A.M. No.

P-92-695 December 7, 1994

CYNTHIA A. FLORENDO, Complainant, v. EXEQUIEL ENRILE, Respondent.

Edgardo G. Villarin for complainant.

PER CURIAM: chanrobles virtual law library

In a sworn letter-complaint filed with the Office of the Court Administrator on 17 March 1992, the complainant
charged the respondent deputy sheriff of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) at Cabanatuan City with the failure
to enforce a writ of demolition notwithstanding his collection and receipt of P5,200.00. She averred that she was the
plaintiff in Civil Cases Nos. 9241 to 9249, all for ejectment, and that in a joint decision rendered on 22 June 1987 by
Branch 2 of the MTCC 1the defendants were ordered to vacate the premises and to surrender the possession thereof to
the complainant. The defendants appealed this decision to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) which in a joint decision of
18 August 1989 2affirmed it in toto. On 19 January 1990, the MTCC issued a writ of execution. 3

The writ was assigned to the respondent for implementation. In view of the refusal of the defendants to vacate the
premises, the complainant asked for the issuance of a writ of demolition, which the court granted pursuant to its order
of 21 March 1990. 4On 27 June 1990, it denied the defendant's motion for extension of time to execute the writ of
demolition. 5For the service and implementation of the writ of demolition, the respondent asked and received from the
complainant and her lawyer the total sum of P5,200.00 purportedly as sheriff's fee. 6The respondent issued no official
receipt for this amount. His acknowledgment of the partial payment of P2,700.00 appears on the stationery of the
complainant's lawyer, Atty. Edgardo G. Villarin, while that for the other payment of P500.00 is handwritten on the
stationery of the Office of the City Legal Officer, who is the same Atty. Edgardo G. Villarin. The other payment of
P2,000.00 was by check drawn by the complainant's counsel.

The respondent did not execute the writ of demolition despite the receipt of P5,200.00. The complainant's lawyer then
wrote a letter to the respondent on 8 November 1990 demanding that the latter implement the writ of demolition or
return the aforesaid sum within ten days from receipt of the letter, otherwise the matter would be brought up to this
Court. 7Since nothing was done by the respondent, the complainant filed this complaint. She asked that the
respondent be dismissed from the service.

On 25 May 1992, we required the respondent to comment on the letter-complaint. law library

In his comment (denominated as an answer) dated 16 June 1992, the respondent did not deny the charge that he
collected P5,200.00 as sheriff's fee; however, he specifically denied the allegation that he did not implement the writ
of execution and the writ of demolition. He claimed that he "returned to the defendants for several times to advice
[sic] them to vacate the said place," but since they did not, he advised the complainant's counsel to file a motion for
the issuance of a writ of demolition. When he received the writ of demolition, he served it on the defendants on 25
July 1990; the latter requested an extension of thirty days. He then prepared a return of service dated 25 July
1990. 8Then, after the expiration of the extended period, he again approached the defendants on 4 September 1990
to make them vacate the premises. However, he was threatened by them that if he would enforce the writ of
demolition something would happen, i.e., "magkamatayan muna." He then prepared the return of service on the said
date. 9The writ was thus unsatisfied. It appears, however, that these returns dated 25 July 1990 and 4 September
1990 were filed with the MTCC only on 29 May 1991 and 6 June 1991, respectively.

He further claimed that on 8 July 1991, Judge Romeo Mauricio of the MTCC referred to Mr. Arsenio S. Vicencio, Clerk
of Court IV and Ex-Officio Sheriff of the MTCC, the respondent's return of service of 4 September 1990 for
comment. 10In his compliance of 15 July 1991, 11Mr. Vicencio informed Judge Mauricio that the threat on the
respondent's life was "real, and it will be very risky for him to implement" it, and requested that a new deputy sheriff
be assigned to enforce the writ. Pursuant to this request, Judge Mauricio sent a formal request to the Presiding Judge
of Branch I of the MTCC of Cabanatuan City asking that deputy sheriff Teodoro Pineda be assigned to implement the
writ of demolition.

This case was referred to the Executive Judge of the RTC in Cabanatuan City for investigation, report and
recommendation.

In his Report and Recommendation dated 4 March 1994, but transmitted to this Court only on 6 June 1994, Executive
Judge Johnson L. Ballutay narrates the several instances that the case was set for hearing and the postponements
thereof because of the respondent's plea for time to secure the services of counsel or because of his non-appearance.
Judge Ballutay recommends:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, and taking into account the stubborn attitude of the respondent of not engaging the services
of counsel to facilitate the early termination of the investigation, it is respectfully recommended that in addition to the
suspension for one (1) year without pay and to return to the complainant the P5,200.00, a suspension without pay for
six (6) months be imposed upon the respondent.

In the resolution of 8 August 1994, we referred the Report and Recommendation of Judge Ballutay to the Office of the
Court Administrator for evaluation, report and recommendation.

In its Memorandum of 23 September 1994, the Office of the Court Administrator finds that:
An exhaustive study of the evidence on record shows a considerable amount of Neglect of Duty on the part of
respondent. He should have coordinated with the counsel of the complainant and/or caused the citation of the defiant
defendants for contempt of court when they resisted the implementation of the writ. Moreover, he should have
requested for additional sheriff and/or police assistance for the proper and immediate implementation of the subject
writs, but he did not. For a long period time, the complainants have been deprived of their constitutional right to a
speedy administration of justice considering that the Decision sought to be enforced was issued in 1989 yet, all
because of the negligence of herein respondent.

In the case of Active Wood Products, Inc. vs. IAC, 183 SCRA 671, the Court declares that sheriffs must implement or
execute the decision of the court without delay to prevent injury or damage to the winning party and so as not to
prejudice said party of obtaining speedy justice.

Respondent did not also conduct himself in an upright and professional manner as the judiciary code of ethics require
[sic], particularly in his getting the amount of P5,200.00 in installment basis from the respondent.

This Court, speaking through Justice Regalado, in the case of Anonuevo vs. Pempena (Administrative Matter No. P-93-
795) promulgated on July 18, 1994, enunciates: - "It is an abhorrent and anomalous practice for a sheriff to demand
fees in excess of those lawfully allowed. This Court has emphasized time and again, that the conduct and behaviour of
everyone connected with an office charged with the dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to the sheriff
down to the lowliest clerk should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. Their conduct at all times,
must be characterized with propriety and decorum, but above all else, must be above and beyond suspicion," for
every employee should be an example of integrity, uprightness and honesty (Valenton, et al. vs.
Melgar - A.M. No. P-92-698, March 3, 1993, 219 SCRA 372).

It then recommends:

WHEREFORE, considering all the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended to the Honorable Court that respondent be
imposed a FINE equivalent to his one (1) month salary payable within ten (10) days upon notice, taking into account
that (a) he was not totally remiss in his duties but also exerted efforts to execute the writs; (b) he even went to the
extent of approaching the City Mayor for relocation of the defendants; and (c) the complainant herself is in conformity
to the dismissal of the complaint; and (2) to RETURN the total amount of P5,200.00 to the complainant, without
interest, within twenty (20) days from notice hereof, with a STERN WARNING that the repetition of similar offense will
be dealt with more severely.

We do not agree with the penalty recommended by Judge Ballutay or the Office of the Court Administrator. Both are,
especially that of the latter, grossly inadequate in the light of the gravity of the administrative offenses committed by
the respondent. Moreover, the former's recommendation of an additional penalty of suspension for six months on
account of the "stubborn attitude of the respondent of not engaging the services of counsel to facilitate the early
termination of the investigation" is improper. The records disclose that Judge Ballutay was very accommodating to the
parties. No less than fifteen scheduled hearings were cancelled or postponed and despite admonitions that he would
proceed with the hearing regardless of the absence of counsel, he never did.

Having been delegated by this Court the authority to investigate the case and to submit his report and
recommendation, he should have, upon deliberate failure of the respondent to engage the services of counsel, allowed
the complainant to present ex-parte her evidence and, upon the non-appearance of the respondent on any of the
scheduled dates of hearing, considered him to have waived the presentation of his evidence. As we see it then, Judge
Ballutay is not entirely without blame for the delay in the termination of the investigation of this case.

It must be stressed that administrative cases involving misconduct, nonfeasance, misfeasance, or malfeasance in
office of officers and employees in the judiciary are of paramount public interest as the respondents are involved in
the administration of justice, a sacred and solemn task. Such cases must be resolved with reasonable dispatch to
clear the name of the innocent and to punish forthwith the guilty whose stay in office, prolonged by delay, could
further tarnish the image of and diminish the public's faith in the judiciary.

We cannot likewise give weight to the circumstances relied upon by the Office of the Court Administrator to mitigate
the respondent's liability. As hereinafter noted, he is guilty of grave misconduct, gross dishonesty, serious dereliction
or neglect of duty, gross inefficiency or incompetence, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. That
the complainant "is in conformity to the dismissal of the complaint" can by no means be considered a mitigating
circumstance as it is offensive to the postulate that a complaint for misconduct, malfeasance, or misfeasance against
a public officer or employee cannot just be withdrawn at any time by the complainant and that the need to maintain
the faith and confidence of the people in the Government and its agencies and instrumentalities demands the
proceedings in such cases should not be made to depend on the whims and caprices of the complainants who are, in a
real sense, only witnesses therein. 13In this case, the conformity of the complainant, found in the motion to dismiss
dated 8 February 1994 14and signed by the counsel for the complainant, is based on the ground that the respondent
had already "fully implemented the writ of execution." That motion to dismiss was not, and correctly so, granted by
Judge Ballutay. On the contrary, on 4 March 1994 he made his Report and Recommendation.

The respondent never denied that he received the sum of P5,200.00 from the complainant in connection with the writ
of demolition. He did not issue any official receipt for the amount received. At the time the writ of demolition was
placed on his hands for implementation, the basic amount that the complainant had to pay was only P8.00 pursuant
to paragraph (g), Section 7, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court. This was later increased to P100.00 per this Court's en
banc resolution of 4 September 1990. 15There are, of course, other sheriff's expenses that prevailing parties have to
pay for the service or implementation of court processes, or the safeguarding of property levied upon, attached or
seized, including kilometrage, guard's fees, warehousing and similar charges, in an amount to be estimated by the
sheriff. However, the approval of the court thereof is needed and upon such approval, the amount shall be deposited
by the interested party with the clerk of court and ex-officio sheriff, who shall disburse the same to the deputy sheriff
assigned to effect the process, subject to liquidation within the same period for rendering a return of the process. Any
unspent amount shall be refunded to the party making the deposit. A full report shall be submitted by the deputy
sheriff assigned with his return. 16

In the instant case, the respondent did not make any report on the amount he received from the complainant nor did
he issue an official receipt therefor. It is then obvious that he asked for the amount not as lawful fees alone but as a
consideration for the performance of his duty. Any portion of the P5,200.00 then in excess of the lawful fees allowed
by the Rules of Court is an unlawful exaction which makes the respondent liable for grave misconduct and gross
dishonesty.

The records further disclose that the respondent's returns of service dated 25 July 1990 17and 24 September
1990 18were filed by him only on 29 May 1991 and 6 June 1991, respectively, with the MTCC, which issued the writ of
demolition. Either the respondent correctly dated the returns, in which case there was a deliberate and unreasonable
delay in their filing with the court, or he antedated them to make it appear that he prepared it well within the period
provided for by the Rules of Court. Section 11 of Rule 39 thereof provides that a writ of execution should be returned
at any time not less than ten days nor more than sixty days after its receipt by the sheriff who must set forth in
writing on its back the whole of his proceedings by virtue thereof and file it with the clerk or judge to be preserved
with the other papers in the case. 19As the court personnel primarily responsible for the speedy and efficient service of
all court processes and writs originating from his court, 20it was the respondent's duty to immediately implement the
writ of demolition. The Manual for Clerks of
Court 21provides:

2. Duty of sheriff as to execution of process. - When a writ is placed in the hands of the sheriff, it is his duty in the
absence of instructions, to proceed with reasonable celerity and promptness to execute it in accordance with its
mandate. . . . He has no discretion whether to execute it or not.

Section E(4) of the Manual also provides:

4. All sheriffs and deputy sheriffs shall submit a report to the Judge concerned on the action taken on all writs and
processes assigned to them within ten (10) days from receipt of said process or writ. Said report shall form part of the
records of the case.

The duty imposed upon the sheriff to execute the writ is ministerial, not directory. A purely ministerial act or duty is
one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the
mandate of the legal authority, without regard to the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety
of the act done. 22

The respondent's explanation that he was not able to implement the writ of demolition because he was threatened
with death by the defendants is unacceptable. If that were true, he should have either reported it to the MTCC and
requested the assistance of other sheriffs or law enforcement authorities, or filed the appropriate criminal complaint
against the defendants who had threatened him. Instead of doing so, he filed his returns only after several months
had lapsed.

For such nonfeasance and misfeasance, the respondent is guilty of serious dereliction or neglect of duty, gross
inefficiency or incompetence, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

Time and again, this Court has stressed that the conduct and behavior of everyone connected with the dispensation of
justice from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility.
They must at all times not only observe propriety and decorum, they must also be above suspicion.

WHEREFORE, for grave misconduct, gross dishonesty, serious dereliction or neglect of duty, gross incompetence or
inefficiency, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, respondent EXEQUIEL ENRILE, Deputy Sheriff
of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Cabanatuan City, is ordered DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all
benefits and with prejudice to re-employment in any branch of service of the Government, including government-
owned or controlled corporations.

This decision is immediately executory.

G.R. No. 139465 January 18, 2000

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, petitioner,

vs.
HON. RALPH C. LANTION, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 25, and MARK B. JIMENEZ, respondents.

