VII.23 G.R. No. 164337 VICENTE S. CENZON, Petitioner, vs. HON. SALVADOR amount of the fraud is P32,000.00 or over.
P32,000.00 or over. It is petitioner Cenzon’s theory that NO
ABAD SANTOS as Acting Presiding Judge, RTC of Makati City, Branch 143, HON.
ASSISTANT CITY PROSECUTOR ANDRES MARCOS in his capacity as Public
Prosecutor of the City Prosecutor’s Office of Makati City and MARGARITA C. SIA,
Respondents. June 27, 2006
Petitioner Vicente S. Cenzon is a member of the Board of Directors of Honig Sugar
Trading Corp. (Honig). On the other hand, private respondent Margarita C. Sia is the
president of South Pacific Sugar Corp. (South Pacific).
petitioner Cenzon filed with the Makati City Prosecution Office, four complaint-
affidavits against private respondent Sia for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and
Estafa under Article 315, par. 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code, alleging that the
checks issued by South Pacific, through private respondent Sia, were dishonored
upon due presentment for having been the subject of a "stop payment order" (SPO),
and for having been "drawn against insufficient funds" (DAIF).
The two informations involved Check No. HRR 0005306682 and Check No. HRR
0005306774, which covered the amounts of P15,840,000.00 and P91,776,970.00,
respectively.
On 11 December 2001, the RTC issued an Order11 directing the issuance of a
warrant of arrest against private respondent Sia.
Subsequently, in the hearing of 15 February 2002, the public prosecutor moved for
the amendment of the informations from NO BAIL RECOMMENDED to BAIL SET AT
P60,000.00 for each count of Estafa. The amendment was sought on the strength of
DOJ Department Circular No. 74, issued on 6 November 2001, which specified the
amount of bail to be recommended, in cases of Estafa under Article 315, par. 2(d),
as amended by Presidential Decree No. 818. The RTC granted the public
prosecutor’s Motion, as contained in the assailed Order12 of 15 February 2002.
Aggrieved, petitioner Cenzon filed with the Court of Appeals, a Petition for Certiorari,
imputing to the RTC, grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in authorizing the amendment of the informations to allow private
respondent Sia to post bail.
In the assailed Decision of 26 February 2004, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
RTC, ratiocinating that the offense by which private respondent Sia is charged is not
punishable by reclusion perpetua, and as such, she is entitled to bail.
Petitioner Cenzon endeavors to build his case by invoking People v. Reyes,18 and
the 2000 Bail Bond Guide of the DOJ. According to petitioner Cenzon, the 2000 Bail
Bond Guide of the DOJ recommends NO BAIL for Estafa under Article 315, par. 2(d)
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 818, if the
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BAIL is recommended in such cases, because the penalty prescribed therein is
reclusion perpetua.19 Petitioner Cenzon posits that the 2000 Bail Bond Guide of the
DOJ was made pursuant to Section 13,20 Article III of the 1987 Constitution, which
provides that crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, when evidence of
guilt is strong, are not bailable.
The issue presented for our consideration is, whether private respondent Sia, who is
charged with Estafa under Article 315, par. 2(d)24 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 818, for having issued bouncing checks in the
amounts of P91,776,970.00 and P15,840,000.00, may be granted bail, as a matter
of right, in accordance with DOJ Department Circular No. 74, dated 6 November
2001.
Thus, it must be asked, is private respondent Sia charged with an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua?
The issue that confronts us is not novel. Perforce, in Panganiban, we settled that the
term, reclusion perpetua, as utilized in Presidential Decree No. 818, merely
describes the penalty imposed on account of the amount of the fraud involved. The
unequivocal import in Presidential Decree No. 81825 is that, if the amount of the
fraud exceeds twenty-two thousand pesos (P22,000.00), the penalty of reclusion
temporal is imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional ten
thousand (P10,000.00) pesos, but the total penalty shall not exceed thirty (30) years,
which shall be termed reclusion perpetua. Taking our legal bearings from the
Panganiban case, we stress that the use of the term reclusion perpetua in
Presidential Decree No. 818 is merely to describe the penalty imposed, but not the
prescribed penalty thereof.
As used in Presidential Decree No. 818, reclusion perpetua is not the prescribed
penalty for the offense, but merely describes the penalty actually imposed on
account of the amount of the fraud involved, which exceeds P22,000.00
We find inapplicable the case of Reyes. In Reyes, the question was whether therein
accused who was convicted, inter alia, of Estafa under Article 315, par. 2(d) of the
Revised Penal Code and sentenced therefore to serve twenty-two years of reclusion
perpetua, with its accessory penalties and liability for indemnification, may be
allowed to remain on bail during the pendency of her appeal from said conviction.32
Comparatively, what is before us is an accused charged with Estafa under
paragraph 2(d), Article 316 of the Revised Penal Code. Clearly, Reyes is not on all
fours with the case at bar. Instead, it is the later case of Lim which finds application.
In the more recent case of Poblete v. Court of Appeals,33 the Court underscored
once more with definitive pronouncement the application of DOJ Department
Circular No. 74 in cases involving the crime of Estafa under Art. 315, par. 2(d) of the
Revised Penal Code
We said in Poblete, thus: It was definitively resolved when the Court adopted
Department of Justice (DOJ) Circular No. 74 ordaining that bail be allowed for the
crime of Estafa under Art. 315, par. 2(d)
WHEREFORE, in estafa under Art. 315 2(d), as amended by PD 818, and Qualified
Theft, the bail to be recommended shall be governed by the following rules: A. FOR
ESTAFA (ART. 315, 2(d), RPC, as amended by PD 818: 1) Where the amount of
fraud involved does not exceed P22,000.00, bail shall be computed based on the
applicable provisions of the 2000 Bail Bond Guide. 2) Where the amount of fraud
involved is more than P22,000.00 but less than P32,000.00, bail shall be based on
the maximum period of the imposable penalty of reclusion temporal multiplied by
P2,000.00. 3) Where the amount of fraud is P32,000.00 or over in which the
imposable penalty is reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua, bail shall be based on
reclusion temporal maximum, pursuant to Par. 2(a) of the 2000 Bail Bond Guide,
multiplied by P2,000.00, plus an additional of P2,000.00 for every P10,000.00 in
excess of P22,000.00; Provided, however, that the total amount of bail shall not
exceed P60,000.00. (Underscoring supplied.) From the foregoing, if the amount of
fraud is P122,000.00 or over, as in the case at bar, the amount of bail is P60,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
from NO BAIL RECOMMENDED to BAIL SET AT P60,000.00 are AFFIRMED
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VII.24 [A.M. NO. RTJ-03-1749 : April 4, 2007] [Formerly OCA IPI-01-1342-RTJ]
EDUARDO SAN MIGUEL, Complainant, v. JUDGE BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA,
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 275, Las Piñas City, Respondent.
Complainant was arrested for illegal sale, dispensation, distribution and delivery of .
50 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride, punishable by prision correccional.
He jumped bail. On May 10, 2001, then Judge Florentino Alumbres issued a bench
warrant and canceled his bail bond in the amount of P60,000.00 and fixed a new bail
bond in the amount of P120,000.00. Complainant was arrested on September 8,
2001. On September 12, 2001, the state prosecutor filed a Motion to Cancel
Recommended Bail on the ground of reasonable belief and indications pointing to
the probability that accused is seriously considering flight from prosecution. The
Motion was set for hearing on September 19, 2001. On September 17, 2001,
complainant filed an Opposition to the Motion. On the same day, or two (2) days
before the scheduled hearing, respondent issued an Order granting the Motion.
During the hearing of September 19, 2001, respondent opted to consider
complainant's Opposition as a motion for reconsideration and merely ordered the
prosecutor to file a reply thereto. On November 21, 2001, respondent issued an
Order clarifying his Order of September 17, 2001.
Complainant comes to this Court alleging that his right to procedural due process
was gravely violated when respondent issued the September 17, 2001 Order
The issuance of the September 17, 2001 Order shows respondent's gross ignorance
of the law as the offense charged is neither a capital offense nor punishable by
reclusion perpetua. His right to bail is not a mere privilege but a constitutionally
guaranteed right that cannot be defeated by any order. Clearly, the intendment of the
September 17, 2001 Order was to deny him of his constitutional right to bail.
Respondent explained when he canceled the bail, the cancellation referred to the
P60,000.00 and not the P120,000.00 bail fixed by Judge Alumbres. The September
17, 2001 Order canceling the bail does not speak of the cancellation
Complainant could have posted the P120,000.00 bail fixed by Judge Alumbres or
could have seasonably moved for the lifting of the warrant, but he did not. The Order
of cancellation is dated September 17, 2001 while the Information for murder was
filed against complainant on September 14, 2001 or three days earlier. Thus, the
cancellation was in due course because complainant was already detained for the
non-bailable offense of murder three days before the cancellation was ordered.
The Court agrees with the findings and recommendations of the OCA.
Records show that the prosecutor's Motion to Cancel Recommended Bail was very presence of the defendant when it is wanted, such amount to be subject, of course,
precise in its prayer, i.e., that the allowance for bail granted to the accused to secure to the other provision that excessive bail shall not be required
his provisional liberty provided in the Warrant of Arrest dated May 10, 2001 be
canceled as there is reasonable ground to believe and all indications point to the Upon review of the TSN of the September 19, 2001 hearing, we find that the
probability that accused is seriously considering flight from the prosecution of the prosecutor failed to adduce evidence that there exists a high probability of accused's
case. jumping bail that would warrant the cancellation of the recommended bail bond.
Following then the above ratiocination, respondent's only recourse is to fix a higher
Records show that complainant was charged with violation of Section 15, Article III amount of bail and not cancel the P120,000.00 bail fixed by Judge Alumbres
of R.A. No. 6425 which is punishable by prision correccional. Following the
provisions of the Constitution and the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, WHEREFORE, Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda, RTC, Branch 275, Las Piñas City is
complainant is entitled to bail as a matter of right. found GUILTY of simple misconduct and FINED in the amount of P5,000.00 with a
WARNING
The bail in the amount of P60,000.00 was already forfeited as a consequence of
complainant's jumping bail.11 How then can respondent claim that he merely
canceled the recommended bail of P60,000.00 when the same had already been
forfeited? The only recommended bail that remains subject of the Motion of the
prosecutor is the increased bail in the amount of P120,000.00. Thus, there remains
no other conclusion except that respondent canceled the recommended bail in the
increased amount of P120,000.00. The Order of September 17, 2001 effectively
deprived complainant of his constitutional right to bail when it was issued two days
before the scheduled hearing on September 19, 2001.

And even granting for the sake of argument that complainant was also charged with
the crime of murder on September 14, 2001, or three days before the Order of
cancellation was issued, respondent failed to consider that what was being prayed
for by the prosecutor was the cancellation of the recommended bail for violation of
R.A. No. 6425 and not that of the crime of murder.

Respondent's asseveration that the cancellation of the bail without due hearing was
justified considering that complainant was already detained for the non-bailable
offense of murder three days before the cancellation was ordered, is misplaced.

As we opined in Andres v. Beltran,12 it is a misconception that when an accused is

charged with the crime of murder, he is not entitled to bail at all or that the crime of
murder is non-bailable. The grant of bail to an accused charged with an offense that
carries with it the penalty of reclusion perpetua x x x is discretionary on the part of
the trial court. In other words, accused is still entitled to bail but no longer "as a
matter of right."

