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Bayan v. Zamora, G.R. No. 138570, October 10, 2000
FACTS:
The Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America entered into an agreement called
the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). The agreement was treated as a treaty by the Philippine
government and was ratified by then-President Joseph Estrada with the concurrence of 2/3 of the
total membership of the Philippine Senate.
The VFA defines the treatment of U.S. troops and personnel visiting the Philippines. It provides
for the guidelines to govern such visits, and further defines the rights of the U.S. and the Philippine
governments in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft, importation
and exportation of equipment, materials and supplies.
Petitioners argued, inter alia, that the VFA violates §25, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution,
which provides that “foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the
Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate . . . and recognized as a treaty
by the other contracting State.”
ISSUE: Was the VFA unconstitutional?
HELD: [The Court DISMISSED the consolidated petitions, held that the petitioners did not commit
grave abuse of discretion, and sustained the constitutionality of the VFA.]
NO, the VFA is not unconstitutional.
Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the country, unless
the following conditions are sufficiently met, viz: (a) it must be under a treaty; (b) the treaty must
be duly concurred in by the Senate and, when so required by congress, ratified by a majority of
the votes cast by the people in a national referendum; and (c) recognized as a treaty by the other
contracting state.
There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two requisites in the case of the VFA. The
concurrence handed by the Senate through Resolution No. 18 is in accordance with the provisions
of the Constitution . . . the provision in [in §25, Article XVIII] requiring ratification by a majority
of the votes cast in a national referendum being unnecessary since Congress has not required it.
xxx xxx xxx
This Court is of the firm view that the phrase “recognized as a treaty” means that the other
contracting party accepts or acknowledges the agreement as a treaty. To require the other
contracting state, the United States of America in this case, to submit the VFA to the United States
Senate for concurrence pursuant to its Constitution, is to accord strict meaning to the phrase.
Well-entrenched is the principle that the words used in the Constitution are to be given their
ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed, in which case the significance thus
attached to them prevails. Its language should be understood in the sense they have in common
use.
Moreover, it is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an executive
agreement because, under international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty. To
be sure, as long as the VFA possesses the elements of an agreement under international law, the
said agreement is to be taken equally as a treaty.
xxx xxx xxx
The records reveal that the United States Government, through Ambassador Thomas C. Hubbard,
has stated that the United States government has fully committed to living up to the terms of the
VFA. For as long as the United States of America accepts or acknowledges the VFA as a treaty,
and binds itself further to comply with its obligations under the treaty, there is indeed marked
compliance with the mandate of the Constitution.
Lim v. Exec. Secretary, G.R. No, 151445, Apr. 11, 2002
Lessons Applicable: Locus Standi, International Law v. Muncipal Law, Certiorari, Incorporation
Clause, Treaties
Laws Applicable: Constitution
FACTS:
Pursuant to the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) signed in 1999, personnel from the armed
forces of the United States of America started arriving in Mindanao to take partin "Balikatan 02-1”
on January 2002. The Balikatan 02-1 exercises involves the simulation of joint military maneuvers
pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty, a bilateral defense agreement entered into by the
Philippines and the United States in 1951. The exercise is rooted from the international anti-
terrorism campaign declared by President George W. Bush in reaction to the 3 commercial aircrafts
hijacking that smashed into twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York City and the
Pentagon building in Washington, D.C. allegedly by the al-Qaeda headed by the Osama bin Laden
that occurred on September 11, 2001. Arthur D. Lim and Paulino P. Ersando as citizens, lawyers
and taxpayers filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition attacking the constitutionality of the
joint exercise. Partylists Sanlakas and Partido Ng Manggagawa as residents of Zamboanga and
Sulu directly affected by the operations filed a petition-in-intervention.
The Solicitor General commented the prematurity of the action as it is based only on a fear of
future violation of the Terms of Reference and impropriety of availing of certiorari to ascertain a
question of fact specifically interpretation of the VFA whether it is covers "Balikatan 02-1” and no
question of constitutionality is involved. Moreover, there is lack of locus standi since it does not
involve tax spending and there is no proof of direct personal injury.
ISSUE: W/N the petition and the petition-in-intervention should prosper.
HELD: NO. Petition and the petition-in-intervention are hereby DISMISSED without prejudice to
the filing of a new petition sufficient in form and substance in the proper Regional Trial Court -
Supreme Court is not a trier of facts
Doctrine of Importance to the Public

Considering however the importance to the public of the case at bar, and in keeping with the
Court's duty, under the 1987 Constitution, to determine whether or not the other branches of the
government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws that they have
not abused the discretion given to them, the Court has brushed aside technicalities of procedure
and has taken cognizance of this petition.
Although courts generally avoid having to decide a constitutional question based on the doctrine
of separation of powers, which enjoins upon the department of the government a becoming
respect for each other's act, this Court nevertheless resolves to take cognizance of the instant
petition.
Interpretation of Treaty
The VFA permits United States personnel to engage, on an impermanent basis, in "activities," the
exact meaning of which was left undefined. The expression is ambiguous, permitting a wide scope
of undertakings subject only to the approval of the Philippine government. The sole encumbrance
placed on its definition is couched in the negative, in that United States personnel must "abstain
from any activity inconsistent with the spirit of this agreement, and in particular, from any political
activity." All other activities, in other words, are fair game.
To aid in this, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Article 31 SECTION 3 and Article 32
contains provisos governing interpretations of international agreements. It is clear from the
foregoing that the cardinal rule of interpretation must involve an examination of the text, which is
presumed to verbalize the parties' intentions. The Convention likewise dictates what may be used
as aids to deduce the meaning of terms, which it refers to as the context of the treaty, as well as
other elements may be taken into account alongside the aforesaid context. According to Professor
Briggs, writer on the Convention, the distinction between the general rule of interpretation and
the supplementary means of interpretation is intended rather to ensure that the supplementary
means do not constitute an alternative, autonomous method of interpretation divorced from the
general rule.
The meaning of the word “activities" was deliberately made that way to give both parties a certain
leeway in negotiation. Thus, the VFA gives legitimacy to the current Balikatan exercises. Both the
history and intent of the Mutual Defense Treaty and the VFA support the conclusion that combat-
related activities -as opposed to combat itself -such as the one subject of the instant petition, are
indeed authorized.
The Terms of Reference are explicit enough. Paragraph 8 of section I stipulates that US exercise
participants may not engage in combat "except in self-defense." ." The indirect violation is actually
petitioners' worry, that in reality, "Balikatan 02-1" is actually a war principally conducted by the
United States government, and that the provision on self-defense serves only as camouflage to
conceal the true nature of the exercise. A clear pronouncement on this matter thereby becomes
crucial. In our considered opinion, neither the MDT nor the VFA allow foreign troops to engage
in an offensive war on Philippine territory. Under the salutary proscription stated in Article 2 of
the Charter of the United Nations.
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Both the Mutual Defense Treaty and the Visiting Forces Agreement, as in all other treaties and
international agreements to which the Philippines is a party, must be read in the context of the
1987 Constitution especially Sec. 2, 7 and 8 of Article 2: Declaration of Principles and State Policies
in this case. The Constitution also regulates the foreign relations powers of the Chief Executive
when it provides that "[n]o treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless
concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the Senate." Even more pointedly Sec.
25 on Transitory Provisions which shows antipathy towards foreign military presence in the
country, or of foreign influence in general. Hence, foreign troops are allowed entry into the
Philippines only by way of direct exception.
International Law vs. Fundamental Law and Municipal Laws
Conflict arises then between the fundamental law and our obligations arising from international
agreements.
Philip Morris, Inc. v. Court of Appeals: “Withal, the fact that international law has been made part
of the law of the land does not by any means imply the primacy of international law over national
law in the municipal sphere. Under the doctrine of incorporation as applied in most countries, rules
of international law are given a standing equal, not superior, to national legislation.”
From the perspective of public international law, a treaty is favored over municipal law pursuant
to the principle of pacta sunt servanda. Hence, "[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties
to it and must be performed by them in good faith." Further, a party to a treaty is not allowed to
"invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty."
Our Constitution espouses the opposing view as stated in section 5 of Article VIII: “The Supreme
Court shall have the following powers: xxx
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of
Court may provide, final judgments and order of lower courts in:
(A) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is
in question.”
Ichong v. Hernandez: “provisions of a treaty are always subject to qualification or amendment by
a subsequent law, or that it is subject to the police power of the State”
Gonzales v. Hechanova: “our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not only when it
conflicts with the fundamental law, but, also, when it runs counter to an act of Congress.”
The foregoing premises leave us no doubt that US forces are prohibited / from engaging in an
offensive war on Philippine territory.
Pimentel v. Executive Secretary, G.R. 158088, July 6, 2005
FACTS:

1. The petitioners filed a petition for mandamus to compel the Office of the Executive Secretary
and the Department of Foreign Affairs to transmit the signed copy of the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court to the Senate of the Philippinesfor its concurrence pursuant to Sec.
21, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution.
2. The Rome Statute established the Int'l Criminal Court which will have jurisdiction over the most
serious crimes as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and crimes of aggression as
defined by the Statute. The Philippines through the Chargie du Affairs in UN. The provisions of the
Statute however require that it be subject to ratification, acceptance or approval of the signatory
state.
3. Petitioners contend that ratification of a treaty, under both domestic and international law, is a
function of the Senate, hence it is the duty of the Executive Department to transmit the signed
copy to the senate to allow it to exercise its discretion.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Exec. Secretary and the DFA have the ministerial duty to transmit to
the Senate the copy of the Rome Statute signed by a member of the Philippine mission to the U.N.
even without the signature of the President.
HELD: NO.
1. The President as the head of state is the sole organ and authorized in the external relations
and he is also the country's sole representative with foreign nations, He is the mouthpiece with
respect to the country's foreign affairs.
2. In treaty-making, the President has the sole authority to negotiate with other states and enter
into treaties but this power is limited by the Constitution with the 2/3 required vote of all the
members of the Senate for the treaty to be valid. (Sec. 21, Art VII).
3. The legislative branch part is essential to provide a check on the executive in the field of foreign
relations, to ensure the nation's pursuit of political maturity and growth.
Constantino v. Cuisia and Del Rosario, G.R. No. 106064, Oct. 13, 2005
During the Aquino regime, her administration came up w/ a scheme to reduce the country’s
external debt. The solution resorted to was to incur foreign debts. Three restructuring programs
were sought to initiate the program for foreign debts – they are basically buyback programs &
bond-conversion programs). Constantino as a taxpayer and in behalf of his minor children who
are Filipino citizens, together w/ FFDC averred that the buyback and bond-conversion schemes
are onerous and they do not constitute the loan “contract” or “guarantee” contemplated in Sec.
20, Art. 7 of the Constitution. And assuming that the President has such power unlike other powers
which may be validly delegated by the President, the power to incur foreign debts is expressly
reserved by the Constitution in the person of the President. They argue that the gravity by which
the exercise of the power will affect the Filipino nation requires that the President alone must
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exercise this power. They argue that the requirement of prior concurrence of an entity specifically
named by the Constitution–the Monetary Board–reinforces the submission that not respondents
but the President “alone and personally” can validly bind the country. Hence, they would like Cuisia
et al to stop acting pursuant to the scheme.
ISSUE: Whether or not the president can validly delegate her debt power to the respondents.
HELD: There is no question that the president has borrowing powers and that the president may
contract or guarantee foreign loans in behalf of this country w/ prior concurrence of the Monetary
Board. It makes no distinction whatsoever and the fact that a debt or a loan may be onerous is
irrelevant. On the other hand, the president can delegate this power to her direct subordinates.
The evident exigency of having the Secretary of Finance implement the decision of the President
to execute the debt-relief contracts is made manifest by the fact that the process of establishing
and executing a strategy for managing the government’s debt is deep within the realm of the
expertise of the Department of Finance, primed as it is to raise the required amount of funding,
achieve its risk and cost objectives, and meet any other sovereign debt management goals. If the
President were to personally exercise every aspect of the foreign borrowing power, he/she would
have to pause from running the country long enough to focus on a welter of time-consuming
detailed activities–the propriety of incurring/guaranteeing loans, studying and choosing among
the many methods that may be taken toward this end, meeting countless times with creditor
representatives to negotiate, obtaining the concurrence of the Monetary Board, explaining and
defending the negotiated deal to the public, and more often than not, flying to the agreed place
of execution to sign the documents. This sort of constitutional interpretation would negate the
very existence of cabinet positions and the respective expertise which the holders thereof are
accorded and would unduly hamper the President’s effectivity in running the government. The act
of the respondents are not unconstitutional.
Exception
There are certain acts which, by their very nature, cannot be validated by subsequent approval or
ratification by the President. There are certain constitutional powers and prerogatives of the Chief
Executive of the Nation which must be exercised by him in person and no amount of approval or
ratification will validate the exercise of any of those powers by any other person. Such, for
instance, in his power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and proclaim martial law and the
exercise by him of the benign prerogative of pardon (mercy).
There are certain presidential powers which arise out of exceptional circumstances, and if
exercised, would involve the suspension of fundamental freedoms, or at least call for the
supersedence of executive prerogatives over those exercised by co-equal branches of government.
The declaration of martial law, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and the exercise of
the pardoning power notwithstanding the judicial determination of guilt of the accused, all fall
within this special class that demands the exclusive exercise by the President of the constitutionally
vested power. The list is by no means exclusive, but there must be a showing that the executive
power in question is of similar gravitas and exceptional import.
Abaya v. Ebdane, G.R. No. 167919, Feb. 14, 2007