MELO, J.:

The individual citizen is but a speck of particle or molecule vis-à-vis the vast and overwhelming powers of government. His only
guarantee against oppression and tyranny are his fundamental liberties under the Bill of Rights which shield him in times of need. The
Court is now called to decide whether to uphold a citizen's basic due process rights, or the government's ironclad duties under a treaty.
The bugle sounds and this Court must once again act as the faithful guardian of the fundamental writ.

The petition at our doorstep is cast against the following factual backdrop:

On January 13, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1069 "Prescribing the Procedure for the
Extradition of Persons Who Have Committed Crimes in a Foreign Country". The Decree is founded on: the doctrine of incorporation
under the Constitution; the mutual concern for the suppression of crime both in the state where it was committed and the state where
the criminal may have escaped; the extradition treaty with the Republic of Indonesia and the intention of the Philippines to enter into
similar treaties with other interested countries; and the need for rules to guide the executive department and the courts in the proper
implementation of said treaties.

On November 13, 1994, then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon, representing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines,
signed in Manila the "Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United
States of America" (hereinafter referred to as the RP-US Extradition Treaty). The Senate, by way of Resolution No. 11, expressed its
concurrence in the ratification of said treaty. It also expressed its concurrence in the Diplomatic Notes correcting Paragraph (5)(a),
Article 7 thereof (on the admissibility of the documents accompanying an extradition request upon certification by the principal
diplomatic or consular officer of the requested state resident in the Requesting State).

On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U.S. Note Verbale No. 0522 containing a
request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jimenez to the United States. Attached to the Note Verbale were the Grand Jury
Indictment, the warrant of arrest issued by the U.S. District Court, Southern District of Florida, and other supporting documents for said
extradition. Based on the papers submitted, private respondent appears to be charged in the United States with violation of the
following provisions of the United States Code (USC):

A) 18 USC 371 (Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United States; two [2] counts; Maximum Penalty — 5 years on
each count);

B) 26 USC 7201 (Attempt to evade or defeat tax; four [4] counts; Maximum Penalty — 5 years on each count);

C) 18 USC 1343 (Fraud by wire, radio, or television; two [2] counts; Maximum Penalty — 5 years on each count);

D) 18 USC 1001 (False statement or entries; six [6] counts; Maximum Penalty — 5 years on each count);

E) 2 USC 441f (Election contributions in name of another; thirty-three [33] counts; Maximum Penalty — less than one year).

(p. 14, Rollo.)

On the same day, petitioner issued Department Order No. 249 designating and authorizing a panel of attorneys to take charge of and to
handle the case pursuant to Section 5(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1069. Accordingly, the panel began with the "technical evaluation
and assessment" of the extradition request and the documents in support thereof. The panel found that the "official English translation
of some documents in Spanish were not attached to the request and that there are some other matters that needed to be addressed"
(p. 15, Rollo).

Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition documents, private respondent, through counsel, wrote a letter dated July 1, 1999
addressed to petitioner requesting copies of the official extradition request from the U.S. Government, as well as all documents and
papers submitted therewith; and that he be given ample time to comment on the request after he shall have received copies of the
requested papers. Private respondent also requested that the proceedings on the matter be held in abeyance in the meantime.

Later, private respondent requested that preliminary, he be given at least a copy of, or access to, the request of the United States
Government, and after receiving a copy of the Diplomatic Note, a period of time to amplify on his request.

In response to private respondent's July 1, 1999 letter, petitioner, in a reply-letter dated July 13, 1999 (but received by private
respondent only on August 4, 1999), denied the foregoing requests for the following reasons:

1. We find it premature to furnish you with copies of the extradition request and supporting documents from the United States
Government, pending evaluation by this Department of the sufficiency of the extradition documents submitted in accordance
with the provisions of the extradition treaty and our extradition law. Article 7 of the Extradition Treaty between the Philippines
and the United States enumerates the documentary requirements and establishes the procedures under which the documents
submitted shall be received and admitted as evidence. Evidentiary requirements under our domestic law are also set forth in
Section 4 of P.D. No. 1069.

Evaluation by this Department of the aforementioned documents is not a preliminary investigation nor akin to preliminary
investigation of criminal cases. We merely determine whether the procedures and requirements under the relevant law and
treaty have been complied with by the Requesting Government. The constitutionally guaranteed rights of the accused in all
criminal prosecutions are therefore not available.
 It is only after the filing of the petition for extradition when the person sought to be extradited will be furnished by the court with
copies of the petition, request and extradition documents and this Department will not pose any objection to a request for
ample time to evaluate said documents.

2. The formal request for extradition of the United States contains grand jury information and documents obtained through
grand jury process covered by strict secrecy rules under United States law. The United States had to secure orders from the
concerned District Courts authorizing the United States to disclose certain grand jury information to Philippine government and
law enforcement personnel for the purpose of extradition of Mr. Jimenez. Any further disclosure of the said information is not
authorized by the United States District Courts. In this particular extradition request the United States Government requested
the Philippine Government to prevent unauthorized disclosure of the subject information. This Department's denial of your
request is consistent with Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty which provides that the Philippine Government must
represent the interests of the United States in any proceedings arising out of a request for extradition. The Department of
Justice under P.D. No. 1069 is the counsel of the foreign governments in all extradition requests.

3. This Department is not in a position to hold in abeyance proceedings in connection with an extradition request. Article 26 of
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, to which we are a party provides that "[E]very treaty in force is binding upon the
parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith". Extradition is a tool of criminal law enforcement and to be effective,
requests for extradition or surrender of accused or convicted persons must be processed expeditiously.

(pp. 77-78, Rollo.)

Such was the state of affairs when, on August 6, 1999, private respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital
Judicial Region a petition against the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and the Director of the National Bureau of
Investigation, for mandamus (to compel herein petitioner to furnish private respondent the extradition documents, to give him access
thereto, and to afford him an opportunity to comment on, or oppose, the extradition request, and thereafter to evaluate the request
impartially, fairly and objectively); certiorari (to set aside herein petitioner's letter dated July 13, 1999); and prohibition (to restrain
petitioner from considering the extradition request and from filing an extradition petition in court; and to enjoin the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs and the Director of the NBI from performing any act directed to the extradition of private respondent to the United States), with
an application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction (pp. 104-105, Rollo).

The aforementioned petition was docketed as Civil Case No. 99-94684 and thereafter raffled to Branch 25 of said regional trial court
stationed in Manila which is presided over by the Honorable Ralph C. Lantion.

After due notice to the parties, the case was heard on August 9, 1999. Petitioner, who appeared in his own behalf, moved that he be
given ample time to file a memorandum, but the same was denied.

On August 10, 1999, respondent judge issued an order dated the previous day, disposing:

WHEREFORE, this Court hereby Orders the respondents, namely: the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs
and the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, their agents and/or representatives to maintain the status quo by
refraining from committing the acts complained of; from conducting further proceedings in connection with the request of the
United States Government for the extradition of the petitioner; from filing the corresponding Petition with a Regional Trial court;
and from performing any act directed to the extradition of the petitioner to the United States, for a period of twenty (20) days
from service on respondents of this Order, pursuant to Section 5, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Court.

The hearing as to whether or not this Court shall issue the preliminary injunction, as agreed upon by the counsels for the
parties herein, is set on August 17, 1999 at 9:00 o'clock in the morning. The respondents are, likewise, ordered to file their
written comment and/or opposition to the issuance of a Preliminary Injunction on or before said date.

SO ORDERED.

(pp. 110-111, Rollo.)

Forthwith, petitioner initiated the instant proceedings, arguing that:

PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
BECAUSE:

I.

BY ORDERING HEREIN PETITIONER TO REFRAIN FROM COMMITTING THE ACTS COMPLAINED OF, I.E., TO DESIST
FROM REFUSING PRIVATE RESPONDENT ACCESS TO THE OFFICIAL EXTRADITION REQUEST AND DOCUMENTS
AND FROM DENYING PRIVATE RESPONDENT AN OPPORTUNITY TO FILE A COMMENT ON, OR OPPOSITION TO,
THE REQUEST, THE MAIN PRAYER FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS IN THE PETITION FOR MANDAMUS,
CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION WAS, IN EFFECT, GRANTED SO AS TO CONSTITUTE AN ADJUDICATION ON THE
MERITS OF THE MANDAMUS ISSUES;

II.

PETITIONER WAS UNQUALIFIEDLY PREVENTED FROM PERFORMING LEGAL DUTIES UNDER THE EXTRADITION
TREATY AND THE PHILIPPINE EXTRADITION LAW;

III.
 THE PETITION FOR (MANDAMUS), CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION IS, ON ITS FACE, FORMALLY AND
SUBSTANTIALLY DEFICIENT; AND

IV.

PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAS NO RIGHT IN ESSE THAT NEEDS PROTECTION AND ENFORCEMENT, AND WILL NOT
SUFFER ANY IRREPARABLE INJURY.

(pp. 19-20, Rollo.)

On August 17, 1999, the Court required private respondent to file his comment. Also issued, as prayed for, was a temporary restraining
order (TRO) providing:

NOW, THEREFORE, effective immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court, You, Respondent Judge Ralph
C. Lantion, your agents, representatives or any person or persons acting in your place or stead are hereby ORDERED to
CEASE and DESIST from enforcing the assailed order dated August 9, 1999 issued by public respondent in Civil Case No. 99-
94684.

GIVEN by the Honorable HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR., Chief Justice, Supreme Court of the Philippines, this 17th day of August
1999.

(pp. 120-121, Rollo.)

The case was heard on oral argument on August 31, 1999, after which the parties, as directed, filed their respective memoranda.

From the pleadings of the opposing parties, both procedural and substantive issues are patent. However, a review of these issues as
well as the extensive arguments of both parties, compel us to delineate the focal point raised by the pleadings: During the evaluation
stage of the extradition proceedings, is private respondent entitled to the two basic due process rights of notice and hearing? An
affirmative answer would necessarily render the proceedings at the trial court, moot and academic (the issues of which are substantially
the same as those before us now), while a negative resolution would call for the immediate lifting of the TRO issued by this Court dated
August 24, 1999, thus allowing petitioner to fast-track the process leading to the filing of the extradition petition with the proper regional
trial court. Corollarily, in the event that private respondent is adjudged entitled to basic due process rights at the evaluation stage of the
extradition proceedings, would this entitlement constitute a breach of the legal commitments and obligations of the Philippine
Government under the RP-US Extradition Treaty? And assuming that the result would indeed be a breach, is there any conflict between
private respondent's basic due process rights and the provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty?

The issues having transcendental importance, the Court has elected to go directly into the substantive merits of the case, brushing
aside peripheral procedural matters which concern the proceedings in Civil Case No. 99-94684, particularly the propriety of the filing of
the petition therein, and of the issuance of the TRO of August 17, 1999 by the trial court.

To be sure, the issues call for a review of the extradition procedure. The RP-US Extradition Treaty which was executed only on
November 13, 1994, ushered into force the implementing provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1069, also called as the Philippine
Extradition Law. Section 2(a) thereof defines extradition as "the removal of an accused from the Philippines with the object of placing
him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or government to hold him in connection with any criminal
investigation directed against him or the execution of a penalty imposed on him under the penal or criminal law of the requesting state
or government." The portions of the Decree relevant to the instant case which involves a charged and not convicted individual, are
abstracted as follows:

The Extradition Request

The request is made by the Foreign Diplomat of the Requesting State, addressed to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and shall be
accompanied by:

1. The original or an authentic copy of the criminal charge and the warrant of arrest issued by the authority of the Requesting
State having jurisdiction over the matter, or some other instruments having equivalent legal force;

2. A recital of the acts for which extradition is requested, with the fullest particulars as to the name and identity of the accused,
his whereabouts in the Philippines, if known, the acts or omissions complained of, and the time and place of the commission of
these acts;

3. The text of the applicable law or a statement of the contents of said law, and the designation or description of the offense by
the law, sufficient for evaluation of the request; and

4. Such other documents or information in support of the request.

(Sec. 4. Presidential Decree No. 1069.)

Sec. 5 of the Presidential Decree, which sets forth the duty of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, pertinently provides

. . . (1) Unless it appears to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs that the request fails to meet the requirements of this law and the
relevant treaty or convention, he shall forward the request together with the related documents to the Secretary of Justice, who
shall immediately designate and authorize an attorney in his office to take charge of the case.

The above provision shows only too clearly that the executive authority given the task of evaluating the sufficiency of the request and
the supporting documents is the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. What then is the coverage of this task?
In accordance with Paragraphs 2 and 3, Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty, the executive authority must ascertain whether or not
the request is supported by:

1. Documents, statements, or other types of information which describe the identity and probable location of the person
sought;

2. A statement of the facts of the offense and the procedural history of the case;

3. A statement of the provisions of the law describing the essential elements of the offense for which extradition is requested;

4. A statement of the provisions of law describing the punishment for the offense;

5. A statement of the provisions of the law describing any time limit on the prosecution or the execution of punishment for the
offense;

6. Documents, statements, or other types of information specified in paragraph 3 or paragraph 4 of said Article, as applicable.

(Paragraph 2, Article 7, Presidential Decree No. 1069.)

7. Such evidence as, according to the law of the Requested State, would provide probable cause for his arrest and committal
for trial if the offense had been committed there;

8. A copy of the warrant or order of arrest issued by a judge or other competent authority; and

9. A copy of the charging document.

(Paragraph 3, ibid.)

The executive authority (Secretary of Foreign Affairs) must also see to it that the accompanying documents received in support of the
request had been certified by the principal diplomatic or consular officer of the Requested State resident in the Requesting State
(Embassy Note No. 052 from U. S. Embassy; Embassy Note No. 951309 from the Department of Foreign Affairs).

