing Philinterlife and/or any other person or
persons claiming to represent it or otherwise, to
acknowledge and allow the
_______________
10
Rollo, pp. 524-526.
11
Rollo, p. 70.
505
VOL. 423, FEBRUARY 23, 2004 505
Lee vs. Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Br. 85
1. said Special Administratrix to exercise all the aforesaid
rights on the said shares and to refrain from resorting to
any action which may tend directly or indirectly to
impede, obstruct or bar the free exercise thereof under
pain of contempt.
2. 6. The President, Corporate Secretary, any responsible
officer/s of Philinterlife, or any other person or persons
claiming to represent it or otherwise, are hereby directed
to comply with this order within three (3) days from
receipt hereof under pain of contempt.
3. 7. The Deputy Sheriffs Adenauer Rivera and Pedro Borja
are hereby directed to implement the writ of execution
with dispatch to forestall any and/or further damage to
the Estate.
“SO ORDERED.”12
In the several occasions that the sheriff went to the office of petitioners to
execute the writ of execution, he was barred by the security guard upon
petitioners’ instructions. Thus, private respondent-Special Administratrix
Enderes filed a motion to cite herein petitioners Jose Lee and Alma
Aggabao (president and secretary, respectively, of Philinterlife) in
contempt.13
Petitioners Lee and Aggabao subsequently filed before the Court of
Appeals a petition for certiorari, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 59736.
Petitioners alleged that the intestate court gravely abused its discretion in
(1) declaring that the ownership of FLAG over the Philinterlife shares of
stock was null and void; (2) ordering the execution of its order declaring
such nullity; and (3) depriving the petitioners of their right to due process.
On July 26, 2000, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition outright:
“We are constrained to DISMISS OUTRIGHT the present petition for
certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a temporary restraining order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction in the light of the following
considerations:
1. “1. The assailed Order dated August 11, 1997 of the
respondent judge had long become final and executory;
2. “2. The certification on non-forum shopping is signed by
only one (1) of the three (3) petitioners in violation of the
Rules; and
_______________
12
Rollo, pp. 47-48.
13
Rollo, pp. 266-268.
506

506 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Lee vs. Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Br. 85
1. 3. Except for the assailed orders and writ of execution,
deed of sale with right to repurchase, deed of sale of
shares of stocks and omnibus motion, the petition is not
accompanied by such pleadings, documents and other
material portions of the record as would support the
allegations therein in violation of the second paragraph,
Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended.
Petition is DISMISSED.
“SO ORDERED.”14
The motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners Lee and Aggabao of the
above decision was denied by the Court of Appeals on October 30, 2000:
“This resolves the “urgent motion for reconsideration” filed by the
petitioners of our resolution of July 26, 2000 dismissing outrightly the
above-entitled petition for the reason, among others, that the assailed
Order dated August 11, 1997 of the respondent Judge had long become
final and executory.
Dura lex, sed lex.
“WHEREFORE, the urgent motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED, for
lack of merit.
“SO ORDERED.”15
On December 4, 2000, petitioners elevated the case to the Supreme Court
through a petition for review under Rule 45 but on December 13, 2000, we
denied the petition because there was no showing that the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 59736 committed any reversible error to
warrant the exercise by the Supreme Court of its discretionary appellate
jurisdiction.16
However, upon motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners Lee and
Aggabao, the Supreme Court granted the motion and reinstated their
petition on September 5, 2001. The parties were then required to submit
their respective memoranda.
Meanwhile, private respondent-Special Administratrix Enderes, on July 19,
2000, filed a motion to direct the branch clerk of court in lieu of herein
petitioners Lee and Aggabao to reinstate the name of Dr. Ortañez in the
stock and transfer book of Philinterlife and
_______________
14
Rollo, pp. 34-35.
15
Rollo, p. 38.
16
Rollo, p. 115.
507
VOL. 423, FEBRUARY 23, 2004 507
Lee vs. Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Br. 85
issue the corresponding stock certificate pursuant to Section 10, Rule 39 of
the Rules of Court which provides that “the court may direct the act to be
done at the cost of the disobedient party by some other person appointed
by the court and the act when so done shall have the effect as if done by
the party.” Petitioners Lee and Aggabao opposed the motion on the
ground that the intestate court should refrain from acting on the motion
because the issues raised therein were directly related to the issues raised
by them in their petition for certiorari at the Court of Appeals docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 59736. On October 30, 2000, the intestate court granted
the motion, ruling that there was no prohibition for the intestate court to
execute its orders inasmuch as the appellate court did not issue any TRO or
writ of preliminary injunction.
On December 3, 2000, petitioners Lee and Aggabao filed a petition for
certiorari in the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 62461,
questioning this time the October 30, 2000 order of the intestate court
directing the branch clerk of court to issue the stock certificates. They also
questioned in the Court of Appeals the order of the intestate court
nullifying the sale made in their favor by Juliana Ortañez and Jose Ortañez.
On November 20, 2002, the Court of Appeals denied their petition and
upheld the power of the intestate court to execute its order. Petitioners
Lee and Aggabao then filed motion for reconsideration which at present is
still pending resolution by the Court of Appeals.
Petitioners Jose Lee and Alma Aggabao (president and secretary,
respectively, of Philinterlife) and FLAG now raise the following errors for
our consideration:
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR:
1. A. IN FAILING TO RECONSIDER ITS PREVIOUS
RESOLUTION DENYING THE PETITION DESPITE THE FACT
THAT THE APPELLATE COURT’S MISTAKE IN
APPREHENDING THE FACTS HAD BECOME PATENT AND
EVIDENT FROM THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
AND THE COMMENT OF RESPONDENT ENDERES WHICH
 HAD ADMITTED THE FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS OF
PETITIONERS IN THE PETITION AS WELL AS IN THE
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION. MOREOVER, THE
RESOLUTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT DENYING THE
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WAS CONTAINED IN
ONLY ONE PAGE WITHOUT EVEN TOUCHING ON THE
SUBSTANTIVE MERITS OF THE EXHAUSTIVE DISCUSSION
OF
508
508 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Lee vs. Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Br. 85
1. FACTS AND SUPPORTING LAW IN THE MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION IN VIOLATION OF THE RULE ON
ADMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESS;
2. B. IN FAILING TO SET ASIDE THE VOID ORDERS OF THE
INTESTATE COURT ON THE ERRONEOUS GROUND THAT
THE ORDERS WERE FINAL AND EXECUTORY WITH
REGARD TO PETITIONERS EVEN AS THE LATTER WERE
NEVER NOTIFIED OF THE PROCEEDINGS OR ORDER
CANCELING ITS OWNERSHIP;
3. C. IN NOT FINDING THAT THE INTESTATE COURT
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING
TO EXCESS OF JURISDICTION (1) WHEN IT ISSUED THE
OMNIBUS ORDER NULLIFYING THE OWNERSHIP OF
PETITIONER FLAG OVER SHARES OF STOCK WHICH WERE
ALLEGED TO BE PART OF THE ESTATE, AND (2) WHEN IT
ISSUED A VOID WRIT OF EXECUTION AGAINST
PETITIONER FLAG AS PRESENT OWNER TO IMPLEMENT
MERELY PROVISIONAL ORDERS, THEREBY VIOLATING
FLAG’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT AGAINST DEPRIVATION
OF PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS;
4. D. IN FAILING TO DECLARE NULL AND VOID THE ORDERS
OF THE INTESTATE COURT WHICH NULLIFIED THE SALE
OF SHARES OF STOCK BETWEEN THE LEGITIMATE HEIR
JOSE S. ORTAÑEZ AND PETITIONER FLAG BECAUSE OF
SETTLED LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE, I.E., THAT AN HEIR
HAS THE RIGHT TO DISPOSE OF THE DECEDENT’S
PROPERTY EVEN IF THE SAME IS UNDER
ADMINISTRATION PURSUANT TO CIVIL CODE PROVISION
THAT POSSESSION OF HEREDITARY PROPERTY IS
TRANSMITTED TO THE HEIR THE MOMENT OF DEATH OF
THE DECEDENT (ACEBEDO VS. ABESAMIS, 217 SCRA 194);
5. E. IN DISREGARDING THE FINAL DECISION OF THE
SUPREME COURT IN G.R. NO. 128525 DATED DECEMBER
17, 1999 INVOLVING SUBSTANTIALLY THE SAME PARTIES,
TO WIT, PETITIONERS JOSE C. LEE AND ALMA AGGABAO
WERE RESPONDENTS IN THAT CASE WHILE RESPONDENT
MA. DIVINA ENDERES WAS THE PETITIONER THEREIN.
THAT DECISION, WHICH CAN BE CONSIDERED LAW OF
THE CASE, RULED THAT PETITIONERS CANNOT BE
ENJOINED BY RESPONDENT ENDERES FROM EXERCISING
THEIR POWER AS DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS OF
PHILINTERLIFE AND THAT THE INTESTATE COURT IN
CHARGE OF THE INTESTATE PROCEEDINGS CANNOT
ADJUDICATE TITLE TO PROPERTIES
509
VOL. 423, FEBRUARY 23, 2004 509
Lee vs. Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Br. 85
1. CLAIMED TO BE PART OF THE ESTATE AND WHICH ARE
EQUALLY CLAIMED BY PETITIONER FLAG.17
The petition has no merit.
Petitioners Jose Lee and Alma Aggabao, representing Philinterlife and
FLAG, assail before us not only the validity of the writ of execution issued
by the intestate court dated July 7, 2000 but also the validity of the August
11, 1997 order of the intestate court nullifying the sale of the 2,029
Philinterlife shares of stock made by Juliana Ortañez and Jose Ortañez, in
their personal capacities and without court approval, in favor of petitioner
FLAG.
We cannot allow petitioners to reopen the issue of nullity of the sale of the
Philinterlife shares of stock in their favor because this was already settled a
long time ago by the Court of Appeals in its decision dated June 23, 1998 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 46342. This decision was effectively upheld by us in our
resolution dated October 9, 1998 in G.R. No. 135177 dismissing the
petition for review on a technicality and thereafter denying the motion for
reconsideration on January 13, 1999 on the ground that there was no
compelling reason to reconsider said denial.18 Our decision became final
on February 23, 1999 and was accordingly entered in the book of entry of
judgments. For all intents and purposes therefore, the nullity of the sale of
the Philinterlife shares of stock made by Juliana Ortañez and Jose Ortañez
in favor of petitioner FLAG is already a closed case. To reopen said issue
would set a bad precedent, opening the door wide open for dissatisfied
parties to relitigate unfavorable decisions no end. This is completely
inimical to the orderly and efficient administration of justice.
The said decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 46342 affirming
the nullity of the sale made by Jose Ortañez and his mother Juliana
Ortañez of the Philinterlife shares of stock read:
Petitioner’s asseverations relative to said [memorandum] agreement were
scuttled during the hearing before this Court thus:
_______________
17
Rollo, pp. 15-17.
18
Rollo, pp. 260-262.
510
510 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Lee vs. Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Br. 85
JUSTICE AQUINO:
Counsel for petitioner, when the Memorandum of Agreement was
executed, did the children of Juliana Salgado know already that there
was a claim for share in the inheritance of the children of Novicio?
ATTY. CALIMAG:
Your Honor please, at that time, Your Honor, it is already known to
them.
JUSTICE AQUINO:
What can be your legal justification for extrajudicial settlement of a
property subject of intestate proceedings when there is an adverse
claim of another set of heirs, alleged heirs? What would be the legal
justification for extrajudicially settling a property under administration
without the approval of the in-testate court?
ATTY. CALIMAG:
Well, Your Honor please, in that extrajudicial settlement there is an
approval of the honorable court as to the property’s partition x x x.
There were as mentioned by the respondents’ counsel, Your Honor.
ATTY. BUYCO:
No. . .
JUSTICE AQUINO:
The point is, there can be no adjudication of a property under intestate
proceedings without the approval of the court. That is basic unless you
can present justification on that. In fact, there are two steps: first, you
ask leave and then execute the document and then ask for approval of
the document executed. Now, is there any legal justification to exclude
this particular transaction from those steps?
ATTY. CALIMAG:
None, Your Honor.
ATTY BUYCO:
With that admission that there is no legal justification, Your Honor, we
rest the case for the private respondent. How can the lower court be
accused of abusing its discretion? (pages 33-35, TSN of January 29,
1998).
Thus, We find merit in the following postulation by private respondent:
What we have here is a situation where some of the heirs of the decedent
without securing court approval have appropriated as their own personal
property the properties of [the] Estate, to the exclusion and the extreme
prejudice of the other claimant/heirs. In
511
VOL. 423, FEBRUARY 23, 2004 511
Lee vs. Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Br. 85
other words, these heirs, without court approval, have distributed the
asset of the estate among themselves and proceeded to dispose the same
to third parties even in the absence of an order of distribution by the
Estate Court. As admitted by petitioner’s counsel, there was absolutely no
legal justification for this action by the heirs. There being no legal
justification, petitioner has no basis for demanding that public respondent
[the intestate court] approve the sale of the Philinterlife shares of the
Estate by Juliana and Jose Ortañez in favor of the Filipino Loan Assistance
Group.
It is an undisputed fact that the parties to the Memorandum of Agreement
dated March 4, 1982 (see Annex “7” of the Comment). . . are not the only
heirs claiming an interest in the estate left by Dr. Juvencio P. Ortañez. The
records of this case . . . clearly show that as early as March 3, 1981 an
Opposition to the Application for Issuance of Letters of Administration was
filed by the acknowledged natural children of Dr. Juvencio P. Ortañez with
Ligaya Novicio. . . This claim by the acknowledged natural children of Dr.
Juvencio P. Ortañez is admittedly known to the parties to the
Memorandum of Agreement before they executed the same. This much
was admitted by petitioner’s counsel during the oral argument. x x x
Given the foregoing facts, and the applicable jurisprudence, public
respondent can never be faulted for not approving . . . the subsequent sale
by the petitioner [Jose Ortañez] and his mother [Juliana Ortañez] of the
Philinterlife shares belonging to the Estate of Dr. Juvencio P. Ortañez.”
(pages 3-4 of Private Respondent’s Memorandum; pages 243-244 of the
Rollo)
Amidst the foregoing, We found no grave abuse of discretion amounting to
excess or want of jurisdiction committed by respondent judge. 19
From the above decision, it is clear that Juliana Ortañez, and her three
sons, Jose, Rafael and Antonio, all surnamed Ortañez, invalidly entered
into a memorandum of agreement extrajudicially partitioning the intestate
estate among themselves, despite their, knowledge that there were other
heirs or claimants to the estate and before final settlement of the estate by
the intestate court. Since the appropriation of the estate properties by
Juliana Ortaez and her children (Jose, Rafael and Antonio Ortaez) was
invalid, the subsequent sale thereof by Juliana and Jose to a third party
(FLAG), without court approval, was likewise void.
_______________
19
Rollo, pp. 254-256.
512
512 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Lee vs. Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Br. 85
An heir can sell his right, interest, or participation in the property under
administration under Art. 533 of the Civil Code which provides that
possession of hereditary property is deemed transmitted to the heir
without interruption from the moment of death of the decedent.20
However, an heir can only alienate such portion of the estate that may be
allotted to him in the division of the estate by the probate or intestate
court after final adjudication, that is, after all debtors shall have been paid
or the devisees or legatees shall have been given their shares. 21 This means
that an heir may only sell his ideal or undivided share in the estate, not any
specific property therein. In the present case, Juliana Ortaez and Jose
Ortaez sold specific properties of the estate (1,014 and 1,011 shares of
stock in Philinterlife) in favor of petitioner FLAG. This they could not
lawfully do pending the final adjudication of the estate by the intestate
court because of the undue prejudice it would cause the other claimants to
the estate, as what happened in the present case.
Juliana Ortaez and Jose Ortaez sold specific properties of the estate,
without court approval. It is well-settled that court approval is necessary
for the validity of any disposition of the decedent’s estate. In the early case
of Godoy vs. Orellano22 we laid down the rule that the sale of the property
of the estate by an administrator without the order of the probate court is
void and passes no title to the purchaser. And in the case of Dillena vs.
Court of Appeals23 we ruled that:
[I]t must be emphasized that the questioned properties (fishpond) were
included in the inventory of properties of the estate submitted by then
Administratrix Fausta Carreon Herrera on November 14, 1974. Private
respondent was appointed as administratrix of the estate on March 3,
1976 in lieu of Fausta Carreon Herrera. On November 1, 1978, the
questioned deed of sale of the fishponds was executed between petitioner
and private respondent without notice and approval of the probate
_______________
20
Acebedo vs. Abesamis, 217 SCRA 186 (1993), citing Vda. de Gil vs. Cancio,
14 SCRA 796 (1965).
21
Based on the Civil Code provisions on co-ownership (Article 493).
Acebedo vs. Abesamis, 217 SCRA 186 (1993), citing Reyes vs. Concepcion,
190 SCRA 171 (1990), PNB vs. Court of Appeals, 98 SCRA 207 (1980),
Mercado vs. Liwanag, 5 SCRA 472 (1962).
22
42 Phil. 347 (1921).
23
163 SCRA 631 (1988).
513
VOL. 423, FEBRUARY 23, 2004 513
Lee vs. Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Br. 85
court. Even after the sale, administratrix Aurora Carreon still included the
three fishponds as among the real properties of the estate in her inventory
submitted on August 13, 1981. In fact, as stated by the Court of Appeals,
petitioner, at the time of the sale of the fishponds in question, knew that
the same were part of the estate under administration.
xxx xxx xxx
The subject properties therefore are under the jurisdiction of the probate
court which according to our settled jurisprudence has the authority to
approve any disposition regarding properties under administration. . .
More emphatic is the declaration We made in Estate of Olave vs. Reyes
(123 SCRA 767) where We stated that when the estate of the deceased
person is already the subject of a testate or intestate proceeding, the
administrator cannot enter into any transaction involving it without prior
approval of the probate court.
Only recently, in Manotok Realty, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (149 SCRA 174),
We held that the sale of an immovable property belonging to the estate of
a decedent, in a special proceedings, needs court approval. . . This
pronouncement finds support in the previous case of Dolores Vda. de Gil
vs. Agustin Cancio (14 SCRA 797) wherein We emphasized that it is within
the jurisdiction of a probate court to approve the sale of properties of a
deceased person by his prospective heirs before final adjudication. x x x
It being settled that property under administration needs the approval of
the probate court before it can be disposed of, any unauthorized
disposition does not bind the estate and is null and void. As early as 1921
in the case of Godoy vs. Orellano (42 Phil. 347), We laid down the rule that
a sale by an administrator of property of the deceased, which is not
authorized by the probate court is null and void and title does not pass to
the purchaser.
There is hardly any doubt that the probate court can declare null and void
the disposition of the property under administration, made by private
respondent, the same having been effected without authority from said
court. It is the probate court that has the power to authorize and/or
approve the sale (Section 4 and 7, Rule 89), hence, a fortiori, it is said court
that can declare it null and void for as long as the proceedings had not
been closed or terminated. To uphold petitioner’s contention that the
probate court cannot annul the unauthorized sale, would render
meaningless the power pertaining to the said court. (Bonga vs. Soler, 2
SCRA 755). (emphasis ours)
Our jurisprudence is therefore clear that (1) any disposition of estate
property by an administrator or prospective heir pending final adjudication
requires court approval, and (2) any unauthorized disposition of estate
property can be annulled by the probate
514
514 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Lee vs. Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Br. 85
court, there being no need for a separate action to annul the unauthorized
disposition.
The question now is: can the intestate or probate court execute its order
nullifying the invalid sale?
We see no reason why it cannot. The intestate court has the power to
execute its order with regard to the nullity of an unauthorized sale of
estate property, otherwise its power to annul the unauthorized or
fraudulent disposition of estate property would be meaningless. In other
words, enforcement is a necessary adjunct of the intestate or probate
court’s power to annul unauthorized or fraudulent transactions to prevent
the dissipation of estate property before final adjudication.
Moreover, in this case, the order of the intestate court nullifying the sale
was affirmed by the appellate courts (the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 46342 dated June 23, 1998 and subsequently by the Supreme Court in
G.R. No. 135177 dated October 9, 1998). The finality of the decision of the
Supreme Court was entered in the book of entry of judgments on February
23, 1999. Considering the finality of the order of the intestate court
nullifying the sale, as affirmed by the appellate courts, it was correct for
private respondent-Special Administratrix Enderes to thereafter move for a
writ of execution and for the intestate court to grant it.
Petitioners Jose Lee, Alma Aggabao and FLAG, however, contend that t he
probate court could not issue a writ of execution with regard to
its order nullifying the sale because said order was merely
provisional:
The only authority given by law is for respondent judge to
determine provisionally whether said shares are included or
excluded in the inventory... In ordering the execution of the
orders, respondent judge acted in excess of his jurisdiction
and grossly violated settled law and jurisprudence, i.e., that
the determination by a probate or intestate court of whether a
property is included or excluded in the inventory of the estate
being provisional in nature, cannot be the subject of
execution.24 (emphasis ours)
Petitioners’ argument is misplaced. There is no question,
based on the facts of this case, that the Philinterlife shares of
stock were part of the estate of Dr. Juvencio Ortaez from the
very start as in fact these shares were included in the
inventory of the properties of
_______________
24 Rollo, pp. 603-604.
515
VOL. 423, FEBRUARY 23, 2004 515
Lee vs. Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Br. 85
the estate submitted by Rafael Ortaez after he and his
brother, Jose Ortaez, were appointed special administrators
by the intestate court.25
The controversy here actually started when, during the
pendency of the settlement of the estate of Dr. Ortaez, his
wife Juliana Ortaez sold the 1,014 Philinterlife shares of stock
in favor petitioner FLAG without the approval of the intestate
court. Her son Jose Ortaez later sold the remaining 1,011
Philinterlife shares also in favor of FLAG without the approval
of the intestate court.
We are not dealing here with the issue of inclusion or
exclusion, of properties in the inventory of the estate because
there is no question that, from the very start, the Philinterlife
shares of stock were owned by the decedent, Dr. Juvencio
Ortaez. Rather, we are concerned here with the effect of the
sale made by the decedent’s heirs, Juliana Ortaez and Jose
Ortaez, without the required approval of the intestate court.
This being so, the contention of petitioners that the
determination of the intestate court was merely provisional
and should have been threshed out in a separate proceeding
is incorrect.
The petitioners Jose Lee and Alma Aggabao next contend that
the writ of execution should not be executed against them
because they were not notified, nor they were aware, of the
proceedings nullifying the sale of the shares of stock.
We are not persuaded. The title of the purchaser like herein
petitioner FLAG can be struck down by the intestate court
after a clear showing of the nullity of the alienation. This is the
logical consequence of our ruling in Godoy and in several
subsequent cases.26 The sale of any property of the estate by
an administrator or prospective heir without order of the
probate or intestate court is void and passes no title to the
purchaser. Thus, in Juan Lao, et al. vs. Hon. Melencio Geneto,
G.R. No. 56451, June 19, 1985, we ordered the probate court
to cancel the transfer certificate of title
_______________
25 Inventory and Accounting of Properties of the Estate dated
March 13, 1984, Rollo, pp. 571-754.
26 Dillena vs. Court of Appeals, 163 SCRA 630 (1988); Manotok
Realty vs. Court of Appeals, 149 SCRA 174 (1987); Leabres vs.
Court of Appeals, 146 SCRA 158 (1986); Estate of Olave vs.
Reyes, 123 SCRA 767 (1983) and Vda. de Gil vs. Cancio, 14
SCRA 797 (1965).
516
516 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Lee vs. Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Br. 85
issued to the vendees at the instance of the administrator
after finding that the sale of real property under probate
proceedings was made without the prior approval of the
court. The dispositive portion of our decision read:
“IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the assailed
Order dated February 18, 1981 of the respondent Judge
approving the questioned Amicable Settlement is declared
NULL and VOID and hereby SET ASIDE. Consequently, the sale
in favor of Sotero Dioniosio III and by the latter to William Go
is likewise declared NULL and VOID. The Transfer Certificate of
Title issued to the latter is hereby ordered cancelled.”
It goes without saying that the increase in Philinterlife’s
authorized capital stock, approved on the vote of petitioners’
nonexistent shareholdings and obviously calculated to make it
difficult for Dr. Ortaez’s estate to reassume its controlling
interest in Philinterlife, was likewise void ab initio.
Petitioners next argue that they were denied due process.
We do not think so.
The facts show that petitioners, for reasons known only to
them, did not appeal the decision of the intestate court
nullifying the sale of shares of stock in their favor. Only the
vendor, Jose Ortaez, appealed the case. A careful review of
the records shows that petitioners had actual knowledge of
the estate settlement proceedings and that they knew private
respondent Enderes was questioning therein the sale to them
of the Philinterlife shares of stock.
It must be noted that private respondent-Special
Administratrix Enderes filed before the intestate court (RTC of
Quezon City, Branch 85) a “Motion to Declare Void Ab Initio
Deeds of Sale of Philinterlife Shares of Stock” on March 22,
1996. But as early as 1994, petitioners already knew of the
pending settlement proceedings and that the shares they
bought were under the administration by the intestate court
because private respondent Ma. Divina Ortaez-Enderes and
her mother Ligaya Novicio had filed a case against them at the
Securities and Exchange Commission on November 7, 1994,
docketed as SEC No. 11-94-4909, for annulment of transfer of
shares of stock, annulment of sale of corporate properties,
annulment of subscriptions on increased capital stocks,
accounting, inspection of corporate books and records and
damages with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction
and/or temporary
517
VOL. 423, FEBRUARY 23, 2004 517
Lee vs. Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Br. 85
restraining order.27 In said case, Enderes and her mother
questioned the sale of the aforesaid shares of stock to
petitioners. The SEC hearing officer in fact, in his resolution
dated March 24, 1995, deferred to the jurisdiction of the
intestate court to rule on the validity of the sale of shares of
stock sold to petitioners by Jose Ortaez and Juliana Ortaez:
Petitioners also averred that. . . the Philinterlife shares of Dr.
Juvencio Ortaez who died, in 1980, are part of his estate which
is presently the subject matter of an intestate proceeding of
the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 85. Although, private
respondents [Jose Lee, et al.] presented the documents of
partition whereby the foregoing share of stocks were allegedly
partitioned and conveyed to Jose S. Ortaez who allegedly
assigned the same to the other private respondents, approval
of the Court was not presented. Thus, the assignments to the
private respondents [Jose Lee, et al.] of the subject shares of
stocks are void.
xxx xxx xxx
With respect to the alleged extrajudicial partition of the
shares of stock owned by the late Dr. Juvencio Ortaez, we rule
that the matter properly belongs to the jurisdiction of the
regular court where the intestate proceedings are currently
pending.28
With this resolution of the SEC hearing officer dated as early
as March 24, 1995 recognizing the jurisdiction of the intestate
court to determine the validity of the extrajudicial partition of
the estate of Dr. Ortaez and the subsequent sale by the heirs
of the decedent of the Philinterlife shares of stock to
petitioners, how can petitioners claim that they were not
aware of the intestate proceedings?
Furthermore, when the resolution of the SEC hearing officer
reached the Supreme Court in 1996 (docketed as G.R.
128525), herein petitioners who were respondents therein
filed their answer which contained statements showing that
they knew of the pending intestate proceedings:
[T]he subject matter of the complaint is not within the
jurisdiction of the SEC but with the Regional Trial Court; Ligaya
Novicio and children represented themselves to be the
common law wife and illegitimate children of the late Ortaez;
that on March 4, 1982, the surviving spouse Juliana Ortaez, on
her behalf and for her minor son Antonio, executed a
_______________
27 Cited in Ma. Divina Ortaez-Enderes, et al. vs. Court of
Appeals, et al., 321 SCRA 178 (1999).
28 Rollo, pp. 147-149.
518
518 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Lee vs. Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Br. 85
Memorandum of Agreement with her other sons Rafael and
Jose, both surnamed Ortaez, dividing the estate of the
deceased composed of his one-half (1/2) share in the conjugal
properties; that in the said Memorandum of Agreement, Jose
S. Ortaez acquired as his share of the estate the 1,329 shares
of stock in Philinterlife; that on March 4, 1982, Juliana and
Rafael assigned their respective shares of stock in Philinterlife
to Jose; that contrary to the contentions of petitioners, private
respondents Jose Lee, Carlos Lee, Benjamin Lee and Alma
Aggabao became stockholders of Philinterlife on March 23,
1983 when Jose S. Ortaez, the principal stockholder at that
time, executed a deed of sale of his shares of stock to private
respondents; and that the right of petitioners to question the
Memorandum of Agreement and the acquisition of shares of
stock of private respondent is barred by prescription.29
Also, private respondent-Special Administratrix Enderes
offered additional proof of actual knowledge of the
settlement proceedings by petitioners which petitioners never
denied: (1) that petitioners were represented by Atty. Ricardo
Calimag previously hired by the mother of private respondent
Enderes to initiate cases against petitioners Jose Lee and Alma
Aggaboa for the nullification of the sale of the shares of stock
but said counsel made a conflicting turnaround and appeared
instead as counsel of petitioners, and (2) that the deeds of
sale executed between petitioners and the heirs of the
decedent (vendors Juliana Ortaez and Jose Ortaez) were
acknowledged before Atty. Ramon Carpio who, during the
pendency of the settlement proceedings, filed a motion for
the approval of the sale of Philinterlife shares of stock to the
Knights of Columbus Fraternal Association, Inc. (which motion
was, however, later abandoned).30 All this sufficiently proves
that petitioners, through their counsels, knew of the pending
settlement proceedings.
Finally, petitioners filed several criminal cases such as libel
(Criminal Case No. 97-7179-81), grave coercion (Criminal Case
No. 84624) and robbery (Criminal Case No. Q-96-67919)
against private respondent’s mother Ligaya Novicio who was a
director of Philinterlife,31 all of which criminal cases were
related to the questionable sale to petitioners of the
Philinterlife shares of stock.
Considering these circumstances, we cannot accept
petitioners’ claim of denial of due process. The essence of due
process is the
_______________
29 Rollo, p. 136.
30 Rollo, pp. 728-729.
31 Rollo, pp. 524-526.
519
VOL. 423, FEBRUARY 23, 2004 519
Lee vs. Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Br. 85
reasonable opportunity to be heard. Where the opportunity
to be heard has been accorded, there is no denial of due
process.32 In this case, petitioners knew of the pending
instestate proceedings for the settlement of Dr. Juvencio
Ortaez’s estate but for reasons they alone knew, they never
intervened. When the court declared the nullity of the sale,
they did not bother to appeal. And when they were notified of
the motion for execution of the Orders of the intestate court,
they ignored the same. Clearly, petitioners alone should bear
the blame.
Petitioners next contend that we are bound by our ruling in
G.R. No. 128525 entitled Ma. Divina Ortaez-Enderes vs. Court
of Appeals, dated December 17, 1999, where we allegedly
ruled that the intestate court “may not pass upon the title to a
certain property for the purpose of determining whether the
same should or should not be included in the inventory but
such determination is not conclusive and is subject to final
decision in a separate action regarding ownership which may
be constituted by the parties.”
We are not unaware of our decision in G.R. No. 128525. The
issue therein was whether the Court of Appeals erred in
affirming the resolution of the SEC that Enderes, et al. were
not entitled to the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction. We ruled that the Court of Appeals was correct in
affirming the resolution of the SEC denying the issuance of the
writ of preliminary injunction because injunction is not
designed to protect contingent rights. Said case did not rule
on the issue of the validity of the sale of shares of stock
belonging to the decedent’s estate without court approval nor
of the validity of the writ of execution issued by the intestate
court. G.R. No. 128525 clearly involved a different issue and it
does not therefore apply to the present case.
Petitioners and all parties claiming rights under them are
hereby warned not to further delay the execution of the
Orders of the intestate court dated August 11 and August 29,
1997.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. S.P. No. 59736 dated July 26,
2000, dismissing petitioners’ petition for certiorari and
affirming the July 6, 2000 order of the trial court which
ordered the execution of its (trial court’s) August 11 and 29,
1997 orders, is hereby AFFIRMED.
_______________
32 Salonga vs. Court of Appeals, 269 SCRA 534 (1997).
520
520 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Gaudia
SO ORDERED.
Vitug (Chairman) and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., No part.
Petition denied, assailed decision affirmed.
Notes.–The declaration of heirship must be made in an
administration proceeding, and not in an independent civil
action. (Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay vs. Del Rosario,
304 SCRA 18 [1999])
Without creditors to take into consideration, it is competent
for the heirs of an estate to enter into an agreement for
distribution thereof in a manner and upon a plan different
from those provided by the rules from which, in the first place,
nothing can be inferred that a writing or other formality is
essential for the partition to be valid. (Castro vs. Miat, 397
SCRA 271 [2003])
––o0o––
© Copyright 2020 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
G.R. No. 138953. June 6, 2002.*
CASTORIO ALVARICO, petitioner, vs. AMELITA L. SOLA, respondent.
Land Registration; Notarial Law; The execution of public documents, as in
the case of Affidavits of Adjudication, is entitled to the presumption of
regularity, hence convincing evidence is required to assail and controvert
them; It requires more than a party’s bare allegation to defeat the Original
_______________
*
SECOND DIVISION.
233
VOL. 383, JUNE 6, 2002 233
Alvarico vs. Sola
Certificate of Title which on its face enjoys the legal presumption of
regularity of issuance.—Petitioner claims that respondent was in bad faith
when she registered the land in her name and, based on the
abovementioned rules, he has a better right over the property because he
was first in material possession in good faith. However, this allegation of
bad faith on the part of Amelita Sola in acquiring the title is devoid of
evidentiary support. For one, the execution of public documents, as in the
case of Affidavits of Adjudication, is entitled to the presumption of
regularity, hence convincing evidence is required to assail and controvert
them. Second, it is undisputed that OCT No. 3439 was issued in 1989 in the
name of Amelita. It requires more than petitioner’s bare allegation to
defeat the Original Certificate of Title which on its face enjoys the legal
presumption of regularity of issuance. A Torrens title, once registered,
serves as notice to the whole world. All persons must take notice and no
one can plead ignorance of its registration.
Same; Actions; Reversion; Only the State can institute reversion
proceedings under Section 101 of the Public Land Act.—Even assuming that
respondent Amelita Sola acquired title to the disputed property in bad
faith, only the State can institute reversion proceedings under Sec. 101 of
the Public Land Act. Thus: Sec. 101.—All actions for reversion to the
Government of lands of the public domain or improvements thereon shall
be instituted by the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead, in
the proper courts, in the name of the Republic of the Philippines.
Same; Same; Same; A private individual may not bring an action for
reversion or any action which would have the effect of canceling a free
patent and the corresponding certificate of title issued on the basis thereof,
such that the land covered thereby will again form part of the public
domain.—In other words, a private individual may not bring an action for
reversion or any action which would have the effect of canceling a free
patent and the corresponding certificate of title issued on the basis
thereof, such that the land covered thereby will again form part of the
public domain. Only the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead
may do so. Since Amelita Sola’s title originated from a grant by the
government, its cancellation is a matter between the grantor and the
grantee. Clearly then, petitioner has no standing at all to question the
validity of Amelita’s title. It follows that he cannot “recover” the property
because, to begin with, he has not shown that he is the rightful owner
thereof.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision and resolution of the Court
of Appeals.
234
234 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Alvarico vs. Sola
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Alejandro V. Peregrino for petitioner.
Eduardo P. Gabriel, Jr. for respondent.
QUISUMBING, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision dated March 23,
1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 54624, reversing the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 10, for
reconveyance. Also sought to be reversed is the CA resolution dated June
8, 1999 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
The facts of this case are as follows:
Petitioner Castorio Alvarico is the natural father of respondent Amelita
Sola while Fermina Lopez is petitioner’s aunt, and also Amelita’s adoptive
mother.
On June 17, 1982, the Bureau of Lands approved and granted the
Miscellaneous Sales Application (MSA) of Fermina over Lot 5, SGS-3451,
with an area of 152 sq. m. at the Waterfront, Cebu City.1
On May 28, 1983,2 Fermina executed a Deed of Self-Adjudication and
Transfer of Rights3 over Lot 5 in favor of Amelita, who agreed to assume all
the obligations, duties, and conditions imposed upon Fermina under MSA
Application No. V-81066. The document of transfer was filed with the
Bureau of Lands.4 The pertinent portions of the deed provide:
xxx
That I, FERMINA A. LOPEZ, of legal age, Filipino, widow of Pedro C. Lopez allegedly donated to petitioner, the property having been transferred
and a resident of Port San Pedro, Cebu City, Philippines, am the AWARDEE earlier to her.13 She added that the donation was
of Lots Nos. 4, 5, 3-B, 3-C and 6-B, Sgs-3451 And being the winning bidder _______________
5
at the auction sale of these parcels by the Bureau of Lands held on May 12, Records, p. 47.
6
1982, at the price of P150.00 per square meter taking a Rollo, p. 24.
7
_______________ Ibid.
1 8
Rollo, p. 24. Ibid.
2 9
May 23, 1983 in the CA decision. June 23, 1993 in the CA decision.
3 10
Records, pp. 47-48. CEB-15191 in other parts of the records.
4 11
Rollo, p. 24. Deed of Donation, Exh. “C”, Records, pp. 180-181.
12
235 Rollo, p. 24.
13
VOL. 383, JUNE 6, 2002 235 Id., at 24-25.
Alvarico vs. Sola 236
purchase price of P282,900.00 for the tract; That I have made as my partial 236 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
payment the sum of P28,290.00 evidenced by Official Receipt No. Alvarico vs. Sola
1357764-B representing ten (10%) per cent of my bid, leaving a balance of void because of lack of approval from the Bureau of Lands, and that she
P254,610.00 that shall be in not more than ten (10) years at an equal had validly acquired the land as Fermina’s rightful heir. She also denied
installments of P25,461.00 beginning June 17, 1983 until the full amount is that she is a trustee of the land for petitioner.14
paid. After trial, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of petitioner, the decretal
. . . the Transferee Mrs. Amelita L. Sola, agrees to assume, all the portion of which reads:
obligations, duties and conditions imposed upon the Awardee in relation “WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor
to the MSA Application No. V-81066 entered in their records as Sales Entry of plaintiff and against the defendant. Lot 5, Sgs-3451, is hereby declared
No. 20476. as lawfully owned by plaintiff and defendant is directed to reconvey the
. . . [I] hereby declare that I accept this Deed of Self-Adjudication and same to the former.
Transfer of Rights and further agree to all conditions provided therein.5 No pronouncement as to damages and attorney’s fees, plaintiff having
Amelita assumed payment of the lot to the Bureau of Lands. She paid a opted to forego such claims.
total amount of P282,900.6 SO ORDERED.”15
On April 7, 1989, the Bureau of Lands issued an order approving the On appeal, the Court of Appeals in its decision dated March 23, 1999
transfer of rights and granting the amendment of the application from reversed the RTC. Thus:
Fermina to Amelita.7 On May 2, 1989, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. “WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the appealed decision is hereby
3439 was issued in favor of Amelita.8 REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint filed by plaintiff-appellee against
On June 24, 1993,9 herein petitioner filed Civil Case No. CEB1419110 for defendant-appellant is hereby DISMISSED.
reconveyance against Amelita. He claimed that on January 4, 1984, Costs against plaintiff-appellee.
Fermina donated the land to him11 and immediately thereafter, he took SO ORDERED.”16
possession of the same. He averred that the donation to him had the effect Petitioner sought reconsideration, but it was denied by the CA.17
of withdrawing the earlier transfer to Amelita. 12 Hence, the instant petition for certiorari seasonably filed on the following
For her part, Amelita maintained that the donation to petitioner is void grounds:
because Fermina was no longer the owner of the property when it was I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR,
REFLECTIVE OF UNMINDFUL RECKLESSNESS WHICH IS THE VERY OPPOSITE
OF JUDICIAL CIRCUMSPECTION, IN DECLARING THAT THE DEED OF
DONATION DATED JANUARY 4, 1984 (ANNEX “C”) IN FAVOR OF
PETITIONER WAS EMBODIED ONLY IN A PRIVATE DOCUMENT (Page 6,
Decision, Annex “A”), ALTHOUGH, BY
_______________
14
Id., at 25.
15
Id., at 49.
16
Id., at 30-31.
17
Id., at 32.
237
VOL. 383, JUNE 6, 2002 237
Alvarico vs. Sola
A MERE CASUAL LOOK AT THE DOCUMENT, IT CAN BE READILY DISCERNED
THAT IT IS NOTARIZED;
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN
APPLYING ON THE CASE AT BAR THE PRINCIPLE IN LAW THAT IT IS
REGISTRATION OF THE SALES PATENT THAT CONSTITUTE THE OPERATIVE
ACT THAT WOULD CONVEY OWNERSHIP OF THE LAND TO THE APPLICANT
(Pp. 3-6, Decision, Annex “A”) BECAUSE THE LEGAL CONTROVERSY
BETWEEN PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT DOES NOT INVOLVE
CONFLICTING CLAIMS ON SALES PATENT APPLICATIONS;
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
AND COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN MAKING A FINDING THAT
RESPONDENT ACQUIRED THE LAND IN QUESTION, IN GOOD FAITH (Page 7,
Decision, Annex “A”), ALTHOUGH THERE IS NO BASIS NOR NEED TO MAKE
SUCH A FINDING; and
IV.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN
ENUNCIATING THAT POSSESSION MENTIONED IN ARTICLE 1544 OF THE
NEW CIVIL CODE INCLUDE SYMBOLIC POSSESSION, UPON WHICH THE
APPELLATE COURT BASED ITS CONCLUSION THAT RESPONDENT WAS FIRST
IN POSSESSION BECAUSE THE DEED OF SELF-ADJUDICATION AND
TRANSFER OF RIGHTS IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT DATED MAY 28, 1983
WAS EXECUTED MUCH EARLIER THAN THE DEED OF DONATION IN FAVOR
OF PETITIONER DATED JANUARY 4, 1984 (Pages 7-8, Decision, Annex
“A”).18
The crucial issue to be resolved in an action for reconveyance is: Who
between petitioner and respondent has a better claim to the land?
To prove she has a better claim, respondent Amelita Sola submitted a copy
of OCT No. 3439 in her name and her husband’s,19 a
_______________
18
Id., at 9-10.
19
Exh. “4”, Records, p. 56.
238
238 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Alvarico vs. Sola
Deed of Self-Adjudication and Transfer of Rights20 over the property dated
1983 executed by Fermina in her favor, and a certification from the
municipal treasurer that she had been declaring the land as her and her
husband’s property for tax purposes since 1993. 21
For his part, petitioner Castorio Alvarico presented, a Deed of Donation 22
dated January 4, 1984, showing that the lot was given to him by Fermina
and according to him, he immediately took possession in 1985 and
continues in possession up to the present. 23
Petitioner further contests the CA ruling that declared as a private
document said Deed of Donation dated January 4, 1984, despite the fact
that a certified true and correct copy of the same was obtained from the
Notarial Records Office, Regional Trial Court, Cebu City on June 11, 1993
and acknowledged before Atty. Numeriano Capangpangan, then Notary
Public for Cebu.24
Given the circumstances in this case and the contentions of the parties, we
find that no reversible error was committed by the appellate court in
holding that herein petitioner’s complaint against respondent should be
dismissed. The evidence on record and the applicable law indubitably favor
respondent.
Petitioner principally relies on Articles 744 and 1544 of the New Civil Code,
which provide:
Art. 744. Donations of the same thing to two or more different donees
shall be governed by the provisions concerning the sale of the same thing
to two or more different persons.

Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees,
the ownership shall be transferred to the person who may have first taken
possession thereof in good faith, if it should be movable property.
_______________
20
Exh. “1”, Records, pp. 47-48.
21
Exhs. “4-6”, Records, pp. 57-65.
22
Exh. “C”, Records, pp. 180-181.
23
TSN, July 26, 1993, p. 11.
24
Rollo, p. 10.
239
VOL. 383, JUNE 6, 2002 239
Alvarico vs. Sola
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person
acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person
who in good faith was first in the possession; and, in the absence thereof,
to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner claims that respondent was in bad faith when she registered the
land in her name and, based on the abovementioned rules, he has a better
right over the property because he was first in material possession in good
faith. However, this allegation of bad faith on the part of Amelita Sola in
acquiring the title is devoid of evidentiary support. For one, the execution
of public documents, as in the case of Affidavits of Adjudication, is entitled
to the presumption of regularity, hence convincing evidence is required to
assail and controvert them.25 Second, it is undisputed that OCT No. 3439
was issued in 1989 in the name of Amelita. It requires more than
petitioner’s bare allegation to defeat the Original Certificate of Title which
on its face enjoys the legal presumption of regularity of issuance.26 A
Torrens title, once registered, serves as notice to the whole world. All
persons must take notice and no one can plead ignorance of its
registration.27
Even assuming that respondent Amelita Sola acquired title to the disputed
property in bad faith, only the State can institute reversion proceedings
under Sec. 101 of the Public Land Act.28 Thus:
Sec. 101.—All actions for reversion to the Government of lands of the
public domain or improvements thereon shall be instituted by the
_______________
25
Cacho vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123361, 269 SCRA 159, 172 (1997).
26
Chan vs. Court of Appeals, (Special Seventh Division), G.R. No. 118516,
298 SCRA 713, 729 (1998).
27
Egao vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 79787, 174 SCRA 484, 492 (1989).
28
Urquiaga vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127833, 301 SCRA 738, 745
(1999).
240
240 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Alvarico vs. Sola
Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead, in the proper courts, in
the name of the Republic of the Philippines.
In other words, a private individual may not bring an action for reversion
or any action which would have the effect of canceling a free patent and
the corresponding certificate of title issued on the basis thereof, such that
the land covered thereby will again form part of the public domain. Only
the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead may do so.29 Since
Amelita Sola’s title originated from a grant by the government, its
cancellation is a matter between the grantor and the grantee. 30 Clearly
then, petitioner has no standing at all to question the validity of Amelita’s
title. It follows that he cannot “recover” the property because, to begin
with, he has not shown that he is the rightful owner thereof.
Anent petitioner’s contention that it was the intention of Fermina for
Amelita to hold the property in trust for him, we held that if this was really
the intention of Fermina, then this should have been clearly stated in the
Deed of Self-Adjudication executed in 1983, in the Deed of Donation
executed in 1984, or in a subsequent instrument. Absent any persuasive
proof of that intention in any written instrument, we are not prepared to
accept petitioner’s bare allegation concerning the donor’s state of mind.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 54624 is hereby AFFIRMED. The complaint filed by herein petitioner
against respondent in Civil Case No. CEB-14191 is declared properly
DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo (Actg. C.J., Chairman), Mendoza, De Leon, Jr. and Corona, JJ.,
concur.
Judgment affirmed, complaint dismissed.
_______________
29
Supra, note 27 at 492-493.
30
De Ocampo vs. Arlos, G.R. No. 135527, 343 SCRA 716, 728 (2000).
241
VOL. 383, JUNE 6, 2002 241
People vs. Manrique
Notes.—Even after the lapse of one year, the State may still bring an action
under §101 of the Public Land Act for the reversion to the public domain of
lands which have been fraudulently granted to private individuals.
(Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 255 SCRA 335 [1996])
It is only the State which may institute reversion proceedings under Sec.
101 of the Public Land Act. (Urquiaga vs. Court of Appeals, 301 SCRA 738
[1999])
——o0o——
 G.R. No. 172720. September 14, 2015.*
ELISEO MALTOS and ROSITA P. MALTOS, petitioners, vs. HEIRS OF EUSEBIO
BORROMEO, respondents.
Civil Law; Property; Homestead; The five (5)-year period prohibiting the
sale of land obtained under homestead or free patent is provided under
Section 118 of the Public Land Act (PLA).—The five-year period prohibiting
the sale of land obtained under homestead or free patent is provided
under Section 118 of the Public Land Act, which states: SECTION 118.
Except in favor of the Government or any of its branches, units, or
institutions, or legally constituted banking corporations, lands acquired
under free patent or home-
* SECOND DIVISION.
398
398 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Maltos vs. Heirs of Eusebio Borromeo
stead provisions shall not be subject to encumbrance or alienation from
the date of the approval of the application and for a term of five years
from and after the date of issuance of the patent or grant, nor shall they
become liable to the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the
expiration of said period; but the improvements or crops on the land may
be mortgaged or pledged to qualified persons, associations, or
corporations.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Counterclaims; The general rule is that “a
compulsory counterclaim . . . not set up shall be barred.”—The general rule
is that “[a] compulsory counterclaim . . . not set up shall be barred.”
Further, the computation of the value of the improvements on the land
entails findings of fact. In any case, the Court of Appeals did not err when it
stated in its Resolution dated April 7, 2006 that: With respect to Appellees’
claim for the reimbursement of the improvements on the land in question,
they are hereby declared to have lost and forfeited the value of the
necessary improvements that they made thereon in the same manner that
Appellants should lose the value of the products gathered by the Appellees
from the said land.
Same; Same; Reversion; The purpose of reversion is “to restore public land
fraudulently awarded and disposed of to private individuals or corporations
to the mass of public domain.”—The purpose of reversion is “to restore
public land fraudulently awarded and disposed of to private individuals or
corporations to the mass of public domain.” The general rule is that
reversion of lands to the state is not automatic, and the Office of the
Solicitor General is the proper party to file an action for reversion.
Same; Same; Same; Since an action for reversion presupposes that the
property in dispute is owned by the state, it is proper that the action be
filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), being the real party-in-
interest.—We clarify that the remedy of reversion is not the same as the
remedy of declaration of nullity of free patents and certificate of title. In
reversion, the “allegations in the complaint would admit State ownership
of the disputed land[,]” while in an action for the declaration of nullity of
free patent and certificate of title, the allegations would include “plaintiff’s
ownership of the contested lot prior to the issuance of [the] free patent
and certificate of title[.]” Since an action for reversion presupposes that
the property
399
VOL. 770, SEPTEMBER 14, 2015 399
Maltos vs. Heirs of Eusebio Borromeo
in dispute is owned by the state, it is proper that the action be filed by the
Office of the Solicitor General, being the real party-in-interest.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the
Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Sansaet-Masendo-Cadiz Bañosia Law Offices for petitioners.
Miguel Padilla Paderanga for respondents.
LEONEN, J.:
The sale of a parcel of agricultural land covered by a free patent during the
five-year prohibitory period under the Public Land Act is void. Reversion of
the parcel of land is proper. However, reversion under Section 101 of the
Public Land Act is not automatic. The Office of the Solicitor General must
first file an action for reversion.
On February 13, 1979, Eusebio Borromeo was issued Free Patent No.
586681 over a piece of agricultural land located in San Francisco, Agusan
del Sur, covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-9053.1
On June 15, 1983, well within the five-year prohibitory period, Eusebio
Borromeo sold the land to Eliseo Maltos.2
Eusebio Borromeo died on January 16, 1991. His heirs claimed that prior to
his death, he allegedly told his wife, Norberta Borromeo,3 and his children
to nullify the sale made to Eliseo Maltos and have the Transfer Certificate
of Title No. T-5477 cancelled because the sale was within the five-year
prohibitory period.4
_______________
1 Rollo, p. 22, Court of Appeals’ Decision.
2 Id.
3 Id., at p. 26.
4 Id., at p. 22.
400
400 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Maltos vs. Heirs of Eusebio Borromeo
On June 23, 1993, Norberta Borromeo and her children (heirs of
Borromeo) filed a Complaint for Nullity of Title and Reconveyance of Title
against Eliseo Maltos, Rosita Maltos, and the Register of Deeds of Agusan
del Sur.5 The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 946.6
Eliseo Maltos and Rosita Maltos (Maltos Spouses) filed their Answer,
arguing that the sale was made in good faith and that in purchasing the
property, they relied on Eusebio Borromeo’s title. Further, the parties were
in pari delicto. Since the sale was made during the five-year prohibitory
period, the land would revert to the public domain and the proper party to
institute reversion proceedings was the Office of the Solicitor General.7
5 Id.
6 Id., at p. 93, Regional Trial Court’s Decision. A copy of the trial court
Decision is attached to the Rollo on pages 93-118; however, the specific
branch of the Regional Trial Court is not legible.
The Register of Deeds of Agusan del Sur also filed an Answer, arguing that
the deed of sale was presented for registration after the five-year
prohibitory period, thus, it was ministerial on its part to register the deed.8
The heirs of Borromeo countered that good faith was not a valid defense
because the prohibitory period appeared on the face of the title of the
property.9
The Regional Trial Court10 of Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur narrowed down
the issues to the following:
1. Whether or not the herein plaintiffs are the legal heirs
of the late Eusebio Borromeo.
_______________
5 Id.
6 Id., at p. 93, Regional Trial Court’s Decision. A copy of the trial court
Decision is attached to the Rollo on pages 93-118; however, the specific
branch of the Regional Trial Court is not legible.
7 Id., at pp. 22-23, Court of Appeals’ Decision.
8 Id., at p. 23.
9 Id.
10 Id., at pp. 93-118, Regional Trial Court’s Decision. The Decision was
promulgated on August 30, 2002 and was penned by Executive Judge
Patricio D. Balite.
401
VOL. 770, SEPTEMBER 14, 2015 401
Maltos vs. Heirs of Eusebio Borromeo
2. Whether or not the sale of the disputed property within
the prohibitory period is valid or binding.11
The trial court dismissed the Complaint on the ground of failure to state a
cause of action.12 Also, the heirs of Borromeo did not have a right of
action because they were unable to establish their status as heirs of the
late Eusebio Borromeo.13 They may have declared themselves the legal
heirs of Eusebio Borromeo, but they did not present evidence to prove
their allegation.14 Further, the determination of their rights to succession
must be established in special proceedings.15
The trial court also ruled that “[t]he sale was null and void because it was
within the five (5)-year prohibitionary [sic] period”16 under the Public Land
Act.17 The defense of indefeasibility of title was unavailing because the
title to the property stated that it was “subject to the provisions of
Sections 118, 119, 121, 122 and 124”18 of the Public Land Act.19 Since the
property was sold within the five-year prohibitory period, such transfer
“result[ed] in the cancellation of the grant and the reversion of the land to
the public domain.”20
As to the defense of in pari delicto, the trial court ruled against its The heirs of Borromeo also argued that the trial court should have ordered
applicability,21 citing Egao v. Court of Appeals (Ninth Division).22 the “revival of [Original Certificate of Title] No. P-9053 in the name of the
_______________ Heirs of EUSEBIO BORROMEO.”27
11 Id., at p. 112. The Court of Appeals28 reversed the Decision of the trial court and held
12 Id. that since Eusebio Borromeo sold his property
13 Id. _______________
14 Id., at pp. 112-113. 23 Id., at p. 252; p. 493.
15 Id., at pp. 113-114. 24 Rollo, p. 118, Regional Trial Court’s Decision.
16 Id., at p. 114. 25 Id.
17 Id., at pp. 114-115. The Public Land Act referred to is Com. Act No. 141 26 Id., at pp. 26-28, Court of Appeals’ Decision.
(1936). 27 Id., at p. 30.
18 Id., at p. 115. 28 Id., at pp. 21-35. The Decision was penned by Associate Justice Myrna
19 Id. Dimaranan-Vidal and concurred in by Associate Justices Romulo V. Borja
20 Id., at p. 116. (Chair) and Ricardo R. Rosario of the Court of Appeals, Mindanao Station,
21 Id., at p. 117. Cagayan de Oro City, Twenty-Second Division.
22 256 Phil. 243; 174 SCRA 484 (1989) [Per J. Padilla, Second Division].