FACTS:
On May 7, 2004 Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) of the Department of Public Works and
Highways (DPWH) issued a Resolution No. PJHL-A-04-012. It was approved by DPWH Acting
Secretary Florante Soriquez. This resolution recommended the award to China Road & Bridge
Corporation of the contract for the implementation of civil works for Contract Package No. I (CP
I), which consists of the improvement/rehabilitation of the San Andres-Virac-Jct. Bago-Viga road,
with the lengt of 79.818 kilometers, in the island province of Catanduanes.
This Loan Agreement No. PH-204 was executed by and between the JBIC and the Philippine
Government pursuant to the exchange of Notes executed by and between Mr. Yoshihisa Ara,
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Japan to the Philippines, and then Foreign Affairs
Secretary Siazon, in behalf of their respective governments.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Loan Agreement No. PH-204 between the JBIC and the Philippine
Government is a kind of a treaty.
HELD: The Loan Agreement No. PH-204 taken in conjunction with the Exchange of Notes dated
December 27, 1999 between the Japanese Government and the Philippine Government is an
executive agreement.
An “exchange of notes” is a record of a routine agreement that has many similarities with the
private law contract. The agreement consists of the exchange of two documents, each of the
parties being in the possession of the one signed by the representative of the other.
…treaties, agreements, conventions, charters, protocols, declarations, memoranda of
understanding, modus vivendi and exchange of notes all are refer to international instruments
binding at international law.
Although these instruments differ from each other by title, they all have common features and
international law has applied basically the same rules to all these instruments. These rules are the
result of long practice among the States, which have accepted them as binding norms in their
mutual relations. Therefore, they are regarded as international customary law.
That case was dismissed by the SCORP last Feb. 14 2007.
What the petitioners wanted was that Foreign funded projects also undergo the procurement
process.
The dismissal of the case somehow gave justification for the delay of the implementing rules for
foreign funded projects (IRR-B) of the procurement law If we recall the decision of the Abaya vs
Ebdane was used by the DOJ when the DOTC Secretary was asking for an opinion from the former,
during the ZTE controversy.as ruled by the Supreme Court in Abaya v. Ebdane, an exchange of
notes is considered a form of an executive agreement, which becomes binding through executive
action without need of a vote by the
Senate and that (like treaties and conventions, it is an international instrument binding at
international law,
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The second issue involves an examination of the coverage of Republic Act No. 9184, otherwise
known as the “Government Procurement Reform Act”. Section 4 of the said Act provides that it
shall
apply to: … the Procurement of infrastructure Projects, Goods and Consulting Services, regardless
of source of funds, whether local or foreign, by all branches and instrumentalities of government,
its departments, offices and agencies, including government-owned and/or -controlled
corporations and local government units, subject to the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 138.
Any treaty or international or executive agreement affecting the subject matter of this Act to which
the Philippine government is a signatory shall be observed.
Pharmaceutical v. DOH, GR 173034, Oct. 9, 2007
FACTS: Named as respondents are the Health Secretary, Undersecretaries, and Assistant
Secretaries of the Department of Health (DOH). For purposes of herein petition, the DOH is
deemed impleaded as a co-respondent since respondents issued the questioned RIRR in their
capacity as officials of said executive agency.1Executive Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by
President Corazon Aquino on October 28, 1986 by virtue of the legislative powers granted to the
president under the Freedom Constitution. One of the preambular clauses of the Milk Code states
that the law seeks to give effect to Article 112 of the International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk
Substitutes (ICMBS), a code adopted by the World Health Assembly (WHA) in 1981. From 1982
to 2006, the WHA adopted several Resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding should be
supported, promoted and protected, hence, it should be ensured that nutrition and health claims
are not permitted for breastmilk substitutes.In 1990, the Philippines ratified the International
Convention on the Rights of the Child. Article 24 of said instrument provides that State Parties
should take appropriate measures to diminish infant and child mortality, and ensure that all
segments of society, specially parents and children, are informed of the advantages of
breastfeeding. On May 15, 2006, the DOH issued herein assailed RIRR which was to take effect
on July 7, 2006.
ISSUE: Whether Administrative Order or the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations (RIRR)
issued by the Department of Health (DOH) is not constitutional;
HELD: YES under Article 23, recommendations of the WHA do not come into force for members,in
the same way that conventions or agreements under Article 19 and regulations under Article 21
come into force. Article 23 of the WHO Constitution reads:
Article 23. The Health Assembly shall have authority to make recommendations to Members with
respect to any matter within the competence of the Organization
for an international rule to be considered as customary law, it must be established that such rule
is being followed by states because they consider it obligatory to comply with such rules
Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law
either

By transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international law
be transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation.
The incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional declaration, international law is
deemed to have the force of domestic law.
Consequently, legislation is necessary to transform the provisions of the WHA Resolutions into
domestic law. The provisions of the WHA Resolutions cannot be considered as part of the law of
the land that can be implemented by executive agencies without the need of a law enacted by the
legislature
The Province of North Cotabato v. GRP Peace Panel, G.R. No. 183591, Oct. 14, 2008
FACTS: Subject of this case is the Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-
AD) which is scheduled to be signed by the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the
MILF in August 05, 2008. Five cases bearing the same subject matter were consolidated by this
court namely:-
GR 183591 by the Province of Cotabato and Vice Governor Pinol on its prayer to declare
unconstitutional and to have the MOA-AD disclosed to the public and be open for public
consultation.
GR 183752 by the City of Zamboanga et al on its prayer to declare null and void said MOA-AD and
to exclude the city to the BJE.
GR 183893 by the City of Iligan enjoining the respondents from signing the MOA-AD and
additionally impleading Exec. Sec. Ermita.
GR 183951 by the Province of Zamboanga del Norte et al, praying to declare null and void the
MOA-AD and without operative effect and those respondents enjoined from executing the MOA-
AD.
GR 183692 by Maceda, Binay and Pimentel III, praying for a judgment prohibiting and
permanently enjoining respondents from formally signing and executing the MOA-AD and or any
other agreement derived therefrom or similar thereto, and nullifying the MOA-AD for being
unconstitutional and illegal and impleading Iqbal.
The MOA-AD is a result of various agreements entered into by and between the
government and the MILF starting in 1996; then in 1997, they signed the Agreement on General
Cessation of Hostilities; and the following year, they signed the General Framework of Agreement
of Intent on August 27, 1998. However, in 1999 and in the early of 2000, the MILF attacked a
number of municipalities in Central Mindanao. In March 2000, they took the hall of Kauswagan,
Lanao del Norte; hence, then Pres. Estrada declared an all-out war-which tolled the peace
negotiation. It was when then Pres. Arroyo assumed office, when the negotiation regarding peace
in Mindanao continued. MILF was hesitant; however, this negotiation proceeded when the
government of Malaysia interceded. Formal peace talks resumed and MILF suspended all its
military actions. The Tripoli Agreement in 2001 lead to the ceasefire between the parties. After
PUBLIC INTL LAW CASES -Page |5
the death of MILF Chairman Hashim and Iqbal took over his position, the crafting of MOA-AD in
its final form was born.
MOA-AD Overview
This is an agreement to be signed by the GRP and the MILF. Used as reference in the birth of this
MOA-AD are the Tripoli Agreement, organic act of ARMM, IPRA Law, international laws such as
ILO Convention 169, the UN Charter etc., and the principle of Islam i.e compact right
entrenchment (law of compact, treaty and order). The body is divided into concepts and principles,
territory, resources, and governance.
Embodied in concepts and principles, is the definition of Bangsamoro as all indigenous peoples of
Mindanao and its adjacent islands. These people have the right to self- governance of their
Bangsamoro homeland to which they have exclusive ownership by virtue of their prior rights of
occupation in the land. The MOA-AD goes on to describe the Bangsamoro people as "the ‘First
Nation' with defined territory and with a system of government having entered into treaties of
amity and commerce with foreign nations." It then mentions for the first time the "Bangsamoro
Juridical Entity" (BJE) to which it grants the authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain
and Ancestral Lands of the Bangsamoro.
As defined in the territory of the MOA-AD, the BJE shall embrace the Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan
geographic region, involving the present ARMM, parts of which are those which voted in the
inclusion to ARMM in a plebiscite. The territory is divided into two categories, “A” which will be
subject to plebiscite not later than 12 mos. after the signing and “B” which will be subject to
plebiscite 25 years from the signing of another separate agreement. Embodied in the MOA-AD
that the BJE shall have jurisdiction over the internal waters-15kms from the coastline of the BJE
territory; they shall also have "territorial waters," which shall stretch beyond the BJE internal
waters up to the baselines of the Republic of the Philippines (RP) south east and south west of
mainland Mindanao; and that within these territorial waters, the BJE and the government shall
exercise joint jurisdiction, authority and management over all natural resources. There will also
be sharing of minerals in the territorial waters; but no provision on the internal waters.
Included in the resources is the stipulation that the BJE is free to enter into any economic
cooperation and trade relations with foreign countries and shall have the option to establish trade
missions in those countries, as well as environmental cooperation agreements, but not to include
aggression in the GRP. The external defense of the BJE is to remain the duty and obligation of the
government. The BJE shall have participation in international meetings and events" like those of
the ASEAN and the specialized agencies of the UN. They are to be entitled to participate in
Philippine official missions and delegations for the negotiation of border agreements or protocols
for environmental protection and equitable sharing of incomes and revenues involving the bodies
of water adjacent to or between the islands forming part of the ancestral domain. The BJE shall
also have the right to explore its resources and that the sharing between the Central Government
and the BJE of total production pertaining to natural resources is to be 75:25 in favor of the BJE.
And they shall have the right to cancel or modify concessions and TLAs.