In this light, Paragraph 3, Article 3 of the Treaty provides that "[e]xtradition shall not be granted if the executive authority of the
Requested State determines that the request is politically motivated, or that the offense is a military offense which is not punishable
under non-military penal legislation."

The Extradition Petition

Upon a finding made by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs that the extradition request and its supporting documents are sufficient and
complete in form and substance, he shall deliver the same to the Secretary of Justice, who shall immediately designate and authorize
an attorney in his office to take charge of the case (Paragraph [1], Section 5, P.D. No. 1069). The lawyer designated shall then file a
written petition with the proper regional trial court of the province or city, with a prayer that the court take the extradition request under
consideration (Paragraph [2], ibid.).

The presiding judge of the regional trial court, upon receipt of the petition for extradition, shall, as soon as practicable, issue an order
summoning the prospective extraditee to appear and to answer the petition on the day and hour fixed in the order. The judge may issue
a warrant of arrest if it appears that the immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused will best serve the ends of justice
(Paragraph [1], Section 6, ibid.), particularly to prevent the flight of the prospective extraditee.

The Extradition Hearing

The Extradition Law does not specifically indicate whether the extradition proceeding is criminal, civil, or a special proceeding.
Nevertheless, Paragraph [1], Section 9 thereof provides that in the hearing of the extradition petition, the provisions of the Rules of
Court, insofar as practicable and not inconsistent with the summary nature of the proceedings, shall apply. During the hearing, Section
8 of the Decree provides that the attorney having charge of the case may, upon application by the Requesting State, represent the
latter throughout the proceedings.

Upon conclusion of the hearing, the court shall render a decision granting the extradition and giving the reasons therefor upon a
showing of the existence of a prima facie case, or dismiss the petition (Section 10, ibid.). Said decision is appealable to the Court of
Appeals, whose decision shall be final and immediately executory (Section 12, ibid.). The provisions of the Rules of Court governing
appeal in criminal cases in the Court of Appeals shall apply in the aforementioned appeal, except for the required 15-day period to file
brief (Section 13, ibid.).

The trial court determines whether or not the offense mentioned in the petition is extraditable based on the application of the dual
criminality rule and other conditions mentioned in Article 2 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty. The trial court also determines whether or
not the offense for which extradition is requested is a political one (Paragraph [1], Article 3, RP-US Extradition Treaty).1âwphi1.nêt

With the foregoing abstract of the extradition proceedings as backdrop, the following query presents itself: What is the nature of the role
of the Department of Justice at the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings?

A strict observance of the Extradition Law indicates that the only duty of the Secretary of Justice is to file the extradition petition after
the request and all the supporting papers are forwarded to him by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. It is the latter official who is
authorized to evaluate the extradition papers, to assure their sufficiency, and under Paragraph [3], Article 3 of the Treaty, to determine
whether or not the request is politically motivated, or that the offense is a military offense which is not punishable under non-military
penal legislation. Ipso facto, as expressly provided in Paragraph [1], Section 5 of the Extradition Law, the Secretary of Justice has the
ministerial duty of filing the extradition papers.

However, looking at the factual milieu of the case before us, it would appear that there was failure to abide by the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 1069. For while it is true that the extradition request was delivered to the Department of Foreign Affairs on June
17, 1999, the following day or less than 24 hours later, the Department of Justice received the request, apparently without the
Department of Foreign Affairs discharging its duty of thoroughly evaluating the same and its accompanying documents. The statement
of an assistant secretary at the Department of Foreign Affairs that his Department, in this regard, is merely acting as a post office, for
which reason he simply forwarded the request to the Department of Justice, indicates the magnitude of the error of the Department of
Foreign Affairs in taking lightly its responsibilities. Thereafter, the Department of Justice took it upon itself to determine the
completeness of the documents and to evaluate the same to find out whether they comply with the requirements laid down in the
Extradition Law and the RP-US Extradition Treaty. Petitioner ratiocinates in this connection that although the Department of Justice had
no obligation to evaluate the extradition documents, the Department also had to go over them so as to be able to prepare an extradition
petition (tsn, August 31, 1999, pp. 24-25). Notably, it was also at this stage where private respondent insisted on the following; (1) the
right to be furnished the request and the supporting papers; (2) the right to be heard which consists in having a reasonable period of
time to oppose the request, and to present evidence in support of the opposition; and (3) that the evaluation proceedings be held in
abeyance pending the filing of private respondent's opposition to the request.

The two Departments seem to have misread the scope of their duties and authority, one abdicating its powers and the other enlarging
its commission. The Department of Foreign Affairs, moreover, has, through the Solicitor General, filed a manifestation that it is adopting
the instant petition as its own, indirectly conveying the message that if it were to evaluate the extradition request, it would not allow
private respondent to participate in the process of evaluation.

Plainly then, the record cannot support the presumption of regularity that the Department of Foreign Affairs thoroughly reviewed the
extradition request and supporting documents and that it arrived at a well-founded judgment that the request and its annexed
documents satisfy the requirements of law. The Secretary of Justice, eminent as he is in the field of law, could not privately review the
papers all by himself. He had to officially constitute a panel of attorneys. How then could the DFA Secretary or his undersecretary, in
less than one day, make the more authoritative determination?

The evaluation process, just like the extradition proceedings proper, belongs to a class by itself. It is sui generis. It is not a criminal
investigation, but it is also erroneous to say that it is purely an exercise of ministerial functions. At such stage, the executive authority
has the power: (a) to make a technical assessment of the completeness and sufficiency of the extradition papers; (b) to outrightly deny
the request if on its face and on the face of the supporting documents the crimes indicated are not extraditable; and (c) to make a
determination whether or not the request is politically motivated, or that the offense is a military one which is not punishable under non-
military penal legislation (tsn, August 31, 1999, pp. 28-29; Article 2 & and Paragraph [3], Article 3, RP-US Extradition Treaty). Hence,
said process may be characterized as an investigative or inquisitorial process in contrast to a proceeding conducted in the exercise of
an administrative body's quasi-judicial power.

In administrative law, a quasi-judicial proceeding involves: (a) taking and evaluation of evidence; (b) determining facts based upon the
evidence presented; and (c) rendering an order or decision supported by the facts proved (De Leon, Administrative Law: Text and
Cases, 1993 ed., p. 198, citing Morgan vs. United States, 304 U.S. 1). Inquisitorial power, which is also known as examining or
investigatory power, is one or the determinative powers of an administrative body which better enables it to exercise its quasi-judicial
authority (Cruz, Phil. Administrative Law, 1996 ed., p. 26). This power allows the administrative body to inspect the records and
premises, and investigate the activities, of persons or entities coming under its jurisdiction (Ibid., p. 27), or to require disclosure of
information by means or accounts, records, reports, testimony of witnesses, production of documents, or otherwise (De Leon, op. cit., p.
64).

The power of investigation consists in gathering, organizing, and analyzing evidence, which is a useful aid or tool in an administrative
agency's performance of its rule-making or quasi-judicial functions. Notably, investigation is indispensable to prosecution.

In Ruperto v. Torres (100 Phil. 1098 [1957], unreported), the Court had occasion to rule on the functions of an investigatory body with
the sole power of investigation. It does not exercise judicial functions and its power is limited to investigating the facts and making
findings in respect thereto. The Court laid down the test of determining whether an administrative body is exercising judicial functions or
merely investigatory functions: Adjudication signifies the exercise of power and authority to adjudicate upon the rights and obligations of
the parties before it. Hence, if the only purpose for investigation is to evaluate evidence submitted before it based on the facts and
circumstances presented to it, and if the agency is not authorized to make a final pronouncement affecting the parties, then there is an
absence of judicial discretion and judgment.

The above description in Ruperto applies to an administrative body authorized to evaluate extradition documents. The body has no
power to adjudicate in regard to the rights and obligations of both the Requesting State and the prospective extraditee. Its only power is
to determine whether the papers comply with the requirements of the law and the treaty and, therefore, sufficient to be the basis of an
extradition petition. Such finding is thus merely initial and not final. The body has no power to determine whether or not the extradition
should be effected. That is the role of the court. The body's power is limited to an initial finding of whether or not the extradition petition
can be filed in court.

It is to be noted, however, that in contrast to ordinary investigations, the evaluation procedure is characterized by certain peculiarities.
Primarily, it sets into motion the wheels of the extradition process. Ultimately, it may result in the deprivation of liberty of the prospective
extraditee. This deprivation can be effected at two stages: First, the provisional arrest of the prospective extraditee pending the
submission of the request. This is so because the Treaty provides that in case of urgency, a contracting party may request the
provisional arrest of the person sought pending presentation of the request (Paragraph [1], Article 9, RP-US Extradition Treaty), but he
shall be automatically discharged after 60 days if no request is submitted (Paragraph 4). Presidential Decree No. 1069 provides for a
shorter period of 20 days after which the arrested person could be discharged (Section 20[d]). Logically, although the Extradition Law is
silent on this respect, the provisions only mean that once a request is forwarded to the Requested State, the prospective extraditee may
be continuously detained, or if not, subsequently rearrested (Paragraph [5], Article 9, RP-US Extradition Treaty), for he will only be
discharged if no request is submitted. Practically, the purpose of this detention is to prevent his possible flight from the Requested
State. Second, the temporary arrest of the prospective extraditee during the pendency of the extradition petition in court (Section 6,
Presidential Decree No. 1069).
Clearly, there is an impending threat to a prospective extraditee's liberty as early as during the evaluation stage. It is not only an
imagined threat to his liberty, but a very imminent one.

Because of these possible consequences, we conclude that the evaluation process is akin to an administrative agency conducting an
investigative proceeding, the consequences of which are essentially criminal since such technical assessment sets off or commences
the procedure for, and ultimately, the deprivation of liberty of a prospective extraditee. As described by petitioner himself, this is a "tool"
for criminal law enforcement (p. 78, Rollo). In essence, therefore, the evaluation process partakes of the nature of a criminal
investigation. In a number of cases, we had occasion to make available to a respondent in an administrative case or investigation
certain constitutional rights that are ordinarily available only in criminal prosecutions. Further, as pointed out by Mr. Justice Mendoza
during the oral arguments, there are rights formerly available only at the trial stage that had been advanced to an earlier stage in the
proceedings, such as the right to counsel and the right against self-incrimination (tsn, August 31, 1999, p. 135; Escobedo vs. Illinois,
378 U.S. 478; Gideon vs. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335; Miranda vs. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436).

In Pascual v. Board of Medical Examiners (28 SCRA 344 [1969]), we held that the right against self-incrimination under Section 17,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution which is ordinarily available only in criminal prosecutions, extends to administrative proceedings
which possess a criminal or penal aspect, such as an administrative investigation of a licensed physician who is charged with
immorality, which could result in his loss of the privilege to practice medicine if found guilty. The Court, citing the earlier case of Cabal
vs. Kapunan (6 SCRA 1059 [1962]), pointed out that the revocation of one's license as a medical practitioner, is an even greater
deprivation than forfeiture of property.

Cabal vs. Kapunan (supra) involved an administrative charge of unexplained wealth against a respondent which was filed under
Republic Act No. 1379, or the Anti-Graft Law. Again, we therein ruled that since the investigation may result in forfeiture of property, the
administrative proceedings are deemed criminal or penal, and such forfeiture partakes the nature of a penalty. There is also the earlier
case of Almeda, Sr. vs. Perez (5 SCRA 970 [1962]), where the Court, citing American jurisprudence, laid down the test to determine
whether a proceeding is civil or criminal: If the proceeding is under a statute such that if an indictment is presented the forfeiture can be
included in the criminal case, such proceeding is criminal in nature, although it may be civil in form; and where it must be gathered from
the statute that the action is meant to be criminal in its nature, it cannot be considered as civil. If, however, the proceeding does not
involve the conviction of the wrongdoer for the offense charged, the proceeding is civil in nature.

The cases mentioned above refer to an impending threat of deprivation of one's property or property right. No less is this true, but even
more so in the case before us, involving as it does the possible deprivation of liberty, which, based on the hierarchy of constitutionally
protected rights, is placed second only to life itself and enjoys precedence over property, for while forfeited property can be returned or
replaced, the time spent in incarceration is irretrievable and beyond recompense.

By comparison, a favorable action in an extradition request exposes a person to eventual extradition to a foreign country, thus saliently
exhibiting the criminal or penal aspect of the process. In this sense, the evaluation procedure is akin to a preliminary investigation since
both procedures may have the same result — the arrest and imprisonment of the respondent or the person charged. Similar to the
evaluation stage of extradition proceedings, a preliminary investigation, which may result in the filing of an information against the
respondent, can possibly lead to his arrest, and to the deprivation of his liberty.

Petitioner's reliance on Wright vs. Court of Appeals (235 SCRA 241 [1992]) (p. 8, petitioner's Memorandum) that the extradition treaty is
neither a piece of criminal legislation nor a criminal procedural statute is not well-taken. Wright is not authority for petitioner's conclusion
that his preliminary processing is not akin to a preliminary investigation. The characterization of a treaty in Wright was in reference to
the applicability of the prohibition against an ex post facto law. It had nothing to do with the denial of the right to notice, information, and
hearing.

As early as 1884, the United States Supreme Court ruled that "any legal proceeding enforced by public authority, whether sanctioned
by age or custom, or newly devised in the discretion of the legislative power, in furtherance of the general public good, which regards
and preserved these principles of liberty and justice, must be held to be due process of law" (Hurtado vs. California, 110 U.S. 516).
Compliance with due process requirements cannot be deemed non-compliance with treaty commitments.

The United States and the Philippines share a mutual concern about the suppression and punishment of crime in their respective
jurisdictions. At the same time, both States accord common due process protection to their respective citizens.

