G.R. No.
157485 On June 19, 2000, the MCTC rendered its Decision in favor of respondents, the
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES Petitioner,
vs.
HEIRS OF MAXIMA LACHICA SIN,.
This is a Petition for Review assailing the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 65244 dated February 24, 2003, which upheld the Decisions of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kalibo, Aklan in Civil Case No. 6130 and the
First Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of New Washington and Batan, Aklan
in Civil Case No. 1181, segregating from the Aklan National College of Fisheries
(ANCF) reservation the portion of land being claimed by respondents.
Petitioner in this case is the Republic of the Philippines, represented by ANCF
and Dr. Elenita R. Andrade, in her capacity as Superintendent of ANCF.
Respondents claim that they are the lawful heirs of the late Maxima Lachica Sin
who was the owner of a parcel of land situated at Barangay Tambac, New
Washington, Aklan, and more particularly described as follows:
A parcel of cocal, nipal and swampy land, located at Barangay Tambac, New
Washington, Aklan, containing an approximate area of FIFTY[-]EIGHT
THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SIX (58,606) square meters, more or less, as per
survey by Geodetic Engineer Reynaldo L. Lopez. Bounded on the North by
Dumlog Creek; on the East by Adriano Melocoton; on the South by Mabilo
Creek; and on the West by Amado Cayetano and declared for taxation purposes
in the name of Maxima L. Sin (deceased) under Tax Declaration No. 10701
(1985) with an assessed value of Php1,320.00.2
On August 26, 1991, respondent heirs instituted in the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan a
complaint against Lucio Arquisola, in his capacity as Superintendent of ANCF
(hereinafter ANCF Superintendent), for recovery of possession, quieting of title,
and declaration of ownership with damages. Respondent heirs claim that a
41,231-square meter-portion of the property they inherited had been usurped
by ANCF, creating a cloud of doubt with respect to their ownership over the
parcel of land they wish to remove from the ANCF reservation.
The ANCF Superintendent countered that the parcel of land being claimed by
respondents was the subject of Proclamation No. 2074 of then President
Ferdinand E. Marcos allocating 24.0551 hectares of land within the area, which
included said portion of private respondents’ alleged property, as civil
reservation for educational purposes of ANCF. The ANCF Superintendent
furthermore averred that the subject parcel of land is timberland and therefore
not susceptible of private ownership.
Subsequently, the complaint was amended to include ANCF as a party
defendant and Lucio Arquisola, who retired from the service during the
pendency of the case, was substituted by Ricardo Andres, then the designated
Officer-in-Charge of ANCF.
The RTC remanded the case to the MCTC of New Washington and Batan, Aklan,
in view of the enactment of Republic Act No. 7659 which expanded the
jurisdiction of first-level courts. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 1181
(4390).
Before the MCTC, respondent heirs presented evidence that they inherited a
bigger parcel of land from their mother, Maxima Sin, who died in the year 1945
in New Washington, Capiz (now Aklan). Maxima Sin acquired said bigger parcel
of land by virtue of a Deed of Sale (Exhibit "B"), and then developed the same
by planting coconut trees, banana plants, mango trees and nipa palms and
usufructing the produce of said land until her death in 1945.
In the year 1988, a portion of said land respondents inherited from Maxima Sin
was occupied by ANCF and converted into a fishpond for educational purpose.
Respondent heirs of Maxima Sin asserted that they were previously in
possession of the disputed land in the concept of an owner. The disputed area
was a swampy land until it was converted into a fishpond by the ANCF. To prove
possession, respondents presented several tax declarations, the earliest of
which was in the year 1945.
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered declaring plaintiffs [respondent heirs
herein] the owner and possessor of the land in question in this case and for the
defendants to cause the segregation of the same from the Civil Reservation of
the Aklan National College of Fisheries, granted under Proclamation No. 2074
dated March 31, 1981.
It is further ordered, that defendants jointly and severally pay the plaintiffs
actual damages for the unearned yearly income from nipa plants uprooted by
the defendants [on] the land in question when the same has been converted
by the defendants into a fishpond, in the amount of Php3,500.00 yearly
beginning the year 1988 until plaintiffs are fully restored to the possession of
the land in question.
It is finally ordered, that defendants jointly and severally pay the plaintiffs the
sum of Php10,000.00 for attorney’s fees and costs of this suit.3
According to the MCTC, the sketch made by the Court Commissioner in his
report (Exh. "LL") shows that the disputed property is an alienable and
disposable land of the public domain. Furthermore, the land covered by Civil
Reservation under Proclamation No. 2074 was classified as timberland only on
December 22, 1960 (Exh. "4-D"). The MCTC observed that the phrase "Block II
Alien or Disp. LC 2415" was printed on the Map of the Civil Reservation for ANCF
established under Proclamation No. 2074 (Exh. "6"), indicating that the
disputed land is an alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
The MCTC likewise cited a decision of this Court in the 1976 case of Republic v.
Court of Appeals4 where it was pronounced that:
Lands covered by reservation are not subject to entry, and no lawful settlement