And lastly in the governance, the MOA-AD claims that the relationship between the GRP and MILF
is associative i.e. characterized by shared authority and responsibility. This structure of governance
shall be further discussed in the Comprehensive Compact, a stipulation which was highly contested
before the court. The BJE shall also be given the right to build, develop and maintain its own
institutions, the details of which shall be discussed in the comprehensive compact as well.
ISSUES:
1. WON the petitions have complied with the procedural requirements for the exercise of judicial
review
2. WON respondents violate constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation and the
right to information when they negotiated and later initialed the MOA-AD; and
3. WON the contents of the MOA-AD violated the Constitution and the laws
HELD: The SC declared the MOA-AD contrary to law and the Constitution.
On the Procedural Issue
1st issue: As regards the procedural issue, SC upheld that there is indeed a need for the exercise
of judicial review.
The power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversy, that is the court will decline
on issues that are hypothetical, feigned problems or mere academic questions. Related to the
requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness. The contention of
the SolGen is that there is no issue ripe for adjudication since the MOA-AD is only a proposal and
does not automatically create legally demandable rights and obligations. Such was denied.
The SC emphasized that the petitions are alleging acts made in violation of their duty or in grave
abuse of discretion. Well-settled jurisprudence states that acts made by authority which exceed
their authority, by violating their duties under E.O. No. 3 and the provisions of the Constitution
and statutes, the petitions make a prima facie case for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus, and
an actual case or controversy ripe for adjudication exists. When an act of a branch of government
is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the
duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. This is aside from the fact that concrete acts made
under the MOA-AD are not necessary to render the present controversy ripe and that the law or
act in question as not yet effective does not negate ripeness.
With regards to the locus standi, the court upheld the personalities of the Province of Cotabato,
Province of Zamboanga del norte, City of Iligan, City of Zamboanga, petitioners in intervention
Province of Sultan Kudarat, City of Isabela and Municipality of Linnamon to have locus standi since
it is their LGUs which will be affected in whole or in part if include within the BJE. Intervenors
Franklin Drilon and Adel Tamano, in alleging their standing as taxpayers, assert that government
PUBLIC INTL LAW CASES -Page |6
funds would be expended for the conduct of an illegal and unconstitutional plebiscite to delineate
the BJE territory. On that score alone, they can be given legal standing. Senator Mar Roxas is also
given a standing as an intervenor. And lastly, the Intervening respondents Muslim Multi-Sectoral
Movement for Peace and Development, an advocacy group for justice and the attainment of peace
and prosperity in Muslim Mindanao; and Muslim Legal Assistance Foundation Inc., a non-
government organization of Muslim lawyers since they stand to be benefited or prejudiced in the
resolution of the petitions regarding the MOA-AD.
On the contention of mootness of the issue considering the signing of the MOA-AD has already
been suspended and that the President has already disbanded the GRP, the SC disagrees. The
court reiterates that the moot and academic principle is a general rule only, the exceptions,
provided in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, that it will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic,
if it finds that (a) there is a grave violation of the Constitution; (b) the situation is of exceptional
character and paramount public interest is involved; (c) the constitutional issue raised requires
formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (d) the case
is capable of repetition yet evading review; and that where there is a voluntary cessation of the
activity complained of by the defendant or doer, it does not divest the court the power to hear
and try the case especially when the plaintiff is seeking for damages or injunctive relief.
Clearly, the suspension of the signing of the MOA-AD and the disbandment of the GRP did not
render the petitions moot and academic. The MOA-AD is subject to further legal enactments
including possible Constitutional amendments more than ever provides impetus for the Court to
formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, the public and, in this case, the
government and its negotiating entity.
At all events, the Court has jurisdiction over most if not the rest of the petitions. There is a
reasonable expectation that petitioners will again be subjected to the same problem in the future
as respondents' actions are capable of repetition, in another or any form. But with respect to the
prayer of Mandamus to the signing of the MOA-AD, such has become moot and academic
considering that parties have already complied thereat.
On the Substantive Issue
2nd Issue: The SC ruled that the MOA-AD is a matter of public concern, involving as it does the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State, which directly affects the lives of the public at
large.
As enshrined in the Constitution, the right to information guarantees the right of the people to
demand information, and integrated therein is the recognition of the duty of the officialdom to
give information even if nobody demands. The policy of public disclosure establishes a concrete
ethical principle for the conduct of public affairs in a genuinely open democracy, with the people's
right to know as the centerpiece. It is a mandate of the State to be accountable by following such