402
402 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Maltos vs. Heirs of Eusebio Borromeo
The rule of pari delicto non oritur action (where two persons are equally at
fault neither party may be entitled to relief under the law), admits of
exceptions and does not apply to an inexistent contract, such as, a sale
void ab initio under the Public Land Act, when its enforcement or
application runs counter to the public policy of preserving the grantee’s
right to the land under the homestead law.23 (Citation omitted)
The trial court further held that since the sale was null and void, no title
passed from Eusebio Borromeo to Eliseo Maltos.24 The dispositive portion
of the trial court’s Decision states:
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the complaint under consideration is
hereby ordered DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.25
On appeal, the heirs of Borromeo argued that they were able to prove
their status as heirs through the testimony of their mother, Norberta
Borromeo.26
403
VOL. 770, SEPTEMBER 14, 2015 403
Maltos vs. Heirs of Eusebio Borromeo
within the five-year prohibitory period, the property should revert to the
state.29 However, the government has to file an action for reversion
because “reversion is not automatic.”30 While there is yet no action for
reversion instituted by the Office of the Solicitor General, the property
should be returned to the heirs of Borromeo.31 The dispositive portion of
the Court of Appeals’ Decision states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Appeal is GRANTED. The
Decision of the court a quo in Civil Case No. 946 is hereby SET ASIDE and
another one is entered (1) ordering Appellee ELISEO MALTOS to reconvey
the property subject matter of this litigation to Appellants upon the refund
by the latter to Appellee ELISEO MALTOS the sum of P36,863.00, all
expenses for the reconveyance to be borne by the buyer, ELISEO MALTOS,
herein Appellee and (2) ordering the Register of Deeds of Prosperidad,
Agusan del Sur to cancel TCT No. T-5477 and revive OCT No. P-9053.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) for its information and appropriate action and to inform this court
within a period of thirty (30) days from receipt hereof of the action done
under the premises.
SO ORDERED.32 (Emphasis supplied)
The Maltos Spouses filed a Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that since
the prohibition on transfers of property is provided by law, only the heirs
of Borromeo should be punished.33 Punishment, in this case, would come
in the form of preventing the heirs of Borromeo from reacquiring the
land.34
_______________
29 Id., at p. 31.
30 Id.
31 Id., at p. 32.
32 Id., at pp. 33-34.
33 Id., at p. 36, Court of Appeals Resolution.
34 Id.
404
404 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Maltos vs. Heirs of Eusebio Borromeo
Instead, the land should revert back to the state.35 The Maltos Spouses
also prayed that they be reimbursed for the improvements they
introduced on the land.36 Assuming that they would be found to be also at
fault, the principle of in pari delicto should apply.37
The Court of Appeals38 denied the Motion for Reconsideration,39
reasoning that it could not rule on the issue of who between the parties
had the better right to the property.40 Also, it was the government who
should decide whether the heirs of Borromeo “should retain ownership of
the land.”41 With regard to the applicability of the in pari delicto doctrine,
the Court of Appeals held that in pari delicto does not apply in cases where
its application will violate the policy of the state.42
On May 10, 2006, the Maltos Spouses filed a Petition43 for Review before
this court, questioning the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals
in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 77142.44
This court, in a Resolution45 dated July 5, 2006, required the heirs of
Borromeo to file their Comment.
_______________
35 Id.
36 Id., at p. 38.
37 Id., at pp. 36-37.
38 Id., at pp. 36-38. The Resolution was penned by Associate Justice
Myrna Dimaranan-Vidal and concurred in by Associate Justices Romulo V.
Borja (Chair) and Ricardo R. Rosario of the Court of Appeals, Mindanao
Station, Cagayan de Oro City, Twenty-Second Division.
39 Id., at p. 38.
40 Id., at p. 37.
41 Id.
42 Id., citing Arsenal v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 227 Phil. 36, 51; 143
SCRA 40, 54 (1986) [Per J. Gutierrez, Jr., Second Division].
43 Id., at pp. 3-20.
44 Id., at p. 18.
45 Id., at p. 41.
405
VOL. 770, SEPTEMBER 14, 2015 405
Maltos vs. Heirs of Eusebio Borromeo
The heirs of Borromeo filed their Comment,46 which was noted by this
court in a Resolution47 dated September 25, 2006. In the same Resolution,
this court required the Maltos Spouses to file their Reply.48
In a Resolution49 dated March 28, 2007, this court required Attys. Ma.
Cherell L. De Castro and Gener C. Sansaet, counsels for the Maltos
Spouses, to show cause why they should not be disciplinarily dealt with for
their failure to file a Reply. They were also required to comply with the
Resolution dated September 25, 2006.50
Counsels for the Maltos Spouses filed a Compliance,51 together with the
Reply.52 In a Resolution53 dated August 15, 2007, this court noted and
accepted the Compliance, and also noted the Reply.
I
The Maltos Spouses argue that the heirs of Borromeo did not present
evidence to prove that they are indeed the heirs of Eusebio Borromeo. The
heirs of Borromeo did not present the death certificate of Eusebio
Borromeo, the marriage certificate of Eusebio Borromeo and Norberta
Borromeo, or any of the birth certificates of the children of Eusebio.54
While Norberta Borromeo and two of her children testified,55 their tes-
_______________
46 Id., at pp. 42-46.
47 Id., at p. 48. (1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
48 Id. child; or
49 Id., at p. 50. (2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
50 Id. 58 Rollo, p. 55, Compliance.
51 Id., at pp. 51-52. 59 Id., at p. 10, Petition.
52 Id., at pp. 51-63. 60 Com. Act No. 141 (1936), Sec. 118 provides:
53 Id., at p. 66. SECTION 118. Except in favor of the Government or any of its branches,
54 Id., at p. 8, Petition. units, or institutions, or legally constituted banking corporations, lands
55 Id., at pp. 99-105, Regional Trial Court’s Decision. The trial court states acquired under free patent or homestead provisions shall not be subject to
that Norberta Borromeo, Armando Borromeo, and Susan Borromeo encumbrance or alienation from the date of the approval of the
Morales testified. application and for a term of five years from and after the date of issuance
of the patent or grant, nor shall they become liable to the satisfaction of
any debt contracted prior to the expiration of said period; but the
406 improvements or crops on the land may be mortgaged or pledged to
406 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED qualified persons, associations, or corporations.
Maltos vs. Heirs of Eusebio Borromeo
timonies should be considered as self-serving.56 The Maltos Spouses cite
Article 17257 of the Family Code, which enumerates how filiation may be 407
established.58 VOL. 770, SEPTEMBER 14, 2015 407
The Maltos Spouses also contest the Court of Appeals’ ruling stating that Maltos vs. Heirs of Eusebio Borromeo
they did not rebut the testimonies of the heirs of Borromeo because they Act.61 Since both parties are at fault, it follows that Article 141262 of the
continuously argued that the heirs of Borromeo were unable to prove their Civil Code applies.63
status as heirs.59 In addition, the Maltos Spouses pray for the reimbursement of the value of
The Maltos Spouses further argue that it was error for the Court of Appeals the improvements on the property to prevent unjust enrichment on the
not to apply the in pari delicto rule, considering that the sale violated part of the heirs of Borromeo.64 The Maltos Spouses enumerate the
Section 11860 of the Public Land following circumstances to show why they should be reimbursed:
_______________ a. EUSEBIO has already long received and enjoyed the
56 Id., at p. 8, Petition. amount of the purchase price of the subject land from
57 Family Code, Art. 172 provides: petitioners.
ARTICLE 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of b. The value of the purchase price of Php36,863.00 paid in
the following: 1983 have since then greatly depreciated. If petitioners had
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; deposited that money in bank or loaned it to another
or person instead of purchasing EUSEBIO’s property, it would
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private have at least earned some interest. However, the Court of
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. Appeals incorrectly assumed that the return of the purchase
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be price would be sufficient compensation to the petitioners.
proved by:
 c. The value of the improvements introduced by
petitioners on the subject property is much greater than the
purchase price that they initially paid on the land.
_______________
61 Rollo, p. 13, Petition.
62 Civil Code, Art. 1412 provides:
ART. 1412. If the act in which the unlawful or forbidden cause consists
does not constitute a criminal offense, the following rules shall be
observed:
(1) When the fault is on the part of both contracting
parties, neither may recover what he has given by
virtue of the contract, or demand the performance
of the other’s undertaking;
(2) When only one of the contracting parties is at
fault, he cannot recover what he has given by reason
of the contract, or ask for the fulfillment of what has
been promised him. The other, who is not at fault,
may demand the return of what he has given
without any obligation to comply with his promise.
63 Rollo, p. 13, Petition.
64 Id., at pp. 17-18.
408
408 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Maltos vs. Heirs of Eusebio Borromeo
Petitioners estimate the value of the improvements, including hundreds of
various fruit-bearing trees and four residential houses, to be at least
Php900,000.00. Because of these improvements, not only can respondents
sell the land at a much higher price, they can even sell the improvements
and profit from them. It would be the height of injustice if all the
petitioners would receive in turning over the subject property to the
respondents is the purchase price that was previously paid EUSEBIO under
the deed of sale.65
On the other hand, the heirs of Borromeo argue that the testimonies of
Norberta Borromeo and Susan Borromeo Morales on their relationship to
Eusebio Borromeo were not refuted by the Maltos Spouses. Thus, they
were able to prove their status as heirs.66
The heirs of Borromeo also argue that the in pari delicto rule is not
applicable because in Santos v. Roman Catholic Church of Midsayap, et
al.,67 this court stated that the in pari delicto rule does not apply if its
application will have the effect of violating public policy.68
With regard to the claim for reimbursements, the heirs of Borromeo argue
that the Maltos Spouses did not raise their claim for reimbursement in
their Answer to the Complaint. They are now barred from claiming
reimbursement since this was not raised at the first instance.69
Based on the arguments of the parties, the issues for resolution are:
First, whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the Decision of the
trial court and ordering the reconveyance of the property from petitioners
Spouses Eliseo Maltos and Rosita Maltos to respondents heirs of Eusebio
Borromeo;
_______________
65 Id.
66 Id., at pp. 42-43, Comment.
67 94 Phil. 405, 410-411 (1954) [Per J. Bautista Angelo, En Banc].
68 Rollo, pp. 43-44, Comment.
69 Id., at p. 44.
409
VOL. 770, SEPTEMBER 14, 2015 409
Maltos vs. Heirs of Eusebio Borromeo
Second, whether the Court of Appeals erred in not applying the doctrine of
in pari delicto; and
Finally, whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that petitioners
Spouses Eliseo Maltos and Rosita Maltos are not entitled to
reimbursement for the improvements they introduced on the land.
II
The five-year period prohibiting the sale of land obtained under
homestead or free patent is provided under Section 118 of the Public Land
Act, which states:
SECTION 118. Except in favor of the Government or any of
its branches, units, or institutions, or legally constituted
banking corporations, lands acquired under free patent or
homestead provisions shall not be subject to encumbrance
or alienation from the date of the approval of the
 application and for a term of five years from and after the
date of issuance of the patent or grant, nor shall they
become liable to the satisfaction of any debt contracted
prior to the expiration of said period; but the improvements
or crops on the land may be mortgaged or pledged to
qualified persons, associations, or corporations.
The reason for prohibiting the alienation or encumbrance of properties
covered by patent or grant was explained in Metropolitan Bank and Trust
Company v. Viray.70
In Metropolitan Bank, Edgardo D. Viray and his wife contracted several
loans with Metrobank which they failed to pay.71 Metrobank filed a
Complaint for sum of money before the Regional Trial Court in Manila.72
In 1982, during the pendency of the case, free patents over three parcels
of land
_______________
70 627 Phil. 398; 613 SCRA 581 (2010) [Per J. Carpio, Second Division].
71 Id., at pp. 400-401; p. 583.
72 Id., at p. 401; p. 584.
410
410 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Maltos vs. Heirs of Eusebio Borromeo
were issued in favor of Viray.73 The Complaint for sum of money was
decided in 1983 in favor of Metrobank.74 In 1984, the trial court issued a
writ of execution over the parcels of land.75 An auction sale was held, and
Metrobank emerged as the winning bidder.76 Viray filed an action for
annulment of sale.77 This court ruled that the auction sale was made
within the five-year prohibitory period78 and explained that:
[T]he main purpose in the grant of a free patent of
homestead is to preserve and keep in the family of the
homesteader that portion of public land which the State has
given to him so he may have a place to live with his family
and become a happy citizen and a useful member of the
society. In Jocson v. Soriano, we held that the conservation
of a family home is the purpose of homestead laws. The
policy of the state is to foster families as the foundation of
society, and thus promote general welfare . . . .
Section 118 of CA 141, therefore, is predicated on public
policy. Its violation gives rise to the cancellation of the grant
and the reversion of the land and its improvements to the
government at the instance of the latter. The provision that
“nor shall they become liable to the satisfaction of any debt
contracted prior to that expiration of the five-year period” is
mandatory and any sale made in violation of such provision
is void and produces no effect whatsoever, just like what
transpired in this case. Clearly, it is not within the
competence of any citizen to barter away what public policy
by law seeks to preserve.79 (Citations omitted)
_______________
73 Id., at p. 402; p. 585.
74 Id., at pp. 401-402; p. 585.
75 Id., at p. 403; p. 585.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id., at p. 406; p. 587.
79 Id., at pp. 407-408; pp. 590-591.
411
VOL. 770, SEPTEMBER 14, 2015 411
Maltos vs. Heirs of Eusebio Borromeo
In Republic v. Court of Appeals,80 Josefina L. Morato applied for free
patent over a parcel which was granted.81 Morato mortgaged and leased a
portion of the land within the five-year prohibitory period.82 Later on, it
would also be discovered that Morato’s land formed part of Calauag
Bay.83 The Republic filed a Complaint for cancellation of title and reversion
of the parcel of land.84 This court held that “lease” and “mortgage” were
encumbrances on the parcel of land.85 This court also discussed the policy
behind the five-year prohibitory period:
It is well-known that the homestead laws were designed to distribute
disposable agricultural lots of the State to land-destitute citizens for their
home and cultivation. Pursuant to such benevolent intention the State
prohibits the sale or encumbrance of the homestead (Section 116) within
five years after the grant of the patent. After that five-year period the law
impliedly permits alienation of the homestead; but in line with the
primordial purpose to favor the homesteader and his family the statute
provides that such alienation or conveyance (Section 117) shall be subject
to the right of repurchase by the homesteader, his widow or heirs within
five years. This Section 117 is undoubtedly a complement of Section 116. It
aims to preserve and keep in the family of the homesteader that portion of
public land which the State had gratuitously given to him. It would,
therefore, be in keeping with this fundamental idea to hold, as we hold,
that the right to repurchase exists not only when the original homesteader
makes the conveyance, but also
_______________
80 346 Phil. 637; 281 SCRA 639 (1997) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].
81 Id., at pp. 641-642; p. 643.
82 Id., at p. 642; p. 643.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id., at pp. 647-649; pp. 648-650.
412
412 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Maltos vs. Heirs of Eusebio Borromeo
when it is made by his widow or heirs. This construction is clearly
deducible from the terms of the statute.86
The effect of violating the five-year prohibitory period is provided under
Section 124 of the Public Land Act, which provides:
SECTION 124. Any acquisition, conveyance, alienation,
transfer, or other contract made or executed in violation of
any of the provisions of Sections one hundred and eighteen,
one hundred and twenty, one hundred and twenty-one, one
hundred and twenty-two, and one hundred and twenty-
three of this Act shall be unlawful and null and void from its
execution and shall produce the effect of annulling and
cancelling the grant, title, patent, or permit originally issued,
recognized or confirmed, actually or presumptively, and
cause the reversion of the property and its improvements to
the State.
In this case, Section 10187 of the Public Land Act is applicable since title
already vested in Eusebio Borromeo’s name. Both the trial court and the
Court of Appeals found that the sale was made within the five-year
prohibitory period. Thus, there is sufficient cause to revert the property in
favor of the state. However, this court cannot declare reversion of the
property in favor of the state in view of the limitation imposed by Section
101 that an action for reversion must first be filed by the Office of the
Solicitor General.
_______________
86 Id., at p. 649; pp. 650-651, citing Pascua v. Talens, 80 Phil. 792, 793-794
(1948) [Per J. Bengzon, En Banc].
87 Com. Act No. 141 (1936), Sec. 101 provides:
SECTION 101. All actions for the reversion to the Government of lands of
the public domain or improvements thereon shall be instituted by the
Solicitor-General or the officer acting in his stead, in the proper courts, in
the name of the Commonwealth of the Philippines.
413
VOL. 770, SEPTEMBER 14, 2015 413
Maltos vs. Heirs of Eusebio Borromeo
III
The doctrine of in pari delicto non oritur actio is inapplicable when public
policy will be violated.
The in pari delicto rule is provided under Articles 1411 and 1412 of the Civil
Code. Article 1411 pertains to acts that constitute criminal offenses, while
Article 1412 pertains to acts that do not constitute criminal offenses. These
provisions state:
ART. 1411. When the nullity proceeds from the illegality
of the cause or object of the contract, and the act
constitutes a criminal offense, both parties being in pari
delicto, they shall have no action against each other, and
both shall be prosecuted. Moreover, the provisions of the
Penal Code relative to the disposal of effects or instruments
 of a crime shall be applicable to the things or the price of
the contract.
This rule shall be applicable when only one of the parties is
guilty; but the innocent one may claim what he has given,
and shall not be bound to comply with his promise.
ART. 1412. If the act in which the unlawful or forbidden
cause consists does not constitute a criminal offense, the
following rules shall be observed:
(1) When the fault is on the part of both contracting
parties, neither may recover what he has given by virtue of
the contract, or demand the performance of the other’s
undertaking;
(2) When only one of the contracting parties is at fault, he
cannot recover what he has given by reason of the contract,
or ask for the fulfilment of what has been promised him.
The other, who is not at fault, may demand the return of
what he has given without any obligation to comply with his
promise.
414
414 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Maltos vs. Heirs of Eusebio Borromeo
Santos involved the sale of a parcel of land within the five-year prohibitory
period.88 The Roman Catholic Church raised the defense of in pari
delicto.89 It was also argued by the Roman Catholic Church that the effect
of the sale would be the reversion of the property to the state.90 This
court held that:
Section 124 of the Public Land Act indeed provides that any acquisition,
conveyance or transfer executed in violation of any of its provisions shall
be null and void and shall produce the effect of annulling and cancelling
the grant or patent and cause the reversion of the property to the State,
and the principle of pari delicto has been applied by this Court in a number
of cases wherein the parties to a transaction have proven to be guilty of
effected the transaction with knowledge of the cause of its invalidity. But
we doubt if these principles can now be invoked considering the
philosophy and the policy behind the approval of the Public Land Act. The
principle underlying pari delicto as known here and in the United States is
not absolute in its application. It recognizes certain exceptions one of them
being when its enforcement or application runs counter to an avowed
fundamental policy or to public interest. As stated by us in the Rellosa
case, “This doctrine is subject to one important limitation, namely,
[‘]whenever public policy is considered advanced by allowing either party to
sue for relief against the transaction.[’]”
The case under consideration comes within the exception above adverted
to. Here appellee desires to nullify a transaction which was done in
violation of the law. Ordinarily the principle of pari delicto would apply to
her because her predecessor-in-interest has carried out the sale with the
presumed knowledge of its illegality, but because the subject of the
transaction is a piece of public land, public policy requires that she, as heir,
be not pre-
_______________
88 Santos v. Roman Catholic Church of Midsayap, supra note 67 at pp.
406-407.
89 Id., at p. 407.
90 Id.
415
VOL. 770, SEPTEMBER 14, 2015 415
Maltos vs. Heirs of Eusebio Borromeo
vented from reacquiring it because it was given by law to her family for her
home and cultivation. This is the policy on which our homestead law is
predicated. This right cannot be waived. “It is not within the competence of
any citizen to barter away what public policy by law seeks to preserve.” We
are, therefore, constrained to hold that appellee can maintain the present
action it being in furtherance of this fundamental aim of our homestead
law.91 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
The non-application of the in pari delicto rule where public policy would be
violated has also been applied in other cases.
In Pajuyo v. Court of Appeals,92 this court held that in pari delicto “is not
[a]pplicable to [e]jectment [c]ases”93 and cited Drilon v. Gaurana,94 which
discussed the policy behind ejectment cases:
It must be stated that the purpose of an action of forcible entry and
detainer is that, regardless of the actual condition of the title to the
property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out
by strong hand, violence or terror. In affording this remedy of restitution
the object of the statute is to prevent breaches of the peace and criminal
disorder which would ensue from the withdrawal of the remedy, and the
reasonable hope such withdrawal would create that some advantage must
accrue to those persons who, believing
_______________
91 Id., at pp. 410-411. See Eugenio v. Perdido, 97 Phil. 41, 45 (1955) [Per J.
Bengzon, En Banc]; Arsenal v. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra note 42
at pp. 51-52; p. 54; Egao v. Court of Appeals (Ninth Division), supra note 22
at p. 252; p. 493; and Binayug v. Ugaddan, G.R. No. 181623, December 5,
2012, 687 SCRA 260, 274-275 [Per J. Leonardo-De Castro, First Division].
92 474 Phil. 557; 430 SCRA 492 (2004) [Per J. Carpio, First Division].
93 Id., at p. 584; p. 514.
94 233 Phil. 350, 356; 149 SCRA 342, 348 (1987) [Per J. Paras, Second
Division].
416
416 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Maltos vs. Heirs of Eusebio Borromeo
themselves entitled to the possession of property, resort to force to gain
possession rather than to some appropriate action in the courts to assert
their claims.95
This court elucidated that:
Clearly, the application of the principle of pari delicto to a case of
ejectment between squatters is fraught with danger. To shut out relief to
squatters on the ground of pari delicto would openly invite mayhem and
lawlessness. A squatter would oust another squatter from possession of
the lot that the latter had illegally occupied, emboldened by the
knowledge that the courts would leave them where they are. Nothing
would then stand in the way of the ousted squatter from reclaiming his
prior possession at all cost.
Petty warfare over possession of properties is precisely what ejectment
cases or actions for recovery of possession seek to prevent. Even the
owner who has title over the disputed property cannot take the law into
his own hands to regain possession of his property. The owner must go to
court.96 (Citation omitted)
In Loria v. Muñoz, Jr.,97 Carlos Loria asked Ludolfo Muñoz, Jr. “to advance
[P]2,000,000.00 for a subcontract of a [P]50,000,000.00 river-dredging
project in Guinobatan.”98 Loria informed Muñoz that the project would be
awarded to Sunwest Construction and Development Corporation, and
Sunwest would subcontract to Muñoz.99 Muñoz agreed to Loria’s
proposal.100 When the river-dredging project was fin-
_______________
95 Pajuyo v. Court of Appeals, supra note 92 at p. 585; pp. 515-516.
96 Id.
97 G.R. No. 187240, October 15, 2014, 738 SCRA 397 [Per J. Leonen,
Second Division].
98 Id., at p. 400.
99 Id.
100 Id.
417
VOL. 770, SEPTEMBER 14, 2015 417
Maltos vs. Heirs of Eusebio Borromeo
ished, Loria did not return the P2,000,000.00 despite Muñoz’s demand.101
Muñoz filed a Complaint for sum of money.102 Loria raised the argument
that Muñoz “should not be allowed to recover the money”103 since they
were in pari delicto.104 This court held that under the principle of unjust
enrichment, the sum of money should be returned.105 In so ruling, this
court cited Gonzalo v. Tarnate, Jr.106 where it was explained that:
. . . the application of the doctrine of in pari delicto is not always rigid. An
accepted exception arises when its application contravenes well-
established public policy. In this jurisdiction, public policy has been defined
as “that principle of the law which holds that no subject or citizen can
lawfully do that which has a tendency to be injurious to the public or
against the public good.”
Unjust enrichment exists, according to Hulst v. PR Builders, Inc., “when a
person unjustly retains a benefit at the loss of another, or when a person
retains money or property of another against the fundamental principles
of justice, equity and good conscience.” The prevention of unjust
enrichment is a recognized public policy of the State, for Article 22 of the
Civil Code explicitly provides that “[e]very person who through an act of
performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into
possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal
ground, shall return the same to him.” It is well to note that Article 22 “is
part of the chapter of the Civil Code on Human Relations, the provisions of
which were formulated as basic principles to be observed for the rightful
relationship between human beings and for the stability of the social
order; designed to indicate
_______________
101 Id., at p. 401.
102 Id.
103 Id., at p. 404.
104 Id.
105 Id., at pp. 408-413.
106 G.R. No. 160600, January 15, 2014, 713 SCRA 224 [Per J. Bersamin,
First Division].
418
418 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Maltos vs. Heirs of Eusebio Borromeo
certain norms that spring from the fountain of good conscience; guides for
human conduct that should run as golden threads through society to the
end that law may approach its supreme ideal which is the sway and
dominance of justice.”107
As the in pari delicto rule is not applicable, the question now arises as to
who between the parties have a better right to possess the subject parcel
of land. This issue was addressed in Santos:
What is important to consider now is who of the parties is the better
entitled to the possession of the land while the government does not take
steps to assert its title to the homestead. Upon annulment of the sale, the
purchaser’s claim is reduced to the purchase price and its interest. As
against the vendor or his heirs, the purchaser is no more entitled to keep
the land than any intruder. Such is the situation of the appellants. Their
right to remain in possession of the land is no better than that of appellee
and, therefore, they should not be allowed to remain in it to the prejudice
of appellee during and until the government takes steps toward its
reversion to the State.108 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)
In Binayug v. Ugaddan,109 which involved the sale of two properties
covered by a homestead patent,110 this court cited jurisprudence showing
that in cases involving the sale of a
_______________
107 Loria v. Muñoz, Jr., supra note 97 at pp. 412-413, citing Gonzalo v.
Tarnate, Jr., id., at pp. 233-234.
108 Santos v. Roman Catholic Church of Midsayap, supra note 67 at p.
412. See Eugenio v. Perdido, supra note 91 at p. 45; Arsenal v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, supra note 42 at pp. 50-52; p. 54; Egao v. Court of Appeals
(Ninth Division), supra note 22 at p. 253; p. 494; and Binayug v. Ugaddan,
supra note 91 at p. 275.
109 Binayug v. Ugaddan, id., at pp. 274-275.
110 Id., at p. 262.
419
VOL. 770, SEPTEMBER 14, 2015 419
Maltos vs. Heirs of Eusebio Borromeo
property covered by the five-year prohibitory period, the property should
be returned to the grantee.111
Applying the ruling in Santos and Binayug, this court makes it clear that
petitioners have no better right to remain in possession of the property
against respondents.
Hence, the Court of Appeals did not err in ruling that while there is yet no
action for reversion filed by the Office of the Solicitor General, the
property should be conveyed by petitioners to respondents.
IV
Petitioners’ argument that respondents failed to establish their status as
heirs is belied by their admissions during trial and in their pleadings.
Petitioners know the identity of Eusebio Borromeo’s wife. As quoted in the
trial court’s Decision, petitioners alleged in their Answer that:
 [I]t was the late Eusebio Borromeo and his wife who came
along in Bayugan 2, San Francisco, Agusan del Sur,
requesting the said defendants to purchase their land
because they badly need money and notwithstanding the
fact that they have a little amount and out of pity bought
the said land.112
In the Reply, respondents alleged:
The allegation that the late Eusebio Borromeo and his wife
went to Bayugan II, San Francisco, Agusan del Sur in order to
sell the land to the defendant Eliseo Maltos has no factual
basis, the truth of the matter is that the
_______________
111 Id., at pp. 275-276, citing Arsenal v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
supra note 42 at p. 50; pp. 53-54, Menil v. Court of Appeals, 173 Phil. 584,
592; 84 SCRA 413, 417 (1978) [Per J. Guerrero, First Division], and
Manzano v. Ocampo, 111 Phil. 283, 291; 1 SCRA 691, 697 (1961) [Per J. J. B.
L. Reyes, En Banc].
112 Rollo, p. 95, Regional Trial Court’s Decision.
420
420 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Maltos vs. Heirs of Eusebio Borromeo
late Eusebio Borromeo, together with defendant Eliseo
Maltos went to Esperanza, Sultan Kudarat to secure the
signature of the wife.113
In addition, when petitioner Eliseo Maltos was presented in court, he
identified the signatures of the witnesses on the deed of sale as the
signatures of Eusebio Borromeo’s children, namely, Susan, Ana, and
Nicolas Borromeo.114
Respondents’ allegation that they are the heirs of Borromeo is admitted by
petitioners. Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err in ruling that “the fact
that Appellants [referring to respondents] are the spouse and children of
the late EUSEBIO remains unrebutted.”115
V
With regard to the claim for reimbursement, respondents argue that it was
not raised as a counterclaim in the Answer to the Complaint.
During trial, petitioner Eliseo Maltos testified that when he entered the
land, there were around 100 trees, including coconut trees and a few
banana trees. He then planted additional coconut trees which, at the time
of the trial, were already bearing fruit.116 Petitioner Eliseo Maltos’
testimony was not rebutted by respondents.
The general rule is that “[a] compulsory counterclaim . . . not set up shall
be barred.”117 Further, the computation of the value of the improvements
on the land entails findings of fact.
_______________
113 Id., at p. 98.
114 Id., at p. 108.
115 Id., at p. 30, Court of Appeals’ Decision.
116 Id., at p. 109, Regional Trial Court’s Decision.
117 Rules of Court, Rule 9, Sec. 2 provides:
Rule 9. Effect of Failure to Plead
....
421
VOL. 770, SEPTEMBER 14, 2015 421
Maltos vs. Heirs of Eusebio Borromeo
In any case, the Court of Appeals did not err when it stated in its
Resolution dated April 7, 2006 that:
With respect to Appellees’ claim for the reimbursement of the
improvements on the land in question, they are hereby declared to have
lost and forfeited the value of the necessary improvements that they made
thereon in the same manner that Appellants should lose the value of the
products gathered by the Appellees from the said land.118
The Court of Appeals cited Angeles, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al.119 and
Arsenal v. Intermediate Appellate Court.120 In Angeles, this court
discussed that:
The question that now poses is whether the return of the value of the
products gathered from the land by the defendants and the expenses
incurred in the construction of the dike — all useful and necessary
expenses — should be ordered to be returned by the defendants to the
plaintiffs. While we believe that the rule of in pari delicto should not apply
to the sale of the homestead, because such sale is contrary to the public
policy enunciated in the homestead law, the loss of the products realized
by the defendants and the value of the necessary improvements made by
them on the land should not be excepted from the application of the said
rule because no cause or reason can be cited to justify an exception. It has
been held that the rule of in pari delicto is inapplicable
_______________
SECTION 2. Compulsory Counterclaim, or Cross-Claim Not Set up
Barred.—A compulsory counterclaim, or a cross-claim, not set up shall be
barred.
118 Rollo, p. 38, Court of Appeals’ Resolution, citing Angeles v. Court of
Appeals, 102 Phil. 1006, 1012 (1958) [Per J. Labrador, En Banc] and Arsenal
v. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra note 42 at p. 53; p. 55.
119 Angeles v. Court of Appeals, id.
120 Arsenal v. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra note 42.
422
422 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Maltos vs. Heirs of Eusebio Borromeo
only where the same violates a well-established public policy.
....
We are constrained to hold that the heirs of the homesteader should be
declared to have lost and forfeited the value of the products gathered
from the land, and so should the defendants lose the value of the
necessary improvements that they have made thereon.121
In Arsenal, the property covered by a homestead patent had been sold to
Suralta in 1957,122 while the Complaint was filed before the trial court in
1974.123 The case was decided by this court in 1986.124 Thus, Suralta had
been in possession of the property for approximately 17 years before a
Complaint was filed. This court held that:
The value of any improvements made on the land and the interests on the
purchase price are compensated by the fruits the respondent Suralta and
his heirs received from their long possession of the homestead.125
Angeles and Arsenal both involved the sale of a parcel of land covered by a
homestead patent within the five-year prohibitory period. These cases also
involved the introduction of improvements on the parcel of land by the
buyer.
Restating the rulings in Angeles and Arsenal, this court finds that while the
rule on in pari delicto does not apply if its effect is to violate public policy,
it is applicable with regard to the value of the improvements introduced by
petitioner Eliseo Maltos. Petitioners had been in possession of the land for
20
_______________
121 Angeles v. Court of Appeals, supra note 118 at pp. 1011-1012 (1958)
[Per J. Labrador, En Banc].
122 Arsenal v. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra note 42 at
p. 40; p. 45.
123 Id., at p. 42; p. 45.
124 Id., at p. 36; p. 40.
125 Id., at p. 53; p. 55.
423
VOL. 770, SEPTEMBER 14, 2015 423
Maltos vs. Heirs of Eusebio Borromeo
years before the heirs of Borromeo filed a Complaint. The expenses
incurred by petitioners in introducing improvements on the land for which
they seek reimbursement should already be compensated by the fruits
they received from the improvements.
VI
Reversion is a remedy provided under Section 101 of the Public Land Act:
SECTION 101. All actions for the reversion to the
Government of lands of the public domain or improvements
thereon shall be instituted by the Solicitor-General or the
 officer acting in his stead, in the proper courts, in the name
of the Commonwealth of the Philippines.
The purpose of reversion is “to restore public land fraudulently awarded
and disposed of to private individuals or corporations to the mass of public
domain.”126
The general rule is that reversion of lands to the state is not automatic, and
the Office of the Solicitor General is the proper party to file an action for
reversion.
In Villacorta v. Ulanday,127 defendant-appellee Vicente Ulanday admitted
that his purchase of a parcel of land covered by a homestead patent was
made within the five-year prohibitory period, but argued that since the
sale was in violation of law,128 the property should automatically revert to
the state.129 This court held that reversion was not automatic,
_______________
126 Estate of the Late Jesus S. Yujuico v. Republic, 563 Phil. 92, 109; 537
SCRA 513, 527 (2007) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., Second Division].
127 73 Phil. 655 (1942) [Per J. Ozaeta, En Banc].
128 The Public Land Act referred to in this case is Act No. 2874, as
amended by Act No. 3517. Act No. 2874 (1919), Sec. 122 is reproduced as
Com. Act No. 141 (1936), Sec. 124.
129 Villacorta v. Ulanday, supra at p. 656.
424
424 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Maltos vs. Heirs of Eusebio Borromeo
and government must file an appropriate action so that the land may be
reverted to the state.130
Ortega v. Tan131 involved the sale and mortgage of a parcel of land
covered by a free patent.132 The series of transactions for the sale and
mortgage of the property had been initiated within the five-year
prohibitory period but was finalized after the prohibitory period.133 This
court held that the sale and mortgage violated Section 118 of the Public
Land Act and that reversion was proper.134 This court also clarified that:
[Reversion] is not automatic. The government has to take action to cancel
the patent and the certificate of title in order that the land involved may
be reverted to it. Correspondingly, any new transaction would be subject
to whatever steps the government may take for the reversion to it.135
(Citation omitted)
Alvarico v. Sola136 involved a miscellaneous sales application over a parcel
of land by Fermina Lopez.137 Subsequently, Lopez executed a deed of self-
adjudication and transfer of rights in favor of Amelita Sola.138 The Bureau
of Lands approved the transfer of rights, and title was issued in Sola’s
name.139 Castorio Alvarico then filed an action for reconveyance, claiming
that the parcel of land was donated to him.140
_______________
130 Id.
131 260 Phil. 371; 181 SCRA 350 (1990) [Per J. Paras, Second Division].
132 Id., at pp. 373-374; p. 356.
133 Id., at p. 377; p. 356.
134 Id.
135 Id., at p. 379; pp. 358-359.
136 432 Phil. 792; 383 SCRA 232 (2002) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second
Division].
137 Id., at p. 794; p. 234.
138 Id.
139 Id., at p. 795; p. 235.
140 Id.
425
VOL. 770, SEPTEMBER 14, 2015 425
Maltos vs. Heirs of Eusebio Borromeo
He also alleged that Sola acquired the property in bad faith.141 This court
held that Alvarico’s allegation of bad faith was not supported by evidence
and that in any case, “only the State can institute reversion proceedings
under Sec[tion] 101 of the Public Land Act.”142 This court restated Section
101 of the Public Land Act:
[A] private individual may not bring an action for reversion or any action
which would have the effect of canceling a free patent and the
corresponding certificate of title issued on the basis thereof, such that the
land covered thereby will again form part of the public domain. Only the
Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead may do so. Since [the]
title originated from a grant by the government, its cancellation is a matter
between the grantor and the grantee.143 (Citations omitted)
The rule in Alvarico was cited in Cawis, et al. v. Hon. Cerilles, et al.144 In
Cawis, the validity of a sales patent and original certificate of title over a
parcel of land in Baguio was questioned.145 This court denied the
Petition146 and ruled that the Complaint was actually a reversion suit,
which can be filed only by the Office of the Solicitor General or a person
acting in its stead.147
It was also discussed in Cawis that:
The objective of an action for reversion of public land is the
cancellation of the certificate of title and the resulting
reversion of the land covered by the title to the State.
_______________
141 Id., at p. 799; p. 239.
142 Id.
143 Id., at p. 800; p. 240.
144 632 Phil. 367, 375; 618 SCRA 357, 362 (2010) [Per J. Carpio, Second
Division].
145 Id., at pp. 370-372; p. 362.
146 Id., at p. 377; p. 367.
147 Id., at p. 375; p. 364.
426
426 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Maltos vs. Heirs of Eusebio Borromeo
This is why an action for reversion is oftentimes designated
as an annulment suit or a cancellation suit.148
We clarify that the remedy of reversion is not the same as the remedy of
declaration of nullity of free patents and certificate of title. In reversion,
the “allegations in the complaint would admit State ownership of the
disputed land[,]”149 while in an action for the declaration of nullity of free
patent and certificate of title, the allegations would include “plaintiff’s
ownership of the contested lot prior to the issuance of [the] free patent
and certificate of title[.]”150
Since an action for reversion presupposes that the property in dispute is
owned by the state, it is proper that the action be filed by the Office of the
Solicitor General, being the real party-in-interest.
There is, however, an exception to the rule that reversion is not automatic.
Section 29 of the Public Land Act provides:
SECTION 29. After the cultivation of the land has begun,
the purchaser, with the approval of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Commerce, may convey or encumber his
rights to any person, corporation, or association legally
qualified under this Act to purchase agricultural public
lands, provided such conveyance or encumbrance does not
affect any right or interest of the Government in the land:
And provided, further, That the transferee is not delinquent
in the payment of any installment due and payable. Any sale
and encumbrance made without the previous approval of
the Secretary of Agriculture and
_______________
148 Id.
149 Heirs of Kionisala v. Heirs of Dacut, 428 Phil. 249, 260; 378 SCRA 206,
214 (2002) [Per J. Bellosillo, Second Division]. See Tancuntian v.
Gempesaw, 483 Phil. 459, 467; 440 SCRA 431, 439 (2004) [Per J. Corona,
Third Division] and Evangelista v. Santiago, 497 Phil. 269, 289; 457 SCRA
744, 764 (2005) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Second Division].
150 Id.
427
VOL. 770, SEPTEMBER 14, 2015 427
Maltos vs. Heirs of Eusebio Borromeo
Commerce shall be null and void and shall produce the effect
of annulling the acquisition and reverting the property and
all rights to the State, and all payments on the purchase
price theretofore made to the Government shall be forfeited.
After the sale has been approved, the vendor shall not lose
his right to acquire agricultural public lands under the
provisions of this Act, provided he has the necessary
qualifications. (Emphasis supplied)
In Francisco v. Rodriguez, et al.,151 this court differentiated reversion
under Sections 29 and 101 of the Public Land Act.152 This court explained
that reversion under Section 29 is self-operative, unlike Section 101 which
requires the Office of the Solicitor General to institute reversion
proceedings.153 Also, Section 101 applies in cases where “title has already
vested in the individual[.]”154 The Director of Lands sought to execute the
Decision in Francisco v. Rodriguez which petitioner Ursula Francisco
opposed, arguing that only 29 hectares were reverted to the state since
she was in possession of the remaining four hectares.155 This court held
that the entire prop-
_______________
151 116 Phil. 764; 6 SCRA 443 (1962) [Per J. Regala, En Banc]. This case
involved the sales application of Ursula Francisco which was denied by the
Bureau of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture because she allowed
herself to be used as a dummy. (Id., at p. 765;
p. 444) Francisco, through counsel Atty. Rodriguez, filed a motion for
reconsideration. (Id.) It appears that during the pendency of the motion for
reconsideration, Francisco conveyed a portion of the property to Atty.
Rodriguez in exchange for a sum of money. (Id., at p. 766; p. 445) This
court held that the conveyance to Atty. Rodriguez was null and void and
the property reverted to the state. (Id., at p. 769;
p. 448) The parties claimed that an action for reversion should first be
instituted, as provided under Section 101. (Id., at p. 770; p. 449) This court
then clarified that reversion under Section 29 is self-operative. (Id.)
152 Id., at pp. 769-770; pp. 448-449.
153 Id., at p. 770; p. 448.
154 Id.
155 Francisco v. Rodriguez, 160-A Phil. 354, 360; 67 SCRA 212, 216 (1975)
[Per J. Martin, First Division].
428
428 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Maltos vs. Heirs of Eusebio Borromeo
erty reverted to the state.156 This court also explained why Francisco v.
Rodriguez was covered by Section 29 and not Section 101 of the Public
Land Act:
By transgressing the law, i.e., allowing herself to be a
dummy in the acquisition of the land and selling the same
without the previous approval of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, plaintiff-appellant
herself [referring to Ursula Francisco] has eliminated the
very source (Sales Application) of her claim to Lot No. 595,
as a consequence of which, she cannot later assert any right
or interest thereon. This is the imperative import of the
pronouncements in No. L-8263 and in No. L-15605 that the
invalidity of the conveyance by plaintiff-appellant
“produced as a consequence the reversion of the property
with all rights thereto to the State.” As a matter of fact,
Section 29 of the Public Land Law (Commonwealth Act No.
141) expressly ordains that any sale and encumbrance made
without the previous approval of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources “shall be null and void
and shall produce the effect of annulling the acquisition and
reverting property and all rights thereto to the State, and all
payments on the purchase price theretofore made to the
Government shall be forfeited.” . . . .
In fact, even if a sales application were already given due
course by the Director of Lands, the applicant is not thereby
conferred any right over the land covered by the
application. It is the award made by the Director to the
applicant (if he is the highest bidder) that confers upon him
a certain right over the land, namely, “to take possession of
the land so that he could comply with the requirements
prescribed by law.” It is at this stage, when the award is
made, that the land can be considered “disposed of by the
Government,” since the aforestated right of the applicant
has the effect of withdrawing the land from the public
domain that is “disposable” by the Director of Lands under
the provisions of the Public Land Act.
_______________
156 Id., at p. 362; p. 216.
429
 VOL. 770, SEPTEMBER 14, 2015 429
Maltos vs. Heirs of Eusebio Borromeo
. . . However, the disposition is merely provisional because
the applicant has still to comply with the requirements
prescribed by law before . . . any patent is issued. After the
requisites of the law are complied with by the applicant to
the satisfaction of the Director [of] Lands, the patent is
issued. It is then that the land covered by the application
may be considered “permanently disposed of by the
Government.”157 (Citations omitted)

In this case, a free patent over the subject parcel of land was issued to
Eusebio Borromeo. This shows that he already had title to the property
when he sold it to petitioner Eliseo Maltos. Thus, Section 101 of the Public
Land Act applies.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is denied, and the Decision and Resolution of
the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 77142 are AFFIRMED, without
prejudice to the appropriate institution of a case for reversion.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Solicitor General
for its appropriate action with respect to the reversion of the land in
question.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio (Chairperson), Brion, Del Castillo and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed.
Notes.—A certificate of title issued pursuant to a homestead patent
becomes indefeasible after one year, is subject to the proviso that “the
land covered by said certificate is a disposable public land within the
contemplation of the Public Land Law.” (Republic-Bureau of Forest
Development vs. Roxas, 712 SCRA 177 [2013])
_______________
157 Id., at pp. 362-364; p. 219.

430
430 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Maltos vs. Heirs of Eusebio Borromeo
Reversion is an action where the ultimate relief sought is to revert the land
back to the government under the Regalian doctrine. (Id.)
G.R. No. 196888. July 19, 2017.*
AURELIA NARCISE, GLORIA A. DELA CRUZ, MARITESS O. GARCIA, PHILIP
FALCON, ENRICO M. VITUG, LYNETTE C. PONTRERAS, BONIFACIO
BARRAMEDA, RAMON S. MORADA, MANUEL G. VIOLA, ZENAIDA LANUZA,
CIRILO G. SALTO, TEODORO DEL ROSARIO, NANCY G. INSIGNE, MELANIE G.
VIANA, ROMEO TICSAY, AMY J. FRANCISCO, MARIE J. FRANCISCO, ZENAIDA
LANUZA, MIGUELITO B. MARTINEZ, APOLONIO SANTOS, MARIVIC TAN,
JANE CLOR DILEMA, VALENTINO DILEMA, JOSE L. PANGAN, ANTONIA M.
MANGELEN, IMELDA MANALASTAS, TEODORICO N. ANDRADE, AIDA L.
CRUZ, MANUEL YAMBOT, JAIME SERDENA, ARIEL PALACIOS, EVE BOLNEO,
LIBETINE MODESTO, MA. AILEEN VERDE, BENNY ILAGAN, MICHELLE
ROMANA, DANILO VILLANUEVA, LEO NALUGON, ROSSANA MARASIGAN,
NELIE BINAY and ISABELITA MENDOZA, petitioners, vs. VALBUECO, INC.,
respondent.
Civil Law; Land Registration; Reversion; Actions; An action for reversion, a
remedy provided under Commonwealth Act No. 141, seeks to cancel the
original certificate of registration, and nullify the original certificate of title,
including the transfer of certificate of title of the successors-in-interest
because the same were all procured
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
320
320 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Narcise vs. Valbueco, Inc.
through fraud and misrepresentation.—An action for reversion, a remedy
provided under Commonwealth Act No. 141, seeks to cancel the original
certificate of registration, and nullify the original certificate of title,
including the transfer of certificate of title of the successors-in-interest
because the same were all procured through fraud and misrepresentation.
In cancelling and nullifying such title, it restores the public land
fraudulently awarded and disposed of to private individuals or
corporations to the mass of public domain. Such action is filed by the OSG
pursuant to its authority under the Administrative Code.
Same; Land Titles and Deeds; Annulment of Titles; An action for annulment
of free patents and certificates of title also seeks for the cancellation and
nullification of the certificate of title, but once the same is granted, it does
not operate to revert the property back to the State, but to its lawful
owner.—An action for annulment of free patents and certificates of title
also seeks for the cancellation and nullification of the certificate of title,
but once the same is granted, it does not operate to revert the property
back to the State, but to its lawful owner. In such action, the nullity arises
not from fraud or deceit, but from the fact that the director of the Land
Management Bureau had no jurisdiction to bestow title; hence, the issued
patent or certificate of title was void ab initio.
Same; “Reversion” and “Annulment of Titles,” Distinguished.—In an action
for reversion, the pertinent allegations in the complaint would admit State
ownership of the disputed land, while in an action for annulment of patent
and certificate of title, pertinent allegations deal with plaintiffs ownership
of the contested land prior to the issuance of the same as well as
defendant’s fraud or mistake in successfully obtaining these documents of
title over the parcel of land claimed by the plaintiff.
Same; Ownership; Acquisitive Prescription; Acquisitive prescription is a
mode of acquiring ownership of a real or immovable property by possessor
through the requisite lapse of time.—Acquisitive prescription is a mode of
acquiring ownership of a real or immovable property by possessor through
the requisite lapse of time. In order to ripen into ownership, possession
must be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful and uninterrupted.
The possession contemplated as foundation for prescriptive right must be
one under
321
VOL. 831, JULY 19, 2017 321
Narcise vs. Valbueco, Inc.
claim of title or adverse to or in prescription. On this note, acquisitive
prescription may either be extraordinary, which requires uninterrupted
adverse possession for 30 years, or ordinary, which requires possession in
good faith and with a just title for a period of ten years.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Jurisdiction; The trial court has jurisdiction
over an action of an owner of a piece of land to recover it, if the Director of
Lands, thinking that it is still disposable public land, grants a free patent to
the one who has occupancy and cultivation.—It must be noted that the
trial court has jurisdiction over an action of an owner of a piece of land to
recover it, if the Director of Lands, thinking that it is still disposable public
land, grants a free patent to the one who has occupancy and cultivation.
The jurisdiction of the Director of Lands, contrary to petitioners’ claim,
covers those issues between two or more applicants for a free patent,
which is not the case here. Here, respondent claims to be the owner of the
subject properties prior to the issuance of the patents and the
corresponding certificates of title. Thus, the trial court has jurisdiction to
hear the case.
Civil Law; Prescription; The defense of prescription is evidentiary in nature
which could not be established by mere allegations in the pleadings and
must not be resolved in a motion to dismiss.—The defense of prescription
is evidentiary in nature which could not be established by mere allegations
in the pleadings and must not be resolved in a motion to dismiss. Such
issue must be resolved at the trial of the case on the merits wherein both
parties will be given ample opportunity to prove their respective claims
and defenses.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the
Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Raymond Roland R. Rojas for petitioners.
Jaso, Dorillo & Associates for respondent.
Emiliano S. Pomer for Ricardo Canta, et al.
322
322 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Narcise vs. Valbueco, Inc.
TIJAM, J.:
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, which seeks
to reverse and set aside the Decision1 dated December 21, 2010 and
Resolution2 dated May 11, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A.-G.R.
CV No. 89616.
Facts
On March 8, 2005, respondent Valbueco, Inc. filed an action for Annulment
of the Free Patents, Certificates of Title and Damages, docketed as Civil
Case No. 8144,3 against petitioners Narcise, et al., the Department of
Natural Resources (DENR) and the Register of Deeds of Bataan before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Balanga City, Branch 1.
In said Complaint, respondent alleged that it is the possessor of the subject
lots in an actual, peaceful, adverse and peaceful possession since 1970.4
Respondent averred that from 1977 until 1999, Original Certificates of
Title, Free Patents and Transfer Certificates of Title covering the lots in
question were issued in the name of petitioners.5
Instead of filing their respective Answer, petitioners filed several Motions
to Dismiss on the ground of lack of cause of action, failure to state cause of
action, defect in the certificate of non-forum shopping and prescription.
On December 7, 2006, the RTC issued an Order,6 granting petitioners’
motions. The RTC ruled that the instant case is an action for reversion
because petitioners are not qualified to
_______________
1 Penned by Associate Justice Priscilla J. Baltazar-Padilla, concurred in by
Associate Justices Fernanda Lampas Peralta and Elihu A. Ybañez; Rollo, pp.
9-20.
2 Id., at pp. 21-22.
3 Id., at pp. 100-135.
4 Id., at p. 106.
5 Id., at p. 11.
6 Rendered by Judge Benjamin T. Vianzon; id., at pp. 280-283.
323
VOL. 831, JULY 19, 2017 323
Narcise vs. Valbueco, Inc.
be issued said free patents. As such, the land must revert back to the State.
Thus, it is the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) who is the real party-in-
interest, and not the respondent. The dispositive portion of the same
reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, let the instant complaint be
dismissed and the motion to declare some defendants in default is
necessarily denied.
SO ORDERED.7
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the
RTC in its Order8 dated March 7, 2017. Our Ruling
Undaunted, respondent filed an appeal9 before the CA. In a Decision10
dated December 21, 2010, the CA reversed and set aside the ruling of the The petition is denied.
RTC. The CA maintained that respondent alleged all the facts necessary to An action for reversion, a remedy provided under Commonwealth Act No.
seek the nullification of the subject free patents. The fallo thereof reads: 141, seeks to cancel the original certificate of registration, and nullify the
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby GRANTED. original certificate of title, including the transfer of certificate of title of the
The Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Balanga City, Branch 1 dated successors-in-interest because the same were all procured through fraud
December 7, 2006 and March 7, 2007 are hereby REVERSED and SET and misrepresentation.15 In cancelling and nullifying such title, it restores
ASIDE. This case is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings. the public land fraudulently awarded and disposed of to private individuals
SO ORDERED.11 or corporations to the mass of public domain. Such action is filed by the
OSG pursuant to its authority under the Administrative Code.16
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration,12 which was denied in a _______________
Resolution13 dated May 11, 2011. 14 Id., at pp. 40-41.
Hence, this petition. 15 Republic v. Mangotara, G.R. No. 170375, October 13, 2010, 633 SCRA
_______________ 64, citing SAAD Agro-Industries, Inc. v. Republic, G.R. No. 152570,
7 Id., at p. 283. September 27, 2006, 503 SCRA 522, 528-529.
8 Id., at p. 296. 16 Estate of the Late Jesus S. Yujuico v. Republic, G.R. No. 168661, October
9 Id., at p. 297. 26, 2007, 537 SCRA 513.
10 Id., at pp. 9-20.
11 Id., at p. 19.
12 Id., at pp. 373-388. 325
13 Id., at pp. 21-22. VOL. 831, JULY 19, 2017 325
Narcise vs. Valbueco, Inc.
On the other hand, an action for annulment of free patents and certificates
324 of title also seeks for the cancellation and nullification of the certificate of
324 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED title, but once the same is granted, it does not operate to revert the
Narcise vs. Valbueco, Inc. property back to the State, but to its lawful owner. In such action, the
Issues nullity arises not from fraud or deceit, but from the fact that the director of
the Land Management Bureau had no jurisdiction to bestow title; hence,
Petitioners interposed the following grounds for review: the issued patent or certificate of title was void ab initio.17
I. Thus, the difference between them lies in the allegations as to the
Whether or not the instant case is actually a reversion case, and not a case character of ownership of the realty whose title is sought to be nullified. In
for annulment of free patents and certificates of title; an action for reversion, the pertinent allegations in the complaint would
II. admit State ownership of the disputed land, while in an action for
Whether or not respondent is the real party-in-interest; and annulment of patent and certificate of title, pertinent allegations deal with
III. plaintiff’s ownership of the contested land prior to the issuance of the
Whether or not the instant case had already prescribed.14
same as well as defendant’s fraud or mistake in successfully obtaining
these documents of title over the parcel of land claimed by the plaintiff.18
A careful perusal of respondent’s complaint reads:
3. That the herein plaintiff has been in the actual, peaceful, adverse,
continuous and peaceful possession since sometime in 1970 and up to
the present time, by itself and its predecessor-in-interest, some of which it
acquired by transfer of rights, claims, interest as evidence [sic] by the
documents x x x and the rest by occupation and planting of root crops and
other including trees. x x x
4. That the plaintiff and its workers and employees of its ranches and the
cultivation and planting of different root crops and trees were always in
the premises since 1970 or thereabouts, and their presence were never
_______________
17 Katon v. Palanca, Jr., G.R. No. 151149, September 7, 2004, 437 SCRA
565.
18 Heirs of Ambrosio Kionisala v. Heirs of Honorio Dacut, G.R. No. 147379,
February 27, 2002, 378 SCRA 206.
326
326 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Narcise vs. Valbueco, Inc.
disturbed nor molested by anybody until sometime in the year 2000.
x x x19 (Emphasis ours)
In this view, We hold that the action is one of annulment of patents and
titles. The allegations in the complaint show that respondent asserts its
ownership over the subject properties by acquisitive prescription.
Acquisitive prescription is a mode of acquiring ownership of a real or
immovable property by possessor through the requisite lapse of time. In
order to ripen into ownership, possession must be in the concept of an
owner, public, peaceful and uninterrupted.20 The possession
contemplated as foundation for prescriptive right must be one under claim
of title or adverse to or in prescription.21
On this note, acquisitive prescription may either be extraordinary, which
requires uninterrupted adverse possession for 30 years,22 or ordinary,
which requires possession in good faith and with a just title for a period of
ten years.23
Without going into the merits of the case, We hold that the allegations in
the complaint sufficiently show that respondent claims its ownership right
by expounding on its uninterrupted possession of the same for a period of
at least 35 years. Also, respondent’s claim of its possession in a public,
peaceful and uninterrupted manner constitutes an allegation of ownership
by acquisitive prescription.
_______________
19 Rollo, pp. 106-107.
20 Heirs of Bienvenido and Araceli Tanyag v. Gabriel, G.R. No. 175763,
April 11, 2012, 669 SCRA 284.
21 Catapusan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 109262, November 21, 1996,
264 SCRA 534.
22 Andres v. Sta. Lucia Realty & Development, Incorporated, G.R. No.
201405, August 24, 2015, 768 SCRA 56.
23 Aguirre v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122249, January 29, 2004, 421
SCRA 310.
327
VOL. 831, JULY 19, 2017 327
Narcise vs. Valbueco, Inc.
Being an action for annulment of patents and titles, it is the respondent
who is the real party-in-interest for it is the one claiming title or ownership
adverse to that of the registered owner.24
Moreover, We agree with the CA when it declared that petitioners’
argument of failure to exhaust administrative remedies is misguided.
It must be noted that the trial court has jurisdiction over an action of an
owner of a piece of land to recover it, if the Director of Lands, thinking that
it is still disposable public land, grants a free patent to the one who has
occupancy and cultivation.25 The jurisdiction of the Director of Lands,
contrary to petitioners’ claim, covers those issues between two or more
applicants for a free patent,26 which is not the case here. Here,
respondent claims to be the owner of the subject properties prior to the
issuance of the patents and the corresponding certificates of title. Thus,
the trial court has jurisdiction to hear the case.
Lastly, the defense of prescription is evidentiary in nature which could not
be established by mere allegations in the pleadings and must not be
resolved in a motion to dismiss. Such issue must be resolved at the trial of
the case on the merits wherein both parties will be given ample
opportunity to prove their respective claims and defenses.27
Verily, the CA did not err in considering the instant case as an action for
annulment of patents and titles.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. Accordingly, the Decision
dated December 21, 2010 and the Resolution dated May 11, 2011 of the
Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 89616 are AFFIRMED in toto.
_______________
24 Goco v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 157449, April 6, 2010, 617 SCRA 397.
25 Maximo v. Court of First Instance of Capiz, Br. III, G.R. No. 61113,
February 21, 1990, 182 SCRA 420.
26 Id.
27 National Irrigation Administration v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129169,
November 17, 1999, 318 SCRA 255.

328
328 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Narcise vs. Valbueco, Inc.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson), Bersamin, Jardeleza and Reyes, Jr., JJ., concur.
Appeal denied, judgment and resolution affirmed in toto.
Notes.—An action for annulment of title or reconveyance based on fraud is
imprescriptible where the plaintiff is in possession of the property subject
of the fraudulent acts. (Lausa vs. Quilaton, 767 SCRA 399 [2015])
The Solicitor General may initiate an action for reversion or escheat of the
land to the State in sales of real estate to aliens incapable of holding title
thereto. (Ang vs. Estate of Sy So, 799 SCRA 266 [2016])

——o0o——
 G.R. No. 218418. November 8, 2017.*
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the REGIONAL EXECUTIVE
DIRECTOR, DENR, REGION IV, MANILA, petitioner, vs. THE HEIRS OF
MEYNARDO CABRERA, as herein represented by MEYNARDO CABRERA, JR.
and ALMA RODRIGUEZ CABRERA, THE HEIRS OF CONSOLACION
DIMACULANGAN CABRERA, as herein represented by ALEXANDER
CABRERA, MANIBI CABRERA, MILAGROS CABRERA GARA, and RAUL
CABRERA, JACKSON CINCO DY, LORETA AGBAYANI, GLORIA SORIANO, CRIS
CALMA, NORA LIWANAG and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF ORIENTAL
MINDORO, respondents.
Civil Law; Land Registration; Reversion; The Supreme Court (SC) held that
public land fraudulently or erroneously included in the scope of patents or
certificates of title may be recovered by the State through reversion
proceedings, in accordance with the Public Land Act.—In Republic v.
Animas, 56 SCRA 499 (1974), the Republic filed an action for reversion
against respondent therein, claiming that the Free Patent issued in the
latter’s favor covered forest land. The Court of First Instance dismissed the
Republic’s action on the ground that the original certificate of title covering
said land had become indefeasible, the same having been issued more
than one (1) year prior to the filing of the Republic’s action. Hence, the
issue brought before the Court in Animas was whether the lapse of said
one (1)-year period had the effect of precluding the State from initi-
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
550
550 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Heirs of Meynardo Cabrera
ating reversion proceedings to recover land which had been unlawfully
registered, either through fraud or oversight. Resolving the issue, the Court
held that public land fraudulently or erroneously included in the scope of
patents or certificates of title may be recovered by the State through
reversion proceedings, in accordance with the Public Land Act.
Same; Same; Regalian Doctrine; The Supreme Court’s (SC’s) ruling in Heirs
of the Late Spouses Palanca v. Republic, 500 SCRA 209 (2006), instructs
that in the absence of any prior classification by the State, unclassified
lands of the public domain assume the category of forest lands not open to
disposition.—The Regalian Doctrine has long been recognized as the basic
foundation of the State’s property regime, and has been consistently
adopted under the 1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitutions; it espouses that all
lands of the public domain belong to the State, and that, as a consequence
thereof, any asserted right of ownership over land necessarily traces back
to the State. At present, Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
classifies lands of the public domain into five (5) categories — forest lands,
agricultural lands, timber lands, mineral lands, and national parks. The
Court’s ruling in Heirs of the Late Spouses Palanca v. Republic, 500 SCRA
209 (2006), instructs that in the absence of any prior classification by the
State, unclassified lands of the public domain assume the category of
forest lands not open to disposition.
Same; Same; The classification and reclassification of public lands into
alienable or disposable, mineral or forest land is the exclusive prerogative
of the Executive Department, and is exercised by the latter through the
President, or such other persons vested with authority to exercise the same
on his behalf.—The classification of unclassified lands of the public domain,
and the reclassification of those previously classified under any of the
categories set forth in the 1987 Constitution (such as the Roxas
Properties), are governed by Commonwealth Act No. 141 dated November
7, 1936, otherwise known as the Public Land Act. Sections 6 and 7 thereof
provide: SEC. 6. The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary
of Agriculture and Commerce, shall from time to time classify the lands of
the public domain into — (a) Alienable or disposable, (b) Timber, and (c)
Mineral lands, and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such
lands from one class to another, for the purposes of their administration
and disposition. SEC. 7. For the purposes of the
551
VOL. 844, NOVEMBER 8, 2017 551
Republic vs. Heirs of Meynardo Cabrera
administration and disposition of alienable or disposable public lands, the
President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce, shall from time to time declare what lands are open to
disposition or concession under this Act. x x x These provisions are clear
and leave no room for interpretation — the classification and
reclassification of public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or
forest land is the exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department, and is
exercised by the latter through the President, or such other persons vested
with authority to exercise the same on his behalf. Since the power to
classify and reclassify land are executive in nature, such acts, effected
without executive authority, are void, and essentially ultra vires.
Same; Same; The applicant is bound to establish, through incontrovertible
evidence, that the land sought to be registered had been declared alienable
or disposable through a positive act of the State.—A land registration
proceeding is the manner through which an applicant confirms title to real
property. In this proceeding, the applicant bears the burden of overcoming
the presumption of State ownership. Accordingly, the applicant is bound to
establish, through incontrovertible evidence, that the land sought to be
registered had been declared alienable or disposable through a positive act
of the State.
Same; Same; Reversion; Words and Phrases; Reversion proceeding is the
manner through which the State seeks to revert land to the mass of the
public domain; it is proper when public land is fraudulently awarded and
disposed of in favor of private individuals or corporations, or when a person
obtains a title under the Public Land Act which includes, by oversight, lands
which cannot be registered under the Torrens system as they form part of
the public domain.—Reversion proceeding is the manner through which
the State seeks to revert land to the mass of the public domain; it is proper
when public land is fraudulently awarded and disposed of in favor of
private individuals or corporations, or when a person obtains a title under
the Public Land Act which includes, by oversight, lands which cannot be
registered under the Torrens system as they form part of the public
domain. Owing to the nature of reversion proceedings and the outcome
which a favorable decision therein entails, the State bears the burden to
prove that the land previously decreed or adjudi-
552
552 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Heirs of Meynardo Cabrera
cated in favor of the defendant constitutes land which cannot be owned by
private individuals.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the
Court of Appeals, Eleventh Division and Special Former Eleventh Division.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Office of the Solicitor General for petitioner.
Zenen L. Sayarot for respondents.
CAGUIOA, J.:
The Case
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 (Petition) filed under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court against the Decision2 dated July 18, 2014 (Assailed
Decision) and Resolution3 dated May 20, 2015 (Assailed Resolution) in
C.A.-G.R. CV No. 98120 rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) Eleventh
Division and Special Former Eleventh Division, respectively.
The Assailed Decision and Resolution stem from an appeal from the
Decision4 dated December 5, 2005 rendered by the Regional Trial Court of
Roxas, Oriental Mindoro, Branch 43 (RTC) in Civil Case No. C-358,
dismissing the complaint for cancellation of free patent and reversion filed
by the Republic of the Philippines (Republic) against the Heirs of Meynardo
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 19-43.
2 Id., at pp. 45-65. Penned by Associate Justice Victoria Isabel A. Paredes,
with Associate Justices Isaias P. Dicdican and Michael P. Elbinias,
concurring.
3 Id., at pp. 67-69. Penned by Associate Justice Victoria Isabel A. Paredes,
with Associate Justices Isaias P. Dicdican and Maria Elisa Sempio Diy,
concurring.
553
VOL. 844, NOVEMBER 8, 2017 553
Republic vs. Heirs of Meynardo Cabrera
Cabrera (Heirs of Meynardo), the Heirs of Consolacion Dimaculangan
Cabrera (Heirs of Consolacion), Jackson Cinco Dy (Dy), Loreta Agbayani
(Agbayani), Gloria Soriano (Soriano), Cris Calma (Calma), Nora Liwanag
(Liwanag), and the Register of Deeds of Oriental Mindoro (ROD)
(collectively, Respondents).5
 The Facts
Sometime in 1971, Meynardo filed an Application for Free Patent
concerning an 8,0726-square-meter parcel of land situated in Pining,
Roxas, Oriental Mindoro.7 In said application, Meynardo alleged that he
had been in possession of such parcel of land since 1936, through his
predecessor-in-interest Marcelo Cabrera.8
In the same year, the Bureau of Lands (BOL) issued Free Patent No. 516197
in favor of Meynardo, covering two (2) lots denominated as: (i) Lot 1 with
an area of 3,591 square meters, and (ii) Lot 2, with an area of 4,481 square
meters.9 On the basis of said patent, the ROD issued Original Certificate of
Title (OCT) No. RP-132 (P-9193) covering both lots in Meynardo’s name.10
Thereafter, a 2,445-square-meter portion of Lot 1 (Lot 1-A)11 was
transferred to Consolacion.12 Thus, on April 6, 1982, Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. 16580 covering Lot 1-A
_______________
4 Id., at p. 46. The RTC Decision does not form part of the
Records.
5 Id., at pp. 47-48.
6 Stated as .8072 hectares, more or less, in the Petition and CA Decision;
id., at pp. 22 and 47.
7 Id., at pp. 46-47.
8 Id., at p. 63.
9 Id., at pp. 46-47.
10 Id., at p. 47.
11 Referred to as Lot 1-E in some parts of the Records.
12 The relationship between Meynardo and Consolacion, as well as the
manner through which Lot 1-A was transferred by the former to the latter,
cannot be determined from the records of the case.
554
554 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Heirs of Meynardo Cabrera
was issued in Consolacion’s name.13 Later still, Consolacion sold portions
of Lot 1-A to several purchasers namely: Dy, Agbayani, Soriano, Calma, and
Liwanag.14
Learning of the issuance of TCT No. 16580, Jose and Leticia De Castro (De
Castros), claiming to be the actual possessors of Lot 1-A, filed before the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) a petition
urging DENR to conduct an investigation to determine Lot 1-A’s land
classification status.15
Consequently, in the DENR Final Investigation Report16 (DENR Final
Report) dated November 9, 1994 issued by Erwin D. Talento of the DENR
Land Management Office (LMO), Free Patent No. 516197, covering Lots 1,
1-A, and 2 (collectively, Roxas Properties), was declared null and void for
having been issued over land forming part of the public domain. The
pertinent portions of the DENR Final Report read:
Sensing that they don’t have any chance in the court to prove their better
right to occupy and possess [Lot 1-A] x x x the [De Castros] addressed their
petitions to the DENR basing their claim on the weight of a certification of
[the National Mapping and Resource Information Authority (NAMRIA)]
x x x. The [De Castros] are now seeking administrative remedies for the
issue which they have already brought to the attention of the court and
wherein they have failed to prove their priority right to occupy and possess
[Lot 1-A]. Granting that [the Roxas Properties constitute] forest land and
[Free Patent No. 516197] issued in favor of [Meynardo] be (sic) rendered
null and void [ab] initio, it (sic) doesn’t warrant that they have better right
to possess and occupy [Lot 1-A] because [Meynardo, through his
_______________
13 Rollo, p. 47.
14 The specific dates of conveyance cannot be ascertained from the
Records.
15 Rollo, p. 47.
16 Id., at pp. 82-83.
555
VOL. 844, NOVEMBER 8, 2017 555
Republic vs. Heirs of Meynardo Cabrera
predecessors-in-interest] have entered [Lot 1-A] since the year 1943 and
have exercised their ownership over the same x x x.
In view of the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that the petition
of [the De Castros] be dismissed x x x and appropriate legal action be
instituted for the cancellation of Free Patent No. 516197 issued in favor
of Meynardo x x x for the same covers land of the public domain which is
certified by the proper authority as public forest.17 (Emphasis supplied)
Thereafter, Antonio G. Principe, the DENR Regional Executive Director of
Region IV, issued an Order18 dated August 8, 1997 declaring Free Patent
No. 516197 null and void.
Later, on November 15, 1999, the Republic filed against the Respondents a
complaint (Complaint) for the annulment and/or cancellation of Free
Patent No. 516197, OCT No. RP-132 (P-9193), and TCT No. 16580. The
Complaint also prayed for the reversion of the Roxas Properties in the
State’s favor.19
The Republic based its claim on the (i) DENR Final Report; and (ii) NAMRIA
certifications dated January 31, 1994, February 1, 1994, and October 3,
1994, all stating that the Roxas Properties (including Lot 1-A) had been
reclassified as forest land as early as November 24, 1949. The statements
in these documents were, in turn, based on the inscriptions appearing on
Land Classification Map No. 209 (LC Map 209) dated March 6, 1924
covering the Roxas Properties. The Republic reasoned that while LC Map
209 indicates that the parcels of land thereunder were classified as
alienable and disposable at the time it was prepared, a subsequent
annotation made
_______________
17 Id., at p. 83.
18 Id., at pp. 70-72.
19 Id., at p. 47.
556
556 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Heirs of Meynardo Cabrera
thereon indicates that they were reclassified as forest land sometime
thereafter, and had thus become inalienable.20
In their respective answers, the Respondents averred, among others, that:
(i) Lot 1-A forms part of the alienable and disposable land of the public
domain, as evidenced by the original statements appearing on LC Map 209;
(ii) the annotations appearing on LC Map 209 do not serve as sufficient
proof of reversion; and (iii) the land area which had been purportedly
reclassified as forest land was not properly identified since the Republic
failed to present the technical description corresponding thereto.21 In
addition to these common assertions, respondents Dy, Agbayani, Soriano,
and Liwanag further averred that they acquired portions of Lot 1-A from
Consolacion in good faith, and have, since then, been in actual, exclusive,
open, and continuous possession of their respective portions as owners.22
On December 5, 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion
of which states:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the instant
complaint for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.23
The RTC found that the Republic failed to present proof that the Roxas
Properties (including Lot 1-A) have been reclassified as forest land. Citing
Republic v. Animas,24 (Animas) the RTC held that in order to prove
reversion of alien-
_______________
20 Id., at p. 63. According to the CA, the annotation on LC Map 209 stated
that “the subject property was reverted (sic) to forest land on November
24, 1949.” A copy of said map, however, does not form part of the records
of the case.
21 Id., at pp. 49-50.
22 Id., at pp. 48-49.
23 Id., at p. 53.
24 155 Phil. 470; 56 SCRA 499 (1974).
557
VOL. 844, NOVEMBER 8, 2017 557
Republic vs. Heirs of Meynardo Cabrera
able and disposable land to forest land, a positive government act evincing
the same is necessary.25
The Republic filed a motion for reconsideration (MR), which was denied in
the RTC’s Order dated October 18, 2011.26
CA’s Proceedings
Aggrieved, the Republic elevated the case to the CA via petition for review
under Rule 42, docketed as C.A.-G.R. CV No. 98120 (Appeal).
In the Appeal, the Republic argued that the Court’s ruling in Animas cannot
be applied to the present case, since, in the former, the fact sought to be
established was the classification of forest land to alienable and disposable
land, and not the other way around, as in this case.27 Further, the
Republic averred that fraud must have necessarily attended the issuance
of Free Patent No. 516197, OCT No. RP-132 and TCT No. 16580, owing to
the status of the Roxas Properties as forest land.28
On July 18, 2014, the CA rendered the Assailed Decision dismissing the
Appeal. The dispositive portion of said decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision
dated December 5, 2005 of the [RTC] x x x is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.29
According to the CA, the Public Land Act vests the power to classify (and
reclassify) lands of the public domain with the
_______________
25 Rollo, pp. 54-55.
26 Id., at p. 54.
27 Id., at p. 55.
28 Id., at pp. 60-61.
29 Id., at p. 64.
558
558 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Heirs of Meynardo Cabrera
President. On this score, the CA held that the annotations appearing on LC
Map 209 anent the alleged reversion of the Roxas Properties deserve scant
consideration, as they do not appear to be based on any executive
directive. Consequently, the NAMRIA certifications and DENR Final Report
relied upon by the Republic are insufficient to sustain its cause, as they are,
in turn, based solely on said annotations.30
The Republic filed an MR, which was denied by the CA in its Assailed
Resolution dated May 20, 2015. The Republic received a copy of the
Assailed Resolution on June 8, 2015.31
On June 19, 2015, the Republic filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File
Petition for Review, praying for an additional period of twenty-five (25)
days from June 23, 2015, or until July 18, 2015 within which to file a
petition for review on certiorari. Subsequently, the Republic filed a Second
Motion for Extension, praying for a five (5)-day extension.32
Finally, on July 22, 2015, the Republic filed the present Petition, to which
Respondents filed their Compliance and Comment dated December 16,
2016.33
Thereafter, the Republic filed a Manifestation and Motion dated May 28,
2017, adopting the Petition as its reply to Respondents’ Compliance and
Comment.34
The Issue
The Petition calls on the Court to determine whether the CA erred when it
held that a positive act of government is necessary to evince the
reclassification of land from alienable and disposable to forest.
_______________
30 Id., at pp. 55-59.
31 Id., at p. 4.
32 Id., at pp. 11-14.
33 Id., at pp. 196-206.
34 Id., at pp. 213-216.
559
VOL. 844, NOVEMBER 8, 2017 559
Republic vs. Heirs of Meynardo Cabrera
The Court’s Ruling
In this Petition, the Republic maintains that the Court’s ruling in Animas did
not have the effect of making a positive executive act a necessary
requirement for the purpose of proving the reclassification of alienable
and disposable land.35 Instead, the Republic posits that Animas affirms its
right to institute reversion proceedings in instances where portions of
forest land are erroneously included within the scope of land patents.36
Moreover, the Republic argues that in reversion proceedings, the State
should not be made to bear the burden of proving that the land in
question constitutes public domain (i.e., forest land).37 In any case, the
Republic posits that the documentary and testimonial evidence it had
presented sufficiently proved such fact.38
The Petition should be denied for lack of merit. The CA did not err when it The Court’s ruling in
affirmed the RTC’s Decision, as the Republic failed to establish that the Animas does not apply
Roxas Properties were classified as forest land at the time Free Patent No. to the present case.
516197 was issued.
The Republic’s Petition primarily proceeds from the supposition that in
The Republic’s Petition ruling in favor of Respondents, the RTC and the CA erroneously relied on
and Respondents’ Com- Animas.
pliance and Comment In Animas, the Republic filed an action for reversion against respondent
should be admitted in therein, claiming that the Free Patent issued in the latter’s favor covered
the interest of substan- forest land. The Court of First Instance dismissed the Republic’s action on
tial justice. the ground that the original certificate of title covering said land had
become indefeasible, the same having been issued more than one (1) year
At the outset, the Court notes that the parties herein, albeit at different prior to the filing of the Republic’s action. Hence, the issue brought before
stages of the proceedings, have both prayed for the relaxation of the Rules the Court in Animas was whether the lapse of said one (1)-year period had
of Court (Rules). the effect of precluding the State from initiating reversion proceedings to
_______________ recover land which had been unlawfully registered, either through fraud or
35 Id., at p. 26. oversight. Resolving the issue, the Court held that
36 Id., at p. 32. _______________
37 Id., at pp. 34-35. 39 The exact date on which Respondents received a copy of the Petition
38 Id., at p. 35. cannot be ascertained from the Records.