on them can be acquired. The claims of persons who have settled on, occupied,
and improved a parcel of public land which is later included in a reservation are
considered worthy of protection and are usually respected, but where the
President, as authorized by law, issues a proclamation reserving certain lands,
and warning all persons to depart therefrom, this terminates any rights
previously acquired in such lands by a person who has settled thereon in order
to obtain a preferential right of purchase. And patents for lands which have
been previously granted, reserved from sale, or appropriated are void.
(Underscoring from the MCTC, citations omitted.)
Noting that there was no warning in Proclamation No. 2074 requiring all
persons to depart from the reservation, the MCTC concluded that the
reservation was subject to private rights if there are any.
The MCTC thus ruled that the claim of respondent heirs over the disputed land
by virtue of their and their predecessors’ open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession amounts to an imperfect title, which should be respected
and protected.
Petitioner, through the Solicitor General, appealed to the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan,
where the case was docketed as Civil Case No. 6130.
On May 2, 2001, the RTC rendered its Decision affirming the MCTC judgment
with modification:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision is modified absolving
Appellant Ricardo Andres from the payment of damages and attorney’s fees.
All other details of the appealed decision are affirmed in toto.5
The RTC stressed that Proclamation No. 2074 recognizes vested rights acquired
by private individuals prior to its issuance on March 31, 1981.
The RTC added that the findings of facts of the MCTC may not be disturbed on
appeal unless the court below has overlooked some facts of substance that may
alter the results of its findings. The RTC, however, absolved the Superintendent
of the ANCF from liability as there was no showing on record that he acted with
malice or in bad faith in the implementation of Proclamation No. 2074.6
Petitioner Republic, represented by the ANCF and Dr. Elenita R. Andrade, in her
capacity as the new Superintendent of the ANCF, elevated the case to the Court
of Appeals through a Petition for Review. The petition was docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 65244.
On February 24, 2003, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision dismissing
the petition for lack of merit. In addition to the findings of the MCTC and the
RTC, the Court of Appeals held:
Moreover, petitioner had not shown by competent evidence that the subject
land was likewise declared a timberland before its formal classification as such
in 1960. Considering that lands adjoining to that of the private respondents,
which are also within the reservation area, have been issued original certificates
of title, the same affirms the conclusion that the area of the subject land was
agricultural, and therefore disposable, before its declaration as a timberland in
1960.
It should be noted that Maxima Lachica Sin acquired, through purchase and
sale, the subject property from its previous owners spouses Sotera Melocoton
and Victor Garcia on January 15, 1932, or 28 years before the said landholding
was declared a timberland on December 22, 1960. Tacking, therefore, the
possession of the previous owners and that of Maxima Lachica Sin over the
disputed property, it does not tax ones imagination to conclude that the subject
property had been privately possessed for more than 30 years before it was
declared a timberland. This being the case, the said possession has ripened into
an ownership against the State, albeit an imperfect one. Nonetheless, it is our
considered opinion that this should come under the meaning of "private rights"
under Proclamation No. 2074 which are deemed segregated from the mass of
civil reservation granted to petitioner.7 (Citation omitted.)
Hence, this Petition for Review, anchored on the following grounds:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN
UPHOLDING RESPONDENTS’ CLAIM TO SUPPOSED "PRIVATE RIGHTS" OVER
SUBJECT LAND DESPITE THE DENR CERTIFICATION THAT IT IS CLASSIFIED AS
TIMBERLAND.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN
AFFIRMING THE DECISIONS OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT AND THE
MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS RELEASING THE SUBJECT LAND BEING
CLAIMED BY RESPONDENTS FROM THE MASS OF PUBLIC DOMAIN AND
AWARDING DAMAGES TO THEM.8
The central dispute in the case at bar is the interpretation of the first paragraph
of Proclamation No. 2074:
Upon recommendation of the Director of Forest Development, approved by the
Minister of Natural Resources and by virtue of the powers vested in me by law,
I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, do hereby set aside as
Civil Reservation for Aklan National College of Fisheries, subject to private
rights, if any there be, parcels of land, containing an aggregate area of 24.0551
hectares, situated in the Municipality of New Washington, Province of Aklan,
Philippines, designated Parcels I and II on the attached BFD Map CR-203, x x x
[.]9
The MCTC, the RTC and the Court of Appeals unanimously held that
respondents retain private rights to the disputed property, thus preventing the
application of the above proclamation thereon. The private right referred to is
an alleged imperfect title, which respondents supposedly acquired by
possession of the subject property, through their predecessors-in-interest, for
30 years before it was declared as a timberland on December 22, 1960.
At the outset, it must be noted that respondents have not filed an application