policy. These provisions are vital to the exercise of the freedom of expression and essential to
hold public officials at all times accountable to the people.
Also, it was held that such stipulation in the Constitution is self-executory with reasonable
safeguards —the effectivity of which need not await the passing of a statute. Hence, it is essential
to keep open a continuing dialogue or process of communication between the government and
the people. It is in the interest of the State that the channels for free political discussion be
maintained to the end that the government may perceive and be responsive to the people's will.
The idea of a feedback mechanism was also sought for since it is corollary to the twin rights to
information and disclosure. And feedback means not only the conduct of the plebiscite as per the
contention of the respondents. Clearly, what the law states is the right of the petitioners to be
consulted in the peace agenda as corollary to the constitutional right to information and disclosure.
As such, respondent Esperon committed grave abuse of discretion for failing to carry out the
furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs contrary to and in excess of
the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and despotic
exercise thereto. Moreover, he cannot invoke of executive privilege because he already waived it
when he complied with the Court’s order to the unqualified disclosure of the official copies of the
final draft of the MOA-AD.
In addition, the LGU petitioners has the right to be involved in matters related to such peace talks
as enshrined in the State policy. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally and
unilaterally vests ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively
and drastically result to the diaspora or displacement of a great number of inhabitants from their
total environment.
With respect to the ICC/IPPs they also have the right to participate fully at all levels on decisions
that would clearly affect their lives, rights and destinies. The MOA-AD is an instrument recognizing
ancestral domain, hence it should have observed the free and prior informed consent to the
ICC/IPPs; but it failed to do so. More specially noted by the court is the excess in authority
exercised by the respondent—since they allowed delineation and recognition of ancestral domain
claim by mere agreement and compromise; such power cannot be found in IPRA or in any law to
the effect.
3rd issue: With regard to the provisions of the MOA-AD, there can be no question that they cannot
be all accommodated under the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific provisions but
the very concept underlying them:
On matters of the Constitution.
Association as the type of relationship governing between the parties. The parties manifested
that in crafting the MOA-AD, the term association was adapted from the international law. In
international law, association happens when two states of equal power voluntarily establish
durable links i.e. the one state, the associate, delegates certain responsibilities to the other,
principal, while maintaining its international status as state; free association is a middle ground
between integration and independence. The MOA-AD contains many provisions that are consistent
PUBLIC INTL LAW CASES -Page |7
with the international definition of association which fairly would deduced that the agreement vest
into the BJE a status of an associated state, or at any rate, a status closely approximating it. The
court vehemently objects because the principle of association is not recognized under the present
Constitution.
On the recognition of the BJE entity as a state. The concept implies power beyond what the
Constitution can grant to a local government; even the ARMM do not have such recognition; and
the fact is such concept implies recognition of the associated entity as a state. There is nothing in
the law that contemplate any state within the jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much
less does it provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for
independence. The court disagrees with the respondent that the MOA-AD merely expands the
ARMM. BJE is a state in all but name as it meets the criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo
Convention, namely, a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and a capacity
to enter into relations with other states. As such the MOA-AD clearly runs counter to the national
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic.
On the expansion of the territory of the BJE. The territory included in the BJE includes those areas
who voted in the plebiscite for them to become part of the ARMM. The stipulation of the
respondents in the MOA-AD that these areas need not participate in the plebiscite is in contrary
to the express provision of the Constitution. The law states that that "[t]he creation of the
autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the
constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities, and
geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region."
Clearly, assuming that the BJE is just an expansion of the ARMM, it would still run afoul the
wordings of the law since those included in its territory are areas which voted in its inclusion to
the ARMM and not to the BJE.
On the powers vested in the BJE as an entity. The respondents contend that the powers vested
to the BJE in the MOA-AD shall be within sub-paragraph 9 of sec 20, art. 10 of the constitution
and that a mere passage of a law is necessary in order to vest in the BJE powers included in the
agreement. The Court was not persuaded. SC ruled that such conferment calls for amendment of
the Constitution; otherwise new legislation will not concur with the Constitution. Take for instance
the treaty making power vested to the BJE in the MOA-AD. The Constitution is clear that only the
President has the sole organ and is the country’s sole representative with foreign nation. Should
the BJE be granted with the authority to negotiate with other states, the former provision must
be amended consequently. Section 22 must also be amended—the provision of the law that
promotes national unity and development. Because clearly, associative arrangement of the MOA-
AD does not epitomize national unity but rather, of semblance of unity. The associative ties
between the BJE and the national government, the act of placing a portion of Philippine territory
in a status which, in international practice, has generally been a preparation for independence, is
certainly not conducive to national unity.
On matters of domestic statutes.

o Provisions contrary to the organic act of ARMM. RA 9054 is a bar to the adoption of the
definition of Bangsamoro people used in the MOA-AD. Said law specifically distinguishes between
the Bangsamoro people and the Tribal peoples that is contrary with the definition of the MOA-AD
which includes all indigenous people of Mindanao.
o Provisions contrary to the IPRA law. Also, the delineation and recognition of the ancestral
domain is a clear departure from the procedure embodied in the IPRA law which ironically is the
term of reference of the MOA-AD.
On matters of international law.
The Philippines adopts the generally accepted principle of international law as part of the law of
the land. In international law, the right to self-determination has long been recognized which
states that people can freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic,
social, and cultural development. There are the internal and external self-determination—internal,
meaning the self-pursuit of man and the external which takes the form of the assertion of the
right to unilateral secession. This principle of self-determination is viewed with respect accorded
to the territorial integrity of existing states. External self-determination is only afforded in
exceptional cases when there is an actual block in the meaningful exercise of the right to internal
self-determination. International law, as a general rule, subject only to limited and exceptional
cases, recognizes that the right of disposing national territory is essentially an attribute of the
sovereignty of every state.
On matters relative to indigenous people, international law states that indigenous peoples situated
within states do not have a general right to independence or secession from those states under
international law, but they do have rights amounting to what was discussed above as the right to
internal self-determination; have the right to autonomy or self-government in matters relating to
their internal and local affairs, as well as ways and means for financing their autonomous
functions; have the right to the lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally
owned, occupied or otherwise used or acquired.
Clearly, there is nothing in the law that required the State to guarantee the indigenous people
their own police and security force; but rather, it shall be the State, through police officers, that
will provide for the protection of the people. With regards to the autonomy of the indigenous
people, the law does not obligate States to grant indigenous peoples the near-independent status
of a state; since it would impair the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and
independent states.
On the basis of the suspensive clause.
PUBLIC INTL LAW CASES -Page |8
o It was contented by the respondents that grave abuse of discretion cannot be had, since the
provisions assailed as unconstitutional shall not take effect until the necessary changes to the legal
framework are effected.
The Court is not persuaded. This suspensive clause runs contrary to Memorandum of Instructions
from the President stating that negotiations shall be conducted in accordance to the territorial
integrity of the country—such was negated by the provision on association incorporated in the
MOA-AD. Apart from this, the suspensive clause was also held invalid because of the delegated
power to the GRP Peace panel to advance peace talks even if it will require new legislation or even
constitutional amendments. The legality of the suspensive clause hence hinges on the query
whether the President can exercise such power as delegated by EO No.3 to the GRP Peace Panel.
Well settled is the rule that the President cannot delegate a power that she herself does not
possess. The power of the President to conduct peace negotiations is not explicitly mentioned in
the Constitution but is rather implied from her powers as Chief Executive and Commander-in-chief.
As Chief Executive, the President has the general responsibility to promote public peace, and as
Commander-in-Chief, she has the more specific duty to prevent and suppress rebellion and lawless
violence.
As such, the President is given the leeway to explore, in the course of peace negotiations, solutions
that may require changes to the Constitution for their implementation. At all event, the president
may not, of course, unilaterally implement the solutions that she considers viable; but she may
not be prevented from submitting them as recommendations to Congress, which could then, if it
is minded, act upon them pursuant to the legal procedures for constitutional amendment and
revision.
While the President does not possess constituent powers - as those powers may be exercised only
by Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people through initiative and referendum - she
may submit proposals for constitutional change to Congress in a manner that does not involve the
arrogation of constituent powers. Clearly, the principle may be inferred that the President - in the
course of conducting peace negotiations - may validly consider implementing even those policies
that require changes to the Constitution, but she may not unilaterally implement them without the
intervention of Congress, or act in any way as if the assent of that body were assumed as a
certainty. The President’s power is limited only to the preservation and defense of the Constitution
but not changing the same but simply recommending proposed amendments or revisions.
o The Court ruled that the suspensive clause is not a suspensive condition but is a term because
it is not a question of whether the necessary changes to the legal framework will take effect; but,
when. Hence, the stipulation is mandatory for the GRP to effect the changes to the legal framework
–which changes would include constitutional amendments. Simply put, the suspensive clause is
inconsistent with the limits of the President's authority to propose constitutional amendments, it
being a virtual guarantee that the Constitution and the laws of the Republic of the Philippines will
certainly be adjusted to conform to all the "consensus points" found in the MOA-AD. Hence, it
must be struck down as unconstitutional.
On the concept underlying the MOA-AD.