As we held in Sy Guan v. Amparo,14 where bail is a matter of right and prior

absconding and forfeiture is not excepted from such right, bail must be allowed
irrespective of such circumstance. The existence of a high degree of probability that
the defendant will abscond confers upon the court no greater discretion than to
increase the bond to such an amount as would reasonably tend to assure the

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VII.26 G.R. No. 180700 March 4, 2008 GERARDO R. VILLASEÑOR and RODEL A.
MESA, Petitioners, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (5th Division) and LOUELLA MAE OCO-
PESQUERRA (Office of the Special Prosecutor, Ombudsman), Respondents.
On August 18, 2001, disaster struck. In the wee hours of the morning, the Quezon
City Manor Hotel went ablaze resulting in the death of seventy-four (74) people and
injuries to scores of others. Investigation into the tragedy revealed that the hotel was
a veritable fire trap.
so that the employee who is charged may be separated, for obvious reasons, from
office.
Criminal and administrative cases separate and distinct
In fine, the preventive suspension against petitioners must be upheld, as the
Sandiganbayan committed no grave abuse of discretion. WHEREFORE, the petition
is DISMISSED

Petitioners have resorted to the present recourse, hoisting the lone issue of
"WHETHER OR NOT THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTED IN EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION AND/OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OF JURISDICTION IN ORDERING THE SUSPENSION PENDENTE LITE OF
HEREIN PETITIONERS DESPITE THE FACT THAT THEY HAD ALREADY BEEN
PREVIOUSLY SUSPENDED ADMINISTRATIVELY BASED ON THE SAME FACTS
AND CIRCUMSTANCES

Petitioners, together with other officials of the City Engineering Office of Quezon
City, are presently facing criminal charges before the 5th Division of the
Sandiganbayan for the crime of multiple homicide through reckless imprudence and
for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. They were also charged
administratively with gross negligence, gross misconduct and conduct prejudicial to
the interest of the service in connection with the Manor Hotel inferno.

In two separate Orders dated August 29, 20015 and September 7, 20016 in the
administrative case, petitioners Villaseñor and Mesa were preventively suspended
for a period of six (6) months

On September 20, 2006, during the pendency of the criminal case, respondent
special prosecutor Louella Mae Oco-Pesquera filed a motion for suspension
pendente lite7 of petitioners. Petitioners opposed8 the motion, contending that they
had already been suspended for six (6) months relative to the administrative case,
based on the same facts and circumstances. They posited that any preventive
suspension that may be warranted in the criminal case was already absorbed by the
preventive suspension in the administrative case because both the criminal and
administrative cases were anchored on the same set of facts.

The Court finds no merit in those arguments. Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019, as
amended, unequivocally provides that the accused public officials "shall be
suspended from office" while the criminal prosecution is pending in court.

Preventive suspension not a penalty Imposed during the pendency of proceedings,

preventive suspension is not a penalty in itself. It is merely a measure of precaution

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VIII.A.1 G.R. No. 195032 February 20, 2013 ISABELO A. BRAZA, Petitioner, vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (1st Division), Respondents.
The Philippines was assigned the hosting rights for the 12th Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Leaders Summit scheduled in December 2006. In
preparation for this international diplomatic event with the province of Cebu as the
designated venue, the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) identified
projects relative to the improvement and rehabilitation of roads and installation of
traffic safety devices and lighting facilities.
One of the ASEAN Summit-related projects to be undertaken was the installation of
street lighting systems along the perimeters of the Cebu International Convention
Center
Four (4) out of eleven (11) street lighting projects were awarded to FABMIK
Construction and Equipment Supply Company, Inc. (FABMIK) and these were
covered by Contract I.D. Nos. 06H0021, 06H00049, 06H00050, and 06H00052.
Contract I.D. No. 06H00050, the subject transaction of this case, involved the supply
and installation of street lighting facilities along the stretch of Mandaue-Mactan
Bridge 1 to Punta Engaño Section in Lapu-Lapu City, with an estimated project cost
of ₱83,950,000.00.
With the exception of the street lighting project covered by Contract I.D. No.
06H0021, the three other projects were bidded out only on November 28, 2006 or
less than two (2) weeks before the scheduled start of the Summit. Thereafter, the
DPWH and FABMIK executed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) whereby
FABMIK obliged itself to implement the projects at its own expense and the DPWH
to guarantee the payment of the work accomplished. FABMIK was able to complete
the projects within the deadline of ten (10) days utilizing its own resources and credit
facilities.
After the summit, a letter-complaint was filed before the Public Assistance and
Corruption Prevention Office (PACPO), Ombudsman –Visayas, alleging that the
ASEAN Summit street lighting projects were overpriced
FABMIK, was impleaded as one of the respondents.
After the preliminary investigation, the OMB-Visayas issued its Resolution,5 dated
January 24, 2008, finding probable cause to indict the concerned respondents for
violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019.
Subsequently, the OMB-Visayas filed several informations before the
Sandiganbayan for violation of Sec. 3(g) of R.A. 3019 against the officials of DPWH
Region VII, the officials of the cities of Mandaue and Lapu-lapu and private
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contractors, FABMIK President Braza and GAMPIK Board Chairman Gerardo S.
Surla (Surla).
On June 6, 2008, Braza was arraigned as a precondition to his authorization to
travel abroad. He entered a plea of "not guilty."
On November 13, 2008, Braza filed a manifestation9 to make of record that he was
maintaining his previous plea of "not guilty" without any condition.
During the proceedings held on November 3, 2008, the Sandiganbayan
reconsidered its August 14, 2008 resolution and directed a reinvestigation of the
case
After concluding its reinvestigation of the case, the OMB-Visayas issued its
Resolution,13 dated May 4, 2009, (Supplemental Resolution) which upheld the
finding of probable cause but modified the charge from violation of Sec. 3(g) of R.A.
No. 301914 to violation of Sec. 3(e)15 of the same law. Accordingly, the prosecution
filed its Manifestation and Motion to Admit Amended Information16 on May 8, 2009.
Braza averred that he could not be arraigned under the second information without
violating the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy.
On October 12, 2009, the Sandiganbayan issued the first assailed resolution
admitting the Amended Information,
The Sandiganbayan ruled that Braza would not be placed in double jeopardy should
he be arraigned anew under the second information because his previous
arraignment was conditional. It continued that even if he was regularly arraigned,
double jeopardy would still not set in because the second information charged an
offense different from, and which did not include or was necessarily included in, the
original offense charged.
A) The Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in sustaining the
withdrawal of the Information in violation of the constitutional guarantee against
double jeopardy, the petitioner having entered a valid plea and vigorously objected
to any further conduct of reinvestigation and amendment of Information
Essentially, Braza posits that double jeopardy has already set in on the basis of his
"not guilty" plea in the first Information and, thus, he can no longer be prosecuted
under the second Information.
The petition is devoid of merit. It is Braza’s stance that his constitutional right under
the double jeopardy clause bars further proceedings in Case No. SB-08-CRM-0275.
He asserts that his arraignment under the first information was simple and
unconditional and, thus, an arraignment under the second information would put him
in double jeopardy.
The June 6, 2008 Order24 of the Sandiganbayan reads: This morning, accused
Isabelo A. Braza was summoned to arraignment as a precondition in authorizing his
travel. The arraignment of the accused was conditional in the sense that if the
present Information will be amended as a result of the pending incidents herein, he
cannot invoke his right against double jeopardy and he shall submit himself to
arraignment anew under such Amended Information.
While it is true that the practice of the Sandiganbayan of conducting "provisional" or
"conditional" arraignment of the accused is not specifically sanctioned by the
Revised Internal Rules of the Procedure of the Sandiganbayan or by the regular
Rules of Procedure, this Court had tangentially recognized such practice in People v.
Espinosa,25 provided that the alleged conditions attached to the arraignment should
be "unmistakable, express, informed and enlightened." The Court further required
that the conditions must be expressly stated in the order disposing of arraignment,
otherwise, it should be deemed simple and unconditional
A careful perusal of the record in the case at bench would reveal that the
arraignment of Braza under the first information was conditional in nature as it was a
mere accommodation in his favor to enable him to travel abroad without the
Sandiganbayan losing its ability to conduct trial in absentia in case he would
abscond.
otherwise terminated without his express consent.30 The test for the third element is
whether one offense is identical with the other or is an attempt to commit it or a
frustration thereof; or whether the second offense includes or is necessarily included
in the offense charged in the first information.
Braza, however, contends that double jeopardy would still attach even if the first
information charged an offense different from that charged in the second information
since both charges arose from the same transaction or set of facts.
It appears that Braza has obviously lost sight, if he is not altogether aware, of the
ruling in Suero v. People32 where it was held that the same criminal act may give
rise to two or more separate and distinct offenses; and that no double jeopardy
attaches as long as there is variance between the elements of the two offenses
charged. The doctrine of double jeopardy is a revered constitutional safeguard
against exposing the accused from the risk of being prosecuted twice for the same
offense, and not a different one.
There is simply no double jeopardy when the subsequent information charges
another and different offense, although arising from the same act or set of acts.33
Prosecution for the same act is not prohibited. What is forbidden is the prosecution
for the same offense.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DENIED. The Sandiganbayan is hereby
DIRECTED to dispose of Case No. SB-08-CRM- 0275 with reasonable dispatch.

Verily, the relinquishment of his right to invoke double jeopardy had been
convincingly laid out. Such waiver was clear, categorical and intelligent.

Having given his conformity and accepted the conditional arraignment and its legal
consequences, Braza is now estopped from assailing its conditional nature just to
conveniently avoid being arraigned and prosecuted of the new charge under the
second information.

Assuming, in gratia argumenti, that there was a valid and unconditional plea, Braza
cannot plausibly rely on the principle of double jeopardy to avoid arraignment under
the second information because the offense charged therein is different and not
included in the offense charged under the first information

To substantiate a claim for double jeopardy, the accused has the burden of
demonstrating the following requisites: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior
to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and (3) the
second jeopardy must be for the same offense as in the first.29 As to the first
requisite, the first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a
competent court; (c) after arraignment, (d) when a valid plea has been entered; and
(e) when the accused was acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed or