for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under the Public Land Act or the
Property Registration Decree. Nevertheless, the courts a quo apparently
treated respondents’ complaint for recovery of possession, quieting of title and
declaration of ownership as such an application and proceeded to determine if
respondents complied with the requirements therefor.
The requirements for judicial confirmation of imperfect title are found in
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No.
1073, as follows:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of
the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but
whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of
First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their
claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:
xxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have
been in the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a
bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier,
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title
except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant
and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
An equivalent provision is found in Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree, which provides:
SECTION 14. Who may apply.— The following persons may file in the proper
Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in- interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim
of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
This Court has thus held that there are two requisites for judicial confirmation
of imperfect or incomplete title under CA No. 141, namely: (1) open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject
land by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide claim
of ownership since time immemorial or from June 12, 1945; and
(2) the classification of the land as alienable and disposable land of the public
domain.10
With respect to the second requisite, the courts a quo held that the disputed
property was alienable and disposable before 1960, citing petitioner’s failure to
show competent evidence that the subject land was declared a timberland
before its formal classification as such on said year.11 Petitioner emphatically
objects, alleging that under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain
belong to the State and that lands not appearing to be clearly within private
ownership are presumed to belong to the State.
After a thorough review of the records, we agree with petitioner. As this Court
held in the fairly recent case of Valiao v. Republic12:
Under the Regalian doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all lands of
the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right
to any ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within private
ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly, public lands not
shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land or
alienated to a private person by the State remain part of the inalienable public
domain. Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified as alienable or
disposable to a private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable certification from the government that the land claimed to have been
public domain. Property of the public domain is beyond the commerce of man possessed for the required number of years is alienable and disposable.
and not susceptible of private appropriation and acquisitive prescription.
Occupation thereof in the concept of owner no matter how long cannot ripen
In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action,
into ownership and be registered as a title. The burden of proof in overcoming
report, statute, or certification was presented to the Court. The records are
the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the
bereft of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay
person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that
occupied by private claimants were subject of a government proclamation that
the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this
the land is alienable and disposable. Absent such well-nigh incontrovertible
presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land
evidence, the Court cannot accept the submission that lands occupied by
subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or disposable.
private claimants were already open to disposition before 2006. Matters of land
classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. They call for proof.14
There must be a positive act declaring land of the public domain as alienable (Emphases in the original; citations omitted.)
and disposable.1âwphi1 To prove that the land subject of an application for
registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of a positive
Accordingly, in the case at bar, the failure of petitioner Republic to show
act of the government, such as a presidential proclamation or an executive
competent evidence that the subject land was declared a timberland before its
order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands
formal classification as such in 1960 does not lead to the presumption that said
investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. The applicant may also secure a
land was alienable and disposable prior to said date. On the contrary, the
certification from the government that the land claimed to have been
presumption is that unclassified lands are inalienable public lands. Such was the
possessed for the required number of years is alienable and disposable.
conclusion of this Court in Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and
(Citations omitted.)
Soterranea Rafols v. Republic,15 wherein we held:

This Court reached the same conclusion in Secretary of the Department of

Environment and Natural Resources v. Yap,13 which presents a similar issue with
respect to another area of the same province of Aklan. On November 10, 1978,
President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1801 declaring Boracay Island,
among other islands, caves and peninsulas of the Philippines, as tourist zones
and marine reserves under the administration of the Philippine Tourism
Authority (PTA). On September 3, 1982, PTA Circular 3-82 was issued to
implement Proclamation No. 1801. The respondents-claimants in said case filed
a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan, claiming that
Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular 3-82 precluded them from filing an
application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling
purposes. The respondents claim that through their predecessors-in-interest,
they have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of their lands in Boracay since June 12, 1945 or earlier since time
immemorial.
On May 22, 2006, during the pendency of the petition for review of the above
case with this Court, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation
No. 1064 classifying Boracay Island into four hundred (400) hectares of
reserved forest land (protection purposes) and six hundred twenty-eight and
96/100 (628.96) hectares of agricultural land (alienable and disposable).
Petitioner-claimants and other landowners in Boracay filed with this Court an
original petition for prohibition, mandamus and nullification of Proclamation
No. 1064, alleging that it infringed on their "prior vested right" over portions of
Boracay which they allege to have possessed since time immemorial. This
petition was consolidated with the petition for review concerning Proclamation
No. 1801 and PTA Circular 3- 82.
This Court, discussing the Regalian Doctrine vis-à-vis the right of the claimants
to lands they claim to have possessed since time immemorial, held:
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping
with the presumption of State ownership, the Court has time and again
emphasized that there must be a positive act of the government, such as an
official proclamation, declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land
for agricultural or other purposes. In fact, Section 8 of CA No. 141 limits
alienable or disposable lands only to those lands which have been "officially
delimited and classified."
While it is true that the land classification map does not categorically state that
the islands are public forests, the fact that they were unclassified lands leads to
the same result. In the absence of the classification as mineral or timber land,
the land remains unclassified land until released and rendered open to
disposition. x x x. (Emphasis supplied, citation deleted.)
The requirements for judicial confirmation of imperfect title in Section 48(b) of
the Public Land Act, as amended, and the equivalent provision in Section 14(1)
of the Property Registration Decree was furthermore painstakingly debated
upon by the members of this Court in
Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic.16 In Malabanan, the members of this
Court were in disagreement as to whether lands declared alienable or
disposable after June 12, 1945 may be subject to judicial confirmation of
imperfect title. There was, however, no disagreement that there must be a
declaration to that effect.
In the case at bar, it is therefore the respondents which have the burden to
identify a positive act of the government, such as an official proclamation,
declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land for agricultural or
other purposes. Since respondents failed to do so, the alleged possession by
them and by their predecessors-in-interest is inconsequential and could never
ripen into ownership. Accordingly, respondents cannot be considered to have
private rights within the purview of Proclamation No. 2074 as to prevent the
application of said proclamation to the subject property. We are thus
constrained to reverse the rulings of the courts a quo and grant the prayer of
petitioner Republic to dismiss Civil Case No. 1181 (4390) for lack of merit.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review is GRANTED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 65244 dated February 24,
2003, which upheld the Decisions of the Regional Trial Court of Kalibo, Aklan in
Civil Case No. 6130 and the First Municipal Circuit Trial Court of New
Washington and Batan, Aklan in Civil Case No. 1181 (4390), segregating from
the Aklan National College of Fisheries reservation the portion of land being
claimed by respondents is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 1181 (4390)
of the First Municipal Circuit Trial Court of New Washington and Batan, Aklan is
hereby DISMISSED.