While the MOA-AD would not amount to an international agreement or unilateral declaration
binding on the Philippines under international law, respondents' act of guaranteeing amendments
is, by itself, already a constitutional violation that renders the MOA-AD fatally defective. The MOA-
AD not being a document that can bind the Philippines under international law notwithstanding,
respondents' almost consummated act of guaranteeing amendments to the legal framework is, by
itself, sufficient to constitute grave abuse of discretion. The grave abuse lies not in the fact that
they considered, as a solution to the Moro Problem, the creation of a state within a state, but in
their brazen willingness to guarantee that Congress and the sovereign Filipino people would give
their imprimatur to their solution. Upholding such an act would amount to authorizing a usurpation
of the constituent powers vested only in Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people
themselves through the process of initiative, for the only way that the Executive can ensure the
outcome of the amendment process is through an undue influence or interference with that
process.
Bayan Muna v. Romulo, G.R. No. 159618, Feb. 1, 2011
FACTS: In 2000, the RP, through Charge d’Affaires Enrique A. Manalo, signed the Rome Statute
which, by its terms, is “subject to ratification, acceptance or approval” by the signatory states.
In 2003, via Exchange of Notes with the US government, the RP, represented by then DFA
Secretary Ople, finalized a non-surrender agreement which aimed to protect certain persons of
the RP and US from frivolous and harassment suits that might be brought against them in
international tribunals.
Petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion to respondents in concluding and ratifying the
Agreement and prays that it be struck down as unconstitutional, or at least declared as without
force and effect.
ISSUE: [1] Did respondents abuse their discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
concluding the RP-US Non Surrender Agreement in contravention of the Rome Statute?
[2] Is the agreement valid, binding and effective without the concurrence by at least 2/3 of all the
members of the Senate?
HELD: The Agreement does not contravene or undermine, nor does it differ from, the Rome
Statute. Far from going against each other, one complements the other. As a matter of fact, the
principle of complementarity underpins the creation of the ICC. According to Art. 1 of the Statute,
the jurisdiction of the ICC is to “be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions [of the
signatory states].” the Rome Statute expressly recognizes the primary jurisdiction of states, like
the RP, over serious crimes committed within their respective borders, the complementary
jurisdiction of the ICC coming into play only when the signatory states are unwilling or unable to
prosecute.
PUBLIC INTL LAW CASES -Page |9
Also, under international law, there is a considerable difference between a State-Party and a
signatory to a treaty. Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a signatory state is
only obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty. The
Philippines is only a signatory to the Rome Statute and not a State-Party for lack of ratification by
the Senate. Thus, it is only obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose
of the Rome Statute. Any argument obliging the Philippines to follow any provision in the treaty
would be premature. And even assuming that the Philippines is a State-Party, the Rome Statute
still recognizes the primacy of international agreements entered into between States, even when
one of the States is not a State-Party to the Rome Statute.
The right of the Executive to enter into binding agreements without the necessity of subsequent
Congressional approval has been confirmed by long usage. From the earliest days of our history,
we have entered executive agreements covering such subjects as commercial and consular
relations, most favored-nation rights, patent rights, trademark and copyright protection, postal
and navigation arrangements and the settlement of claims. The validity of these has never been
seriously questioned by our courts.
Executive agreements may be validly entered into without such concurrence. As the President
wields vast powers and influence, her conduct in the external affairs of the nation is, as Bayan
would put it, “executive altogether.” The right of the President to enter into or ratify binding
executive agreements has been confirmed by long practice. DISMISSED.
China National Machinery v. Santamaria, G.R. No. 185572, Feb. 7, 2012
FACTS: On 14 September 2002, petitioner China National Machinery & Equipment Corp. (Group)
(CNMEG), represented by its chairperson, Ren Hongbin, entered into a Memorandum of
Understanding with the North Luzon Railways Corporation (Northrail), represented by its
president, Jose L. Cortes, Jr. for the conduct of a feasibility study on a possible railway line from
Manila to San Fernando, La Union (the Northrail Project).
On 30 August 2003, the Export Import Bank of China (EXIM Bank) and the Department of Finance
of the Philippines (DOF) entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (Aug 30 MOU), wherein
China agreed to extend Preferential Buyer’s Credit to the Philippine government to finance the
Northrail Project. The Chinese government designated EXIM Bank as the lender, while the
Philippine government named the DOF as the borrower. Under the Aug 30 MOU, EXIM Bank agreed
to extend an amount not exceeding USD 400,000,000 in favor of the DOF, payable in 20 years,
with a 5-year grace period, and at the rate of 3% per annum.
On 1 October 2003, the Chinese Ambassador to the Philippines, Wang Chungui (Amb. Wang),
wrote a letter to DOF Secretary Jose Isidro Camacho (Sec. Camacho) informing him of CNMEG’s
designation as the Prime Contractor for the Northrail Project.
On 30 December 2003, Northrail and CNMEG executed a Contract Agreement for the construction
of Section I, Phase I of the North Luzon Railway System from Caloocan to Malolos on a turnkey
basis (the Contract Agreement). The contract price for the Northrail Project was pegged at USD
421,050,000.