560
560 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Heirs of Meynardo Cabrera
For its part, the Republic filed two (2) motions which sought for an
aggregate period of thirty (30) days from the expiration of the initial thirty
(30)-day period prescribed by the Rules for the filing of a petition for
review on certiorari. The Respondents, on the other hand, sought the
admission of their Compliance and Comment, filed more than seven (7)
months after the filing of the Petition.39
Considering the nature of the issues involved in the present Petition, and
the lack of evidence showing that neither the Republic’s nor the
Respondents’ requests for accommodation had been impelled by any ill
motive, the Court resolves to admit in the interest of substantial justice the
Republic’s Petition and the Respondents’ Comment with Compliance.
561
VOL. 844, NOVEMBER 8, 2017 561
Republic vs. Heirs of Meynardo Cabrera
public land fraudulently or erroneously included in the scope of patents or
certificates of title may be recovered by the State through reversion
proceedings, in accordance with the Public Land Act.
While the Animas ruling upholds the State’s right to seek reversion with
respect to fraudulently or erroneously registered lands, it does not, in any
manner, lay down the facts that must be established for an action for
reversion to prosper. Undoubtedly, the RTC and CA’s reliance on the
Animas ruling is misplaced.
Nevertheless, such erroneous reliance on Animas, as will be discussed
below, does not advance the Republic’s cause, since the principle which
serves as basis for the decisions of the RTC and CA remains correct, albeit
attributed to the wrong case.
The power to classify (a) Alienable or disposable,
and reclassify land lies (b) Timber, and
solely with the Executive (c) Mineral lands,
Department. and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from one
class to another, for the purposes of their administration and disposition.
The Regalian Doctrine has long been recognized as the basic foundation of SEC. 7. For the purposes of the administration and disposition of
the State’s property regime,40 and has been consistently adopted under alienable or disposable public lands, the President, upon recommendation
the 1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitutions;41 it espouses that all lands of the by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, shall from time to time de-
public domain belong to the State, and that, as a consequence thereof, any _______________
asserted right of ownership over land necessarily traces back to the 43 531 Phil. 602, 616; 500 SCRA 209, 222-223 (2006).
State.42 44 Supra note 41 at p. 196; p. 205.
_______________ 45 Com. Act No. 141, entitled “An Act to Amend and Compile the Laws
40 Republic v. Espinosa, G.R. No. 186603, April 5, 2017, 822 SCRA 317, Relative to Lands of the Public Domain” (1936).
332, citing SAAD Agro-Industries, Inc. v. Republic, 534 Phil. 648, 663; 503
SCRA 522, 535 (2006).
41 Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources v. 563
Yap, 589 Phil. 156, 176; 568 SCRA 164, 184-185 (2008). VOL. 844, NOVEMBER 8, 2017 563
42 Id. Republic vs. Heirs of Meynardo Cabrera
clare what lands are open to disposition or concession under this Act.
(Emphasis supplied)
562
562 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED These provisions are clear and leave no room for interpretation — the
Republic vs. Heirs of Meynardo Cabrera classification and reclassification of public lands into alienable or
At present, Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution classifies lands of disposable, mineral or forest land is the exclusive prerogative of the
the public domain into five (5) categories — forest lands, agricultural lands, Executive Department,46 and is exercised by the latter through the
timber lands, mineral lands, and national parks. The Court’s ruling in Heirs President, or such other persons vested with authority to exercise the
of the Late Spouses Palanca v. Republic,43 instructs that in the absence of same on his behalf.47
any prior classification by the State, unclassified lands of the public domain Since the power to classify and reclassify land are executive in nature, such
assume the category of forest lands not open to disposition.44 acts, effected without executive authority, are void, and essentially ultra
In turn, the classification of unclassified lands of the public domain, and vires.
the reclassification of those previously classified under any of the
categories set forth in the 1987 Constitution (such as the Roxas In reversion proceedings,
Properties), are governed by Commonwealth Act No. 14145 dated the State bears the burden
November 7, 1936, otherwise known as the Public Land Act. Sections 6 and of proving that the prop-
7 thereof provide: erty in question was inal-
SEC. 6. The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of ienable at the time it was
Agriculture and Commerce, shall from time to time classify the lands of the decreed or adjudicated in
public domain into — favor of the defendant.

A land registration proceeding is the manner through which an applicant
confirms title to real property. In this proceeding, the applicant bears the
burden of overcoming the presumption of State ownership.48 Accordingly,
the applicant is bound to establish, through incontrovertible evidence, that
the land sought to be registered had been declared alienable or disposable
through a positive act of the State.49
Conversely, reversion proceeding is the manner through which the State
seeks to revert land to the mass of the public
_______________
46 Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols Vda.
de Palanca v. Republic, supra note 43 at p. 618; p. 224.
47 See Com. Act No. 141 (1936), Sec. 6.
48 Republic v. Espinosa, supra note 40 at p. 325.
49 Id.
564
564 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Heirs of Meynardo Cabrera
domain;50 it is proper when public land is fraudulently awarded and
disposed of in favor of private individuals or corporations,51 or when a
person obtains a title under the Public Land Act which includes, by
oversight, lands which cannot be registered under the Torrens system as
they form part of the public domain.52
Owing to the nature of reversion proceedings and the outcome which a
favorable decision therein entails, the State bears the burden to prove that
the land previously decreed or adjudicated in favor of the defendant
constitutes land which cannot be owned by private individuals. The Court’s
ruling in Republic v. Development Resources Corporation53 is instructive:
Since a complaint for reversion can upset the stability of registered titles
through the cancellation of the original title and the others that emanate
from it, the State bears a heavy burden of proving the ground for its action.
x x x54 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, in Republic v. Espinosa55 (Espinosa), the Court held that the
dismissal of the Republic’s action for reversion is proper since the Republic
failed to establish that the land subject thereof was classified as forest land
at the time the cadastral decree in favor of the defendant was issued:
[I]t is undisputed that Espinosa was granted a cadastral decree and was
subsequently issued OCT No. 191-N x x x. Having been granted a decree in
a cadastral proceeding, Espinosa can be presumed to have overcome the
presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public
domain. This means that Espinosa, as
_______________
50 Id., at p. 326.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 623 Phil. 490; 608 SCRA 591 (2009).
54 Id., at p. 493; p. 594.
55 Republic v. Espinosa, supra note 40.
565
VOL. 844, NOVEMBER 8, 2017 565
Republic vs. Heirs of Meynardo Cabrera
the applicant, was able to prove by incontrovertible evidence that the
property is alienable and disposable property in the cadastral proceedings.
xxxx
In this case, the State, through the Solicitor General, alleges neither fraud
nor misrepresentation in the cadastral proceedings and in the issuance of
the title in Espinosa’s favor. The argument for the State is merely that the
property was unlawfully included in the certificate of title because it is of
the public domain.
Since the case is one for reversion and not one for land registration, the
burden is on the State to prove that the property was classified as
timberland or forest land at the time it was decreed to Espinosa. To
reiterate, there is no burden on [the present owner] to prove that the
property in question is alienable and disposable land. At this stage, it is
reasonable to presume that Espinosa, from whom [the present owner]
derive[s] her title, had already established that the property is alienable
and disposable land considering that she succeeded in obtaining the OCT
over it. In this reversion proceeding, the State must prove that there was
an oversight or mistake in the inclusion of the property in Espinosa’s title
because it was of public dominion. This is consistent with the rule that the
burden of proof rests on the party who, as determined by the pleadings or Q: So you don’t have the law or the order reverting that portion of land to
the nature of the case, asserts the affirmative of an issue.56 (Emphasis and forest land on November 24, 1949?
underscoring supplied) A: Except only that it is a swamp land. And it is shown here in our map, sir.
_______________
Hence, to resolve this Petition, the Court must determine whether the 57 Engineer Mariano Mendez was the designated Land Classification
documentary and testimonial evidence offered by the Republic are Verifier of NAMRIA during the relevant period; Rollo, p. 51.
sufficient to sustain its cause.
_______________
56 Id., at pp. 326-327. 567
VOL. 844, NOVEMBER 8, 2017 567
Republic vs. Heirs of Meynardo Cabrera
566 xxxx
566 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED PROS. MARCO:
Republic vs. Heirs of Meynardo Cabrera Q: x x x [W]hat is the basis, if any, of you (sic) in declaring that this portion
The Complaint should be of land was reverted back from timber land to forest land on November
dismissed as the Repub- 24, 1949?
lic failed to show that the A: Our files and records.
Roxas Properties (includ- Q: What are these files and records?
ing Lot 1-A) were classi- A: As indicated in [LC Map 209].
fied as forest land at the Engineer Mendez admitted that there was no presidential order or act
time Free Patent No. 516197 reverting the classification of the subject property from alienable and
was issued in Meynardo’s disposable to forest land, thus:
favor. Q: Did you prepare the basis of the reversion of the land from disposable
to forest land on November 24, 1949?
To recall, the Republic presented the following pieces of evidence to A: Yes, sir.
support its complaint for reversion: (i) DENR Final Report; (ii) NAMRIA Q: What were the basis?
certifications; and (iii) LC Map 209. However, these documents, whether A: Yes, because when I studied that, I found out that the area was a swamp
taken individually or collectively, do not evince a positive act of land?
reclassification by the Executive Department. As aptly stated by the CA: Q: Aside from that, that the area was a swamp land, what are your other
In this case, the Republic presented the [NAMRIA certifications], the [DENR basis?
Final Report] and [LC Map 209] dated March 6, 1924, with an inscription A: Nothing more, sir. As per records, that is the only basis.
that the [Roxas Properties] [were] reverted x x x to the category of forest Q: Did you not research any law, decree, presidential order or act as the
land on November 24, 1949. However, it appears that the findings of the basis of reverting this parcel of land to forest zone on November 24, 1949?
CENRO and the NAMRIA are based solely on such mapping [LC Map 209] A: I have even decrees or law reverting certain area to forest land but not
where eighteen (18) hectares, including the location therein of the [Roxas in this particular area.
Properties], [were] reclassified as forest land. Engineer [Mariano] Q: So, you know that before a certain parcel of land would be reverted
Mendez57 testified that: from alienable and disposable to forest zone, there should be a basis for
xxxx the same,