The due process clauses in the American and Philippine Constitutions are not only worded in exactly identical language and
terminology, but more importantly, they are alike in what their respective Supreme Courts have expounded as the spirit with which the
provisions are informed and impressed, the elasticity in their interpretation, their dynamic and resilient character which make them
capable of meeting every modern problem, and their having been designed from earliest time to the present to meet the exigencies of
an undefined and expanding future. The requirements of due process are interpreted in both the United States and the Philippines as
not denying to the law the capacity for progress and improvement. Toward this effect and in order to avoid the confines of a legal
straitjacket, the courts instead prefer to have the meaning of the due process clause "gradually ascertained by the process of inclusion
and exclusion in the course of the decisions of cases as they arise" (Twining vs. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78). Capsulized, it refers to "the
embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play" (Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Owner's Association vs. City Mayor of Manila, 20 SCRA
849 [1967]). It relates to certain immutable principles of justice which inhere in the very idea of free government (Holden vs. Hardy, 169
U.S. 366).

Due process is comprised of two components — substantive due process which requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering
with the rights of the person to his life, liberty, or property, and procedural due process which consists of the two basic rights of notice
and hearing, as well as the guarantee of being heard by an impartial and competent tribunal (Cruz, Constitutional Law, 1993 Ed., pp.
102-106).

True to the mandate of the due process clause, the basic rights of notice and hearing pervade not only in criminal and civil proceedings,
but in administrative proceedings as well. Non-observance of these rights will invalidate the proceedings. Individuals are entitled to be
notified of any pending case affecting their interests, and upon notice, they may claim the right to appear therein and present their side
and to refute the position of the opposing parties (Cruz, Phil. Administrative Law, 1996 ed., p. 64).

In a preliminary investigation which is an administrative investigatory proceeding, Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court guarantees
the respondent's basic due process rights, granting him the right to be furnished a copy of the complaint, the affidavits, and other
supporting documents, and the right to submit counter-affidavits and other supporting documents within ten days from receipt thereof.
Moreover, the respondent shall have the right to examine all other evidence submitted by the complainant.

These twin rights may, however, be considered dispensable in certain instances, such as:

1. In proceeding where there is an urgent need for immediate action, like the summary abatement of a nuisance per se (Article
704, Civil Code), the preventive suspension of a public servant facing administrative charges (Section 63, Local Government
Code, B.P. Blg. 337), the padlocking of filthy restaurants or theaters showing obscene movies or like establishments which are
immediate threats to public health and decency, and the cancellation of a passport of a person sought for criminal prosecution;

2. Where there is tentativeness of administrative action, that is, where the respondent is not precluded from enjoying the right
to notice and hearing at a later time without prejudice to the person affected, such as the summary distraint and levy of the
property of a delinquent taxpayer, and the replacement of a temporary appointee; and

3. Where the twin rights have previously been offered but the right to exercise them had not been claimed.

Applying the above principles to the case at bar, the query may be asked: Does the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings fall
under any of the described situations mentioned above?

Let us take a brief look at the nature of American extradition proceedings which are quite noteworthy considering that the subject treaty
involves the U.S. Government.

American jurisprudence distinguishes between interstate rendition or extradition which is based on the Extradition Clause in the U.S.
Constitution (Art. IV, §2 cl 2), and international extradition proceedings. In interstate rendition or extradition, the governor of the asylum
state has the duty to deliver the fugitive to the demanding state. The Extradition Clause and the implementing statute are given a liberal
construction to carry out their manifest purpose, which is to effect the return as swiftly as possible of persons for trial to the state in
which they have been charged with crime (31A Am Jur 2d 754-755). In order to achieve extradition of an alleged fugitive, the requisition
papers or the demand must be in proper form, and all the elements or jurisdictional facts essential to the extradition must appear on the
face of the papers, such as the allegation that the person demanded was in the demanding state at the time the offense charged was
committed, and that the person demanded is charged with the commission of the crime or that prosecution has been begun in the
demanding state before some court or magistrate (35 C.J.S. 406-407). The extradition documents are then filed with the governor of the
asylum state, and must contain such papers and documents prescribed by statute, which essentially include a copy of the instrument
charging the person demanded with a crime, such as an indictment or an affidavit made before a magistrate. Statutory requirements
with respect to said charging instrument or papers are mandatory since said papers are necessary in order to confer jurisdiction on the
government of the asylum state to effect extradition (35 C.J.S. 408-410). A statutory provision requiring duplicate copies of the
indictment, information, affidavit, or judgment of conviction or sentence and other instruments accompanying the demand or requisitions
be furnished and delivered to the fugitive or his attorney is directory. However, the right being such a basic one has been held to be a
right mandatory on demand (Ibid., p. 410, citing Ex parte Moore, 256 S.W. 2d 103, 158 Tex. Cr. 407 and Ex parte Tucker, Cr., 324,
S.W.2d 853).

In international proceedings, extradition treaties generally provide for the presentation to the executive authority of the Requested State
of a requisition or demand for the return of the alleged offender, and the designation of the particular officer having authority to act in
behalf of the demanding nation (31A Am Jur 2d 815).

In petitioner's memorandum filed on September 15, 1999, he attached thereto a letter dated September 13, 1999 from the Criminal
Division of the U.S. Department of Justice, summarizing the U.S. extradition procedures and principles, which are basically governed by
a combination of treaties (with special reference to the RP-US Extradition Treaty), federal statutes, and judicial decisions, to wit:

1. All requests for extradition are transmitted through the diplomatic channel. In urgent cases, requests for the provincial arrest
of an individual may be made directly by the Philippine Department of Justice to the U.S. Department of Justice, and vice-
versa. In the event of a provisional arrest, a formal request for extradition is transmitted subsequently through the diplomatic
channel.

2. The Department of State forwards the incoming Philippine extradition request to the Department of Justice. Before doing so,
the Department of State prepares a declaration confirming that a formal request has been made, that the treaty is in full force
and effect, that under Article 17 thereof the parties provide reciprocal legal representation in extradition proceedings, that the
offenses are covered as extraditable offenses under Article 2 thereof, and that the documents have been authenticated in
accordance with the federal statute that ensures admissibility at any subsequent extradition hearing.

3. A judge or magistrate judge is authorized to issue a warrant for the arrest of the prospective extraditee (18 U.S.C. §3184).
Said judge or magistrate is authorized to hold a hearing to consider the evidence offered in support of the extradition request
(Ibid.)

4. At the hearing, the court must determine whether the person arrested is extraditable to the foreign country. The court must
also determine that (a) it has jurisdiction over the defendant and jurisdiction to conduct the hearing; (b) the defendant is being
sought for offenses for which the applicable treaty permits extradition; and (c) there is probable cause to believe that the
defendant is the person sought and that he committed the offenses charged (Ibid.)

5. The judge or magistrate judge is vested with jurisdiction to certify extraditability after having received a "complaint made
under oath, charging any person found within his jurisdiction" with having committed any of the crimes provided for by the
governing treaty in the country requesting extradition (Ibid.) [In this regard, it is noted that a long line of American decisions
pronounce that international extradition proceedings partake of the character of a preliminary examination before a committing
magistrate, rather than a trial of the guilt or innocence of the alleged fugitive (31A Am Jur 2d 826).]

6. If the court decides that the elements necessary for extradition are present, it incorporates its determinations in factual
findings and conclusions of law and certifies the person's extraditability. The court then forwards this certification of
extraditability to the Department of State for disposition by the Secretary of State. The ultimate decision whether to surrender
an individual rests with the Secretary of State (18 U.S.C. §3186).
 7. The subject of an extradition request may not litigate questions concerning the motives of the requesting government in
seeking his extradition. However, a person facing extradition may present whatever information he deems relevant to the
Secretary of State, who makes the final determination whether to surrender an individual to the foreign government concerned.

From the foregoing, it may be observed that in the United States, extradition begins and ends with one entity — the Department of
State — which has the power to evaluate the request and the extradition documents in the beginning, and, in the person of the
Secretary of State, the power to act or not to act on the court's determination of extraditability. In the Philippine setting, it is the
Department of Foreign Affairs which should make the initial evaluation of the request, and having satisfied itself on the points earlier
mentioned (see pp. 10-12), then forwards the request to the Department of Justice for the preparation and filing of the petition for
extradition. Sadly, however, the Department of Foreign Affairs, in the instant case, perfunctorily turned over the request to the
Department of Justice which has taken over the task of evaluating the request as well as thereafter, if so warranted, preparing, filing,
and prosecuting the petition for extradition.

Private respondent asks what prejudice will be caused to the U.S. Government should the person sought to be extradited be given due
process rights by the Philippines in the evaluation stage. He emphasizes that petitioner's primary concern is the possible delay in the
evaluation process.

We agree with private respondent's citation of an American Supreme Court ruling:

The establishment of prompt efficacious procedures to achieve legitimate state ends is a proper state interest worthy of
cognizance in constitutional adjudication. But the Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency. Indeed, one
might fairly say of the Bill of Rights in general, and the Due Process Clause, in particular, that they were designed to protect
the fragile values of a vulnerable citizenry from the overbearing concern for efficiency and efficacy that may characterize
praiseworthy government officials no less, and perhaps more, than mediocre ones.

(Stanley vs. Illinois, 404 U.S. 645, 656)

The United States, no doubt, shares the same interest as the Philippine Government that no right — that of liberty — secured not only
by the Bills of Rights of the Philippines Constitution but of the United States as well, is sacrificed at the altar of expediency.

(pp. 40-41, Private Respondent's Memorandum.)

In the Philippine context, this Court's ruling is invoked:

One of the basic principles of the democratic system is that where the rights of the individual are concerned, the end does not
justify the means. It is not enough that there be a valid objective; it is also necessary that the means employed to pursue it be
in keeping with the Constitution. Mere expediency will not excuse constitutional shortcuts. There is no question that not even
the strongest moral conviction or the most urgent public need, subject only to a few notable exceptions, will excuse the
bypassing of an individual's rights. It is no exaggeration to say that a person invoking a right guaranteed under Article III of the
Constitution is a majority of one even as against the rest of the nation who would deny him that right (Association of Small
Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343, 375-376 [1989]).

There can be no dispute over petitioner's argument that extradition is a tool of criminal law enforcement. To be effective, requests for
extradition or the surrender of accused or convicted persons must be processed expeditiously. Nevertheless, accelerated or fast-
tracked proceedings and adherence to fair procedures are, however, not always incompatible. They do not always clash in discord.
Summary does not mean precipitous haste. It does not carry a disregard of the basic principles inherent in "ordered liberty."

Is there really an urgent need for immediate action at the evaluation stage? At that point, there is no extraditee yet in the strict sense of
the word. Extradition may or may not occur. In interstate extradition, the governor of the asylum state may not, in the absence of
mandatory statute, be compelled to act favorably (37 C.J.S. 387) since after a close evaluation of the extradition papers, he may hold
that federal and statutory requirements, which are significantly jurisdictional, have not been met (31 Am Jur 2d 819). Similarly, under an
extradition treaty, the executive authority of the requested state has the power to deny the behest from the requesting state.
Accordingly, if after a careful examination of the extradition documents the Secretary of Foreign Affairs finds that the request fails to
meet the requirements of the law and the treaty, he shall not forward the request to the Department of Justice for the filing of the
extradition petition since non-compliance with the aforesaid requirements will not vest our government with jurisdiction to effect the
extradition.

In this light, it should be observed that the Department of Justice exerted notable efforts in assuring compliance with the requirements
of the law and the treaty since it even informed the U.S. Government of certain problems in the extradition papers (such as those that
are in Spanish and without the official English translation, and those that are not properly authenticated). In fact, petitioner even admits
that consultation meetings are still supposed to take place between the lawyers in his Department and those from the U.S. Justice
Department. With the meticulous nature of the evaluation, which cannot just be completed in an abbreviated period of time due to its
intricacies, how then can we say that it is a proceeding that urgently necessitates immediate and prompt action where notice and
hearing can be dispensed with?

Worthy of inquiry is the issue of whether or not there is tentativeness of administrative action. Is private respondent precluded from
enjoying the right to notice and hearing at a later time without prejudice to him? Here lies the peculiarity and deviant characteristic of the
evaluation procedure. On one hand there is yet no extraditee, but ironically on the other, it results in an administrative if adverse to the
person involved, may cause his immediate incarceration. The grant of the request shall lead to the filing of the extradition petition in
court. The "accused" (as Section 2[c] of Presidential Decree No. 1069 calls him), faces the threat of arrest, not only after the extradition
petition is filed in court, but even during the evaluation proceeding itself by virtue of the provisional arrest allowed under the treaty and
the implementing law. The prejudice to the "accused" is thus blatant and manifest.

Plainly, the notice and hearing requirements of administrative due process cannot be dispensed with and shelved aside.

Apart from the due process clause of the Constitution, private respondent likewise invokes Section 7 of Article III which reads:
 Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and
to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as
basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

The above provision guarantees political rights which are available to citizens of the Philippines, namely: (1) the right to information on
matters of public concern, and (2) the corollary right of access to official records documents. The general right guaranteed by said
provision is the right to information on matters of public concern. In its implementation, the right of access to official records is likewise
conferred. These cognate or related rights are "subject to limitations as may be provided by law" (Bernas, The 1987 Phil. Constitution A
Reviewer-Primer, 1997 ed., p. 104) and rely on the premise that ultimately it is an informed and critical public opinion which alone can
protect the values of democratic government (Ibid.).

Petitioner argues that the matters covered by private respondent's letter-request dated July 1, 1999 do not fall under the guarantee of
the foregoing provision since the matters contained in the documents requested are not of public concern. On the other hand, private
respondent argues that the distinction between matters vested with public interest and matters which are of purely private interest only
becomes material when a third person, who is not directly affected by the matters requested, invokes the right to information. However,
if the person invoking the right is the one directly affected thereby, his right to information becomes absolute.