On 26 February 2004, the Philippine government and EXIM Bank entered into a counterpart
financial agreement – Buyer Credit Loan Agreement No. BLA 04055 (the Loan Agreement). In the
Loan Agreement, EXIM Bank agreed to extend Preferential Buyer’s Credit in the amount of USD
400,000,000 in favor of the Philippine government in order to finance the construction of Phase I
of the Northrail Project.
On 13 February 2006, respondents filed a Complaint for Annulment of Contract and Injunction
with Urgent Motion for Summary Hearing to Determine the Existence of Facts and Circumstances
Justifying the Issuance of Writs of Preliminary Prohibitory and Mandatory Injunction and/or TRO
against CNMEG, the Office of the Executive Secretary, the DOF, the Department of Budget and
Management, the National Economic Development Authority and Northrail. RTC Br. 145 issued an
Order dated 17 March 2006 setting the case for hearing on the issuance of injunctive reliefs. On
29 March 2006, CNMEG filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of this Order. Before RTC Br.
145 could rule thereon, CNMEG filed a Motion to Dismiss dated 12 April 2006, arguing that the
trial court did not have jurisdiction over (a) its person, as it was an agent of the Chinese
government, making it immune from suit, and (b) the subject matter, as the Northrail Project was
a product of an executive agreement.
On 15 May 2007, RTC Br. 145 issued an Omnibus Order denying CNMEG’s Motion to Dismiss and
setting the case for summary hearing to determine whether the injunctive reliefs prayed for should
be issued. CNMEG then filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the trial court in
an Order dated 10 March 2008. Thus, CNMEG filed before the CA a Petition for Certiorari with
Prayer for the Issuance of TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated 4 April 2008.
In the assailed Decision dated 30 September 2008, the appellate court dismissed the Petition for
Certiorari. Subsequently, CNMEG filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the CA
in a Resolution dated 5 December 2008.
ISSUE: Whether CNMEG is entitled to immunity, precluding it from being sued before a local
court.
HELD: There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and firmly
established. According to the classical or absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without its consent,
be made a respondent in the courts of another sovereign. According to the newer or restrictive
theory, the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure
imperii of a state, but not with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis.
Since the Philippines adheres to the restrictive theory, it is crucial to ascertain the legal nature of
the act involved – whether the entity claiming immunity performs governmental, as opposed to
proprietary, functions. The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the
proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities
or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level of an
individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters
into business contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign
functions.
P U B L I C I N T L L A W C A S E S - P a g e | 10
It was CNMEG that initiated the undertaking, and not the Chinese government. The Feasibility
Study was conducted not because of any diplomatic gratuity from or exercise of sovereign
functions by the Chinese government but was plainly a business strategy employed by CNMEG
with a view to securing this commercial enterprise.
The use of the term “state corporation” to refer to CNMEG was only descriptive of its nature as a
government-owned and/or -controlled corporation, and its assignment as the Primary Contractor
did not imply that it was acting on behalf of China in the performance of the latter’s sovereign
functions. To imply otherwise would result in an absurd situation, in which all Chinese corporations
owned by the state would be automatically considered as performing governmental activities, even
if they are clearly engaged in commercial or proprietary pursuits.
Even assuming arguendo that CNMEG performs governmental functions, such claim does not
automatically vest it with immunity. This view finds support in Malong v. Philippine National
Railways, in which this Court held that “immunity from suit is determined by the character of the
objects for which the entity was organized.”
In the case at bar, it is readily apparent that CNMEG cannot claim immunity from suit, even if it
contends that it performs governmental functions. Its designation as the Primary Contractor does
not automatically grant it immunity, just as the term “implementing agency” has no precise
definition for purposes of ascertaining whether GTZ was immune from suit. Although CNMEG
claims to be a government-owned corporation, it failed to adduce evidence that it has not
consented to be sued under Chinese law. Thus, following this Court’s ruling in Deutsche
Gesellschaft, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, CNMEG is to be presumed to be a
government-owned and -controlled corporation without an original charter. As a result, it has the
capacity to sue and be sued under Section 36 of the Corporation Code.
An agreement to submit any dispute to arbitration may be construed as an implicit waiver of
immunity from suit.
In the United States, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 provides for a waiver by
implication of state immunity. In the said law, the agreement to submit disputes to arbitration in
a foreign country is construed as an implicit waiver of immunity from suit. Although there is no
similar law in the Philippines, there is a reason to apply the legal reasoning behind the waiver in
this case.
Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 104768, July 21, 2003
FACTS: The PCGG (Presidential Commission on Good Government) created an AFP Anti-Graft
Board tasked to scrutinize the reports of unexplained wealth and corrupt practices by any AFP
personnel (active or retired). The AFP Board investigated various reports of alleged “ill-gotten”
wealth of respondent Maj. Gen. Josephus Ramas. Along with this, the Constabulary raiding team
served a search and seizure warrant on the premises of Ramas’ alleged mistress, Elizabeth
Dimaano. The Board then concluded that Ramas be prosecuted for violating the “Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019)” and “Forfeiture of unlawfully Acquired Property (RA 1379)”.

Thereafter, they filed a petition for forfeiture against him before the Sandiganbayan. The
Sandiganbayan dismissed the case on several grounds one of which is that there was an illegal
search and seizure of the items confiscated.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the PCGG has the authority to investigate Ramas and Dimaano2. Whether or
not the properties and other belongings confiscated in Dimaano’s house were illegally seized which
will consequently make it inadmissible
HELD: The petition was dismissed. Even in the absence of a Constitution, the right against
unlawful seizure can be found in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Nevertheless, even during the interregnum, the Filipino
people under the Covenant and Declaration continued to enjoy almost the same rights found in
the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution. As stated in Article 2(1) of the Convenant, the States is
required “to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction
the rights recognized in the present Covenant.”
Further, under Article 17(1) of the Covenant, the revolutionary government had the duty to insure
that “[n]o one else shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family,
home or correspondence.” The Declaration also provides in its Article 17(2) that “[n]o one shall
be arbitrarily deprived of his property.”
The Court has taken into consideration the Declaration as part of the generally accepted principles
of international law and binding on the State. Hence, the revolutionary government was also
obligated under international law to observe the rights of individuals under the Declaration,
because it didn’t repudiated either the Covenant or the Declaration during the inter regnum.
The Paquete Habana (175 U.S. 677, 1900)
Brief Fact Summary. The argument of the fishermen whose vessels was seized by the U.S (P)
officials was that international law exempted coastal fishermen from capture as prizes of war.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. The argument of the fishermen whose vessels was seized by the U.S (P)
officials was that international law exempted coastal fishermen from capture as prizes of war.
FACTS: This appeal of a district court decree, which condemned two fishing vessels and their
cargoes as prizes of war, was brought by the owners (D) of two separate fishing vessels. Each of
the vessel running in and out of Havana and sailing under the Spanish flag was a fishing smack
which regularly engaged in fishing on the coast of Cuba. Inside the vessels were fresh fish which
the crew had caught.
The owners of the vessels were not aware of the existence of a war until they were stopped by
U.S. (P) squadron. No incriminating material like arms were found on the fishermen and they did
not make any attempt to run the blockade after learning of its existence not did they resist their
arrest. When the owners (D) appealed, they argued that both customary international law and
writings of leading international scholars recognized an exemption from seizure at wartime of
coastal fishing vessels.
P U B L I C I N T L L A W C A S E S - P a g e | 11
ISSUE: Are coastal fishing vessels with their cargoes and crews excluded from prizes of war?
HELD: (Gray, J.). Yes. Coastal fishing vessels with their cargoes and crews are excluded from
prizes of war. The doctrine that exempts coastal fishermen with their vessels and crews from
capture as prizes of war has been known by the U.S. (P) from the time of the War of Independence
and has been recognized explicitly by the French and British governments. It is an established rule
of international law that coastal fishing vessels with their equipment and supplies, cargoes and
crews, unarmed and honestly pursuing their peaceful calling of catching and bringing in fish are
exempt from capture as prizes of war. Reversed.
Discussion. Chief Justice Fuller who had a dissenting opinion which was not published in this
casebook argued that the captured vessels were of such a size and range as to not fall within the
exemption. He further argued that the exemption in any case had not become a customary rule
of international law, but was only an act of grace that had not been authorized by the President.
Nuclear Test Cases (Australia v. France; New Zealand v. France, I.C.J. Reports, 1974
Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France)
OVERVIEW OF THE CASE
On 9 May 1973, Australia and New Zealand each instituted proceedings against France concerning
tests of nuclear weapons which France proposed to carry out in the atmosphere in the South
Pacific region. France stated that it considered the Court manifestly to lack jurisdiction and
refrained from appearing at the public hearings or filing any pleadings. By two Orders of 22 June
1973, the Court, at the request of Australia and New Zealand, indicated provisional measures to
the effect, inter alia , that pending judgment France should avoid nuclear tests causing radioactive
fall-out on Australian or New Zealand territory. By two Judgments delivered on 20 December 1974,
the Court found that the Applications of Australia and New Zealand no longer had any object and
that it was therefore not called upon to give any decision thereon. In so doing the Court based
itself on the conclusion that the objective of Australia and New Zealand had been achieved
inasmuch as France, in various public statements, had announced its intention of carrying out no
further atmospheric nuclear tests on the completion of the 1974 series.
This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the
Court.
Tanada v. Angara, 272 SCRA 18
FACTS: This is a case petition by Sen. Wigberto Tanada, together with other lawmakers,
taxpayers, and various NGO’s to nullify the Philippine ratification of the World Trade Organization
(WTO) Agreement.
Petitioners believe that this will be detrimental to the growth of our National Economy and against
to the “Filipino First” policy. The WTO opens access to foreign markets, especially its major trading
partners, through the reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural and industrial