The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the

lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming
ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable
or disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must
be established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or
disposable. There must still be a positive act declaring land of the public domain
as alienable and disposable. To prove that the land subject of an application for
registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of a positive
act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive
order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands
investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. The applicant may also secure a
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,vs. TRI-PLUS CORPORATION,
SO ORDERED.11
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
The OSG appealed the trial court's judgment with the CA.12
of Court assailing the Decision1 dated September 14, 2001 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 60671, which affirmed the judgment of the
Subsequently, the Land Registration Authority (LRA), through its Director on
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Consolacion, Metro Cebu in LRC Case No. N-21
Registration, submitted a Report dated August 6, 1998 to the MTC, pertinent
granting herein respondent's application for registration of title to Lots Nos.
portions of which read as follows:
1061 and 1062 of the Cadastral Survey of Consolacion, Cebu.
1. Two (2) parcels of land described as Lots 1062 and 1061, Cad. 545-D,
The facts of the case are as follows:
Consolacion Cadastre on Plan Ap-07-002366 and Ap-07-002362, both situated
in the Barangay of Tayud, Municipality of Consolacion, Province of Cebu, are
On April 30, 1997 Tri-Plus Corporation2, through its president, Euclid C. Po, filed
being applied for original registration of title;
with the MTC of Consolacion, Metro Cebu,3 an Application for Registration of
Title over two parcels of land designated as Lots 1061 and 1062 of the cadastral
2. After examining the afore-said plan discrepancy was noted in the bearings
survey of Consolacion, Cebu, containing an area of 3,939 and 4,796 square
and distances of line 3-4 and 4-5 of Lot 1061, Ap-07-002362, being S.57 deg.
meters, respectively, and located at Barangay Tayud, Consolacion, Cebu.4 In its
19'W 8.02m. and S.52 deg. 10'W 18.24, which do not conform with the
application, Tri-Plus alleged that it is the owner in fee simple of the subject
bearings and distances (N. 52 deg. 01'E., 18.00m) and (N. 52 deg. 47'E.,
parcels of land, including the improvements thereon, having acquired the same
17.71m.) along lines 12-13 and 11-12, respectively of plan Rs-07-01-000358, lot
through purchase; and that it is in actual, continuous, public, notorious,
1508, Consolacion Cad. 545-D, decreed in LRA (NALTDRA) Record No. N-60851.
exclusive and peaceful possession of the subject properties in the concept of an
owner for more than 30 years, including that of its predecessors-in-interest.5
3. That the above discrepancy was brought to the attention of the Regional
The case was docketed as LRC Case No. N-21.6
Technical Director, DENR, Land Management Services, Region VII, Mandaue
City, for verification and correction in a letter dated 7 July 1998.
On September 4, 1997, the trial court received an Opposition to the Application
for Registration filed by the Republic of the Philippines through the Office of the
4. This Authority is not in a position to verify whether or not the parcels of land
Solicitor General (OSG) on the grounds that neither the applicant nor its
subject of registration are already covered by land patent.13
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the land in question since June 12,
On September 14, 2001, the CA rendered the presently assailed Decision
1945 or prior thereto; that the muniments of title submitted by the applicant
finding no reversible error in the appealed judgment, thereby, affirming the
which consists, among others, of tax declarations and receipts of tax payments,
same.14
do not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition
of the land applied for or of its open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
Hence, herein petition based on the following assignments of errors:
possession and occupation thereof in the concept of owner since June 12, 1945
or prior thereto; that the claim of ownership in fee simple on the basis of a
I
Spanish title or grant may no longer be availed of by the applicant because it
failed to file an appropriate application for registration in accordance with the
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT FINDING
provisions of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 892; and that the subject parcels of
THAT THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ACQUIRE JURISDICTION TO HEAR AND DECIDE
land are portions of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the
THE CASE, BECAUSE THE IDENTITY OF THE LAND REMAINS UNCERTAIN.
Philippines and are not subject to private appropriation.7
II
On September 19, 1997, Tri-Plus presented documentary evidence to prove
compliance with the jurisdictional requirements of the law. On even date, a
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT FINDING
Manifestation and Motion was filed by the heirs of Toribio Pepito praying that
THAT RESPONDENT FAILED TO DISCHARGE THE BURDEN OF PROVING THAT
they be given a period of 10 days within which to file their written opposition.8
THE PROPERTY IS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE.
However, the oppositors failed to file their written opposition on time. The trial
court then commissioned its clerk of court to receive evidence from the
III
applicant and directed the former to submit a report thereon. Accordingly, a
Commissioner's Report was submitted on the proceedings taken.9
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT FINDING
THAT RESPONDENT IS DISQUALIFIED FROM ACQUIRING LANDS OF THE PUBLIC
In its Judgment dated February 26, 1998, the MTC made the following finding
DOMAIN.15
and conclusion:
As to the first assigned error, petitioner contends that the CA erred in relying