568
568 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Heirs of Meynardo Cabrera
like proclamation or law. From your experience, presidential decrees?
A: Yes, sir. These are proclamation decrees regarding the reversion of
certain land use. But in this particular area, the land is swamp land.
Q: But in this particular case, did you encounter or did you see any law,
executive order, presidential proclamation declaring this parcel of land
from alienable and disposable to forest zone?
A: I have not encountered any decree or presidential proclamation or
order reverting this land to forest zone. x x x
Even Engineer Mendez of the NAMRIA agreed that a law or proclamation is
required before a certain parcel of land is reclassified from alienable and
disposable to forest land. His insistence that because the land was
(originally) swamp land that reclassification was made (sic), is not
supported by any presidential or legal pronouncement or by practice and
tradition. x x x Unfortunately, the Republic failed to present any law,
presidential proclamation, order or act to prove that the subject property
was indeed within the area which is reclassified as forest land. Even an
administrative order from the Bureau of Forestry was not presented to
show that the subject property had been reclassified as forest land.58
(Additional emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The foregoing testimony, culled from the Assailed Decision, confirms that
the alleged reclassification of the Roxas Properties is bereft of basis, as it
was done by Engineer Mendez on his sole account, without any prior
directive from the President, or a duly authorized officer from the
Executive Department. In fact, the annotation appearing on LC Map 209
upon which the Republic relies does not even state upon whose
_______________
58 Id., at pp. 56-59.
569
VOL. 844, NOVEMBER 8, 2017 569
Republic vs. Heirs of Meynardo Cabrera
authority the alleged reclassification had been made,59 placing the
annotation’s validity, veracity and worth in serious doubt.
Ultimately, the Republic failed to prove that the Roxas Properties
(including Lot 1-A) were classified as forest land when they were decreed
in Meynardo’s favor in 1971. Thus, in accordance with the Court’s ruling in
Development Resources Corporation and Espinosa, the present Petition
must be, as it is hereby, denied.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is
DENIED. The Assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 18, 2014
and Resolution dated May 20, 2015 in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 98120 are hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio (Chairperson), Peralta and Reyes, Jr., JJ., concur.
Perlas-Bernabe, J., On Official Leave.
Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed.
Notes.—Reversion is an action where the ultimate relief sought is to revert
the land back to the government under the Regalian doctrine. (Republic vs.
Hachero, 791 SCRA 352 [2016])
The Solicitor General may initiate an action for reversion or escheat of the
land to the State in sales of real estate to aliens incapable of holding title
thereto. (Ang vs. Estate of Sy So, 799 SCRA 266 [2016])
——o0o——
_______________
59 Id., at p. 63.
G.R. No. 147148. January 13, 2003.*
PILAR GOYENA, petitioner, vs. AMPARO LEDESMA-GUSTILO, respondent.
Remedial Law; Certiorari; Questions of fact are not proper subjects of
appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court as this mode of
appeal is confined to questions of law.—It is well-entrenched doctrine that
questions of fact are not proper subjects of appeal by certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court as this mode of appeal is confined to questions of
law. The test of whether the question is one of law or of fact is whether
the appellate court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or
evaluating the evidence, in which case it is a question of law; otherwise, it
is a question of fact.
Same; Same; Court cannot be tasked to go over the proofs presented by the
parties and analyze, assess and weigh them to ascertain if the trial
_______________
*
THIRD DIVISION.
118
118 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Goyena vs. Ledesma-Gustilo
court and appellate court were correct in according them superior credit.—
Clearly, the issues raised and arguments in support of petitioner’s position
require a review of the evidence, hence, not proper for consideration in
the petition at bar. This Court cannot thus be tasked to go over the proofs
presented by the parties and analyze, assess, and weigh them to ascertain
if the trial court and appellate court were correct in according them
superior credit.
Same; Guardianship; In the selection of a guardian, a large discretion must
be allowed the judge who deals directly with the parties.—In the selection
of a guardian, a large discretion must be allowed the judge who deals
directly with the parties. As this Court said: As a rule, when it appears that
the judge has exercised care and diligence in selecting the guardian, has
given due consideration to the reasons for and against his action which are
urged by the interested parties, his action should not be disturbed unless it
is made very clear that he has fallen into grievous error. In the case at bar,
petitioner has not shown that the lower courts committed any error.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Cayetano, Sebastian, Ata, Dado & Cruz for petitioner.
Castillo, Laman, Tan, Pantaleon & San Jose for private respondent.
Raphael A. Diaz collaborating counsel for private respondent.
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
From the Court of Appeals June 19, 2000 Decision which affirmed that of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, Branch 149 in Special Proceeding
No. N-4375 appointing herein respondent Amparo Ledesma Gustilo as
guardian over the person and property of her sister Julieta Ledesma, Pilar
Y. Goyena, Julieta’s close friend and companion of more than 60 years,
comes to this Court on petition for review on certiorari.
On July 8, 1996, respondent filed at the RTC of Makati a “PETITION FOR
LETTERS OF GUARDIANSHIP”1 over the person
_______________
1
Records, pp. 1-3.
119
VOL. 395, JANUARY 13, 2003 119
Goyena vs. Ledesma-Gustilo
and properties of her sister Julieta, the pertinent allegations of which read:
1. 2. That for the most part during the year 1995 and 1996,
Julieta Ledesma has been a patient in the Makati Medical
Center where she is under medical attention for old age,
general debility, and a “mini”-stroke which she suffered
in the United States in early 1995;
2. 3. That Julieta Ledesma is confined to her bed and can
not get up from bed without outside assistance, and she
has to be moved by wheel chair;
3. 4. That Julieta Ledesma owns real estate and personal
properties in Metro Manila and in Western Visayas, with
an aggregate estimated assessed and par value of P1
Million Pesos[;]
4. 5. That Julieta Ledesma is not in a position to care for
herself, and that she needs the assistance of a guardian
to manage her interests in ongoing corporate and
agricultural enterprises;
5. 6. That the nearest of kin of Julieta Ledesma are her
sisters of the full blood, namely, petitioner Amparo
Ledesma Gustilo, Teresa Ledesma (aka. Sister Cristina of
the Religious of the Assumption), and Loreto Ledesma
Mapa, all of whom have given their consent to the filing
 of this petition as shown by their signatures at the
bottom of this petition[;]
6. 7. That petitioner has extensive experience in business
management of commercial, agricultural and corporate
enterprises, many of which are in the same entities
where Julieta Ledesma holds an interest, and that she is
in a position to monitor and supervise the delivery of
vitally needed medical services to Julieta Ledesma
whether in the Metro Manila area, or elsewhere.
Petitioner filed an Opposition to the petition for letters of guardianship.
She later filed an Amended Opposition on August 15, 1996 reading in part:
2.03 The petition lacked factual and legal basis in that Julieta Ledesma is
competent and sane and there is absolutely no need to appoint a guardian
to take charge of her person/property. She is very able to take charge of
her affairs, and this is clearly evident from her letters to the petitioner.
Copies of her recent letters are herewith attached as Annexes “A” to “E.”
xxx
2.05 Petitioner is not fit to be appointed as the guardian of Julieta Ledesma
since their interests are antagonistic (Sudler v. Sudler, 121 Md. 46. 49
L.R.A. 800, as cited in vol. V-B Francisco Revised Rules of Court, Rule 93,
Section 4, p. 414).
120
120 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Goyena vs. Ledesma-Gustilo
xxx
3.01 The above captioned petition should be dismissed for utter lack of
legal and/or factual basis.
3.02 In the remote event that this Honorable Court should find that Julieta
Ledesma is incompetent and resolve that there is need to appoint a
guardian over her person and property, this Honorable Court should
appoint as such guardian:
1. 1.Oppositor Goyena;
2. 2.Bart Lacson;
3. 3.Fely Montelibano;
4. 4. Jose T. Revilla; or
5. 5. a qualified and reputable person as may be
determined fit by this Honorable Court.
By Decision2 of October 4, 1996, the trial court found Julieta “incompetent
and incapable of taking care of herself and her property” and appointed
respondent as guardian of her person and properties, ratiocinating as
follows:
A perusal of the records shows that petitioner (Amparo) is 72 years of age,
the youngest sister of Julieta. Admittedly, the Oppositor Pilar Goyena, 90
years of age has been the close friend and companion of Julieta for 61
years. Julieta was with Oppositor when she suffered her first stroke in
Makati in 1991 which was the reason why Julieta had to give up the
management of their hacienda in Bacolod. It is also not disputed that
Julieta was with Pilar when she had her second stroke in the U.S. In short,
the special bond of friendship existing between Julieta and the Oppositor
cannot be denied. Now that Julieta is unable to manage her personal life
and business concerns due to senility and “vascular dementia,” the
oppositor wants to be appointed her guardian or else Bart Lacson, Fely
Montelibano and Jose T. Revilla.
It is interesting to note that the oppositor has interposed her objection to
the appointment of Amparo as guardian because she thinks that the latter
dislikes her. She further added that there were a number of letters
allegedly written by Julieta to Amparo which showed Julieta’s sentiments
regarding certain matters. Nevertheless, not one of the nearest of kin of
Julieta opposed the petition. As a matter of fact, her sisters signified their
conformity thereto. Thus, Ms. Goyena’s mere conjecture that Amparo
dislikes her is no sufficient reason why the petition should be denied.
Neither does it make Amparo unsuitable and unfit to perform the duties of
_______________
2
Id., at pp. 303-308.
121
VOL. 395, JANUARY 13, 2003 121
Goyena vs. Ledesma-Gustilo
a guardian. On the contrary, it is Ms. Goyena who could be considered as
to have an adverse interest to that of Julieta if it is true that 50% of
Julieta’s holdings at the Makati Medical Center has been transferred to her
as alleged in Exhibit “1” and Exhibit “A”.
By and large, the qualification of Amparo to act as guardian over the
person and properties of Julieta has been duly established. As a sister, she
can best take care of Julieta’s concerns and well being. Now that Julieta is
in the twilight of her life, her family should be given the opportunity to
show their love and affection for her without however denying Pilar
Goyena access to her considering the special bond of friendship between
the two. Needless to say, the oppositor at 90 years of age could not be said
to be physically fit to attend to all the needs of Julieta.
“WHEREFORE, petitioner Amparo Gustilo, is hereby appointed guardian
over the person and property of Julieta Ledesma, an incompetent with all
the powers and duties specified under the law.
Accordingly, let letters of guardianship issue to petitioner upon her filing of
a bond in the amount of P200,000.00 to guarantee the performance of the
obligations prescribed for general guardians.
SO ORDERED.” (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration of the trial court’s decision was, by
Order of November 4, 1996,3 denied in this wise:
Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Oppositor thru
counsel, and finding no merits on the ground stated therein, considering
that petitioner appears to be most qualified and suitable to act as Julieta
Ledesma’s guardian after taking into consideration the qualifications of the
oppositor and her other recomendees [sic], aside from the fact that
petitioner’s appointment as such was not objected to by any of her nearest
kin, in contrast to the hostile interest of oppositor, the same is hereby
DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal of petitioner, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s
decision on the following ratiocination:4
Indeed, oppositor-appellant (Pilar) has not shown the authenticity and due
execution of the letters which purport to show the existence of a rift
between Julieta and her family and dissatisfaction as to how the
businesses were managed. At any rate, while it is correct to say that no
person
_______________
3
Records at p. 321.
4
CA Rollo, pp. 197-201.
122
122 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Goyena vs. Ledesma-Gustilo
should be appointed guardian if his interest conflict with those of the ward
(Guerrero vs. Teran, 13 Phil. 212), there are really no antagonistic interests
to speak of between petitioner [Amparo] and Julieta, they being co-owners
of certain properties. There is also no showing that petitioner’s business
decisions in the past had resulted in the prejudice of Julieta.
While the oppositor may have been very close to Julieta, there is no
sufficient showing that petitioner is hostile to the best interests of the
latter. On the contrary, it was the petitioner who, realizing the need for the
appointment of a person to guard her sister’s interests, initiated the
petition for guardianship. We see no indication that petitioner is animated
by a desire to prejudice Julieta’s health as well as financial interests. In
point of fact, it was oppositor-appellant who had initially concealed the
deteriorating state of mind of Julieta from the court. Oppositor’s advanced
age of 90 years also militate against her assuming the guardianship of the
incompetent. The oppositor has declared that she is not interested to be
appointed legal guardian (p. 21[,] Appellant’s Brief, Rollo, p. 59). But the
person that she points to as being better choices as Julieta’s guardian over
the appellee have not acted, nor even indicated, their desire to act as such.
In any case, We see no cogent reason why We should reverse the well-
reasoned disquisition of the trial court.
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the appealed decision, the same is hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision
having been denied, she filed the present petition which proffers that:
THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A
WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS
HONORABLE COURT.
THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DEPARTED FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL
COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT’S
DECISION DATED OCTOBER 4, 1996 AND IN ISSUING THE RESOLUTIONS
DATED JUNE 29, 2000 AND FEBRUARY 9, 2001.
The petition fails.
It is well-entrenched doctrine that questions of fact are not proper subjects
of appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
123
VOL. 395, JANUARY 13, 2003 123
Goyena vs. Ledesma-Gustilo
of Court as this mode of appeal is confined to questions of law.5 The test of
whether the question is one of law or of fact is whether the appellate court
can determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the
evidence, in which case it is a question of law; otherwise, it is a question of Although the general rule is that this Honorable Court is not a trier of facts,
fact.6 its jurisdiction being limited to reviewing and revising only errors of law, it
In the case at bar, the only issue before this Court is whether or not the is nonetheless subject to the following exceptions which have been laid
appellate court and the trial court erred in finding that respondent is not down in a number of decisions of this Honorable Court:
unsuitable for appointment as guardian of the person and properties of (1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation,
Julieta. In support of an affirmative answer, petitioner posits as follows: surmises and conjectures; (2) When the inference made is manifestly
1. 1. The Court of Appeals’ basis for its decision that there mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) When there is a grave abuse of
are no antagonistic interest between [her] and discretion; (4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
[respondent] is contrary to the evidence on record, 7 (5) When the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) When the Court of
2. 2. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that there is no Appeals, in making it findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the
showing that [respondent] is hostile to the best interest same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7)
of Julieta,8 and When the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial
3. 3. Julieta Ledesma’s appointed representatives are most court; (8) When the findings of facts are conclusions without citation of
suitable to be appointed as her guardian.9 specific evidence on which they are based; (9) When the facts set forth in
Clearly, the issues raised and arguments in support of petitioner’s position the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not
require a review of the evidence, hence, not proper for consideration in disputed by the respondents; and (10) When the findings of facts of the
the petition at bar. This Court cannot thus be tasked to go over the proofs Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is
presented by the parties and analyze, assess, and weigh them to ascertain contradicted by the evidence on record (Emphasis supplied); (Rollo, 350-
if the trial court and appellate court were correct in according them 351)
superior credit.10 Petitioner claims that “there is no doubt that the instant petition falls
That the issues raised are factual is in fact admitted by petitioner in her within the above-stated exceptions because the findings of the court of
Reply dated August 30, 2001:11 Appeals are clearly belied by the evidence on record.”12
_______________ In the selection of a guardian, a large discretion must be allowed the judge
5
RULES OF COURT, Rule 45, Section 1; See Perez v. Court of Appeals, 316 who deals directly with the parties.13 As this Court said:
SCRA 43, 61 (1999) (citation omitted); Chan Sui Bi v. Court of Appeals, 341 As a rule, when it appears that the judge has exercised care and diligence
SCRA 364, 372 (2000). in selecting the guardian, ahs given due consideration to the reasons for
6
China Road and Bridge Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 348 SCRA 401, and against his action which are urged by the interested parties, his action
411 (2000) (citation omitted). should not be disturbed unless it is made very clear that he has fallen into
7
Rollo, p. 20. grievous error.14
8
Id., at p. 28. In the case at bar, petitioner has not shown that the lower courts
9
Id., at p. 34. committed any error.
10
Chan Sui Bi v. Court of Appeals, 341 SCRA 364, 372-373 (2000) (citation Petitioner cannot rely on Garchitorena v. Sotelo15 with respect to the
omitted). existence of antagonistic interests between respondent and Julieta. In that
11
Rollo at pp. 350-351. case, the interest of Perfecto Gabriel as creditor
124 _______________
12
124 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Id., at p. 351.
13
Goyena vs. Ledesma-Gustilo Feliciano v. Camahort, 22 Phil. 235, 235-236 (1912).
14
Id. (emphasis supplied).
15
74 Phil. 25, 29-30 (1942).
125
VOL. 395, JANUARY 13, 2003 125
Goyena vs. Ledesma-Gustilo
and mortgagee of the minor-wards’ properties (a house and lot) is
antagonistic to the interests of the wards as mortgagors, hence, Gabriel’s
appointment as guardian was erroneous. For while he sought to foreclose
the wards’ properties as creditor and mortgagee on one hand, he had to,
on the other hand, endeavor to retain them for the wards as their
guardian. Added to that was Gabriel’s appointment as guardian without
him informing the guardianship court that he held a mortgage on the
properties. Furthermore, he deliberately misinformed the said court that
the first mortgagee was the Santa Clara Monastery when it was him. None
of the said circumstances obtain in the present case.
Petitioner can neither rely on certain letters of Julieta to establish her
claim that there existed16 a rift between the two which amounts to
antagonistic interests. The first letter17 sent by Julieta to respondent which
reads:
x x x So if you (appellee) do not agree with me (Julieta) my decision is right
to let us divide as soon as possible, so we will have capital each of us to
work, and keep the Had, for [sic] generation to generation.
xxx
For the last time I will have to repeat even if I have to kneel before you and
Carlos I have no interest anymore in any future investment due to my age
and being single and alone in life. I would like to be able to enjoy whatever
monies that correspond to me. I would like to have enough money as a
reserve for any future need that I might have like hospitalization, travel,
buying whatever I like, etc. etc. (Letter to appellee; Exhibit “2”)
merely shows Julieta’s lack of interest in future investments, not
necessarily a business disagreement, and certainly not per se amounting to
antagonistic interests between her and respondent to render the latter
unsuitable for appointment as guardian.
The second letter18 which reads:
My mind is still clear to tell you about Fortuna when I had my stroke I was
confined in MMC for one month. If I am not mistaken you did not visit me.
One day Carlos came to visit me and asked me this question. Do
_______________
16
Rollo at p. 22.
17
Id., at pp. 20-21.
18
Id., at p. 21.
126
126 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Goyena vs. Ledesma-Gustilo
you think you will be able to continue managing the Had? I answered him I
don’t know it all depends on my sickness. Carlos said who do you want to
take your place? I said I want Cheling Zabaljauregui. Then Carlos said O.K.
He asked Pilar can you contact Cheling? Tell him to call me or see me. The
nephew of Cheling was a resident in MMC through him Pilar was able to
contact Cheling and gave him Carlo’s message. So I thought all the time it
was agreeable. I left for USA for treatment. To my surprise when I came
back from USA it was not Cheling, but you (appellee) took over the
management as you requested. Carlos did not tell me but decided in your
favor. x x x (Letter to appeellee; Exhibit “3”; emphasis supplied)
shows that: 1) respondent did not visit Julieta when she was confined at
the Makati Medical Center on account of her stroke, 2) there was
disagreement as to who should run the hacienda, with Julieta favoring a
certain Cheling Zabaljaurigue, and 3) respondent took over management of
the hacienda with their brothers Carlos (Ledesma) supporting her. No
inference as to the existence of antagonistic interests between respondent
and Julieta can thus be made.
The third letter19 which reads:
x x x Carlos went to the house before I left and asked from me twenty
thousand (20,000) shares of San Carlos Milling which you gave because I
wanted to sell all. x x x If he does not sell or cannot sell, just arrange to
send them back to me. Amparing since I came here to America and
Vancouver my requests have been ignored. Everyone is suspecting that
Pilar is the one ordering or commanding me that is not true. What I asked
from Julio is just to report to me or send me reports so I can follow up
from here. But up to now he has ignored my requests x x x x. (Letter to
appellee Exhibit “4”)
has no relevance to the issue of whether or not the lower courts erred in
finding that respondent is not unsuitable for appointment as guardian. The
letter in fact discloses, that it was Julieta’s nephew Julio Ledesma, and not
respondent, who ignored the “request.”
As for the fourth letter20 which reads:
_______________
19
Id. 128
20
Id. 128 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
127 People vs. Visperas, Jr.
VOL. 395, JANUARY 13, 2003 127 SO ORDERED.
Goyena vs. Ledesma-Gustilo Puno (Chairman), Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez and Corona, JJ.,
I want all of you to know that whatever decision now and in the future I concur.
want to do nobody can stop me especially regarding my properties, Petition dismissed.
money, etc. I will be the only one to dispose of it because it is mine. You Note.—Only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on
said to Raul you are going to court, you are most welcome x x x. (Letter to certiorari. (Baguio vs. Republic, 301 SCRA 450 [1999])
Connie, Exhibit “5”)
It has no relevance to the issue in the case at bar. The letter is not even
addressed to respondent but to a certain Connie (a sister-in-law of Julieta).
Petitioner’s assertion that respondent’s intent in instituting the
guardianship proceedings is to take control of Julieta’s properties and use
them for her own benefit21 is purely speculative and finds no support from
the records.
The claim that respondent is hostile to the best interests of Julieta also
lacks merit. That respondent removed Julieta from the Makati Medical
Center where she was confined after she suffered a stroke does not
necessarily show her hostility towards Julieta, given the observation by the
trial court, cited in the present petition, that Julieta was still placed under
the care of doctors22 after she checked out and was returned to the
hospital when she suffered another stroke.
Finally, this court notes two undisputed facts in the case at bar, to wit: 1)
Petitioner opposed the petition for the appointment of respondent as
guardian before the trial court because, among other reasons, she felt she
was disliked by respondent,23 a ground which does not render respondent
unsuitable for appointment as guardian, and 2) Petitioner concealed the
deteriorating state of mind of Julieta before the trial court,24 which is
reflective of a lack of good faith.
Discussion of the third argument is unnecessary, the suitability of Amparo
for appointment as guardian not having been successfully contested.
ACCORDINGLY, for lack of merit, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
_______________
21
Rollo at p. 23; See also at p. 53.
22
Rollo at p. 31.
23
Records at p. 307.
24
CA Rollo, pp. 200-201.
G.R. No. 110427. February 24, 1997.*
The Incompetent, CARMEN CAÑIZA, represented by her legal guardian,
AMPARO EVANGELISTA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS (SPECIAL
FIRST DIVISION), PEDRO ESTRADA and his wife, LEONORA ESTRADA,
respondents.
Actions; Pleadings and Practice; What determines the nature of an action
as well as which court has jurisdiction over it are the allegations of the
complaint and the character of the relief sought.—It is axiomatic that what
determines the nature of an action as well as which court has jurisdiction
over it, are the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief
sought. An inquiry into the averments of the amended complaint in the
Court of origin is thus in order.
Same; Same; Ejectment; Unlawful Detainer; A complaint for unlawful
detainer is sufficient if it alleges that the withholding of possession or the
refusal to vacate is unlawful without necessarily employing the terminology
of the law.—Undoubtedly, a cause of action for desahucio has been
adequately set out. It is settled that in an action for unlawful detainer, to
allege that the defendant is unlawfully withholding possession from the
plaintiff is deemed sufficient, and a complaint for unlawful detainer is
sufficient if it alleges that the withholding of possession or the refusal to
vacate is unlawful without necessarily employing the terminology of the
law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; An owner’s act of allowing another to occupy
her house, rent-free, does not create a permanent and indefeasible right of
possession in the latter’s favor.—The argument is arrant sophistry. Cañiza’s
act of allowing the Estradas to occupy her
_______________
*
THIRD DIVISION.
641
VOL. 268, FEBRUARY 24, 1997 641
Cañiza vs. Court of Appeals
house, rent-free, did not create a permanent and indefeasible right of
possession in the latter’s favor. Common sense, and the most rudimentary
sense of fairness clearly require that that act of liberality be implicitly, but
no less certainly, accompanied by the necessary burden on the Estradas of
returning the house to Cañiza upon her demand. More than once has this
Court adjudged that a person who occupies the land of another at the
latter’s tolerance or permission without any contract between them is
necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand,
failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against
him. The situation is not much different from that of a tenant whose lease
expires but who continues in occupancy by tolerance of the owner, in
which case there is deemed to be an unlawful deprivation or withholding
of possession as of the date of the demand to vacate. In other words, one
whose stay is merely tolerated becomes a deforciant illegally occupying
the land or property the moment he is required to leave.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Where there had been more than one demand
to vacate, the one-year period for filing the complaint for unlawful detainer
must be reckoned from the date of the last demand, the reason being that
the lessor has the option to waive his right of action based on previous
demands and let the lessee remain meanwhile in the premises.—It may not
be amiss to point out in this connection that where there had been more
than one demand to vacate, the one-year period for filing the complaint
for unlawful detainer must be reckoned from the date of the last demand,
the reason being that the lessor has the option to waive his right of action
based on previous demands and let the lessee remain meanwhile in the
premises. Now, the complaint filed by Cañiza’s guardian alleges that the
same was “filed within one (1) year from the date of the first letter of
demand dated February 3, 1990.” Although this averment is not in accord
with law because there is in fact a second letter of demand to vacate,
dated February 27, 1990, the mistake is inconsequential, since the
complaint was actually filed on September 17, 1990, well within one year
from the second (last) written demand to vacate.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Guardianship; A judicial guardian is clothed with
authority to withdraw the ward’s earlier express permission given to third
persons to occupy a certain property.—The Estradas’ possession of the
house stemmed from the owner’s express permission. That permission
was subsequently withdrawn by the
642
642 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cañiza vs. Court of Appeals
owner, as was her right; and it is immaterial that the withdrawal was made
through her judicial guardian, the latter being indisputably clothed with
authority to do so. Nor is it of any consequence that Carmen Cañiza had
executed a will bequeathing the disputed property to the Estradas; that
circumstance did not give them the right to stay in the premises after
demand to vacate on the theory that they might in the future become
owners thereof, that right of ownership being at best inchoate, no transfer
of ownership being possible unless and until the will is duly probated.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Where the issue is possession de facto, not de
jure, the proper remedy is ejectment, not accion publiciana.—In any case,
the only issue that could legitimately be raised under the circumstances
was that involving the Estradas’ possession by tolerance, i.e., possession de
facto, not de jure. It is therefore incorrect to postulate that the proper
remedy for Cañiza is not ejectment but accion publiciana, a plenary action
in the RTC or an action that is one for recovery of the right to possession
de jure.
Wills and Succession; A will is essentially ambulatory—at any time prior to
the testator’s death, it may be changed or revoked, and until admitted to
probate, it has no effect whatever and no right can be claimed thereunder;
An owner’s intention to confer title in the future to persons possessing
property by his tolerance is not inconsistent with the former’s taking back
possession in the meantime for any reason deemed sufficient.—A will is
essentially ambulatory; at any time prior to the testator’s death, it may be
changed or revoked; and until admitted to probate, it has no effect
whatever and no right can be claimed thereunder, the law being quite
explicit: “No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is
proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court” (ART. 838, id.).
An owner’s intention to confer title in the future to persons possessing
property by his tolerance, is not inconsistent with the former’s taking back
possession in the meantime for any reason deemed sufficient. And that in
this case there was sufficient cause for the owner’s resumption of
possession is apparent: she needed to generate income from the house on
account of the physical infirmities afflicting her, arising from her extreme
age.
Guardianship; The ward has no right to possession or control of his
property during his or her incompetency.—Amparo Evangelista was
appointed by a competent court the general guardian of both the person
and the estate of her aunt, Carmen Cañiza. Her Letters of
643
VOL. 268, FEBRUARY 24, 1997 643
Cañiza vs. Court of Appeals
Guardianship dated December 19, 1989 clearly installed her as the
“guardian over the person and properties of the incompetent CARMEN
CAÑIZA with full authority to take possession of the property of said
incompetent in any province or provinces in which it may be situated and
to perform all other acts necessary for the management of her properties
**.” By that appointment, it became Evangelista’s duty to care for her
aunt’s person, to attend to her physical and spiritual needs, to assure her
well-being, with right to custody of her person in preference to relatives
and friends. It also became her right and duty to get possession of, and
exercise control over, Cañiza’s property, both real and personal, it being
recognized principle that the ward has no right to possession or control of
his property during her incompetency. That right to manage the ward’s
estate carries with it the right to take possession thereof and recover it
from anyone who retains it, and bring and defend such actions as may be
needful for this purpose.
Actions; Ejectment; Even when, in forcible entry and unlawful detainer
cases, the defendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings and
the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of
ownership, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts nevertheless have the undoubted competence
to resolve the issue of ownership only to determine the issue of
possession.—It may be pointed out in relation to the Estrada’s defenses in
the ejectment action, that as the law now stands, even when, in forcible
entry and unlawful detainer cases, the defendant raises the question of
ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be
resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
nevertheless have the undoubted competence to resolve “the issue of
ownership ** only to determine the issue of possession.”
Same; Same; Parties; An ejectment case survives the death of a party.—To
be sure, an ejectment case survives the death of a party. Cañiza’s demise
did not extinguish the desahucio suit instituted by her through her
guardian. That action, not being a purely personal one, survived her death;
her heirs have taken her place and now represent her interests in the
appeal at bar.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
644
644 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cañiza vs. Court of Appeals
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
 Priscilla A. Villacorta for petitioner.
Montilla Law Office for private respondents.
NARVASA, C.J.:
On November 20, 1989, being then ninety-four (94) years of age, Carmen
Cañiza, a spinster, a retired pharmacist, and former professor of the
College of Chemistry and Pharmacy of the University of the Philippines,
was declared incompetent by judgment1 of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 107,2 in a guardianship proceeding instituted by her
niece, Amparo A. Evangelista.3 She was so adjudged because of her
advanced age and physical infirmities which included cataracts in both
eyes and senile dementia. Amparo A. Evangelista was appointed legal
guardian of her person and estate. Cañiza was the owner of a house and
lot at No. 61 Tobias St., Quezon City. On September 17, 1990, her guardian
Amparo Evangelista commenced a suit in the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MetroTC) of Quezon City (Branch 35) to eject the spouses Pedro and
Leonora Estrada from said premises.4 The complaint was later amended to
identify the incompetent Cañiza as plaintiff, suing through her legal
guardian, Amparo Evangelista.
The amended Complaint5 pertinently alleged that plaintiff Cañiza was the
absolute owner of the property in question, covered by TCT No. 27147;
that out of kindness, she had allowed the Estrada Spouses, their children,
grandchildren and
_______________
1 6
Petition, Annex “D,” Rollo, pp. 41-43.
2 7
Presided over by Judge Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis
3 8
Docketed as SP, PROC. No. Q-89-2603 of Branch 107, entitled “Petition
for Guardianship of the Person and Estate of the Incompetent Carmen
Cañiza, Amparo A. Evangelista, Petitioner.”
4
Docketed as Civil Case No. 3410 for Ejectment with Damages.
5
Petition, Annex “K,” Rollo, pp. 55-59.
645
VOL. 268, FEBRUARY 24, 1997 645
Cañiza vs. Court of Appeals
sons-in-law to temporarily reside in her house, rent-free; that Cañiza
already had urgent need of the house on account of her advanced age and
failing health, “so funds could be raised to meet her expenses for support,
maintenance and medical treatment”; that through her guardian, Cañiza
had asked the Estradas verbally and in writing to vacate the house but they
had refused to do so; and that “by the defendants’ act of unlawfully
depriving plaintiff of the possession of the house in question, they **
(were) enriching themselves at the expense of the incompetent, because,
while they ** (were) saving money by not paying any rent for the house,
the incompetent ** (was) losing much money as her house could not be
rented by others.” Also alleged was that the complaint was “filed within
one (1) year from the date of first letter of demand dated February 3,
1990.”
In their Answer with Counterclaim, the defendants declared that they had
been living in Cañiza’s house since the 1960’s; that in consideration of their
faithful service they had been considered by Cañiza as her own family, and
the latter had in fact executed a holographic will on September 4, 1988 by
which she “bequeathed” to the Estradas the house and lot in question.
Judgment was rendered by the MetroTC on April 13, 1992 in Cañiza’s
favor,6 the Estradas being ordered to vacate the premises and pay Cañiza
P5,000.00 by way of attorney’s fees.
But on appeal,7 the decision was reversed by the Quezon City Regional
Trial Court, Branch 96.8 By judgment rendered on October 21, 1992,9 the
RTC held that the “action by which the issue of defendants’ possession
should be resolved is accion publiciana, the obtaining factual and legal
situation ** demanding adjudication by such plenary action for recovery of
possession cognizable in the first instance by the Regional Trial Court.”
_______________
Petition, Annex “B,” Rollo, pp. 33-35.
Docketed as Civil Case No. Q-92-12554.
Presided Over by Judge Lucas P. Bersamin.
9
Rollo, pp. 36-40.
646
646 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cañiza vs. Court of Appeals
Cañiza sought to have the Court of Appeals reverse the decision of October
21, 1992, but failed in that attempt. In a decision 10 promulgated on June 2,
1993, the Appellate Court11 affirmed the RTC’s judgment in toto. It ruled
that (a) the proper remedy for Cañiza was indeed an accion publiciana in
the RTC, not an accion interdictal in the MetroTC, since the “defendants
have not been in the subject premises as mere tenants or occupants by
tolerance, they have been there as a sort of adopted family of Carmen
Cañiza,” as evidenced by what purports to be the holographic will of the
plaintiff; and (b) while “said will, unless and until it has passed probate by
the proper court, could not be the basis of defendants’ claim to the
property, ** it is indicative of intent and desire on the part of Carmen
Cañiza that defendants are to remain and are to continue in their
occupancy and possession, so much so that Cañiza’s supervening
incompetency can not be said to have vested in her guardian the right or
authority to drive the defendants out.”12
Through her guardian, Cañiza came to this Court praying for reversal of the
Appellate Court’s judgment. She contends in the main that the latter erred
in (a) holding that she should have pursued an accion publiciana, and not
an accion interdictal; and in (b) giving much weight to “a xerox copy of an
alleged holographic will, which is irrelevant to this case.”13
In the responsive pleading filed by them on this Court’s requirement, 14 the
Estradas insist that the case against them was really not one of unlawful
detainer; they argue that since possession of the house had not been
obtained by them by any “contract, express or implied,” as contemplated
by Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, their occupancy of the premises
could not be deemed one “terminable upon mere demand (and
_______________
10
Rollo, pp. 27-32.
11
Special First Division composed of Vailoces, J., ponente, with Lantin and
Mabutas, Jr., JJ., concurring.
12
CA Decision, p. 4, Rollo, p. 30.
13
Petition, p. 11, Rollo, p. 18.
14
Rollo, pp. 97-112.
647
VOL. 268, FEBRUARY 24, 1997 647
Cañiza vs. Court of Appeals
hence never became unlawful) within the context of the law.” Neither
could the suit against them be deemed one of forcible entry, they add,
because they had been occupying the property with the prior consent of
the “real owner,” Carmen Cañiza, which “occupancy can even ripen into
full ownership once the holographic will of petitioner Carmen Cañiza is
admitted to probate.” They conclude, on those postulates, that it is
beyond the power of Cañiza’s legal guardian to oust them from the
disputed premises.
Carmen Cañiza died on March 19, 1994,15 and her heirs—the
aforementioned guardian, Amparo Evangelista, and Ramon C. Nevado, her
niece and nephew, respectively—were by this Court’s leave, substituted
for her.16
Three issues have to be resolved: (a) whether or not an ejectment action is
the appropriate judicial remedy for recovery of possession of the property
in dispute; (b) assuming desahucio to be proper, whether or not
Evangelista, as Cañiza’s legal guardian had authority to bring said action;
and (c) assuming an affirmative answer to both questions, whether or not
Evangelista may continue to represent Cañiza after the latter’s death.
I
It is axiomatic that what determines the nature of an action as well as
which court has jurisdiction over it, are the allegations of the complaint
and the character of the relief
_______________
15
Manifestation dated March 25, 1994.
16
Second Division Resolution dated June 20, 1994.
648
648 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cañiza vs. Court of Appeals
sought.17 An inquiry into the averments of the amended complaint in the
Court of origin is thus in order.18
The amended Complaint alleges:19
1. “6. That the plaintiff, Carmen Cañiza, is the sole and
absolute owner of a house and lot at No. 61 Scout
Tobias, Quezon City, which property is now the subject of
this complaint;
** ** **
2. 9. That the defendants, their children, grandchildren and
sons-in-law, were allowed to live temporarily in the
house of plaintiff, Carmen Cañiza, for free, out of her
kindness;
3. 10. That the plaintiff, through her legal guardian, has
duly notified the defendants, for them to vacate the said
house, but the two (2) letters of demand were ignored
and the defendants refused to vacate the same. **
4. 11. That the plaintiff, represented by her legal guardian,
Amparo Evangelista, made another demand on the
defendants for them to vacate the premises, before
Barangay Captain Angelina A. Diaz of Barangay Laging
 Handa, Quezon City, but after two (2) conferences, the
result was negative and no settlement was reached. A
photocopy of the Certification to File Action dated July 4,
1990, issued by said Barangay Captain is attached,
marked Annex “D” and made an integral part hereof;
5. 12. That the plaintiff has given the defendants more than
thirty (30) days to vacate the house, but they still refused
to vacate the premises, and they are up to this time
residing in the said place;
6. 13. That this complaint is filed within one (1) year from
the date of first letter of demand dated February 3, 1990
(Annex “B”) sent by the plaintiff to the defendants, by
her legal guardian—Amparo Evangelista;
_______________
17
Sumulong vs. Court of Appeals, 232 SCRA 372 [1994], citing Abrin vs.
Campos, 203 SCRA 420 [1991]; Mariategui vs. Court of Appeals, 205 SCRA
337 [1992]; Abad vs. Court of First Instance, 206 SCRA 567 [1992]; Del
Castillo vs. Aguinaldo, 212 SCRA 169 [1992]; Santos vs. Court of Appeals,
214 SCRA 162 [1992]; Ganadin vs. Ramos, 99 SCRA 613 (1980); Ramirez v.
Chit, 21 SCRA 1364 [1967]; Mediran vs. Villanueva, 37 Phil. 752 [1918].
18
Sarmiento vs. Court of Appeals, 150 SCRA 108 [1995].
19
Rollo, pp. 56-57, underscoring in original text.
649
VOL. 268, FEBRUARY 24, 1997 649
Cañiza vs. Court of Appeals
1. 14. By the defendants’ act of unlawfully depriving the
plaintiff of the possession of the house in question, they
are enriching themselves at the expense of the
incompetent plaintiff, because, while they are saving
money by not paying any rent for the house, the plaintiff
is losing much money as her house could not be rented
by others;
2. 15. That the plaintiff’s health is failing and she needs the
house urgently, so that funds could be raised to meet her
expenses for her support, maintenance and medical
treatment;
3. 16. That because of defendants’ refusal to vacate the
house at No. 61 Scout Tobias, Quezon City, the plaintiff,
through her legal guardian, was compelled to go to court
for justice, and she has to spend P10,000.00 as attorney’s
fees.”
Its prayer20 is quoted below:
“WHEREFORE, in the interest of justice and the rule of law, plaintiff,
Carmen Cañiza, represented by her legal guardian, Amparo Evangelista,
respectfully prays to this Honorable Court, to render judgment in favor of
plaintiff and against the defendants as follows:
1. 1. To order the defendants, their children, grandchildren,
sons-in-law and other persons claiming under them, to
vacate the house and premises at No. 61 Scout Tobias,
Quezon City, so that its possession can be restored to the
plaintiff, Carmen Cañiza; and
2. 2. To pay attorney’s fees in the amount of P10,000.00;
3. 3. To pay the costs of the suit.”
In essence, the amended complaint states:
1. 1) that the Estradas were occupying Cañiza’s house by
tolerance—having been “allowed to live temporarily **
(therein) for free, out of ** (Cañiza’s) kindness”;
2. 2) that Cañiza needed the house “urgently” because her
“health ** (was) failing and she ** (needed) funds ** to
meet her expenses for her support, maintenance and
medical treatment”;
3. 3) that through her general guardian, Cañiza requested
the Estradas several times, orally and in writing, to give
back possession of the house;
_______________
20
Rollo, pp. 57-58.
650
650 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cañiza vs. Court of Appeals
1. 4) that the Estradas refused and continue to refuse to
give back the house to Cañiza, to her continuing
prejudice; and
2. 5) that the action was filed within one (1) year from the
last demand to vacate.
Undoubtedly, a cause of action for desahucio has been adequately set out.
It is settled that in an action for unlawful detainer, it suffices that the
defendant is unlawfully withholding possession from the plaintiff is
deemed sufficient,21 and a complaint for unlawful detainer is sufficient if it
alleges that the withholding of possession or the refusal to vacate is
unlawful without necessarily employing the terminology of the law. 22
The Estradas’ first proffered defense derives from a literal construction of
Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court which inter alia authorizes the
institution of an unlawful detainer suit when “the possession of any land or
building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the
right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied.”
They contend that since they did not acquire possession of the property in
question “by virtue of any contract, express or implied”—they having been,
to repeat, “allowed to live temporarily ** (therein) for free, out of **
(Cañiza’s) kindness”—in no sense could there be an “expiration or
termination of ** (their) right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract,
express or implied.” Nor would an action for forcible entry lie against them,
since there is no claim that they had “deprived (Cañiza) of the possession
of ** (her property) by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth.”
_______________
21
Sumulong vs. Court of Appeals, 232 SCRA 372 [1994], citing Maddamu
vs. Judge of Municipal Court of Manila, 74 Phil. 230 [1943].
22
Sumulong vs. Court of Appeals, supra, citing Co Tiamco vs. Diaz, 75 Phil.
672 [1946]; Valderama Lumber Manufacturer’s Co. vs. L.S. Sarmiento Co., 5
SCRA 287 [1992]; Pangilinan vs. Aguilar, 43 SCRA 136 [1972].
651
VOL. 268, FEBRUARY 24, 1997 651
Cañiza vs. Court of Appeals
The argument is arrant sophistry. Cañiza’s act of allowing the Estradas to
occupy her house, rent-free, did not create a permanent and indefeasible
right of possession in the latter’s favor. Common sense, and the most
rudimentary sense of fairness clearly require that that act of liberality be
implicitly, but no less certainly, accompanied by the necessary burden on
the Estradas of returning the house to Cañiza upon her demand. More
than once has this Court adjudged that a person who occupies the land of
another at the latter’s tolerance or permission without any contract
between them is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will
vacate upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the
proper remedy against him.23 The situation is not much different from that
of a tenant whose lease expires but who continues in occupancy by
tolerance of the owner, in which case there is deemed to be an unlawful
deprivation or withholding of possession as of the date of the demand to
vacate.24 In other words, one whose stay is merely tolerated becomes a
deforciant illegally occupying the land or property the moment he is
required to leave.25 Thus, in Asset Privatization Trust vs. Court of Appeals,26
where a company, having lawfully obtained possession of a plant upon its
undertaking to buy the same, refused to return it after failing to fulfill its
promise of payment despite demands, this Court held that “(a)fter demand
and its repudiation, ** (its) continuing possession ** became illegal and
the complaint for unlawful detainer filed by the ** (plant’s owner) was its
proper remedy.”
_______________
23
Yu vs. de Lara, 6 SCRA 785 [1962]; Pangilinan vs. Aguilar, 43 SCRA 136
[1972]; Dakudao vs. Consolacion, 122 SCRA 877 [1983]; Peran vs. Presiding
Judge, Br. II, CFI, Sorsogon, 125 SCRA 78 [1983]; Banco de Oro Savings and
Mortgage Bank vs. Court of Appeals, 182 SCRA 464 [1990].
24
Vda. de Catchuela vs. Francisco, 98 SCRA 172 [1980] citing Calubayan vs.
Pascual, 21 SCRA 146, 148 [1967].
25
Odsigue vs. Court of Appeals, 233 SCRA 626 [1994].
26
229 SCRA 627, 636 [1994].
652
652 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cañiza vs. Court of Appeals
It may not be amiss to point out in this connection that where there had
been more than one demand to vacate, the one-year period for filing the
complaint for unlawful detainer must be reckoned from the date of the
last demand,27 the reason being that the lessor has the option to waive his
right of action based on previous demands and let the lessee remain
meanwhile in the premises.28 Now, the complaint filed by Cañiza’s
guardian alleges that the same was “filed within one (1) year from the date
of the first letter of demand dated February 3, 1990.” Although this
averment is not in accord with law because there is in fact a second letter
of demand to vacate, dated February 27, 1990, the mistake is
inconsequential, since the complaint was actually filed on September 17,
1990, well within one year from the second (last) written demand to
vacate.
The Estradas’ possession of the house stemmed from the owner’s express
permission. That permission was subsequently withdrawn by the owner, as
was her right; and it is immaterial that the withdrawal was made through
her judicial guardian, the latter being indisputably clothed with authority
to do so. Nor is it of any consequence that Carmen Cañiza had executed a
will bequeathing the disputed property to the Estradas; that circumstance
did not give them the right to stay in the premises after demand to vacate
on the theory that they might in the future become owners thereof, that
right of ownership being at best inchoate, no transfer of ownership being
possible unless and until the will is duly probated.
Thus, at the time of the institution of the action of desahucio, the Estradas
had no legal right to the property, whether as possessors by tolerance or
sufferance, or as owners. They could not claim the right of possession by
sufferance that had been legally ended. They could not assert any right
_______________
27
Sarmiento vs. Court of Appeals, 250 SCRA 108 [1995] citing Sarona, et al.
vs. Villegas, et al., 22 SCRA 1257 [1968].
28
Penas, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 233 SCRA 744 [1994] citing Racaza vs.
Susana Realty, Inc., 18 SCRA 1172 [1966].
653
VOL. 268, FEBRUARY 24, 1997 653
Cañiza vs. Court of Appeals
of possession flowing from their ownership of the house; their status as
owners is dependent on the probate of the holographic will by which the
property had allegedly been bequeathed to them—an event which still has
to take place; in other words, prior to the probate of the will, any assertion
of possession by them would be premature and inefficacious.
In any case, the only issue that could legitimately be raised under the
circumstances was that involving the Estradas’ possession by tolerance,
i.e., possession de facto, not de jure. It is therefore incorrect to postulate
that the proper remedy for Cañiza is not ejectment but accion publiciana, a
plenary action in the RTC or an action that is one for recovery of the right
to possession de jure.
II
The Estradas insist that the devise of the house to them by Cañiza clearly
denotes her intention that they remain in possession thereof, and legally
incapacitated her judicial guardian, Amparo Evangelista, from evicting
them therefrom, since their ouster would be inconsistent with the ward’s
will.
A will is essentially ambulatory; at any time prior to the testator’s death, it
may be changed or revoked;29 and until admitted to probate, it has no
effect whatever and no right can be claimed thereunder, the law being
quite explicit: “No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is
proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court” (ART. 838,
id.).30 An owner’s intention to confer title in the future to persons
possessing property by his tolerance, is not inconsistent with the former’s
taking back possession in the meantime for any reason deemed sufficient.
And that in this case there was sufficient cause for the owner’s resumption
of possession is apparent: she needed to generate income from the house
on account of the physical infirmities afflicting her, arising from her
extreme age.
_______________
29
ART. 828, Civil Code.
30
ART. 838, Civil Code.
654
654 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cañiza vs. Court of Appeals
Amparo Evangelista was appointed by a competent court the general
guardian of both the person and the estate of her aunt, Carmen Cañiza.
Her Letters of Guardianship31 dated December 19, 1989 clearly installed
her as the “guardian over the person and properties of the incompetent
CARMEN CAÑIZA with full authority to take possession of the property of
said incompetent in any province or provinces in which it may be situated
and to perform all other acts necessary for the management of her
properties **.”32 By that appointment, it became Evangelista’s duty to care
for her aunt’s person, to attend to her physical and spiritual needs, to
assure her wellbeing, with right to custody of her person in preference to
relatives and friends.33 It also became her right and duty to get possession
of, and exercise control over, Cañiza’s property, both real and personal, it
being recognized principle that the ward has no right to possession or
control of his property during her incompetency. 34 That right to manage
the ward’s estate carries with it the right to take possession thereof and
recover it from anyone who retains it,35 and bring and defend such actions
as may be needful for this purpose.36
Actually, in bringing the action of desahucio, Evangelista was merely
discharging the duty to attend to “the comfortable and suitable
maintenance of the ward” explicitly imposed on her by Section 4, Rule 96
of the Rules of Court, viz.:
_______________
31
Petition, Annex “E,” Rollo, p. 44.
32
Emphasis supplied.
33
Francisco, The Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines, 1970 Ed., Vol. V-
B, p. 457, citing Ex-parte Fletcher, 142 So. 30; 39 C.J.S. 86.
34
Francisco, The Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines, 1970 Ed., Vol. V-
B. p. 458, citing 39 C.J.S. 114-115.
35
Castillo v. Bustamante, 64 Phil. 839 [1937], cited in Moran, Comments on
the Rules of Court, Vol. 3, 1980 ed., p. 570.
36
Conchita Juachon vs. Felix Manalo, G.R. No. L-42, 77 Phil. 1092, [January
20, 1947, unreported], cited in Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court,
1979 Ed., Volume I, p. 176.
655
VOL. 268, FEBRUARY 24, 1997 655
Cañiza vs. Court of Appeals
“SEC. 4. Estate to be managed frugally, and proceeds applied to
maintenance of ward.—A guardian must manage the estate of his ward
frugally and without waste, and apply the income and profits thereof, so
far as may be necessary, to the comfortable and suitable maintenance of
the ward and his family, if there be any; and if such income and profits be
insufficient for that purpose, the guardian may sell or encumber the real
estate, upon being authorized by order to do so, and apply to such of the
proceeds as may be necessary to such maintenance.”
Finally, it may be pointed out in relation to the Estrada’s defenses in the
ejectment action, that as the law now stands, even when, in forcible entry
and unlawful detainer cases, the defendant raises the question of
ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be
resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
nevertheless have the undoubted competence to resolve “the issue of
ownership ** only to determine the issue of possession.” 37
III
As already stated, Carmen Cañiza passed away during the pendency of this
appeal. The Estradas thereupon moved to dismiss the petition, arguing
that Cañiza’s death automatically terminated the guardianship, Amparo
Evangelista lost all authority as her judicial guardian, and ceased to have
legal personality to represent her in the present appeal. The motion is
without merit.
While it is indeed well-established rule that the relationship of guardian
and ward is necessarily terminated by the death of either the guardian or
the ward,38 the rule affords no advantage to the Estradas. Amparo
Evangelista, as niece of
_______________
37
Sec. 3, R.A. No. 7691, amending Sec. 33 of B.P. 129; SEE Wilmon Auto
Supply Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 208 SCRA 108 [1992].
38
Francisco, The Revised Rules of Court in the Phils., Vol. V-B, 1970 Ed.,
citing 25 Am. Jur. 37.
656
656 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cañiza vs. Court of Appeals
Carmen Cañiza, is one of the latter’s only two (2) surviving heirs, the other
being Cañiza’s nephew, Ramon C. Nevado. On their motion and by
Resolution of this Court39 of June 20, 1994, they were in fact substituted as
parties in the appeal at bar in place of the deceased, in accordance with
Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, viz.:40
SEC. 18. Death of a party.—After a party dies and the claim is not thereby
extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal
representative of the deceased to appear and be substituted for the
deceased within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such time as may be
granted. If the legal representative fails to appear within said time, the
court may order the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal
representative of the deceased within a time to be specified by the court,
and the representative shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the
interest of the deceased. The court charges involved in procuring such
appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as
costs. The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the
deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or
administrator and the court may appoint guardian ad litem for the minor
heirs.
To be sure, an ejectment case survives the death of a party. Cañiza’s
demise did not extinguish the desahucio suit instituted by her through her
guardian.41 That action, not being a purely personal one, survived her
death; her heirs have taken her place and now represent her interests in
the appeal at bar.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals promulgated on June 2, 1993—affirming the Regional Trial Court’s
judgment and dismissing petitioner’s petition for certiorari—is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE, and the Decision dated April 13, 1992 of the Metro-
_______________
39
Second Division; SEE footnote 17, supra.
40
Emphasis supplied.
41
Vda. de Salazar vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 250 SCRA 305 (Nov. 23, 1995)
citing Vda. de Haberes vs. Court of Appeals, 104 SCRA 534 [1981]; Republic
vs. Bagtas, 6 SCRA 242 [1962]; Florendo, Jr. vs. Coloma, 129 SCRA 304
[1984].
657
VOL. 268, FEBRUARY 26, 1997 657
Nazareno vs. Almario
politan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 35, in Civil Case No. 3410 is
REINSTATED and AFFIRMED. Costs against private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Melo, Francisco and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
Petition granted. Judgment reversed and set aside, that of the court a quo
reinstated and affirmed.
Notes.—An action for annulment of a contract entered into by minors or
other incapacitated persons shall be brought within four years from the
time the guardianship ceases. (Causapin vs. Court of Appeals, 233 SCRA
615 [1994])
No contract may be entered into upon a future inheritance except in cases
expressly authorized by law—such a contract is not valid and cannot be the
source of any right nor the creator of any obligation between the parties.
(Tañedo vs. Court of Appeals, 252 SCRA 80 [1996])
——o0o——
G.R. No. 194366 October 10, 2012
NAPOLEON D. NERI, ALICIA D. NERI-MONDEJAR, VISMINDA D. NERI-
CHAMBERS, ROSA D. NERI-MILLAN, DOUGLAS D. NERI, EUTROPIA D.
ILLUT-COCKINOS AND VICTORIA D. ILLUT-PIALA, Petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF HADJI YUSOP UY AND JULPHA* IBRAHIM UY, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, petitioners Napoleon D. Neri (Napoleon), Alicia D. Neri-Mondejar
(Alicia), Visminda D. Neri-Chambers (Visminda), Rosa D. Neri-Millan (Rosa),
Douglas D. Neri (Douglas), Eutropia D. Illut-Cockinos (Eutropia), and
Victoria D. Illut-Piala (Victoria) seek to reverse and set aside the April 27,
2010 Decision2 and October 18, 2010 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 01031-MIN which annulled the October 25, 2004
Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Panabo City, Davao del Norte
and instead, entered a new one dismissing petitioners’ complaint for
annulment of sale, damages and attorney’s feesagainst herein respondents
heirs of spouses Hadji Yusop Uy and Julpha Ibrahim Uy (heirs of Uy).
The Facts
During her lifetime, Anunciacion Neri (Anunciacion) had seven children,
two (2) from her first marriage with Gonzalo Illut (Gonzalo), namely:
Eutropia and Victoria, and five (5) from her second marriage with Enrique
Neri (Enrique), namely: Napoleon, Alicia, Visminda, Douglas and Rosa.
Throughout the marriage of spouses Enrique and Anunciacion, they
acquired several homestead properties with a total area of 296,555 square
meters located in Samal, Davao del Norte, embraced by Original Certificate
of Title (OCT) Nos. (P-7998) P-21285 , (P-14608) P-51536 and P-20551 (P-
8348)7 issued on February 15, 1957, August 27, 1962 and July 7, 1967,
respectively.
On September 21, 1977, Anunciacion died intestate. Her husband, Enrique,
in his personal capacity and as natural guardian of his minor children Rosa
and Douglas, together with Napoleon, Alicia, and Vismindaexecuted an
Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale 8 on July
7, 1979, adjudicating among themselves the said homestead properties,
and thereafter, conveying themto the late spouses Hadji Yusop Uy and
Julpha Ibrahim Uy (spouses Uy)for a consideration of ₱ 80,000.00.
On June 11, 1996, the children of Enrique filed a complaint for annulment
of saleof the said homestead properties against spouses Uy (later
substituted by their heirs)before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No.96-28,
assailing the validity of the sale for having been sold within the prohibited
period. Thecomplaint was later amended to include Eutropia and
Victoriaas additional plaintiffs for having been excluded and deprived of
their legitimes as childrenof Anunciacion from her first marriage.
In their amended answer with counterclaim, the heirs of Uy countered that
the sale took place beyond the 5-year prohibitory period from the issuance
of the homestead patents. They also denied knowledge of Eutropia and
Victoria’s exclusionfrom the extrajudicial settlement and sale of the
subject properties, and interposed further the defenses of prescription and
laches.
The RTC Ruling
On October 25, 2004, the RTC rendered a decision ordering, among others,
the annulment of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute
Deed of Sale. It ruled that while the sale occurred beyond the 5-year
prohibitory period, the sale is still void because Eutropia and Victoria were
deprived of their hereditary rights and that Enrique had no judicial
authority to sell the shares of his minor children, Rosa and Douglas.
Consequently, it rejected the defenses of laches and prescription raised by
spouses Uy, who claimed possession of the subject properties for 17 years,
holding that co-ownership rights are imprescriptible.
The CA Ruling
On appeal, the CAreversed and set aside the ruling of the RTC in its April
27, 2010 Decision and dismissed the complaint of the petitioners. It held
that, while Eutropia and Victoria had no knowledge of the extrajudicial
settlement and sale of the subject properties and as such, were not bound
by it, the CA found it unconscionable to permit the annulment of the sale
considering spouses Uy’s possession thereof for 17 years, and thatEutropia
and Victoriabelatedlyfiled their actionin 1997, ormore than two years
fromknowledge of their exclusion as heirs in 1994 when their stepfather
died. It, however, did not preclude the excluded heirs from recovering
their legitimes from their co-heirs.
Similarly, the CA declared the extrajudicial settlement and the subsequent
saleas valid and binding with respect to Enrique and hischildren, holding
that as co-owners, they have the right to dispose of their respective shares
as they consider necessary or fit.While recognizing Rosa and Douglas to be
minors at that time, they were deemed to have ratified the sale whenthey
failed to question it upon reaching the age of majority.Italso found laches
to have set in because of their inaction for a long period of time.
The Issues
In this petition, petitioners imputeto the CA the following errors:
I. WHEN IT UPHELDTHE VALIDITY OF THE "EXTRA JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF
THE ESTATE WITH ABSOLUTE DEED OF SALE" AS FAR AS THE SHARES OF
EUTROPIA AND VICTORIA WERE CONCERNED, THEREBY DEPRIVING THEM
OF THEIR INHERITANCE;
II. WHEN IT DID NOT NULLIFY OR ANNUL THE "EXTRA JUDICIAL
SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE WITH ABSOLUTE DEED OF SALE" WITH
RESPECT TO THE SHARESOF ROSA AND DOUGLAS, THEREBY DEPRIVING
THEM OF THEIR INHERITANCE; and
III. WHEN IT FOUND THAT LACHES OR PRESCRIPTION HAS SET IN.
The Ruling of the Court
The petitionis meritorious.
It bears to stress that all the petitioners herein are indisputably legitimate
children of Anunciacion from her first and second marriages with Gonzalo
and Enrique, respectively, and consequently, are entitled to inherit from
her in equal shares, pursuant to Articles 979 and 980 of the Civil Code
which read:
ART. 979. Legitimate children and their descendants succeed the parents
and other ascendants, without distinction as to sex or age, and even if they
should come from different marriages.
xxx
ART. 980. The children of the deceased shall always inherit from him in
their own right, dividing the inheritance in equal shares.
As such, upon the death of Anunciacion on September 21, 1977, her
children and Enrique acquired their respective inheritances, 9 entitling them
to their pro indiviso shares in her whole estate, as follows:
Enrique 9/16 (1/2 of the conjugal assets + 1/16)
Eutropia 1/16
Victoria 1/16
Napoleon 1/16
Alicia 1/16
Visminda 1/16
Rosa 1/16
Douglas 1/16
Hence, in the execution of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with
Absolute Deed of Sale in favor of spouses Uy, all the heirs of
Anunciacionshould have participated. Considering that Eutropia and
Victoria were admittedly excluded and that then minors Rosa and Douglas
were not properly represented therein, the settlement was not valid and
binding uponthem and consequently, a total nullity.
Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. – x x x
The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be
published in a newspaper of general circulation in the manner provided in
the next succeeding section; but no extrajudicial settlement shall be
binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice
thereof. (Underscoring added)
The effect of excluding the heirs in the settlement of estate was further
elucidated in Segura v. Segura,10 thus:
It is clear that Section 1 of Rule 74 does not apply to the partition in
question which was null and void as far as the plaintiffs were concerned.
The rule covers only valid partitions. The partition in the present case was
invalid because it excluded six of the nine heirs who were entitled to equal
shares in the partitioned property. Under the rule "no extrajudicial
settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated
therein or had no notice thereof." As the partition was a total nullity and
did not affect the excluded heirs, it was not correct for the trial court to
hold that their right to challenge the partition had prescribed after two
years from its execution…
However, while the settlement of the estate is null and void, the
subsequent sale of the subject propertiesmade by Enrique and his children,
Napoleon, Alicia and Visminda, in favor of the respondents isvalid but only
with respect to their proportionate shares therein.It cannot be denied that
these heirs have acquired their respective shares in the properties of
Anunciacion from the moment of her death11 and that, as owners thereof,
they can very well sell their undivided share in the estate. 12
With respect to Rosa and Douglas who were minors at the time of the
execution of the settlement and sale, their natural guardian and father,
Enrique, represented them in the transaction. However, on the basis of the
laws prevailing at that time, Enrique was merely clothed with powers of
administration and bereft of any authority to dispose of their 2/16 shares
in the estate of their mother, Anunciacion.
Articles 320 and 326 of the Civil Code, the laws in force at the time of the
execution of the settlement and sale, provide:
ART. 320. The father, or in his absence the mother, is the legal
administrator of the property pertaining to the child under parental
authority. If the property is worth more than two thousand pesos, the
father or mother shall give a bond subject to the approval of the Court of
First Instance.
ART. 326. When the property of the child is worth more than two thousand
pesos, the father or mother shall be considered a guardian of the child’s
property, subject to the duties and obligations of guardians under the
Rules of Court.
Corollarily, Section 7, Rule 93 of the Rules of Court also provides:
SEC. 7. Parents as Guardians. – When the property of the child under
parental authority is worth two thousand pesos or less, the father or the
mother, without the necessity of court appointment, shall be his legal
guardian. When the property of the child is worth more than two thousand
pesos, the father or the mother shall be considered guardian of the child’s
property, with the duties and obligations of guardians under these Rules,
and shall file the petition required by Section 2 hereof. For good reasons,
the court may, however, appoint another suitable persons.
Administration includes all acts for the preservation of the property and
the receipt of fruits according to the natural purpose of the thing. Any act
of disposition or alienation, or any reduction in the substance of the
patrimony of child, exceeds the limits of administration.13 Thus, a father or
mother, as the natural guardian of the minor under parental authority,
does not have the power to dispose or encumber the property of the
latter. Such power is granted by law only to a judicial guardian of the
ward’s property and even then only with courts’ prior approval secured in
accordance with the proceedings set forth by the Rules of Court. 14
Consequently, the disputed sale entered into by Enrique in behalf of his
minor children without the proper judicial authority, unless ratified by
them upon reaching the age of majority,15 is unenforceable in accordance
with Articles 1317 and 1403(1) of the Civil Code which provide:
ART. 1317. No one may contract in the name of another without being
authorized by the latter or unless he has by law a right to represent him.
A contract entered into in the name of another by one who has no
authority or legal representation, or who has acted beyond his powers,
shall be unenforceable, unless it is ratified, expressly or impliedly, by the
person on whose behalf it has been executed, before it is revoked by the
other contracting party.
ART. 1403. The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they are
ratified:
(1) Those entered into the name of another person by one who has been
given no authority or legal representation, or who has acted beyond his
powers;
xxx
Ratification means that one under no disability voluntarily adopts and
gives sanction to some unauthorized act or defective proceeding, which
without his sanction would not be binding on him. It is this voluntary
choice, knowingly made, which amounts to a ratification of what was
theretofore unauthorized, and becomes the authorized act of the party so
making the ratification.16 Once ratified, expressly or impliedly such as when
the person knowingly received benefits from it, the contract is cleansed
from all its defects from the moment it was constituted,17 as it has a
retroactive effect.
Records, however, show that Rosa had ratified the extrajudicial settlement
of the estate with absolute deed of sale. In Napoleon and Rosa’s
Manifestation18 before the RTC dated July 11, 1997,they stated:
"Concerning the sale of our parcel of land executed by our father, Enrique
Neri concurred in and conformed to by us and our other two sisters and
brother (the other plaintiffs), in favor of Hadji Yusop Uy and his spouse
Hadja Julpa Uy on July 7, 1979, we both confirmed that the same was
voluntary and freely made by all of us and therefore the sale was
absolutely valid and enforceable as far as we all plaintiffs in this case are
concerned;" (Underscoring supplied)
In their June 30, 1997 Joint-Affidavit,19 Napoleon and Rosa also alleged:
"That we are surprised that our names are included in this case since we
do not have any intention to file a case against Hadji Yusop Uy and Julpha
Ibrahim Uy and their family and we respect and acknowledge the validity
of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale
dated July 7, 1979;" (Underscoring supplied)
Clearly, the foregoing statements constitutedratification of the settlement
of the estate and the subsequent sale, thus, purging all the defects existing
at the time of its execution and legitimizing the conveyance of Rosa’s 1/16
share in the estate of Anunciacion to spouses Uy. The same, however, is
not true with respect to Douglas for lack of evidence showing ratification.
Considering, thus, that the extrajudicial settlement with sale is invalid and
therefore, not binding on Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas, only the shares
ofEnrique, Napoleon, Alicia, Visminda and Rosa in the homestead
properties have effectivelybeen disposed in favor of spouses Uy. "A person
can only sell what he owns, or is authorized to sell and the buyer can as a
consequence acquire no more than what the sellercan legally
transfer."20 On this score, Article 493 of the Civil Codeis relevant, which
provides:
Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits
and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or
mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except
when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the
mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion
which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the
co-ownership.
Consequently, spouses Uy or their substituted heirs became pro indiviso
co-owners of the homestead properties with Eutropia, Victoria and
Douglas, who retained title to their respective 1/16 shares. They were
deemed to be holding the 3/16 shares of Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas
under an implied constructive trust for the latter’s benefit, conformably
with Article 1456 of the Civil Code which states:"if property is acquired
through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law,
considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from
whom the property comes." As such, it is only fair, just and equitable that
the amount paid for their shares equivalent to ₱ 5,000.0021 each or a total
of ₱ 15,000.00 be returned to spouses Uy with legal interest.
On the issue of prescription, the Court agrees with petitioners that the
present action has not prescribed in so far as it seeks to annul the
extrajudicial settlement of the estate. Contrary to the ruling of the CA, the
prescriptive period of 2 years provided in Section 1 Rule 74 of the Rules of
Court reckoned from the execution of the extrajudicial settlement finds no
application to petitioners Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas, who were
deprived of their lawful participation in the subject estate. Besides, an
"action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does
not prescribe" in accordance with Article 1410 of the Civil Code.
However, the action to recover property held in trust prescribes after 10
years from the time the cause of action accrues,22 which is from the time of
actual notice in case of unregistered deed.23 In this case, Eutropia, Victoria
and Douglas claimed to have knowledge of the extrajudicial settlement
with sale after the death of their father, Enrique, in 1994 which spouses Uy
failed to refute. Hence, the complaint filed in 1997 was well within the
prescriptive period of 10 years.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The April 27, 2010 Decision
and October 18, 2010 Resolution of the Court of Appeals
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new judgment is entered:
1. Declaring the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of
Anunciacion Neri NULL and VOID;
2. Declaring the Absolute Deed of Sale in favor of the late spouses
Hadji Yusop Uy and Julpha Ibrahim Uy as regards the 13/16 total
shares of the late Enrique Neri, Napoleon Neri, Alicia D. Neri-
Mondejar, Visminda D. Neri-Chambers and Rosa D. Neri-
Millan VALID;
3. Declaring Eutropia D. Illut-Cockinos, Victoria D. Illut-Piala and
Douglas D. Neri as the LAWFUL OWNERS of the 3/16 portions of
the subject homestead properties, covered by Original Certificate
of Title Nos. (P-7998) P-2128, (P-14608) P-5153 and P-20551 (P-
8348); and
4. Ordering the estate of the late Enrique Neri, as well as
Napoleon Neri, Alicia D. Neri-Mondejar, Visminda D. Neri-
Chambers and Rosa D. Neri-Millan to return to the respondents
jointly and solidarily the amount paid corresponding to the 3/16
shares of Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas in the total amount of ₱
15,000.00, with legal interest at 6% per annum computed from
the time of payment until finality of this decision and 12% per
annum thereafter until fully paid.
No pronouncement as to costs.
 G.R. No. 184528. April 25, 2012.*
NILO OROPESA, petitioner, vs. CIRILO OROPESA, respondent.
Remedial Law; Special Proceedings; Guardianship; A guardianship is a trust
relation of the most sacred character, in which one person, called a
“guardian” acts for another called the “ward” whom the law regards as
incapable of managing his own affairs.—In Francisco v. Court of Appeals,
127 SCRA 371 (1984), we laid out the nature and purpose of guardianship
in the following wise: A guardianship is a trust relation of the most sacred
character, in which one person, called a “guardian” acts for another called
the “ward” whom the law regards as incapable of managing his own
affairs. A guardianship is designed to further the ward’s well-being, not
that of the guardian. It is intended to preserve the ward’s property, as well
as to render any assistance that the ward may personally require. It has
been stated that while custody involves immediate care and control,
guardianship indicates not only those responsibilities, but those of one in
loco parentis as well. In a guardianship proceeding, a court may appoint a
qualified guardian if the prospective ward is proven to be a minor or an
incompetent.
Same; Same; Same; Incompetents; A reading of Section 2, Rule 92 of the
Rules of Court tells us that persons who, though of sound mind but by
reason of age, disease, weak mind or other similar causes, are incapable of
taking care of themselves and their property without outside aid are
considered as incompetents who may properly be placed under
guardianship.—A reading of Section 2, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court tells us
that persons who, though of sound mind but by reason of age, disease,
weak mind or other similar causes, are incapable of taking care of
themselves and their property without outside aid are considered as
incompetents who may properly be placed under guardianship. The full
text of the said provision reads: Sec. 2. Meaning of the word
“incompetent.”—Under this rule, the word “incompetent” includes
persons suffering the penalty of civil interdiction or who are hospitalized
lepers, prodigals, deaf and dumb
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
175
VOL. 671, APRIL 25, 2012 175
Oropesa vs. Oropesa
who are unable to read and write, those who are of unsound mind, even
though they have lucid intervals, and persons not being of unsound mind,
but by reason of age, disease, weak mind, and other similar causes,
cannot, without outside aid, take care of themselves and manage their
property, becoming thereby an easy prey for deceit and exploitation.
Same; Civil Procedure; Petition for Review on Certiorari; Appeals; As a
general rule, “only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review
on certiorari because the Court is not a trier of facts.”—It is axiomatic that,
as a general rule, “only questions of law may be raised in a petition for
review on certiorari because the Court is not a trier of facts.” We only take
cognizance of questions of fact in certain exceptional circumstances;
however, we find them to be absent in the instant case. It is also long
settled that “factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court
of Appeals, will not be disturbed by this Court. As a rule, such findings by
the lower courts are entitled to great weight and respect, and are deemed
final and conclusive on this Court when supported by the evidence on
record.” We therefore adopt the factual findings of the lower court and
the Court of Appeals and rule that the grant of respondent’s demurrer to
evidence was proper under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar.
Same; Same; Demurrer to Evidence; A demurrer to evidence is defined as
“an objection by one of the parties in an action, to the effect that the
evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law,
whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain the issue.”—A demurrer
to evidence is defined as “an objection by one of the parties in an action,
to the effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient
in point of law, whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain the
issue.” We have also held that a demurrer to evidence “authorizes a
judgment on the merits of the case without the defendant having to
submit evidence on his part, as he would ordinarily have to do, if plaintiff’s
evidence shows that he is not entitled to the relief sought.”
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the
Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.176
176 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Oropesa vs. Oropesa
Paras & Manlapaz Lawyers for petitioner.
Adaza, Adaza & Adaza for respondent.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure of the Decision1 dated February 29, 2008, as well as the
Resolution2 dated September 16, 2008, both rendered by the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88449, entitled “NILO OROPESA vs. CIRILO
OROPESA.” The Court of Appeals’ issuances affirmed the Order3 dated
September 27, 2006 and the Order4 dated November 14, 2006 issued by
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Parañaque City, Branch 260 in SP. Proc.
Case No. 04-0016, which dismissed petitioner Nilo Oropesa’s petition for
guardianship over the properties of his father, respondent Cirilo Oropesa
(a widower), and denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration thereof,
respectively.
The facts of this case, as summed in the assailed Decision, follow:
“On January 23, 2004, the (petitioner) filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Parañaque City, a petition for him and a certain Ms. Louie Ginez to be
appointed as guardians over the property of his father, the (respondent)
Cirilo Oropesa. The case was docketed as SP Proc. No. 04-0016 and raffled
off to Branch 260.
In the said petition, it is alleged among others that the (respondent) has
been afflicted with several maladies and has been sickly for over ten (10)
years already having suffered a stroke on April 1, 2003 and June 1, 2003,
that his judgment and memory
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 72-83; penned by Associate Justice Amelita G. Tolentino with
Associate Justices Lucenito N. Tagle and Agustin S. Dizon, concurring.
2 Id., at pp. 85-86.
3 Id., at pp. 457-460.
4 Id., at pp. 468-469.
177
VOL. 671, APRIL 25, 2012 177
Oropesa vs. Oropesa
[were] impaired and such has been evident after his hospitalization; that
even before his stroke, the (respondent) was observed to have had lapses
in memory and judgment, showing signs of failure to manage his property
properly; that due to his age and medical condition, he cannot, without
outside aid, manage his property wisely, and has become an easy prey for
deceit and exploitation by people around him, particularly Ms. Ma. Luisa
Agamata, his girlfriend.
In an Order dated January 29, 2004, the presiding judge of the court a quo
set the case for hearing, and directed the court social worker to conduct a
social case study and submit a report thereon.
Pursuant to the abovementioned order, the Court Social Worker
conducted her social case study, interviewing the (petitioner) and his
witnesses. The Court Social Worker subsequently submitted her report but
without any finding on the (respondent) who refused to see and talk to the
social worker.
On July 6, 2004, the (respondent) filed his Opposition to the petition for
guardianship. On August 3, 2004, the (respondent) filed his Supplemental
Opposition.
Thereafter, the (petitioner) presented his evidence which consists of his
testimony, and that of his sister Gianina Oropesa Bennett, and the
(respondent’s) former nurse, Ms. Alma Altaya.
After presenting evidence, the (petitioner) filed a manifestation dated May
29, 2006 resting his case. The (petitioner) failed to file his written formal
offer of evidence.
Thus, the (respondent) filed his “Omnibus Motion (1) to Declare the
petitioner to have waived the presentation of his Offer of Exhibits and the
presentation of his Evidence Closed since they were not formally offered;
(2) To Expunge the Documents of the Petitioner from the Record; and (3)
To Grant leave to the Oppositor to File Demurrer to Evidence.
In an Order dated July 14, 2006, the court a quo granted the (respondent’s)
Omnibus Motion. Thereafter, the (respondent) then filed his Demurrer to
Evidence dated July 23, 2006.”5 (Citations omitted.)
_______________
5 Id., at pp. 73-75.
178
178 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Oropesa vs. Oropesa
The trial court granted respondent’s demurrer to evidence in an Order
dated September 27, 2006. The dispositive portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, considering that the petitioner has failed to provide
sufficient evidence to establish that Gen. Cirilo O. Oropesa is incompetent
to run his personal affairs and to administer his properties, Oppositor’s
Demurrer to Evidence is GRANTED, and the case is DISMISSED.”6
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but this was denied by the trial court
in an Order dated November 14, 2006, the dispositive portion of which
states:
“WHEREFORE, considering that the Court record shows that petitioner-
movant has failed to provide sufficient documentary and testimonial
evidence to establish that Gen. Cirilo Oropesa is incompetent to run his
personal affairs and to administer his properties, the Court hereby affirms
its earlier Order dated 27 September 2006.
Accordingly, petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED for lack of
merit.”7
Unperturbed, petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals but his
appeal was dismissed through the now assailed Decision dated February
29, 2008, the dispositive portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The
assailed orders of the court a quo dated September 27, 2006 and
November 14, 2006 are AFFIRMED.”8
A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner but this was denied by
the Court of Appeals in the similarly as-
_______________
6 Id., at p. 460.
7 Id., at p. 469.
8 Id., at p. 82.
179
VOL. 671, APRIL 25, 2012 179
Oropesa vs. Oropesa
sailed Resolution dated September 16, 2008. Hence, the instant petition
was filed.
Petitioner submits the following question for consideration by this Court:
WHETHER RESPONDENT IS CONSIDERED AN “INCOMPETENT” PERSON AS
DEFINED UNDER SECTION 2, RULE 92 OF THE RULES OF COURT WHO
SHOULD BE PLACED UNDER GUARDIANSHIP9
After considering the evidence and pleadings on record, we find the
petition to be without merit.
Petitioner comes before the Court arguing that the assailed rulings of the
Court of Appeals should be set aside as it allegedly committed grave and
reversible error when it affirmed the erroneous decision of the trial court
which purportedly disregarded the overwhelming evidence presented by
him showing respondent’s incompetence.
In Francisco v. Court of Appeals,10 we laid out the nature and purpose of
guardianship in the following wise:
“A guardianship is a trust relation of the most sacred character, in which
one person, called a “guardian” acts for another called the “ward” whom
the law regards as incapable of managing his own affairs. A guardianship is
designed to further the ward’s well-being, not that of the guardian. It is
intended to preserve the ward’s property, as well as to render any
assistance that the ward may personally require. It has been stated that
while custody involves immediate care and control, guardianship indicates
not only those responsibilities, but those of one in loco parentis as well.”11
_______________
9 Id., at p. 667.
10 212 Phil. 346; 127 SCRA 371 (1984).
11 Id., at p. 352; pp. 377-378.
180
180 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Oropesa vs. Oropesa
In a guardianship proceeding, a court may appoint a qualified guardian if
the prospective ward is proven to be a minor or an incompetent.
A reading of Section 2, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court tells us that persons
who, though of sound mind but by reason of age, disease, weak mind or
other similar causes, are incapable of taking care of themselves and their
property without outside aid are considered as incompetents who may
properly be placed under guardianship. The full text of the said provision
reads:
“Sec. 2. Meaning of the word “incompetent.”—Under this rule, the word
“incompetent” includes persons suffering the penalty of civil interdiction
or who are hospitalized lepers, prodigals, deaf and dumb who are unable
to read and write, those who are of unsound mind, even though they have
lucid intervals, and persons not being of unsound mind, but by reason of
age, disease, weak mind, and other similar causes, cannot, without outside
aid, take care of themselves and manage their property, becoming thereby
an easy prey for deceit and exploitation.”
We have held in the past that a “finding that a person is incompetent
should be anchored on clear, positive and definite evidence.”12 We
consider that evidentiary standard unchanged and, thus, must be applied
in the case at bar.In support of his contention that respondent is
incompetent and, therefore, should be placed in guardianship, petitioner
raises in his Memorandum13 the following factual matters:
a. Respondent has been afflicted with several maladies
and has been sickly for over ten (10) years already;
_______________
12 Vda. de Baluyut v. Luciano, 164 Phil. 55, 70; 72 SCRA 52, 66 (1976),
citing Yangco v. Court of First Instance of Manila, 29 Phil. 183, 190 (1915).
13 Rollo, pp. 653-682.
181
VOL. 671, APRIL 25, 2012 181
Oropesa vs. Oropesa
b. During the time that respondent was hospitalized at the
St. Luke’s Medical Center after his stroke, he purportedly
requested one of his former colleagues who was visiting him
to file a loan application with the Armed Forces of the
Philippines Savings and Loan Association, Inc. (AFPSLAI) for
payment of his hospital bills, when, as far as his children
knew, he had substantial amounts of money in various
banks sufficient to cover his medical expenses;
c. Respondent’s residence allegedly has been left
dilapidated due to lack of care and management;
d. The realty taxes for respondent’s various properties
remain unpaid and therefore petitioner and his sister were
supposedly compelled to pay the necessary taxes;
e. Respondent allegedly instructed petitioner to sell his
Nissan Exalta car for the reason that the former would be
purchasing another vehicle, but when the car had been sold,
respondent did not procure another vehicle and refused to
account for the money earned from the sale of the old car;
f. Respondent withdrew at least $75,000.00 from a joint
account under his name and his daughter’s without the
latter’s knowledge or consent;
g. There was purportedly one occasion where respondent
took a kitchen knife to stab himself upon the “orders” of his
girlfriend during one of their fights;
h. Respondent continuously allows his girlfriend to ransack
his house of groceries and furniture, despite protests from
his children.14
Respondent denied the allegations made by petitioner and cited
petitioner’s lack of material evidence to support his claims. According to
respondent, petitioner did not present any relevant documentary or
testimonial evidence that would attest to the veracity of his assertion that
respondent is in-
_______________
14 Id., at p. 659.
182
182 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Oropesa vs. Oropesa
competent largely due to his alleged deteriorating medical and mental
condition. In fact, respondent points out that the only medical document
presented by petitioner proves that he is indeed competent to run his
personal affairs and administer his properties. Portions of the said
document, entitled “Report of Neuropsychological Screening,”15 were
quoted by respondent in his Memorandum16 to illustrate that said report
in fact favored respondent’s claim of competence, to wit:
“General Oropesa spoke fluently in English and Filipino, he enjoyed and
participated meaningfully in conversations and could be quite elaborate in
his responses on many of the test items. He spoke in a clear voice and his
articulation was generally comprehensible. x x x.
xxxx
General Oropesa performed in the average range on most of the domains
that were tested. He was able to correctly perform mental calculations and
keep track of number sequences on a task of attention. He did BEST in
visuo-constructional tasks where he had to copy geometrical designs using
tiles. Likewise, he was able to render and read the correct time on the
Clock Drawing Test. x x x.
xxxx
x x x Reasoning abilities were generally intact as he was able to suggest
effective solutions to problem situations. x x x.”17
With the failure of petitioner to formally offer his documentary evidence,
his proof of his father’s incompetence consisted purely of testimonies
given by himself and his sister (who were claiming interest in their father’s
real and personal properties) and their father’s former caregiver (who
admitted to be acting under their direction). These testimonies, which did
not include any expert medical testimony, were insufficient to convince
the trial court of petitioner’s cause of action
_______________
15 Records, pp. 10-13.
16 Rollo, pp. 684-705.
17 Records, pp. 11-12.
183
VOL. 671, APRIL 25, 2012 183
Oropesa vs. Oropesa
and instead lead it to grant the demurrer to evidence that was filed by
respondent.
Even if we were to overlook petitioner’s procedural lapse in failing to make
a formal offer of evidence, his documentary proof were comprised mainly
of certificates of title over real properties registered in his, his father’s and
his sister’s names as co-owners, tax declarations, and receipts showing
payment of real estate taxes on their co-owned properties, which do not in
any way relate to his father’s alleged incapacity to make decisions for
himself. The only medical document on record is the aforementioned
“Report of Neuropsychological Screening” which was attached to the
petition for guardianship but was never identified by any witness nor
offered as evidence. In any event, the said report, as mentioned earlier,
was ambivalent at best, for although the report had negative findings
regarding memory lapses on the part of respondent, it also contained
findings that supported the view that respondent on the average was
indeed competent.
In an analogous guardianship case wherein the soundness of mind of the
proposed ward was at issue, we had the occasion to rule that “where the
sanity of a person is at issue, expert opinion is not necessary [and that] the
observations of the trial judge coupled with evidence establishing the
person’s state of mental sanity will suffice.”18
Thus, it is significant that in its Order dated November 14, 2006 which
denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration on the trial court’s
unfavorable September 27, 2006 ruling, the trial court highlighted the fatal
role that petitioner’s own documentary evidence played in disproving its
case and, likewise, the trial court made known its own observation of
respondent’s physical and mental state, to wit:
_______________
18 Hernandez v. San Juan-Santos, G.R. Nos. 166470 and 169217, August 7,
2009, 595 SCRA 464, 473-474.
184
184 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Oropesa vs. Oropesa
“The Court noted the absence of any testimony of a medical expert which
states that Gen. Cirilo O. Oropesa does not have the mental, emotional,
and physical capacity to manage his own affairs. On the contrary,
Oppositor’s evidence includes a Neuropsychological Screening Report
which states that Gen. Oropesa, (1) performs on the average range in most
of the domains that were tested; (2) is capable of mental calculations; and
(3) can provide solutions to problem situations. The Report concludes that
Gen. Oropesa possesses intact cognitive functioning, except for mildly
impaired abilities in memory, reasoning and orientation. It is the
observation of the Court that oppositor is still sharp, alert and able.”19
(Citation omitted; emphasis supplied.)
It is axiomatic that, as a general rule, “only questions of law may be raised
in a petition for review on certiorari because the Court is not a trier of
facts.”20 We only take cognizance of questions of fact in certain
exceptional circumstances;21 however, we find them to be absent in the
instant case. It is also long settled that “factual findings of the trial court,
when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, will not be disturbed by this Court.
As a rule, such findings by the lower courts are entitled to great weight and
respect, and are deemed final and conclusive on this Court when
supported by the evidence on record.”22 We therefore adopt the factual
findings of the lower court and the Court of Appeals and rule that the grant
of respondent’s demurrer to evidence was proper under the circumstances
obtaining in the case at bar.
Section 1, Rule 33 of the Rules of Court provides:
_______________
19 Rollo, p. 468.
20 Office of the Ombudsman v. Racho, G.R. No. 185685, January 31, 2011,
641 SCRA 148, 155.
21 Heirs of Jose Lim v. Lim, G.R. No. 172690, March 3, 2010, 614 SCRA 141,
147.
22 Maxwell Heavy Equipment Corporation v. Yu, G.R. No. 179395,
December 15, 2010, 638 SCRA 653, 658.
185
VOL. 671, APRIL 25, 2012 185
Oropesa vs. Oropesa
“Section 1. Demurrer to evidence.—After the plaintiff has completed the As a general rule, an order granting the accused’s demurrer to evidence
presentation of his evidence, the defendant may move for dismissal on the amounts to an acquittal. There are certain exceptions, however, as when
ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to the grant thereof would not violate the constitutional proscription on
relief. If his motion is denied, he shall have the right to present evidence. If double jeopardy. (Mupas vs. People, 659 SCRA 56 [2011])
the motion is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he ——o0o——
shall be deemed to have waived the right to present evidence.” © Copyright 2020 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
A demurrer to evidence is defined as “an objection by one of the parties in
an action, to the effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is
insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make out a case or
sustain the issue.”23 We have also held that a demurrer to evidence
“authorizes a judgment on the merits of the case without the defendant
having to submit evidence on his part, as he would ordinarily have to do, if
plaintiff’s evidence shows that he is not entitled to the relief sought.”24
There was no error on the part of the trial court when it dismissed the
petition for guardianship without first requiring respondent to present his
evidence precisely because the effect of granting a demurrer to evidence
other than dismissing a cause of action is, evidently, to preclude a
defendant from presenting his evidence since, upon the facts and the law,
the plaintiff has shown no right to relief.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The
assailed Decision dated February 29, 2008 as well as the Resolution dated
September 16, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88449 are
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Corona (C.J., Chairperson), Bersamin, Del Castillo and Villarama, Jr., JJ.,
concur.
_______________
23 Republic v. Estate of Alfonso Lim, Sr., G.R. No. 164800, July 22, 2009,
593 SCRA 404, 422.
24 Uy v. Chua, G.R. No. 183965, September 18, 2009, 600 SCRA 806, 822.
186
186 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Oropesa vs. Oropesa
Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed.
Notes.—Jurisprudence dictates that the guardian must be a person who
has legal relationship with his ward. (People vs. Flores, 629 SCRA 478
[2010])
G.R. No. 191993. December 5, 2012.*
EDUARDO T. ABAD, petitioner, vs. LEONARDO BIASON and GABRIEL A.
MAGNO, respondents.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Moot and Academic; An issue or a case
becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable
controversy, so that a determination of the issue would be without
practical use and value.―An issue or a case becomes moot and academic
when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy, so that a determination
of the issue would be without practical use and value. In such cases, there
is no actual substantial relief to which the petitioner would be entitled and
which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition.
Same; Special Proceedings; Guardianship; The relationship of guardian and
ward is necessarily terminated by the death of either the guardian or the
ward.―It is a well-established rule that the relationship of guardian and
ward is necessarily terminated by the death of either the guardian or the
ward. The supervening event of death rendered it pointless to delve into
the propriety of Biason’s appointment since the juridical tie between him
and Maura has already been dissolved. The petition, regardless of its
disposition, will not afford Abad, or anyone else for that matter, any
substantial relief.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the
Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
Luis Manuel U. Bugayong for petitioner.
Jaime A. Paredes, Jr. for movant Maura B. Abad.
Cesar M. Cariño for respondent L. Biason.
Leoncio M. Pausanos for respondent Atty. G. Magno.
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
369
VOL. 687, DECEMBER 5, 2012 369
Abad vs. Biason
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court seeking to annul and set aside the Decision1 dated August
28, 2009 and Resolution2 dated April 19, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CV No. 90145.
The facts show that on March 19, 2007, petitioner Eduardo Abad (Abad)
filed a petition for guardianship over the person and properties of Maura
B. Abad (Maura) with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Dagupan City, Branch
42, which was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 2007-0050-D. In support thereof,
Abad alleged that he maintains residence at No. 14 B St. Paul Street,
Horseshoe Village, Quezon City and that he is Maura’s nephew. He averred
that Maura, who is single, more than ninety (90) years old and a resident
of Rizal Street, Poblacion, Mangaldan, Pangasinan, is in dire need of a
guardian who will look after her and her business affairs. Due to her
advanced age, Maura is already sickly and can no longer manage to take
care of herself and her properties unassisted thus becoming an easy prey
of deceit and exploitation.3
Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the RTC gave due
course to the same and scheduled it for hearing. When the petition was
called for hearing on April 27, 2007, nobody entered an opposition and
Abad was allowed to present evidence ex parte. After Abad formally
offered his evidence and the case was submitted for decision, Atty. Gabriel
Magno filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene, together with an Opposition-
in-Intervention. Subsequently, on June
_______________
1 Penned by Associate Justice Amelita G. Tolentino, with Associate Justices
Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe (now member of this Court) and Stephen C. Cruz,
concurring; Rollo, pp. 37-51.
2 Id., at pp. 52-53.
3 Id., at p. 38.
370
370 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Abad vs. Biason
14, 2007, Leonardo Biason (Biason) filed a Motion for Leave to File
Opposition to the Petition and attached therewith his Opposition to the
Appointment of Eduardo Abad as Guardian of the Person and Properties of
Maura B. Abad. Specifically, Biason alleged that he is also a nephew of
Maura and that he was not notified of the pendency of the petition for the
appointment of the latter’s guardian. He vehemently opposed the
appointment of Abad as Maura’s guardian as he cannot possibly perform
his duties as such since he resides in Quezon City while Maura maintains
her abode in Mangaldan, Pangasinan. Biason prayed that he be appointed
as Maura’s guardian since he was previously granted by the latter with a
power of attorney to manage her properties.4
On September 26, 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision,5 denying Abad’s
petition and appointing Biason as Maura’s guardian. The RTC disposed
thus:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby denied. Petitioner Eduardo T. Abad is
found to be disqualified to act as guardian of incompetent Maura B. Abad.
Oppositor Leonardo A. Biason is established by this Court to be in a better
position to be the guardian of said incompetent Maura B. Abad.
The Court hereby fixes the guardianship bond at [P]500,000.00 and the
letters of guardianship shall be issued only upon the submission of the
bond, conditioned on the following provisions of the Rule 94[,] Section 1,
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure:
a. To make and return to the Court within three (3)
months true and complete inventory of all the estate, real
and personal, of his ward which shall come to his possession
or knowledge or to the possession or knowledge of any
other person for him;
b. To faithfully execute the duties of his trust, to manage
and dispose of the estate according to these rules for the
best interests of the ward, and to provide for the proper
care, custody x x x of the ward;
_______________
4 Id., at pp. 39-40.
5 Id., at pp. 83-86.
371
VOL. 687, DECEMBER 5, 2012 371
Abad vs. Biason
c. To render a true and just account of all the estate of the
ward in his hands, and of all proceeds or interest derived
therefrom, and of the management and disposition of the
same, at the time designated by these rules and such other
times as the court directs, and at the expiration of his trust
to settle his accounts with the court and deliver and pay
over all the estate, effects, and moneys remaining in his
hands, or due from him on such settlement, to the person
lawfully entitled thereto;
d. To perform all orders of the court by him to be
performed.
SO ORDERED.6
Unyielding, Abad filed a motion for reconsideration of the foregoing
decision but the RTC denied the same in an Order dated December 11,
2007.
Abad filed an appeal to the CA. He argued that the RTC erred in
disqualifying him from being appointed as Maura’s guardian despite the
fact that he has all the qualifications stated under the Rules. That he was
not a resident of Mangaldan, Pangasinan should not be a ground for his
disqualification as he had actively and efficiently managed the affairs and
properties of his aunt even if he is residing in Metro Manila. Moreover, he
was expressly chosen by Maura to be her guardian.7
Abad further averred that no hearing was conducted to determine the
qualifications of Biason prior to his appointment as guardian. He claimed
that the RTC also overlooked Maura’s express objection to Biason’s
appointment.8
On August 28, 2009, the CA issued a Decision,9 affirming the decision of
the RTC, the pertinent portions of which read:
_______________
6 Id., at pp. 85-86.
7 Id., at p. 43.
8 Ibid.
9 Supra note 1.
372
372 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Abad vs. Biason
The petitioner-appellant may have been correct in arguing that there is no
legal requirement that the guardian must be residing in the same dwelling
place or municipality as that of the ward or incompetent, and that the
Vancil vs. Belmes case cited by the court a quo which held that “courts
should not appoint as guardians persons who are not within the
jurisdiction of our courts” pertains to persons who are not residents of the
country.
However, we do not find that the court a quo, by deciding to appoint the
oppositor-appellee as guardian, has fallen into grievous error.
For one, the oppositor-appellee, like petitioner-appellant, is also a relative,
a nephew of the incompetent. There are no vices of character which have
been established as to disqualify him from being appointed as a guardian.
xxxx
Anent the claim of the petitioner-appellant that he has been expressly
chosen by her aunt to be her guardian as evidenced by her testimony,
although it could be given weight, the same could not be heavily relied
upon, especially considering the alleged mental state of the incompetent
due to her advanced age.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DISMISSED for
lack of merit. The assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan
City, Branch 42 is AFFIRMED IN TOTO.
SO ORDERED.10
Dissatisfied, Abad filed a motion for reconsideration but the CA denied the
same in a Resolution11 dated April 19, 2010, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration is
DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.12
_______________
10 Id., at pp. 47-48, 50; citation omitted.
11 Supra note 2.
12 Id., at p. 53.
373
VOL. 687, DECEMBER 5, 2012 373
Abad vs. Biason
On June 7, 2010, Abad filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with this
Court. Subsequently, Maura filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene,13
together with a Petition-in-Intervention.14
The instant petition raises the following assignment of errors:
I acquired pneumonia high risk, prostate CA with metastasis, and attached a
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT DENIED
THE PETITIONER’S APPEAL AND AFFIRMED THE TRIAL COURT’S DECISION
DESPITE VERY CLEAR VIOLATIONS OF DUE PROCESS, DISREGARD OF THE
RULES, AND IRREGULARITIES IN THE APPOINTMENT OF RESPONDENT
BIASON AS GUARDIAN;
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT DENIED
THE PETITIONER’S APPEAL AND ERRONEOUSLY UPHELD RESPONDENT
BIASON’S APPOINTMENT AS GUARDIAN BASED ON SOLE GROUND OF
RESIDENCE, AND FAILED TO CONSIDER THE REQUIREMENTS AND
QUALIFICATIONS PRESCRIBED BY THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE
APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIAN.15
Abad contends that that CA erred in affirming the RTC’s decision despite
the fact that it did not hold any hearing to determine whether Biason
possessed all the qualifications for a guardian as provided by law. Further,
he was not given the opportunity to submit evidence to controvert
Biason’s appointment.16
Abad also bewails his disqualification as guardian on the sole basis of his
residence. He emphasizes that it is not a requirement for a guardian to be
a resident of the same local-
_______________
13 Id., at pp. 68-70.
14 Id., at pp. 71-80.
15 Id., at p. 21.
16 Id., at pp. 22-23.
374
374 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Abad vs. Biason
ity as the ward, or to be living with the latter under the same roof in order
to qualify for the appointment. The more significant considerations are
that the person to be appointed must be of good moral character and
must have the capability and sound judgment in order that he may be able
to take care of the ward and prudently manage his assets.17
Unfortunately, pending the resolution of the instant petition, Biason died.
On May 11, 2012, Maura filed a Manifestation and Motion,18 informing
this Court that Biason passed away on April 3, 2012 at SDS Medical Center,
Marikina City due to multiple organ failure, septic shock, community
copy of his Death Certificate.19 Maura averred that Biason’s death
rendered moot and academic the issues raised in the petition. She thus
prayed that the petition be dismissed and the guardianship be terminated.
On June 20, 2012, this Court issued a Resolution,20 requiring Abad to
comment on the manifestation filed by Maura. Pursuant to the Resolution,
Abad filed his Comment21 on August 9, 2012 and expressed his
acquiescence to Maura’s motion to dismiss the petition. He asseverated
that the issues raised in the petition pertain to the irregularity in the
appointment of Biason as guardian which he believed had been rendered
moot and academic by the latter’s death. He also supported Maura’s
prayer for the termination of the guardianship by asseverating that her act
of filing of a petition-in-intervention is indicative of the fact that she is of
sound mind and that she can competently manage her business affairs.
We find Maura’s motion meritorious.
_______________
17 Id., at p. 29.
18 Id., at pp. 254-255.
19 Id., at p. 256.
20 Id., at p. 260.
21 Id., at pp. 261-262.
375
VOL. 687, DECEMBER 5, 2012 375
Abad vs. Biason
An issue or a case becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present
a justiciable controversy, so that a determination of the issue would be
without practical use and value. In such cases, there is no actual
substantial relief to which the petitioner would be entitled and which
would be negated by the dismissal of the petition.22
In his petition, Abad prayed for the nullification of the CA Decision dated
August 28, 2009 and Resolution dated April 19, 2010, which dismissed his
appeal from the Decision dated September 26, 2007 of the RTC and denied
his motion for reconsideration, respectively. Basically, he was challenging
Biason’s qualifications and the procedure by which the RTC appointed him
as guardian for Maura. However, with Biason’s demise, it has become
impractical and futile to proceed with resolving the merits of the petition.
It is a well-established rule that the relationship of guardian and ward is
necessarily terminated by the death of either the guardian or the ward.23
The supervening event of death rendered it pointless to delve into the
propriety of Biason’s appointment since the juridical tie between him and
Maura has already been dissolved. The petition, regardless of its
disposition, will not afford Abad, or anyone else for that matter, any
substantial relief.
Moreover, Abad, in his Comment, shared Maura’s belief that the petition
has lost its purpose and even consented to Maura’s prayer for the
dismissal of the petition.
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the petition is
hereby DISMISSED.
_______________
22 Roxas v. Tipon, G.R. No. 160641, June 20, 2012, 674 SCRA 52, citing
Romero II v. Estrada, G.R. No. 174105, April 2, 2009, 583 SCRA 396, 404.
23 Cañiza v. CA, 335 Phil. 1107, 1120; 268 SCRA 640, 655 (1997), citing
Francisco, The Revised Rules of Court in the Phils., Vol. V-B, 1970 Ed., citing
25 Am. Jur. 37.
376
376 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Abad vs. Biason
SO ORDERED.
Leonardo-De Castro (Acting Chairperson), Bersamin, Villarama, Jr. and
Perez,** JJ., concur.
Petition dismissed.
Notes.―A guardianship is a trust relation of the most sacred character, in
which one person, called a “guardian” acts for another called the “ward”
whom the law regards as incapable of managing his own affairs. (Oropesa
vs. Oropesa, 671 SCRA 174 [2012])
A reading of Section 2, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court tells us that persons
who, though of sound mind but by reason of age, disease, weak mind or
other similar causes, are incapable of taking care of themselves and their
property without outside aid are considered as incompetents who may
properly be placed under guardianship. (Id.)
――o0o――
_______________
** Acting member per Special Order No. 1385 dated December 4, 2012
vice Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno.
 G.R. No. 166884. June 13, 2012.*
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. LAMBERTO C. PEREZ,
NESTOR C. KUN, MA. ESTELITA P. ANGELES-PANLILIO, and NAPOLEON O.
GARCIA, respondents.
Civil Law; Trusts; Under the Trust Receipts Law, intent to defraud is
presumed when (1) the entrustee fails to turn over the proceeds of the sale
of goods covered by the trust receipt to the entruster; or (2) when the
entrustee fails to return the goods under trust, if they are not disposed of in
accordance with the terms of the trust receipts.—There are two obligations
in a trust receipt transaction. The first is covered by the provision that
refers to money under the obligation to deliver it (entregarla) to the owner
of the merchandise sold. The second is covered by the provision referring
to merchandise received under the obligation to return it (devolvera) to
the owner. Thus, under the Trust Receipts Law, intent to defraud is
presumed when (1) the entrustee fails to turn over the proceeds of the
sale of goods covered by the trust receipt to the entruster; or (2) when the
entrustee fails to return the goods under trust, if they are not disposed of
in accordance with the terms of the trust receipts.
Same; Same; In all trust receipt transactions, both obligations on the part
of the trustee exist in the alternative—the return of the proceeds of the
sale or the return or recovery of the goods, whether raw or processed.—In
all trust receipt transactions, both obligations on the part of the trustee
exist in the alternative—the return of the proceeds of the sale or the
return or recovery of the goods, whether raw or processed. When both
parties enter into an agreement knowing that the return of the goods
subject of the trust receipt is not possible even without any fault on the
part of the trustee, it is not a trust receipt transaction penalized under
Section 13 of P.D. 115; the only obligation actually agreed upon by the
parties would be the return of the proceeds of the sale transaction. This
transaction becomes a mere loan, where the borrower is obligated to pay
the bank the amount spent for the purchase of the goods.
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
118
118 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Perez
Same; Contracts; Article 1371 of the Civil Code provides that “[i]n order to
judge the intention of the contracting parties, their contemporaneous and
subsequent acts shall be principally considered.”—Article 1371 of the Civil
Code provides that “[i]n order to judge the intention of the contracting
parties, their contemporaneous and subsequent acts shall be principally
considered.” Under this provision, we can examine the contemporaneous
actions of the parties rather than rely purely on the trust receipts that they
signed in order to understand the transaction through their intent.
Criminal Law; Estafa; Trust Receipts Law; Elements of estafa under Article
315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, in relation with Section 13
of the Trust Receipts Law.—In order that the respondents “may be validly
prosecuted for estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised
Penal Code, in relation with Section 13 of the Trust Receipts Law, the
following elements must be established: (a) they received the subject
goods in trust or under the obligation to sell the same and to remit the
proceeds thereof to [the trustor], or to return the goods if not sold; (b)
they misappropriated or converted the goods and/or the proceeds of the
sale; (c) they performed such acts with abuse of confidence to the damage
and prejudice of Metrobank; and (d) demand was made on them by [the
trustor] for the remittance of the proceeds or the return of the unsold
goods.”
Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC); The mandate given to
the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel is limited to the civil
liabilities arising from the crime, and is subject to the control and
supervision of the public prosecutor.—If we look at the mandate given to
the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel, we find that it is limited
to the civil liabilities arising from the crime, and is subject to the control
and supervision of the public prosecutor. Section 2, Rule 8 of the Rules
Governing the Exercise by the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel
of its Authority, Duties and Powers as Principal Law Office of All
Government Owned or Controlled Corporations, filed before the Office of
the National Administration Register on September 5, 2011, reads: Section
2. Extent of legal assistance—The OGCC shall represent the complaining
GOCC in all stages of the criminal proceedings. The legal assistance
extended is not limited to the preparation of appropriate sworn
statements but shall include all aspects of an effective private prose-
119
VOL. 672, JUNE 13, 2012
Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Perez
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 76588. In the assailed decision, the
Court of Appeals dismissed the criminal complaint for estafa against the
respondents, Lamberto C. Perez, Nestor C. Kun, Ma. Estelita P. Angeles-
Panlilio and Napoleon Garcia, who allegedly violated Article 315, paragraph
1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, in relation with Section 13 of Presidential
Decree No. (P.D.) 115—the “Trust Receipts Law.”
Petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) is a government financial
institution and the official depository of the
_______________
119
1 Rollo, pp. 15-30.

cution including recovery of civil liability arising from the crime, subject to
the control and supervision of the public prosecutor. Based on
jurisprudence, there are two exceptions when a private party complainant
or offended party in a criminal case may file a petition with this Court,
without the intervention of the OSG: (1) when there is denial of due
process of law to the prosecution, and the State or its agents refuse to act
on the case to the prejudice of the State and the private offended party;
and (2) when the private offended party questions the civil aspect of a
decision of the lower court.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
2 Penned by Associate Justice Lucenito N. Tagle, and concurred in by
Associate Justices Martin S. Villarama, Jr. (now a member of this Court)
and Regalado E. Maambong; id., at pp. 35-48.
120
120 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Perez
Philippines.3 Respondents are the officers and representatives of Asian
Construction and Development Corporation (ACDC), a corporation
incorporated under Philippine law and engaged in the construction
business.4

Office of the Government Corporate Counsel for petitioner.
Benedictine Law Center for respondents.
BRION, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari,1 under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, assailing the decision2 dated January 20, 2005 of the
On June 7, 1999, LBP filed a complaint for estafa or violation of Article 315,
paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to P.D. 115, against
the respondents before the City Prosecutor’s Office in Makati City. In the
affidavit-complaint5 of June 7, 1999, the LBP’s Account Officer for the
Account Management Development, Edna L. Juan, stated that LBP
extended a credit accommodation to ACDC through the execution of an
Omnibus Credit Line Agreement (Agreement)6 between LBP and ACDC on
October 29, 1996. In various instances, ACDC used the Letters of
Credit/Trust Receipts Facility of the Agreement to buy construction
materials. The respondents, as officers and representatives of ACDC,
executed trust receipts7 in connection with the construction materials,
with a total principal amount of P52,344,096.32. The trust receipts
matured, but ACDC failed to return to LBP the proceeds of the construction
projects or the construction materials subject of the trust receipts. LBP
sent ACDC a demand letter,8 dated May 4, 1999, for the payment of its
debts, including those under the Trust Receipts
_______________
3 Id., at pp. 15-16.
4 Id., at p. 16.
5 Id., at pp. 89-91.
6 Id., at pp. 49-50.
7 The affidavit-complaint of June 7, 1999 and the resolution of Makati
Assistant City Prosecutor Amador Y. Pineda dated September 30, 1999
refer to eleven trust receipts marked as Annexes “C” to “C-10.” However,
the Annexes found in the records of the Department of Justice, the Court
of Appeals and the Supreme Court show only ten trust receipts marked as
“C” to “C-9.” The letters used for the markings vary before each quasi-
judicial or judicial office, but there are only ten trust receipts attached.
(Records, pp. 89-108; CA Rollo, pp. 75-93; and Rollo, pp. 69-88.)
8 CA Rollo, p. 94.
121
VOL. 672, JUNE 13, 2012 121
Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Perez
Facility in the amount of P66,425,924.39. When ACDC failed to comply
with the demand letter, LBP filed the affidavit-complaint.
The respondents filed a joint affidavit9 wherein they stated that they
signed the trust receipt documents on or about the same time LBP and
ACDC executed the loan documents; their signatures were required by LBP
for the release of the loans. The trust receipts in this case do not contain
(1) a description of the goods placed in trust, (2) their invoice values, and
(3) their maturity dates, in violation of Section 5(a) of P.D. 115. Moreover,
they alleged that ACDC acted as a subcontractor for government projects
such as the Metro Rail Transit, the Clark Centennial Exposition and the
Quezon Power Plant in Mauban, Quezon. Its clients for the construction
projects, which were the general contractors of these projects, have not
yet paid them; thus, ACDC had yet to receive the proceeds of the materials
that were the subject of the trust receipts and were allegedly used for
these constructions. As there were no proceeds received from these
clients, no misappropriation thereof could have taken place.
On September 30, 1999, Makati Assistant City Prosecutor Amador Y.
Pineda issued a Resolution10 dismissing the complaint. He pointed out
that the evidence presented by LBP failed to state the date when the
goods described in the letters of credit were actually released to the
possession of the respondents. Section 4 of P.D. 115 requires that the
goods covered by trust receipts be released to the possession of the
entrustee after the latter’s execution and delivery to the entruster of a
signed trust receipt. He adds that LBP’s evidence also fails to show the date
when the trust receipts were executed since all the trust receipts are
undated. Its dispositive portion reads:
_______________
9 Records, p. 32.
10 Rollo, pp. 92-95.
122
122 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Perez
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, and for insufficiency of evidence, it is 13 Id., at pp. 97-102.
respectfully recommended that the instant complaints be dismissed, as
upon approval, the same are hereby dismissed.”11 14 Id., at p. 101.