The concept of matters of public concerns escapes exact definition. Strictly speaking, every act of a public officer in the conduct of the
governmental process is a matter of public concern (Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, 1996 ed., p. 336).
This concept embraces a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives
or simply because such matters arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen (Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, 150 SCRA 530 [1987]).
Hence, the real party in interest is the people and any citizen has "standing".

When the individual himself is involved in official government action because said action has a direct bearing on his life, and may either
cause him some kind of deprivation or injury, he actually invokes the basic right to be notified under Section 1 of the Bill of Rights and
not exactly the right to information on matters of public concern. As to an accused in a criminal proceeding, he invokes Section 14,
particularly the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

The right to information is implemented by the right of access to information within the control of the government (Bernas, The 1987
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, 1996 ed., p. 337). Such information may be contained in official records, and in
documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions.

In the case at bar, the papers requested by private respondent pertain to official government action from the U.S. Government. No
official action from our country has yet been taken. Moreover, the papers have some relation to matters of foreign relations with the
U.S. Government. Consequently, if a third party invokes this constitutional provision, stating that the extradition papers are matters of
public concern since they may result in the extradition of a Filipino, we are afraid that the balance must be tilted, at such particular time,
in favor of the interests necessary for the proper functioning of the government. During the evaluation procedure, no official
governmental action of our own government has as yet been done; hence the invocation of the right is premature. Later, and in
contrast, records of the extradition hearing would already fall under matters of public concern, because our government by then shall
have already made an official decision to grant the extradition request. The extradition of a fellow Filipino would be forthcoming.

We now pass upon the final issue pertinent to the subject matter of the instant controversy: Would private respondent's entitlement to
notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the proceedings constitute a breach of the legal duties of the Philippine Government
under the RP-Extradition Treaty? Assuming the answer is in the affirmative, is there really a conflict between the treaty and the due
process clause in the Constitution?

First and foremost, let us categorically say that this is not the proper time to pass upon the constitutionality of the provisions of the RP-
US Extradition Treaty nor the Extradition Law implementing the same. We limit ourselves only to the effect of the grant of the basic
rights of notice and hearing to private respondent on foreign relations.

The rule of pacta sunt servanda, one of the oldest and most fundamental maxims of international law, requires the parties to a treaty to
keep their agreement therein in good faith. The observance of our country's legal duties under a treaty is also compelled by Section 2,
Article II of the Constitution which provides that "[t]he Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice,
freedom, cooperation and amity with nations." Under the doctrine of incorporation, rules of international law form part of the law of the
and land no further legislative action is needed to make such rules applicable in the domestic sphere (Salonga & Yap, Public
International Law, 1992 ed., p. 12).

The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals (or local courts) are confronted with situations in which there
appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of the local state. Efforts
should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since it is to be presumed that municipal law was enacted with
proper regard for the generally accepted principles of international law in observance of the observance of the Incorporation Clause in
the above-cited constitutional provision (Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1996 ed., p. 55). In a situation, however, where the conflict is
irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule of international law and municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal
law should be upheld by the municipal courts (Ichong vs. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155 [1957]; Gonzales vs. Hechanova, 9 SCRA 230
[1963]; In re: Garcia, 2 SCRA 984 [1961]) for the reason that such courts are organs of municipal law and are accordingly bound by it in
all circumstances (Salonga & Yap, op. cit., p. 13). The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not
pertain to or imply the primacy of international law over national or municipal law in the municipal sphere. The doctrine of incorporation,
as applied in most countries, decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing with, but are not superior to, national
legislative enactments. Accordingly, the principle lex posterior derogat priori takes effect — a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute
may repeal a treaty. In states where the constitution is the highest law of the land, such as the Republic of the Philippines, both statutes
and treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution (Ibid.).

In the case at bar, is there really a conflict between international law and municipal or national law? En contrario, these two components
of the law of the land are not pined against each other. There is no occasion to choose which of the two should be upheld. Instead, we
see a void in the provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty, as implemented by Presidential Decree No. 1069, as regards the basic
due process rights of a prospective extraditee at the evaluation stage of extradition proceedings. From the procedures earlier
abstracted, after the filing of the extradition petition and during the judicial determination of the propriety of extradition, the rights of
notice and hearing are clearly granted to the prospective extraditee. However, prior thereto, the law is silent as to these rights.
Reference to the U.S. extradition procedures also manifests this silence.

Petitioner interprets this silence as unavailability of these rights. Consequently, he describes the evaluation procedure as an "ex
parte technical assessment" of the sufficiency of the extradition request and the supporting documents.

We disagree.

In the absence of a law or principle of law, we must apply the rules of fair play. An application of the basic twin due process rights of
notice and hearing will not go against the treaty or the implementing law. Neither the Treaty nor the Extradition Law precludes these
rights from a prospective extraditee. Similarly, American jurisprudence and procedures on extradition pose no proscription. In fact, in
interstate extradition proceedings as explained above, the prospective extraditee may even request for copies of the extradition
documents from the governor of the asylum state, and if he does, his right to be supplied the same becomes a demandable right (35
C.J.S. 410).

Petitioner contends that the United States requested the Philippine Government to prevent unauthorized disclosure of confidential
information. Hence, the secrecy surrounding the action of the Department of Justice Panel of Attorneys. The confidentiality argument is,
however, overturned by petitioner's revelation that everything it refuses to make available at this stage would be obtainable during trial.
The Department of Justice states that the U.S. District Court concerned has authorized the disclosure of certain grand jury information.
If the information is truly confidential, the veil of secrecy cannot be lifted at any stage of the extradition proceedings. Not even during
trial.

A libertarian approach is thus called for under the premises.

One will search in vain the RP-US Extradition Treaty, the Extradition Law, as well as American jurisprudence and procedures on
extradition, for any prohibition against the conferment of the two basic due process rights of notice and hearing during the evaluation
stage of the extradition proceedings. We have to consider similar situations in jurisprudence for an application by analogy.

Earlier, we stated that there are similarities between the evaluation process and a preliminary investigation since both procedures may
result in the arrest of the respondent or the prospective extraditee. In the evaluation process, a provisional arrest is even allowed by the
Treaty and the Extradition Law (Article 9, RP-US Extradition Treaty; Sec. 20, Presidential Decree No. 1069). Following petitioner's
theory, because there is no provision of its availability, does this imply that for a period of time, the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is suspended, despite Section 15, Article III of the Constitution which states that "[t]he privilege of the writ or habeas corpus shall
not be suspended except in cases of invasion or rebellion when the public safety requires it"? Petitioner's theory would also infer that
bail is not available during the arrest of the prospective extraditee when the extradition petition has already been filed in court since
Presidential Decree No. 1069 does not provide therefor, notwithstanding Section 13, Article III of the Constitution which provides that
"[a]ll persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before
conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be
impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. . ." Can petitioner validly argue that since these
contraventions are by virtue of a treaty and hence affecting foreign relations, the aforestated guarantees in the Bill of Rights could thus
be subservient thereto?

The basic principles of administrative law instruct us that "the essence of due process in administrative proceeding is an opportunity to
explain one's side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the actions or ruling complained of (Mirano vs. NLRC, 270 SCRA 96
[1997]; Padilla vs. NLRC, 273 SCRA 457 [1997]; PLDT vs. NLRC, 276 SCRA 1 [1997]; Helpmate, Inc. vs. NLRC, 276 SCRA 315
[1997]; Aquinas School vs. Magnaye, 278 SCRA 602 [1997]; Jamer vs. NLRC, 278 SCRA 632 [1997]). In essence, procedural due
process refers to the method or manner by which the law is enforced (Corona vs. United Harbor Pilots Association of the Phils., 283
SCRA 31 [1997]). This Court will not tolerate the least disregard of constitutional guarantees in the enforcement of a law or treaty.
Petitioner's fears that the Requesting State may have valid objections to the Requested State's non-performance of its commitments
under the Extradition Treaty are insubstantial and should not be given paramount consideration.

How then do we implement the RP-US Extradition Treaty? Do we limit ourselves to the four corners of Presidential Decree No. 1069?

Of analogous application are the rulings in Government Service Insurance System vs. Court of Appeals (201 SCRA 661 [1991]) and Go
vs. National Police Commission (271 SCRA 447 [1997]) where we ruled that in summary proceedings under Presidential Decree No.
807 (Providing for the Organization of the Civil Service Commission in Accordance with Provisions of the Constitution, Prescribing its
Powers and Functions and for Other Purposes), and Presidential Decree No. 971 (Providing Legal Assistance for Members of the
Integrated National Police who may be charged for Service-Connected Offenses and Improving the Disciplinary System in the
Integrated National Police, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for other purposes), as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1707,
although summary dismissals may be effected without the necessity of a formal investigation, the minimum requirements of due
process still operate. As held in GSIS vs. Court of Appeals:

. . . [I]t is clear to us that what the opening sentence of Section 40 is saying is that an employee may be removed or dismissed
even without formal investigation, in certain instances. It is equally clear to us that an employee must be informed of the
charges preferred against him, and that the normal way by which the employee is so informed is by furnishing him with a copy
of the charges against him. This is a basic procedural requirement that a statute cannot dispense with and still remain
consistent with the constitutional provision on due process. The second minimum requirement is that the employee charged
with some misfeasance or malfeasance must have a reasonable opportunity to present his side of the matter, that is to say, his
defenses against the charges levelled against him and to present evidence in support of his defenses. . . .

(at p. 671)

Said summary dismissal proceedings are also non-litigious in nature, yet we upheld the due process rights of the respondent.

In the case at bar, private respondent does not only face a clear and present danger of loss of property or employment, but of liberty
itself, which may eventually lead to his forcible banishment to a foreign land. The convergence of petitioner's favorable action on the
extradition request and the deprivation of private respondent's liberty is easily comprehensible.
We have ruled time and again that this Court's equity jurisdiction, which is aptly described as "justice outside legality," may be availed of
only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law or judicial pronouncements (Smith Bell & Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 267
SCRA 530 [1997]; David-Chan vs. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 677 [1997]). The constitutional issue in the case at bar does not even
call for "justice outside legality," since private respondent's due process rights, although not guaranteed by statute or by treaty, are
protected by constitutional guarantees. We would not be true to the organic law of the land if we choose strict construction over
guarantees against the deprivation of liberty. That would not be in keeping with the principles of democracy on which our Constitution is
premised.

Verily, as one traverses treacherous waters of conflicting and opposing currents of liberty and government authority, he must ever hold
the oar of freedom in the stronger arm, lest an errant and wayward course be laid.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Petitioner is ordered to
furnish private respondent copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers, and to grant him a reasonable period within
which to file his comment with supporting evidence. The incidents in Civil Case No. 99-94684 having been rendered moot and
academic by this decision, the same is hereby ordered dismissed.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 149335. July 1, 2003

EDILLO C. MONTEMAYOR, Petitioner, v. LUIS BUNDALIAN, RONALDO B. ZAMORA, Executive Secretary, Office of the
President, AND GREGORIO R. VIGILAR, Secretary, Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), respondents.

DECISION

PUNO, J.:

In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner EDILLO C. MONTEMAYOR assails the Decision of the Court of
Appeals, dated April 18, 2001, affirming the decision of the Office of the President in Administrative Order No. 12
ordering petitioners dismissal as Regional Director of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) for
unexplained wealth.

Petitioners dismissal originated from an unverified letter-complaint, dated July 15, 1995, addressed by private
respondent LUIS BUNDALIAN to the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. Private
respondent accused petitioner, then OIC-Regional Director, Region III, of the DPWH, of accumulating unexplained
wealth, in violation of Section 8 of Republic Act No. 3019. Private respondent charged that in 1993, petitioner and his
wife purchased a house and lot at 907 North Bel Aire Drive, Burbank, Los Angeles, California, making a down payment
of US$100,000.00. He further alleged that petitioners in-laws who were living in California had a poor credit standing
due to a number of debts and they could not have purchased such an expensive property for petitioner and his wife.
Private respondent accused petitioner of amassing wealth from lahar funds and other public works projects.

Private respondent attached to his letter-complaint the following documents:

a) a copy of a Grant Deed, dated May 27, 1993, where spouses David and Judith Tedesco granted the subject
property to petitioner and his wife;

b) a copy of the Special Power of Attorney (SPA) executed by petitioner and his wife in California appointing
petitioners sister-in-law Estela D. Fajardo as their attorney-in-fact, to negotiate and execute all documents and
requirements to complete the purchase of the subject property; and,

c) an excerpt from the newspaper column of Lito A. Catapusan in the Manila Bulletin, entitled Beatwatch, where it was
reported that a low-ranking, multimillionaire DPWH employee, traveled to Europe and the U.S. with his family,
purchased an expensive house in California, appointed a woman through an SPA to manage the subject property and
had hidden and unexplained wealth in the Philippines and in the U.S.

Accordingly, the letter-complaint and its attached documents were indorsed by the Philippine Consulate General of
San Francisco, California, to the Philippine Commission Against Graft and Corruption (PCAGC)[1] for investigation.
Petitioner, represented by counsel, submitted his counter-affidavit before the PCAGC alleging that the real owner of
the subject property was his sister-in-law Estela Fajardo. Petitioner explained that in view of the unstable condition of
government service in 1991, his wife inquired from her family in the U.S. about their possible emigration to the
States. They were advised by an immigration lawyer that it would be an advantage if they had real property in the
U.S. Fajardo intimated to them that she was interested in buying a house and lot in Burbank, California, but could not
do so at that time as there was a provision in her mortgage contract prohibiting her to purchase another property
pending full payment of a real estate she earlier acquired in Palmdale, Los Angeles. Fajardo offered to buy the
Burbank property and put the title in the names of petitioner and his wife to support their emigration plans and to
enable her at the same time to circumvent the prohibition in her mortgage contract.