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VIII.A.2 G.R. No. 169509 June 16, 2006 JOCELYN E. CABO, Petitioner, vs. THE
SANDIGANBAYAN, FOURTH DIVISION, THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR OF THE
OMBUDSMAN and THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, REGION XIII, Respondents.
On June 26, 2004, an information for violation of Section 3(b) of R.A. 3019 or the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act was filed against petitioner
the above-named accused, BONIFACIO C. BALAHAY, then Mayor of the
Municipality of Barobo, Surigao del Sur,
feloniously receive and accept the amount of ONE HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND
ONE HUNDRED SIXTY TWO PESOS AND 31/100 (P104,162.31) from said
JOCELYN CABO, Business Manager of Orient Integrated Development
Consultancy, Inc. (OIDCI), a consultancy group charged with conducting a feasibility
study for the Community-Based Resource Management Project of the Municipality of
Barobo, with accused Cabo giving and granting the said amount to accused Balahay
in consideration of the said accused having officially intervened in the undertaking by
the OIDCI of such contract for consultancy services with the Municipality of Barobo
Thus, the Sandiganbayan set anew the arraignment of petitioner and her co-
accused on October 12, 2004
The Sandiganbayan subsequently granted petitioner’s motion on March 29, 2004
and directed the Office of the Special Prosecutor to conduct a reinvestigation insofar
as petitioner is concerned
Meanwhile, petitioner filed a motion seeking the court’s permission to travel abroad
for a family vacation.4 The Sandiganbayan granted the same
However, considering that this case is still pending reinvestigation/review before the
Office of the Special Prosecutor; considering further that the accused has not yet
been arraigned by reason thereof; and considering finally that there is a need for the
Court to preserve its authority to conduct trial in absentia should the accused fail to
return to the Philippines, accused Jocelyn E. Cabo, with her express conformity, is
hereby ordered arraigned conditionally.
However, if it should be found that there is a need to amend the present indictment
or to pave the way for the filing of some other indictment/s, then the accused shall
waive her right to object under Section 14, Rule 110 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal
Procedure and her constitutional right to be protected against double jeopardy.
When arraigned, the Information having been read in a language known and familiar
to her, accused Jocelyn E. Cabo, duly assisted by her counsel, Atty. Tomas N.
Prado, pleaded not guilty to the offense charged in the Information.
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Petitioner returned from abroad on May 24, 2004. Thereafter, the Special Prosecutor
concluded its reinvestigation and found probable cause to charge her with violation
of Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019.6
On November 24, 2004, Balahay, through counsel, filed a motion to quash the
information on the ground that the same does not charge any offense
The Sandiganbayan thus gave the prosecution a period of 15 days from notice
within which to file an amended information that is sufficient as to both form and
substance. On February 7, 2005, the prosecution filed an amended information
which incorporated all the essential elements of the crime charged
Consequently, Balahay was sent a notice for his arraignment on the amended
information. Petitioner was likewise notified of her re-arraignment which was set on
April 14, 2005.17 However, on April 11, 2005, petitioner filed a Motion to Cancel
Second Arraignment18 on the ground that the amended information pertained to
Balahay alone. Petitioner claimed that she could no longer be re-arraigned on the
amended information since substantial amendment of an information is not allowed
after a plea had already been made thereon.
On May 4, 2005, the Sandiganbayan issued the first assailed resolution denying
petitioner’s motion for lack of merit,
The issue here boils down to whether double jeopardy would attach on the basis of
the "not guilty" plea entered by petitioner on the original information.
She argues that it would, considering that her arraignment, which was initially
conditional in nature, was ratified when she confirmed her "not guilty" plea by means
of a written manifestation. In other words, the trial court could no longer assert that
she waived her right to the filing of an amended information under the terms of her
conditional arraignment because she has, in effect, unconditionally affirmed the
same.
Petitioner’s assertions must fail.
Initially, it must be pointed out that the Sandiganbayan’s practice of "conditionally"
arraigning the accused pending reinvestigation of the case by the Ombudsman is
not specifically provided in the regular rules of procedure.22 In People v.
Espinosa,23 however, the Court tangentially recognized the practice of
"conditionally" arraigning the accused, provided that the alleged conditions attached
thereto should be "unmistakable, express, informed and enlightened." The Court
ventured further by requiring that said conditions be expressly stated in the order
disposing of the arraignment. Otherwise, it was held that the arraignment should be
deemed simple and unconditional.
In the case at bar, the Sandiganbayan Order dated May 14, 2004 unequivocally set
forth the conditions for petitioner’s arraignment pending reinvestigation of the case
as well as her travel abroad.
Thus, petitioner cannot now be allowed to turn her back on such conditions on the
pretext that she affirmed her conditional arraignment by means of a written
manifestation. To begin with, there is no showing that the Sandiganbayan ruled on
her written manifestation and motion that she be allowed to merely confirm her
previous plea on the original information.
following requisites must concur: (1) there is a complaint or information or other
formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the same
is filed before a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) there is a valid arraignment or
plea to the charges; and (4) the accused is convicted or acquitted or the case is
otherwise dismissed or terminated without his express consent.29 The first and
fourth requisites are not present in the case at bar. WHEREFORE, the petition is
DISMISSED

At any rate, with or without a valid plea, still petitioner cannot rely upon the principle
of double jeopardy to avoid arraignment on the amended information. It is
elementary that for double jeopardy to attach, the case against the accused must
have been dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court
of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid information sufficient in form and substance
and the accused pleaded to the charge.25 In the instant case, the original
information to which petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty" was neither valid nor
sufficient to sustain a conviction, and the criminal case was also neither dismissed
nor terminated. Double jeopardy could not, therefore, attach even if petitioner is
assumed to have been unconditionally arraigned on the original charge.

It should be noted that the previous information in Criminal Case No. 27959 failed to
allege all the essential elements of violation of Section 3(b), R.A. No. 3019. It, in fact,
did not charge any offense and was, to all intents and purposes, void and defective.
A valid conviction cannot be sustained on the basis of such information. Petitioner
was resultantly not placed in danger of being convicted when she entered her plea
of "not guilty" to the insufficient indictment.

Moreover, there was no dismissal or termination of the case against petitioner. What
the Sandiganbayan ordered was for the amendment of the information

In the case at bar, while certain elements of the crime charged were missing in the
indictment, the amended information did not change the nature of the offense which
is for violation of Section 3(b), R.A. No. 3019.

Consequently, even if we treat petitioner’s arraignment on the original information as

"unconditional," the same would not bar the amendment of the original information
under Section 14, Rule 110. Re-arraignment on the amended information will not
prejudice petitioner’s rights since the alterations introduced therein did not change
the nature of the crime.

All told, the Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it
ordered the re- arraignment of petitioner on the amended information. Double
jeopardy did not attach by virtue of petitioner’s "conditional arraignment" on the first
information. It is well-settled that for a claim of double jeopardy to prosper, the

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VIII.A.3 G.R. No. 117487 December 12, 1995 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
plaintiff-appellee, vs. ARNEL ALICANDO y BRIONES, accused-appellant.
The records reveal that appellant Arnel Alicando was charged with the crime of rape
with homicide
That on or about the 12th day of June 1994 in the City of Iloilo, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Court, said accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously and by means of force, violence and intimidation to wit: by
then and there pinning down one KHAZIE MAE PENECILLA, a minor, four years of
age, choking her with his right hand, succeeded in having carnal knowledge with her
and as a result thereof she suffered asphyxia by strangulation fractured cervical
vertebra and lacerations of the vaginal and rectal openings causing profuse
hemorrhages and other injuries which are necessarily fatal and which were the direct
cause of her death.
On June 29, 1994, appellant was arraigned with the assistance of Atty. Rogelio
Antiquiera of the PAO, Department of Justice. Appellant pleaded guilty.
The prosecution evidence shows that in the afternoon of June 12, 1994, Romeo
Penecilla, father of the four year old victim Khazie Mae, was drinking liquor with
Ramil Rodriguez and Remus Gaddi in his (Penecilla's) house at Barangay Rizal,
Zone 1, Pulo Bala, Iloilo. Appellant joined them but every now and then would take
leave and return. Appellant was living in his uncle's house some five (5) arm's length
from Penecilla's house. At about 4:30 p.m., Penecilla's group stopped drinking and
left.
Luisa Rebada also lives in the Penecilla neighborhood, about one and a half (1-1/2)
arm's length from the house of appellant. At about 5:30 p.m. of that day, she saw the
victim at the window of appellant's house.
The sight shocked her appellant was naked, on top of the victim, his left hand
choking her neck.
The case is before us on automatic review considering the death penalty imposed by
the trial court.
We find that the Decision of the trial court sentencing the appellant to death is shot
full of errors, both substantive and procedural. The conviction is on an amalgam of
inadmissible and incredible evidence and supported by scoliotic logic. First. The
arraignment of the appellant is null and void. The trial judge failed to follow section
(1) (a) — of Rule 116 on arraignment. Said section provides:
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Sec. 1. Arraignment and plea; how made. — (a) The accused must be arraigned
before the court where the complaint or information has been filed or assigned for
trial. The arraignment must be made in open court by the judge or clerk by furnishing
the accused a copy of the complaint or information with the list of witnesses, reading
the same in the language or dialect known to him and asking him whether he pleads
guilty or not guilty. The prosecutor may, however, call at the trial witnesses other
than those named in the complaint or information.
The reading of the complaint or information to the appellant in the language or
dialect known to him is a new requirement imposed by the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure. It implements the constitutional right of an appellant ". . . to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation against him."3 The new rule also responds
to the reality that the Philippines is a country divided by dialects and Pilipino as a
national language is still in the process of evolution.4 Judicial notice can be taken of
the fact that many Filipinos have limited understanding either of the Pilipino or
English language, our official languages for purposes of communication and
instruction. 5 The importance of reading the complaint or information to the appellant
in the language or dialect known to him cannot thus be understated.
In the case at bar, the records do not reveal that the Information against the
appellant was read in the language or dialect known to him. The Information against
the appellant is written in the English language. It is unbeknown whether the
appellant knows the English language. Neither is it known what dialect is understood
by the appellant. Nor is there any showing that the Information couched in English
was translated to the appellant in his own dialect before his plea of guilt.
One need not draw a picture to show that the arraignment of the appellant is a
nullity. It violated section 1(a) of Rule 116, the rule implementing the constitutional
right of the appellant to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him.
Second. The plea of guilt made by the appellant is likewise null and void. The trial
court violated section 3 of Rule 116 when it accepted the plea of guilt of the
appellant. Said section provides:
Sec. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence.— When the accused
pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the
voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and require
the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The accused
may also present evidence in his behalf.
The records reveal how the trial judge inadequately discharged this duty of
conducting a "searching inquiry."
The bottom line of the rule is that the plea of guilt must be based on a free and Criminal Case No. 43663, convicting accused Arnel Alicando of the crime of Rape
informed judgment. Thus, the searching inquiry of the trial court must be focused on: with Homicide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death is annulled and set
(1) the voluntariness of the plea, and (2) the full comprehension of the aside and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. No costs.
consequences of the plea

The questions of the trial court failed to show the voluntariness of the plea of guilt of
the appellant nor did the questions demonstrate appellant's full comprehension of
the consequences of his plea. The records do not reveal any information about the
personality profile of the appellant which can serve as a trustworthy index of his
capacity to give a free and informed plea of guilt. The age, socio-economic status,
and educational background of the appellant were not plumbed by the trial court.

A cursory examination of the questions of the trial court to establish the

voluntariness of appellant's plea of guilt will show their utter insufficiency

It did not ask the appellant when he was arrested, who arrested him, how and where
he was interrogated, whether he was medically examined before and after his
interrogation, etc. It limited its efforts trying to discover late body marks of
maltreatment as if involuntariness is caused by physical abuse alone.

Likewise, the trial court's effort to determine whether appellant had full
comprehension of the consequences of his plea is fatally flawed. It warned the
appellant he would get the mandatory death penalty without explaining the meaning
of "mandatory" It did not inform the appellant of the indemnity he has to pay for the
death of the victim. It cautioned appellant there ". . . will be some effects on your civil
rights" without telling the appellant what those "effects" are and what "civil rights" of
his are involved.

We stress that under the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, a conviction in capital
offenses cannot rest alone on a plea of guilt. Section 3 of Rule 116 requires that after
a free and intelligent plea of guilt, the trial court must require the prosecution to
prove the guilt of the appellant and the precise degree of his culpability beyond
reasonable doubt. This rule modifies prior jurisprudence that a plea of guilt even in
capital offenses is sufficient to sustain a conviction charged in the information
without need of further proof.