LBP filed a motion for reconsideration which the Makati Assistant City 15 Id., at pp. 103-105.
Prosecutor denied in his order of January 7, 2000.12
123
On appeal, the Secretary of Justice reversed the Resolution of the Assistant
City Prosecutor. In his resolution of August 1, 2002,13 the Secretary of VOL. 672, JUNE 13, 2012 123
Justice pointed out that there was no question that the goods covered by Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Perez
the trust receipts were received by ACDC. He likewise adopted LBP’s
argument that while the subjects of the trust receipts were not mentioned
Colinares v. Court of Appeals16 does not apply to the case. He explained
in the trust receipts, they were listed in the letters of credit referred to in
that in Colinares, the building materials were delivered to the accused
the trust receipts. He also noted that the trust receipts contained maturity
before they applied to the bank for a loan to pay for the merchandise;
dates and clearly set out their stipulations. He further rejected the
thus, the ownership of the merchandise had already been transferred to
respondents’ defense that ACDC failed to remit the payments to LBP due
the entrustees before the trust receipts agreements were entered into. In
to the failure of the clients of ACDC to pay them. The dispositive portion of
the present case, the parties have already entered into the Agreement
the resolution reads:
before the construction materials were delivered to ACDC.
“WHEREFORE, the assailed resolution is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The City
Subsequently, the respondents filed a petition for review before the Court
Prosecutor of Makati City is hereby directed to file an information for
of Appeals.
estafa under Art. 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code in relation to
Section 13, Presidential Decree No. 115 against respondents Lamberto C.
Perez, Nestor C. Kun, [Ma. Estelita P. Angeles-Panlilio] and Napoleon O. After both parties submitted their respective Memoranda, the Court of
Garcia and to report the action taken within ten (10) days from receipt Appeals promulgated the assailed decision of January 20, 2005.17 Applying
hereof.”14 the doctrine in Colinares, it ruled that this case did not involve a trust
receipt transaction, but a mere loan. It emphasized that construction
materials, the subject of the trust receipt transaction, were delivered to
The respondents filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution dated
ACDC even before the trust receipts were executed. It noted that LBP did
August 1, 2002, which the Secretary of Justice denied.15 He rejected the
not offer proof that the goods were received by ACDC, and that the trust
respondents’ submission that
receipts did not contain a description of the goods, their invoice value, the
amount of the draft to be paid, and their maturity dates. It also adopted
_______________
ACDC’s argument that since no payment for the construction projects had
been received by ACDC, its officers could not have been guilty of
11 Id., at p. 95. misappropriating any payment. The dispositive portion reads:

12 Id., at p. 96. “WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE.
The assailed Resolutions of the respondent Secretary of Justice dated
August 1, 2002 and February 17, 2003, respectively in I.S. No. 99-F-9218-28
are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.”18
_______________
16 394 Phil. 106; 339 SCRA 609 (2000).
17 Supra note 2.
18 Rollo, p. 47.
124
124 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Perez
LBP now files this petition for review on certiorari, dated March 15, 2005,
raising the following error:
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE BY
APPLYING THE RULING IN THE CASE OF COLINARES V. COURT OF APPEALS,
339 SCRA 609, WHICH IS NOT APPLICABLE IN THE CASE AT BAR.19
On April 8, 2010, while the case was pending before this Court, the
respondents filed a motion to dismiss.20 They informed the Court that LBP
had already assigned to Philippine Opportunities for Growth and Income,
Inc. all of its rights, title and interests in the loans subject of this case in a
Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 23, 2005 (attached as Annex “C” of the
motion). The respondents also stated that Avent Holdings Corporation, in
behalf of ACDC, had already settled ACDC’s obligation to LBP on October 8,
2009. Included as Annex “A” in this motion was a certification21 issued by
the Philippine Opportunities for Growth and Income, Inc., stating that it
was LBP’s successor-in-interest insofar as the trust receipts in this case are
concerned and that Avent Holdings Corporation had already settled the
claims of LBP or obligations of ACDC arising from these trust receipts.
We deny this petition.
The disputed transactions are not
trust receipts.
Section 4 of P.D. 115 defines a trust receipt transaction in this manner:
_______________
19 Id., at p. 21.
20 Id., at pp. 265-279.
21 Id., at p. 273.
125
VOL. 672, JUNE 13, 2012 125
Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Perez
“Section 4. What constitutes a trust receipt transaction.—A trust receipt
transaction, within the meaning of this Decree, is any transaction by and
between a person referred to in this Decree as the entruster, and another
person referred to in this Decree as entrustee, whereby the entruster, who
owns or holds absolute title or security interests over certain specified
goods, documents or instruments, releases the same to the possession of
the entrustee upon the latter’s execution and delivery to the entruster of a
signed document called a “trust receipt” wherein the entrustee binds
himself to hold the designated goods, documents or instruments in trust
for the entruster and to sell or otherwise dispose of the goods, documents
or instruments with the obligation to turn over to the entruster the
proceeds thereof to the extent of the amount owing to the entruster or as
appears in the trust receipt or the goods, documents or instruments
themselves if they are unsold or not otherwise disposed of, in accordance
with the terms and conditions specified in the trust receipt, or for other
purposes substantially equivalent to any of the following:
1. In the case of goods or documents, (a) to sell the goods or procure
their sale; or (b) to manufacture or process the goods with the purpose of
ultimate sale: Provided, That, in the case of goods delivered under trust
receipt for the purpose of manufacturing or processing before its ultimate
sale, the entruster shall retain its title over the goods whether in its
original or processed form until the entrustee has complied fully with his
obligation under the trust receipt; or (c) to load, unload, ship or tranship or
otherwise deal with them in a manner preliminary or necessary to their
sale[.]”
There are two obligations in a trust receipt transaction. The first is covered
by the provision that refers to money under the obligation to deliver it
(entregarla) to the owner of the merchandise sold. The second is covered
by the provision referring to merchandise received under the obligation to
return it (devolvera) to the owner. Thus, under the Trust Receipts Law,22
intent to defraud is presumed when (1) the
_______________
22 Section 13 of P.D. 115 reads:
Section 13. Penalty clause.—The failure of an entrustee to turn over the
proceeds of the sale of the goods, documents or instruments covered by a
trust receipt to the extent of the amount owing to
126
126 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Perez
entrustee fails to turn over the proceeds of the sale of goods covered by
the trust receipt to the entruster; or (2) when the entrustee fails to return
the goods under trust, if they are not disposed of in accordance with the
terms of the trust receipts.23
In all trust receipt transactions, both obligations on the part of the trustee
exist in the alternative—the return of the proceeds of the sale or the
return or recovery of the goods, whether raw or processed.24 When both
parties enter into an agreement knowing that the return of the goods
subject of the trust receipt is not possible even without any fault on the
part of the trustee, it is not a trust receipt transaction penalized under
Section 13 of P.D. 115; the only obligation actually
_______________
the entruster or as appears in the trust receipt or to return said goods,
documents or instruments if they were not sold or disposed of in
accordance with the terms of the trust receipt shall constitute the crime
of estafa, punishable under the provisions of Article Three hundred and
fifteen, paragraph one (b) of Act Numbered Three thousand eight hundred
and fifteen, as amended, otherwise known as the Revised Penal Code. If
the violation or offense is committed by a corporation, partnership,
association or other juridical entities, the penalty provided for in this
Decree shall be imposed upon the directors, officers, employees or other
officials or persons therein responsible for the offense, without prejudice
to the civil liabilities arising from the criminal offense. (Emphasis ours.)
23 Colinares v. Court of Appeals, supra note 16, at p. 120; pp. 619-620; and
Gonzales v. Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, G.R. No.
164904, October 19, 2007, 537 SCRA 255, 272.
24 See Allied Banking Corporation v. Ordoñez, G.R. No. 82495, December
10, 1990, 192 SCRA 246, 254; and Ching v. The Secretary of Justice, 517
Phil. 151, 174-175; 481 SCRA 609 (2006). We clarified in these two cases
that a trust receipt agreement covers materials used in manufacturing. It
covers all the components of a product that is ultimately sold, even if this
component is fungible or comes in the form of machineries and
equipment. The fact that the raw material or process can no longer be
distinguished within the finished product does not remove it from the
protection of the Trust Receipts Law.
127
 VOL. 672, JUNE 13, 2012 127 26 Records, p. 29.
Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Perez
27 Rollo, pp. 55-68.
agreed upon by the parties would be the return of the proceeds of the sale
transaction. This transaction becomes a mere loan,25 where the borrower 28 Id., at p. 90.
is obligated to pay the bank the amount spent for the purchase of the
goods. 29 CA Rollo, p. 94. The crucial parts of the letter read:

Article 1371 of the Civil Code provides that “[i]n order to judge the 128
intention of the contracting parties, their contemporaneous and
subsequent acts shall be principally considered.” Under this provision, we 128 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
can examine the contemporaneous actions of the parties rather than rely Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Perez
purely on the trust receipts that they signed in order to understand the
transaction through their intent.
The fact that LBP had knowingly authorized the delivery of construction
materials to a construction site of two government projects, as well as
We note in this regard that at the onset of these transactions, LBP knew
unspecified construction sites, repudiates the idea that LBP intended to be
that ACDC was in the construction business and that the materials that it
the owner of those construction materials. As a government financial
sought to buy under the letters of credit were to be used for the following
institution, LBP should have been aware that the materials were to be used
projects: the Metro Rail Transit Project and the Clark Centennial Exposition
for the construction of an immovable property, as well as a property of the
Project.26 LBP had in fact authorized the delivery of the materials on the
public domain. As an immovable property, the ownership of whatever was
construction sites for these projects, as seen in the letters of credit it
constructed with those materials would presumably belong to the owner
attached to its complaint.27 Clearly, they were aware of the fact that there
of the land, under Article 445 of the Civil Code which provides:
was no way they could recover the buildings or constructions for which the
materials subject of the alleged trust receipts had been used. Notably,
“Article 445. Whatever is built, planted or sown on the land of another
despite the allegations in the affidavit-complaint wherein LBP sought the
and the improvements or repairs made thereon, belong to the owner of
return of the construction materials,28 its demand letter dated May 4,
the land, subject to the provisions of the following articles.”
1999 sought the payment of the balance but failed to ask, as an
alternative, for the return of the construction materials or the buildings
where these materials had been used.29 Even if we consider the vague possibility that the materials, consisting of
cement, bolts and reinforcing steel bars, would be used for the
construction of a movable property, the ownership of these properties
_______________
would still pertain to the government and not remain with the bank as
they would be classified as property of the public domain, which is defined
25 Article 1953 of the Civil Code states that:
by the Civil Code as:

Article 1953. A person who receives a loan of money or any other

“Article 420. The following things are property of public dominion:
fungible thing acquires the ownership thereof, and is bound to pay to the
creditor an equal amount of the same kind and quality.
_______________
“Records indicate that your unpaid obligation under the Short Term Loan
Line Facility as of March 31, 1999 amounts to P44,392,455.58, including
interest and penalties. Further, availments under the Trust Receipt Facility
as of said date amounts to P66,425,924.39 or an aggregate total obligation
of P110,818,379.97. Attached herewith is the Statement of Account for
your reference.
In view thereof, you are hereby given ten (10) days from receipt of this
letter, to settle said obligation, otherwise, we have no recourse but to file
civil and criminal actions against you and other officers of the corporation
to protect the interest of our client.”
129
VOL. 672, JUNE 13, 2012 129
Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Perez
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents,
ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and
others of similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are
intended for some public service or for the development of the national
wealth.”
In contrast with the present situation, it is fundamental in a trust receipt
transaction that the person who advanced payment for the merchandise
becomes the absolute owner of said merchandise and continues as owner
until he or she is paid in full, or if the goods had already been sold, the
proceeds should be turned over to him or to her.30
Thus, in concluding that the transaction was a loan and not a trust receipt,
we noted in Colinares that the industry or line of work that the borrowers
were engaged in was construction. We pointed out that the borrowers
were not importers acquiring goods for resale.31 Indeed, goods sold in
retail are often within the custody or control of the trustee until they are
purchased. In the case of materials used in the manufacture of finished
products, these finished products—if not the raw materials or their
components—similarly remain in the possession of the trustee until they
are sold. But the goods and the materials that are used for a construction
project are often placed under the control and custody of the clients
employing the contractor, who can only be compelled to return the
materials if they fail to pay the contractor and often only after the
requisite legal proceedings. The contractor’s difficulty and uncertainty in
claiming these materials (or the buildings and structures which they
become part of), as soon as the bank demands them, disqualify them from
being covered by trust receipt agreements.
_______________
30 National Bank v. Viuda e Hijos de Angel Jose, 63 Phil. 814, 821 (1936).
31 Supra note 16, at p. 124.
130
130 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Perez
Based on these premises, we cannot consider the agreements between the
parties in this case to be trust receipt transactions because (1) from the
start, the parties were aware that ACDC could not possibly be obligated to
reconvey to LBP the materials or the end product for which they were
used; and (2) from the moment the materials were used for the
government projects, they became public, not LBP’s, property.
Since these transactions are not trust receipts, an action for estafa should
not be brought against the respondents, who are liable only for a loan. In
passing, it is useful to note that this is the threat held against borrowers
that Retired Justice Claudio Teehankee emphatically opposed in his dissent
in People v. Cuevo,32 restated in Ong v. CA, et al.:33
“The very definition of trust receipt x x x sustains the lower court’s
rationale in dismissing the information that the contract covered by a trust
receipt is merely a secured loan. The goods imported by the small importer
and retail dealer through the bank’s financing remain of their own
property and risk and the old capitalist orientation of putting them in jail
for estafa for nonpayment of the secured loan (granted after they had
been fully investigated by the bank as good credit risks) through the fiction
of the trust receipt device should no longer be permitted in this day and
age.”
As the law stands today, violations of Trust Receipts Law are criminally
punishable, but no criminal complaint for violation of Article 315,
paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, in relation with P.D. 115, should
prosper against a borrower who was not part of a genuine trust receipt
transaction.
_______________
32 191 Phil. 622, 633; 104 SCRA 312, 321 (1981).
33 209 Phil. 475, 479; 124 SCRA 578, 582 (1983).
131
VOL. 672, JUNE 13, 2012 131
Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Perez
Misappropriation or abuse of
confidence is absent in this case.
Even if we assume that the transactions were trust receipts, the complaint
against the respondents still should have been dismissed. The Trust
Receipts Law punishes the dishonesty and abuse of confidence in the
handling of money or goods to the prejudice of another, regardless of
whether the latter is the owner or not. The law does not singularly seek to
enforce payment of the loan, as “there can be no violation of [the] right
against imprisonment for non-payment of a debt.”34
In order that the respondents “may be validly prosecuted for estafa under
Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code,35 in relation with
Section 13 of the Trust Receipts Law, the following elements must be
established: (a) they received the subject goods in trust or under the
obligation to sell the same and to remit the proceeds thereof to [the
trustor], or to return the goods if not sold; (b) they misappropriated or
converted the goods and/or the proceeds of the sale; (c) they performed
such acts with abuse of confidence to the damage and prejudice of
Metrobank; and (d) demand was made on them by [the trustor] for the
remittance of the proceeds or the return of the unsold goods.”36
_______________
34 People v. Nitafan, G.R. Nos. 81559-60, April 6, 1992, 207 SCRA 726, 730.
35 Article 315. Swindling (estafa).—Any person who shall defraud
another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow x x x:
xxxx
b. By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another,
money, goods, or any other personal property received by the offender in
trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other
obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same,
even though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond;
or by denying having received such money, goods, or other property.
36 Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Go, G.R. No. 155647,
November 23, 2007, 538 SCRA 337, 345-346.
132
132 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
 Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Perez
In this case, no dishonesty or abuse of confidence existed in the handling
of the construction materials.
In this case, the misappropriation could be committed should the
entrustee fail to turn over the proceeds of the sale of the goods covered by
the trust receipt transaction or fail to return the goods themselves. The
respondents could not have failed to return the proceeds since their
allegations that the clients of ACDC had not paid for the projects it had
undertaken with them at the time the case was filed had never been
questioned or denied by LBP. What can only be attributed to the
respondents would be the failure to return the goods subject of the trust
receipts.
We do not likewise see any allegation in the complaint that ACDC had used
the construction materials in a manner that LBP had not authorized. As
earlier pointed out, LBP had authorized the delivery of these materials to
these project sites for which they were used. When it had done so, LBP
should have been aware that it could not possibly recover the processed
materials as they would become part of government projects, two of
which (the Metro Rail Transit Project and the Quezon Power Plant Project)
had even become part of the operations of public utilities vital to public
service. It clearly had no intention of getting these materials back; if it had,
as a primary government lending institution, it would be guilty of extreme
negligence and incompetence in not foreseeing the legal complications
and public inconvenience that would arise should it decide to claim the
materials. ACDC’s failure to return these materials or their end product at
the time these “trust receipts” expired could not be attributed to its
volition. No bad faith, malice, negligence or breach of contract has been
attributed to ACDC, its officers or representatives. Therefore, absent any
abuse of confidence or misappropriation on the part of the respondents,
the criminal proceedings against them for estafa should not prosper.133
VOL. 672, JUNE 13, 2012 133
Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Perez
In Metropolitan Bank,37 we affirmed the city prosecutor’s dismissal of a
complaint for violation of the Trust Receipts Law. In dismissing the
complaint, we took note of the Court of Appeals’ finding that the bank was
interested only in collecting its money and not in the return of the goods.
Apart from the bare allegation that demand was made for the return of
the goods (raw materials that were manufactured into textiles), the bank
had not accompanied its complaint with a demand letter. In addition,
there was no evidence offered that the respondents therein had
misappropriated or misused the goods in question.
The petition should be dismissed
because the OSG did not file it and
the civil liabilities have already
been settled.
The proceedings before us, regarding the criminal aspect of this case,
should be dismissed as it does not appear from the records that the
complaint was filed with the participation or consent of the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG). Section 35, Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the
Administrative Code of 1987 provides that:
“Section 35. Powers and Functions.—The Office of the Solicitor General
shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and
instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceedings,
investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers. x x x It shall have
the following specific powers and functions:
(1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals in all criminal proceedings; represent the Government and its
officers in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals and all other courts or
tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which the
Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party.”
(Emphasis provided.)
_______________
37 Id., at pp. 350-351.
134
134 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Perez
In Heirs of Federico C. Delgado v. Gonzalez,38 we ruled that the
preliminary investigation is part of a criminal proceeding. As all criminal
proceedings before the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals may be
brought and defended by only the Solicitor General in behalf of the
Republic of the Philippines, a criminal action brought to us by a private
party alone suffers from a fatal defect. The present petition was brought in
behalf of LBP by the Government Corporate Counsel to protect its private
interests. Since the representative of the “People of the Philippines” had
not taken any part of the case, it should be dismissed.
On the other hand, if we look at the mandate given to the Office of the
Government Corporate Counsel, we find that it is limited to the civil
liabilities arising from the crime, and is subject to the control and
supervision of the public prosecutor. Section 2, Rule 8 of the Rules
Governing the Exercise by the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel
of its Authority, Duties and Powers as Principal Law Office of All
Government Owned or Controlled Corporations, filed before the Office of
the National Administration Register on September 5, 2011, reads:
“Section 2. Extent of legal assistance.—The OGCC shall represent the
complaining GOCC in all stages of the criminal proceedings. The legal
assistance extended is not limited to the preparation of appropriate sworn
statements but shall include all aspects of an effective private prosecution
including recovery of civil liability arising from the crime, subject to the
control and supervision of the public prosecutor.”
Based on jurisprudence, there are two exceptions when a private party
complainant or offended party in a criminal case may file a petition with
this Court, without the intervention of the OSG: (1) when there is denial of
due process of law to the prosecution, and the State or its agents refuse to
act on
_______________
38 G.R. No. 184337, August 7, 2009, 595 SCRA 501, 522-524.
135
VOL. 672, JUNE 13, 2012 135
Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Perez
the case to the prejudice of the State and the private offended party;39 and
(2) when the private offended party questions the civil aspect of a decision
of the lower court.40
In this petition, LBP fails to allege any inaction or refusal to act on the part
of the OSG, tantamount to a denial of due process. No explanation appears
as to why the OSG was not a party to the case. Neither can LBP now
question the civil aspect of this decision as it had already assigned ACDC’s
debts to a third person, Philippine Opportunities for Growth and Income,
Inc., and the civil liabilities appear to have already been settled by Avent
Holdings Corporation, in behalf of ACDC. These facts have not been
disputed by LBP. Therefore, we can reasonably conclude that LBP no
longer has any claims against ACDC, as regards the subject matter of this
case, that would entitle it to file a civil or criminal action.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the January 20, 2005
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 76588. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio (Chairperson), Perez, Sereno and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Petition denied, judgment affirmed.
Notes.—Trust receipt transaction defined in Presidential Decree No. 115.
(Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company vs. Gonzales, 584 SCRA 631 [2009])
_______________
39 Merciales v. Court of Appeals, 429 Phil. 70, 78-80; 379 SCRA 345
(2002); Narciso v. Sta. Romana-Cruz, 385 Phil. 208, 221-224; 328 SCRA
505 (2000); and People v. Calo, Jr., 264 Phil. 1007, 1012-1014; 186 SCRA
620 (1990).

40 Perez v. Hagonoy Rural Bank, Inc., 384 Phil. 322, 337; 327 SCRA 588
(2000); and People v. Judge Santiago, 255 Phil. 851, 861-862; 174 SCRA
143 (1989).

136

136 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Perez

Trust is the right to the beneficial enjoyment of property, the legal title to
which is vested in another—it is a fiduciary relationship that obliges the
trustee to deal with the property for the benefit of the beneficiary. (Heirs of
Tranquilino Labiste vs. Heirs of Jose Labiste, 587 SCRA 417 [2009])

——o0o——
 G.R. No. 188801. October 15, 2014.*
ROSARIO MATA CASTRO and JOANNE BENEDICTA CHARISSIMA M. CASTRO,
a.k.a. “MARIA SOCORRO M. CASTRO” and “JAYROSE M. CASTRO,”
petitioners, vs. JOSE MARIA JED LEMUEL GREGORIO and ANA MARIA
REGINA GREGORIO, respondents.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Annulment of Judgments; The remedy of
annulment of judgment will only be available if “the ordinary remedies of
new trial, ul judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil actions of
Regional Trial Courts. This remedy will only be available if “the ordinary
remedappeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no
longer available through no fault of the petitioner.”—Under Rule 47,
Section 1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may file an action with the
Court of Appeals to annies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other
appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the
petitioner.”
Same; Same; Same; Because of the exceptional nature of the remedy, there
are only two grounds by which annulment of judgment may be availed of:
extrinsic fraud, which must be brought four (4) years from discovery, and
lack of jurisdiction, which must be brought before it is barred by estoppel or
laches.—Because of the exceptional
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
416
416 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Castro vs. Gregorio
nature of the remedy, there are only two grounds by which annulment of
judgment may be availed of: extrinsic fraud, which must be brought four
(4) years from discovery, and lack of jurisdiction, which must be brought
before it is barred by estoppel or laches. Lack of jurisdiction under this rule
means lack of jurisdiction over the nature of the action or subject matter,
or lack of jurisdiction over the parties. Extrinsic fraud, on the other hand, is
“[that which] prevents a party from having a trial or from presenting his
entire case to the court, or [that which] operates upon matters pertaining
not to the judgment itself but to the manner in which it is procured.” The
grant of adoption over respondents should be annulled as the trial court
did not validly acquire jurisdiction over the proceedings, and the favorable
decision was obtained through extrinsic fraud.
Civil Law; Adoption; The law on adoption requires that the adoption by the
father of a child born out of wedlock obtain not only the consent of his wife
but also the consent of his legitimate children.—It is settled that “the
jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of
the commencement of the action.” As Jose filed the petition for adoption
on August 1, 2000, it is Republic Act No. 8552 which applies over the
proceedings. The law on adoption requires that the adoption by the father
of a child born out of wedlock obtain not only the consent of his wife but
also the consent of his legitimate children. Under Article III, Section 7 of
Republic Act No. 8552, the husband must first obtain the consent of his
wife if he seeks to adopt his own children born out of wedlock.
Same; Same; As a general rule, the husband and wife must file a joint
petition for adoption; The law provides for several exceptions to the
general rule, as in a situation where a spouse seeks to adopt his or her own
children born out of wedlock.—As a general rule, the husband and wife
must file a joint petition for adoption. The rationale for this is stated in In
Re: Petition for Adoption of Michelle P. Lim, 588 SCRA 98 (2009): The use of
the word “shall” in the above quoted provision means that joint adoption
by the husband and the wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the
concept of joint parental authority over the child which is the ideal
situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate
child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also
insures harmony between the spouses. The law provides for several
exceptions to the general rule, as in a situation where a spouse seeks
417
VOL. 738, OCTOBER 15, 2014 417
Castro vs. Gregorio
to adopt his or her own children born out of wedlock. In this instance, joint
adoption is not necessary. However, the spouse seeking to adopt must first
obtain the consent of his or her spouse.
Same; Civil Procedure; Adoption; Service of Summons; Personal Service of
Summons; Personal service of summons should have been effected on the
spouse and all legitimate children to ensure that their substantive rights
are protected.—For the adoption to be valid, petitioners’ consent was
required by Republic Act No. 8552. Personal service of summons should
have been effected on the spouse and all legitimate children to ensure that
their substantive rights are protected. It is not enough to rely on
constructive notice as in this case. Surreptitious use of procedural
technicalities cannot be privileged over substantive statutory rights.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Annulment of Judgments; Extrinsic Fraud;
Prescription; An action for annulment based on extrinsic fraud must be
brought within four (4) years from discovery.—In People v. Court of Appeals
and Socorro Florece, 660 SCRA 323 (2011): Extrinsic fraud refers to any
fraudulent act of the prevailing party in litigation committed outside of the
trial of the case, whereby the defeated party is prevented from fully
exhibiting his side of the case by fraud or deception practiced on him by
his opponent, such as by keeping him away from court, by giving him a
false promise of a compromise, or where the defendant never had the
knowledge of the suit, being kept in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff,
or where an attorney fraudulently or without authority connives at his
defeat. (Emphasis supplied) An action for annulment based on extrinsic
fraud must be brought within four years from discovery. Petitioners
alleged that they were made aware of the adoption only in 2005. The filing
of this petition on October 18, 2007 is within the period allowed by the
rules.
Same; Same; Same; Same; When fraud is employed by a party precisely to
prevent the participation of any other interested party, then the fraud is
extrinsic, regardless of whether the fraud was committed through the use
of forged documents or perjured testimony during the trial.—When fraud is
employed by a party precisely to prevent the participation of any other
interested party, as in this case, then the fraud is extrinsic, regardless of
whether the fraud was committed through the use of forged documents or
perjured testi-
418
418 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Castro vs. Gregorio
mony during the trial. Jose’s actions prevented Rosario and Joanne from
having a reasonable opportunity to contest the adoption. Had Rosario and
Joanne been allowed to participate, the trial court would have hesitated to
grant Jose’s petition since he failed to fulfill the necessary requirements
under the law. There can be no other conclusion than that because of
Jose’s acts, the trial court granted the decree of adoption under fraudulent
circumstances.
Civil Law; Adoption; Domestic Adoption Act of 1993 (R.A. No. 8552);
Republic Act (RA) No. 8552 fails to provide any provision on the status of
adoption decrees if the adoption is found to have been obtained
fraudulently.—The law itself provides for penal sanctions for those who
violate its provisions. Under Article VII, Section 21 of Republic Act No.
8552: ARTICLE VII VIOLATIONS AND PENALTIES SEC. 21. Violations and
Penalties.—(a) The penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and
one (1) day to twelve (12) years and/or a fine not less than Fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000.00), but not more than Two hundred thousand pesos
(P200,000.00) at the discretion of the court shall be imposed on any person
who shall commit any of the following acts: (i) obtaining consent for an
adoption through coercion, undue influence, fraud, improper material
inducement, or other similar acts; (ii) noncompliance with the procedures
and safeguards provided by the law for adoption; or (iii) subjecting or
exposing the child to be adopted to danger, abuse, or exploitation. (b) Any
person who shall cause the fictitious registration of the birth of a child
under the name(s) of a person(s) who is not his/her biological parent(s)
shall be guilty of simulation of birth, and shall be punished by prisión mayor
in its medium period and a fine not exceeding Fifty thousand pesos
(P50.000.00). (Emphasis supplied) Unfortunately, Jose’s death carried with
it the extinguishment of any of his criminal liabilities. Republic Act No.
8552 also fails to provide any provision on the status of adoption decrees if
the adoption is found to have been obtained fraudulently. Petitioners also
cannot invoke Article VI, Section 19 of Republic Act No. 8552 since
rescission of adoption can only be availed of by the adoptee. Petitioners,
therefore, are left with no other remedy in law other than the annulment
of the judgment.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
419
VOL. 738, OCTOBER 15, 2014 419
Castro vs. Gregorio
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Raro, Trinidad & Cudia for petitioners.
Victor Dayrit Rodriguez for respondents.
LEONEN, J.:
The policy of the law is clear. In order to maintain harmony, there must be
a showing of notice and consent. This cannot be defeated by mere
procedural devices. In all instances where it appears that a spouse
attempts to adopt a child out of wedlock, the other spouse and other
legitimate children must be personally notified through personal service of
summons. It is not enough that they be deemed notified through
constructive service.
This is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the decision2 of the
Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 101021, which denied the petition for
annulment of judgment filed by petitioners. The petition before the
appellate court sought to annul the judgment of the trial court that
granted respondents’ decree of adoption.3
The case originally stemmed from the adoption of Jose Maria Jed Lemuel
Gregorio (Jed) and Ana Maria Regina Gregorio (Regina) by Atty. Jose G.
Castro (Jose). Jose is the estranged husband of Rosario Mata Castro
(Rosario) and the father of Joanne Benedicta Charissima M. Castro
(Joanne), also known by her baptismal name, “Maria Socorro M. Castro”
and her nickname, “Jayrose.”
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 3-29.
2 Id., at pp. 37-62. The decision was penned by Associate Justice Remedios
A. Salazar-Fernando (Chairperson) and concurred in by Associate Justices
Rebecca De Guia-Salvador and Rosalinda Asuncion Vicente of the Special
Former Seventh Division.
3 Id., at p. 37.
420
420 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Castro vs. Gregorio
Rosario alleged that she and Jose were married on August 5, 1962 in Laoag
City. Their marriage had allegedly been troubled. They had a child, Rose
Marie, who was born in 1963, but succumbed to congenital heart disease
and only lived for nine days. Rosario allegedly left Jose after a couple of
months because of the incompatibilities between them.4
Rosario and Jose, however, briefly reconciled in 1969. Rosario gave birth to
Joanne a year later. She and Jose allegedly lived as husband and wife for
about a year even if she lived in Manila and Jose stayed in Laoag City. Jose
would visit her in Manila during weekends. Afterwards, they separated
permanently because Rosario alleged that Jose had homosexual
tendencies.5 She insisted, however, that they “remained friends for fifteen
(15) years despite their separation(.)”6
On August 1, 2000, Jose filed a petition7 for adoption before the Regional
Trial Court of Batac, Ilocos Norte. In the petition, he alleged that Jed and
Regina were his illegitimate children with Lilibeth Fernandez Gregorio
(Lilibeth),8 whom Rosario alleged was his erstwhile housekeeper.9 At the
time of the filing of the petition, Jose was 70 years old.10
According to the Home Study Report11 conducted by the Social Welfare
Officer of the trial court, Jose belongs to a prominent and respected family,
being one of the three children of former Governor Mauricio Castro. He
was also a well-known lawyer in Manila and Ilocos Norte.12 The report
mentioned
_______________
4 Id., at pp. 38-39 and 48.
5 Id., at pp. 39 and 48.
6 Id., at p. 49.
7 Id., at pp. 109-110.
8 Id., at p. 109.
9 Id., at p. 52.
10 Id., at p. 79.
11 Id., at pp. 79-82.
12 Id., at p. 80.
421
VOL. 738, OCTOBER 15, 2014 421
Castro vs. Gregorio
that he was once married to Rosario, but the marriage did not produce any
children.13 It also stated that he met and fell in love with Lilibeth in 1985,
and Lilibeth was able to bear him two children, Jed on August 1987, and
Regina on March 1989.14 Under “Motivation for Adoption,” the social
welfare officer noted:
Since, he has no child with his marriaged [sic] to Rosario Mata, he was not
able to fulfill his dreams to parent a child. However, with the presence of
his 2 illegitimate children will fulfill his dreams [sic] and it is his intention to
legalize their relationship and surname. . . .15
At the time of the report, Jose was said to be living with Jed and Regina
temporarily in Batac, Ilocos Norte.16 The children have allegedly been in
his custody since Lilibeth’s death in July 1995.17
On October 16, 2000, the trial court approved the adoption,18 having
ruled that “[n]o opposition had been received by this Court from any
person including the government which was represented by the Office of
the Solicitor General.”19 A certificate of finality20 was issued on February
9, 2006.
Meanwhile, on July 3, 2006, Rosario, through her lawyer, Atty. Rene V.
Saguisag, filed a complaint for disbarment against Jose with the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines.21 In her complaint, she alleged that Jose had been
remiss in providing support for their daughter, Joanne, for the past 36
_______________
13 Id., at pp. 79-80.
14 Id., at pp. 80 and 83-84.
15 Id., at p. 80.
16 Id., at p. 81.
17 Id., at p. 80.
18 Id., at pp. 87-90.
19 Id., at p. 87
20 Id., at p. 91.
21 Id., at pp. 168-173.
422
422 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Castro vs. Gregorio
years.22 She alleged that she single-handedly raised and provided financial
support to Joanne while Jose had been showering gifts to his driver and
alleged lover, Larry R. Rentegrado (Larry), and even went to the extent of
adopting Larry’s two children, Jed and Regina, without her and Joanne’s
knowledge and consent.23 She also alleged that Jose made blatant lies to
the trial court by alleging that Jed and Regina were his illegitimate children
with Larry’s wife, Lilibeth, to cover up for his homosexual relationship with
Larry.24
In his answer before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Jose denies
being remiss in his fatherly duties to Joanne during her minority. He
alleged that he always offered help, but it was often declined.25 He also
alleged that he adopted Jed and Regina because they are his illegitimate
children. He denied having committed any of the falsification alluded to by
Rosario. He also stated that he had suffered a stroke in 1998 that left him
paralyzed. He alleged that his income had been diminished because
several properties had to be sold to pay for medical treatments.26 He then
implored the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to weigh on the case with
“justice and equity.”27
On October 8, 2006, Jose died in Laoag City, Ilocos Norte.28
On October 18, 2007, Rosario and Joanne filed a petition for annulment of
judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Civil Procedure with the Court of
Appeals, seeking to annul the October 16, 2000 decision of the trial court
approving Jed and Regina’s adoption.29
_______________
22 Id., at p. 168.
23 Id., at pp. 169-170.
24 Id., at p. 171.
25 Id., at p. 174.
26 Id., at pp. 175-176.
27 Id., at p. 176.
28 Id., at p. 122.
29 Id., at p. 38.
423
VOL. 738, OCTOBER 15, 2014 423
Castro vs. Gregorio
In their petition, Rosario and Joanne allege that they learned of the
adoption sometime in 2005.30 They allege that Rosario’s affidavit of
consent, marked by the trial court as “Exh. K,”31 was fraudulent.32 They
also allege that Jed and Regina’s birth certificates showed different sets of
information, such as the age of their mother, Lilibeth, at the time she gave
birth. They argue that one set of birth certificates states the father to be
Jose and in another set of National Statistics Office certificates shows the
father to be Larry, Jose’s driver and alleged lover.33 It was further alleged
that Jed and Regina are not actually Jose’s illegitimate children but the
legitimate children of Lilibeth and Larry who were married at the time of
their birth.34
On May 26, 2009, the Court of Appeals denied the petition.
While admittedly, no notice was given by the trial court to Rosario and
Joanne of the adoption, the appellate court ruled that there is “no explicit
provision in the rules that the spouse and legitimate child of the adopter . .
. should be personally notified of the hearing.”35
The appellate court “abhor[red] the mind baffling scheme employed by
[Jose] in obtaining an adoption decree in favor of [his illegitimate children]
to the prejudice of the interests of his legitimate heirs”36 but stated that
its hands were bound by the trial court decision that had already attained
“finality and immutability.”37
The appellate court also ruled that the alleged fraudulent information
contained in the different sets of birth certificates
_______________
30 Id., at p. 9.
31 Id., at p. 14.
32 Id., at p. 40.
33 Id., at pp. 153-158 and 226-227.
34 Id., at pp. 41 and 136.
35 Id., at p. 59.
36 Id., at pp. 59-60.
37 Id., at p. 60.
424
424 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Castro vs. Gregorio
required the determination of the identities of the persons stated therein
and was, therefore, beyond the scope of the action for annulment of
judgment. The alleged fraud was also perpetrated during the trial and
could not be classified as extrinsic fraud, which is required in an action for
annulment of judgment.38
When Rosario and Joanne’s motion for reconsideration was denied on July
10, 2009,39 they filed this petition.
The issue before this court is whether the Court of Appeals erred in
denying the petition for annulment for failure of petitioners to (1) show
that the trial court lacked jurisdiction and (2) show the existence of
extrinsic fraud.
In their petition, petitioners argue that the appellate court erred in its
application of the law on extrinsic fraud as ground to annul a judgment.40
They argue that because of the fabricated consent obtained by Jose and
the alleged false information shown in the birth certificates presented as
evidence before the trial court,41 they were not given the opportunity to
oppose the petition since the entire proceedings were concealed from
them.42
Petitioners also argue that the appellate court misunderstood and
misapplied the law on jurisdiction despite the denial of due process,
notice, and noninclusion of indispensable parties.43 They argue that the
adoption of illegitimate children requires the consent, not only of the
spouse, but also the legitimate children 10 years or over of the adopter,
and such consent was never secured from Joanne.44
_______________
38 Id., at pp. 60-61.
39 Id., at pp. 98-99.
40 Id., at p. 13.
41 Id., at pp. 14-15.
42 Id., at p. 18.
43 Id., at p. 22.
44 Id., at pp. 26-27.
425
VOL. 738, OCTOBER 15, 2014 425
Castro vs. Gregorio
Respondents, however, argue in their comment that petitioners could not
have been deprived of their day in court since their interest was “amply
protected by the participation and representation of the Solicitor General
through the deputized public prosecutor.”45
Respondents also argue that there was constructive notice through
publication for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation, which constitutes not only notice to them but also notice to
the world of the adoption proceedings.46 They argue that since the alleged
fraud was perpetrated during the trial, it cannot be said to be extrinsic
fraud but intrinsic fraud, which is not a ground for annulment of
judgment.47 They also argue that petitioners were not indispensable
parties because adoption is an action in rem and, as such, the only
indispensable party is the state.48
The petition is granted.
Annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Civil Procedure
Under Rule 47, Section 1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may file an
action with the Court of Appeals to annul judgments or final orders and
resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts. This remedy will only be
available if “the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief
or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of
the petitioner.”49
_______________
45 Id., at p. 306.
46 Id., at p. 307.
47 Id., at pp. 311 and 313.
48 Id., at p. 313.
49 Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 47, Sec. 1.
426
426 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Castro vs. Gregorio
In Dare Adventure Farm Corporation v. Court of Appeals:50
A petition for annulment of judgment is a remedy in equity so exceptional
in nature that it may be availed of only when other remedies are wanting,
and only if the judgment, final order or final resolution sought to be
annulled was rendered by a court lacking jurisdiction or through extrinsic
fraud. Yet, the remedy, being exceptional in character, is not allowed to be
so easily and readily abused by parties aggrieved by the final judgments,
orders or resolutions. The Court has thus instituted safeguards by limiting
the grounds for the annulment to lack of jurisdiction and extrinsic fraud,
and by prescribing in Section 1 of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court that the
petitioner should show that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal,
petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available
through no fault of the petitioner. A petition for annulment that ignores or
disregards any of the safeguards cannot prosper.
The attitude of judicial reluctance towards the annulment of a judgment,
final order or final resolution is understandable, for the remedy disregards
the time-honored doctrine of immutability and unalterability of final
judgments, a solid corner stone in the dispensation of justice by the courts.
The doctrine of immutability and unalterability serves a two-fold purpose,
namely: (a) to avoid delay in the administration of justice and thus,
procedurally, to make orderly the discharge of judicial business; and (b) to
put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional errors, which
is precisely why the courts exist. As to the first, a judgment that has
acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and is no longer to
be modified in any respect even if the modification is meant to correct an
erroneous conclusion of fact or of law, and whether the modification is
made by the court that rendered the decision or by the highest court of
the land. As to the latter, controversies cannot
_______________
50 G.R. No. 161122, September 24, 2012, 681 SCRA 580 [Per J. Bersamin,
First Division].
427
VOL. 738, OCTOBER 15, 2014 427
Castro vs. Gregorio
drag on indefinitely because fundamental considerations of public policy
and sound practice demand that the rights and obligations of every litigant
must not hang in suspense for an indefinite period of time.51 (Emphasis
supplied)
Because of the exceptional nature of the remedy, there are only two
grounds by which annulment of judgment may be availed of: extrinsic
fraud, which must be brought four years from discovery, and lack of
jurisdiction, which must be brought before it is barred by estoppel or
laches.52
Lack of jurisdiction under this rule means lack of jurisdiction over the
nature of the action or subject matter, or lack of jurisdiction over the
parties.53 Extrinsic fraud, on the other hand, is “[that which] prevents a
party from having a trial or from presenting his entire case to the court, or
[that which] operates upon matters pertaining not to the judgment itself
but to the manner in which it is procured.”54
_______________
51 Id., at pp. 586-587, citing People v. Bitanga, 552 Phil. 686, 693; 525
SCRA 623, 629 (2007) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, Third Division]; Fraginal v.
Heirs of Toribia Belmonte Parañal, 545 Phil. 425, 432; 516 SCRA 530, 539
(2007) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, Third Division]; Macalalag v. Ombudsman,
468 Phil. 918, 923; 424 SCRA 741, 744-745 (2004) [Per J. Vitug, Third
Division]; Apo Fruits Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 622 Phil. 215, 231;
607 SCRA 200, 213 (2009) [Per J. Bersamin, En Banc]; Peña v. Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS), 533 Phil. 670, 689-690; 502 SCRA 383, 404
(2006) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, First Division]; Gallardo-Corro v. Gallardo, 403
Phil. 498, 511; 350 SCRA 568, 578 (2001) [Per J. Bellosillo, Second Division].
52 Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 47, Secs. 2 and 3.
53 Barco v. Court of Appeals, 465 Phil. 39, 57; 420 SCRA 162, 174 (2004)
[Per J. Tinga, Second Division].
54 Bulawan v. Aquende, G.R. No. 182819, June 22, 2011, 652 SCRA 585,
594 [Per J. Carpio, Second Division], citing Alaban v. Court of Appeals, 507
Phil. 682, 694; 470 SCRA 697, 708 (2005) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division].
428
428 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Castro vs. Gregorio
The grant of adoption over respondents should be annulled as the trial
court did not validly acquire jurisdiction over the proceedings, and the
favorable decision was obtained through extrinsic fraud.
Jurisdiction over adoption proceedings vis-à-vis the law on adoption
Petitioners argue that they should have been given notice by the trial court
of the adoption, as adoption laws require their consent as a requisite in the
proceedings.
Petitioners are correct.
It is settled that “the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute
in force at the time of the commencement of the action.”55 As Jose filed
the petition for adoption on August 1, 2000, it is Republic Act No. 855256
which applies over the proceedings. The law on adoption requires that the
adoption by the father of a child born out of wedlock obtain not only the
consent of his wife but also the consent of his legitimate children.
Under Article III, Section 7 of Republic Act No. 8552, the husband must first
obtain the consent of his wife if he seeks to adopt his own children born
out of wedlock:
ARTICLE III
ELIGIBILITY
SEC. 7. Who May Adopt.—The following may adopt:
_______________
55 Republic v. Court of Appeals and Zenaida Bobiles, G.R. No. 92326,
January 24, 1992, 205 SCRA 356, 363 [Per J. Regalado, Second Division],
citing Ramos, et al. v. Central Bank of the Philippines, 148-B Phil. 1047,
1066; 41 SCRA 565, 583 (1971) [Per J. J.B.L. Reyes, En Banc].
56 Domestic Adoption Act of 1998.
429
VOL. 738, OCTOBER 15, 2014 429
Castro vs. Gregorio
....
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases:
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other;
or
(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter:
Provided, however, That the other spouse has signified, his/her consent
thereto; or
(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other. . . (Emphasis
supplied)
The provision is mandatory. As a general rule, the husband and wife must
file a joint petition for adoption. The rationale for this is stated in In Re:
Petition for Adoption of Michelle P. Lim:57
The use of the word “shall” in the above quoted provision means that joint
adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory. This is in consonance
with the concept of joint parental authority over the child which is the
ideal situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a
legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly.
The rule also insures harmony between the spouses.58
The law provides for several exceptions to the general rule, as in a
situation where a spouse seeks to adopt his or her own children born out
of wedlock. In this instance, joint adoption is not necessary. However, the
spouse seeking to adopt must first obtain the consent of his or her spouse.
_______________
57 606 Phil. 82; 588 SCRA 98 (2009) [Per J. Carpio, First Division].
58 Id., at pp. 89-90; p. 106, citing Republic v. Toledano, G.R. No. 94147,
June 8, 1994, 233 SCRA 9, 13 [Per J. Puno, Second Division].
430
430 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Castro vs. Gregorio
In the absence of any decree of legal separation or annulment, Jose and
Rosario remained legally married despite their de facto separation. For
Jose to be eligible to adopt Jed and Regina, Rosario must first signify her
consent to the adoption. Jose, however, did not validly obtain Rosario’s
consent. His submission of a fraudulent affidavit of consent in her name
cannot be considered compliance of the requisites of the law. Had Rosario
been given notice by the trial court of the proceedings, she would have
had a reasonable opportunity to contest the validity of the affidavit. Since
her consent was not obtained, Jose was ineligible to adopt.
The law also requires the written consent of the adopter’s children if they
are 10 years old or older. In Article III, Section 9 of Republic Act No. 8552:
SEC. 9. Whose Consent is Necessary to the Adoption.—After being
properly counseled and informed of his/her right to give or withhold
his/her approval of the adoption, the written consent of the following to
the adoption is hereby required:
....
(c) The legitimate and adopted sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or
over, of the adopter(s) and adoptee, if any. (Emphasis supplied)
The consent of the adopter’s other children is necessary as it ensures
harmony among the prospective siblings. It also sufficiently puts the other
children on notice that they will have to share their parent’s love and care,
as well as their future legitimes, with another person.
It is undisputed that Joanne was Jose and Rosario’s legitimate child and
that she was over 10 years old at the time of the adoption proceedings.
Her written consent, therefore, was necessary for the adoption to be valid.
To circumvent this requirement, however, Jose manifested to the trial
court that he and Rosario were childless, thereby
431
VOL. 738, OCTOBER 15, 2014 431
Castro vs. Gregorio
preventing Joanne from being notified of the proceedings. As her written
consent was never obtained, the adoption was not valid.
For the adoption to be valid, petitioners’ consent was required by Republic
Act No. 8552. Personal service of summons should have been effected on
the spouse and all legitimate children to ensure that their substantive
rights are protected. It is not enough to rely on constructive notice as in
this case. Surreptitious use of procedural technicalities cannot be
privileged over substantive statutory rights.
Since the trial court failed to personally serve notice on Rosario and Joanne
of the proceedings, it never validly acquired jurisdiction.
There was extrinsic fraud
The appellate court, in denying the petition, ruled that while fraud may
have been committed in this case, it was only intrinsic fraud, rather than
extrinsic fraud. This is erroneous.
In People v. Court of Appeals and Socorro Florece:59
Extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in
litigation committed outside of the trial of the case, whereby the defeated
party is prevented from fully exhibiting his side of the case by fraud or
deception practiced on him by his opponent, such as by keeping him
away from court, by giving him a false promise of a compromise, or where
the defendant never had the knowledge of the suit, being kept in
ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff, or where an attorney fraudulently or
without authority connives at his defeat.60 (Emphasis supplied)
_______________
59 G.R. No. 187409, November 16, 2011, 660 SCRA 323 [Per J. Reyes,
Second Division].
60 Id., at p. 327, citing Amihan Bus Lines, Inc. v. Romars International
Gases Corporation, G.R. No. 180819, July 5, 2010, 623 SCRA 406, 411 [Per J.
Nachura, Second Division].
432
432 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Castro vs. Gregorio
An action for annulment based on extrinsic fraud must be brought within
four years from discovery.61 Petitioners alleged that they were made
aware of the adoption only in 2005. The filing of this petition on October
18, 2007 is within the period allowed by the rules.
The badges of fraud are present in this case.
First, the petition for adoption was filed in a place that had no relation to
any of the parties. Jose was a resident of Laoag City, llocos Norte.62 Larry
and Lilibeth were residents of Barangay 6, Laoag City.63 Jed and Regina
were born in San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte.64 Rosario and Joanne were
residents of Parañaque City, Manila.65 The petition for adoption, however,
was filed in the Regional Trial Court of Batac, Ilocos Norte.66 The trial court
gave due course to the petition on Jose’s bare allegation in his petition that
he was a resident of Batac,67 even though it is admitted in the Home
Study Report that he was a practicing lawyer in Laoag City.68
Second, using the process of delayed registration,69 Jose was able to
secure birth certificates for Jed and Regina showing him to be the father
and Larry as merely the informant.70 Worse still is that two different sets
of fraudulent certificates were procured: one showing that Jose and
Lilibeth were married on December 4, 1986 in Manila,71 and another
wherein the portion for the mother’s name was not filled in at all.72
_______________
61 Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 47, Sec. 3.
62 Rollo, p. 139.
63 Id., at p. 138.
64 Id., at p. 88.
65 Id., at pp. 4-5
66 Id., at pp. 87-90.
67 Id., at p. 109
68 Id., at p. 80.
69 Id., at pp. 155 and 158.
70 Id., at pp. 153 and 156.
71 Id., at pp. 154 and 157.
72 Id., at pp. 153 and 156.
433
VOL. 738, OCTOBER 15, 2014 433
Castro vs. Gregorio
The birth certificates of Jed and Regina from the National Statistics Office,
however, show that their father was Larry R. Rentegrado.73 These
certificates are in clear contradiction to the birth certificates submitted by
Jose to the trial court in support of his petition for adoption.
Third, Jose blatantly lied to the trial court when he declared that his
motivation for adoption was because he and his wife, Rosario, were
childless,74 to the prejudice of their daughter, Joanne. The consent of
Rosario to the adoption was also disputed by Rosario and alleged to be
fraudulent.75
All these tactics were employed by Jose, not only to induce the trial court
in approving his petition, but also to prevent Rosario and Joanne from
participating in the proceedings or opposing the petition.
The appellate court erroneously classified the fraud employed by Jose as
intrinsic on the basis that they were “forged instruments or perjured
testimonies”76 presented during the trial. It failed to understand,
however, that fraud is considered intrinsic when the other party was either
present at the trial or was a participant in the proceedings when such
instrument or testimony was presented in court, thus:
[I]ntrinsic fraud refers to the acts of a party at a trial that prevented a fair
and just determination of the case, but the difference is that the acts or
things, like falsification and false testimony, could have been litigated and
determined at the trial or adjudication of the case. In other words, intrinsic
fraud does not deprive the petitioner of his day in court because he can
guard against that kind of fraud through so many means, including a
thorough trial preparation, a skillful, cross-examination,
_______________
73 Id., at pp. 226-227.
74 Id., at p. 80.
75 Id., at p. 14. The allegedly fraudulent affidavit of consent was not
attached in the Rollo.
76 Id., at p. 61.
434
434 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Castro vs. Gregorio
resorting to the modes of discovery, and proper scientific or forensic
applications. Indeed, forgery of documents and evidence for use at the
trial and perjury in court testimony have been regarded as not preventing
the participation of any party in the proceedings, and are not, therefore,
constitutive of extrinsic fraud.77 (Emphasis supplied)
When fraud is employed by a party precisely to prevent the participation
of any other interested party, as in this case, then the fraud is extrinsic,
regardless of whether the fraud was committed through the use of forged
documents or perjured testimony during the trial.
Jose’s actions prevented Rosario and Joanne from having a reasonable
opportunity to contest the adoption. Had Rosario and Joanne been
allowed to participate, the trial court would have hesitated to grant Jose’s
petition since he failed to fulfill the necessary requirements under the law.
There can be no other conclusion than that because of Jose’s acts, the trial
court granted the decree of adoption under fraudulent circumstances.
The law itself provides for penal sanctions for those who violate its
provisions. Under Article VII, Section 21 of Republic Act No. 8552:
ARTICLE VII
VIOLATIONS AND PENALTIES
SEC. 21. Violations and Penalties.—
_______________
77 Pinausukan Seafood House v. Far East Bank and Trust, G.R. No. 159926,
January 20, 2014, 714 SCRA 226
<http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2014
/january2014/159926.pdf> [Per J. Bersamin, First Division], citing Ybañez v.
Court of Appeals, 323 Phil. 643, 656; 253 SCRA 540, 551 (1996) [Per J.
Francisco, Third Division] and Strait Times, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 356
Phil. 217, 226; 294 SCRA 717, 721-722 (1998) [Per J. Panganiban, First
Division].
435
VOL. 738, OCTOBER 15, 2014 435
Castro vs. Gregorio
(a) The penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day
to twelve (12) years and/or a fine not less than Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00), but not more than Two hundred thousand pesos
(P200,000.00) at the discretion of the court shall be imposed on any person
who shall commit any of the following acts:
(i) obtaining consent for an adoption through coercion, undue influence,
fraud, improper material inducement, or other similar acts;
(ii) noncompliance with the procedures and safeguards provided by the law
for adoption; or
(iii) subjecting or exposing the child to be adopted to danger, abuse, or
exploitation.
(b) Any person who shall cause the fictitious registration of the birth of a
child under the name(s) of a person(s) who is not his/her biological
parent(s) shall be guilty of simulation of birth, and shall be punished by
prisión mayor in its medium period and a fine not exceeding Fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000.00). (Emphasis supplied)
Unfortunately, Jose’s death carried with it the extinguishment of any of his
criminal liabilities.78 Republic Act No. 8552 also fails to provide any
provision on the status of adoption decrees if the adoption is found to
have been obtained fraudulently. Petitioners also cannot invoke Article VI,
Section 19 of Republic Act No. 855279 since rescission of adoption can only
_______________
78 Revised Penal Code, Art. 89.
79 Article VI of Rep. Act. No. 8552 provides:c
SEC. 19. Grounds for Rescission of Adoption.—Upon petition of the
adoptee, with the assistance of the Department if a minor or if over
eighteen (18) years of age but is incapacitated, as guardian/counsel, the
adoption may be rescinded on any of the following grounds committed by
the adopter(s): (a) repeated physical and verbal maltreatment by the
adopter(s) despite having undergone counseling; (b) attempt on the life of
the
436
436 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Castro vs. Gregorio
be availed of by the adoptee. Petitioners, therefore, are left with no other
remedy in law other than the annulment of the judgment.
The fraud employed in this case has been to Joanne’s prejudice. There is
reason to believe that Joanne has grown up having never experienced the
love and care of a father, her parents having separated a year after her
birth. She has never even benefited from any monetary support from her
father. Despite all these adversities, Joanne was able to obtain a medical
degree from the University of the Philippines College of Medicine80 and is
now working as a doctor in Canada.81 These accomplishments, however,
are poor substitutes if the injustice done upon her is allowed to continue.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision dated October 16,
2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Batac, Ilocos Norte, Branch 17 in S.P.
Proc. No. 3445-17 is rendered NULL and VOID.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio (Chairperson), Del Castillo, Mendoza and Reyes,** JJ., concur.
Petition granted.
_______________
adoptee; (c) sexual assault or violence; or (d) abandonment and failure to
comply with parental obligations.
Adoption, being in the best interest of the child, shall not be subject to
rescission by the adopter(s). However, the adopter(s) may disinherit the
adoptee for causes provided in Article 919 of the Civil Code.
80 Rollo, p. 169.
81 Id., at p. 5.
* * Designated acting member per Special Order No. 1844 dated October
14, 2014.
437
VOL. 738, OCTOBER 15, 2014 437
Castro vs. Gregorio
Notes.—A petition directed against the “thing” itself or the res, which
concerns the status of a person, like a petition for adoption, annulment of
marriage, or correction of entries in the birth certificate, is an action in
rem. (Lucas vs. Lucas, 650 SCRA 667 [2011])
Personal service of summons should and always be the first option, and it
is only when the said summons cannot be served within a reasonable time
can the process server resort to substituted service. (Planters Development
Bank vs. Chandumal, 680 SCRA 269 [2012])
——o0o——
G.R. No. 105308. September 25, 1998.*
HERBERT CANG, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and Spouses RONALD
V. CLAVANO and MARIA CLARA CLAVANO, respondents.
Remedial Law; Actions; Jurisdiction; The established rule is that the statute
in force at the time of the commencement of the action determines the
jurisdiction of the court.—Jurisdiction being a matter of substantive law,
the established rule is that the statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action determines the jurisdiction of the court. As
such, when private respondents filed the petition for adoption on
September 25, 1987, the applicable law was the Child and Youth Welfare
Code, as amended by Executive Order No. 91.
Civil Law; Adoption; The written consent of the natural parent to the
adoption has remained a requisite for its validity.—It is thus evident that
notwithstanding the amendments to the law, the written consent of the
natural parent to the adoption has remained a requisite for its validity.
Same; Same; Article 256 of the Family Code provides for its retroactivity
“insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or ac-
_____________
*
THIRD DIVISION.
129
VOL. 296, SEPTEMBER 25, 1998
Cang vs. Court of Appeals
quired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.”—During the
pendency of the petition for adoption or on August 3, 1988, the Family
Code which amended the Child and Youth Welfare Code took effect.
Article 256 of the Family Code provides for its retroactivity “insofar as it
does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with
the Civil Code or other laws.” As amended by the Family Code, the
statutory provision on consent for adoption now reads: “Art. 188. The
written consent of the following to the adoption shall be necessary: (1) The
person to be adopted, if ten years of age or over; (2) The parents by nature
of the child, the legal guardian, or the proper government instrumentality;
(3) The legitimate and adopted children, ten years of age or over, of the
adopting parent or parents; (4) The illegitimate children, ten years of age
or over, of the adopting parents, if living with said parent and the latter’s
spouse, if any; and (5) The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be
adopted.” (Italics supplied)
Same; Same; The requirement of written consent can be dispensed with if
the parent has abandoned the child.—As clearly inferred from the
foregoing provisions of law, the written consent of the natural parent is
indispensable for the validity of the decree of adoption. Nevertheless, the
requirement of written consent can be dispensed with if the parent has
abandoned the child or that such parent is “insane or hopelessly
intemperate.” The court may acquire jurisdiction over the case even
without the written consent of the parents or one of the parents provided
that the petition for adoption alleges facts sufficient to warrant exemption
from compliance therewith. This is in consonance with the liberality with
which this Court treats the procedural aspect of adoption.
129
Same; Same; Allegations of abandonment in the petition for adoption, even
absent the written consent of petitioner, sufficiently vested the lower court
with jurisdiction.—The allegations of abandonment in the petition for
adoption, even absent the written consent of petitioner, sufficiently vested
the lower court with jurisdiction since abandonment of the child by his
natural parents is one of the circumstances under which our statutes and
jurisprudence dispense with the requirement of written consent to the
adoption of their minor children.
Same; Same; The issue of abandonment by the oppositor natural parent is
a preliminary issue that an adoption court must first
130
130 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cang vs. Court of Appeals
confront.—In cases where the father opposes the adoption primarily
because his consent thereto was not sought, the matter of whether he had
abandoned his child becomes a proper issue for determination. The issue
of abandonment by the oppositor natural parent is a preliminary issue that
an adoption court must first confront. Only upon failure of the oppositor
natural father to prove to the satisfaction of the court that he did not
abandon his child may the petition for adoption be considered on its
merits.
Same; Same; Meaning of Abandonment.—In its ordinary sense, the word
“abandon” means to forsake entirely, to forsake or renounce utterly. The
dictionaries trace this word to the root idea of “putting under a ban.” The
emphasis is on the finality and publicity with which a thing or body is thus
put in the control of another, hence, the meaning of giving up absolutely,
with intent never to resume or claim one’s rights or interests. In reference
to abandonment of a child by his parent, the act of abandonment imports
“any conduct of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forego all
parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child.” It means
“neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations of care and
support which parents owe their children.”
Same; Same; Same; Physical estrangement alone, without financial and
moral desertion, is not tantamount to abandonment.—In the instant case,
records disclose that petitioner’s conduct did not manifest a settled
purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over
his children as to constitute abandonment. Physical estrangement alone,
without financial and moral desertion, is not tantamount to abandonment.
While admittedly, petitioner was physically absent as he was then in the
United States, he was not remiss in his natural and legal obligations of
love, care and support for his children. He maintained regular
communication with his wife and children through letters and telephone.
He used to send packages by mail and catered to their whims.
Same; Same; Parental authority cannot be entrusted to a person simply
because he could give the child a larger measure of material comfort than
his natural parent.—In a number of cases, this Court has held that parental
authority cannot be entrusted to a person simply because he could give
the child a larger measure of material comfort than his natural parent.
Thus, in David v. Court of Appeals, the Court awarded custody of a minor
illegitimate child to his
131
VOL. 296, SEPTEMBER 25, 1998 131
Cang vs. Court of Appeals
mother who was a mere secretary and market vendor instead of to his has ruled in Tenchavez v. Escaño that a divorce obtained by Filipino citizens
affluent father who was a married man, not solely because the child opted after the effectivity of the Civil Code is not recognized in this jurisdiction as
to go with his mother. it is contrary to State policy. While petitioner is now an American citizen,
as regards Anna Marie who has apparently remained a Filipino citizen, the
Same; Same; In awarding custody, the court shall take into account “all divorce has no legal effect.
relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven years
of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit.”—The transfer of custody over Remedial Law; Appeals; Although the Court is not a trier of facts, it has the
the children to Anna Marie by virtue of the decree of legal separation did authority to review and reverse the factual findings of
not, of necessity, deprive petitioner of parental authority for the purpose
of placing the children up for adoption. Article 213 of the Family Code 132
states: “. . . in case of legal separation of parents, parental authority shall
be exercised by the parent designated by the court.” In awarding custody, 132 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cang vs. Court of Appeals
the court shall take into account “all relevant considerations, especially the
choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is
the lower courts if it finds that these do not conform to the evidence on
unfit.”
record.—As a rule, factual findings of the lower courts are final and binding
upon this Court. This Court is not expected nor required to examine or
Same; Same; Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may
contrast the oral and documentary evidence submitted by the parties.
not be transferred or renounced except in cases authorized by law.—
However, although this Court is not a trier of facts, it has the authority to
Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be
review and reverse the factual findings of the lower courts if it finds that
transferred or renounced except in cases authorized by law. The right
these do not conform to the evidence on record.
attached to parental authority, being purely personal, the law allows a
waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship and
Same; Same; Exceptions to the rule that factual findings of the trial court
surrender to a children’s home or an orphan institution. When a parent
are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal.—In Reyes v.
entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or godfather,
Court of Appeals, this Court has held that the exceptions to the rule that
even in a document, what is given is merely temporary custody and it does
factual findings of the trial court are final and conclusive and may not be
not constitute a renunciation of parental authority. Even if a definite
reviewed on appeal are the following: (1) when the inference made is
renunciation is manifest, the law still disallows the same.
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) when there is a grave abuse
of discretion; (3) when the finding is grounded entirely on speculations,
Same; Divorce; A divorce obtained by Filipino citizens after the effectivity of
surmises or conjectures; (4) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
the Civil Code is not recognized in this jurisdiction as it is contrary to State
based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are
policy.—As regards the divorce obtained in the United States, this Court
conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went
beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions
of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings of the Court of
Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings of
fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based; (9) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain
relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion and (10) when the findings
of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence
and are contradicted by the evidence on record.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Rosello & Fernandez Law Office for petitioner.
De Borja, Medialdea, Ata, Bello, Guevarra & Serapio for private
respondents.
133
VOL. 296, SEPTEMBER 25, 1998
Cang vs. Court of Appeals
ROMERO, J.:
Can minor children be legally adopted without the written consent of a
natural parent on the ground that the latter has abandoned them? The
answer to this interesting query, certainly not one of first impression,
would have to be reached, not solely on the basis of law and
jurisprudence, but also the hard reality presented by the facts of the case.
This is the question posed before this Court in this petition for review on
certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals affirming the decree of
adoption issued by the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 14, 2 in
Special Proceedings No. 1744-CEB, “In the Matter of the Petition for
Adoption of the minors Keith, Charmaine and Joseph Anthony, all
surnamed Cang, Spouses Ronald V. Clavano and Maria Clara Diago
Clavano, petitioners.”
Petitioner Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano who were married on
January 27, 1973, begot three children, namely: Keith, born on July 3,
1973; Charmaine, born on January 23, 1977, and Joseph Anthony, born on
January 3, 1981.
During the early years of their marriage, the Cang couple’s relationship was
undisturbed. Not long thereafter, however, Anna Marie learned of her
husband’s alleged extramarital affair with Wilma Soco, a family friend of
the Clavanos.
Upon learning of her husband’s alleged illicit liaison, Anna Marie filed a
petition for legal separation with alimony pendente lite3 with the then
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Cebu4 which rendered a decision5
approving the joint
133
___________
1
Penned by Associate Justice Serafin E. Camilon and concurred in by
Associate Justices Celso L. Magsino and Artemon D. Luna.
2
Presided by Judge Renato C. Dacudao.
3
Docketed as Civil Case No. JD-707.
4
Presided by Judge Maura C. Navarro.
5
Original Records, pp. 39-40.
134
134 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cang vs. Court of Appeals
manifestation of the Cang spouses providing that they agreed to “live
separately and apart or from bed and board.” They further agreed:
1. “(c) That the children of the parties shall be entitled to a
monthly support of ONE THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00)
effective from the date of the filing of the complaint. This
shall constitute a first lien on the net proceeds of the
house and lot jointly owned by the parties situated at
Cinco Village, Mandaue City;
2. (d) That the plaintiff shall be entitled to enter into any
contract or agreement with any person or persons,
natural or juridical without the written consent of the
husband; or any undertaking or acts that ordinarily
requires husband’s consent as the parties are by this
agreement legally separated” 6;
Petitioner then left for the United States where he sought a divorce from
Anna Marie before the Second Judicial District Court of the State of
Nevada. Said court issued the divorce decree that also granted sole
custody of the three minor children to Anna Marie, reserving “rights of
visitation at all reasonable times and places” to petitioner. 7
Thereafter, petitioner took an American wife and thus became a
naturalized American citizen. In 1986, he divorced his American wife and
never remarried.
While in the United States, petitioner worked in Tablante Medical Clinic
earning P18,000.00 to P20,000.00 a month8 a portion of which was
remitted to the Philippines for his children’s expenses and another,
deposited in the bank in the name of his children.
Meanwhile, on September 25, 1987, private respondents Ronald V.
Clavano and Maria Clara Diago Clavano, respectively the brother and
sister-in-law of Anna Marie, filed Special Proceedings No. 1744-CEB for the
adoption of the three minor Cang children before the Regional Trial Court
of Cebu.
__________
6
Exh. H-2.
7
Original Records, pp. 5-7.
8
RTC Decision, p. 3.
135
VOL. 296, SEPTEMBER 25, 1998 135
Cang vs. Court of Appeals
The petition bears the signature of then 14-year-old Keith signifying
consent to his adoption. Anna Marie likewise filed an affidavit of consent
alleging that her husband had “evaded his legal obligation to support” his
children; that her brothers and sisters including Ronald V. Clavano, had
been helping her in taking care of the children; that because she would be 136
going to the United States to attend to a family business, “leaving the
children would be a problem and would naturally hamper (her) job-seeking 136 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cang vs. Court of Appeals
venture abroad”; and that her husband had “long forfeited his parental
rights” over the children for the following reasons:
On March 27, 1990, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 14, issued
a decree of adoption with a dispositive portion reading as follows:
1. 1. The decision in Civil Case No. JD-707 allowed her to
enter into any contract without the written consent of
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for adoption of the
her husband;
minors Keith, Charmaine and Joseph Anthony all surnamed Cang, by the
2. 2. Her husband had left the Philippines to be an illegal
petitioners-spouses Ronald V. Clavano and Maria Clara Diago Clavano is
alien in the United States and had been transferring from
hereby granted and approved. These children shall henceforth be known
one place to another to avoid detection by Immigration
and called as Keith D. Clavano, Charmaine D. Clavano and Joseph Anthony
authorities; and
D. Clavano respectively. Moreover, this Decree of Adoption shall:
3. 3. Her husband had divorced her.