Petitioner likewise pointed out that the charge against him was the subject of similar cases filed before the
Ombudsman.[2] He attached to his counter-affidavit the Consolidated Investigation Report[3] of the Ombudsman
dismissing similar charges for insufficiency of evidence.

From May 29, 1996 until March 13, 1997, the PCAGC conducted its own investigation of the complaint. While
petitioner participated in the proceedings and submitted various pleadings and documents through his counsel, private
respondent-complainant could not be located as his Philippine address could not be ascertained. In the course of the
investigation, the PCAGC repeatedly required petitioner to submit his Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth
(SALN), Income Tax Returns (ITRs) and Personal Data Sheet. Petitioner ignored these directives and submitted only
his Service Record. He likewise adduced in evidence the checks allegedly issued by his sister-in-law to pay for the
house and lot in Burbank, California. When the PCAGC requested the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon to furnish it with
copies of petitioners SALN from 1992-1994, it was informed that petitioner failed to file his SALN for those years.

After the investigation, the PCAGC, in its Report to the Office of the President, made the following findings: Petitioner
purchased a house and lot in Burbank, California, for US$195,000.00 (or P3.9M at the exchange rate prevailing in
1993). The sale was evidenced by a Grant Deed. The PCAGC concluded that the petitioner could not have been able to
afford to buy the property on his annual income of P168,648.00 in 1993 as appearing on his Service Record. It
likewise found petitioners explanation as unusual, largely unsubstantiated, unbelievable and self-serving. The PCAGC
noted that instead of adducing evidence, petitioners counsel exerted more effort in filing pleadings and motion to
dismiss on the ground of forum shopping. It also took against petitioner his refusal to submit his SALN and ITR
despite the undertaking made by his counsel which raised the presumption that evidence willfully suppressed would
be adverse if produced. The PCAGC concluded that as petitioners acquisition of the subject property was manifestly
out of proportion to his salary, it has been unlawfully acquired. Thus, it recommended petitioners dismissal from
service pursuant to Section 8 of R.A. No. 3019.
On August 24, 1998, the Office of the President, concurring with the findings and adopting the recommendation of the
PCAGC, issued Administrative Order No. 12,[4] ordering petitioners dismissal from service with forfeiture of all
government benefits.

Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied. His appeal to the Court of Appeals was likewise dismissed.[5]

Hence, this petition for review where petitioner raises the following issues for resolution: first, whether he was denied
due process in the investigation before the PCAGC; second, whether his guilt was proved by substantial evidence;
and, third, whether the earlier dismissal of similar cases before the Ombudsman rendered the administrative case
before the PCAGC moot and academic.

On the issue of due process, petitioner submits that the PCAGC committed infractions of the cardinal rules of
administrative due process when it relied on Bundalians unverified letter-complaint. He gripes that his counter-
affidavit should have been given more weight as the unverified complaint constitutes hearsay evidence. Moreover,
petitioner insists that in ruling against him, the PCAGC failed to respect his right to confront and cross-examine the
complainant as the latter never appeared in any of the hearings before the PCAGC nor did he send a representative
therein.

We find no merit in his contentions. The essence of due process in administrative proceedings is the opportunity to
explain ones side or seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. As long as the parties are given the
opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered, the demands of due process are sufficiently met.[6] In the case
at bar, the PCAGC exerted efforts to notify the complainant of the proceedings but his Philippine residence could not
be located.[7] Be that as it may, petitioner cannot argue that he was deprived of due process because he failed to
confront and cross-examine the complainant. Petitioner voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the PCAGC by
participating in the proceedings before it. He was duly represented by counsel. He filed his counter-affidavit,
submitted documentary evidence, attended the hearings, moved for a reconsideration of Administrative Order No. 12
issued by the President and eventually filed his appeal before the Court of Appeals. His active participation in every
step of the investigation effectively removed any badge of procedural deficiency, if there was any, and satisfied the
due process requirement. He cannot now be allowed to challenge the procedure adopted by the PCAGC in the
investigation.[8]

Neither can we sustain petitioners contention that the charge against him was unsupported by substantial evidence as
it was contained in an unverified complaint. The lack of verification of the administrative complaint and the non-
appearance of the complainant at the investigation did not divest the PCAGC of its authority to investigate the charge
of unexplained wealth. Under Section 3 of Executive Order No. 151 creating the PCAGC, complaints involving graft and
corruption may be filed before it in any form or manner against presidential appointees in the executive
department. Indeed, it is not totally uncommon that a government agency is given a wide latitude in the scope and
exercise of its investigative powers. The Ombudsman, under the Constitution, is directed to act on any complaint
likewise filed in any form and manner concerning official acts or omissions. The Court Administrator of this Court
investigates and takes cognizance of, not only unverified, but even anonymous complaints filed against court
employees or officials for violation of the Code of Ethical Conduct. This policy has been adopted in line with the serious
effort of the government to minimize, if not eradicate, graft and corruption in the service.

It is well to remember that in administrative proceedings, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly
applied. Administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense for it is enough
that the party is given the chance to be heard before the case against him is decided.[9] This was afforded to the
petitioner in the case at bar.

On the second issue, there is a need to lay down the basic principles in administrative investigations. First, the burden
is on the complainant to prove by substantial evidence the allegations in his complaint.[10]Substantial evidence is
more than a mere scintilla of evidence. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds equally reasonable might conceivably opine
otherwise.[11] Second, in reviewing administrative decisions of the executive branch of the government, the findings
of facts made therein are to be respected so long as they are supported by substantial evidence. Hence, it is not for
the reviewing court to weigh the conflicting evidence, determine the credibility of witnesses, or otherwise substitute its
judgment for that of the administrative agency with respect to the sufficiency of evidence. Third, administrative
decisions in matters within the executive jurisdiction can only be set aside on proof of gross abuse of discretion, fraud,
or error of law. These principles negate the power of the reviewing court to re-examine the sufficiency of the evidence
in an administrative case as if originally instituted therein, and do not authorize the court to receive additional
evidence that was not submitted to the administrative agency concerned.[12]

In the case at bar, petitioner admitted that the subject property was in his name. However, he insisted that it was his
sister-in-law Estela Fajardo who paid for the property in installments. He submitted as proof thereof the checks issued
by Fajardo as payment for the amortizations of the property. His evidence, however, likewise fail to convince us. First,
the record is bereft of evidence to prove the alleged internal arrangement petitioner entered into with Fajardo. He did
not submit her affidavit to the investigating body nor did she testify before it regarding her ownership of the Burbank
property. Second, the checks allegedly issued by Fajardo to pay for the monthly amortizations on the property have
no evidentiary weight as Fajardos mere issuance thereof cannot prove petitioners non-ownership of the property.
Fajardo would naturally issue the checks as she was appointed by petitioner as attorney-in-fact and the latter would
naturally course through her the payments for the Burbank property. Third, petitioners own evidence contradict his
position. We cannot reconcile petitioners denial of ownership of the property with the loan statement[13] he adduced
showing that he obtained a loan from the World Savings and Loan Association for $195,000.00 on June 23, 1993 to
finance the acquisition of the property. Then, three (3) years later, on May 30, 1996, petitioner and his wife executed
a Quitclaim Deed[14] donating the Burbank property to his sisters-in-law Estela and Rose Fajardo allegedly to prove
his non-ownership of the property. It is obvious that the Quitclaim Deed is a mere afterthought, having been executed
only after a complaint for unexplained wealth was lodged against petitioner. Why the Quitclaim Deed included Rose
Fajardo when it was only Estela Fajardo who allegedly owned the property was not explained on the record.
Petitioners evidence failed to clarify the issue as it produced, rather than settled, more questions.

Petitioner admitted that the Grant Deed over the property was in his name. He never denied the existence and due
execution of the Grant Deed and the Special Power of Attorney he conferred to Estela Fajardo with respect to the
acquisition of the Burbank property. With these admissions, the burden of proof was shifted to petitioner to prove
non-ownership of the property. He cannot now ask this Court to remand the case to the PCAGC for reception of
additional evidence as, in the absence of any errors of law, it is not within the Courts power to do so. He had every
opportunity to adduce his evidence before the PCAGC.

Lastly, we cannot sustain petitioners stance that the dismissal of similar charges against him before the Ombudsman
rendered the administrative case against him before the PCAGC moot and academic. To be sure, the decision of the
Ombudsman does not operate as res judicata in the PCAGC case subject of this review. The doctrine of res
judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, not to the exercise of administrative
powers.[15]Petitioner was investigated by the Ombudsman for his possible criminal liability for the acquisition of the
Burbank property in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and the Revised Penal Code. For the same
alleged misconduct, Petitioner, as a presidential appointee, was investigated by the PCAGC by virtue of the
administrative power and control of the President over him. As the PCAGCs investigation of petitioner was
administrative in nature, the doctrine of res judicata finds no application in the case at bar.

Thus, we find that the Court of Appeals correctly sustained petitioners dismissal from service as the complaint and its
supporting documents established that he acquired a property whose value is disproportionate to his income in the
government service, unless he has other sources of income which he failed to reveal. His liability was proved by
substantial evidence.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DISMISSED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
[G.R. NO. 157684. April 27, 2005]

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, Petitioners, v. PRISCILLA G. CAMPOSANO, ENRIQUE L. PEREZ, and IMELDA Q.

AGUSTIN, Respondents.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Administrative due process requires that, prior to imposing disciplinary sanctions, the disciplining authority must make
an independent assessment of the facts and the law. On its face, a decision imposing administrative sanctions must
show the bases for its conclusions. While the investigation of a case may be delegated to and conducted by another
body or group of officials, the disciplining authority must nevertheless weigh the evidence gathered and indicate the
applicable law. In this manner, the respondents would be informed of the bases for the sanctions and thus be able to
prepare their appeal intelligently. Such procedure is part of the sporting idea of fair play in a democracy.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the March 19, 2003 Decision2 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 67720. The challenged Decision disposed as follows:

"WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions of the CSC are
hereby SET ASIDE.

"The Department of Health is hereby ordered to:

"1) Reinstate petitioners without loss of seniority rights but without prejudice to an administrative investigation that
may be undertaken against them by the DOH should the evidence warrant; andcralawlibrary

"2) Pay petitioners their back salaries from the time their preventive suspension expired. Mandatory leave credits shall
not be charged against their leave credits."3

The Facts

The facts are narrated by the CA as follows:

"[Respondents] are former employees of the Department of Health National Capital Region (hereinafter DOH-NCR).
They held various positions as follows: [Respondent] Priscilla B. Camposano (hereinafter Camposano) was the Finance
and Management Officer II, [Respondent] Imelda Q. Agusin (hereinafter Agustin) was an Accountant I, and
[Respondent] Enrique L. Perez (hereinafter Perez) was the Acting Supply Officer III.

"On May 15, 1996, some concerned [DOH-NCR] employees filed a complaint before the DOH Resident Ombudsman
Rogelio A. Ringpis (hereinafter the Resident Ombudsman) against Dir. IV Rosalinda U. Majarais, Acting Administrative
Officer III Horacio Cabrera, and [respondents], arising out of an alleged anomalous purchase by DOH-NCR of 1,500
bottles of Ferrous Sulfate 250 mg. with Vitamin B Complex and Folic Acid capsules worth P330,000.00 from Lumar
Pharmaceutical Laboratory on May 13, 1996.

"On August 6, 1996, the Resident Ombudsman submitted an investigation report to the Secretary of Health
recommending the filing of a formal administrative charge of Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct against [respondents]
and their co-respondents.

"On August 8, 1996, the Secretary of Health filed a formal charge against the [respondents] and their co-respondents
for Grave Misconduct, Dishonesty, and Violation of RA 3019. On October 25, 1996, then Executive Secretary Ruben D.
Torres issued Administrative Order No. 298 (hereafter AO 298) creating an ad-hoc committee to investigate the
administrative case filed against the DOH-NCR employees. The said AO was indorsed to the Presidential Commission
Against Graft and Corruption (hereafter PCAGC) on October 26, 1996. The same reads:

'I have the honor to transmit herewith, for your information and guidance, a certified copy of Administrative Order No.
298 dated October 25, 1996 entitled 'CREATING AN AD HOC COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATIVE
CASES FILED AGAINST NCR HEALTH DIRECTOR ROSALINDA U. MAJARAIS AND OTHER OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION.'

"On December 2, 1996, the PCAGC took over the investigation from the DOH. After the investigation, it issued a
resolution on January 23, 1998 disposing [respondents]' case as follows:

'WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Commission finds Respondents Rosalinda U. Majarais, Priscilla G. Camposano,
Financial Management Chief II, Horacio D. Cabrera, Acting Administrative Officer V, Imelda Q. Agustin, Accountant I
and Enrique L. Perez, Acting Supply Officer III, all of the Department of Health - National Capital Region (DOH-NCR)
guilty as charged and so recommends to his Excellency President Fidel V. Ramos that the penalty of dismissal from
the government service be imposed thereon.

'SO ORDERED.'
"On April 20, 1998, President Ramos issued [Administrative Order No. 390 (hereinafter AO 390)] that reads:

'WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Dr. Rosalinda U. Majarais is hereby found guilty as charged and, as
recommended by the Presidential Commission Against Graft and Corruption, is meted the Penalty of dismissal from
the service. The records of the case with respect to the other respondents are remanded to Secretary Carmencita N.
Reodica, Department of Health for appropriate action.'