The totality of the evidence, both documentary and testimonial, of the
on the original survey plan approved by the Lands Management Services of the
applicant clearly shows that it and its predecessors-in-interest had been in
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) when it ruled that
actual, public, exclusive and continuous possession in concept of owner of the
the applicant was able to duly establish the identity of Lot 1061. This reliance,
parcels of land above-mentioned for no less than thirty (30) years prior to the
petitioner argues, is mistaken considering that the Report of the Director on
filing of the instant petition for registration of its imperfect title. This being so,
Registration of the LRA pointed to a discrepancy in the bearings and distances
the applicant is entitled that its title be confirmed under the provisions of the
of the boundaries which separate Lot 1061 from an adjoining land, Lot 1058.
Torrens System of Registration.10
This discrepancy, petitioners submit, casts doubt on the identity of the land
subject of the application for registration. Petitioner then concludes that if
Accordingly, it disposed of the case as follows:
there is uncertainty in the metes and bounds of the property sought to be
titled, the trial court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered declaring
case. Hence, the proceedings before the trial court, including its decision
the applicant TRI-PLUS LAND CORPORATION the exclusive and absolute owner
granting the application for registration, are void.
of Lot 1061 of the Cadastral Survey of Consolacion, Cebu, as shown on plan Ap-
07-002362 (Exhibit "J") and described in its corresponding technical description
As to the second assignment of error, petitioner argues that the CA erred in
(Exhibit "K"), and Lot 1062 of the Cadastral Survey of Consolacion, Cebu, as
holding that the applicant was able to prove that the subject properties are
shown on plan Ap-07-002366 (Exhibit "O") and described in its corresponding
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. Petitioner contends that a
technical description (Exhibit "P").
mere notation appearing in the survey plans of the disputed properties showing
that the subject lands had been classified as alienable and disposable on June
Once this decision becomes final, let an Order for the issuance of the decree of
25, 1963 is not sufficient to establish the nature and character of these lands.
registration for Lots 1061 and 1062, Consolacion Cadastre, be issued in the
Petitioner asserts that there should be a positive act on the part of the
name of TRI-PLUS LAND CORPORATION.
government, such as a certification from the DENR, to prove that the said lands
are indeed alienable and disposable. Petitioner further contends that even if
the subject properties were classified as alienable and disposable on June 25,
1963, the law, nonetheless, requires that such classification should have been
made on June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Anent the last assigned error, petitioner contends that since the applicant failed
to discharge the burden of proving that the subject properties are alienable and
disposable, there is no basis for the CA to rule that these properties are private
lands.
In its Comment, respondent contends that it was able to prove the identity of
Lot 1061 with certainty. While it admits the discrepancy in the bearings and
distances which form the boundary between Lot 1061 and the adjoining Lot
1058, respondent contends that such discrepancy is merely technical in nature
because Lots 1058 and 1061 remain the same and that there is neither an
increase nor decrease in the area of the subject lot sought to be titled; and that
what was required by the LRA in its Report was for the applicant to correct and
adjust the bearings and distances of Lot 1061 in order to conform to the
boundaries of Lot 1058.
Respondent also argues that the notations appearing in the survey plans of the
subject properties serve as sufficient proof that these lands are alienable and
disposable. Respondent asserts that the survey plans were duly approved by
the DENR, Lands Management Services whose official acts are presumed to be
in accordance with law.
Lastly, respondent argues that its predecessor-in-interest's continuous, actual,
adverse and peaceful possession of the subject properties in the concept of an
owner for a period of more than 30 years, coupled with the fact that they
declared these lands in their name, gives a strong presumption in respondent's
favor that the subject properties no longer form part of the public domain.
Parties filed their respective Memoranda.16
The Court finds the petition meritorious.
At the outset, however, the Court does not agree with petitioner's contention
in its first assigned error that respondent failed to properly identify Lot 1061
which is one of the lots sought to be titled.
Insofar as the identity of the land subject of an application for original
registration is concerned, this Court has laid down the rule, as follows:
The submission in evidence of the original tracing cloth plan, duly approved by
the Bureau of Lands, in cases for application of original registration of land is a
mandatory requirement. The reason for this rule is to establish the true identity
of the land to ensure that it does not overlap a parcel of land or a portion
thereof already covered by a previous land registration, and to forestall the
possibility that it will be overlapped by a subsequent registration of any
adjoining land. The failure to comply with this requirement is fatal to
petitioner's application for registration.17
However, in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals18 and in the more
recent cases of Spouses Recto v. Republic of the Philippines19 and Republic of
the Philippines v. Hubilla20, the Court ruled that while the best evidence to
identify a piece of land for registration purposes is the original tracing cloth plan
from the Bureau of Lands (now the Lands Management Services of the DENR),
blueprint copies and other evidence could also provide sufficient identification.
In the present case, respondent submitted in evidence a blueprint copy of the
Advance Plan of Lot 106121 and a Technical Description22 thereof, both of