1. (1) Confer upon the adopted children the same rights

Upon learning of the petition for adoption, petitioner immediately
and duties as though they were in fact the legitimate
returned to the Philippines and filed an opposition thereto, alleging that,
children of the petitioners;
although private respondents Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano were
2. (2) Dissolve the authority vested in the parents by
financially capable of supporting the children while his finances were “too
nature, of the children; and,
meager” compared to theirs, he could not “in conscience, allow anybody
3. (3) Vest the same authority in the petitioners.
to strip him of his parental authority over his beloved children.”

Furnish the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, Philippines with a copy of this
Pending resolution of the petition for adoption, petitioner moved to
Decree of Adoption for registration purposes.
reacquire custody over his children alleging that Anna Marie had
transferred to the United States thereby leaving custody of their children
SO ORDERED.”
to private respondents. On January 11, 1988, the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu City, Branch 19, issued an order finding that Anna Marie had, in
In so ruling, the lower court was “impelled” by these reasons:
effect, relinquished custody over the children and, therefore, such custody
should be transferred to the father. The court then directed the Clavanos
1. (1) The Cang children had, since birth, developed “close
to deliver custody over the minors to petitioner.
filial ties with the Clavano family, especially their
maternal uncle,” petitioner Ronald Clavano.
 2. (2) Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano were childless and,
with their printing press, real estate business, export
business and gasoline station and mini-mart in
Rosemead, California, U.S.A., had substantial assets and
income.
3. (3) The natural mother of the children, Anna Marie,
nicknamed “Menchu,” approved of the adoption because
of her heart ailment, near-fatal accident in 1981, and the
fact that she could not provide them a secure and happy
future as she “travels a lot.”
4. (4) The Clavanos could provide the children moral and
spiritual direction as they would go to church together
and had sent the children to Catholic schools.
5. (5) The children themselves manifested their desire to be
adopted by the Clavanos—Keith had testified and
expressed the
137
VOL. 296, SEPTEMBER 25, 1998
Cang vs. Court of Appeals
1. wish to be adopted by the Clavanos while the two
younger ones were observed by the court to have
“snuggled” close to Ronald even though their natural
mother was around.
On the other hand, the lower court considered the opposition of petitioner
to rest on “a very shaky foundation” because of its findings that:
1. (1) Petitioner was “morally unfit to be the father of his
children” on account of his being “an improvident father
of his family” and an “undisguised Lothario.” This
conclusion is based on the testimony of his alleged
paramour, mother of his two sons and close friend of
Anna Marie, Wilma Soco, who said that she and
petitioner lived as husband and wife in the very house of
the Cangs in Opao, Mandaue City.
2. (2) The alleged deposits of around $10,000 that were of
“comparatively recent dates” were “attempts at
verisimilitude” as these were joint deposits the
authenticity of which could not be verified.
3. (3) Contrary to petitioner’s claim, the possibility of his
reconciliation with Anna Marie was “dim if not nil”
because it was petitioner who “devised, engineered and
executed the divorce proceedings at the Nevada Washoe
County court.”
4. (4) By his naturalization as a U.S. citizen, petitioner “is
now an alien from the standpoint of Philippine laws” and
137 therefore, how his “new attachments and loyalties would
sit with his (Filipino) children is an open question.”
Quoting with approval the evaluation and recommendation of the RTC
Social Worker in her Child Study Report, the lower court concluded as
follows:
“Simply put, the oppositor Herbert Cang has abandoned his children. And
abandonment of a child by its (sic) parent is commonly specified by statute
as a ground for dispensing with his consent to its (sic) adoption (Re Cozza,
163 Cal. 514 P. 161, Ann. [As. 1914A, 214]). Indeed, in such case, adoption
will be allowed not only without the consent of the parent, but even
against his opposition (Re McKeag, 141 Cal. 403, 74 P. 1039, 99 Am. St.
Rep. 80; Re Camp. 131 Cal. 469, 63 P. 736, 82 Am. St. Rep. 371; Graham v.
Francis, 83 Colo. 346, 265 P. 690, citing R.C.L.; Seibert, 170 Iowa 561, 153
N.W.
138
138 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cang vs. Court of Appeals
160, citing R.C.L.; Stearns v. Allen, 183 Mass. 404, 67 N.E. 349; 97 Am. St.
Rep. 441; Wilson v. Otis, 71 N.H. 483, 53 A. 439, 93 Am. St. Rep. 564;
Nugent v. Powell, 4 Wyo. 173, 33 P. 23, 20 L.R.A. 199, 62 Am. St. Rep. 17.)”9
Before the Court of Appeals, petitioner contended that the lower court
erred in holding that it would be in the best interest of the three children if
they were adopted by private respondents Ronald and Maria Clara
Clavano. He asserted that the petition for adoption was fatally defective
and tailored to divest him of parental authority because: (a) he did not
have a written consent to the adoption; (b) he never abandoned his
children; (c) Keith and Charmaine did not properly give their written
consent; and (d) the petitioners for adoption did not present as witness
the representative of the Department of Social Welfare and Development
who made the case study report required by law.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decree of adoption stating:
“Article 188 of the Family Code requires the written consent of the natural
parents of the child to be adopted. It has been held however that the
consent of the parent who has abandoned the child is not necessary
(Dayrit vs. Piccio, 92 Phil. 729; Santos vs. Ananzanso, 16 SCRA 344). The
question therefore is whether or not oppositor may be considered as
having abandoned the children. In adoption cases, abandonment connotes
any conduct on the part of the parent to forego parental duties and
relinquish parental claims to the child, or the neglect or refusal to perform
the natural and legal obligations which parents owe their children (Santos
vs. Ananzanso, supra), or the withholding of the parent’s presence, his care
and the opportunity to display voluntary affection. The issue of
abandonment is amply covered by the discussion of the first error.
Oppositor argues that he has been sending dollar remittances to the
children and has in fact even maintained bank accounts in their names. His
duty to provide support comes from two judicial pronouncements. The
first, the decision in JD-707 CEB, supra, obliges him to pay the children
P1,000.00 a month. The second is
___________
9
RTC Decision, pp. 7-8.
139
VOL. 296, SEPTEMBER 25, 1998 139
Cang vs. Court of Appeals
mandated by the divorce decree of the Nevada, U.S.A. Federal Court which
orders him to pay monthly support of US$50.00 for each child. Oppositor
has not submitted any evidence to show compliance with the decision in
JD-101 CEB, but he has submitted 22 cancelled dollar checks (Exhs. 24 to
45) drawn in the children’s names totalling $2,126.98. The last remittance
was on October 6, 1987 (Exh. 45). His obligation to provide support
commenced under the divorce decree on May 5, 1982 so that as of
October 6, 1987, oppositor should have made 53 remittances of $150.00,
or a total of $7,950.00. No other remittances were shown to have been
made after October 6, 1987, so that as of this date, oppositor was woefully
in arrears under the terms of the divorce decree. And since he was totally
in default of the judgment in JD-707 CEB, the inevitable conclusion is
oppositor had not really been performing his duties as a father, contrary to
his protestations.
True, it has been shown that oppositor had opened three accounts in
different banks, as follows—
Acct. No. Date Opened Balance Name of Bank
1)118- July 23,1985 $5,018.50Great Western Savings, Daly City,
606437-4 Oct. 29, 1987 Cal., U.S.A.
2)73-166-8 March 5, 1986 3,129.00Matewan National Bank of
Oct. 29, 1987 Williamson, West Virginia, U.S.A.
3)564- December 31, 2,622.19Security Pacific National Bank, Daly
146883 1986 City, Cal., U.S.A.
Oct. 29, 1987
The first and third accounts were opened however in oppositor’s name as
trustee for Charmaine Cang and Joseph Anthony Cang, respectively. In
other words, the accounts are operated and the amounts withdrawable by
oppositor himself and it cannot be said that they belong to the minors. The
second is an ‘or’ account, in the names of Herbert Cang or Keith Cang.
Since Keith is a minor and in the Philippines, said account is operable only
by oppositor and the funds withdrawable by him alone.
The bank accounts do not really serve what oppositor claimed in his offer
of evidence ‘the aim and purpose of providing for a better future and
security of his family.’ ”10
____________
10
CA Decision, pp. 16-17. Penned by Justices Serafin E. Camilon, Celso L.
Magsino and Artemon D. Luna, JJ., concurring.
140
140 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cang vs. Court of Appeals
Petitioner moved to reconsider the decision of the Court of Appeals. He
emphasized that the decree of legal separation was not based on the
merits of the case as it was based on a manifestation amounting to a
compromise agreement between him and Anna Marie. That he and his
wife agreed upon the plan for him to leave for the United States was borne
out by the fact that prior to his departure to the United States, the family
lived with petitioner’s parents. Moreover, he alone did not instigate the
divorce proceedings as he and his wife initiated the “joint complaint” for
divorce.
Petitioner argued that the finding that he was not fit to rear and care for
his children was belied by the award to him of custody over the children in
Civil Case No. JD-707. He took exception to the appellate court’s findings
that as an American citizen he could no longer lay claim to custody over his
children because his citizenship would not take away the fact that he “is
still a father to his children.” As regards his alleged illicit relationship with
another woman, he had always denied the same both in Civil Case No. JD-
707 and the instant adoption case. Neither was it true that Wilma Soco
was a neighbor and family friend of the Clavanos as she was residing in
Mandaue City seven (7) kilometers away from the Clavanos who were
residents of Cebu City. Petitioner insisted that the testimony of Wilma
Soco should not have been given weight for it was only during the hearing
of the petition for adoption that Jose Clavano, a brother of Ronald, came
to know her and went to her residence in Iligan City to convince her to be a
witness for monetary considerations. Lastly, petitioner averred that it
would be hypocritical of the Clavanos to claim that they could love the
children much more than he could.11
His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner is now
before this Court, alleging that the petition for adoption was fatally
defective as it did not have his written consent as a natural father as
required by Article 31 (2) of Presidential Decree No. 603, the Child and
Youth Welfare Code, and Article 188(2) of the Family Code.
___________
11
Record of CA-G.R. CV No. 27108, pp. 46-53.
141
VOL. 296, SEPTEMBER 25, 1998 141
Cang vs. Court of Appeals
Article 31 of P.D. No. 603 provides—
“ART. 31. Whose Consent is Necessary.—The written consent of the
following to the adoption shall be necessary:
1. (1) The person to be adopted, if fourteen years of age or
over;
2. (2) The natural parents of the child or his legal guardian
of the Department of Social Welfare or any duly licensed
child placement agency under whose care the child may
be;
3. (3) The natural children, fourteen years and above, of the
adopting parents.” (Italics supplied)
On December 17, 1986, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive
Order No. 91 amending Articles 27, 28, 29, 31, 33 and 35 of the Child and
Youth Welfare Code. As thus amended, Article 31 read:
“ART. 31. Whose Consent is Necessary.—The written consent of the
following to the adoption shall be necessary:
1. (1) The person to be adopted, if fourteen years of age or
over;
2. (2) The natural parents of the child or his legal guardian
after receiving counselling and appropriate social
services from the Ministry of Social Services and
Development or from a duly licensed child-placement
agency;
3. (3) The Ministry of Social Services and Development or
any duly licensed child-placement agency under whose
care and legal custody the child may be;
4. (4) The natural children, fourteen years and above, of the
adopting parents.” (Italics supplied)
Jurisdiction being a matter of substantive law, the established rule is that
the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action
determines the jurisdiction of the court.12 As such, when private
respondents filed the petition for adoption on September 25, 1987, the
applicable law was
___________
12
Republic v. Court of Appeals and Bobiles, G.R. No. 92326, January 24,
1992, 205 SCRA 356, 362.
142
142 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cang vs. Court of Appeals
the Child and Youth Welfare Code, as amended by Executive Order No. 91.
During the pendency of the petition for adoption or on August 3, 1988, the
Family Code which amended the Child and Youth Welfare Code took
effect. Article 256 of the Family Code provides for its retroactivity “insofar
as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance
with the Civil Code or other laws.” As amended by the Family Code, the
statutory provision on consent for adoption now reads:
“Art. 188. The written consent of the following to the adoption shall be
necessary:
1. (1) The person to be adopted, if ten years of age or over;
2. (2) The parents by nature of the child, the legal guardian,
or the proper government instrumentality;
3. (3) The legitimate and adopted children, ten years of age
or over, of the adopting parent or parents;
4. (4) The illegitimate children, ten years of age or over, of
the adopting parents, if living with said parent and the
latter’s spouse, if any; and
5. (5) The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be
adopted.” (Italics supplied)
Based on the foregoing, it is thus evident that notwithstanding the
amendments to the law, the written consent of the natural parent to the
adoption has remained a requisite for its validity. Notably, such
requirement is also embodied in Rule 99 of the Rules of Court as follows:
“SEC. 3. Consent to adoption.—There shall be filed with the petition a
written consent to the adoption signed by the child, if fourteen years of age
or over and not incompetent, and by the child’s spouse, if any, and by each
of its known living parents who is not insane or hopelessly intemperate or
has not abandoned the child, or if there are no such parents by the general
guardian or guardian ad litem of the child, or if the child is in the custody of
an orphan asylum, children’s home, or benevolent society or person, by
the proper officer or officers of such asylum, home, or society, or by such
per-
143
VOL. 296, SEPTEMBER 25, 1998 143
Cang vs. Court of Appeals
sons; but if the child is illegitimate and has not been recognized, the
consent of its father to the adoption shall not be required.” (Italics
supplied)
As clearly inferred from the foregoing provisions of law, the written
consent of the natural parent is indispensable for the validity of the decree
of adoption. Nevertheless, the requirement of written consent can be
dispensed with if the parent has abandoned the child 13 or that such parent
is “insane or hopelessly intemperate.” The court may acquire jurisdiction
over the case even without the written consent of the parents or one of
the parents provided that the petition for adoption alleges facts sufficient
to warrant exemption from compliance therewith. This is in consonance
with the liberality with which this Court treats the procedural aspect of
adoption. Thus, the Court declared:
“x x x. The technical rules of pleading should not be stringently applied to
adoption proceedings, and it is deemed more important that the petition
should contain facts relating to the child and its parents, which may give
information to those interested, than that it should be formally correct as a
pleading. Accordingly, it is generally held that a petition will confer
jurisdiction if it substantially complies with the adoption statute, alleging
all facts necessary to give the court jurisdiction.”14
In the instant case, only the affidavit of consent of the natural mother was
attached to the petition for adoption. Petitioner’s consent, as the natural
father is lacking. Nonetheless, the petition sufficiently alleged the fact of
abandonment of the minors for adoption by the natural father as follows:
“3. That the children’s mother, sister of petitioner RONALD V. CLAVANO,
has given her express consent to this adoption, as
___________
13
AQUINO, CIVIL CODE, Vol. I, 1990 ed., p. 299 citing Santos v. Aranzanso,
123 Phil. 160, 167 (1966).
14
Republic v. Court of Appeals and Bobiles, supra, at p. 365.
144
144 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cang vs. Court of Appeals
shown by Affidavit of Consent, Annex ‘A.’ Likewise, the written consent of
Keith Cang, now 14 years of age appears on page 2 of this petition;
However, the father of the children, Herbert Cang, had already left his wife
and children and had already divorced the former, as evidenced by the
xerox copy of the DECREE OF DIVORCE issued by the County of Washoe,
State of Nevada, U.S.A. (Annex ‘B’) which was filed at the instance of Mr.
Cang, not long after he abandoned his family to live in the United States as
an illegal immigrant.”15
The allegations of abandonment in the petition for adoption, even absent
the written consent of petitioner, sufficiently vested the lower court with
jurisdiction since abandonment of the child by his natural parents is one of
the circumstances under which our statutes and jurisprudence16 dispense
with the requirement of written consent to the adoption of their minor
children.
However, in cases where the father opposes the adoption primarily
because his consent thereto was not sought, the matter of whether he had
abandoned his child becomes a proper issue for determination. The issue
of abandonment by the oppositor natural parent is a preliminary issue that
an adoption court must first confront. Only upon failure of the oppositor
natural father to prove to the satisfaction of the court that he did not
abandon his child may the petition for adoption be considered on its
merits.
As a rule, factual findings of the lower courts are final and binding upon
this Court.17 This Court is not expected nor required to examine or contrast
the oral and documentary evidence submitted by the parties. 18 However, admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings of the
although this Court is not a trier of facts, it has the authority to review and Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the
findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
____________ which they are based; (9) when the Court of Appeals manifestly
overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if
15
Exh. A. properly considered, would justify a different conclusion and (10) when
the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of
16
Duncan v. CFI of Rizal, L-30576, February 10, 1976, 69 SCRA 298; Santos evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record.
v. Aranzanso, supra.
This Court finds that both the lower court and the Court of Appeals failed
17
Del Mundo v. Court of Appeals, 322 Phil. 463, 471 (1996). to appreciate facts and circumstances that should have elicited a different
conclusion21 on the issue of whether petitioner has so abandoned his
18
Imperial v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102037, July 17, 1996, 259 SCRA children, thereby making his consent to the adoption unnecessary.
65, 71.
In its ordinary sense, the word “abandon” means to forsake entirely, to
145 forsake or renounce utterly. The dictionaries trace this word to the root
idea of “putting under a ban.” The em-
VOL. 296, SEPTEMBER 25, 1998 145
Cang vs. Court of Appeals
___________

reverse the factual findings of the lower courts if it finds that these do not 19
Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, L-43972, July 24, 1990, 187
conform to the evidence on record.19
SCRA 735, 739 citing Ongsiako v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No.
69901, July 31, 1987, 152 SCRA 627.
In Reyes v. Court of Appeals,20 this Court has held that the exceptions to
the rule that factual findings of the trial court are final and conclusive and 20
258 SCRA 651 [1996].
may not be reviewed on appeal are the following: (1) when the inference
made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) when there is a 21
P.M. Pastera Brokerage v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113657, January 20,
grave abuse of discretion; (3) when the finding is grounded entirely on
1997, 266 SCRA 365, 371.
speculations, surmises or conjectures; (4) when the judgment of the Court
of Appeals is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of
146
fact are conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings,
went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the
146 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cang vs. Court of Appeals
phasis is on the finality and publicity with which a thing or body is thus put
in the control of another, hence, the meaning of giving up absolutely, with
intent never to resume or claim one’s rights or interests. 22 In reference to
abandonment of a child by his parent, the act of abandonment imports
“any conduct of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forego all
parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child.” It means
“neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations of care and
support which parents owe their children.”23
In the instant case, records disclose that petitioner’s conduct did not
manifest a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all
parental claims over his children as to constitute abandonment. Physical
estrangement alone, without financial and moral desertion, is not
24
tantamount to abandonment. While admittedly, petitioner was physically
absent as he was then in the United States, he was not remiss in his natural
and legal obligations of love, care and support for his children. He
maintained regular communication with his wife and children through
letters and telephone. He used to send packages by mail and catered to
their whims.
Petitioner’s testimony on the matter is supported by documentary
evidence consisting of the following handwritten letters to him of both his
wife and children:
1. 1.Exh. 1—a 4-page undated letter of Menchu (Anna
Marie) addressed to “Dear Bert” on a C. Westates Carbon
Phil. Corp. stationery. Menchu stated therein that it had
been “a long time since the last time you’ve heard from
me excluding that of the phone conversation we’ve had.”
She discussed petitioner’s intention to buy a motorbike
for Keith, expressing apprehension over risks that could
be engendered by Keith’s use of it. She said that in the
“last phone conversation” she had with petitioner on the
birthday of “Ma,” she forgot to tell petitioner that Keith’s
voice had changed; he had be-
___________
22
De la Cruz v. De la Cruz, 130 Phil. 324 (1968).
23
Duncan v. CFI of Rizal, supra at p. 304; Santos v. Aranzanso, supra at p.
168.
24
De la Cruz v. De la Cruz, supra.
147
VOL. 296, SEPTEMBER 25, 1998 147
Cang vs. Court of Appeals
1. come a “bagito” or a teen-ager with many “fans” who
sent him Valentine’s cards. She told him how Charmaine
had become quite a talkative “almost dalaga” who could
carry on a conversation with her angkong and how pretty
she was in white dress when she won among the
candidates in the Flores de Mayo after she had prayed so
hard for it. She informed him, however, that she was
worried because Charmaine was vain and wont to
extravagance as she loved clothes. About Joeton (Joseph
 Anthony), she told petitioner that the boy was smart for
his age and “quite spoiled” being the youngest of the
children in Lahug. Joeton was mischievous but Keith was
his idol with whom he would sleep anytime. She
admitted having said so much about the children
because they might not have informed petitioner of
“some happenings and spices of life” about themselves.
She said that it was “just very exciting to know how
they’ve grown up and very pleasant, too, that each of
them have (sic) different characters.” She ended the
letter with the hope that petitioner was “at the best of
health.” After extending her regards “to all,” she signed
her name after the word “Love.” This letter was mailed
on July 9, 1986 from Cebu to petitioner whose address
was P.O. Box 2445, Williamson, West Virginia 25661 (Exh.
1-D).
2. 2.Exh. 2—letter dated 11/13/84 on a green stationery
with golden print of “a note from Menchu” on the left
upper corner. Anna Marie stated that “we” wrote to
petitioner on Oct. 2, 1984 and that Keith and Joeton
were very excited when petitioner “called up last time.”
She told him how Joeton would grab the phone from
Keith just so petitioner would know what he wanted to
order. Charmaine, who was asleep, was so disappointed
that she missed petitioner’s call because she also wanted
something that petitioner should buy. Menchu told
petitioner that Charmaine wanted a pencil sharpener,
light-colored T-shirts for her walking shorts and a (k)nap
sack. Anna Marie informed petitioner that the kids were
growing up and so were their needs. She told petitioner
to be “very fatherly” about the children’s needs because
those were expensive here. For herself, Anna Marie
asked for a subscription of Glamour and Vogue
magazines and that whatever expenses he would incur,
she would “replace” these. As a postcript, she told
petitioner that Keith wanted a size 6 khaki-colored
“Sperry topsider shoes.”
3. 3.Exh. 3—an undated note on a yellow small piece of
paper that reads:
148
148 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cang vs. Court of Appeals
“Dear Herbert,
Hi, how was Christmas and New Year? Hope you had a wonderful one.
By the way thanks for the shoes, it was a nice one. It’s nice to be thought
of at X’mas. Thanks again.
Sincerely,
Menchu”
1. 4.Exh. 4—a two-page undated letter of Keith on
stationery of Jose Clavano, Inc. addressed to “Dear Dad.”
Keith told his father that they tried to tell their mother
“to stay for a little while, just a few weeks after classes
start(s)” on June 16. He informed petitioner that Joeton
would be in Kinder I and that, about the motorbike, he
had told his mother to write petitioner about it and
 “we’ll see what you’re (sic) decision will be.” He asked for pass by the Iglesia ni Cristo church and his insistence that
chocolates, nuts, basketball shirt and shorts, rubber Aquino was not dead because
shoes, socks, headband, some clothes for outing and
perfume. He told petitioner that they had been going to 149
Lahug with their mother picking them up after Angkong
or Ama had prepared lunch or dinner. From her aerobics, VOL. 296, SEPTEMBER 25, 1998 149
Cang vs. Court of Appeals
his mother would go for them in Lahug at about 9:30 or
10:00 o’clock in the evening. He wished his father “luck
1. he had seen him on the betamax machine. For Keith,
and the best of health” and that they prayed for him and
Charmaine had become “very maldita” who was not
their other relatives. The letter was ended with “Love
always satisfied with her dolls and things but Joeton was
Keith.”
full of surprises. He ended the letter with “Love your son,
2. 5.Exh. 5—another undated long letter of Keith. He
Keith.” The letter was mailed on February 6, 1985 (Exh.
thanked his father for the Christmas card “with $40.00,
5-D).
$30.00 and $30.00” and the “card of Joeton with $5.00
2. 6.Exh. 6—an undated letter of Charmaine. She thanked
inside.” He told petitioner the amounts following his
petitioner for the bathing suit, key chain, pencil box,
father’s instructions and promise to send money through
socks, half shirt, pencil sharpener and $50.00. She
the mail. He asked his father to address his letter directly
reminded him of her birthday on January 23 when she
to him because he wanted to open his own letters. He
would turn 9 years old. She informed him that she wore
informed petitioner of activities during the Christmas
size 10 and the size of her feet was IM. They had fun at
season—that they enjoyed eating, playing and giving
Christmas in Lahug but classes would start on January 9
surprises to their mother. He apprised him of his daily
although Keith’s classes had started on January 6. They
schedule and that their mother had been closely
would feel sad again because Mommy would be leaving
supervising them, instructing them to fold their blankets
soon. She hoped petitioner would keep writing them.
and pile up their pillows. He informed petitioner that
She signed, “Love, Charmaine.”
Joeton had become very smart while Charmaine, who
3. 7.Exh. 7—an undated letter of Keith. He explained to
was also smart, was very demanding of their mother.
petitioner that they had not been remiss in writing
Because their mother was leaving for the United States
letters to him. He informed him of their trip to Manila—
on February 5, they would be missing her like they were
they went to Malacañang, Tito Doy Laurel’s house, the
missing petitioner. He asked for his “things” and $200.00.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the executive house, Tagaytay
He told petitioner more anecdotes about Joeton like he
for three days and Baguio for one week. He informed him
would make the sign of the cross even when they would
 that he got “honors,” Charmaine was 7th in her class and
Joeton had excellent grades. Joeton would be enrolled in
Sacred Heart soon and he was glad they would be
together in that school. He asked for his “reward” from
petitioner and so with Charmaine and Joeton. He asked
for a motorbike and dollars that he could save. He told
petitioner that he was saving the money he had been
sending them. He said he missed petitioner and wished
him the best. He added that petitioner should call them
on Sundays.
4. 8.Exh. 8—a letter from Joeton and Charmaine but
apparently written by the latter. She asked for money
from petitioner to buy something for the school and
“something else.” She promised not to spend so much
and to save some. She said she loved petitioner and
missed him. Joeton said “hi!” to petitioner. After ending
the letter with “Love, Joeton and Charmaine,” she asked
for her prize for her grades as she got seventh place.
5. 9.Exh. 9—undated letter of Keith. He assured petitioner
that he had been writing him; that he would like to have
some money but he would save them; that he learned
that petitioner had called them up but he was not
around; that he would be going to Manila but would be
back home May 3; that his Mommy had just arrived
Thursday afternoon, and that he would be the “official
altar boy.” He asked petitioner to write them soon.
150
150 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cang vs. Court of Appeals
1. 10.Exh. 10—Keith thanked petitioner for the money he
sent. He told petitioner that he was saving some in the
bank and he was proud because he was the only one in
his group who saved in the bank. He told him that Joeton
had become naughty and would claim as his own the
shirts sent to Keith by petitioner. He advised petitioner to
send pants and shirts to Joeton, too, and asked for a pair
of topsider shoes and candies. He informed petitioner
that he was a member of the basketball team and that
his mom would drive for his group. He asked him to call
them often like the father of Ana Christie and to write
them when he would call so that they could wait for it.
He informed petitioner that they had all grown bigger
and heavier. He hoped petitioner would be happy with
the letter that had taken him so long to write because he
did not want to commit any mistakes. He asked
petitioner to buy him perfume (Drakkar) and, after
thanking petitioner, added that the latter should buy
something for Mommy.
2. 11.Exh. 11—a Christmas card “For My Wonderful Father”
dated October 8, 1984 from Keith, Charmaine and
Joeton.
3. 12.Exh. 12—another Christmas card, “Our Wish For You”
with the year ‘83 written on the upper right hand corner
of the inside page, from Keith, Charmaine and Joeton.
4. 13.Exh. 13—a letter of Keith telling petitioner that he had
written him even when their Mom “was there” where
she bought them clothes and shoes. Keith asked
petitioner for $300.00. Because his mother would not
agree to buy him a motorbike, he wanted a Karaoke unit
that would cost P12,000.00. He informed petitioner that
he would go to an afternoon disco with friends but their
grades were all good with Joeton receiving “stars” for
excellence. Keith wanted a bow and arrow, Rambo toys
and G.I. Joe. He expressed his desire that petitioner
would come and visit them someday.
5. 14.Exh. 14—a letter of Keith with one of the four pages
bearing the date January 1986. Keith told his father that
they had received the package that the latter sent them.
The clothes he sent, however, fitted only Keith but not
Charmaine and Joeton who had both grown bigger. Keith
asked for grocery items, toys and more clothes. He
asked, in behalf of his mother, for low-heeled shoes and
a dress to match, jogging pants, tights and leotards that
 would make her look sexy. He intimated to petitioner
that he had grown taller and that he was already
ashamed to be asking for things to buy in the grocery
even though his mother had told him not to be shy about
it.
151
VOL. 296, SEPTEMBER 25, 1998 151
Cang vs. Court of Appeals
Aside from these letters, petitioner also presented certifications of banks
in the U.S.A. showing that even prior to the filing of the petition for
adoption, he had deposited amounts for the benefit of his children. 25
Exhibits 24 to 45 are copies of checks sent by petitioner to the children
from 1985 to 1989.
These pieces of evidence are all on record. It is, therefore, quite surprising
why the courts below simply glossed over these, ignoring not only
evidence on financial support but also the emotional exchange of
sentiments between petitioner and his family. Instead, the courts below
emphasized the meagerness of the amounts he sent to his children and the
fact that, as regards the bank deposits, these were “withdrawable by him
alone.” Simply put, the courts below attached a high premium to the
prospective adopters’ financial status but totally brushed aside the
possible repercussion of the adoption on the emotional and psychological
well-being of the children.
True, Keith had expressed his desire to be adopted by his uncle and aunt.
However, his seeming steadfastness on the matter as shown by his
testimony is contradicted by his feelings towards his father as revealed in
his letters to him. It is not at all farfetched to conclude that Keith’s
testimony was actually the effect of the filing of the petition for adoption
that would certainly have engendered confusion in his young mind as to
the capability of his father to sustain the lifestyle he had been used to.
The courts below emphasized respondents’ emotional attachment to the
children. This is hardly surprising for, from the very start of their young
lives, the children were used to their presence. Such attachment had
persisted and certainly, the young ones’ act of snuggling close to private
respondent Ronald Clavano was not indicative of their emotional
detachment from their father. Private respondents, being the uncle and
aunt of the children, could not but come to their succor when they needed
help as when Keith got sick and private respondent Ronald spent for his
hospital bills.
__________
25
Exhs. 15 to 17.
152
152 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cang vs. Court of Appeals
In a number of cases, this Court has held that parental authority cannot be
entrusted to a person simply because he could give the child a larger
measure of material comfort than his natural parent. Thus, in David v.
Court of Appeals,26 the Court awarded custody of a minor illegitimate child
to his mother who was a mere secretary and market vendor instead of to
his affluent father who was a married man, not solely because the child
opted to go with his mother. The Court said:
“Daisie and her children may not be enjoying a life of affluence that private
respondent promises if the child lives with him. It is enough, however, that
petitioner is earning a decent living and is able to support her children
according to her means.”
In Celis v. Cafuir27 where the Court was confronted with the issue of
whether to award custody of a child to the natural mother or to a foster
mother, this Court said:
“This court should avert the tragedy in the years to come of having
deprived mother and son of the beautiful associations and tender,
imperishable memories engendered by the relationship of parent and
child. We should not take away from a mother the opportunity of bringing
up her own child even at the cost of extreme sacrifice due to poverty and
lack of means; so that afterwards, she may be able to look back with pride
and a sense of satisfaction at her sacrifices and her efforts, however
humble, to make her dreams of her little boy come true. We should not
forget that the relationship between a foster mother and a child is not
natural but artificial. If the child turns out to be a failure or forgetful of
what its foster parents had done for him, said parents might yet count and
appraise (sic) all that they have done and spent for him and with regret
consider all of it as a dead loss, and even rue the day they committed the
blunder of taking the child into their hearts and their home. Not so with a
real natural mother who never counts the cost and her sacrifices, ever
treasuring memories of her associations with her child, however
unpleasant and disappointing. Flesh and blood count. x x x.”

____________
26
250 SCRA 82 [1995].
27
86 Phil. 554, 559-560 (1950).
153
VOL. 296, SEPTEMBER 25, 1998 153
Cang vs. Court of Appeals
In Espiritu v. Court of Appeals,28 the Court stated that “(I)n ascertaining the
welfare and best interests of the child, courts are mandated by the Family
Code to take into account all relevant considerations.” Thus, in awarding
custody of the child to the father, the Court said:
“A scrutiny of the pleadings in this case indicates that Teresita, or at least,
her counsel are more intent on emphasizing the ‘torture and agony’ of a
mother separated from her children and the humiliation she suffered as a
result of her character being made a key issue in court rather than the
feelings and future, the best interests and welfare of her children. While
the bonds between a mother and her small child are special in nature,
either parent, whether father or mother, is bound to suffer agony and pain
if deprived of custody. One cannot say that his or her suffering is greater
than that of the other parent. It is not so much the suffering, pride, and
other feelings of either parent but the welfare of the child which is the
paramount consideration.” (Italics supplied)29
Indeed, it would be against the spirit of the law if financial consideration
were to be the paramount consideration in deciding whether to deprive a
person of parental authority over his children. There should be a holistic
approach to the matter, taking into account the physical, emotional,
psychological, mental, social and spiritual needs of the child.30 The
conclusion of the courts below that petitioner abandoned his family needs
more evidentiary support other than his inability to provide them the
material comfort that his admittedly affluent in-laws could provide. There
should be proof that he had so emotionally abandoned them that his
children would not miss his guidance and counsel if they were given to
adopting parents. The letters he received from his children prove that
petitioner maintained the more important emotional tie between him and
his children. The children needed him not only because he could cater to
their whims but also because he was
____________
28
312 Phil. 431 (1995).
29
Ibid., at p. 439.
30
See: Perez v. Court of Appeals, 325 Phil. 1014, 1020 (1996).
154
154 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cang vs. Court of Appeals
a person they could share with their daily activities, problems and
triumphs.
The Court is thus dismayed that the courts below did not look beyond
petitioner’s “meager” financial support to ferret out other indications on
whether petitioner had in fact abandoned his family. The omission of said
courts has led us to examine why the children were subjected to the
process of adoption, notwithstanding the proven ties that bound them to
their father. To our consternation, the record of the case bears out the fact
that the welfare of the children was not exactly the “paramount
consideration” that impelled Anna Marie to consent to their adoption.
In her affidavit of consent, Anna Marie expressly said that leaving the
children in the country, as she was wont to travel abroad often, was a
problem that would naturally hamper her job-seeking abroad. In other
words, the adoption appears to be a matter of convenience for her
because Anna Marie herself is financially capable of supporting her
children.31 In his testimony, private respondent Ronald swore that Anna
Marie had been out of the country for two years and came home twice or
three times,32 thereby manifesting the fact that it was she who actually left
her children to the care of her relatives. It was bad enough that their father
left their children when he went abroad, but when their mother followed
suit for her own reasons, the situation worsened. The Clavano family must
have realized this. Hence, when the family first discussed the adoption of
the children, they decided that the prospective adopter should be Anna
Marie’s brother Jose. However, because he had children of his own, the
family decided to devolve the task upon private respondents.33
This couple, however, could not always be in Cebu to care for the children.
A businessman, private respondent Ronald Clavano commutes between
Cebu and Manila while his wife,
__________
31
TSN, November 17, 1987, p. 38.
32
Ibid., p. 22.
33
RTC Decision, pp. 1-2.
155
VOL. 296, SEPTEMBER 25, 1998 155
 Cang vs. Court of Appeals
private respondent Maria Clara, is an international flight stewardess. 34
Moreover, private respondent Ronald claimed that he could “take care of
the children while their parents are away,”35 thereby indicating the
evanescence of his intention. He wanted to have the children’s surname
changed to Clavano for the reason that he wanted to take them to the
United States as it would be difficult for them to get a visa if their surname
were different from his.36 To be sure, he also testified that he wanted to
spare the children the stigma of being products of a broken home.
Nevertheless, a close analysis of the testimonies of private respondent
Ronald, his sister Anna Marie and their brother Jose points to the
inescapable conclusion that they just wanted to keep the children away
from their father. One of the overriding considerations for the adoption
was allegedly the state of Anna Marie’s health—she was a victim of an
almost fatal accident and suffers from a heart ailment. However, she
herself admitted that her health condition was not that serious as she
could still take care of the children.37 An eloquent evidence of her ability to
physically care for them was her employment at the Philippine Consulate
in Los Angeles38—she could not have been employed if her health were
endangered. It is thus clear that the Clavanos’ attempt at depriving
petitioner of parental authority apparently stemmed from their notion that
he was an inveterate womanizer. Anna Marie in fact expressed fear that
her children would “never be at ease with the wife of their father.”39
Petitioner, who described himself as single in status, denied being a
womanizer and father to the sons of Wilma Soco.40 As to whether he was
telling the truth is beside the
_________
34
TSN, February 3, 1988, p. 13.
35
TSN, November 17, 1987, p. 24.
36
Ibid., pp. 28-29.
37
TSN, January 12, 1988, p. 10.
38
Ibid.
39
Ibid., p. 6.
40
TSN, December 8, 1987, p. 12.
156
156 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cang vs. Court of Appeals
point. Philippine society, being comparatively conservative and traditional,
aside from being Catholic in orientation, it does not countenance
womanizing on the part of a family man, considering the baneful effects
such irresponsible act visits on his family. Neither may the Court place a
premium on the inability of a man to distinguish between siring children
and parenting them. Nonetheless, the actuality that petitioner carried on
an affair with a paramour cannot be taken as sufficient basis for the
conclusion that petitioner was necessarily an unfit father.41 Conventional
wisdom and common human experience show that a “bad” husband does
not necessarily make a “bad” father. That a husband is not exactly an
upright man is not, strictly speaking, a sufficient ground to deprive him as a
father of his inherent right to parental authority over the children. 42
Petitioner has demonstrated his love and concern for his children when he
took the trouble of sending a telegram43 to the lower court expressing his
intention to oppose the adoption immediately after learning about it. He
traveled back to this country to attend to the case and to testify about his
love for his children and his desire to unite his family once more in the
United States.44
Private respondents themselves explained why petitioner failed to abide
by the agreement with his wife on the support of the children. Petitioner
was an illegal alien in the United States. As such, he could not have
procured gainful employment. Private respondents failed to refute
petitioner’s testimony that he did not receive his share from the sale of the
conjugal home,45 pursuant to their manifestation/compromise agreement
in the legal separation case. Hence, it can be reasonably presumed that the
proceeds of the sale redounded to the benefit of his family, particularly his
children. The proceeds may not have lasted long but there is ample
evidence to
___________
41
Silva v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 114742, July 17, 1997.
42
Chua v. Cabangbang, 137 Phil. 204 (1969).
43
Exh. 18.
44
TSN, December 8, 1987, pp. 47-48; February 11, 1988, p. 6.
45
TSN, December 8, 1987, p. 20.
157
VOL. 296, SEPTEMBER 25, 1998 157
Cang vs. Court of Appeals
show that thereafter, petitioner tried to abide by his agreement with his
wife and sent his family money, no matter how “meager.”
The liberality with which this Court treats matters leading to adoption
insofar as it carries out the beneficent purposes of the law to ensure the
rights and privileges of the adopted child arising therefrom, ever mindful
that the paramount consideration is the overall benefit and interest of the
adopted child, should be understood in its proper context and perspective.
The Court’s position should not be misconstrued or misinterpreted as to
extend to inferences beyond the contemplation of law and
jurisprudence.46 The discretion to approve adoption proceedings is not to
be anchored solely on best interests of the child but likewise, with due
regard to the natural rights of the parents over the child. 47
In this regard, this Court notes private respondents’ reliance on the
manifestation/compromise agreement between petitioner and Anna
Marie which became the basis of the decree of legal separation. According
to private respondents’ counsel,48 the authority given to Anna Marie by
that decree to enter into contracts as a result of the legal separation was
“all embracing”49 and, therefore, included giving her sole consent to the
adoption. This conclusion is however, anchored on the wrong premise that
the authority given to the innocent spouse to enter into contracts that
obviously refer to their conjugal properties, shall include entering into
agreements leading to the adoption of the children. Such conclusion is as
devoid of a legal basis as private respondents’ apparent reliance on the
decree of legal separation for doing away with petitioner’s consent to the
adoption.
The transfer of custody over the children to Anna Marie by virtue of the
decree of legal separation did not, of necessity,
___________
46
Republic v. Hernandez, 323 Phil. 606 (1996).
47
Republic v. Court of Appeals and Bobiles, supra.
48
Atty. Ricardo Padilla.
49
TSN, November 17, 1987, p. 37.
158
158 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cang vs. Court of Appeals
deprive petitioner of parental authority for the purpose of placing the
children up for adoption. Article 213 of the Family Code states: “. . . in case
of legal separation of parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the
parent designated by the court.” In awarding custody, the court shall take
into account “all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child
over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit.”
It should be noted, however, that the law only confers on the innocent
spouse the “exercise” of parental authority. Having custody of the child,
the innocent spouse shall implement the sum of parental rights with
respect to his rearing and care. The innocent spouse shall have the right to
the child’s services and earnings, and the right to direct his activities and
make decisions regarding his care and control, education, health and
religion.50
In a number of cases, this Court has considered parental authority, the
joint exercise of which is vested by the law upon the parents,51 as
“x x x a mass of rights and obligations which the law grants to parents for
the purpose of the children’s physical preservation and development, as
well as the cultivation of their intellect and the education of their hearts
and senses. As regards parental authority, ‘there is no power, but a task;
no complex of rights, but a sum of duties; no sovereignty but a sacred trust
for the welfare of the minor.’
Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be
transferred or renounced except in cases authorized by law. The right
attached to parental authority, being purely personal, the law allows a
waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship and
surrender to a children’s home or an orphan institution. When a parent
entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or godfather,
even in a document, what is given is
__________
50
Dissenting Opinion of Justice Felix V. Makasiar in Luna v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, (G.R. No. 68374, June 18, 1985, 137 SCRA 7) citing 59 Am.
Jur. 2d 107.
51
Art. 211, Family Code.
159
VOL. 296, SEPTEMBER 25, 1998 159
Cang vs. Court of Appeals
merely temporary custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of
parental authority. Even if a definite renunciation is manifest, the law still
disallows the same.
The father and mother, being the natural guardians of unemancipated
children, are duty-bound and entitled to keep them in their custody and
company.”52 (Italics supplied)
As such, in instant case, petitioner may not be deemed as having been
completely deprived of parental authority, notwithstanding the award of
custody to Anna Marie in the legal separation case. To reiterate, that
award was arrived at by the lower court on the basis of the agreement of
the spouses.
While parental authority may be waived, as in law it may be subject to a
compromise,53 there was no factual finding in the legal separation case
that petitioner was such an irresponsible person that he should be
deprived of custody of his children or that there are grounds under the law
that could deprive him of parental authority. In fact, in the legal separation
case, the court thereafter ordered the transfer of custody over the children
from Anna Marie back to petitioner. The order was not implemented
because of Anna Marie’s motion for reconsideration thereon. The Clavano
family also vehemently objected to the transfer of custody to the
petitioner, such that the latter was forced to file a contempt charge against
them.54
The law is clear that either parent may lose parental authority over the
child only for a valid reason. No such reason was established in the legal
separation case. In the instant case for adoption, the issue is whether or
not petitioner had abandoned his children as to warrant dispensation of
his consent to their adoption. Deprivation of parental authority is
__________
52
Sagala-Eslao v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 116773, January 16, 1997, 266
SCRA 317, 322-323 citing Santos, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113054,
March 16, 1995, 242 SCRA 407.
53
TOLENTINO, CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Vol. V, 1992 ed., p. 491
citing 4 Salvat 383.
54
TSN, February 11, 1988, pp. 9-12.
160
160 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cang vs. Court of Appeals
one of the effects of a decree of adoption.55 But there cannot be a valid
decree of adoption in this case precisely because, as this Court has
demonstrated earlier, the finding of the courts below on the issue of
petitioner’s abandonment of his family was based on a misappreciation
that was tantamount to non-appreciation, of facts on record.
As regards the divorce obtained in the United States, this Court has ruled
in Tenchavez v. Escaño 56 that a divorce obtained by Filipino citizens after
the effectivity of the Civil Code is not recognized in this jurisdiction as it is
contrary to State policy. While petitioner is now an American citizen, as
regards Anna Marie who has apparently remained a Filipino citizen, the
divorce has no legal effect.
Parental authority is a constitutionally protected State policy borne out of
established customs and tradition of our people. Thus, in Silva v. Court of
Appeals,57 a case involving the visitorial rights of an illegitimate parent over
his child, the Court expressed the opinion that:
“Parents have the natural right, as well as the moral and legal duty, to care
for their children, see to their upbringing and safeguard their best interest
and welfare. This authority and responsibility may not be unduly denied
the parents; neither may it be renounced by them. Even when the parents
are estranged and their affection for each other is lost, the attachment and
feeling for their offsprings invariably remain unchanged. Neither the law
nor the courts allow this affinity to suffer absent, of course, any real, grave
and imminent threat to the well-being of the child.”
Since the incorporation of the law concerning adoption in the Civil Code,
there has been a pronounced trend to place emphasis in adoption
proceedings, not so much on the need of childless couples for a child, as on
the paramount interest of a child who needs the love and care of parents.
After the pas-
___________
55
Cervantes v. Fajardo, G.R. No. 79955, January 27, 1989, 169 SCRA 575,
579.
56
122 Phil. 752 (1965).
57
Supra.
161
VOL. 296, SEPTEMBER 25, 1998 161
Cang vs. Court of Appeals
sage of the Child and Youth Welfare Code and the Family Code, the
discernible trend has impelled the enactment of Republic Act No. 8043 on
Intercountry Adoption58 and Republic Act No. 8552 establishing the rules
on the domestic adoption of Filipino children.59
The case at bar applies the relevant provisions of these recent laws, such
as the following policies in the “Domestic Adoption Act of 1998”:
1. (a) To ensure that every child remains under the care and
custody of his/her parent(s) and be provided with love,
care, understanding and security towards the full and
harmonious development of his/her personality.60
2. (b) In all matters relating to the care, custody and
adoption of a child, his/her interest shall be the
paramount consideration in accordance with the tenets
set forth in the United Nations (UN) Convention on the
Rights of the Child.61
3. (c) To prevent the child from unnecessary separation
from his/her biological parent(s).62
Inasmuch as the Philippines is a signatory to the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child, the government and its officials are
duty bound to comply with its mandates. Of particular relevance to instant
case are the following provisions:
“States Parties shall respect the responsibilities, rights and duties of
parents . . . to provide, in a manner consistent with the evolving capacities
of the child, appropriate direction and guidance
___________
58
The law was approved on June 7, 1995.
59
The law was approved on February 25, 1998.
60
Art. 1, Sec. 2(a), R.A. No. 8552.
61
Art. 1, Sec. 2(b), Ibid.; adopted by the General Assembly of the United
Nations on November 20, 1989 and ratified by the Philippines in July 1990
by virtue of Senate Resolution No. 109.
62
Art. 1, Sec. 2(c), ii, Ibid.
162
162 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cang vs. Court of Appeals
in the exercise by the child of the rights recognized in the present
Convention.”63
“States Parties shall respect the right of the child who is separated from
one or both parents to maintain personal relations and direct contact with
both parents on a regular basis, except if it is contrary to the child’s best
interests.”64
“A child whose parents reside in different States shall have the right to
maintain on a regular basis, save in exceptional circumstances personal
relations and direct contacts with both parents . . .”65
“States Parties shall respect the rights and duties of the parents . . . to
provide direction to the child in the exercise of his or her right in a manner
consistent with the evolving capacities of the child.” 66
Underlying the policies and precepts in international conventions and the
domestic statutes with respect to children is the overriding principle that
all actuations should be in the best interests of the child. This is not,
however, to be implemented in derogation of the primary right of the
parent or parents to exercise parental authority over him. The rights of
parents vis-à-vis that of their children are not antithetical to each other, as
in fact, they must be respected and harmonized to the fullest extent
possible.
Keith, Charmaine and Joseph Anthony have all grown up. Keith and
Charmaine are now of legal age while Joseph Anthony is approaching
eighteen, the age of majority. For sure, they shall be endowed with the
discretion to lead lives independent of their parents. This is not to state
that this case has been rendered moot and academic, for their welfare and
best interests regarding their adoption, must be determined as of the time
that the petition for adoption was filed.67 Said peti-
__________
63
Art. 5, Convention on the Rights of the Child.
64
Art. 9, parag. 3, ibid.
65
Art. 10, parag. 2, Ibid.
66
Art. 14, parag. 2, Ibid.
67
See: Espiritu v. Court of Appeals, supra at p. 441.
163
VOL. 296, SEPTEMBER 25, 1998 163
People vs. Leachon, Jr.
tion must be denied as it was filed without the required consent of their
father who, by law and under the facts of the case at bar, has not
abandoned them.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby
GRANTED. The questioned Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals, as well as the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, are SET
ASIDE thereby denying the petition for adoption of Keith, Charmaine and
Joseph Anthony, all surnamed Cang, by the spouse respondents Ronald
and Maria Clara Clavano. This Decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (C.J., Chairman), Kapunan and Purisima, JJ., concur.
Petition granted, judgment and resolution set aside.
——o0o——
© Copyright 2020 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights

66 True False 340397
772 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Vda. de. Jacob vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 135216. August 19, 1999.*
TOMASA VDA. DE JACOB, as Special Administratrix of the Intestate Estate
of Deceased Alfredo E. Jacob, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO
PILAPIL, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS for the Province of Camarines Sur, and
JUAN F. TRIVINO as publisher of “Balalong,– respondents.
Evidence; Best and Secondary Evidence; Authentication and Proof of
Evidence; Public and Private Documents; If the original writing has been
lost or destroyed or cannot be produced in court, upon proof of its
execution and loss or destruction, or unavailability, its contents may be
proved by a copy or recital of its contents in some authentic document, or
by recollection of witnesses.–“It is settled that if the original writing has
been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced in court, upon proof of its
execution and loss or destruction, or unavailability, its contents may be
proved by a copy or a recital of its contents in some authentic document,
or by recollection of witnesses.– Upon a showing that the document was
duly executed and subsequently lost, without any bad faith on the part of
the offeror, secondary evidence may be adduced to prove its contents.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The execution of a document may be
proven by the parties themselves, by the swearing officer, by witnesses
who saw and recognized the signatures of the parties; or even by those to
whom the parties have previously narrated the execution thereof.– Truly,
the execution of a document may be proven by the parties themselves, by
the swearing officer, by witnesses who saw and recognized the signatures
of the parties; or even by those to whom the parties have previously
narrated the execution thereof. The Court
_______________
*
THIRD DIVISION.
773
VOL. 312, AUGUST 19, 1999 773
Vda. de Jacob vs. Court of Appeals
has also held that “[t]he loss may be shown by any person who [knows]
the fact of its loss, or by any one who ha[s] made, in the judgment of the
court, a sufficient examination in the place or places where the document
or papers of similar character are usually kept by the person in whose
custody the document lost was, and has been unable to find it; or who has
made any other investigation which is sufficient to satisfy the court that
the instrument [has] indeed [been] lost.–
Same; Same; Same; Same; Since the due execution and the loss of the
marriage contract were clearly shown by the evidence presented,
secondary evidence–testimonial and documentary–may be admitted to
prove the fact of marriage.–In the present case, due execution was
established by the testimonies of Adela Pilapil, who was present during the
marriage ceremony, and of petitioner herself as a party to the event. The
subsequent loss was shown by the testimony and the affidavit of the
officiating priest, Monsignor Yllana, as well as by petitioner’s own
declaration in court. These are relevant, competent and admissible
evidence. Since the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract
were clearly shown by the evidence presented, secondary evidence–
testimonial and documentary–may be admitted to prove the fact of
marriage.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Certificates; Failure to send a copy of a
marriage certificate for record purposes does not invalidate the marriage.–
Respondent Pedro Pilapil misplaces emphasis on the absence of an entry
pertaining to 1975 in the Books of Marriage of the Local Civil Registrar of
Manila and in the National Census and Statistics Office (NCSO). He finds it
quite “bizarre– for petitioner to have waited three years before registering
their marriage. On both counts, he proceeds from the wrong premise. In
the first place, failure to send a copy of a marriage certificate for record
purposes does not invalidate the marriage. In the second place, it was not
the petitioner’s duty to send a copy of the marriage certificate to the civil
registrar. Instead, this charge fell upon the solemnizing officer.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Marriages; This jurisprudential attitude
towards marriage is based on the prima facie presumption that a man and
a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a
lawful contract of marriage.–This jurisprudential attitude towards marriage
is based on the prima facie presumption that a man and a woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful
contract of marriage. Given the undis-
774
774 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
 Vda. de Jacob vs. Court of Appeals
puted, even accepted, fact that Dr. Jacob and petitioner lived together as
husband and wife, we find that the presumption of marriage was not
rebutted in this case.
Trial Courts; Finality of Findings of Fact; As a rule, factual findings of
the trial court are accorded great weight and respect by appellate courts
except when it failed to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly
considered, will justify a different conclusion.–As a rule, the factual findings
of the trial court are accorded great weight and respect by appellate
courts, because it had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of
witnesses and to note telltale signs indicating the truth or the falsity of a
testimony. The rule, however, is not applicable to the present case,
because it was Judge Augusto O. Cledera, not the ponente, who heard the
testimonies of the two expert witnesses. Thus, the Court examined the
records and found that the Court of Appeals and the trial court “failed to
notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify a
different conclusion.– Hence, the present case is an exception to the
general rule that only questions of law may be reviewed in petitions under
Rule 45.
Same; Same; Adoption; The burden of proof in establishing adoption
is upon the person claiming such relationship.–The burden of proof in
establishing adoption is upon the person claiming such relationship. This
Respondent Pilapil failed to do. Moreover, the evidence presented by
petitioner shows that the alleged adoption is a sham.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Benito P. Fabie and Nelson P. Paraiso for petitioner.
Coronado, Osorio & Associates for private respondent.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The contents of a document may be proven by competent evidence other
than the document itself, provided that the offeror establishes its due
execution and its subsequent loss or
775
VOL. 312, AUGUST 19, 1999 775
Vda. de Jacob vs. Court of Appeals
destruction. Accordingly, the fact of marriage may be shown by extrinsic
evidence other than the marriage contract.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals1 (CA) dated January 15, 1998,
and its Resolution dated August 24, 1998, denying petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration. The dispositive part of the CA Decision reads:
“WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from it
being more consistent with the facts and the applicable law, the
challenged Decision dated 05 April 1994 of the RTC, Br. 30, Tigaon,
Camarines Sur is AFFIRMED in toto.–2
The decretal portion of the trial court Decision3 is as follows:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, decision is hereby rendered in favor of
[herein Respondent] Pedro Pilapil, and against [herein Petitioner] Tomasa
Guison as follows:
1. a) Declaring Exh. B, the so called ‘reconstructed marriage
contract’ excluded under the best evidence rule, and
therefore declaring said Exh. B spurious and non-
existent.
2. b) Declaring Exh. 3 Order dated July 18, 1961, and the
signature of the issuing Judge JOSE L. MOYA (Exh. 34) to
be genuine.
3. c) Permanently setting aside and lifting the provisional
writ of injunction earlier issued; and
________________
1
Sixth Division composed of J. Jesus M. Elbinias (chairman), J. Omar U.
Amin (ponente), and J. Hector L. Hofileña.
2
CA Decision, p. 10; rollo, p. 59.
3
Penned by Judge Angel S. Malaya. The case was heard by several
judges; namely, Judges Alfredo A. Cabral, Nilo A. Malanyaon, Ceferino P.
Barcinas, Bonifacio C. Initia, and Augusto O. Cledera.
776
776 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Vda. de Jacob vs. Court of Appeals
d) To pay attorney’s fees of P50,000.
And costs against [herein petitioner.]–
The Facts
The Court of Appeals narrates the facts thus:
“Plaintiff-appellant [petitioner herein] claimed to be the surviving spouse
of deceased Dr. Alfredo E. Jacob and was appointed Special Administratix
for the various estates of the deceased by virtue of a reconstructed
Marriage Contract between herself and the deceased.
“Defendant-appellee on the other hand, claimed to be the legally-
adopted son of Alfredo. In support of his claim, he presented an Order
dated 18 July 1961 issued by then Presiding Judge Jose L. Moya, CFI,
Camarines Sur, granting the petition for adoption filed by deceased Alfredo
in favor of Pedro Pilapil.
“During the proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased Alfredo in Case No. T-46 (entitled “Tomasa Vda. de Jacob v. Jose
Centenera, et al.) herein defendant-appellee Pedro sought to intervene
therein claiming his share of the deceased’s estate as Alfredo’s adopted
son and as his sole surviving heir. Pedro questioned the validity of the
marriage between appellant Tomasa and his adoptive father Alfredo.
“Appellant Tomasa opposed the Motion for Intervention and filed a
complaint for injunction with damages (Civil Case No. T-83) questioning
appellee’s claim as the legal heir of Alfredo.
“The following issues were raised in the court a quo:
1. a) Whether the marriage between the plaintiff-appellant
and deceased Alfredo Jacob was valid;
2. b) Whether the defendant-appellee is the legally adopted
son of deceased Jacob.
“On the first issue, appellant claims that the marriage between her and
Alfredo was solemnized by one Msgr. Florencio C. Yllana, CBCP,
Intramuros, Manila sometime in 1975. She could not however present the
original copy of the Marriage Contract stating that the original document
was lost when Msgr. Yllana allegedly gave it to Mr. Jose Centenera for
registration. In lieu of the original, Tomasa presented as secondary
evidence a reconstructed Marriage Contract issued in 1978.
777
VOL. 312, AUGUST 19, 1999 777
Vda. de Jacob vs. Court of Appeals
“During the trial, the court a quo observed the following irregularities
in the execution of the reconstructed Marriage Contract, to wit:
1. 1.No copy of the Marriage Contract was sent to the local
civil registrar by the solemnizing officer thus giving the
implication that there was no copy of the marriage
contract sent to, nor a record existing in the civil registry
of Manila;
2. 2. In signing the Marriage Contract, the late Alfredo
Jacob merely placed his “thumbmark– on said contract
purportedly on 16 September 1975 (date of the
marriage). However, on a Sworn Affidavit executed
between appellant Tomasa and Alfredo a day before the
alleged date of marriage or on 15 September 1975
attesting that both of them lived together as husband
and wife for five (5) years, Alfredo [af]fixed his customary
signature. Thus the trial court concluded that the
“thumbmark– was logically “not genuine.– In other
words, not of Alfredo Jacob’s;
3. 3. Contrary to appellant’s claim, in his Affidavit stating
the circumstances of the loss of the Marriage Contract,
the affiant Msgr. Yllana never mentioned that he
allegedly “gave the copies of the Marriage Contract to
Mr. Jose Centenera for registration.– And as admitted by
appellant at the trial, Jose Centenera (who allegedly
acted as padrino) was not present at the date of the
marriage since he was then in Australia. In fact, on the
face of the reconstructed Marriage Contract, it was one
“Benjamin Molina– who signed on top of the typewritten
name of Jose Centenera. This belies the claim that Msgr.
Yllana allegedly gave the copies of the Marriage Contract
to Mr. Jose Centenera;
4. 4. Appellant admitted that there was no record of the
purported marriage entered in the book of records in San
Agustin Church where the marriage was allegedly
solemnized.
“Anent the second issue, appellee presented the Order dated 18 July
1961 in Special Proceedings No. 192 issued by then Presiding Judge Moya
granting the petition for adoption filed by deceased Alfredo which
declared therein Pedro Pilapil as the legally adopted son of Alfredo.
“Appellant Tomasa however questioned the authenticity of the
signature of Judge Moya.
778
778 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Vda. de Jacob vs. Court of Appeals
“In an effort to disprove the genuineness and authenticity of Judge
Moya’s signature in the Order granting the petition for adoption, the
deposition of Judge Moya was taken at his residence on 01 October 1990.
“In his deposition, Judge Moya attested that he could no longer
remember the facts in judicial proceedings taken about twenty-nine (29)
years ago when he was then presiding judge since he was already 79 years
old and was suffering from “glaucoma–.
“The trial court then consulted two (2) handwriting experts to test the
authenticity and genuineness of Judge Moya’s signature.
“A handwriting examination was conducted by Binevenido C. Albacea,
NBI Document Examiner. Examiner Albacea used thirteen (13) specimen
signatures of Judge Moya and compared it with the questioned signature.
He pointed out irregularities and “significant fundamental differences in
handwriting characteristics/habits existing between the questioned and
the ‘standard’ signature– and concluded that the questioned and the
standard signatures “JOSE L. MOYA– were NOT written by one and the
same person.
“On the other hand, to prove the genuineness of Judge Moya’s
signature, appellee presented the comparative findings of the handwriting
examination made by a former NBI Chief Document Examiner Atty.
Desiderio A. Pagui who examined thirty-two (32) specimen signatures of
Judge Moya inclusive of the thirteen (13) signatures examined by Examiner
Albacea. In his report, Atty. Pagui noted the existence of significant
similarities of unconscious habitual pattern within allowable variation of
writing characteristics between the standard and the questioned
signatures and concluded that the signature of Judge Moya appearing in
the Order dated 18 July 1961 granting the petition for adoption was indeed
genuine.
“Confronted with two (2) conflicting reports, the trial court sustained
the findings of Atty. Pagui declaring the signature of Judge Moya in the
challenged Order as genuine and authentic.
“Based on the evidence presented, the trial court ruled for defendant-
appellee sustaining his claim as the legally adopted child and sole heir of
deceased Alfredo and declaring the reconstructed Marriage Contract as
spurious and non-existent.–4 (citations omitted, emphasis in the original)
_______________
4
CA Decision, pp. 3-7; rollo, pp. 52-56.
779
VOL. 312, AUGUST 19, 1999 779
Vda. de Jacob vs. Court of Appeals
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In affirming the Decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals ruled in
this wise:
“Dealing with the issue of validity of the reconstructed Marriage Contract,
Article 6, par. 1 of the Family Code provides that the declaration of the
contracting parties that they take each other as husband and wife ‘shall be
set forth in an instrument signed by the parties as well as by their
witnesses and the person solemnizing the marriage.’ Accordingly, the
primary evidence of a marriage must be anauthentic copy of the marriage
contract.
“And if the authentic copy could not be produced, Section 3 in relation
to Section 5, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
‘Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions.–When the
subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be
admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following
cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be
produced in court without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
xxx xxx xxx
‘Sec. 5. When the original document is unavailable.– When the original
document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the
offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its
unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a
copy. Or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the
testimony of witnesses in the order stated.’
“As required by the Rules, before the terms of a transaction in reality
may be established by secondary evidence, it is necessary that the due
execution of the document and subsequent loss of the original instrument
evidencing the transaction be proved. For it is the due execution of the
document and subsequent loss that would constitute the foundation for
the introduction of secondary evidence to prove the contents of such
document.
 “In the case at bench, proof of due execution besides the loss of the
three (3) copies of the marriage contract has not been shown for the
introduction of secondary evidence of the contents of the recon-
780
780 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Vda. de Jacob vs. Court of Appeals
structed contract. Also, appellant failed to sufficiently establish the
circumstances of the loss of the original document.
“With regard to the trial court’s finding that the signature of then
Judge Moya in the questioned Order granting the petition for adoption in
favor of Pedro Pilapil was genuine, suffice it to state that, in the absence of
clear and convincing proof to the contrary, the presumption applies that
Judge Moya in issuing the order acted in the performance of his regular
duties.
“Furthermore, since the signature appearing in the challenged Order
was subjected to a rigid examination of two (2) handwriting experts, this
negates the possibility of forgery of Judge Moya’s signature. The value of
the opinion of a handwriting expert depends not upon his mere statement
of whether a writing is genuine or false, but upon the assistance he may
afford in pointing out distinguishing marks, characteristics, and
discrepancies in and between genuine and false specimens of writing of
which would ordinarily escape notice or dete[c]tion from an unpracticed
observer. And in the final analysis, the assessment of the credibility of such
expert witnesses rests largely in the discretion of the trial court, and the
test of qualification is necessarily a relative one, depending upon the
subject under investigation and the fitness of the particular witness. Except
in extraordinary cases, an appellate court will not reverse on account of a
mistake of judgment on the part of the trial court in determining
qualifications of this case.
“Jurisprudence is settled that the trial court’s findings of fact when ably
supported by substantial evidence on record are accorded with great
weight and respect by the Court. Thus, upon review, We find that no
material facts were overlooked or ignored by the court below which if
considered might vary the outcome of this case nor there exist cogent
reasons that would warrant reversal of the findings below. Factual findings
of the trial court are entitled to great weight and respect on appeal
especially when established by unrebutted testimony and documentary
evidence.–5 (citations omitted, emphasis in the original)
Disagreeing with the above, petitioner lodged her Petition for Review
before this Court.6
______________
5
CA Decision, pp. 7-9; rollo, pp. 56-58.
6
This case was deemed submitted for resolution on June 8, 1999, upon
receipt by the Court of respondent’s Memorandum.
781
VOL. 312, AUGUST 19, 1999 781
Vda. de Jacob vs. Court of Appeals
The Issues
In her Memorandum, petitioner presents the following issues for the
resolution of this Court:
1. “a) Whether or not the marriage between the plaintiff
Tomasa Vda. De Jacob and deceased Alfredo E. Jacob was
valid; and
2. b) Whether defendant Pedro Pilapil is the legally adopted
son of Alfredo E. Jacob.–7
The Court’s Ruling
The Petition is meritorious. Petitioner’s marriage is valid, but respondent’s
adoption has not been sufficiently established.
First Issue:
Validity of Marriage
Doctrinally, a void marriage may be subjected to collateral attack, while a
voidable one may be assailed only in a direct proceeding. 8 Aware of this
fundamental distinction, Respondent Pilapil contends that the marriage
between Dr. Alfredo Jacob and petitioner was void ab initio, because there
was neither a marriage license nor a marriage ceremony.9 We cannot
sustain this contention.
To start with, Respondent Pedro Pilapil argues that the marriage was
void because the parties had no marriage license. This argument is
misplaced, because it has been established that Dr. Jacob and petitioner
lived together as husband and wife for at least five years.10 An affidavit to
this effect was
_______________
7
Memorandum for Petitioner, p. 11; rollo, p. 83.
 8 13
Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines: Commentaries and
Jurisprudence, Vol. I, 1987 ed., p. 265.
9 14
Respondents’ Memorandum, p. 8; rollo, p. 120.
10
See note 34, infra.
782
782 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Vda. de Jacob vs. Court of Appeals
executed by Dr. Jacob and petitioner.11 Clearly then, the marriage was
exceptional in character and did not require a marriage license under
Article 76 of the Civil Code.12 The Civil Code governs this case, because the
questioned marriage and the assailed adoption took place prior the
effectivity of the Family Code.
When Is Secondary Evidence Allowed?
“It is settled that if the original writing has been lost or destroyed or
cannot be produced in court, upon proof of its execution and loss or
destruction, or unavailability, its contents may be proved by a copy or a
recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by recollection of
witnesses.–13 Upon a showing that the document was duly executed and
subsequently lost, without any bad faith on the part of the offeror,
secondary evidence may be adduced to prove its contents. 14
The trial court and the Court of Appeals committed reversible error
when they (1) excluded the testimonies of petitioner, Adela Pilapil and
Msgr. Florencio Yllana and (2) disregarded the following: (a) photographs
of the wedding ceremony; (b) documentary evidence, such as the letter of
Monsi-
_______________
11
See CA Decision, p. 5; rollo, p. 54.
12
Art. 76 of the Civil Code provides:
“No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who
have attained the age of majority and who, being unmarried, have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years, desire to marry each
other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit
before any person authorized by law to administer oath. The official, priest
or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit
that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the
contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the
marriage.–
De Guzman v. CA, 260 SCRA 389, 395, August 7, 1996, per Mendoza,
J. See Rule 130, § 5, Rules of Court.
SeeDe Vera v. Aguilar, 218 SCRA 602, February 9, 1993.
783
VOL. 312, AUGUST 19, 1999 783
Vda. de Jacob vs. Court of Appeals
gnor Yllana stating that he had solemnized the marriage between Dr. Jacob
and petitioner, informed the Archbishop of Manila that the wedding had
not been recorded in the Book of Marriages, and at the same time
requested the list of parties to the marriage; (c) the subsequent
authorization issued by the Archbishop–through his vicar general and
chancellor, Msgr. Benjamin L. Marino–ordaining that the union between
Dr. Jacob and petitioner be reflected through a corresponding entry in the
Book of Marriages; and (d) the Affidavit of Monsignor Yllana stating the
circumstances of the loss of the marriage certificate.
It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the
marriage contract, both constituting the conditio sine qua non for the
introduction of secondary evidence of its contents, were shown by the
very evidence they have disregarded. They have thus confused the
evidence to show due execution and loss as “secondary– evidence of the
marriage. In Hernaez v. Mcgrath,15 the Court clarified this misconception
thus:
“x x x [T]he court below was entirely mistaken in holding that parol
evidence of the execution of the instrument was barred. The court
confounded the execution and the contents of the document. It is the
contents, x x x which may not be prove[n] by secondary evidence when the
instrument itself is accessible. Proofs of the execution are not dependent
on the existence or non-existence of the document, and, as a matter of
fact, such proofs precede proofs of the contents: due execution, besides
the loss, has to be shown as foundation for the introduction of secondary
evidence of the contents.
xxx xxx xxx
“Evidence of the execution of a document is, in the last analysis,
necessarily collateral or primary. It generally consists of parol testimony or
extrinsic papers. Even when the document is actually produced, its
authenticity is not necessarily, if at all, determined from its face or recital of
its contents but by parol evidence. At the most, failure to produce the
 18
document, when available, to establish its execution may affect the weight De Vera v. Aguilar,supra, pp. 606-607, citing Michael & Co v.
of the evidence presented but not the admissibility of such evidence.– Enriquez, 33 Phil. 87, 89-90, December 24, 1915. See also De Guzman v.
(emphasis ours) CA,supra.
19
________________ Ibid., p. 607, citing Michael & Co v. Enriquez,supra. (emphasis ours)
15
91 Phil. 565, 573, July 9, 1952, per Tuason, J. 785
784 VOL. 312, AUGUST 19, 1999 785
784 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Vda. de Jacob vs. Court of Appeals
Vda. de Jacob vs. Court of Appeals gesting that it had fraudulently been obtained.20 Even if we were to agree
The Court of Appeals, as well as the trial court, tried to justify its stand on with the trial court and to disregard the reconstructed marriage contract,
this issue by relying on Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete.16 But even there, we said we must emphasize that this certificate is not the only proof of the union
that “marriage may be prove[n] by other competent evidence.–17 between Dr. Jacob and petitioner.
Truly, the execution of a document may be proven by the parties Proof of Marriage
themselves, by the swearing officer, by witnesses who saw and recognized As early as Pugeda v. Trias 21 we have held that marriage may be proven by
the signatures of the parties; or even by those to whom the parties have any competent and relevant evidence. In that case, we said:
previously narrated the execution thereof.18 The Court has also held that “Testimony by one of the parties to the marriage, or by one of the
“[t]he loss may be shown by any person who [knows] the fact of its loss, or witnesses to the marriage, has been held to be admissible to prove the fact
by any one who ha[s] made, in the judgment of the court, a sufficient of marriage.The person who officiated at the solemnization is also
examination in the place or places where the document or papers of competent to testify as an eyewitness to the fact of marriage.–22 (emphasis
similar character are usually kept by the person in whose custody the supplied)
document lost was, and has been unable to find it; or who has made any In Balogbog v. CA,23 we similarly held:
other investigation which is sufficient to satisfy the court that the “[A]lthough a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of
instrument [has] indeed [been] lost.–19 marriage, the failure to present it is not proof that no marriage took place.
In the present case, due execution was established by the testimonies Other evidence may be presented to prove marriage.– (emphasis supplied,
of Adela Pilapil, who was present during the marriage ceremony, and of footnote omitted)
petitioner herself as a party to the event. The subsequent loss was shown In both cases, we allowed testimonial evidence to prove the fact of
by the testimony and the affidavit of the officiating priest, Monsignor marriage. We reiterated this principle in Trinidad v. CA,24 in which, because
Yllana, as well as by petitioner’s own declaration in court. These are of the destruction of the marriage contract, we accepted testimonial
relevant, competent and admissible evidence. Since the due execution and evidence in its place.25 Respondent Pedro Pilapil misplaces emphasis on
the loss of the marriage contract were clearly shown by the evidence the absence of an entry pertaining to 1975 in the Books of Marriage
presented, secondary evidence– testimonial and documentary–may be _______________
20
admitted to prove the fact of marriage. CA Decision, pp. 4-5; rollo, pp. 53-54.
21
The trial court pointed out that on the face of the reconstructed 4 SCRA 849, 855, March 31, 1962, per Labrador, J.
22
marriage contract were certain irregularities sug- Ibid., citing 55 CJS, p. 900.
23
_______________ 269 SCRA 259, 266, March 7, 1997; per Mendoza, J.
16 24
66 SCRA 425, August 29, 1975. 289 SCRA 188, April 20, 1998.
17 25
Ibid., p. 469, per Barredo, J. Ibid., p. 204, per Panganiban, J.
786
786 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED This jurisprudential attitude31 towards marriage is based on the prima facie
Vda. de Jacob vs. Court of Appeals presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband
and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.32 Given the
of the Local Civil Registrar of Manila and in the National Census and
undisputed, even accepted,33 fact that Dr. Jacob and petitioner lived
Statistics Office (NCSO).26 He finds it quite “bizarre– for petitioner to have
together as husband and wife,34 we find that the presumption of marriage
waited three years before registering their marriage. 27 On both counts, he
was not rebutted in this case.
proceeds from the wrong premise. In the first place, failure to send a copy
Second Issue:
of a marriage certificate for record purposes does not invalidate the
Validity of Adoption Order
marriage.28 In the second place, it was not the petitioner’s duty to send a
In ruling that Respondent Pedro Pilapil was adopted by Dr. Jacob and that
copy of the marriage certificate to the civil registrar. Instead, this charge
the signature of Judge Moya appearing on the Adoption Order was valid,
fell upon the solemnizing officer.29
the Court of Appeals relied on the presumption that the judge had acted in
Presumption in Favor of Marriage
the regular performance of his duties. The appellate court also gave
Likewise, we have held:
credence to the testimony of respondent’s handwriting expert, for “the
“The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is x x x of
assessment of the credibility of such expert witness rests largely on the
marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a
discretion of the trial court x x x.–35
new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is
We disagree. As a rule, the factual findings of the trial court are
deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans
accorded great weight and respect by appellate courts, because it had the
toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent
opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses and to note telltale
matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counterpresumption or
signs indicating the truth or the falsity of a testimony. The rule, however, is
evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such
not applicable to the present case, because it was Judge Augusto O.
is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus
Cledera, not the ponente, who heard the testimonies of the two expert
hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation
witnesses. Thus, the Court examined the records and found that the Court
of decency and of law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil
of Appeals and the trial court “failed
Procedure is ‘that a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and
_______________
wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.’ Semper praesumitur 31
See Trinidad v. CA,supra;Balogbog v. CA,supra;People v. Borromeo,
pro matrimonio–Always presume marriage.–30 (emphasis supplied)
133 SCRA 110, October 31, 1984; Perido v. Perido, 63 SCRA 97, March 12,
______________
26 1975.
Respondent’s Memorandum, p. 8; rollo, p. 120. 32
27 Section 3 (aa), Rule 131, Rules of Court. Cf. Section 5 (bb), Rule 131,
Respondent’s Memorandum, p. 10; rollo, p. 122.
28 1964 Rules of Court and Article 220 of the Civil Code.
See Madridejo v. De Leon, 55 Phil. 1, 3, October 6, 1930; cited in 33
Respondent’s Memorandum, p. 12; rollo, p. 124.
Jones v. Hortigëela, 64 Phil. 179, 184, March 6, 1937. Article 53 of the New 34
This is evidenced by the “Affidavit of Marriage Between a Man and
Civil Code. Cf. Petition, p. 22; rollo, p. 29.
29 Woman Who Have Lived for at Least Five Years,– the authenticity of which
Article 68, Civil Code.
30 was not questioned by respondent.
Perido v. Perido, 63 SCRA 97, 103, March 12, 1975, per Makalintal, 35
CA Decision, p. 9; rollo, p. 58.
C.J., citing Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee, 43 Phil. 43, 56, March 3, 1922.
788
787
788 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
VOL. 312, AUGUST 19, 1999 787
Vda. de Jacob vs. Court of Appeals
Vda. de Jacob vs. Court of Appeals
to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify a
different conclusion.–36 Hence, the present case is an exception to the
general rule that only questions of law may be reviewed in petitions under
Rule 45.37
Central to the present question is the authenticity of Judge Moya’s
signature on the questioned Order of Adoption. To enlighten the trial court
on this matter, two expert witnesses were presented, one for petitioner
and one for Respondent Pilapil. The trial court relied mainly on
respondent’s expert and brushed aside the Deposition of Judge Moya
himself.38 Respondent Pilapil justifies the trial judge’s action by arguing
that the Deposition was ambiguous. He contends that Judge Moya could
not remember whether the signature on the Order was his and cites the
following portion as proof:39
“Q. What was you[r] response, sir?
A. I said I do not remember.–
Respondent Pilapil’s argument is misleading, because it took the judge’s
testimony out of its context. Considered with the rest of the Deposition,
Judge Moya’s statements contained no ambiguity. He was clear when he
answered the queries in the following manner:
“Atty. Benito P. Fabie
Q. What else did she tell you[?]
A. And she ask[ed] me if I remembered having issued the order.
Q. What was your response sir[?]
A. I said I do not remember.–40
________________
36
Fuentes v. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 703, February 26, 1997, per
Panganiban, J.
37
Alcantara v. Court of Appeals, 252 SCRA 353, January 25,
1996;Cayabyab v. IAC, 232 SCRA 1, April 18, 1994.
38
See RTC Decision, p. 11; Records, Vol. III, p. 1,506.
39
Respondent’s Memorandum, pp. 13-14; rollo, pp. 125-126.
40
Deposition of Judge Jose L. Moya, p. 2, October 1, 1990; Records,
Vol. 3, p. 1,128.
789
VOL. 312, AUGUST 19, 1999 789
Vda. de Jacob vs. Court of Appeals
The answer “I do not remember– did not suggest that Judge Moya was
unsure of what he was declaring. In fact, he was emphatic and categorical
in the subsequent exchanges during the Deposition:
“Atty. Benito P. Fabie
Q. I am showing to you this Order, Exh. ‘A’ deposition[;] will you please
recall whether you issued this Order and whether the facsimile of the
signature appearing thereon is your signature.
A. As I said, I do not remember having issued such an order and the
signature reading Jose[;] I can’t make out clearly what comes after the
name[;] Jose Moya is not my signature.–41
Clearly, Judge Moya could not recall having ever issued the Order of
Adoption. More importantly, when shown the signature over his name, he
positively declared that it was not his.
The fact that he had glaucoma when his Deposition was taken does not
discredit his statements. At the time, he could with medication still read
the newspapers; upon the request of the defense counsel, he even read a
document shown to him.42 Indeed, we find no reason–and the respondent
has not presented any–to disregard the Deposition of Judge Moya.
Judge Moya’s declaration was supported by the expert testimony of
NBI Document Examiner Bienvenido Albacea, who declared:
“Atty. Paraiso
Q And were you able to determine [w]hat purpose you had in your
examination of this document?
A Yes sir, [based on] my conclusion, [I] stated that the questioned and the
standard signature Jose L. Moya were not written by one and the same
person. On the basis of my findings that I would point out in detail, the
difference in the writing characteristics [was] in the struc
_______________
41
Ibid. (Emphasis supplied).
42
Ibid., p. 4; Records, Vol. 3, p. 1,130.
790
790 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Vda. de Jacob vs. Court of Appeals
tural pattern of letters which is very apparent as shown in the photograph
as the capital letter ‘J.’ –43
It is noteworthy that Mr. Albacea is a disinterested party, his services
having been sought without any compensation. Moreover, his competence
was recognized even by Respondent Pilapil’s expert witness, Atty.
Desiderio Pagui.44
Other considerations also cast doubt on the claim of respondent. The
alleged Order was purportedly made in open court. In his Deposition,
however, Judge Moya declared that he did not dictate decisions in
adoption cases. The only decisions he made in open court were criminal
cases, in which the accused pleaded guilty.45 Moreover, Judge Moya
insisted that the branch where he was assigned was always indicated in his
decisions and orders; yet the questioned Order did not contain this
information. Furthermore, Pilapil’s conduct gave no indication that he
recognized his own alleged adoption, as shown by the documents that he
signed and other acts that he performed thereafter. 46 In the same vein, no
proof was presented that Dr. Jacob had treated him as an adopted child.
Likewise, both the Bureau of Records Management47 in Manila and the
Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Tigaon, Camarines Sur, 48 issued
Certifications that there was no record that Pedro Pilapil had been adopted
by Dr. Jacob. Taken together, these circumstances inexorably negate the
alleged adoption of respondent.49
The burden of proof in establishing adoption is upon the person
claiming such relationship.50 This Respondent Pilapil
________________
43
TSN, p. 9, May 3, 1991; Records, p. 1,266, Vol. 3.
44
TSN, p. 7, December 8, 1992; Records, Vol. 3, p. 1,422.
45
Deposition of Judge Jose L. Moya, p. 4; Records, Vol. 3, p. 1,130.
46
Petitioner’s Memorandum, pp. 31-36; rollo, pp. 103-108.
47
Records, Vol. I, p. 40.
48
Records, Vol. I, p. 41.
49
Eusebio v. Valmores, 97 Phil. 163, May 31, 1955.
50
Lazatin v. Campos, 92 SCRA 250, July 30, 1979.
791
VOL. 312, AUGUST 19, 1999 791
Vda. de Jacob vs. Court of Appeals
failed to do. Moreover, the evidence presented by petitioner shows that
the alleged adoption is a sham.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision of the
Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage between
Petitioner Tomasa Vda. de Jacob and the deceased Alfredo E. Jacob is
hereby recognized and declared VALID and the claimed adoption of
Respondent Pedro Pilapil is DECLARED NONEXISTENT. No pronouncement
as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo (Chairman), Vitug, Purisima and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ.,concur.
Petition granted; Assailed decision reversed and set aside.
Notes.–Although a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of
marriage, the failure to present it is not proof that no marriage took place–
other evidence may be presented to prove marriage. (Balogbog vs. Court
of Appeals, 269 SCRA 259 [1997])
An exchange of vows can be presumed to have been made from the
testimonies of the witnesses who state that a wedding took place, since
the very purpose for having a wedding is to exchange vows of marital
commitment–it would indeed be unusual to have a wedding without an
exchange of vows and quite unnatural for people not to notice its absence.
(Ibid.)
To prove the fact of marriage, the following would constitute
competent evidence: the testimony of a witness to the matrimony, the
couple’s public and open cohabitation as husband and wife after the
alleged wedlock, the birth and the baptismal certificates of children born
during such union, and the mention of such nuptial in subsequent
documents. (Trinidad vs. Court of Appeals, 289 SCRA 188 [1998])
––o0o––
792
© Copyright 2020 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
 G.R. No. 175080. November 24, 2010.*
EUGENIO R. REYES, joined by TIMOTHY JOSEPH M. REYES, MA. GRACIA S.
REYES, ROMAN GABRIEL M. REYES, and MA. ANGELA S. REYES,
petitioners, vs. LIBRADA F. MAURICIO (deceased) and LEONIDA F.
MAURICIO, respondents.
Remedial Law; Appeals; In a petition for review under Rule 45, only
questions of law may be raised.—In the main, Eugenio insists that no
tenancy relationship existed between him and Godofredo. This is a
question of fact beyond the province of this Court in a petition for review
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in which only questions of law may be
raised. Absent any of the obtaining exceptions to this rule, the findings of
facts of the Provincial Adjudicator, as affirmed by DARAB and especially by
the Court of Appeals, are binding on this Court.
_______________
** Designated as additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Antonio
Eduardo B. Nachura, per Raffle dated November 22, 2010.
* FIRST DIVISION.
80
80 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Reyes vs. Mauricio
Tenancy Relations; Agrarian Reform Law; Agricultural Tenancy Act; Code of
Agrarian Reforms of the Philippines; Agricultural Leasehold Relation Not
Extinguished by Expiration of Period.—Assuming that the leasehold
contract between Susana and Godofredo is void, our conclusion remains.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that a tenancy relationship cannot be
extinguished by mere expiration of term or period in a leasehold contract;
or by the sale, alienation or the transfer of legal possession of the
landholding. Section 9 of Republic Act No. 1199 or the Agricultural Tenancy
Act provides: x x x Moreover, Section 10 of Republic Act No. 3844 (Code of
Agrarian Reforms of the Philippines) likewise provides: SEC. 10. Agricultural
Leasehold Relation Not Extinguished by Expiration of Period, etc.—The
agricultural leasehold relation under this Code shall not be extinguished by
mere expiration of the term or period in a leasehold contract nor by the
sale, alienation or transfer of the legal possession of the landholding. In
case the agricultural lessor sells, alienates or transfers the legal
possession of the landholding, the purchaser or transferee thereof shall
be subrogated to the rights and substituted to the obligations of the
agricultural lessor.
Civil Law; Filiation; Filiation cannot be collaterally attacked.—It is settled
law that filiation cannot be collaterally attacked. Well-known civilista Dr.
Arturo M. Tolentino, in his book “Civil Code of the Philippines,
Commentaries and Jurisprudence,” noted that the aforecited doctrine is
rooted from the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines. He
explained thus: The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of
defense or as a collateral issue in another action for a different purpose.
The necessity of an independent action directly impugning the legitimacy is
more clearly expressed in the Mexican code (article 335) which provides:
“The contest of the legitimacy of a child by the husband or his heirs must
be made by proper complaint before the competent court; any contest
made in any other way is void.” This principle applies under our Family
Code. Articles 170 and 171 of the code confirm this view, because they
refer to “the action to impugn the legitimacy.” This action can be brought
only by the husband or his heirs and within the periods fixed in the present
articles.
Same; Adoption; Adoption cannot be made subject to a collateral attack.—
The same rule is applied to adoption such that it cannot also be made
subject to a collateral attack. In Reyes v. Sotero,
81
VOL. 636, NOVEMBER 24, 2010 81
Reyes vs. Mauricio
482 SCRA 520 (2006), this Court reiterated that adoption cannot be
assailed collaterally in a proceeding for the settlement of a decedent’s
estate. Furthermore, in Austria v. Reyes, 31 SCRA 754 (1970), the Court
declared that the legality of the adoption by the testatrix can be assailed
only in a separate action brought for that purpose and cannot be subject
to collateral attack.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the
Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Medialdea, Ata, Bello, Guevarra for petitioners.
Valeriano B. Mariano for respondents.
PEREZ, J.:
Subject of this petition is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated 10
August 2006 in CA-G.R. SP No. 87148, affirming the Decision dated 7 July
1998 and Resolution dated 28 September 2004 of the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).
Eugenio Reyes (Eugenio) was the registered owner of a parcel of land
located at Turo, Bocaue, Bulacan, with an area of four thousand five
hundred twenty-seven (4,527) square meters, more or less, and covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 109456(M). Said title came from
and cancelled TCT No. T-62290 registered in the name of Eufracia and
Susana Reyes, siblings of Eugenio. The subject property was adjudicated to
Eugenio by virtue of an extrajudicial settlement among the heirs following
the death of his parents.
The controversy stemmed from a complaint filed before the DARAB of
Malolos, Bulacan by respondents Librada F. Mauricio (Librada), now
deceased, and her alleged daughter
_______________
1 Penned by Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. with Associate Justices
Godardo A. Jacinto and Magdangal M. De Leon, concurring. Rollo, pp. 44-
51.
82
82 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Reyes vs. Mauricio
Leonida F. Mauricio (Leonida) for annulment of contract denominated as
Kasunduan and between Librada and Eugenio as parties. Respondents also
prayed for maintenance of their peaceful possession with damages.
Respondents alleged that they are the legal heirs of the late Godofredo
Mauricio (Godofredo), who was the lawful and registered tenant of
Eugenio through his predecessors-in-interest to the subject land; that from
1936 until his death in May 1994, Godofredo had been working on the
subject land and introduced improvements consisting of fruit-bearing
trees, seasonal crops, a residential house and other permanent
improvements; that through fraud, deceit, strategy and other unlawful
means, Eugenio caused the preparation of a document denominated as
Kasunduan dated 28 September 1994 to eject respondents from the
subject property, and had the same notarized by Notary Public Ma. Sarah
G. Nicolas in Pasig, Metro Manila; that Librada never appeared before the
Notary Public; that Librada was illiterate and the contents of the
Kasunduan were not read nor explained to her; that Eugenio took undue
advantage of the weakness, age, illiteracy, ignorance, indigence and other
handicaps of Librada in the execution of the Kasunduan rendering it void
for lack of consent; and that Eugenio had been employing all illegal means
to eject respondents from the subject property. Respondents prayed for
the declaration of nullity of the Kasunduan and for an order for Eugenio to
maintain and place them in peaceful possession and cultivation of the
subject property. Respondents likewise demanded payment of damages.2
During trial, respondents presented a leasehold contract executed
between Susana and Godofredo to reaffirm the existing tenancy
agreement.3
Eugenio averred that no tenancy relationship existed between him and
respondents. He clarified that Godofredo’s
_______________
2 Id., at pp. 55-57.
3 Id., at pp. 65-66.
83
VOL. 636, NOVEMBER 24, 2010 83
Reyes vs. Mauricio
occupation of the subject premises was based on the former’s mere
tolerance and accommodation. Eugenio denied signing a tenancy
agreement, nor authorizing any person to sign such an agreement. He
maintained that Librada, accompanied by a relative, voluntarily affixed her
signature to the Kasunduan and that she was fully aware of the contents of
the document. Moreover, Librada received P50,000.00 from Eugenio on
the same day of the execution of the Kasunduan. Eugenio also questioned
the jurisdiction of the DARAB since the principal relief sought by
respondents is the annulment of the contract, over which jurisdiction is
vested on the regular courts. Eugenio also asserted that Leonida had no
legal personality to file the present suit.4
Based on the evidence submitted by both parties, the Provincial
Adjudicator5 concluded that Godofredo was the tenant of Eugenio, and
Librada, being the surviving spouse, should be maintained in peaceful
possession of the subject land. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:
“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of plaintiff Librada Mauricio and against defendant Eugenio R. Reyes
and order is hereby issued:
1. Declaring the kasunduan null and void;
2. Ordering defendant to respect the peaceful possession
of herein plaintiff Librada Mauricio over the subject
landholding;
 3. Ordering plaintiff to return the amount of P50,000.00 to
herein defendant;
4. No pronouncement as to costs.”6
On appeal, two issues were presented to and taken up by the DARAB,
namely: (1) Whether or not there is tenancy relation between the parties;
and (2) whether or not the Ka-
_______________
4 Id., at pp. 68-75.
5 Gregorio D. Sapera.
6 Rollo, p. 88.
84
84 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Reyes vs. Mauricio
sunduan dated 28 September 1994 is valid and enforceable. The DARAB
held that the Mauricio’s are former tenants of Spouses Reyes. It found that
when Spouses Reyes died, siblings Eufracia, Susana and Eugenio, among
others inherited the subject property. Under the law, they were
subrogated to the rights and substituted to the “obligations” of their late
parents as the agricultural lessors over the farmholding tenanted by
respondents. Moreover, the DARAB banked on the Kasunduang Buwisan
sa Sakahan or the leasehold contract executed by Susana in favor of
Godofredo to support the tenancy relationship. Furthermore, the DARAB
declared the other Kasunduan as void by relying on the evaluation of the
Provincial Adjudicator as to the legal incapacity of Librada to enter into
such a contract.7
Eugenio filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the DARAB
on 28 September 2004.8
Aggrieved by the DARAB ruling, Eugenio filed a petition for review with the
Court of Appeals. On 10 July 2006, the Court of Appeals issued a resolution
regarding the status of Leonida as a legal heir and allowed her to substitute
Librada, who died during the pendency of the case.9 On 10 August 2006,
the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision and resolution of the DARAB. It
sustained the factual findings of the DARAB with respect to the tenancy
relation between Godofredo and Spouses Reyes and the nullity of the
Kasunduan.10
Undaunted, Eugenio filed the instant petition. Eugenio submits that no
tenancy relationship exists between him and respondents. He insists that
the Kasunduang Buwisan sa Sakahan allegedly executed between
Godofredo and Susana in 1993 giving the former the right to occupy and
cultivate the subject property is unenforceable against Eugenio, having
_______________
7 Id., at pp. 95-97.
8 Id., at p. 172.
9 CA Rollo, p. 159.
10 Rollo, pp. 49-50.
85
VOL. 636, NOVEMBER 24, 2010 85
Reyes vs. Mauricio
been entered into without his knowledge and consent. Eugenio further
asserts that per records of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), no
leasehold contract was entered into by Godofredo and Eugenio with
respect to the disputed property. Eugenio attributes error on the part of
the Court of Appeals in concluding that a tenancy relationship existed
between the parties despite the absence of some of the essential
requisites of a tenancy relationship such as personal cultivation and the
subject land being agricultural. Finally, Eugenio defends the validity of the
Kasunduan entered into between him and Librada wherein the latter
agreed to vacate the subject property, in that it was voluntarily entered
into and the contents thereof were mutually understood by the parties.11
In a Resolution dated 7 February 2007, this Court denied the petition for
failure to show that the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in its
challenged decision and resolution. The Court also dismissed the issues
raised as factual. However, upon filing of a motion for reconsideration by
Eugenio, this Court reinstated the petition and required respondent
Leonida to comment on the petition.12
In her comment, respondent prayed for the denial of the petition because
the jurisdiction of this Court is limited to review of errors of law and not of
facts.13
In the main, Eugenio insists that no tenancy relationship existed between
him and Godofredo. This is a question of fact beyond the province of this
Court in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in which
only questions of law may be raised.14 Absent any of the obtaining
exceptions15
_______________
11 Id., at pp. 23-30.
12 Id., at p. 125.
13 Id., at p. 238.
14 Tarona v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 170182, 18 June 2009, 589 SCRA
474, 482; Cornes v. Leal Realty Centrum Co., Inc., G.R. No. 172146, 30 July
2008, 560 SCRA 545, 567.
86
86 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Reyes vs. Mauricio
to this rule, the findings of facts of the Provincial Adjudicator, as affirmed
by DARAB and especially by the Court of Appeals, are binding on this Court.
The DARAB ruling outlined how the tenancy relationship between
Godofredo and the Mauricio’s came about, thus:
“This Board, after a thorough evaluation of the evidences, is convinced
that the Mauricios are former tenants of the parents of the herein
Defendant-Appellant. A perusal of Exhibit “H” which is the Tax Declaration
of the property in controversy proves that upon the death of the parents
of Defendant-Appellant, the property was the subject matter of their
extrajudicial partition/settlement and this property was initially under the
ownership of the appellant’s sisters, Eufracia and Susana Reyes until the
same property was finally acquired/transferred in the name of
Respondent-Appellant. Obviously, in order to re-affirm the fact that the
Mauricios are really the tenants, Susana Reyes had voluntarily executed
the Leasehold Contract with Godofredo Librada being the tenant on the
property and to prove that she (Susana Reyes) was the predecessor-in-
interest of Respondent-Appellant Eugenio Reyes. x x x. The “Kasunduang
Buwisan sa Sakahan” alleging that their tenancy relationship began in the
year 1973 and their agreement as to the rental shall remain until further
revised.”16
_______________
15 (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise
and conjecture; (2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) there is
a grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) the
Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case and its findings are
contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) the findings
of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8)
said findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
which they are based; (9) the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and
(10) the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the
supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on
record. See Cornes v. Leal Realty Centrum Co., Inc., id.
16 Rollo, p. 95.
87
VOL. 636, NOVEMBER 24, 2010 87
Reyes vs. Mauricio
This is a contest of “Kasunduans.” Respondents rely on a Kasunduan of
tenancy. Petitioners swear by a Kasunduan of termination of tenancy.
Librada claims that her late husband had been working on the land since
1936 until his death in 1994. She presented the Kasunduang Buwisan sa
Sakahan dated 26 May 1993 and executed by Godofredo and Susana
which reaffirmed the leasehold tenancy over the subject land. On the
other hand, Eugenio disputes the claims of Librada and presented another
Kasunduan executed between him and Librada on 28 September 1994
which effectively terminates the leasehold tenancy when the latter
allegedly agreed to vacate the subject premises in exchange of monetary
considerations.
This second Kasunduan is the subject of the instant complaint. In its
disquisition, the DARAB nullified the second Kasunduan, to wit:
“x x x Insofar as this “Kasunduan” is concerned, and after reading the
transcript of the testimony of the old woman Librada Mauricio, this Board
is convinced that indeed the purpose of the document was to eject her
from the farmholding but that Librada Mauricio wanted to return the
money she received because the contents of the document was never
explained to her being illiterate who cannot even read or write. This Board
is even further convinced after reading the transcript of the testimonies
that while the document was allegedly signed by the parties in Turo,
Bocaue, Bulacan, the same document was notarized in Pasig, Metro
Manila, thus, the Notary Public was not in a position to explain much less
ascertain the veracity of the contents of the alleged “Kasunduan” as to
whether or not Plaintiff-Appellee Librada Mauricio had really understood
the contents thereof. This Board further adheres to the principle that it
cannot substitute its own evaluation of the testimony of the witnesses
with that of the personal evaluation of the Adjudicator a quo who, in the
case at bar, had the best opportunity to observe the demeanor of the
witness Librada Mauricio while testifying on the circumstances relevant to
the execution of the alleged “Kasunduan.” Furthermore, this Board
adheres to the principle that in all contractual, property or other relations,
when one of the parties is at a disadvantage on account of his moral
dependence, ignorance, mental weakness or
88
88 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Reyes vs. Mauricio
other handicap, the courts (and in the case at bar, this Board) must be
vigilant for his protection (Art. 24, New Civil Code). In the case at bar,
Plaintiff-Appellee is already eighty-one (81) years old who can neither read
nor write, thus, she just simply signs her name with her thumbmark.”17
Applying the principle that only questions of law may be entertained by
this Court, we defer to the factual ruling of the Provincial Adjudicator, as
affirmed by DARAB and the Court of Appeals, which clearly had the
opportunity to closely examine the witnesses and their demeanor on the
witness stand.
Assuming that the leasehold contract between Susana and Godofredo is
void, our conclusion remains. We agree with the Court of Appeals that a
tenancy relationship cannot be extinguished by mere expiration of term or
period in a leasehold contract; or by the sale, alienation or the transfer of
legal possession of the landholding. Section 9 of Republic Act No. 1199 or
the Agricultural Tenancy Act provides:
“SECTION 9. Severance of Relationship.—The tenancy relationship is
extinguished by the voluntary surrender of the land by, or the death or
incapacity of, the tenant, but his heirs or the members of his immediate
farm household may continue to work the land until the close of the
agricultural year. The expiration of the period of the contract as fixed by
the parties, and the sale or alienation of the land does not of themselves
extinguish the relationship. In the latter case, the purchaser or transferee
shall assume the rights and obligations of the former landholder in
relation to the tenant. In case of death of the landholder, his heir or heirs
shall likewise assume his rights and obligations.” (Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, Section 10 of Republic Act No. 3844 (Code of Agrarian Reforms
of the Philippines) likewise provides:
“SEC. 10. Agricultural Leasehold Relation Not Extinguished by Expiration
of Period, etc.—The agricultural leasehold relation
_______________
17 Id., at pp. 96-97.
89
VOL. 636, NOVEMBER 24, 2010 89
Reyes vs. Mauricio
under this Code shall not be extinguished by mere expiration of the term
or period in a leasehold contract nor by the sale, alienation or transfer of
the legal possession of the landholding. In case the agricultural lessor sells,
alienates or transfers the legal possession of the landholding, the
purchaser or transferee thereof shall be subrogated to the rights and
substituted to the obligations of the agricultural lessor.” (Emphasis
supplied)
As an incidental issue, Leonida’s legal standing as a party was also assailed
by Eugenio. Eugenio submitted that the complaint was rendered moot
with the death of Librada, Godofredo’s sole compulsory heir. Eugenio
contended that Leonida is a mere ward of Godofredo and Librada, thus,
not a legal heir.18
We are in full accord with the Court of Appeals when it ruled that Eugenio
cannot collaterally attack the status of Leonida in the instant petition.19
It is settled law that filiation cannot be collaterally attacked.20 Well-known
civilista Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino, in his book “Civil Code of the Philippines,
Commentaries and Jurisprudence,” noted that the aforecited doctrine is
rooted from the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines. He
explained thus:
“The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or as a
collateral issue in another action for a different purpose. The necessity of
an independent action directly impugning the legitimacy is more clearly
expressed in the Mexican code (article 335) which provides: “The contest
of the legitimacy of a child by the husband or his heirs must be made by
proper complaint before the competent court; any contest made in any
other way is void.” This principle applies under our Family Code. Articles
170 and 171 of the code confirm this view, because they refer to “the
action to impugn
_______________
18 Id., at p. 32.
19 Id., at p. 49.
20 Trinidad v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118904, 20 April 1998, 289 SCRA
188, 210.
90
90 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Reyes vs. Mauricio
the legitimacy.” This action can be brought only by the husband or his heirs
and within the periods fixed in the present articles.”21
In Braza v. City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental,22
the Court stated that legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a
direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through
collateral attack.23
The same rule is applied to adoption such that it cannot also be made
subject to a collateral attack. In Reyes v. Sotero,24 this Court reiterated
that adoption cannot be assailed collaterally in a proceeding for the
settlement of a decedent’s estate.25 Furthermore, in Austria v. Reyes,26
the Court declared that the legality of the adoption by the testatrix can be
assailed only in a separate action brought for that purpose and cannot be
subject to collateral attack.27
Against these jurisprudential backdrop, we have to leave out the status of
Leonida from the case for annulment of the “Kasunduan” that supposedly
favors petitioners’ cause.
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing premises, the instant petition for
review on certiorari is DENIED and the Decision dated 10 August 2006 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87148 is AFFIRMED.
_______________
21 Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Commentaries and
Jurisprudence, Vol. I, 1990 ed., p. 536. See Rosales v. Castillo-Rosales, G.R.
No. L-31712, 28 September 1984, 132 SCRA 132, 141-142.
22 G.R. No. 181174, 4 December 2009, 607 SCRA 638.
23 Id., at p. 643.
24 G.R. No. 167405, 16 February 2006, 482 SCRA 520, 531 citing Santos v.
Aranzanso, G.R. No. L-26940, 21 August 1982, 116 SCRA 1.
25 Santos v. Aranzanso, id., at pp. 5-6.
26 G.R. No. L-23079, 27 February 1970, 31 SCRA 754.
27 Id., at pp. 762-763.
 49 True False 311326 542 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
VOL. 454, MARCH 31, 2005 541 In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia
In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia juridical act, a proceeding in rem which creates between two persons a
relationship similar to that which results from legitimate paternity and
G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005.*
filiation. The modern trend is to consider adoption not merely as an act to
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA
establish a relationship of paternity and filiation, but also as an act which
GARCIA, HONORATO B. CATINDIG, petitioner.
endows the child with a legitimate status. This was, indeed, confirmed in
Parents and Children; Adoption; Names; It is both of personal as well
1989, when the Philippines, as a State Party to the Convention of the Rights
as public interest that every person must have a name.—For all practical
of the Child initiated by the United Nations, accepted the principle that
and legal purposes, a man’s name is the designation by which he is known
adoption is impressed with social and moral responsibility, and that its
and called in the community in which he lives and is best known. It is
underlying intent is geared to favor the adopted child. Republic Act No.
defined as the word or combination of words by which a person is
8552, otherwise known as the “Domestic Adoption Act of 1998,” secures
distinguished from other individuals and, also, as the label or appellation
these rights and privileges for the adopted.
which he bears for the convenience of the world at large addressing him,
Same; Same; Same; An adopted child is entitled to all the rights
or in speaking of or dealing with him. It is both of personal as well as public
provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind,
interest that every person must have a name.
including the right to bear the surname of her father and her mother.—
Same; Same; Same; The name of an individual has two parts—the
Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie
given or proper name and the surname or family name; The given name
is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without
may be freely selected by the parents for the child, but the surname to
discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her
which the child is entitled is fixed by law.—The name of an individual has
father and her mother, as discussed above. This is consistent with the
two parts: (1) the given or proper name and (2) the surname or family
intention of the members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees as
name. The given or proper name is that which is given to the individual at
earlier discussed. In fact, it is a Filipino custom that the initial or surname
birth or at baptism, to distinguish him from other individuals. The surname
of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father.
or family name is that which identifies the family to which he belongs and
Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; Adoption statutes, being
is continued from parent to child. The given name may be freely selected
humane and salutary, should be liberally construed to carry out the
by the parents for the child, but the surname to which the child is entitled
beneficent purposes of adoption.—It is a settled rule that adoption
is fixed by law.
statutes, being humane and salutary, should be liberally construed to carry
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Adoption is defined as the
out the beneficent purposes of adoption. The interests and welfare of the
process of making a child, whether related or not to the adopter, possess in
adopted child are of primary and paramount consideration, hence, every
general, the rights accorded to a legitimate child; The modern trend is to
reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these
consider adoption not merely as an act to establish a relationship of
noble and compassionate objectives of the law.
paternity and filiation, but also as an act which endows the child with a
Same; Same; Same; Same; Article 10 of the Civil Code which
legitimate status.—Adoption is defined as the process of making a child,
presumes in the interpretation of application of law that the lawmaking
whether related or not to the adopter, possess in general, the rights
body intended right and justice to prevail was intended to strengthen the
accorded to a legitimate child. It is a
determination of the courts to avoid an injustice which may apparently be
_______________
* authorized by some way of interpreting the law.— Art. 10 of the New Civil
THIRD DIVISION.
542
Code provides that: “In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of
laws, it is presumed that the law-
543
VOL. 454, MARCH 31, 2005 543
In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia
making body intended right and justice to prevail.” This provision,
according to the Code Commission, “is necessary so that it may tip the
scales in favor of right and justice when the law is doubtful or obscure. It
will strengthen the determination of the courts to avoid an injustice which
may apparently be authorized by some way of interpreting the law.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Since there is no law prohibiting an
illegitimate child adopted by her natural father to use, as middle name her
mother’s surname, the Court finds no reason why she should not be
allowed to do so.—Hence, since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate
child adopted by her natural father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle name
her mother’s surname, we find no reason why she should not be allowed
to do so.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Malolos, Bulacan, Br. 13.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Catindig, Tiongco & Nibungco for petitioner.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
May an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the
surname of her natural mother as her middle name? This is the issue raised
in the instant case.
The facts are undisputed.
On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a
petition1 to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga
Garcia. He alleged therein, among others, that Stephanie was born on June
26, 1994;2 that her mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia; that Stephanie has
been using her mother’s middle name and surname; and that he is now a
widower and qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed that
Stephanie’s middle name Astorga be changed to
_______________
1 5
Rollo at pp. 34-36.
2
Annex “C”, Id., at p. 33.
544
544 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia
“Garcia,” her mother’s surname, and that her surname “Garcia” be
changed to “Catindig,” his surname.
On March 23, 2001,3 the trial court rendered the assailed Decision
granting the adoption, thus:
“After a careful consideration of the evidence presented by the petitioner,
and in the absence of any opposition to the petition, this Court finds that
the petitioner possesses all the qualifications and none of the
disqualification provided for by law as an adoptive parent, and that as such
he is qualified to maintain, care for and educate the child to be adopted;
that the grant of this petition would redound to the best interest and
welfare of the minor Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. The Court further
holds that the petitioner’s care and custody of the child since her birth up
to the present constitute more than enough compliance with the
requirement of Article 35 of Presidential Decree No. 603.
WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be meritorious, the same is
GRANTED. Henceforth, Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia is hereby freed
from all obligations of obedience and maintenance with respect to her
natural mother, and for civil purposes, shall henceforth be the petitioner’s
legitimate child and legal heir. Pursuant to Article 189 of the Family Code
of the Philippines, the minor shall be known as STEPHANIE NATHY
CATINDIG.
Upon finality of this Decision, let the same be entered in the Local Civil
Registrar concerned pursuant to Rule 99 of the Rules of Court.
Let copy of this Decision be furnished the National Statistics Office for
record purposes.
SO ORDERED.”4
On April 20, 2001, petitioner filed a motion for clarification and/or
reconsideration5 praying that Stephanie should be allowed to use the
surname of her natural mother (GARCIA) as her middle name.
_______________
3
Annex “F”, Id., at pp. 41-43.
4
Rollo at pp. 42-43.
Annex “G”, Id., at pp. 44-48.
545
VOL. 454, MARCH 31, 2005 545
 In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia
On May 28, 2001,6 the trial court denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration holding that there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an
adopted child to use the surname of his biological mother as his middle
name.
Hence, the present petition raising the issue of whether an illegitimate
child may use the surname of her mother as her middle name when she is
subsequently adopted by her natural father.
Petitioner submits that the trial court erred in depriving Stephanie of a
middle name as a consequence of adoption because: (1) there is no law
prohibiting an adopted child from having a middle name in case there is
only one adopting parent; (2) it is customary for every Filipino to have as
middle name the surname of the mother; (3) the middle name or initial is a
part of the name of a person; (4) adoption is for the benefit and best
interest of the adopted child, hence, her right to bear a proper name
should not be violated; (5) permitting Stephanie to use the middle name
“Garcia” (her mother’s surname) avoids the stigma of her illegitimacy; and;
(6) her continued use of “Garcia” as her middle name is not opposed by
either the Catindig or Garcia families.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), agrees
with petitioner that Stephanie should be permitted to use, as her middle
name, the surname of her natural mother for the following reasons:
First, it is necessary to preserve and maintain Stephanie’s filiation with
her natural mother because under Article 189 of the Family Code, she
remains to be an intestate heir of the latter. Thus, to prevent any
confusion and needless hardship in the future, her relationship or proof of
that relationship with her natural mother should be maintained.
Second, there is no law expressly prohibiting Stephanie to use the
surname of her natural mother as her middle name. What the law does
not prohibit, it allows.
_______________
6
Annex “H”, Id., at p. 49.
546
546 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia
Last, it is customary for every Filipino to have a middle name, which is
ordinarily the surname of the mother. This custom has been recognized by
the Civil Code and Family Code. In fact, the Family Law Committees agreed
that “the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the
surname of the father so that the second name, if any, will be before the
surname of the mother.”7
We find merit in the petition.
Use Of Surname Is Fixed By Law—
For all practical and legal purposes, a man's name is the designation by
which he is known and called in the community in which he lives and is
best known. It is defined as the word or combination of words by which a
person is distinguished from other individuals and, also, as the label or
appellation which he bears for the convenience of the world at large
addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with him. 8 It is both of
personal as well as public interest that every person must have a name.
The name of an individual has two parts: (1) the given or proper name
and (2) the surname or family name. The given or proper name is that
which is given to the individual at birth or at baptism, to distinguish him
from other individuals. The surname or family name is that which identifies
the family to which he belongs and is continued from parent to child. The
given name may be freely selected by the parents for the child, but the
surname to which the child is entitled is fixed by law.9
_______________
7
Minutes of the Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law
Committees, August 10, 1985, p. 8.
8
Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Maximo Wong, G.R. No. 97906,
May 21, 1992, 209 SCRA 189, citing 38 Am. Jur., Name 594-595.
9
Republic vs. Hon. Hernandez, et al., G.R. No. 117209, February 9,
1996, 253 SCRA 509, citing Tolentino, A.M., Civil Code of the Philippines,
Commentaries and Jurisprudence, Vol. I, 1993 ed., 672.
547
VOL. 454, MARCH 31, 2005 547
In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia
Thus, Articles 364 to 380 of the Civil Code provides the substantive rules
which regulate the use of surname10 of an individual whatever may be his
status in life, i.e., whether he may be legitimate or illegitimate, an adopted
child, a married woman or a previously married woman, or a widow, thus:
“Art. 364. Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the
surname of the father.
 Art. 365. An adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter.
xxx
Art. 369. Children conceived before the decree annulling a voidable
marriage shall principally use the surname of the father.
Art. 370. A married woman may use:
1. (1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her
husband’s surname, or
2. (2) Her maiden first name and her husband’s surname or
3. (3) Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word
indicating that she is his wife, such as ‘Mrs.’
Art. 371. In case of annulment of marriage, and the wife is the guilty
party, she shall resume her maiden name and surname. If she is the
innocent spouse, she may resume her maiden name and surname.
However, she may choose to continue employing her former husband’s
surname, unless:
1. (1) The court decrees otherwise, or
2. (2) She or the former husband is married again to
another person.
Art. 372. When legal separation has been granted, the wife shall
continue using her name and surname employed before the legal
separation.
Art. 373. A widow may use the deceased husband’s surname as though he
were still living, in accordance with Article 370.
_______________
10
Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Maximo Wong, supra.
548
548 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia
Art. 374. In case of identity of names and surnames, the younger person
shall be obliged to use such additional name or surname as will avoid
confusion.
Art. 375. In case of identity of names and surnames between
ascendants and descendants, the word ‘Junior’ can be used only by a son.
Grandsons and other direct male descendants shall either:
1. (1)Add a middle name or the mother's surname, or
2. (2) Add the Roman numerals II, III, and so on.
x x x”
Law Is Silent As To The Use Of
Middle Name—
As correctly submitted by both parties, there is no law regulating the use
of a middle name. Even Article 17611 of the Family Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 9255, otherwise known as “An Act Allowing Illegitimate
Children To Use The Surname Of Their Father,” is silent as to what middle
name a child may use.
The middle name or the mother’s surname is only considered in Article
375(1), quoted above, in case there is identity of names and surnames
between ascendants and descendants, in which case, the middle name or
the mother’s surname shall be added.
_______________
11
“Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be
under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to
support in conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate children may
use the surname of their father if their filiation has been expressly
recognized by the father through the record of birth appearing in the civil
register, or when an admission in a public document or private
handwritten instrument is made by the father. Provided, the father has the
right to institute an action before the regular courts to prove non-filiation
during his lifetime. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of
one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child.”
549
VOL. 454, MARCH 31, 2005 549
In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia
Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee
may use. Article 365 of the Civil Code merely provides that “an adopted
child shall bear the surname of the adopter.” Also, Article 189 of the Family
Code, enumerating the legal effects of adoption, is likewise silent on the
matter, thus:
“(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate
child of the adopters and both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and
obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child, including the
right of the adopted to use the surname of the adopters;
x x x”
However, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, the members of the Civil
Code and Family Law Committees that drafted the Family Code recognized
the Filipino custom of adding the surname of the child’s mother as his
middle name. In the Minutes of the Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and
Family Law Committees, the members approved the suggestion that the
initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname
of the father, thus:
“Justice Caguioa commented that there is a difference between the use by
the wife of the surname and that of the child because the father’s
surname indicates the family to which he belongs, for which reason he
would insist on the use of the father’s surname by the child but that, if he
wants to, the child may also use the surname of the mother.
Justice Puno posed the question: If the child chooses to use the
surname of the mother, how will his name be written? Justice Caguioa
replied that it is up to him but that his point is that it should be mandatory
that the child uses the surname of the father and permissive in the case
of the surname of the mother.
Prof. Baviera remarked that Justice Caguioa’s point is covered by the
present Article 364, which reads:
550
550 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia
Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the
father.
Justice Puno pointed out that many names change through no choice
of the person himself precisely because of this misunderstanding. He then
cited the following example: Alfonso Ponce Enrile’s correct surname is
Ponce since the mother’s surname is Enrile but everybody calls him Atty.
Enrile. Justice Jose Gutierrez David’s family name is Gutierrez and his
mother’s surname is David but they all call him Justice David.
Justice Caguioa suggested that the proposed Article (12) be modified
to the effect that it shall be mandatory on the child to use the surname of
the father but he may use the surname of the mother by way of an initial
or a middle name. Prof. Balane stated that they take note of this for
inclusion in the Chapter on Use of Surnames since in the proposed Article
(10) they are just enumerating the rights of legitimate children so that the
details can be covered in the appropriate chapter.
xxx
Justice Puno remarked that there is logic in the simplification
suggested by Justice Caguioa that the surname of the father should always
be last because there are so many traditions like the American tradition
where they like to use their second given name and the Latin tradition,
which is also followed by the Chinese wherein they even include the Clan
name.
xxx
Justice Puno suggested that they agree in principle that in the
Chapter on the Use of Surnames, they should say that initial or surname
of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father so
that the second name, if any, will be before the surname of the mother.
Prof. Balane added that this is really the Filipino way. The Committee
approved the suggestion.”12 (Emphasis supplied)
In the case of an adopted child, the law provides that “the adopted shall
bear the surname of the adopters.”13 Again, it is
_______________
12
Minutes of the Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family law
Committees, August 10, 1985, pp. 16-18.
13
Article 365 of the New Civil Code.
551
VOL. 454, MARCH 31, 2005 551
In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia
silent whether he can use a middle name. What it only expressly allows, as
a matter of right and obligation, is for the adoptee to bear the surname of
the adopter, upon issuance of the decree of adoption.14
The Underlying Intent of Adoption
Is In Favor of the Adopted Child—
Adoption is defined as the process of making a child, whether related or
not to the adopter, possess in general, the rights accorded to a legitimate
child.15 It is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem which creates between two
persons a relationship similar to that which results from legitimate
paternity and filiation.16 The modern trend is to consider adoption not
merely as an act to establish a relationship of paternity and filiation, but
also as an act which endows the child with a legitimate status. 17 This was,
indeed, confirmed in 1989, when the Philippines, as a State Party to the
Convention of the Rights of the Child initiated by the United Nations,
accepted the principle that adoption is impressed with social and moral
responsibility, and that its underlying intent is geared to favor the adopted
child.18 Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise known as the “Domestic Adoption
Act of 1998,”19 secures these rights
_______________
14
Republic vs. Hon. Hernandez, et al., supra; Republic vs. Court of
Appeals and Maximo Wong, supra.
15
Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines Annotated, Vol. I, Fifteenth
Edition, 2002, p. 685.
16
Pineda, The Family Code of the Philippines Annotated, 1989 Edition,
p. 272-273, citing 4 Valverde, 473.
17
Paras, supra, citing Prasnick vs. Republic, 98 Phil. 665.
18
Lahom vs. Sibulo, G.R. No. 143989, July 14, 2003, 406 SCRA 135,
citing United Nation General Assembly/44/49 (1989).
19
“Sec. 17. Legitimacy.—The adoptee shall be considered the
legitimate son/daughter of the adopter(s) for all intents and purposes and
as such is entitled to all the rights and obligations provided by law to
legitimate sons/daughters born to them without discrimina
552
552 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia
and privileges for the adopted.20
One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a
legitimate child of the adopter for all intents and purposes pursuant to
Article 18921 of the Family Code and Section 1722 Article V of RA 8552.23
Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that
Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child
without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname
of her father and her mother, as discussed above. This is consistent with
the intention of the members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees
as earlier discussed. In fact, it is a Filipino custom that the initial or
surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the
father.
Additionally, as aptly stated by both parties, Stephanie’s continued use
of her mother’s surname (Garcia) as her middle name will maintain her
maternal lineage. It is to be noted that Article 189(3) of the Family Code
and Section 1824, Article V of RA 8552 (law on adoption) provide that the
adoptee remains an intestate heir of his/her biological parent. Hence,
Stephanie can well assert or claim her hereditary rights from her natural
mother in the future.
_______________
tion of any kind. To this end, the adoptee is entitled to love, guidance
and support in keeping with the means of the family.”
20
Id.
21
“Art. 189. (1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a
legitimate child of the adopters and both shall acquire the reciprocal rights
and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child, including
the right of the adopted to use the surname of the adopters;”
22
Supra.
23
Domestic Adoption Act of 1998.
24
“Sec. 18. Succession.—In legal and intestate succession, the
adopter(s) and the adoptee shall have reciprocal rights of succession
without distinction from legitimate filiation. However, if the adoptee and
his/her biological parent(s) had left a will, the law on testamentary
succession shall govern.”
553
VOL. 454, MARCH 31, 2005 553
In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia
Moreover, records show that Stephanie and her mother are living together
in the house built by petitioner for them at 390 Tumana, San Jose, Baliuag,
Bulacan. Petitioner provides for all their needs. Stephanie is closely
attached to both her mother and father. She calls them “Mama” and
“Papa.” Indeed, they are one normal happy family. Hence, to allow
Stephanie to use her mother’s surname as her middle name will not only
sustain her continued loving relationship with her mother but will also
eliminate the stigma of her illegitimacy.
Liberal Construction of Adoption
Statutes In Favor Of Adoption—
It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary,
should be liberally construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of
adoption.25 The interests and welfare of the adopted child are of primary
and paramount consideration,26 hence, every reasonable intendment
should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate
objectives of the law.27
Lastly, Art. 10 of the New Civil Code provides that:
“In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is person intended—a middle name is very important or even decisive in a
presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.” case in which the issue is as between two persons who have the same first
This provision, according to the Code Commission, “is necessary so that it name and surname, did the act complained of, or is injured or sued or the
may tip the scales in favor of right and justice when the law is doubtful or like. (United Coconut Planters Bank vs. Ramos, 415 SCRA 596 [2003])
obscure. It will strengthen ——o0o——
_______________ _______________
25 28
Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. Paras, supra, p. 91.
92326, January 24, 1992, 205 SCRA 356, citing 2 Am. Jur. 2d, Adoption, 555
865. © Copyright 2020 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
26
Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et al., Id., citing 2
Am. Jur. 2d, Adoption, 910.
27
Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et al., Id., citing
Bobanovic, et al. vs. Montes, etc., et al., 142 SCRA 485 (1986).
554
554 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia
the determination of the courts to avoid an injustice which may apparently
be authorized by some way of interpreting the law.”28
Hence, since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted
by her natural father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mother’s
surname, we find no reason why she should not be allowed to do so.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is partly
MODIFIED in the sense that Stephanie should be allowed to use her
mother’s surname “GARCIA” as her middle name.
Let the corresponding entry of her correct and complete name be
entered in the decree of adoption.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban (Chairman), Corona, Carpio-Morales and Garcia, JJ.,
concur.
Petition granted.
Notes.—A person may be known by several aliases, irrespective of his
knowledge or consent to the use thereof. (People vs. Bergonio, Jr., 340
SCRA 269 [2000])
Since the use of initials, instead of a given name, before a surname, has
become a practice, the necessity that these initials be all given and
correctly given in court proceedings has become of importance in every
case, and in many, absolutely essential to a correct designation of the
 18 True False 403530 not the illegitimate children of petitioner. And third, petitioner and Olario
are not legally separated from each other.
G.R. Nos. 168992-93. May 21, 2009.*
Same; Same; Domestic Adoption Act of 1998 (Republic Act No. 8552); A
IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHELLE P. LIM, MONINA P. LIM,
foreigner adopting together with his or her Philippine spouse must meet
petitioner.
the qualifications set forth in Republic Act No. 8552, and the requirements
IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHAEL JUDE P. LIM, MONINA P. LIM,
on residency and certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt cannot be
petitioner.
waived.—The fact that Olario gave his consent to the adoption as shown in
Adoption; Husband and Wife; Husband and wife must jointly adopt.—It
his Affidavit of Consent does not suffice. There are certain requirements
is undisputed that, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed,
that Olario must comply being an American citizen. He must meet the
petitioner had already remarried. She filed the petitions by herself,
qualifications set forth in Section 7 of RA 8552 such as: (1) he must prove
without being joined by her husband Olario. We have no other recourse
that his country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the
but to affirm the trial court’s decision denying the petitions for adoption.
Philippines; (2) he must have been living in the Philippines for at least
Dura lex sed lex. The law is explicit. Section 7, Article III of RA 8552 reads:
three continuous years prior to the filing of the application for adoption;
SEC. 7. Who May Adopt.—The following may adopt: x x x Husband and
(3) he must maintain such residency until the adoption decree is entered;
wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases: x x x The use of the
(4) he has legal capacity to adopt in his own country; and (5) the adoptee is
word “shall” in the above-quoted provision means that joint adoption by
allowed to enter the adopter’s country as the latter’s adopted child. None
the husband and the wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the
of these qualifications were shown and proved during the trial. These
concept of joint parental authority over the child which is the ideal
requirements on residency and certification of the alien’s qualification to
situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate
adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Section 7. The children or
child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also
adoptees are not relatives within the fourth degree of consanguinity or
insures harmony between the spouses. The law is clear. There is no room
affinity of petitioner or of Olario. Neither are the adoptees the legitimate
for ambiguity. Petitioner, having remarried at the time the petitions for
children of petitioner.
adop-
Same; Effects; Even if emancipation terminates parental authority, the
_______________
adoptee is still considered a legitimate child of the adopter with all the
rights of a legitimate child.—Adoption has, thus, the following effects: (1)
* FIRST DIVISION.
sever all legal ties between the biological parent(s) and the adoptee,
99 except when the biological parent is the spouse of the adopter; (2) deem
the adoptee as a legitimate child of the adopter; and (3) give adopter and
VOL. 588, MAY 21, 2009 99 adoptee reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of
In Re: Petition for Adoption of Michelle P. Lim, Monina P. Lim parent and child, including but not limited to: (i) the right of the adopter to
choose the name the child is to be known; and (ii) the right of the adopter
tion were filed, must jointly adopt. Since the petitions for adoption were and adoptee to be legal and compulsory heirs of each other. Therefore,
filed only by petitioner herself, without joining her husband, Olario, the
even if emancipation terminates parental authority, the adoptee is still
trial court was correct in denying the petitions for adoption on this ground.
considered a legitimate child of the adopter with all the rights of a
Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three exceptions enumerated
legitimate
in Section 7. First, the children to be adopted are not the legitimate
100
children of petitioner or of her husband Olario. Second, the children are
100 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
 In Re: Petition for Adoption of Michelle P. Lim, Monina P. Lim
child such as: (1) to bear the surname of the father and the mother; (2) to
receive support from their parents; and (3) to be entitled to the legitime
and other successional rights. Conversely, the adoptive parents shall, with
respect to the adopted child, enjoy all the benefits to which biological
parents are entitled such as support and successional rights.
Same; Separation of Powers; Judicial Legislation; While the Court is not
unmindful of the main purpose of adoption statutes, which is the
promotion of the welfare of the children, regrettably, the law is clear and it
cannot be modified without violating the proscription against judicial
legislation.—We are mindful of the fact that adoption statutes, being
humane and salutary, hold the interests and welfare of the child to be of
paramount consideration. They are designed to provide homes, parental
care and education for unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give
them the protection of society and family, as well as to allow childless
couples or persons to experience the joys of parenthood and give them
legally a child in the person of the adopted for the manifestation of their
natural parental instincts. Every reasonable intendment should be
sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives
of the law. But, as we have ruled in Republic v. Vergara (270 SCRA 206
[1997]): We are not unmindful of the main purpose of adoption statutes,
which is the promotion of the welfare of the children. Accordingly, the law
should be construed liberally, in a manner that will sustain rather than
defeat said purpose. The law must also be applied with compassion,
understanding and less severity in view of the fact that it is intended to
provide homes, love, care and education for less fortunate children.
Regrettably, the Court is not in a position to affirm the trial court’s decision
favoring adoption in the case at bar, for the law is clear and it cannot be
modified without violating the proscription against judicial legislation.
Until such time however, that the law on the matter is amended, we
cannot sustain the respondent-spouses’ petition for adoption. Petitioner,
being married at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, should
have jointly filed the petitions with her husband. We cannot make our own
legislation to suit petitioner.
Same; Husband and Wife; Dissolution of Marriage; The filing of a case for
dissolution of the marriage between the spouses is of no moment—it is not
equivalent to a decree of dissolution of marriage; Since, at the time the
petitions for adoption were filed, the petitioner was married, joint adoption
with the husband is mandatory.—Petitioner, in her Memorandum, insists
that subsequent events would show that joint adoption could no101
VOL. 588, MAY 21, 2009 101
In Re: Petition for Adoption of Michelle P. Lim, Monina P. Lim
longer be possible because Olario has filed a case for dissolution of his
marriage to petitioner in the Los Angeles Superior Court. We disagree. The
filing of a case for dissolution of the marriage between petitioner and
Olario is of no moment. It is not equivalent to a decree of dissolution of
marriage. Until and unless there is a judicial decree for the dissolution of
the marriage between petitioner and Olario, the marriage still subsists.
That being the case, joint adoption by the husband and the wife is
required. We reiterate our ruling above that since, at the time the
petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner was married to Olario, joint
adoption is mandatory.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Regional Trial
Court of General Santos City, Br. 22.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Teodoro P. Sales for petitioner.
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Monina P. Lim
(petitioner) seeking to set aside the Decision1 dated 15 September 2004 of
the Regional Trial Court, General Santos City, Branch 22 (trial court), in SPL.
PROC. Case Nos. 1258 and 1259, which dismissed without prejudice the
consolidated petitions for adoption of Michelle P. Lim and Michael Jude P.
Lim.
The Facts
The following facts are undisputed. Petitioner is an optometrist by
profession. On 23 June 1974, she married Primo Lim (Lim). They were
childless. Minor children, whose parents were unknown, were entrusted to
them by a certain Lucia Ayuban (Ayuban). Being so eager to have a child of
their own, petitioner and Lim registered the children to make it appear
that they were the children’s par-
_______________
1 Penned by Judge Antonio C. Lubao. Records of SPL. PROC. Case No.
1258, pp. 161-162 and SPL. PROC. Case No. 1259, pp. 163-164.
102
102 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
In Re: Petition for Adoption of Michelle P. Lim, Monina P. Lim
ents. The children2 were named Michelle P. Lim (Michelle) and Michael
Jude P. Lim (Michael). Michelle was barely eleven days old when brought
to the clinic of petitioner. She was born on 15 March 1977. 3 Michael was
11 days old when Ayuban brought him to petitioner’s clinic. His date of
birth is 1 August 1983.4
The spouses reared and cared for the children as if they were their
own. They sent the children to exclusive schools. They used the surname
“Lim” in all their school records and documents. Unfortunately, on 28
November 1998, Lim died. On 27 December 2000, petitioner married Angel
Olario (Olario), an American citizen.
Thereafter, petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the
amnesty5 given under Republic Act No. 85526 (RA 8552) to those
individuals who simulated the birth of a child. Thus, on 24 April 2002,
petitioner filed separate petitions for the adoption of
_______________
2 Three children were actually entrusted to petitioner and Lim. The
third, who was named Primo Jude P. Lim, was still a minor at the time the
petition for adoption was filed. The case was docketed as SPL. PROC. No.
1260. Petitioner opted not to appeal the decision insofar as the minor
Primo Jude P. Lim was concerned.
3 Records (SPL. Proc. Case No. 1258), pp. 94-96.
4 Records (SPL. Proc. Case No. 1259), pp. 69-71.
5 Section 22 of RA 8552 provides:
SEC. 22. Rectification of Simulated Births.—A person who has, prior
to the effectivity of this Act, simulated the birth of a child shall not be
punished for such act: Provided, That the simulation of birth was made for
the best interest of the child and that he/she has been consistently
considered and treated by that person as his/her own son/daughter:
Provided, further, That the application for correction of the birth
registration and petition for adoption shall be filed within five (5) years
from the effectivity of this Act and completed thereafter: Provided, finally,
That such person complies with the procedure as specified in Article IV of
this Act and other requirements as determined by the Department.
6 An Act Establishing the Rules and Policies on the Domestic Adoption
of Filipino Children and For Other Purposes, otherwise known as the
“Domestic Adoption Act of 1998.” Approved on 25 February 1998.
103
VOL. 588, MAY 21, 2009 103
In Re: Petition for Adoption of Michelle P. Lim, Monina P. Lim
Michelle and Michael before the trial court docketed as SPL PROC. Case
Nos. 1258 and 1259, respectively. At the time of the filing of the petitions
for adoption, Michelle was 25 years old and already married, while Michael
was 18 years and seven months old.
Michelle and her husband gave their consent to the adoption as
evidenced by their Affidavits of Consent.7 Michael also gave his consent to
his adoption as shown in his Affidavit of Consent.8 Petitioner’s husband
Olario likewise executed an Affidavit of Consent9 for the adoption of
Michelle and Michael.
In the Certification issued by the Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD), Michelle was considered as an abandoned child and
the whereabouts of her natural parents were unknown. 10 The DSWD
issued a similar Certification for Michael.11
The Ruling of the Trial Court
On 15 September 2004, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing
the petitions. The trial court ruled that since petitioner had remarried,
petitioner should have filed the petition jointly with her new husband. The
trial court ruled that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is
mandatory citing Section 7(c), Article III of RA 8552 and Article 185 of the
Family Code.
 Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision but the
motion was denied in the Order dated 16 June 2005. In denying the
motion, the trial court ruled that petitioner did not fall under any of the
exceptions under Section 7(c), Article III of RA 8552. Petitioner’s argument
that mere consent of her husband would suffice was untenable because,
under the law, there are additional requirements, such as residency and
certification of his qualification, which the husband, who was not even
made a party in this case, must comply.
_______________
7 Records (SPL. Proc. Case No. 1258), pp. 147-148.
8 Id., at p. 147.
9 Id., at p. 149.
10 Id., at p. 145.
11 Records (SPL. Proc. Case No. 1259), p. 8.
104
104 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
In Re: Petition for Adoption of Michelle P. Lim, Monina P. Lim
As to the argument that the adoptees are already emancipated and
joint adoption is merely for the joint exercise of parental authority, the
trial court ruled that joint adoption is not only for the purpose of exercising
parental authority because an emancipated child acquires certain rights
from his parents and assumes certain obligations and responsibilities.
Hence, the present petition.
Issue
Petitioner appealed directly to this Court raising the sole issue of
whether or not petitioner, who has remarried, can singly adopt.
The Court’s Ruling
Petitioner contends that the rule on joint adoption must be relaxed
because it is the duty of the court and the State to protect the paramount
interest and welfare of the child to be adopted. Petitioner argues that the
legal maxim “dura lex sed lex” is not applicable to adoption cases. She
argues that joint parental authority is not necessary in this case since, at
the time the petitions were filed, Michelle was 25 years old and already
married, while Michael was already 18 years of age. Parental authority is
not anymore necessary since they have been emancipated having attained
the age of majority.
We deny the petition.
Joint Adoption by Husband and Wife
It is undisputed that, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed,
petitioner had already remarried. She filed the petitions by herself,
without being joined by her husband Olario. We have no other recourse
but to affirm the trial court’s decision denying the petitions for adoption.
Dura lex sed lex. The law is explicit. Section 7, Article III of RA 8552 reads:
“SEC. 7. Who May Adopt.—The following may adopt:105
VOL. 588, MAY 21, 2009 105
In Re: Petition for Adoption of Michelle P. Lim, Monina P. Lim
(a) Any Filipino citizen of legal age, in possession of full civil capacity
and legal rights, of good moral character, has not been convicted of any
crime involving moral turpitude, emotionally and psychologically capable
of caring for children, at least sixteen (16) years older than the adoptee,
and who is in a position to support and care for his/her children in keeping
with the means of the family. The requirement of sixteen (16) year
difference between the age of the adopter and adoptee may be waived
when the adopter is the biological parent of the adoptee, or is the spouse
of the adoptee’s parent;
(b) Any alien possessing the same qualifications as above stated for
Filipino nationals: Provided, That his/her country has diplomatic relations
with the Republic of the Philippines, that he/she has been living in the
Philippines for at least three (3) continuous years prior to the filing of the
application for adoption and maintains such residence until the adoption
decree is entered, that he/she has been certified by his/her diplomatic or
consular office or any appropriate government agency that he/she has the
legal capacity to adopt in his/her country, and that his/her government
allows the adoptee to enter his/her country as his/her adopted son/
daughter: Provided, further, That the requirements on residency and
certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt in his/her country may be
waived for the following:
(i) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a
relative within the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or
affinity; or
(ii )one who seeks to adopt the legitimate
son/daughter of his/her Filipino spouse; or
(iii) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks
to adopt jointly with his/her spouse a relative within the
fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity of the
Filipino spouses; or
(c) The guardian with respect to the ward after the termination of the
guardianship and clearance of his/her financial accountabilities.
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases:
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate
son/daughter of the other; or
(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own
illegitimate son/daughter: Provided, however, That the
other spouse has signified his/her consent thereto; or
(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each
other.106
106 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
In Re: Petition for Adoption of Michelle P. Lim, Monina P. Lim
In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse
adopts the illegitimate son/daughter of the other, joint
parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses.”
(Emphasis supplied)
The use of the word “shall” in the above-quoted provision means that
joint adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory. This is in
consonance with the concept of joint parental authority over the child
which is the ideal situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to the
level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt
jointly. The rule also insures harmony between the spouses. 12
The law is clear. There is no room for ambiguity. Petitioner, having
remarried at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, must jointly
adopt. Since the petitions for adoption were filed only by petitioner
herself, without joining her husband, Olario, the trial court was correct in
denying the petitions for adoption on this ground.
Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three exceptions
enumerated in Section 7. First, the children to be adopted are not the
legitimate children of petitioner or of her husband Olario. Second, the
children are not the illegitimate children of petitioner. And third, petitioner
and Olario are not legally separated from each other.
The fact that Olario gave his consent to the adoption as shown in his
Affidavit of Consent does not suffice. There are certain requirements that
Olario must comply being an American citizen. He must meet the
qualifications set forth in Section 7 of RA 8552 such as: (1) he must prove
that his country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the
Philippines; (2) he must have been living in the Philippines for at least
three continuous years prior to the filing of the application for adoption;
(3) he must maintain such residency until the adoption decree is entered;
(4) he has legal capacity to adopt in his own country; and (5) the adoptee is
allowed to enter the adopter’s country as the latter’s adopted child. None
of these qualifications were shown and proved during the trial.
_______________
12 Republic v. Toledano, G.R. No. 94147, 8 June 1994, 233 SCRA 9.
107
VOL. 588, MAY 21, 2009 107
In Re: Petition for Adoption of Michelle P. Lim, Monina P. Lim
These requirements on residency and certification of the alien’s
qualification to adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Section 7. The
children or adoptees are not relatives within the fourth degree of
consanguinity or affinity of petitioner or of Olario. Neither are the
adoptees the legitimate children of petitioner.
Effects of Adoption
Petitioner contends that joint parental authority is not anymore
necessary since the children have been emancipated having reached the
age of majority. This is untenable.
 Parental authority includes caring for and rearing the children for civic
consciousness and efficiency and the development of their moral, mental
and physical character and well-being.13 The father and the mother shall
jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their common
children.14 Even the remarriage of the surviving parent shall not affect the
parental authority over the children, unless the court appoints another
person to be the guardian of the person or property of the children. 15
It is true that when the child reaches the age of emancipation—that is,
when he attains the age of majority or 18 years of age 16—emancipation
terminates parental authority over the person and property of the child,
who shall then be qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life. 17
However, parental authority is merely just one of the effects of legal
adoption. Article V of RA 8552 enumerates the effects of adoption, thus:
_______________
13 Article 209, Family Code.
14 Article 210, Family Code.
15 Article 212, Family Code.
16 Republic Act No. 6809, An Act Lowering the Age of Majority from
Twenty-One to Eighteen Years, Amending for the Purpose Executive Order
Numbered Two Hundred Nine, and For Other Purposes.
17 Article 236, Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 6809.
108
108 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
In Re: Petition for Adoption of Michelle P. Lim, Monina P. Lim
ARTICLE V
EFFECTS OF ADOPTION
“SEC. 16. Parental Authority.—Except in cases where the biological
parent is the spouse of the adopter, all legal ties between the biological
parent(s) and the adoptee shall be severed and the same shall then be
vested on the adopter(s).
SEC. 17. Legitimacy.—The adoptee shall be considered the legitimate
son/daughter of the adopter(s) for all intents and purposes and as such is
entitled to all the rights and obligations provided by law to legitimate
sons/daughters born to them without discrimination of any kind. To this
end, the adoptee is entitled to love, guidance, and support in keeping with
the means of the family.
SEC. 18. Succession.—In legal and intestate succession, the
adopter(s) and the adoptee shall have reciprocal rights of succession
without distinction from legitimate filiation. However, if the adoptee and
his/her biological parent(s) had left a will, the law on testamentary
succession shall govern.”
Adoption has, thus, the following effects: (1) sever all legal ties
between the biological parent(s) and the adoptee, except when the
biological parent is the spouse of the adopter; (2) deem the adoptee as a
legitimate child of the adopter; and (3) give adopter and adoptee
reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and
child, including but not limited to: (i) the right of the adopter to choose the
name the child is to be known; and (ii) the right of the adopter and
adoptee to be legal and compulsory heirs of each other. 18 Therefore, even
if emancipation terminates parental authority, the adoptee is still
considered a legitimate child of the adopter with all the rights 19 of a
legitimate child such as: (1) to bear the surname of the father and the
mother; (2) to receive support from their parents; and (3) to be entitled to
the legitime and other successional rights. Conversely, the adoptive
parents shall, with respect to the adopted child, enjoy all the benefits to
_______________
18 Section 33, Article VI, Rules and Regulations to Implement the
Domestic Adoption Act of 1998.
19 Article 174, Family Code.
109
VOL. 588, MAY 21, 2009 109
In Re: Petition for Adoption of Michelle P. Lim, Monina P. Lim
which biological parents are entitled20 such as support21 and successional
rights.22
We are mindful of the fact that adoption statutes, being humane and
salutary, hold the interests and welfare of the child to be of paramount
consideration. They are designed to provide homes, parental care and
education for unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give them the
protection of society and family, as well as to allow childless couples or
persons to experience the joys of parenthood and give them legally a child
in the person of the adopted for the manifestation of their natural parental
instincts. Every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote
and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law.23 But, as
we have ruled in Republic v. Vergara:24
“We are not unmindful of the main purpose of adoption statutes,
which is the promotion of the welfare of the children. Accordingly, the law
should be construed liberally, in a manner that will sustain rather than
defeat said purpose. The law must also be applied with compassion,
understanding and less severity in view of the fact that it is intended to
provide homes, love, care and education for less fortunate children.
Regrettably, the Court is not in a position to affirm the trial court’s decision
favoring adoption in the case at bar, for the law is clear and it cannot be
modified without violating the proscription against judicial legislation.
Until such time however, that the law on the matter is amended, we
cannot sustain the respondent-spouses’ petition for adoption.” (Emphasis
supplied)
Petitioner, being married at the time the petitions for adoption were
filed, should have jointly filed the petitions with her husband. We cannot
make our own legislation to suit petitioner.
_______________
20 Section 34, Article VI, Rules and Regulations to Implement the
Domestic Adoption Act of 1998.
21 Article 195, Family Code.
22 Section 18, Article V, RA 8552.
23 Bobanovic v. Montes, 226 Phil. 404; 142 SCRA 485 (1986).
24 336 Phil. 944, 948-949; 270 SCRA 206, 210 (1997).
110
110 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
In Re: Petition for Adoption of Michelle P. Lim, Monina P. Lim
Petitioner, in her Memorandum, insists that subsequent events would
show that joint adoption could no longer be possible because Olario has
filed a case for dissolution of his marriage to petitioner in the Los Angeles
Superior Court.
We disagree. The filing of a case for dissolution of the marriage
between petitioner and Olario is of no moment. It is not equivalent to a
decree of dissolution of marriage. Until and unless there is a judicial decree
for the dissolution of the marriage between petitioner and Olario, the
marriage still subsists. That being the case, joint adoption by the husband
and the wife is required. We reiterate our ruling above that since, at the
time the petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner was married to
Olario, joint adoption is mandatory.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 15
September 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, General Santos City, Branch 22
in SPL. PROC. Case Nos. 1258 and 1259. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Puno (C.J., Chairperson), Corona, Leonardo-De Castro and Bersamin, JJ.,
concur.
Petition denied, judgment affirmed.
Notes.—While the right of a natural parent to name the child is
recognized, guaranteed and protected under the law, the so-called right of
an adoptive parent to re-name an adopted child by virtue or as a
consequence of adoption, even for the most noble intentions and moving
supplications, is unheard of in law and consequently cannot be favorably
considered. (Republic vs. Hernandez, 253 SCRA 509 [1996])
Since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her
natural father to use, as middle name her mother’s surname, the Court
finds no reason why she should not be allowed to do so. (In the Matter of
the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia, 454 SCRA 541 [2005])
——o0o——
© Copyright 2020 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved
 21 True False 403876
. client and of the public confidence in the legal profession.—Having no valid
A.C. No. 10196. September 9, 2014.*
MELODY R. NERY, complainant, vs. ATTY. GLICERIO A. SAMPANA,
respondent.
Attorney-Client Relationship; Acceptance of money from a client
establishes an attorney-client relationship and gives rise to the duty of
fidelity to the client’s cause.—Acceptance of money from a client
establishes an attorney-client relationship and gives rise to the duty of
fidelity to the client’s cause. Every case accepted by a lawyer deserves full
attention, diligence, skill and competence, regardless of importance. A
lawyer also owes it to the court, their clients, and other lawyers to be
candid and fair. Thus, the Code of Professional Responsibility clearly states:
CANON 15 – A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his
dealings and transactions with his client. CANON 16 – A lawyer shall hold in
trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his
possession. Rule 16.03 – A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of
his client when
_______________
* EN BANC.
487
VOL. 734, SEPTEMBER 9, 2014 487
Nery vs. Sampana
due or upon demand. x x x. CANON 17 – A lawyer owes fidelity to the
cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed in him. CANON 18 – A lawyer shall serve his client with
competence and diligence. Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal
matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall
render him liable.
Civil Law; Adoption; The alien adopter can jointly adopt a relative
within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity of his/her Filipino
spouse, and the certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt is
waived.—Under the Domestic Adoption Act provision, which Sampana
suggested, the alien adopter can jointly adopt a relative within the fourth
degree of consanguinity or affinity of his/her Filipino spouse, and the
certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt is waived.
Attorneys; Legal Ethics; A lawyer’s failure to return upon demand the
funds held by him gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated
the same for his own use, in violation of the trust reposed in him by his
reason not to file the petition for adoption, Sampana misinformed Nery of
the status of the petition. He then conceded that the annulment case
overshadowed the petition for adoption. Verily, Sampana neglected the
legal matter entrusted to him. He even kept the money given him, in
violation of the Code’s mandate to deliver the client’s funds upon demand.
A lawyer’s failure to return upon demand the funds held by him gives rise
to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use, in
violation of the trust reposed in him by his client and of the public
confidence in the legal profession.
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE in the Supreme Court. Disbarment.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
488
488 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Nery vs. Sampana
RESOLUTION
CARPIO,** J.:
The Case
This is a disbarment complaint filed by Melody R. Nery (Nery) against
Atty. Glicerio A. Sampana (Sampana) for failing to file the petition for
adoption despite receiving his legal fees and for making Nery believe that
the petition was already filed.
The Facts
In her verified complaint filed on 18 June 2010,1 Nery alleged that in
June 2008, she engaged the services of Sampana for the annulment of her
marriage and for her adoption by an alien adopter. The petition for
annulment was eventually granted, and Nery paid P200,000.00 to
Sampana. As for the adoption, Sampana asked Nery if she had an aunt,
whom they could represent as the wife of her alien adopter. Sampana then
gave Nery a blurred copy of a marriage contract, which they would use for
her adoption. Thereafter, Nery paid Sampana P100,000.00, in installment:
(a) P10,000.00 on 10 September 2008; (b) P50,000.00 on 2 October 2008;
and (c) P40,000.00 on 17 November 2008. Nery no longer asked for
receipts since she trusted Sampana.
 On 14 February 2009, Sampana sent a text message informing Nery
that he already filed the petition for adoption and it was already published.
Sampana further informed Nery that they needed to rehearse before the
hearing. Subsequently, Sampana told Nery that the hearing was set on 5
March 2010 in Branch 11 of Malolos, Bulacan. When Nery
_______________
* * Acting Chief Justice per Special Order No. 1770 dated 28 August
2014.
1 Rollo, pp. 2-5.
489
VOL. 734, SEPTEMBER 9, 2014 489
Nery vs. Sampana
asked why she did not receive notices from the court, Sampana claimed
that her presence was no longer necessary because the hearing was only
jurisdictional. Sampana told Nery that the hearing was reset to 12 March
2010.
On 11 March 2010, Nery inquired from Branch 11 of Malolos, Bulacan
about the status of the petition for adoption and discovered that there was
no such petition filed in the court.2 Thus, in the afternoon of the same day,
Nery met Sampana and sought the reimbursement of the P100,000.00 she
paid him. Sampana agreed, but said that he would deduct the filing fee
worth P12,000.00. Nery insisted that the filing fee should not be deducted,
since the petition for adoption was never filed. Thereafter, Nery repeatedly
demanded for the reimbursement of the P100,000.00 from Sampana, but
the demands were left unheeded.
2 Id., at p. 8. Certification issued by the Office of the Clerk of Court
dated 6 April 2010.
In an Order dated 25 February 2011,3 the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), through Commissioner
Atty. Eldrid C. Antiquiera (Commissioner Antiquiera), stated that Sampana
failed to file his answer to the complaint and to appear during the
mandatory conference. Thus, both parties were directed to submit their
position papers.
3 Id., at p. 16.
In her position paper,4 Nery reiterated her allegations in the complaint.
4 Id., at pp. 17-19.
On the other hand, in his position paper dated 25 March 2011, 5
Sampana argued that Nery’s allegations were self-serving and
unsubstantiated. However, Sampana admitted receiving “one package fee”
from Nery for both cases of annulment of marriage and adoption.
Sampana alleged that he initially frowned upon the proposed adoption
because of the
490
490 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Nery vs. Sampana
old age, civil status and nationality of the alien adopter, but Nery insisted
on being adopted. Thus, Sampana suggested that “if the [alien] adopter
would be married to a close relative of [Nery], the intended [adoption by
an alien] could be possible.” Sampana, then, required Nery to submit the
documents, including the marriage contracts and the certification of the
alien’s qualification to adopt from the Japanese Embassy (certification).
Nery furnished the blurred marriage contract, but not the certification.
Sampana alleged that he prepared the petition for adoption but did not file
it because he was still waiting for the certification.
5 Id., at pp. 23-27.
Sampana denied that he misled Nery as to the filing of the petition for
adoption. Sampana claimed that Nery could have mistaken the proceeding
for the annulment case with the petition for adoption, and that the
annulment case could have overshadowed the adoption case. In any case,
Sampana committed to refund the amount Nery paid him, after deducting
his legal services and actual expenses.
The IBP’s Report and Recommendation
In his Report and Recommendation,6 Commissioner Antiquiera found
Sampana guilty of malpractice for making Nery believe that he already filed
the petition for adoption and for failing to file the petition despite
receiving his legal fees. Thus, Commissioner Antiquiera recommended a
penalty of three (3) months suspension from the practice of law.
In Resolution No. XX-2013-217 passed on 20 March 2013, the IBP
Board of Governors adopted and approved Commissioner Antiquiera’s
report and recommendation, as follows:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously
ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, [t]he Report and
Recommendation of the
_______________
6 Id., at pp. 33-34.
491
VOL. 734, SEPTEMBER 9, 2014 491
Nery vs. Sampana
Investigating Commissioner in the above entitled case, herein made part of
this Resolution as Annex “A,” and finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules and
considering that Respondent is guilty of malpractice by his failure to file a
petition for adoption and made complainant believe that he filed the
petition in Court, Atty. Glicerio Sampana is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for three (3) months and ORDERED to RETURN to
complainant the amount of One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos
with legal interest within thirty days from receipt of notice.7
The Ruling of the Court
The recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors is well-taken,
except as to the penalty.
Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client
relationship and gives rise to the duty of fidelity to the client’s cause. 8
Every case accepted by a lawyer deserves full attention, diligence, skill and
competence, regardless of importance.9 A lawyer also owes it to the court,
their clients, and other lawyers to be candid and fair. 10 Thus, the Code of
Professional Responsibility clearly states:
_______________
7 Id., at p. 32.
8 Yutuc v. Penuela, A.C. No. 7904, 22 September 2008 (Unsigned
Resolution), citing Adrimisin v. Javier, 532 Phil. 639; 501 SCRA 192 (2006);
Rollon v. Naraval, 493 Phil. 24; 452 SCRA 675 (2005), citing Pariñas v.
Paguinto, 478 Phil. 239; 434 SCRA 179 (2004); Fernandez v. Cabrera II, 463
Phil. 352; 418 SCRA 1 (2003); Emiliano Court Townhouses Homeowners
Association v. Dioneda, 447 Phil. 408; 399 SCRA 296 (2003).
9 Yutuc v. Penuela, supra, citing In Re: Atty. David Briones, 415 Phil.
203; 363 SCRA 1 (2001); Rollon v. Naraval, supra, citing Schulz v. Flores,
462 Phil. 601; 417 SCRA 159 (2003).
10 The Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 15.
492
492 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Nery vs. Sampana
CANON 15 – A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all
his dealings and transactions with his client.
CANON 16 – A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of
his client that may come into his possession.
Rule 16.03 – A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client
when due or upon demand. x x x.
CANON 17 – A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he
shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
CANON 18 – A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and
diligence.
Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him
and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
In the present case, Sampana admitted that he received “one package
fee” for both cases of annulment and adoption. Despite receiving this fee,
he unjustifiably failed to file the petition for adoption and fell short of his
duty of due diligence and candor to his client. Sampana’s proffered excuse
of waiting for the certification before filing the petition for adoption is
disingenuous and flimsy. In his position paper, he suggested to Nery that if
the alien adopter would be married to her close relative, the intended
adoption could be possible. Under the Domestic Adoption Act provision,
which Sampana suggested, the alien adopter can jointly adopt a relative
within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity of his/her Filipino
spouse, and the certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt is
waived.11
Having no valid reason not to file the petition for adoption, Sampana
misinformed Nery of the status of the petition. He then conceded that the
annulment case overshadowed the petition for adoption. Verily, Sampana
neglected the legal
_______________
11 Republic Act No. 8552 or the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998,
Section 7(b)(iii).
493
VOL. 734, SEPTEMBER 9, 2014 493
Nery vs. Sampana
matter entrusted to him. He even kept the money given him, in violation of
the Code’s mandate to deliver the client’s funds upon demand. A lawyer’s
failure to return upon demand the funds held by him gives rise to the
presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use, in
violation of the trust reposed in him by his client and of the public
confidence in the legal profession.12
This is not the first administrative case filed against Sampana. In Lising
v. Sampana,13 we already found Sampana guilty of violating Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility for his unethical and illegal act relative
to his double sale of a parcel of land. We imposed upon him the penalty of
suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year and warned him that a
repetition of a similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
In Rollon v. Naraval,14 we imposed upon the respondent therein the
penalty of suspension from the practice of law for two (2) years for failing
to render any legal service after receiving the filing and partial service fee.
Considering the serious consequence of disbarment and the previous
rulings of this Court, we deem it proper to increase the penalty for
Sampana’s malpractice and violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility to suspension from the practice of law for three (3) years.
WHEREFORE, we SUSPEND Atty. Glicerio A. Sampana from the practice
of law for THREE (3) YEARS with a stern warning that a repetition of a
similar act shall be dealt with more severely. We also ORDER Atty. Glicerio
A. Sampana to RETURN to complainant Melody R. Nery the amount of One
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00), with 12% interest
_______________
12 Dhaliwal v. Dumaguing, A.C. No. 9390, 1 August 2012, 678 SCRA 68.
13 A.C. No. 7958, 3 March 2014, citing Adrimisin v. Javier, 532 Phil.
639; 501 SCRA 192 (2006).
14 Supra note 8.
494
494 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Nery vs. Sampana
per annum from the time of his receipt of the full amount of money on 17
November 2008 until 30 June 2013, then 6% interest per annum from 1
July 2013 until fully paid.
Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant to be
included in the records of the respondent; the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for distribution to all its chapters; and the Office of the Court
Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo,
Villarama, Jr., Perez, Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen and Jardeleza, JJ.,
concur.
Sereno, CJ., On Official Leave.
Mendoza, J., On Official Leave.
Atty. Glicerio A. Sampana suspended from practice of law for three (3)
years with stern warning against repetition of similar act. He is ordered to
return to complainant Melody R. Nery the amount of P100,000.00.
Notes.—A lawyer’s failure to return the client’s money upon demand
gives rise to the presumption that he has misappropriated it for his own
use to the prejudice of and in violation of the trust reposed in him by the
client — it may border on the criminal as it may constitute a certiorari case
of swindling or estafa. (Belleza vs. Macasa, 593 SCRA 549 [2009])
Even if it were true that no attorney-client relationship existed
between them, case law has it that an attorney may be removed, or
otherwise disciplined, not only for malpractice and dishonesty in the
profession, but also for gross misconduct not connected with his
professional duties, making him unfit for the office and unworthy of the
privileges which his license and the law confer upon him. (Barcenas vs.
Alvero, 619 SCRA 1 [2010])
——o0o——
© Copyright 2020 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.