In sum, the Court cannot send the appellant to die in the electric chair on the basis
of the procedural irregularities committed by, and the inadmissible evidence
considered by the trial court. In Binabay vs. People, et al., 24 ponencia of Mr. Chief
Justice R. Concepcion, this Court held that no valid judgment can be rendered upon
an invalid arraignment. Since in the case at bar, the arraignment of the appellant is
void, his judgment of conviction is also void. In fairness to the appellant, and in
justice to the victim, the case has to be remanded to the trial court. for further
proceedings. There is no philosophy of punishment that allows the State to kill
without any semblance of fairness and justice. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision in
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VIII.A.4 [G.R. NOS. 163972-77 : March 28, 2008] JOSELITO RANIERO J. DAAN,
Petitioner, v. THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN Respondent
Said accused,2 together with accused Benedicto E. Kuizon, were charged before
this Court for three counts of malversation of public funds
which they purportedly tried to conceal by falsifying the time book and payrolls for
given period making it appear that some laborers worked on the construction of the
new municipal hall building of Bato, Leyte and collected their respective salaries
thereon when, in truth and in fact, they did not. Thus, in addition to the charge for
malversation, the accused were also indicted before this Court for three counts of
falsification of public document by a public officer or employee.
In the falsification cases, the accused offered to withdraw their plea of "not guilty"
and substitute the same with a plea of "guilty", provided, the mitigating
circumstances of confession or plea of guilt and voluntary surrender will be
appreciated in their favor. In the alternative, if such proposal is not acceptable, said
accused proposed instead to substitute their plea of "not guilty" to the crime of
falsification of public document by a public officer or employee with a plea of "guilty",
but to the lesser crime of falsification of a public document by a private individual. On
the other hand, in the malversation cases, the accused offered to substitute their
plea of "not guilty" thereto with a plea of "guilty", but to the lesser crime of failure of
an accountable officer to render accounts.
Insofar as the falsification cases are concerned, the prosecution found as acceptable
the proposal of the accused to plead "guilty" to the lesser crime of falsification of
public document by a private individual.
Insofar as the malversation cases are concerned, the prosecution was likewise
amenable to the offer of said accused to plead "guilty" to the lesser crime of failure
of an accountable officer to render accounts
The Sandiganbayan, in the herein assailed Resolution,4 dated March 25, 2004,
denied petitioner's Motion to Plea Bargain, despite favorable recommendation by the
prosecution, on the main ground that no cogent reason was presented to justify its
approval.
This compelled petitioner to file the present case for certiorari and prohibition with
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/ or writ of preliminary
injunction under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in
denying his plea bargaining offer on the following grounds: first, petitioner is not an
accountable officer and he merely affixed his signature on the payrolls on a
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"routinary basis," negating any criminal intent; and that the amount involved is only
P18,860.00, which he already restituted.
The petition is meritorious.
Plea bargaining in criminal cases is a process whereby the accused and the
prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court
approval. It usually involves the defendant's pleading guilty to a lesser offense or to
only one or some of the counts of a multi- count indictment in return for a lighter
sentence than that for the graver charge
Plea bargaining is authorized under Section 2, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, to wit:
SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. - At arraignment, the accused, with the
consent of the offended party and the prosecutor, may be allowed by the trial court
to plead guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense
charged. After arraignment but before trial, the accused may still be allowed to plead
guilty to said lesser offense after withdrawing his plea of not guilty. No amendment of
the complaint or information is necessary. (
Ordinarily, plea bargaining is made during the pre-trial stage of the proceedings.
Sections 1 and 2, Rule 118 of the Rules of Court, require plea bargaining to be
considered by the trial court at the pre-trial conference
But it may also be made during the trial proper and even after the prosecution has
finished presenting its evidence and rested its case. Thus, the Court has held that it
is immaterial that plea bargaining was not made during the pre-trial stage or that it
was made only after the prosecution already presented several witnesses
Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court presents the basic requisites upon which
plea bargaining may be made, i.e., that it should be with the consent of the offended
party and the prosecutor,10 and that the plea of guilt should be to a lesser offense
which is necessarily included in the offense charged. The rules however use word
may in the second sentence of Section 2, denoting an exercise of discretion upon
the trial court on whether to allow the accused to make such plea.11 Trial courts are
exhorted to keep in mind that a plea of guilty for a lighter offense than that actually
charged is not supposed to be allowed as a matter of bargaining or compromise for
the convenience of the accused.
In People of the Philippines v. Villarama,13 the Court ruled that the acceptance of an
offer to plead guilty to a lesser offense is not demandable by the accused as a
matter of right but is a matter that is addressed entirely to the sound discretion of the
trial court,
We held that the rules allow such a plea only when the prosecution does not have Plea Bargain. Let records of this case be REMANDED to the Sandiganbayan for
sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the crime charged further proceedings in accordance with this Decision.

In the present case, the Sandiganbayan rejected petitioner's plea offer on the ground
that petitioner and the prosecution failed to demonstrate that the proposal would
redound to the benefit of the public. The Sandiganbayan believes that approving the
proposal would "only serve to trivialize the seriousness of the charges against them
and send the wrong signal to potential grafters in public office that the penalties they
are likely to face would be lighter than what their criminal acts would have merited or
that the economic benefits they are likely to derive from their criminal activities far
outweigh the risks they face in committing them; thus, setting to naught the deterrent
value of the laws intended to curb graft and corruption in government.

Apparently, the Sandiganbayan has proffered valid reasons in rejecting petitioner's

plea offer. However, subsequent events and higher interests of justice and fair play
dictate that petitioner's plea offer should be accepted. The present case calls for the
judicious exercise of this Court's equity jurisdiction

In the cases at bar, there is no dispute that JOSELITO RANIERO J. DAAN has
already restituted the total amount of P18,860.00 as per official receipt issued by the
provincial government of Leyte dated February 26, 2002. In short, the damage
caused to the government has already been restituted by the accused. There is also
no dispute that accused DAAN voluntarily surrendered in the instant cases.
Moreover, the accused is also willing to plead guilty to a lesser offense which to our
mind, merits consideration.

the lesser offenses of Falsification by Private Individuals and Failure to Render

Account by an Accountable Officer are necessarily included in the crimes of
Falsification of Public Documents and Malversation of Public Funds, respectively,
with which petitioner was originally charged.

An offense may be said to necessarily include another when some of the essential
elements or ingredients of the former as alleged in the complaint or information
constitute the latter. And vice versa, an offense may be said to be necessarily
included in another when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form
part of those constituting the latter.

In this case, the allegations in the Informations filed against petitioner are sufficient
to hold petitioner liable for the lesser offenses.

Under the peculiar circumstances of the present case, where gross inequity will
result in a discriminatory dispensation of justice, the Court will not hesitate to
intervene in order to equalize the imbalance. WHEREFORE, the petition is
GRANTED. The Resolutions dated March 25, 2004 and May 31, 2004 are SET
ASIDE. The Sandiganbayan is hereby ORDERED to grant petitioner's Motion to

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VIII.A.5 G.R. No. 99287 June 23, 1992 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs. HON. MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR., AND JAIME MANUEL, respondents.
On August 24, 1990, Jaime Manuel y Ohide was charged with violation of Section
16, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended. The penalty prescribed in the said section
is imprisonment ranging from six years and one day to twelve years and a fine
ranging from six thousand to twelve thousand pesos. The information against him
reads:
That on or about the 21st day of August, 1990, in the Municipality of San Juan,
Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, without the corresponding license or prescription did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and
control 0.08 grams of Methamphetamin Hydrocloride (Shabu) wrapped with an
aluminum foil, which is a regulated drug.
During the arraignment, the accused entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, trial
ensued. On November 21, 1990, the prosecution rested its case. On January 9,
1991, counsel for private respondent verbally manifested in open court that private
respondent was willing to change his former plea of "not guilty" to that of "guilty" to
the lesser offense of violation of Section 17, R.A. No. 6425, as amended. The said
section provides a penalty of imprisonment ranging from six months and one day to
four years and a fine ranging from six hundred to four thousand pesos shall be
imposed upon any pharmacist, physician, dentist, veterinarian, manufacturer,
wholesaler who violates or fails to keep the records required under Section 25 of the
Act; if the violation or failure involves a regulated drug. That same day, the
respondent Judge issued an order (Annex "B," p. 17, Rollo) directing private
respondent to secure the consent of the prosecutor to the change of plea, and set
the promulgation of decision on January 30, 1991. On January 30, 1991, respondent
Judge postponed the promulgation of the decision to February 18, 1991 to give
private respondent another opportunity to secure the consent of the prosecutor. Also,
on the said date, the private respondent filed his Request to Plead Guilty to a Lesser
Offense. On February 18, 1991, respondent Judge issued another order (Annex "D,"
p. 19, Rollo) postponing the promulgation of decision to February 25, 1991 to give
private respondent further opportunity to secure the consent of the prosecutor. On
February 20, 1991, the prosecutor filed his Opposition to the Request to Plead Guilty
to a Lesser Offense (annex "E," p. 20, Rollo) on the grounds that: (1) the prosecution
already rested its case on November 21, 1990; (2) the possibility of conviction of
private respondent of the crime originally charged was high because of the strong
evidence of the prosecution; and (3) the valuable time which the court and the
prosecutor had expended would be put to waste. On February 21, 1991, private
respondent filed his Reply to Opposition with Leave of Court to Plead Guilty to a
Lesser Offense (annex F, p. 21, Rollo), alleging therein, among other matters, that
the Rules on Criminal Procedure does not fix a specific period within which an
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accused is allowed to plead guilty to a lesser offense. Subsequently, on February 25,
1991, respondent Judge rendered a decision granting the accused's motion
Hence, this petition raising the following issues: I. WHETHER OR NOT
RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN GRANTING PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S
REQUEST TO PLEAD GUILTY TO A LESSER OFFENSE BECAUSE THE
REQUEST WAS FILED OUT OF TIME AND THE CONSENT THERETO OF THE
PROSECUTOR AND THE OFFENDED PARTY WAS NOT OBTAINED
In the case at bar, the private respondent (accused) moved to plead guilty to a lesser
offense after the prosecution had already rested its case. In such situation,
jurisprudence has provided the trial court and the Office of the Prosecutor with
yardstick within which their discretion may be properly exercised. Thus, in People v.
Kayanan (L-39355, May 31, 1978, 83 SCRA 437, 450), We held that the rules allow
such a plea only when the prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to establish
guilt of the crime charged. In his concurring opinion in People v. Parohinog (G.R. No.
L-47462, February 28, 1980, 96 SCRA 373, 377), then Justice Antonio Barredo
explained clearly and tersely the rationale of the law: . . . (A)fter the prosecution had
already rested, the only basis on which the fiscal and the court could rightfully act in
allowing the appellant to charge his former plea of not guilty to murder to guilty to the
lesser crime of homicide could be nothing more nothing less than the evidence
already in the record. The reason for this being that Section 4 of Rule 118 (now
Section 2, Rule 116) under which a plea for a lesser offense is allowed was not and
could not have been intended as a procedure for compromise, much less
bargaining. As evident from the foregoing, the trial court need not wait for a guideline
from the Office of the Prosecutor before it could act on the accused's motion to
change plea. As soon as the fiscal has submitted his comment whether for or
against the said motion, it behooves the trial court to assiduously study the
prosecution's evidence as well as all the circumstances upon which the accused
made his change of plea to the end that the interests of justice and of the public will
be served. A reading of the disputed rulings in this case failed to disclose the
strength or weakness of the prosecution's evidence. Apparently, the judgment under
review dwelt solely on only one of the three objections (i.e. waste of valuable time
already spent by the court and prosecution) interposed by the Fiscal which was the
least persuasive. It must be recalled that the other two grounds of objection were
that the prosecution had already rested its case and that the possibility of conviction
of the private respondent of the crime originally charged was high because of the
strong evidence of the prosecution. Absent any finding on the weight of the evidence
in hand, the respondent judge's acceptance of the private respondent's change of
plea is improper and irregular.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The judgment and order of the
Regional Trial Court, National Capital Region at Pasig, Branch 156 dated February
25 and March 13, 1991, respectively in Criminal Case No. 1345-D (People v.
Manuely Ohide) are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The said criminal case is hereby
remanded to the trial court for continuation of trial on the original charge of violation
of Section 16 of Republic Act No. 6425 as amended. The temporary restraining
order issued in this case is made permanent. No costs.
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VIII.A.6 G.R. No. 196231 January 28, 2014 EMILIO A. GONZALES III, Petitioner, vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, ACTING THROUGH AND
REPRESENTED BY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.,
SENIOR DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY JOSE AMOR M. AMORANDO,
OFFICER-IN-CHARGE - OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS, ATTY. RONALDO A. GERON, DIR. ROWENA TURINGAN-
SANCHEZ, AND ATTY. CARLITO D. CATAYONG, Respondents. x - - - - - - - - - - - - -
----------x
G.R. No. 196232 WENDELL BARRERAS-SULIT Petitioner, vs. ATTY. PAQUITO N.
OCHOA, JR., IN HIS CAP A CITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, ATTY. DENNIS F. ORTIZ, ATTY. CARLO D. SULAY AND ATTY.
FROILAN D. MONTALBAN, JR., IN THEIR CAPACITIES AS CHAIRMAN AND
MEMBERS OF OFFICE OF MALACANANG LEGAL AFFAIRS, Respondents.
B. Sulit’s petition (G.R. No. 196232) In April 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman
charged Major General Carlos F. Garcia and several others, before the
Sandiganbayan, with plunder and money laundering. On May 7, 2007, Garcia filed
an Urgent Petition for Bail which the prosecution opposed. The Sandiganbayan
denied Garcia's urgent petition for bail on January 7, 2010, in view of the strength of
the prosecution’s evidence against Garcia.
On February 25, 2010, the Office of the Ombudsman, through Sulit and her
prosecutorial staff, entered into a plea bargaining agreement (Agreement) with
Garcia.24 Garcia thereby agreed to: (i) withdraw his plea of not guilty to the charge
of plunder and enter a plea of guilty to the lesser offense of indirect bribery; and (ii)
withdraw his plea of not guilty to the charge of money laundering and enter a guilty
plea to the lesser offense of facilitating money laundering. In exchange, he would
convey to the government his ownership, rights and other interests over the real and
personal properties enumerated in the Agreement and the bank deposits alleged in
the information.25
The Sandiganbayan approved the Agreement on May 4, 201026 based on the
parties’ submitted Joint Motion for Approval.
The apparent one-sidedness of the Agreement drew public outrage and prompted
the Committee on Justice of the House of Representatives to conduct an
investigation. After public hearings, the Committee found that Sulit, her deputies and
assistants committed culpable violations of the Constitution and betrayal of public
trust – grounds for removal under Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770.28 The Committee
recommended to the President the dismissal from the service of Sulit and the filing
of appropriate charges against her deputies and assistants before the appropriate
government office.
Accordingly, the OP initiated an administrative disciplinary proceeding against
Sulit.29 On March 24, 2011, Sulit filed her Written Explanation, questioning the OP’s
jurisdiction.30 The question of jurisdiction notwithstanding, the OP set the case for
preliminary investigation on April 15, 2011, prompting Sulit to seek relief from this
Court.
II. COURT’S RULING
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to declare Section 8(2)
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. This ruling renders any further ruling on the dismissal of
Deputy Ombudsman Emilio Gonzales III unnecessary, but is without prejudice to the
power of the Ombudsman to conduct an administrative investigation, if warranted,
into the possible administrative liability of Deputy Ombudsman Emilio Gonzales III
under pertinent Civil Service laws, rules and regulations.

c. Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 vesting disciplinary authority in the President over the
Deputy Ombudsman violates the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman and
is thus unconstitutional. Our discussions, particularly the Court’s expressed caution
against presidential interference with the constitutional commissions, on one hand,
and those expressed by the framers of the 1987 Constitution, on the other, in
protecting the independence of the Constitutional Commissions, speak for
themselves as overwhelming reasons to invalidate Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 for
violating the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman.

In more concrete terms, we rule that subjecting the Deputy Ombudsman to discipline
and removal by the President, whose own alter egos and officials in the Executive
Department are subject to the Ombudsman’s disciplinary authority, cannot but
seriously place at risk the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman itself. The
Office of the Ombudsman, by express constitutional mandate, includes its key
officials, all of them tasked to support the Ombudsman in carrying out her mandate.
Unfortunately, intrusion upon the constitutionally-granted independence is what
Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 exactly did. By so doing, the law directly collided not
only with the independence that the Constitution guarantees to the Office of the
Ombudsman, but inevitably with the principle of checks and balances that the
creation of an Ombudsman office seeks to revitalize.

What is true for the Ombudsman must be equally and necessarily true for her
Deputies who act as agents of the Ombudsman in the performance of their duties.
The Ombudsman can hardly be expected to place her complete trust in her
subordinate officials who are not as independent as she is, if only because they are
subject to pressures and controls external to her Office. This need for complete trust
is true in an ideal setting and truer still in a young democracy like the Philippines
where graft and corruption is still a major problem for the government. For these
reasons, Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 (providing that the President may remove a
Deputy Ombudsman) should be declared void.

At any rate, even assuming that the OP has disciplinary authority over the Deputy
Ombudsman, its decision finding Gonzales guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty and
Grave Misconduct constituting betrayal of public trust is patently erroneous. The
OP’s decision perfectly illustrates why the requirement of impeachment-grounds in
Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 cannot be considered, even at a minimum, a measure
of protection of the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman.
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VIII.A.7 See People v Garcia – Sandiganbayan – Separate PDF
VIII.A.8 [G.R. Nos. 137256-58. August 6, 2003.] THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. RUFINO ERNAS Y VILLANUEVA,** Appellant.
For automatic review is the joint judgment 1 dated January 14, 1999 of the Regional
Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna (Branch 34) rendered in Criminal Cases Nos. 6178-
98-C, 6179-98 and 6180-98-C convicting appellant Rufino Ernas y Villanueva of
three counts of rape committed against his daughters Elsa and Celeste Ernas and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death for each case.
ACCORDINGLY, by virtue of his voluntary plea of guilty, judgment is hereby
rendered
Crim. Case No. 6178-98-C
That on or about May 11, 1998, at Tramo, Brgy. Masile, Municipality of Calamba,
Province of Laguna and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, with lewd design and thru force and intimidation and with intent to
satisfy his lust, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge of his daughter ELSA ERNAS y FLORENTINO, 14 years old, against her
will and consent. CONTRARY TO LAW. 4
Crim. Case No. 6179-98-C That on or about September 21, 1998, at Tramo, Brgy.
Masile, Municipality of Calamba, Province of Laguna and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design and thru force
and intimidation and with intent to satisy (sic) his lust, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of his daughter CELESTE ERNAS
y FLORENTINO, 15 years old, against her will and consent.
At the initial hearing held on January 13, 1999, Atty. Eloida Capuno, counsel for the
appellant, manifested the intention of her client to withdraw his former plea of not
guilty.
Thereafter, the Court granted the motion to withdraw his former plea and ordered the
re- arraignment of appellant. The three Informations were again read to him in
Tagalog, a language spoken, read and understood by him, who, with the assistance
of Atty. Capuno, voluntarily pleaded guilty to the three counts of rape.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT REQUIRING THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE
THE GUILT OF ACCUSED DESPITE THE PLEA OF GUILTY TO A CAPITAL
OFFENSE. 14 Appellant claims that aside from conducting a searching inquiry into
the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his pleas, the trial
court should have also required the prosecution to prove his guilt to determine the
CRIMPRO
precise degree of his culpability as mandated under Section 3 of Rule 116 of the
Revised Rules of Court.
Under the rule, three things are enjoined of the trial court after a plea of guilty to a
capital offense has been entered by the accused: (1) To conduct a searching inquiry
into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea; (2)
To require the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and
the precise degree of his culpability; and (3) To inquire from the accused if he
desires to present evidence on his behalf and allow him to do so if he desires. 15
This procedure is mandatory, and a judge who fails to observe it commits a grave
abuse of discretion. 16 The rationale behind the rule is that the courts must proceed
with more care where the possible punishment is in its severest form, namely death,
for the reason that the execution of such a sentence is irrevocable and experience
has shown that innocent persons have at times pleaded guilty. 17 The primordial
purpose is to avoid improvident pleas of guilt on the part of an accused where grave
crimes are involved since he might be admitting his guilt before the court and thus
forfeit his life and liberty without having fully understood the meaning, significance
and consequence of his plea. 18 Moreover, the requirement of taking further
evidence would aid this Court on appellate review in determining the propriety or
impropriety of the plea. 19
To assist the trial judges in the proper conduct of "searching inquiry," the Court, in
People v. Pastor, 20 collated the following guidelines which should be
observed:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. Ascertain from the accused himself (a) how he was brought into the custody of the
law; (b) whether he had the assistance of a competent counsel during the custodial
and preliminary investigations; and (c) under what conditions he was detained and
interrogated during the investigations. This is intended to rule out the possibility that
the accused has been coerced or placed under a state of duress either by actual
threats of physical harm coming from malevolent quarters 21 or simply because of
the judge’s intimidating robes. 22
2. Ask the defense counsel a series of questions as to whether he had conferred
with, and completely explained to, the accused the meaning and consequences of a
plea of guilty. 23
3. Elicit information about the personality profile of the accused, such as his age,
socio-economic status, and educational background, which may serve as a
trustworthy index of his capacity to give a free and informed plea of guilty. 24
4. Inform the accused the exact length of imprisonment or nature of the penalty
under the law and the certainty that he will serve such sentence. For not
infrequently, an accused pleads guilty in the hope of a lenient treatment or upon bad
advice or because of promises of the authorities or parties of a lighter penalty should
he admit guilt or express remorse. It is the duty of the judge to ensure that the Third, appellant was not even asked why he had a change of heart and decided to
accused does not labor under these mistaken impressions because a plea of guilty plead guilty to the charges. The judge did not explain to him that in case of
carries with it not only the admission of authorship of the crime proper but also of the incestuous rape of a minor child, the penalty is death under the law and his plea of
aggravating circumstances attending it, that increase punishment.25cralaw:red guilt would not under any circumstance affect or reduce his sentence.

5. Inquire if the accused knows the crime with which he is charged and fully explain
to him the elements of the crime which is the basis of his indictment. 26 Failure of
the court to do so would constitute a violation of his fundamental right to be informed
of the precise nature of the accusation against him and a denial of his right to due
process. 27
6. All questions posed the accused should be in a language known and understood
by the latter. 28
7. The trial judge must satisfy himself that the accused, in pleading guilty, is truly
guilty. The accused must be required to narrate the tragedy or reenact the crime or
furnish its missing details. 29
Tested with the above guidelines which were enunciated in earlier cases prior to the
date of rendition of new assailed decision of the trial court, the questions
propounded and the proceedings taken by the trial court were not sufficient to
apprise appellant of the consequences of his plea of guilty.
Fourth, the Judge should have asked appellant to recount what he exactly did to
show that he fully understood the nature of the crimes filed against him
It likewise erred in allowing the prosecution to dispense with the testimonies of the
complaining witnesses. As we have ruled, even if the trial court is satisfied that the
plea of guilty was entered with full knowledge of its meaning and consequences, the
introduction of evidence to establish the guilt and the degree of culpability of the
accused is still required. Judges therefore must be cautioned, toward this end,
against the demands of sheer speed in disposing of cases, for their mission after all,
and as has been time and again put, is to see that justice is done.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby SET ASIDE. The case is
REMANDED for re-arraignment and thereafter, should the accused enter a plea of
"guilty," the Regional Trial Court (Branch 34), Calamba, Laguna, is directed, with
reasonable dispatch, to receive the evidence for the prosecution as well as that of
the defense, if appellant opts to do so.

Appellant has made an improvident plea of guilty.

First, there was no effort on the part of the presiding judge to comply with the
guidelines enumerated above. While Atty. Capuno manifested to the trial court that
appellant intimated to her the latter’s intention to withdraw his former plea of not
guilty, the trial court did not inquire from Atty. Capuno whether she had conferred and
explained to appellant the meaning and consequences of the latter’s plea of guilt.
Further, the records do not show the age, socio- economic status as well as the
educational attainment of the appellant to assist the court a quo as well as this Court
in determining if appellant has full understanding and capacity to give a free and
informed plea of guilty.

Second, the records show that during the pre-trial conference, appellant disputed the
ages of the victims. The trial judge should have pointed this out to appellant when he
was re-arraigned. The trial judge should have required the prosecution to present its
evidence on this matter considering that the true age of the victims would determine
the nature of the crimes of rape and the proper imposition of the corresponding
penalty. Although both qualifying circumstances of relationship and minority were
alleged in the Informations, they must be proved during the trial just as the crime of
rape.