"Thereafter, on May 8, 1998, the Secretary of Health issued an Order disposing of the case against [respondents] and
[Horacio Cabrera]. The dispositive portion reads:

'WHEREFORE, pursuant to the Resolution rendered by the Presidential Commission Against Graft and Corruption
(PCAGC) dated 23 January 1998 on the above-captioned case, respondents Priscilla G. Camposano, Financial
Management Chief II, Horacio D. Cabrera, Acting Administrative Officer V, Imelda Q. Agustin, Accountant I and
Enrique L. Perez, Acting Supply Officer III, all of the Department of Health - NCR are hereby DISMISSED from the
service.

'SO ORDERED.'

"On May 28, 1998 [respondents] filed a motion for reconsideration of the said Order. The Secretary of Health denied
the same on June 5, 1998. Thus, [respondents] filed a Notice of Appeal on June 29, 1998.

"On July 17, 1998, [respondents] filed their appeal with the CSC. The appeal was denied by the CSC on May 21, 1999.
Horacio Cabrera filed a separate appeal with the CSC which was denied on August 17, 1999. [Respondents]' motion
for reconsideration was denied on September 30, 1999. While Cabrera's motion for reconsideration was denied on
January 27, 2000. [Respondents], however, received the resolution denying their motion for reconsideration on
November 2001. Thus, Horacio Cabrera was able to appeal to [the CA] the CSC's resolutions ahead of [respondents].
The petition of Cabrera was granted [by the CA] in a decision dated October 15, 2001 with a dispositive portion which
reads:

'WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Assailed Resolutions of the Civil Service Commission are hereby
SET ASIDE.

'Petitioner Horacio D. Cabrera is exonerated of the administrative charges against him. The Civil Service Commission
is hereby ORDERED[:]

'(1) To reinstate petitioner immediately, without loss of seniority rights; andcralawlibrary

'(2) To pay petitioner's back salaries from the time his preventive suspension expired. Mandatory leave credits shall
not be charged against his leave credits.

'SO ORDERED. '"4

Not satisfied with the denial by the CSC (Civil Service Commission) of their appeal, respondents brought the matter to
the CA.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

While the herein assailed Decision made no reference to the separate appeal of Horacio Cabrera, the CA nonetheless
used the same legal bases for annulling the CSC's Resolution against respondents.5

The appellate court held that the PCAGC's jurisdiction over administrative complaints pertained only to presidential
appointees. Thus, the Commission had no power to investigate the charges against respondents. 6 Moreover, in simply
and completely relying on the PCAGC's findings, the secretary of health failed to comply with administrative due
process.7

Hence, this Petition.8

The Issues

Petitioner raises the following grounds for our consideration:

"I

The Court of Appeals erred in finding that the Presidential Commission Against Graft and Corruption (PCAGC) did not
have jurisdiction to investigate the anomalous transaction involving respondents.

"II

The Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the authority to investigate and decide was relinquished by the
Secretary of Health and that the Secretary of Health merely performed a mechanical act when she ordered the
dismissal of respondents from government service.
 "III

The Court of Appeals erred in ignoring the fact that an exhaustive investigation was already conducted by the
Presidential Commission Against Graft and Corruption (PCAGC) which resulted in the finding that the anomalous
contract for the purchase of medicines without the required public bidding is patently illegal." 9

The second and the third grounds will be discussed together, as they are necessarily intertwined.

The Court's Ruling

The Petition is partly meritorious.

First Issue:

Jurisdiction to Investigate

Executive Order (EO) No. 15110 granted the PCAGC the jurisdiction to investigate administrative complaints against
presidential appointees allegedly involved in graft and corruption. From a cursory reading of its provisions, it is
evident that EO 151 authorizes the PCAGC to investigate charges against presidential, not non-presidential,
appointees. In its Preamble, specifically in its "Whereas" clauses, the EO "specifically tasked [the PCAGC] to x x x
investigate presidential appointees charged with graft and corruption x x x." More pointedly, Section 3 states that the
"Commission shall have jurisdiction over all administrative complaints involving graft and corruption filed in any form
or manner against presidential appointees x x x." We quote the pertinent provisions below:

"Section 3. Jurisdiction. - The Commission shall have jurisdiction over all administrative complaints involving graft and
corruption filed in any form or manner against presidential appointees, including those in government-owned or
controlled corporations." (emphasis supplied)

"Section 4. Powers, Functions and Duties. - The Commission shall have the following powers, functions and duties:

"(a) Investigation - The Commission shall have the power to investigate administrative complaints
against presidential appointees in the executive department of the government, including those in government-
owned or controlled corporations, charged with graft and corruption. In the exercise thereof, the Commission is (1)
authorized to summon witnesses, administer oaths, or take testimony or evidence relevant to the investigation by
subpoena ad testificandum and subpoena duces tecum, and do such other acts necessary and incidental to the
discharge of its function and duty to investigate the said administrative complaints; and (2) empowered to call upon
and secure the assistance of any department, bureau, office, agency, or instrumentality of the government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations.

"The Commission shall confine itself to cases of graft and corruption involving one or a combination of the following
criteria:

"1. Presidential appointees with the rank equivalent to or higher than an Assistant Regional Director;

"2. The amount involved is at least Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00);

"3. Those which threaten grievous harm or injury to the national interest; andcralawlibrary

"4. Those which may be assigned to it by the President.11

"The Commission may refer to the Office of the Ombudsman, when warranted and necessary, any case calling for the
investigation and/or prosecution of the party or parties concerned for violation of anti-graft and corruption laws.

"Administrative investigation of complaints against presidential appointees currently undertaken by various

presidential committees or government agencies, including government-owned or controlled corporations shall
continue notwithstanding the creation and organization of the Commission. This, however, shall be without prejudice
to the Commission, in its discretion, taking over the investigation if the matter under investigation is within its
jurisdiction.

"(b) Coordination - The Commission shall coordinate with different government agencies for the purpose of eradicating
opportunities and the climate favorable to the commission of graft and corruption. x x x." 12 (emphasis supplied)

On the basis of the foregoing verba legis approach, respondents claim that the PCAGC did not have jurisdiction over
them, because they were not presidential appointees.

The Court notes, however, that respondents were not investigated pursuant to EO 151. The investigation was
authorized under Administrative Order No. 298 dated October 25, 1996, which had created an Ad Hoc Committee to
look into the administrative charges filed against Director Rosalinda U. Majarais, Priscilla G. Camposano, Horacio D.
Cabrera, Imelda Q. Agustin and Enrique L. Perez.

The Investigating Committee was composed of all the members of the PCAGC: Chairman Eufemio C. Domingo,
Commissioner Dario C. Rama and Commissioner Jaime L. Guerrero. The Committee was directed by AO 298 to "follow
the procedure prescribed under Section 38 to 40 of the Civil Service Law (PD 807), as amended." It was tasked to
"forward to the Disciplining Authority the entire records of the case, together with its findings and recommendations,
as well as the draft decision for the approval of the President."

The Chief Executive's power to create the Ad Hoc Investigating Committee cannot be doubted. Having been
constitutionally granted full control of the Executive Department, to which respondents belong, the President has the
obligation to ensure that all executive officials and employees faithfully comply with the law. 13 With AO 298 as
mandate, the legality of the investigation is sustained. Such validity is not affected by the fact that the investigating
team and the PCAGC had the same composition, or that the former used the offices and facilities of the latter in
conducting the inquiry.

Parenthetically, the perceived vacuum in EO 151 with regard to cases involving non-presidential appointees was
rectified in Executive Order No. 12,14 which created the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC). Non-presidential
appointees who may have acted in conspiracy, or who may have been involved with a presidential appointee, may
now be investigated by the PAGC.15

Second and Third Issues:

Validity of Health Secretary's Decision

The Administrative Code of 1987 vests department secretaries with the authority to investigate and decide matters
involving disciplinary actions for officers and employees under the former's jurisdiction. 16 Thus, the health secretary
had disciplinary authority over respondents.

Note that being a presidential appointee, Dr. Rosalinda Majarais was under the jurisdiction of the President, in line
with the principle that the "power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint."17 While the Chief Executive directly
dismissed her from the service, he nonetheless recognized the health secretary's disciplinary authority over
respondents when he remanded the PCAGC's findings against them for the secretary's "appropriate action." 18

As a matter of administrative procedure, a department secretary may utilize other officials to investigate and report
the facts from which a decision may be based.19 In the present case, the secretary effectively delegated the power to
investigate to the PCAGC.

Neither the PCAGC under EO 151 nor the Ad Hoc Investigating Committee created under AO 298 had the power to
impose any administrative sanctions directly. Their authority was limited to conducting investigations and preparing
their findings and recommendations. The power to impose sanctions belonged to the disciplining authority, who had to
observe due process prior to imposing penalties.

Due process in administrative proceedings requires compliance with the following cardinal principles: (1) the
respondents' right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one's case and submit supporting evidence, must
be observed; (2) the tribunal must consider the evidence presented; (3) the decision must have some basis to
support itself; (4) there must be substantial evidence; (5) the decision must be rendered on the evidence presented
at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected; (6) in arriving at a decision,
the tribunal must have acted on its own consideration of the law and the facts of the controversy and must not have
simply accepted the views of a subordinate; and (7) the decision must be rendered in such manner that respondents
would know the reasons for it and the various issues involved.20

The CA correctly ruled that administrative due process had not been observed in the present factual milieu.
Noncompliance with the sixth requisite is equally evident from the health secretary's Order dismissing the respondents
thus:

"ORDER

"This refers to the Resolution of the Presidential Commission Against Graft and Corruption (PCAG[C]) on the above
captioned case dated January 23, 1998, the dispositive portion of which reads:

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Commission finds Respondents Rosalinda U. Majarais, Priscilla G.
Camposano, Financial Management Chief II, [Horacio] D. Cabrera, Acting Supply Officer III, all of the Department of
Health National Capital Region (DOH-NCR) guilty as charged and so recommends to his Excellency President Fidel V.
Ramos that the penalty of dismissal from the government be imposed thereon."

"Acting on the aforequoted resolution of the PCAGC[,] His Excellency President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative
Order No. 390 dated [A]pril 20, 1998, resolving thus:

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Dr. Rosalinda U. Majarais is hereby found guilty as charged and, as
recommended by the Presidential Commission Against Graft and Corruption, is meted the penalty of dismissal from
the service. The records of the case with respect to the other respondents are remanded to Secretary Carmencita N.
Reodica, Department of Health for appropriate action."

WHEREFORE, pursuant to the Resolution rendered by the Presidential Commission Against Graft and Corruption
(PCAGC) dated January 23, 1998 on the above captioned case, respondents Priscilla G. Camposano, Financial
Management Chief II; Horacio D. Cabrera, Acting Administrative Officer V; Imelda Q. Agustin, Accountant I; and
Enrique G. Perez, Acting Supply Officer III; all of the Department of Health NCR, are hereby DISMISSED from the
service."21
Concededly, the health secretary has the competence and the authority to decide what action should be taken against
officials and employees who have been administratively charged and investigated. However, the actual exercise of the
disciplining authority's prerogative requires a prior independent consideration of the law and the facts. Failure to
comply with this requirement results in an invalid decision. The disciplining authority should not merely and solely rely
on an investigator's recommendation, but must personally weigh and assess the evidence gathered. There can be no
shortcuts, because at stake are the honor, the reputation, and the livelihood of the person administratively charged.

In the present case, the health secretary's two-page Order dismissing respondents pales in comparison with the
presidential action with regard to Dr. Majarais. Prior to the issuance of his seven-page decision, President Fidel V.
Ramos conducted a restudy of the doctor's case. He even noted a violation that had not been considered by the
PCAGC.22 On the other hand, Health Secretary Carmencita N. Reodica simply and blindly relied on the dispositive
portion of the Commission's Resolution. She even misquoted it by inadvertently omitting the recommendation with
regard to Respondents Enrique L. Perez and Imelda Q. Agustin.

The Order of Secretary Reodica denying respondents' Motion for Reconsideration also failed to correct the deficiency in
the initial Order.23 She improperly relied on the President's findings in AO 390 which, however, pertained only to the
administrative charge against Dr. Majarais, not against respondents. To repeat, the Chief Executive recognized that
the disciplinary jurisdiction over respondents belonged to the health secretary,24 who should have followed the
manner in which the President had rendered his action on the recommendation.

The President's endorsement of the records of the case for the "appropriate action" of the health secretary25 did not
constitute a directive for the immediate dismissal of respondents. Like that of President Ramos, the decision of
Secretary Reodica should have contained a factual finding and a legal assessment of the controversy to enable
respondents to know the bases for their dismissal and thereafter prepare their appeal intelligently, if they so desired.

To support its position, petitioner cites American Tobacco Co. v. Director of Patents.26 However, this case merely
authorized the delegation of the power to investigate, but not the authority to impose sanctions. Verily, in requiring
the disciplining authority to exercise its own judgment and discretion in deciding a case, American Tobacco supports
the present respondents' cause. In that case, the petitioners objected to the appointment of hearing officers and
sought the personal hearing of their case by the disciplining authority.27 The Court, however, sustained the right to
delegate the power to investigate, as long as the adjudication would be made by the deciding authority.

By the same token, the Constitution28 grants the Supreme Court disciplinary authority over all lower court justices and
judges, as well as judicial employees and lawyers. While the investigation of administrative complaints is delegated
usually to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) or the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP),29 the Court
nonetheless makes its own judgments of the cases when sanctions are imposed. It does not merely adopt or solely
rely on the recommendations of the OCA or the IBP.

Inasmuch as the health secretary's twin Orders were patently void for want of due process, the CA did not err in
refusing to discuss the merit of the PCAGC's (or the Ad Hoc Committee's) recommendations. Such a discussion should
have been made by the health secretary before it could be passed upon by the CA.