which had been duly certified and approved by the Lands Management Services
of the DENR. The Court finds these pieces of evidence as substantial compliance
with the legal requirements for the proper identification of Lot 1061. The
discrepancy in the common boundary that separates Lot 1061 from Lot 1058,
as contained in the LRA Report does not cast doubt on the identity of the
subject lot. As the CA correctly held, the discrepancy is not substantial because
it does not unduly increase or affect the total area of the subject lot and at the
same time prejudice the adjoining lot owner. It is only when the discrepancy
results to an unexplained increase in the total area of the land sought to be
registered that its identity is made doubtful. Besides, only a portion of the many
boundaries of Lot 1061 has been found to bear a discrepancy in relation to the
boundary of one adjoining lot and the LRA Report simply recommends that the
Lands Management Services of the DENR verify the reported discrepancy and
make the necessary corrections, if needed, in order to avoid duplication in the
issuance of titles covering the same parcels of land.
Petitioner's argument that, on the basis of the LRA Report, the MTC should
have dismissed respondent's application for registration for lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter, is without merit. The MTC could not have possibly
done this because said Report was submitted to the trial court more than five
months after the latter rendered its Decision. A copy of the LRA Report
attached to the present petition shows that it is dated August 6, 1998 while the
MTC decision was rendered much earlier on February 26, 1998. In fact, the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) perfected its appeal by filing a notice of
appeal of the MTC Decision on April 2, 1998, which is also prior to the
submission of the LRA report. Hence, by the time the LRA report was submitted
to the MTC, the latter has already lost jurisdiction over the case, not on the
ground cited by petitioner but because the appeal to the CA was already
perfected, vesting jurisdiction upon the appellate court.
In any case, while the subject lands were properly identified, the Court finds
that respondent failed to comply with the other legal requirements for its
application for registration to be granted.
Applicants for confirmation of imperfect title must prove the following: (a) that
the land forms part of the alienable and disposable agricultural lands of the
public domain; and (b) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of
ownership either since time immemorial or since June 12, 1945.23
In the present case, the Court finds merit in petitioner's contention that
respondent failed to prove the first requirement that the properties sought to
be titled forms part of the alienable and disposable agricultural lands of the
public domain.
Section 6 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, provides that the
classification and reclassification of public lands into alienable or disposable,
mineral or forest land is the prerogative of the Executive Department. Under
the Regalian doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all lands of the
public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to
any ownership of land.24 All lands not appearing to be clearly within private
ownership are presumed to belong to the State.25 Accordingly, public lands not
shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land or
alienated to a private person by the State remain part of the inalienable public
domain.26
It must be stressed that incontrovertible evidence must be presented to
establish that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable.27
In the present case, the only evidence to prove the character of the subject
lands as required by law is the notation appearing in the Advance Plan stating in
effect that the said properties are alienable and disposable. However, this is
hardly the kind of proof required by law. To prove that the land subject of an
application for registration is alienable, an applicant must establish the
existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential
proclamation or an executive order, an administrative action, investigation
reports of Bureau of Lands investigators, and a legislative act or statute.28 The
applicant may also secure a certification from the Government that the lands
applied for are alienable and disposable.29 In the case at bar, while the
Advance Plan bearing the notation was certified by the Lands Management
Services of the DENR, the certification refers only to the technical correctness
of the survey plotted in the said plan and has nothing to do whatsoever with
the nature and character of the property surveyed. Respondents failed to
submit a certification from the proper government agency to prove that the
lands subject for registration are indeed alienable and disposable.
As to the second requirement, testimonial evidence were presented to prove
that respondent's predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the
subject lots in the concept of an owner for the period required by law. The first
witness was Thelma Pilapil who claims to be the daughter of Constancia Frias
from whom respondent bought Lot 1061. Pilapil testified that her family has
been in possession of Lot 1061 since her birth.30 When her testimony was
offered on October 7, 1997, she was 40 years old.31 Deducting 40 years from
1997, it means that her family started possession of Lot 1061 only in 1957. The
second witness who was presented was Tomas Frias from whom respondent
bought Lot 1062. Frias testified that he was 67 years old at the time that his
testimony was taken on October 7, 1997.32 He claims that he started owning
the subject lot when he was 17 years old and had been in possession of the
same since then.33 Hence, by simple arithmetic, the testimony of Frias proves
that he came to possess Lot 1062 only in 1947. While he testified that Lot 1062
was previously owned by his father and that he inherited the property from his
parents, no evidence was presented to show that the latter indeed previously
owned the said property and that they had been in possession of the same on
or before June 12, 1945.