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VIII.A.9 G.R. No. 155511-22 April 14, 2004 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
appellee, vs. MARIO ODEN, appellant
Appellant Mario Oden was charged with twelve (12) counts of "rape," defined and
penalized under Article 266-A, paragraph 1, in relation to Article 266-B, sixth
paragraph of No. 1, of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 5(b) of
Republic Act No. 7610, Republic Act No. 8353, and Section 5(a) of Republic Act No.
8369, before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City. The corresponding
Informations were docketed Criminal Case No. 01-20356, Case No. 01-20724 to
Case No. 34, inclusive.
"Criminal Case No. 01-20356
"`That on or about the 8th day of January 2001, in the City of Antipolo, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with
lewd designs and by means of force and intimidation, did, then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with one Anna Liza Oden y Ailes,
who is [his] daughter and a fifteen year old minor, against the latter’s will and
consent.
On his arraignment, appellant, assisted by counsel de oficio, Atty. Harley Padolina of
the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO), pleaded "guilty" to the charges.
The Solicitor General summed up the case for the prosecution; viz:
"Private complainant Anna Liza Oden is a fifteen (15) year old girl who lived with her
siblings and father x x x at Senora Dela Paz, Brgy. Sta. Cruz, Antipolo City. Her
mother [has] already [passed away].
"On 26 August 2000, about 2:00 o’clock in the morning, Anna Liza - - then only about
fourteen (14) years old - - was sleeping with her younger sister in bed, when her
father woke her up. Accused told her that he is going to `use’ her for a while.
Hurriedly, he undressed Anna Liza, and, in an instant, inserted his penis in her
vagina. As he was doing so, accused kissed Anna Liza’s breast. Anna Liza fought
back and resisted such bestiality by kicking him, but to no avail. She even pushed
her younger sister who was asleep just to wake her up. Anna Liza’s resistance,
however, was in vain as accused successfully penetrated his penis inside Anna
Liza’s vagina. This caused Anna Liza to bleed in pain. Accused stopped only when
he had satisfied his lust. Thereupon, accused threatened Anna Liza not to tell others
what happened between them; otherwise, he would kill her and her siblings.
Helpless, Anna Liza acceded to her father’s threat and never reported the incident to
anyone.
"On September 10, 11, and 12, 2000, about 11:00 o’clock in the evening, accused
repeated what he had done to Anna Liza on 26 August 2000. On all of those three
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(3) occasions, accused succeeded in inserting his penis inside Anna Liza’s vagina
against her will and consent. Similar sexual assaults were made on October 15, 16,
and 27, 2000 in their house.
After the prosecution had rested its case with the testimony of its lone witness (the
private complainant), Atty. Harley Padolina (PAO) manifested that the defense would
not present any evidence
In the review of his various cases by this Court, appellant asserts that his plea of
guilty has been improvidently made on the mistaken belief that he would be given a
lighter penalty with his plea of guilt.4 On this particular score, the Solicitor General
agrees. There is merit in the observation.
While the records of the case are indeed bereft of any indication that the rule has
sufficiently been complied with, the evidence for the prosecution outside of the plea
of guilt, nevertheless, would adequately establish the guilt of appellant beyond
reasonable doubt.9 The manner by which the plea of guilt is made, whether
improvidently or not, loses much of great significance where the conviction can be
based on independent evidence proving the commission by the person accused of
the offense charged.10
The prosecution presented at the witness stand Anna Liza. She recounted
straightforwardly and in sufficient detail the twelve harrowing and humiliating
incidents of rape she had suffered in the hands of her own father.
The death penalty, however, was indeed erroneously imposed. The Solicitor General
conceded that the prosecution had failed to establish private complainant’s age at
the time of commission of the offenses. It was only the bare statement of the victim,
when asked to describe her personal circumstances in the hearing held on 05
February 2002, that mention was made of her being merely 17 years of age.
WHEREFORE, the decision under review is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Appellant Mario Oden is convicted of twelve (12) counts of simple rape and
sentenced to reclusion perpetua for each count. Appellant is further ordered to
indemnify Anna Liza Oden in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) civil
indemnity, Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) moral damages, and Twenty
Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) exemplary damages for each count of rape.
VIII.A.10 G.R. No. L-80845 March 14, 1994 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
petitioner, vs. HON. ERNESTO M. MENDOZA, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court of Malaybalay, Bukidnon, Branch 10, and JUAN MAGALOP y SALVACION,
respondents.
This is a petition for certiorari and mandamus filed by the Office of the Provincial
Fiscal (now Provincial Prosecutor) of Malaybalay, Bukidnon, in behalf of the People
of the Philippines, assailing the judgment of respondent Judge Ernesto M. Mendoza
in Crim. Case No. 4264 acquitting accused Juan Magalop y Salvacion, private
respondent herein, of the crime of robbery with force upon things notwithstanding his
plea of guilt. Petitioner prays that respondent Judge be ordered to reverse his
judgment exonerating Magalop and, instead, to impose upon him the proper penalty
for the offense to which he pleaded guilty.
The evidence discloses that on 20 January 1987, the storeroom of the Bukidnon
National School of Home Industries (BNSHI) in Maramag, Bukidnon, was ransacked.
After an on-the-spot investigation, the police found themselves at a loss as to the
identity of the culprit or culprits. The value of the missing articles was estimated at
P15,298.15.
Eventually, responsibility for the robbery with force upon things was laid on accused
Juan Magalop y Salvacion, Petronilo Fernandez y Cano and Ricarte Dahilan alias
Ricky. All three (3) were represented by District Citizens Attorney Isidro L. Caracol.
At the arraignment on 23 June 1987, Magalop pleaded "guilty" while Fernandez
pleaded "not guilty." The arraignment of Dahilan was deferred as he was "not
mentally well."
Instead of pronouncing judgment on Magalop, the court a quo conducted trial. The
prosecution presented Pat. Jakosalem, INP, who investigated the break-in, as well
as a clerk and a storekeeper of the BNSHI. The prosecution likewise offered in
evidence colored pictures of the ransacked storeroom, a pair of ordinary pliers
colored blue, a pair of long-nose pliers colored red, and a coping saw. The last three
items were said to have been recovered by the police.
The evidence of the prosecution failed to prove that the three accused were
responsible for stealing these three articles or tools.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the accused Petronilo Fernandez and Juan Magalop
are hereby ACQUITTED.
Petitioner submits that the accused Magalop, who was assisted by counsel, had
voluntarily, spontaneously and intelligently pleaded guilty to the crime of robbery with
force upon things. Thus, the trial court had no alternative but to pronounce judgment
and impose the proper penalty.
CRIMPRO
Petitioner would have this Court set aside the acquittal of Magalop, insisting that with
his voluntary plea of guilt, the trial court had no other recourse but to pronounce
judgment and impose the proper penalty.
This rule is at most directory. It will certainly be a clear abuse of discretion on the
part of the judge to persist in holding the accused bound to his admission of guilt and
sentencing him accordingly when the totality of the evidence points to his acquittal.
There is no rule which provides that simply because the accused pleaded guilty to
the charge that his conviction automatically follows. Additional evidence independent
of the plea may be considered to convince the judge that it was intelligently made.
Here it is evident, even from the start, that the case of the prosecution against the
three (3) accused was virtually non-existent as the asported articles were found in
the possession of a certain Babie Tan and yet, quite inexplicably, the prosecution did
not summon him to the witness stand. Babie Tan could have positively identified
those who sold him the stolen articles if called to testify. Or, he could very well have
been the perpetrator of the crime himself. In the absence of an explanation of how
one has come into possession of stolen effects, the possessor is presumed to be the
author of the crime of robbery.7
Indeed, not even the testimonies and the mute exhibits introduced during the trial
could breathe life into the moribund state of the case for the prosecution. While the
loss of articles in the storeroom of the BNSHI was established, there was nothing,
independent of the acknowledgment of guilt, which could link accused Magalop to
the robbery. As the trial court succinctly put it, "the plea of Juan Magalop was not
intelligently done."
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit
and the acquittal of the accused-respondent JUAN MAGALOP Y SALVACION is
sustained.
VIII.A.11 G.R. No. 172707 October 1, 2013 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, vs. HALIL GAMBAO Y ESMAIL, EDDIE KARIM Y USO,
EDWIN DUKILMAN Y SUBOH, TONY ABAO Y SULA, RAUL UDAL Y KAGUI,
THENG DILANGALEN Y NANDING, JAMAN MACALINBOL Y KATOL, MONETTE
RONAS Y AMPIL, NORA EVAD Y MULOK, THIAN PERPENIAN Y RAFON A.K.A
LARINA PERPENIAN AND JOHN DOES, ACCUSED- APPELLANTS.
The accused-appellants, along with an unidentified person, were charged under the
criminal information3 which reads: Criminal Case No. 98-0928 For Kidnapping for
Ransom as amended by RA 7659 That on August 12, 1998 at around 7:30 o’clock in
the evening at No. 118 FB Harrison Pasay City and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above named-accused conspiring, confederating and mutually
helping one another and grouping themselves together, did then and there by force
and intimidation, and the use of high powered firearms, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take, carry away and deprive Lucia Chan y Lee of her liberty against her
will for the purpose of extorting ransom as in fact a demand for ransom was made as
a condition for her release amounting to FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(₱400,000.00) to the damage and prejudice of Lucia L. Chan in the said amount and
such other amounts as may be awarded to her under the provisions of the Civil
Code.
The antecedent facts were culled from the records of the case:
Lucia Chan (Chan) was a fish dealer based in Manila. She usually expected fish
deliveries, which were shipped by her suppliers from the provinces. Sometime in the
afternoon of 11 August 1998, two persons, one of whom was identified as Theng
Dilangalen (Dilangalen), went to Chan’s residence at FB Harrison St., Pasay City to
inquire about a certain passport alleged to have been mistakenly placed inside a box
of fish to be delivered to her. Unable to locate said passport, the two left.
Dilangalen, accompanied by an unidentified person who remains at large, returned
to Chan’s residence that evening. Chan’s houseboy ushered them in and Chan met
them by the stairs.6 Thereat, the unidentified companion of Dilangalen pointed his
gun at Chan’s son, Levy Chan (Levy), and the house companions.7 As the
unidentified man forcibly dragged Chan, her son Levy tried to stop the man by
grabbing his mother’s feet. Seeing this, Dilangalen pointed his gun at Levy’s head
forcing the latter to release his grip on Chan’s feet.8 Levy thereafter proceeded to
the Pasay Police Headquarters to report the incident.9 Chan was forced to board a
"Tamaraw FX" van.
On 13 August 1998, Chan was awakened by Evad and was asked to board the
"Tamaraw FX" van. After travelling for about ten minutes, the van stopped and the
group alighted. Chan was brought to a room on the second floor of the house. Inside
the room were three persons whom Chan identified in court as Macalinbol, Raul
Udal (Udal) and Halil Gambao (Gambao).15 Another woman, later identified as
CRIMPRO
Thian Perpenian (Perpenian), arrived.16 At about 9:00 o’clock in the evening, a man
who was later identified as Teng Mandao (Mandao), entered the room with a
handgun and asked Chan "Bakit kayo nagsumbong sa pulis?"17 Another man,
whom Chan identified in court as Eddie Karim (Karim), ordered Mandao out of the
room. Karim informed Chan that he was sent by their boss to ask her how much
money she has.18 Chan was instructed to talk to her son through a cell phone and
she gave instructions to her son to get the ₱75, 000.00 she kept in her cabinet.19
The group then talked to Chan’s son and negotiated the ransom amount in
exchange for his mother’s release. It was agreed upon that Levy was to deliver
₱400,000.00 at the "Chowking" Restaurant at Buendia Avenue.
At about 5:00 o’clock in the morning of the same day, the police team assaulted
Cottage No. 1, resulting in the safe rescue of Chan and the apprehension of seven
of her abductors, later identified in court as Dilangalen, Udal, Macalinbol, Mandao,
Perpenian, Evad and Ronas.24 During the 7 October 1998 hearing, after the victim
and her son testified, Karim manifested his desire to change his earlier plea of "not
guilty" to "guilty." The presiding judge then explained the consequences of a change
of plea, stating: "It would mean the moment you withdraw your previous pleas of not
guilty and enter a plea of guilty, the court of course, after receiving evidence, as in
fact it has received the testimonies of [the] two witnesses, will [outrightly] sentence
you to the penalty provided by law after the prosecution shall have finished the
presentation of its evidence. Now that I have explained to you the consequences of
your entering a plea of guilty, are you still desirous of entering a plea of ‘guilty’?"
Eddie Karim answered, "Yes."25 On hearing this clarification, the other appellants
likewise manifested, through their counsel who had earlier conferred with them and
explained to each of them the consequences of a change of plea, their desire to
change the pleas they entered. The trial court separately asked each of the
appellants namely: Gambao, Abao, Udal, Mandao, Dilangalen, Macalinbol, Ronas
and Evad if they understood the consequence of changing their pleas. All of them
answered in the affirmative.26 Similarly, Dukilman manifested his desire to change
his plea and assured the trial court that he understood the consequences of such
change of plea.27 Thereupon, the trial court ordered their re-arraignment. After they
pleaded guilty,28 the trial court directed the prosecution to present evidence, which it
did.
On 16 October 1998, the RTC rendered a decision convicting Gambao, Karim,
Dukilman, Abao, Udal, Mandao, Dilangalen, Macalinbol, Ronas, Evad and Perpenian
of Kidnapping for Ransom. Hence, they appealed to the CA.
In a Decision dated 28 June 2005, the appellate court affirmed with modifications the
decision of the trial court. The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo finding accused-appellants HALIL
GAMBAO y ESMAIL, EDDIE KARIM y USO, EDWIN DUKILMAN y SUBOH, TONY
ABAO y SULA, RAUL UDAL y KAGUI, TENG MANDAO y HARON, THENG
DILANGALEN y NANDING, JAMAN MACALINBOL y KATOL, MONETTE RONAS y
AMPIL and NORA EVAD y MULOK guilty beyond reasonable doubt of kidnapping for
ransom defined and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by RA 7659 and imposing upon each of them the supreme penalty of
death is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION that each of them is ordered to pay
jointly and severally the victim in the amount of ₱50,000.00 by way of moral
damages.
Improvident Plea
As provided for by Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659,
the penalty for kidnapping for ransom is death. A review of the records36 shows that
on 7 October 1998, the accused-appellants withdrew their plea of "not guilty" and
were re-arraigned. They subsequently entered pleas of "guilty" to the crime of
kidnapping for ransom, a capital offense.
Inform the accused the exact length of imprisonment or nature of the penalty under
the law and the certainty that he will serve such sentence. For not infrequently, an
accused pleads guilty in the hope of a lenient treatment or upon bad advice or
because of promises of the authorities or parties of a lighter penalty should he admit
guilt or express remorse. It is the duty of the judge to ensure that the accused does
not labor under these mistaken impressions because a plea of guilty carries with it
not only the admission of authorship of the crime proper but also of the aggravating
circumstances attending it, that increase punishment.
The trial judge must satisfy himself that the accused, in pleading guilty, is truly guilty.
The accused must be required to narrate the tragedy or reenact the crime or furnish
its missing details. It is evident from the records42 that the aforesaid rules have not
been fully complied with. The questions propounded by the trial court judge failed to
ensure that accused-appellants fully understood the consequences of their plea. In
fact, it is readily apparent from the records43 that Karim had the mistaken
assumption that his plea of guilt would mitigate the imposable penalty and that both
the judge and his counsel failed to explain to him that such plea of guilt will not
mitigate the penalty pursuant to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code. Karim was not
warned by the trial court judge that in cases where the penalty is single and
indivisible, like death, the penalty is not affected by either aggravating or mitigating
circumstances. The trial court judge’s seemingly annoyed statement that a
conditional plea is not allowed
Although the pleas rendered, save for Perpenian’s, were improvidently made, this
Court will still not set aside the condemnatory judgment. Despite the trial court
judge’s shortcomings, we still agree with his ruling on accused-appellants’ culpability.
As a general rule, convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are set aside
and the cases are remanded for further proceedings if such plea is the sole basis of
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judgement. If the trial court, however, relied on sufficient and credible evidence to
convict the accused, as it did in this case, the conviction must be sustained, because
then it is predicated not merely on the guilty plea but on evidence proving the
commission of the offense charged. The manner by which the plea of guilty is made,
whether improvidently or not, loses legal significance where the conviction can be
based on independent evidence proving the commission of the crime by the
accused.46
Contrary to accused-appellants’ assertions, they were convicted by the trial court,
not on the basis of their plea of guilty, but on the strength of the evidence adduced
by the prosecution, which was properly appreciated by the trial court.47 The
prosecution was able to prove the guilt of the accused-appellants and their degrees
of culpability beyond reasonable doubt.
Having admitted their involvement in the crime of kidnapping for ransom and
considering the evidence presented by the prosecution, linking accused-appellants’
participation in the crime, no doubt can be entertained as to their guilt. The CA
convicted the accused-appellants of kidnapping for ransom and imposed upon them
the supreme penalty of death, applying the provisions of Article 267 of the Revised
Penal Code. Likewise, this Court finds accused- appellants guilty beyond reasonable
doubt as principals to the crime of kidnapping for ransom. However, pursuant to R.A.
No. 9346,64 we modify the penalty imposed by the trial court and reduce the penalty
to Reclusion Perpetua, without eligibility for parole.
WHEREFORE, the 28 June 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR–
H.C. No. 00863 is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellants
HALIL GAMBAO y ESMAIL, EDDIE KARIM y USO, EDWIN DUKILMAN y SUBOH,
TONY ABAO y SULA, RAUL UDAL y KAGUI, THENG DILANGALEN y NANDING,
JAMAN MACALINBOL y KATOL, MONETTE RONAS y AMPIL and NORA EVAD y
MULOK are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals in the crime of
kidnapping for ransom and sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua,
without eligibility of parole. Accused-appellant THIAN PERPENIAN y RAFON A.K.A.
LARINA PERPENIAN is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as accomplice in the
crime of kidnapping for ransom and sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
six (6) months and one (1) day of Prision Correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years
and one (1) day of Prision Mayor, as maximum. Accused-appellants are ordered to
indemnify the victim in the amounts of ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱100,000.00
as moral damages and ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages apportioned in the
following manner: the principals to the crime shall jointly and severally pay the victim
the total amount of ₱288,000.00 while the accomplice shall pay the victim
₱12,000.00, subject to Article 110 of the Revised Penal Code on several and
subsidiary liability.
VIII.A.12 [G.R. No. 159823, February 18, 2013] TEODORO A. REYES, Petitioner, v.
ETTORE ROSSI, Respondents.
On October 31, 1997, petitioner Teodoro A. Reyes (Reyes) and Advanced
Foundation Construction Systems Corporation (Advanced Foundation), represented
by its Executive Project Director, respondent Ettore Rossi (Rossi), executed a deed
of conditional sale involving the purchase by Reyes of equipment consisting of a
Warman Dredging Pump HY 300A worth P10,000,000.00. The parties agreed
therein that Reyes would pay the sum of P3,000,000.00 as downpayment, and the
balance of P7,000,000.00 through four post-dated checks. Reyes complied, but in
January 1998, he requested the restructuring of his obligation under the deed of
conditional sale by replacing the four post-dated checks with nine post-dated checks
that would include interest at the rate of P25,000.00/month accruing on the unpaid
portion of the obligation on April 30, 1998, June 30, 1998, July 31, 1998, September
30, 1998 and October 31, 1998.1 Advanced Foundation assented to Reyes’ request,
and returned the four checks. In turn, Reyes issued and delivered the following nine
post-dated checks in the aggregate sum of P7,125,000.00 drawn against the United
Coconut Planters Bank
Rossi deposited three of the post-dated checks (i.e., No. 72807, No. 79125 and No.
72808) on their maturity dates in Advanced Foundation’s bank account at the PCI
Bank in Makati. Two of the checks were denied payment ostensibly upon Reyes’
instructions to stop their payment, while the third (i.e., No. 72802) was dishonored
for insufficiency of funds
In the meanwhile, on July 29, 1998, Reyes commenced an action for rescission of
contract and damages in the Regional Trial Court in Quezon City (RTC). His
complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. Q98-35109 and entitled Teodoro A. Reyes v.
Advanced Foundation Construction Systems Corporation, sought judgment
declaring the deed of conditional sale “rescinded and of no further force and effect,”
and ordering Advanced Foundation to return the P3,000,000.00 downpayment with
legal interest from June 4, 1998 until fully paid; and to pay to him attorney’s fees,
and various kinds and amounts of damages
On September 8, 1998, Rossi charged Reyes with five counts of estafa and five
counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 in the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Makati for the dishonor of Checks No. 72807, No. 72808, No. 72801, No. 72809 and
No. 79125. Another criminal charge for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 was
lodged against Reyes in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City for the
dishonor of Check No. 72802
Reyes assailed the jurisdiction of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati over the
criminal charges against him on the ground that he had issued the checks in Quezon
City; as well as argued that the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati should
suspend the proceedings because of the pendency in the RTC of the civil action for
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rescission of contract that posed a prejudicial question as to the criminal
proceedings
Reyes asserts that the CA erred in ruling that there was no prejudicial question that
warranted the suspension of the criminal proceedings against him; that the petition
suffered fatal defects that merited its immediate dismissal; that the CA was wrong in
relying on the pronouncements in Balgos, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan12 and Umali v.
Intermediate Appellate Court13 because the factual backgrounds thereat were not
similar to that obtaining here; and that the Secretary of Justice did not commit any
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
A prejudicial question generally comes into play in a situation where a civil action
and a criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the former an issue that
must first be determined before the latter may proceed, because howsoever the
issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of
the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case.16 The rationale for the
suspension on the ground of a prejudicial question is to avoid conflicting
decisions.17
Two elements that must concur in order for a civil case to be considered a prejudicial
question are expressly stated in Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal
Procedure, to wit:
Section 7. Elements of prejudicial question. – The elements of a prejudicial question
are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately
related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of
such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
Contending that the rescission of the contract of sale constitutes a prejudicial
question, Reyes posits that the resolution of the civil action will be determinative of
whether or not he was criminally liable for the violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.
He states that if the contract would be rescinded, his obligation to pay under the
conditional deed of sale would be extinguished, and such outcome would
necessarily result in the dismissal of the criminal proceedings for the violations of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
Accordingly, we agree with the holding of the CA that the civil action for the
rescission of contract was not determinative of the guilt or innocence of Reyes
In this light, it is clear that the pendency of the civil case does not bar the
continuation of the proceedings in the preliminary investigation on the ground that it
poses a prejudicial question. Considering that the contracts are deemed to be valid
until rescinded, the consideration and obligatory effect thereof are also deemed to
have been validly made, thus demandable. Consequently, there was no failure of
consideration at the time when the subject checks were dishonored. (Emphasis
supplied) x x x x WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review; AFFIRMS
the decision the Court of Appeals promulgated on May 30, 2003; and DIRECTS the
petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
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VIII.A.13 G.R. No. 166836 September 4, 2013 SAN MIGUEL PROPERTIES, INC.,
PETITIONER, vs. SEC. HERNANDO B. PEREZ, ALBERT C. AGUIRRE, TEODORO
B. ARCENAS, JR., MAXY S. ABAD, JAMES G. BARBERS, STEPHEN N. SARINO,
ENRIQUE N. ZALAMEA, JR., MARIANO M. MARTIN, ORLANDO O. SAMSON,
CATHERINE R. AGUIRRE, AND ANTONIO V. AGCAOILI, RESPONDENTS.
Petitioner San Miguel Properties Inc. (San Miguel Properties), a domestic
corporation engaged in the real estate business, purchased in 1992, 1993 and April
1993 from B.F. Homes, Inc. (BF Homes), then represented by Atty. Florencio B.
Orendain (Orendain) as its duly authorized rehabilitation receiver appointed by the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC),2 130 residential lots situated in its
subdivision BF Homes Parañaque, containing a total area of 44,345 square meters
for the aggregate price of ₱106,248,000.00. The transactions were embodied in
three separate deeds of sale.3 The TCTs covering the lots bought under the first and
second deeds were fully delivered to San Miguel Properties, but 20 TCTs covering
20 of the 41 parcels of land with a total area of 15,565 square meters purchased
under the third deed of sale, executed in April 1993 and for which San Miguel
Properties paid the full price of ₱39,122,627.00, were not delivered to San Miguel
Properties.
On its part, BF Homes claimed that it withheld the delivery of the 20 TCTs for parcels
of land purchased under the third deed of sale because Atty. Orendain had ceased
to be its rehabilitation receiver at the time of the transactions after being meanwhile
replaced as receiver by FBO Network Management, Inc. on May 17, 1989 pursuant
to an order from the SEC.4
BF Homes refused to deliver the 20 TCTs despite demands. Thus, on August 15,
2000, San Miguel Properties filed a complaint-affidavit in the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Las Piñas City (OCP Las Piñas) charging respondent directors and
officers of BF Homes with non-delivery of titles in violation of Section 25, in relation
to Section 39, both of Presidential Decree No. 957 (I.S. No. 00-2256)
Did the Secretary of Justice commit grave abuse of discretion in upholding the
dismissal of San Miguel Properties’ criminal complaint for violation of Presidential
Decree No. 957 for lack of probable cause and for reason of a prejudicial question?
The question boils down to whether the HLURB administrative case brought to
compel the delivery of the TCTs could be a reason to suspend the proceedings on
the criminal complaint for the violation of Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 957
on the ground of a prejudicial question.
An action for specific performance is the remedy to demand the exact performance
of a contract in the specific form in which it was made, or according to the precise
terms agreed upon by a party bound to fulfill it.26 Evidently, before the remedy of
specific performance is availed of, there must first be a breach of the contract
Ruling of the Court The petition has no merit. 1. Action for specific performance,
even if pending in the HLURB, an administrative agency, raises a prejudicial
question BF Homes’ posture that the administrative case for specific performance in
the HLURB posed a prejudicial question that must first be determined before the
criminal case for violation of Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 957 could be
resolved is correct.
obviously precede that of the latter, for should the HLURB hold San Miguel
Properties to be not entitled to the delivery of the 20 TCTs because Atty. Orendain
did not have the authority to represent BF Homes in the sale due to his receivership
having been terminated by the SEC, the basis for the criminal liability for the
violation of Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 957 would evaporate, thereby
negating the need to proceed with the criminal case