products. Thus, provides new opportunities for the service sector cost and uncertainty associated
with exporting and more investment in the country. These are the predicted benefits as reflected
in the agreement and as viewed by the signatory Senators, a “free market” espoused by WTO.
Petitioners also contends that it is in conflict with the provisions of our constitution, since the said
Agreement is an assault on the sovereign powers of the Philippines because it meant that Congress
could not pass legislation that would be good for national interest and general welfare if such
legislation would not conform to the WTO Agreement.
ISSUES: Whether or not the petition present a justiciable controversy.
Whether or not the provisions of the ‘Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization and
the Agreements and Associated Legal Instruments included in Annexes one (1), two (2) and three
(3) of that agreement’ cited by petitioners directly contravene or undermine the letter, spirit and
intent of Section 19, Article II and Sections 10 and 12, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement unduly limit, restrict or impair the exercise of
legislative power by Congress.
Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement impair the exercise of judicial power by this
Honorable Court in promulgating the rules of evidence.
Whether or not the concurrence of the Senate ‘in the ratification by the President of the Philippines
of the Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization’ implied rejection of the treaty
embodied in the Final Act.
Discussions:
1987 Constitution states that Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.
Although the Constitution mandates to develop a self-reliant and independent national economy
controlled by Filipinos, does not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and
services. It contemplates neither “economic seclusion” nor “mendicancy in the international
community.” The WTO itself has some built-in advantages to protect weak and developing
economies, which comprise the vast majority of its members. Unlike in the UN where major states
have permanent seats and veto powers in the Security Council, in the WTO, decisions are made
on the basis of sovereign equality, with each member’s vote equal in weight to that of any other.
Hence, poor countries can protect their common interests more effectively through the WTO than
through one-on-one negotiations with developed countries. Within the WTO, developing countries
can form powerful blocs to push their economic agenda more decisively than outside the
Organization. Which is not merely a matter of practical alliances but a negotiating strategy rooted
in law. Thus, the basic principles underlying the WTO Agreement recognize the need of developing
countries like the Philippines to “share in the growth in international trade commensurate with the
needs of their economic development.”
P U B L I C I N T L L A W C A S E S - P a g e | 12
In its Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the Constitution “adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace,
equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity, with all nations. By the doctrine of incorporation,
the country is bound by generally accepted principles of international law, which are considered
to be automatically part of our own laws. A state which has contracted valid international
obligations is bound to make in its legislations such modifications as may be necessary to ensure
the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken. Paragraph 1, Article 34 of the General Provisions and
Basic Principles of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)
may intrudes on the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice
and procedures. With regard to Infringement of a design patent, WTO members shall be free to
determine the appropriate method of implementing the provisions of TRIPS within their own
internal systems and processes.
The alleged impairment of sovereignty in the exercise of legislative and judicial powers is balanced
by the adoption of the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the
land and the adherence of the Constitution to the policy of cooperation and amity with all nations.
The Senate, after deliberation and voting, voluntarily and overwhelmingly gave its consent to the
WTO Agreement thereby making it “a part of the law of the land” is a legitimate exercise of its
sovereign duty and power.
HELD: In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the
Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the
legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the
right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. As explained by former Chief Justice
Roberto Concepcion, “the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question of whether or not a branch
of government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or so
capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. This is not
only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.”
While the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and
enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the
world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only
against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair. In other words, the Constitution
did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It did not shut out foreign investments, goods and
services in the development of the Philippine economy. While the Constitution does not encourage
the unlimited entry of foreign goods, services and investments into the country, it does not prohibit
them either. In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only
on foreign competition that is unfair.
By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness of sovereignty. By their
voluntary act, nations may surrender some aspects of their state power in exchange for greater
benefits granted by or derived from a convention or pact. After all, states, like individuals, live
with coequals, and in pursuit of mutually covenanted objectives and benefits, they also commonly
agree to limit the exercise of their otherwise absolute rights. As shown by the foregoing treaties
Philippines has entered, a portion of sovereignty may be waived without violating the Constitution,
based on the rationale that the Philippines “adopts the generally accepted principles of
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international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of cooperation and amity
with all nations.”
The provision in Article 34 of WTO agreement does not contain an unreasonable burden,
consistent as it is with due process and the concept of adversarial dispute settlement inherent in
our judicial system.
Regional Trial Courts. Thus, the Complaint to enforce the US District Court judgment is one capable
of pecuniary estimations but at the same time, it is also an action based on judgment against an
estate, thus placing it beyond the ambit of Section 7(a) of Rule 141. What governs the proper
computation of the filing fees over Complaints for the enforcement of foreign judgments is
Section7(b)(3), involving “other actions not involving property.”

The assailed Senate Resolution No. 97 expressed concurrence in exactly what the Final Act
required from its signatories, namely, concurrence of the Senate in the WTO Agreement.
Moreover, the Senate was well-aware of what it was concurring in as shown by the members’
deliberation on August 25, 1994. After reading the letter of President Ramos dated August 11,
1994, the senators of the Republic minutely dissected what the Senate was concurring in.

Mijares v. Hon. Ranada, GR 1393325, April 12, 2005

FACTS: Invoking the Alien Tort Act, petitioners Mijares, et al.*, all of whom suffered human rights
violations during the Marcos era, obtained a Final Judgment in their favor against the Estate of
the late Ferdinand Marcos amounting to roughly 1.9 Billion U.S. Dollars in compensatory and
exemplary damages for tortuous violations of international law in the US District Court of Hawaii.
This Final Judgment was affirmed by the US Court of Appeals. As a consequence, Petitioners filed
a Complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Makati for the enforcement of the Final Judgment,
paying Php 410.00 as docket and filing fees based on Rule 141, Section 7(b) where the value of
the subject matter is incapable of pecuniary estimation. The Estate of Marcos however, filed a
MTD alleging the non-payment of the correct filing fees. The Regional Trial Court of Makati
dismissed the Complaint stating that the subject matter was capable of pecuniary estimation as it
involved a judgment rendered by a foreign court ordering the payment of a definite sum of money
allowing for the easy determination of the value of the foreign judgment. As such, the proper filing
fee was 472 Million Philippine pesos, which Petitioners had not paid.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the amount paid by the Petitioners is the proper filing fee?

HELD:

Yes, but on a different basis—amount merely corresponds to the same amount required for “other
actions not involving property”. The Regional Trial Court of Makati erred in concluding that the
filing fee should be computed on the basis of the total sum claimed or the stated value of the
property in litigation. The Petitioner’s Complaint was lodged against the Estate of Marcos but it is
clearly based on a judgment, the Final Judgment of the US District Court. However, the Petitioners
erred in stating that the Final Judgment is incapable of pecuniary estimation because it is so
capable. On this point, Petitioners state that this might lead to an instance wherein a first level
court (MTC, MeTC, etc.) would have jurisdiction to enforce a foreign judgment. Under Batasang
Pambansa 129, such courts are not vested with such jurisdiction. Section 33 of Batasang
Pambansa 129 refers to instances wherein the cause of action or subject matter pertains to an
assertion of rights over property or a sum of money. But here, the subject matter is the foreign
judgment itself. Section 16 of Batasang Pambansa 129 reveals that the complaint for enforcement
of judgment even if capable of pecuniary estimation would fall under the jurisdiction of the