G.R. No. 192531. November 12, 2014.*
BERNARDINA P. BARTOLOME, petitioner, vs. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM and
SCANMAR MARITIME SERVICES, INC., respondents.
Administrative Agencies; Appeals; Generally, findings of fact by
administrative agencies are generally accorded great respect, if not finality,
by the courts by reason of the special knowledge and expertise of said
administrative agencies over matters falling under their jurisdiction.—
Generally, findings of fact by administrative agencies are generally
accorded great respect, if not finality, by the courts by reason of the
special knowledge and expertise of said administrative agencies over
matters falling under their jurisdiction. However, in the extant case, the
ECC had overlooked a crucial piece of evidence offered by the petitioner —
Cornelio’s death certificate. Based on Cornelio’s death certificate, it
appears that John’s adoptive father died on October 26, 1987, or only less
than three (3) years since the decree of adoption on February 4, 1985,
which attained finality. As such, it was error for the ECC to have ruled that
it was not duly proven that the adoptive parent, Cornelio, has already
passed away.
Administrative Regulations; Administrative regulations must always be
in harmony with the provisions of the law because any resulting
discrepancy between the two will always be resolved in favor of the basic
law.—This Court held in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Fortune
Tobacco Corporation, 559 SCRA 160 (2008) that: As we have previously
declared, rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the
mode or proceedings in order to carry into effect the law as it has been
enacted, and it cannot be extended to amend or expand the statutory
requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute.
Administrative regulations must always be in harmony with the
provisions of the law because any resulting discrepancy between the two
will always be resolved in favor of the basic law. (Emphasis supplied)
Guided by this doctrine, We find that Rule XV of the Amended Rules on
Employees’ Compensation is patently a wayward restriction of and a
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
79
VOL. 740, NOVEMBER 12, 2014 79
Bartolome vs. Social Security System
substantial deviation from Article 167(j) of the Labor Code when it
interpreted the phrase “dependent parents” to refer to “legitimate
parents.”
Dependent Parents; Words and Phrases; Plainly, “dependent parents”
are parents, whether legitimate or illegitimate, biological or by adoption,
who are in need of support or assistance.—The term “parents” in the
phrase “dependent parents” in the aforequoted Article 167(j) of the Labor
Code is used and ought to be taken in its general sense and cannot be
unduly limited to “legitimate parents” as what the ECC did. The phrase
“dependent parents” should, therefore, include all parents, whether
legitimate or illegitimate and whether by nature or by adoption. When the
law does not distinguish, one should not distinguish. Plainly, “dependent
parents” are parents, whether legitimate or illegitimate, biological or by
adoption, who are in need of support or assistance.
Constitutional Law; Equal Protection of the Laws; As jurisprudence
elucidates, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed.—As jurisprudence elucidates, equal protection
simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be
treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It
requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals
in a similar manner. In other words, the concept of equal justice under the
law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw
distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to
a legitimate governmental objective. The concept of equal protection,
however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all
persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality
among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the
equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however,
to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four
requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is
germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing
conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.
“Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification.”
 80
80 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Bartolome vs. Social Security System
Legitimate Parents; Nowhere in the law nor in the rules does it say that
“legitimate parents” pertain to those who exercise parental authority over
the employee enrolled under the Employees’ Compensation Program
(ECP).—Nowhere in the law nor in the rules does it say that “legitimate
parents” pertain to those who exercise parental authority over the
employee enrolled under the ECP. It was only in the assailed Decision
wherein such qualification was made. In addition, assuming arguendo that
the ECC did not overstep its boundaries in limiting the adverted Labor
Code provision to the deceased’s legitimate parents, and that the
commission properly equated legitimacy to parental authority, petitioner
can still qualify as John’s secondary beneficiary. True, when Cornelio, in
1985, adopted John, then about two (2) years old, petitioner’s parental
authority over John was severed. However, lest it be overlooked, one key
detail the ECC missed, aside from Cornelio’s death, was that when the
adoptive parent died less than three (3) years after the adoption decree,
John was still a minor, at about four (4) years of age. John’s minority at
the time of his adopter’s death is a significant factor in the case at bar.
Under such circumstance, parental authority should be deemed to have
reverted in favor of the biological parents. Otherwise, taking into account
Our consistent ruling that adoption is a personal relationship and that
there are no collateral relatives by virtue of adoption, who was then left to
care for the minor adopted child if the adopter passed away?
Civil Law; Adoption; Succession; Biological Parents; It is apparent that
the biological parents retain their rights of succession to the estate of their
child who was the subject of adoption.—It is apparent that the biological
parents retain their rights of succession to the estate of their child who
was the subject of adoption. While the benefits arising from the death of
an SSS covered employee do not form part of the estate of the adopted
child, the pertinent provision on legal or intestate succession at least
reveals the policy on the rights of the biological parents and those by
adoption vis-à-vis the right to receive benefits from the adopted. In the
same way that certain rights still attach by virtue of the blood relation, so
too should certain obligations, which, We rule, include the exercise of
parental authority, in the event of the untimely passing of their minor
offspring’s adoptive parent. We cannot leave undetermined the fate of a
minor child whose second chance at a better life under the care of the
adoptive parents was snatched from him by death’s cruel grasp.
81
VOL. 740, NOVEMBER 12, 2014 81
Bartolome vs. Social Security System
Otherwise, the adopted child’s quality of life might have been better off
not being adopted at all if he would only find himself orphaned in the end.
Thus, We hold that Cornelio’s death at the time of John’s minority resulted
in the restoration of petitioner’s parental authority over the adopted child.
PETITION for review of a decision of the Employees’ Compensation
Commission.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Michael D. Domingo for petitioner.
Mary G. Miranda for respondent SSS.
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Nature of the Case
This Appeal, filed under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, seeks to annul
the March 17, 2010 Decision1 of the Employees’ Compensation
Commission (ECC) in ECC Case No. SL-18483-0218-10, entitled Bernardina
P. Bartolome v. Social Security System (SSS) [Scanmar Maritime Services,
Inc.], declaring that petitioner is not a beneficiary of the deceased
employee under Presidential Decree No. (PD) 442, otherwise known as the
Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended by PD 626.2
The Facts
John Colcol (John), born on June 9, 1983, was employed as electrician
by Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc., onboard the vessel Maersk Danville,
since February 2008. As such, he was enrolled under the government’s
Employees’ Compensation
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 59-64.
2 Further Amending Certain Articles of Presidential Decree No. 442
Entitled “Labor Code of the Philippines.”
82
82 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Bartolome vs. Social Security System
Program (ECP).3 Unfortunately, on June 2, 2008, an accident occurred
onboard the vessel whereby steel plates fell on John, which led to his
untimely death the following day.4
John was, at the time of his death, childless and unmarried. Thus,
petitioner Bernardina P. Bartolome, John’s biological mother and,
allegedly, sole remaining beneficiary, filed a claim for death benefits under
PD 626 with the Social Security System (SSS) at San Fernando City, La
Union. However, the SSS La Union office, in a letter dated June 10, 2009 5
addressed to petitioner, denied the claim, stating:
We regret to inform you that we cannot give due course to your claim
because you are no longer considered as the parent of JOHN COLCOL as he
was legally adopted by CORNELIO COLCOL based on documents you
submitted to us.
The denial was appealed to the Employees’ Compensation Commission
(ECC), which affirmed the ruling of the SSS La Union Branch through the
assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED and the claim is
hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.6
In denying the claim, both the SSS La Union branch and the ECC ruled
against petitioner’s entitlement to the death benefits sought after under
PD 626 on the ground she can no longer be considered John’s primary
beneficiary. As culled from the records, John and his sister Elizabeth were
adopted
_______________
3 Rollo, p. 59.
4 Id., at p. 60.
5 Id., at p. 53.
6 Id., at p. 64.
83
VOL. 740, NOVEMBER 12, 2014 83
Bartolome vs. Social Security System
by their great grandfather, petitioner’s grandfather, Cornelio Colcol
(Cornelio), by virtue of the Decision7 in Spec. Proc. No. 8220-XII of the
Regional Trial Court in Laoag City dated February 4, 1985, which decree of
adoption attained finality.8 Consequently, as argued by the agencies, it is
Cornelio who qualifies as John’s primary beneficiary, not petitioner.
Neither, the ECC reasoned, would petitioner qualify as John’s
secondary beneficiary even if it were proven that Cornelio has already
passed away. As the ECC ratiocinated:
Under Article 167(j) of P.D. 626, as amended, provides (sic) that
beneficiaries are the “dependent spouse until he remarries and dependent
children, who are the primary beneficiaries. In their absence, the
dependent parents and subject to the restrictions imposed on dependent
children, the illegitimate children and legitimate descendants who are the
secondary beneficiaries; Provided, that the dependent acknowledged
natural child shall be considered as a primary beneficiary when there are
no other dependent children who are qualified and eligible for monthly
income benefit.”
The dependent parent referred to by the above provision relates to the
legitimate parent of the covered member, as provided for by Rule XV,
Section 1(c)(1) of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation. This
Commission believes that the appellant is not considered a legitimate
parent of the deceased, having given up the latter for adoption to Mr.
Cornelio C. Colcol. Thus, in effect, the adoption divested her of the status
as the legitimate parent of the deceased.
xxxx
In effect, the rights which previously belong [sic] to the biological
parent of the adopted child shall now be upon the adopting parent. Hence,
in this case, the legal parent referred to by P.D. 626, as amended, as the
bene-
_______________
7 Id., at p. 31.
 8 Id., at p. 34. VOL. 740, NOVEMBER 12, 2014 85
84 Bartolome vs. Social Security System
84 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Bartolome vs. Social Security System The ECC’s factual findings
are not consistent with the
ficiary, who has the right to file the claim, is the adoptive father of the evidence on record
deceased and not herein appellant.9 (Emphasis supplied)
To recall, one of the primary reasons why the ECC denied petitioner’s
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was claim for death benefits is that even though she is John’s biological
likewise denied by the ECC.10 Hence, the instant petition. mother, it was allegedly not proven that his adoptive parent, Cornelio, was
no longer alive. As intimated by the ECC:
The Issues Moreover, there had been no allegation in the records as to whether
the legally adoptive parent, Mr. Colcol, is dead, which would immediately
Petitioner raises the following issues in the petition: qualify the appellant [petitioner] for Social Security benefits. Hence, absent
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS such proof of death of the adoptive father, this Commission will presume
him to be alive and well, and as such, is the one entitled to claim the
I. The Honorable ECC’s Decision is contrary to evidence on record. benefit being the primary beneficiary of the deaceased. Thus, assuming
II. The Honorable ECC committed grave abuse in denying the just, due and that appellant is indeed a qualified beneficiary under the Social Security
lawful claims of the petitioner as a lawful beneficiary of her deceased law, in view of her status as other beneficiary, she cannot claim the benefit
biological son. legally provided by law to the primary beneficiary, in this case the adoptive
III. The Honorable ECC committed grave abuse of discretion in not giving father since he is still alive.
due course/denying petitioner’s otherwise meritorious motion for
reconsideration.11 We disagree with the factual finding of the ECC on this point.
Generally, findings of fact by administrative agencies are generally
In resolving the case, the pivotal issue is this: Are the biological parents accorded great respect, if not finality, by the courts by reason of the
of the covered, but legally adopted, employee considered secondary special knowledge and expertise of said administrative agencies over
beneficiaries and, thus, entitled, in appropriate cases, to receive the matters falling under their jurisdiction.12 However, in the extant case, the
benefits under the ECP? ECC had overlooked a crucial piece of evidence offered by the petitioner —
Cornelio’s death certificate.13
The Court’s Ruling _______________
12 Hipolito, Jr. v. Cinco, G.R. No. 174143, November 28, 2011, 661
The petition is meritorious. SCRA 211, 326-327.
_______________ 13 Rollo, p. 74.
9 Id., at pp. 62-64. 86
10 Id., at p. 73. 86 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
11 Id., at pp. 15-16. Bartolome vs. Social Security System
85
 Based on Cornelio’s death certificate, it appears that John’s adoptive
father died on October 26, 1987,14 or only less than three (3) years since
the decree of adoption on February 4, 1985, which attained finality. 15 As
such, it was error for the ECC to have ruled that it was not duly proven that
the adoptive parent, Cornelio, has already passed away.
The rule limiting death benefits claims to the legitimate parents is
contrary to law
This brings us to the question of whether or not petitioner is entitled to
the death benefits claim in view of John’s work-related demise. The
pertinent provision, in this regard, is Article 167(j) of the Labor Code, as
amended, which reads:
ART. 167. Definition of terms.—As used in this Title unless the
context indicates otherwise:
xxxx
(j) ‘Beneficiaries’ means the dependent spouse until he remarries and
dependent children, who are the primary beneficiaries. In their absence,
the dependent parents and subject to the restrictions imposed on
dependent children, the illegitimate children and legitimate descendants
who are the secondary beneficiaries; Provided, that the dependent
acknowledged natural child shall be considered as a primary beneficiary
when there are no other dependent children who are qualified and eligible
for monthly income benefit. (Emphasis supplied)
Concurrently, pursuant to the succeeding Article 177(c) supervising the
ECC “[T]o approve rules and regulations governing the processing of claims
and the settlement of disputes arising therefrom as prescribed by the
System,” the ECC has issued the Amended Rules on Employees’
Compensation, interpreting the above cited provision as follows:
_______________
14 Id., at p. 37.
15 Id., at p. 34.
87
VOL. 740, NOVEMBER 12, 2014 87
Bartolome vs. Social Security System
RULE XV – BENEFICIARIES
SECTION 1. Definition.—(a) Beneficiaries shall be either primary or
secondary, and determined at the time of employee’s death.
(b) The following beneficiaries shall be considered primary:
(1) The legitimate spouse living with the employee at the time of the
employee’s death until he remarries; and
(2) Legitimate, legitimated, legally adopted or acknowledged natural
children, who are unmarried not gainfully employed, not over 21 years of
age, or over 21 years of age provided, that he is incapacitated and
incapable of self-support due to physical or mental defect which is
congenital or acquired during minority; Provided, further, that a dependent
acknowledged natural child shall be considered as a primary beneficiary
only when there are no other dependent children who are qualified and
eligible for monthly income benefit; provided, finally, that if there are two
or more acknowledged natural children, they shall be counted from the
youngest and without substitution, but not exceeding five.
(c) The following beneficiaries shall be considered secondary:
(1) The legitimate parents wholly dependent upon the employee for
regular support;
(2) The legitimate descendants and illegitimate children who are
unmarried, not gainfully employed, and not over 21 years of age, or over
21 years of age provided that he is incapacitated and incapable of self-
support due to physical or mental defect which is congenital or acquired
during minority. (Emphasis supplied)
88
88 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Bartolome vs. Social Security System
Guilty of reiteration, the ECC denied petitioner’s claim on the ground
that she is no longer the deceased’s legitimate parent, as required by the
implementing rules. As held by the ECC, the adoption decree severed the
relation between John and petitioner, effectively divesting her of the
status of a legitimate parent, and, consequently, that of being a secondary
beneficiary.
We disagree.

a. Rule XV, Sec. 1(c)(1) of the Amended Rules on Employees’
Compensation deviates from the clear language of Art. 167(j) of the
Labor Code, as amended
Examining the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation in light of
the Labor Code, as amended, it is at once apparent that the ECC indulged
in an unauthorized administrative legislation. In net effect, the ECC read
into Art. 167 of the Code an interpretation not contemplated by the
provision. Pertinent in elucidating on this point is Article 7 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines, which reads:
Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their
violation or nonobservance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or
practice to the contrary.
When the courts declared a law to be inconsistent with the
Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid
only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution.
(Emphasis supplied)
89
VOL. 740, NOVEMBER 12, 2014 89
Bartolome vs. Social Security System
As applied, this Court held in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.
Fortune Tobacco Corporation16 that:
As we have previously declared, rule-making power must be confined
to details for regulating the mode or proceedings in order to carry into
effect the law as it has been enacted, and it cannot be extended to amend
or expand the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered
by the statute. Administrative regulations must always be in harmony
with the provisions of the law because any resulting discrepancy
between the two will always be resolved in favor of the basic law.
(Emphasis supplied)
Guided by this doctrine, We find that Rule XV of the Amended Rules on
Employees’ Compensation is patently a wayward restriction of and a
substantial deviation from Article 167(j) of the Labor Code when it
interpreted the phrase “dependent parents” to refer to “legitimate
parents.”
It bears stressing that a similar issue in statutory construction was
resolved by this Court in Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court17 in this wise:
It is Our shared view that the word “relatives” should be construed in
its general acceptation. Amicus curiae Prof. Ruben Balane has this to say:
The term relatives, although used many times in the Code, is not
defined by it. In accordance therefore with the canons of statutory
interpretation, it should be understood to have a general and inclusive
scope, inasmuch as the term is a general one. Generalia verba sunt
generaliter intelligenda. That the law does not make a distinction prevents
us from making one: Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguera debemus.
xxx
_______________
16 G.R. Nos. 167274-75, July 21, 2008, 559 SCRA 160, 179.
17 No. L-66574, February 21, 1990, 182 SCRA 427, 435.
90
90 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Bartolome vs. Social Security System
According to Prof. Balane, to interpret the term relatives in Article 992
in a more restrictive sense than it is used and intended is not warranted by
any rule of interpretation. Besides, he further states that when the law
intends to use the term in a more restrictive sense, it qualifies the term
with the word collateral, as in Articles 1003 and 1009 of the New Civil
Code.
Thus, the word “relatives” is a general term and when used in a
statute it embraces not only collateral relatives but also all the kindred of
the person spoken of, unless the context indicates that it was used in a
more restrictive or limited sense — which as already discussed earlier, is
not so in the case at bar. (Emphasis supplied)
In the same vein, the term “parents” in the phrase “dependent
parents” in the aforequoted Article 167(j) of the Labor Code is used and
ought to be taken in its general sense and cannot be unduly limited to
“legitimate parents” as what the ECC did. The phrase “dependent parents”
should, therefore, include all parents, whether legitimate or illegitimate
and whether by nature or by adoption. When the law does not distinguish,
one should not distinguish. Plainly, “dependent parents” are parents,
whether legitimate or illegitimate, biological or by adoption, who are in
need of support or assistance.
Moreover, the same Article 167(j), as couched, clearly shows that
Congress did not intend to limit the phrase “dependent parents” to solely
legitimate parents. At the risk of being repetitive, Article 167 provides that
“in their absence, the dependent parents and subject to the restrictions
imposed on dependent children, the illegitimate children and legitimate
descendants who are secondary beneficiaries.” Had the lawmakers
contemplated “dependent parents” to mean legitimate parents, then it
would have simply said descendants and not “legitimate
descendants.” The manner by which the provision in question was crafted
undeniably show that the 91
VOL. 740, NOVEMBER 12, 2014 91
Bartolome vs. Social Security System
phrase “dependent parents” was intended to cover all parents —
legitimate, illegitimate or parents by nature or adoption.
b. Rule XV, Section 1(c)(1) of the Amended Rules on Employees’
Compensation is in contravention of the equal protection clause
To insist that the ECC validly interpreted the Labor Code provision is an
affront to the Constitutional guarantee of equal protection under the laws
for the rule, as worded, prevents the parents of an illegitimate child from
claiming benefits under Art. 167(j) of the Labor Code, as amended by PD
626. To Our mind, such postulation cannot be countenanced.
As jurisprudence elucidates, equal protection simply requires that all
persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to
rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and
institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. 18 In
other words, the concept of equal justice under the law requires the state
to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between individuals
solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental
objective.19
The concept of equal protection, however, does not require the
universal application of the laws to all persons or things without
distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined
according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause
permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass
the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The
_______________
18 Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, G.R. Nos.
192935 and 193036, December 7, 2010, 637 SCRA 78, 167.
19 Id.
92
92 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Bartolome vs. Social Security System
classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the
purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4)
It applies equally to all members of the same class. “Superficial differences
do not make for a valid classification.”20
In the instant case, there is no compelling reasonable basis to
discriminate against illegitimate parents. Simply put, the above cited rule
promulgated by the ECC that limits the claim of benefits to the legitimate
parents miserably failed the test of reasonableness since the classification
is not germane to the law being implemented. We see no pressing
government concern or interest that requires protection so as to warrant
balancing the rights of unmarried parents on one hand and the rationale
behind the law on the other. On the contrary, the SSS can better fulfill its
mandate, and the policy of PD 626 — that employees and their
dependents may promptly secure adequate benefits in the event of work-
connected disability or death — will be better served if Article 167(j) of the
Labor Code is not so narrowly interpreted.
There being no justification for limiting secondary parent beneficiaries
to the legitimate ones, there can be no other course of action to take other
than to strike down as unconstitutional the phrase “illegitimate” as
appearing in Rule XV, Section 1(c)(1) of the Amended Rules on Employees’
Compensation.
Petitioner qualifies as John’s dependent parent

In attempting to cure the glaring constitutional violation of the
adverted rule, the ECC extended illegitimate parents an opportunity to file
claims for and receive death benefits by equating dependency and
legitimacy to the exercise of parental authority. Thus, as insinuated by the
ECC in its assailed
_______________
20 Id., at p. 168.
93
VOL. 740, NOVEMBER 12, 2014 93
Bartolome vs. Social Security System
Decision, had petitioner not given up John for adoption, she could have
still claimed death benefits under the law.
To begin with, nowhere in the law nor in the rules does it say that
“legitimate parents” pertain to those who exercise parental authority over
the employee enrolled under the ECP. It was only in the assailed Decision
wherein such qualification was made. In addition, assuming arguendo that
the ECC did not overstep its boundaries in limiting the adverted Labor
Code provision to the deceased’s legitimate parents, and that the
commission properly equated legitimacy to parental authority, petitioner
can still qualify as John’s secondary beneficiary.
True, when Cornelio, in 1985, adopted John, then about two (2) years
old, petitioner’s parental authority over John was severed. However, lest it
be overlooked, one key detail the ECC missed, aside from Cornelio’s death,
was that when the adoptive parent died less than three (3) years after
the adoption decree, John was still a minor, at about four (4) years of
age.
John’s minority at the time of his adopter’s death is a significant factor
in the case at bar. Under such circumstance, parental authority should be
deemed to have reverted in favor of the biological parents. Otherwise,
taking into account Our consistent ruling that adoption is a personal
relationship and that there are no collateral relatives by virtue of
adoption,21 who was then left to care for the minor adopted child if the
adopter passed away?
To be sure, reversion of parental authority and legal custody in favor of
the biological parents is not a novel concept. Section 20 of Republic Act
No. 855222 (RA 8552), otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act,
provides:
_______________
21 Johnston v. Republic, No. L-18284, April 30, 1963, 7 SCRA 1040,
1042.
22 An Act Establishing the Rules and Policies on the Domestic
Adoption of Filipino Children and for Other Purposes.
94
94 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Bartolome vs. Social Security System
Section 20. Effects of Rescission.—If the petition [for rescission of
adoption] is granted, the parental authority of the adoptee’s biological
parent(s), if known, or the legal custody of the Department shall be
restored if the adoptee is still a minor or incapacitated. The reciprocal
rights and obligations of the adopter(s) and the adoptee to each other shall
be extinguished. (emphasis added)
The provision adverted to is applicable herein by analogy insofar as the
restoration of custody is concerned. The manner herein of terminating the
adopter’s parental authority, unlike the grounds for rescission, 23 justifies
the retention of vested rights and obligations between the adopter and the
adoptee, while the consequent restoration of parental authority in favor of
the biological parents, simultaneously, ensures that the adoptee, who is
still a minor, is not left to fend for himself at such a tender age.
To emphasize, We can only apply the rule by analogy, especially since
RA 8552 was enacted after Cornelio’s death. Truth be told, there is a
lacuna in the law as to which provision shall govern contingencies in all
fours with the factual milieu of the instant petition. Nevertheless, We are
guided by the catena of cases and the state policies behind RA 8552 24
_______________
23 Sec. 19, RA 8552.
24 Section 2. Declaration of Policies.—(a) It is hereby declared the
policy of the State to ensure that every child remains under the care and
custody of his/her parent(s) and be provided with love, care,
understanding and security towards the full and harmonious development
of his/her personality. Only when such efforts prove insufficient and no
appropriate placement or adoption within the child’s extended family is
available shall adoption by an unrelated person be considered.
(b) In all matters relating to the care, custody and adoption of a
child, his/her interest shall be the paramount consideration in accordance
with the tenets set forth in the United Nations (UN) Convention on the
Rights of the Child; UN Declaration on Social and
95
VOL. 740, NOVEMBER 12, 2014 95
Bartolome vs. Social Security System
wherein the paramount consideration is the best interest of the child,
which We invoke to justify this disposition. It is, after all, for the best
interest of the child that someone will remain charged for his welfare and
upbringing should his or her adopter fail or is rendered incapacitated to
perform his duties as a parent at a time the adoptee is still in his formative
years, and, to Our mind, in the absence or, as in this case, death of the
adopter, no one else could reasonably be expected to perform the role of a
parent other than the adoptee’s biological one.
Moreover, this ruling finds support on the fact that even though
parental authority is severed by virtue of adoption, the ties between the
adoptee and the biological parents are not entirely eliminated. To
demonstrate, the biological parents, in some instances, are able to inherit
from the adopted, as can be gleaned from Art. 190 of the Family Code:
Art. 190. Legal or intestate succession to the estate of the adopted shall
be governed by the following rules:
xxx
(2) When the parents, legitimate or illegitimate, or the legitimate
ascendants of the adopted concur with the adopter, they shall divide the
entire estate, one-half to be inherited by the parents or ascendants and
the other half, by the adopters;
_______________
Legal Principles Relating to the Protection and Welfare of Children with
Special Reference to Foster Placement and Adoption, Nationally and
Internationally; and the Hague Convention on the Protection of Children
and Cooperation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption. Toward this end, the
State shall provide alternative protection and assistance through foster
care or adoption for every child who is neglected, orphaned, or
abandoned.
(c) It shall also be a State policy to:
xxx
(ii) Prevent the child from unnecessary separation from his/her
biological parent(s).
96
96 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Bartolome vs. Social Security System
xxx
(6) When only collateral blood relatives of the adopted survive, then the
ordinary rules of legal or intestate succession shall apply.
Similarly, at the time of Cornelio Colcol’s death, which was prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code, the governing provision is Art. 984 of the
New Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 984. In case of the death of an adopted child, leaving no children or
descendants, his parents and relatives by consanguinity and not by
adoption, shall be his legal heirs.
From the foregoing, it is apparent that the biological parents retain
their rights of succession to the estate of their child who was the subject of
adoption. While the benefits arising from the death of an SSS covered
employee do not form part of the estate of the adopted child, the
pertinent provision on legal or intestate succession at least reveals the
policy on the rights of the biological parents and those by adoption vis-à-
vis the right to receive benefits from the adopted.
In the same way that certain rights still attach by virtue of the blood
relation, so too should certain obligations, which, We rule, include the
exercise of parental authority, in the event of the untimely passing of their
minor offspring’s adoptive parent. We cannot leave undetermined the fate
of a minor child whose second chance at a better life under the care of the
adoptive parents was snatched from him by death’s cruel grasp.
Otherwise, the adopted child’s quality of life might have been better off
not being adopted at all if he would only find himself orphaned in the end.
Thus, We hold that Cornelio’s death at the time of John’s minority resulted
in the restoration of petitioner’s parental authority over the adopted child.
On top of this restoration of parental authority, the fact of petitioner’s
dependence on John can be established from the
97
VOL. 740, NOVEMBER 12, 2014 97
Bartolome vs. Social Security System
documentary evidence submitted to the ECC. As it appears in the
records, petitioner, prior to John’s adoption, was a housekeeper. Her late
husband died in 1984, leaving her to care for their seven (7) children. But
since she was unable to “give a bright future to her growing children” as a
housekeeper, she consented to Cornelio’s adoption of John and Elizabeth
in 1985.
Following Cornelio’s death in 1987, so records reveal, both petitioner
and John repeatedly reported “Brgy. Capurictan, Solsona, Ilocos Norte” as
their residence. In fact, this very address was used in John’s Death
Certificate25 executed in Brazil, and in the Report of Personal Injury or Loss
of Life accomplished by the master of the vessel boarded by John. 26
Likewise, this is John’s known address as per the ECC’s assailed Decision. 27
Similarly, this same address was used by petitioner in filing her claim
before the SSS La Union branch and, thereafter, in her appeal with the ECC.
Hence, it can be assumed that aside from having been restored parental
authority over John, petitioner indeed actually exercised the same, and
that they lived together under one roof.
Moreover, John, in his SSS application,28 named petitioner as one of his
beneficiaries for his benefits under RA 8282, otherwise known as the
“Social Security Law.” While RA 8282 does not cover compensation for
work-related deaths or injury and expressly allows the designation of
beneficiaries who are not related by blood to the member unlike in PD
626, John’s deliberate act of indicating petitioner as his beneficiary at least
evinces that he, in a way, considered petitioner as his dependent.
Consequently, the confluence of circumstances — from Cornelio’s death
during John’s minority, the restoration of petitioner’s parental authority,
the documents showing
_______________
25 Rollo, p. 41.
26 Id., at p. 44.
27 Id., at p. 59.
28 Id., at p. 40.
98
98 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Bartolome vs. Social Security System
singularity of address, and John’s clear intention to designate
petitioner as a beneficiary — effectively made petitioner, to Our mind,
entitled to death benefit claims as a secondary beneficiary under PD 626 as
a dependent parent.
All told, the Decision of the ECC dated March 17, 2010 is bereft of legal
basis. Cornelio’s adoption of John, without more, does not deprive
petitioner of the right to receive the benefits stemming from John’s death
as a dependent parent given Cornelio’s untimely demise during John’s
minority. Since the parent by adoption already died, then the death
benefits under the Employees’ Compensation Program shall accrue solely
to herein petitioner, John’s sole remaining beneficiary.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The March 17, 2010
Decision of the Employees’ Compensation Commission, in ECC Case No. SL-
18483-0218-10, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The ECC is hereby directed to
release the benefits due to a secondary beneficiary of the deceased
covered employee John Colcol to petitioner Bernardina P. Bartolome.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Villarama, Jr., Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe** and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.
Petition granted, judgment reversed and set aside. ECC directed to
release benefits due to petitioner Bernardina P. Bartolome.
Notes.—The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution
allows classification. (Aquino vs. Philippine Ports Authority, 696 SCRA 666
[2013])
_______________
* * Designated acting member per Special Order No. 1866 dated
November 4, 2014.
99
VOL. 740, NOVEMBER 12, 2014 99
Bartolome vs. Social Security System
 Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly
situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed. (Garcia vs. Drilon, 699 SCRA 352 [2013])
——o0o——

© Copyright 2020 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.