The concept of a prejudicial question involves a civil action and a criminal case. Yet,
contrary to San Miguel Properties’ submission that there could be no prejudicial
question to speak of because no civil action where the prejudicial question arose
was pending, the action for specific performance in the HLURB raises a prejudicial
question that sufficed to suspend the proceedings determining the charge for the
criminal violation of Section 2524 of Presidential Decree No. 957. This is true simply
because the action for specific performance was an action civil in nature but could
not be instituted elsewhere except in the HLURB, whose jurisdiction over the action
was exclusive and original.
The concept of a prejudicial question involves a civil action and a criminal case. Yet,
contrary to San Miguel Properties’ submission that there could be no prejudicial
question to speak of because no civil action where the prejudicial question arose
was pending, the action for specific performance in the HLURB raises a prejudicial
question that sufficed to suspend the proceedings determining the charge for the
criminal violation of Section 2524 of Presidential Decree No. 957. This is true simply
because the action for specific performance was an action civil in nature but could
not be instituted elsewhere except in the HLURB, whose jurisdiction over the action
was exclusive and original.
Worthy to note at this juncture is that a prejudicial question need not conclusively
resolve the guilt or innocence of the accused. It is enough for the prejudicial question
to simply test the sufficiency of the allegations in the information in order to sustain
the further prosecution of the criminal case. A party who raises a prejudicial question
is deemed to have hypothetically admitted that all the essential elements of the
crime have been adequately alleged in the information, considering that the
Prosecution has not yet presented a single piece of evidence on the indictment or
may not have rested its case. A challenge to the allegations in the information on the
ground of prejudicial question is in effect a question on the merits of the criminal
charge through a non- criminal suit.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on February 24, 2004
by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP NO. 73008; and ORDERS petitioner to pay
the costs of suit.