In representation of petitioner, the Office of the Solicitor General insists that respondents are guilty of the charges
and, like Dr. Majarais, deserve dismissal from the service. Suffice it to stress that the issue in this case is not the guilt
of respondents, but solely due process.

In closing, the Court reiterates the oft-quoted aphorism that the end does not justify the means. Guilt cannot be
pronounced nor penalty imposed, unless due process is first observed. This is the essence of fairness and the rule of
law in a democracy.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is MODIFIED in the
sense that the authority of the Ad Hoc Investigating Committee created under Administrative Order 298
is SUSTAINED. Being violative of administrative due process, the May 8, 1998 and the June 5, 1998 Orders of the
health secretary are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Let the records of this case be REMANDED to the Department of
Health, so that proper steps can be taken to correct the due-process errors pointed out in this Decision.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 137473. August 2, 2001.]

ESTELITO V. REMOLONA, Petitioner, v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Respondent.

DECISION

PUNO, J.:

The present petition seeks to review and set aside the Decision rendered by the Court of Appeals dated July 31, 1998
1 upholding the decision of the Civil Service Commission which ordered the dismissal of petitioner Estelito V.
Remolona (Remolona) from the government service for dishonesty, and the Resolution dated February 5, 1999 2
denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Records show that petitioner Estelito V. Remolona is the Postmaster at the Postal Office Service in Infanta, Quezon,
while his wife Nery Remolona is a teacher at the Kiborosa Elementary School.

In a letter 3 dated January 3, 1991, Francisco R. America, District Supervisor of the Department of Education, Culture
& Sports at Infanta, Quezon, inquired from the Civil Service Commission (CSC) as to the status of the civil service
eligibility of Mrs. Remolona who purportedly got a rating of 81.25% as per Report of Rating issued by the National
Board for Teachers. 4 Mr. America likewise disclosed that he received information that Mrs. Remolona was
campaigning for a fee of P8,000.00 per examinee for a passing mark in the teacher’s board examinations.

On February 11, 1991, then CSC Chairman Patricia A. Sto. Tomas issued an Order directing CSC Region IV Director
Bella Amilhasan to conduct an investigation on Mrs. Remolona’s eligibility, after verification from the Register of
Eligibles in the Office for Central Personnel Records revealed "that Remolona’s name is not in the list of passing and
failing examinees, and that the list of examinees for December 10, 1989 does not include the name of Remolona.
Furthermore, Examination No. 061285 as indicated in her report of rating belongs to a certain Marlou C. Madelo, who
took the examination in Cagayan de Oro and got a rating of 65.00%." 5

During the preliminary investigation conducted by Jaime G. Pasion, Director II, Civil Service Field Office, Lucena City,
Quezon, only petitioner Remolona appeared. He signed a written statement of facts 6 regarding the issuance of the
questioned Report of Rating of Mrs. Remolona, which is summarized in the Memorandum 7 submitted by Director
Pasion as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"3.1 That sometime in the first week of September, 1990, while riding in a Kapalaran Transit Bus from Sta. Cruz,
Laguna on his way to San Pablo City, he met one Atty. Hadji Salupadin (this is how it sounded) who happened to be
sitting beside him;

3.2 That a conversation broke out between them until he was able to confide his problem to Atty. Salupadin about his
wife having difficulty in acquiring an eligibility;

3.3 That Atty. Salupadin who represented himself as working at the Batasan, offered his help for a fee of P3,000.00;

3.4 That the following day they met at the Batasan where he gave the amount of P2,000.00, requirements,
application form and picture of his wife;

3.5 That the following week, Thursday, at around 1:00 P.M., they met again at the Batasan where he handed to Atty.
Salupadin the amount of P1,000.00 plus P500.00 bonus who in turn handed to him the Report of Rating of one Nery
C. Remolona with a passing grade, then they parted;chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

3.6 That sometime in the last week of September, he showed the Report of Rating to the District Supervisor,
Francisco America who informed her (sic) that there was no vacancy;

3.7 That he went to Lucena City and complained to Dr. Magsino in writing . . . that Mr. America is asking for money in
exchange for the appointment of his wife but failed to make good his promise. He attached the corroborating affidavits
of Mesdames Carmelinda Pradillada and Rosemarie P. Romantico and Nery C. Remolona . . .;

3.8 That from 1986 to 1988, Mr. America was able to get six (6) checks at P2,600.00 each plus bonus of Nery C.
Remolona;

3.9 That Mr. America got mad at them. And when he felt that Mr. America would verify the authenticity of his wife’s
Report of Rating, he burned the original."cralaw virtua1aw library

Furthermore, Remolona admitted that he was responsible in acquiring the alleged fake eligibility, that his wife has no
knowledge thereof, and that he did it because he wanted them to be together. Based on the foregoing, Director Pasion
recommended the filing of the appropriate administrative action against Remolona but absolved Mrs. Nery Remolona
from any liability since it has not been shown that she willfully participated in the commission of the offense.

Consequently, a Formal Charge dated April 6, 1993 was filed against petitioner Remolona, Nery C. Remolona, and
Atty. Hadji Salupadin for possession of fake eligibility, falsification and dishonesty. 8 A formal hearing ensued wherein
the parties presented their respective evidence. Thereafter, CSC Regional Director Bella A. Amilhasan issued a
Memorandum dated February 14, 1995 9 recommending that the spouses Estelito and Nery Remolona be found guilty
as charged and be meted the corresponding penalty.
Said recommendation was adopted by the CSG which issued Resolution No. 95-2908 on April 20, 1995, finding the
spouses Estelito and Nery Remolona guilty of dishonesty and imposing the penalty of dismissal and all its accessory
penalties. The case against Atty. Hadji Salupadin was held in abeyance pending proof of his identity. 10 In its
Resolution No. 965510 11 dated August 27, 1996, the CSC, acting on the motion for reconsideration filed by the
spouses Remolona, absolved Nery Remolona from liability and held that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Further, a review of the records and of the arguments presented fails to persuade this Commission to reconsider its
earlier resolution insofar as Estelito Remolona’s culpability is concerned. The evidence is substantial enough to effect
his conviction. His act of securing a fake eligibility for his wife is proved by substantial evidence. However, in the case
of Nery Remolona, the Commission finds her innocent of the offense charged, for there is no evidence to show that
she has used the fake eligibility to support an appointment or promotion. In fact, Nery Remolona did not indicate in
her Personal Data Sheet that she possesses any eligibility. It must be pointed out that it was her husband who
unilaterally worked to secure a fake eligibility for her.

WHEREFORE, the instant Motion for Reconsideration is hereby denied insofar as respondent Estelito Remolona is
concerned. However, Resolution No. 95-2908 is modified in the sense that respondent Nery Remolona is exonerated
of the charges. Accordingly, Nery Remolona is automatically reinstated to her former position as Teacher with back
salaries and other benefits."cralaw virtua1aw library

On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered its questioned decision dismissing the petition for review filed by herein
petitioner Remolona. His motion for reconsideration and/or new trial was likewise denied. Hence, this petition for
review.

Petitioner submits that the Court of Appeals erred:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"1. in denying petitioner’s motion for new trial;

2. in holding that petitioner is liable for dishonesty; and

3. in sustaining the dismissal of the petitioner for an offense not work connected in relation to his official position in
the government service." chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

The main issue posed for resolution is whether a civil service employee can be dismissed from the government service
for an offense which is not work-related or which is not connected with the performance of his official duty. Remolona
likewise imputes a violation of his right to due process during the preliminary investigation because he was not
assisted by counsel. He claims that the extra-judicial admission allegedly signed by him is inadmissible because he
was merely made to sign a blank form. He also avers that his motion for new trial should be granted on the ground
that the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the hearing of the case before the Regional Office of the CSC
was not forwarded to the Court of Appeals. Finally, he pleads that the penalty of dismissal with forfeiture of all
benefits is too harsh considering the nature of the offense for which he was convicted, the length of his service in
government, that this is his first offense, and the fact that no damage was caused to the government.

The submission of Remolona that his alleged extra-judicial confession is inadmissible because he was not assisted by
counsel during the investigation as required under Section 12 paragraphs 1 and 3, Article III of the 1987 Constitution
deserves scant consideration.

The right to counsel under Section 12 of the Bill of Rights is meant to protect a suspect in a criminal case under
custodial investigation. Custodial investigation is the stage where the police investigation is no longer a general
inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect who had been taken into custody by the
police to carry out a process of interrogation that lends itself to elicit incriminating statements. It is when questions
are initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant way. The right to counsel attaches only upon the start of such investigation.
Therefore, the exclusionary rule under paragraph (2), Section 12 of the Bill of Rights applies only to admissions made
in a criminal investigation but not to those made in an administrative investigation. 12

While investigations conducted by an administrative body may at times be akin to a criminal proceeding, the fact
remains that under existing laws, a party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel,
irrespective of the nature of the charges and of the respondent’s capacity to represent himself, and no duty rests on
such body to furnish the person being investigated with counsel. In an administrative proceeding, a respondent has
the option of engaging the services of counsel or not. This is clear from the provisions of Section 32, Article VII of
Republic Act No. 2260 (otherwise known as the Civil Service Act) and Section 39, paragraph 2, Rule XIV (on
discipline) of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 (otherwise known as the
Administrative Code of 1987). Thus, the right to counsel is not always imperative in administrative investigations
because such inquiries are conducted merely to determine whether there are facts that merit disciplinary measure
against erring public officers and employees, with the purpose of maintaining the dignity of government service. As
such, the hearing conducted by the investigating authority is not part of a criminal prosecution. 13

In the case at bar, Remolona was not accused of any crime in the investigation conducted by the CSC field office. The
investigation was conducted for the purpose of ascertaining the facts and whether there is a prima facie evidence
sufficient to form a belief that an offense cognizable by the CSC has been committed and that Remolona is probably
guilty thereof and should be administratively charged. Perforce, the admissions made by Remolona during such
investigation may be used as evidence to justify his dismissal.

The contention of Remolona that he never executed an extra-judicial admission and that he merely signed a blank
form cannot be given credence. Remolona occupies a high position in government as Postmaster at Infanta, Quezon
and, as such, he is expected to be circumspect in his actions specially where he is being administratively charged with
a grave offense which carries the penalty of dismissal from service.
Remolona insists that his dismissal is a violation of his right to due process under Section 2(3), Article XI (B) of the
Constitution which provides that "no officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for
cause." Although the offense of dishonesty is punishable under the Civil Service law, Remolona opines that such act
must have been committed in the performance of his function and duty as Postmaster. Considering that the charge of
dishonesty involves the falsification of the certificate of rating of his wife Nery Remolona, the same has no bearing on
his office and hence, he is deemed not to have been dismissed for cause. This proposition is untenable.chanrob1es
virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

It cannot be denied that dishonesty is considered a grave offense punishable by dismissal for the first offense under
Section 23, Rule XIV of the Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292. And the rule is that dishonesty, in
order to warrant dismissal, need not be committed in the course of the performance of duty by the person charged.
The rationale for the rule is that if a government officer or employee is dishonest or is guilty of oppression or grave
misconduct, even if said defects of character are not connected with his office, they affect his right to continue in
office. The Government cannot tolerate in its service a dishonest official, even if he performs his duties correctly and
well, because by reason of his government position, he is given more and ample opportunity to commit acts of
dishonesty against his fellow men, even against offices and entities of the government other than the office where he
is employed; and by reason of his office, he enjoys and possesses a certain influence and power which renders the
victims of his grave misconduct, oppression and dishonesty less disposed and prepared to resist and to counteract his
evil acts and actuations. The private life of an employee cannot be segregated from his public life. Dishonesty
inevitably reflects on the fitness of the officer or employee to continue in office and the discipline and morale of the
service. 14

The principle is that when an officer or employee is disciplined, the object sought is not the punishment of such officer
or employee but the improvement of the public service and the preservation of the public’s faith and confidence in the
government. 15

The general rule is that where the findings of the administrative body are amply supported by substantial evidence,
such findings are accorded not only respect but also finality, and are binding on this Court. 16 It is not for the
reviewing court to weigh the conflicting evidence, determine the credibility of witnesses, or otherwise substitute its
own judgment for that of the administrative agency on the sufficiency of evidence. 17 Thus, when confronted with
conflicting versions of factual matters, it is for the administrative agency concerned in the exercise of discretion to
determine which party deserves credence on the basis of the evidence received. 18 The rule, therefore, is that courts
of justice will not generally interfere with purely administrative matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of
government agencies unless there is a clear showing that the latter acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion
or when they have acted in a capricious and whimsical manner such that their action may amount to an excess of
jurisdiction. 19

We have carefully scrutinized the records of the case below and we find no compelling reason to deviate from the
findings of the CSC and the Court of Appeals. The written admission of Remolona is replete with details that could
have been known only to him. No ill-motive or bad faith was ever imputed to Director Pasion who conducted the
investigation. The presumption that official duty has been regularly performed remains unrebutted.

The transmittal of the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the formal hearing before the CSC is entirely a
matter of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals. Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 of this Court clearly
states that in resolving appeals from quasi-judicial agencies, it is within the discretion of the Court of Appeals to have
the original records of the proceedings under review transmitted to it. 20 Verily, the Court of Appeals decided the
merits of the case on the bases of the uncontroverted facts and admissions contained in the pleadings filed by the
parties.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

We likewise find no merit in the contention of Remolona that the penalty of dismissal is too harsh considering that
there was no damage caused to the government since the certificate of rating was never used to get an appointment
for his wife, Nery Remolona. Although no pecuniary damage was incurred by the government, there was still
falsification of an official document that constitutes gross dishonesty which cannot be countenanced, considering that
he was an accountable officer and occupied a sensitive position. 21 The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees enunciates the State policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost
responsibility in the public service. 22

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.chanrob1