On the other hand, Presidential Decree No. 957 is a law that regulates the sale of
subdivision lots and condominiums in view of the increasing number of incidents
wherein "real estate subdivision owners, developers, operators, and/or sellers have
reneged on their representations and obligations to provide and maintain properly"
the basic requirements and amenities, as well as of reports of alarming magnitude of
swindling and fraudulent manipulations perpetrated by unscrupulous subdivision and
condominium sellers and operators,29 such as failure to deliver titles to the buyers
or titles free from liens and encumbrances. Presidential Decree No. 957 authorizes
the suspension and revocation of the registration and license of the real estate
subdivision owners, developers, operators, and/or sellers in certain instances, as
well as provides the procedure to be observed in such instances; it prescribes
administrative fines and other penalties in case of violation of, or non-compliance
with its provisions. Conformably with the foregoing, the action for specific
performance in the HLURB would determine whether or not San Miguel Properties
was legally entitled to demand the delivery of the remaining 20 TCTs, while the
criminal action would decide whether or not BF Homes’ directors and officers were
criminally liable for withholding the 20 TCTs. The resolution of the former must

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VIII.A.14 G.R. No.148004 VINCENT E. OMICTIN, Petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to
APPEALS (Special Twelfth Division) and GEORGE I. LAGOS, Respondents. deliver or to return the same or deliver the value thereof to the owner could only give
January 22, 2007 rise to a civil action and does not constitute the crime of estafa. This is because the
crime is committed by misappropriating or converting money or goods received by
Petitioner Vincent E. Omictin, Operations Manager Ad Interim of Saag Phils., Inc., the offender under a lawful transaction.
filed a complaint for two counts of estafa with the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Makati against private respondent George I. Lagos. He alleged that private WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The decision and resolution of the Court
respondent, despite repeated demands, refused to return the two company vehicles of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 55834, dated June 30, 2000 and March 5, 2001,
entrusted to him when he was still the president of Saag Phils., Inc.. On February respectively, are AFFIRMED.
26, 1999, public prosecutor Alex G. Bagaoisan recommended the indictment of
private respondent, and on the same day, respondent was charged with the crime of
estafa under Article 315, par. 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 57 of Makati City. The case was docketed as Criminal
Case No. 99-633, entitled "People of the Philippines v. George I. Lagos."

On June 24, 1999, private respondent filed a motion to suspend proceedings on the
basis of a prejudicial question because of a pending petition with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) involving the same parties. It appears that on January
7, 1999, private respondent filed SEC Case No. 01-99-6185 for the declaration of
nullity of the respective appointments of Alex Y. Tan and petitioner as President Ad
Interim and Operations Manager Ad Interim of Saag Phils., Inc., declaration of
dividends, recovery of share in the profits, involuntary dissolution and the
appointment of a receiver, recovery of damages and an application for a temporary
restraining order (TRO) and injunction against Saag (S) Pte. Ltd., Nicholas Ng,
Janifer Yeo, Tan and petitioner.

In sum, the main issue is whether or not a prejudicial question exists to warrant the
suspension of the criminal proceedings pending the resolution of the intra-corporate
controversy that was originally filed with the SEC.

Ultimately, the resolution of the issues raised in the intra-corporate dispute will
determine the guilt or innocence of private respondent in the crime of estafa filed
against him by petitioner before the RTC of Makati. As correctly stated by the CA,
one of the elements of the crime of estafa with abuse of confidence under Article
315, par. 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code is a demand made by the offended party to
the offender

Logically, under the circumstances, since the alleged offended party is Saag Phils.,
Inc., the validity of the demand for the delivery of the subject vehicles rests upon the
authority of the person making such a demand on the company’s behalf. Private
respondent is challenging petitioner’s authority to act for Saag Phils., Inc. in the
corporate case pending before the RTC of Mandaluyong, Branch 214. Taken in this
light, if the supposed authority of petitioner is found to be defective, it is as if no
demand was ever made, hence, the prosecution for estafa cannot prosper.
Moreover, the mere failure to return the thing received for safekeeping or on
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VIII.A.16 G.R. No. L-38626 March 14, 1975 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
plaintiff-appellee, vs. STEPHEN DOUGLAS STRONG alias STEVE STRONG,
defendant-appellant.
As set forth in his manifestation and motion in lieu of appellee's brief, on February 6,
1974, during the continuation of the arraignment, the accused Stephen Douglas
Strong was asked by Judge Occena "And it is also stated here, "that on the occasion
and in pursuance of said robbery and to ensure his felonious intent, the above-
named accused with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with the use of a fork and towel, attack,
assault, stab, choke and strangle one Cornelia Bartolaba, which caused her
immediate death", what do you say to that?2 His categorical answer: "No."3 Then
when interrogated further to explain why he answered in the negative considering
that he had entered a guilty plea and specifically queried as to whether he meant to
say that he did not attack, that he did not assault, that be did not stab, that he did not
choke and strangle the victim, Cornelia Bartolaba, to death, there was an outright
denial that he did any of those acts attributed to him, answering "no" every time to
each and ever question.4
Thus it was quite unexpected when on February 8, 1974, notwithstanding such
explicit refusal to acknowledge guilt, the trial court rendered judgment finding the
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
It is well-settled that when a plea of guilty is not definite or ambiguous, or not
absolute, the same amounts to a plea of not guilty.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court dated February 8, 1974 is set aside
and nullified and the case remanded to it for a trial to be conducted strictly in
accordance with the requirements of the law. No costs.
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VIII.A.17 G.R. No. L-26376 August 31, 1966 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
plaintiff and appellant, vs. AURELIO BALISACAN, defendant and appellee
This is an appeal by the prosecution from a decision of acquittal.
On February 1, 1965, Aurelio Balisacan was charged with homicide in the Court of
First Instance of Ilocos Norte.
To this charge the accused, upon being arraigned, entered a plea of guilty. In doing
so, he was assisted by counsel. At his de oficio counsel's petition, however, he was
allowed to present evidence to prove mitigating circumstances. Thereupon the
accused testified to the effect that he stabbed the deceased in self-defense because
the latter was strangling him. And he further stated that after the incident he
surrendered himself voluntarily to the police authorities. Subsequently, on March 6,
1965, on the basis of the above-mentioned testimony of the accused, the court a
quo rendered a decision acquitting the accused. As stated, the prosecution appealed
therefrom.
The sole assignment of error is: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ACQUITTING THE
ACCUSED OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED DESPITE THE LATTER'S PLEA OF
GUILTY WHEN ARRAIGNED.
Appellant's contention is meritorious. A plea of guilty is an unconditional admission of
guilt with respect to the offense charged. It forecloses the right to defend oneself
from said charge and leaves the court with no alternative but to impose the penalty
fixed by law under the circumstances. (People v. Ng Pek, 81 Phil. 563). In this case,
the defendant was only allowed to testify in order to establish mitigating
circumstances, for the purposes of fixing the penalty. Said testimony, therefore,
could not be taken as a trial on the merits, to determine the guilt or innocence of the
accused.
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is hereby set aside and this case is
remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings under another judge of said
court, that is, for plea by the defendant, trial with presentation of evidence for the
prosecution and the defense, and judgment thereafter, No costs. So ordered.