Moreover, other pieces of evidence presented by respondent to prove the

period of its possession and that of its predecessors-in-interest show that the
subject properties were declared for taxation purposes beginning only in
1961.34 This date may be considered as relatively recent considering that
respondent's predecessors-in-interest claim to have been in possession of the
subject properties as early as 1947. While belated declaration of a property for
taxation purposes does not necessarily negate the fact of possession, tax
declarations or realty tax payments of property are, nevertheless, good indicia
of possession in the concept of an owner, for no one in his right mind would be
paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual, or at least, constructive
possession.35 In the present case, respondent failed to explain why, despite the
claim of its predecessors-in interest that they possessed the subject properties
in the concept of an owner as early as 1947, it was only in 1961 that they
started to declare the same for purposes of taxation.

From the foregoing, it is clear that respondent and its predecessors-in-interest

failed to prove that they had been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession of the subject properties under a bona fide claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945 or earlier, as required by law.

Well-entrenched is the rule that the burden of proof in land registration cases
rests on the applicant who must show clear, positive and convincing evidence
that his alleged possession and occupation were of the nature and duration
required by law.36 In the present case, the Court finds that respondent failed to
prove, by clear and convincing evidence, the legal requirements that the lands
sought to be titled are alienable and disposable and that its predecessors-in-
interest were already in possession of the subject lots since 1945 or earlier.

As to the last assigned error, respondent having failed to prove that the subject
properties are alienable and disposable public lands, the Court agrees with
petitioner that there would be no basis in concluding that these lands have
already become private. The presumption remains that said properties remain
part of the inalienable public domain and, therefore, could not become the
subject of confirmation of imperfect title.

Finally, while it is an acknowledged policy of the State to promote the

distribution of alienable public lands as a spur to economic growth and in line
with the ideal of social justice, the law imposes stringent safeguards upon the
grant of such resources lest they fall into the wrong hands to the prejudice of
the national patrimony.37 The Court must not, therefore, relax the stringent
safeguards relative to the registration of imperfect titles.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of

Appeals dated September 14, 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 60671 is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Respondent Tri-Plus Corporation's application for registration and
issuance of title to Lots 1061 and 1062, Consolacion Cad-545-D, in LRC Case No.
N-21 filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Consolacion, Metro Cebu, is
DISMISSED.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs.

CANDY MAKER, INC., as represented by its President, ONG YEE SEE,*

At bar is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to
set aside the May 21, 2004 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CV No. 73287, which affirmed in toto the October 12, 2001 Decision2 of the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Taytay, Rizal in Land Registration Case No. 99-
0031 declaring respondent the owner of the parcels of land designated as Lots
3138-A and 3138-B in Plan CSD. 04-018302, Cainta-Taytay Cadastre.
Sometime in 1998, Candy Maker, Inc. decided to purchase Lot No. 3138 Cad.
688 of the Cainta-Taytay Cadastre, a parcel of land located below the
reglementary lake elevation of 12.50 meters, about 900 meters away from the
Laguna de Bay, and bounded on the southwest by the Manggahan Floodway,
and on the southeast by a legal easement.
On April 1, 1998, Geodetic Engineer Potenciano H. Fernandez, prepared and
signed a Subdivision Plan of the property for Apolonio Cruz. The property was
subdivided into two lots: Lot No. 3138-A with an area of 10,971 square
meters, and Lot No. 3138-B with an area of 239 square meters.3 The technical
description of Lot No. 3138 was also prepared by Fernandez, and was
approved by the Regional Technical Director of the Bureau of Lands on April
14, 1998.4
On April 29, 1999, Antonio, Eladia, and Felisa, all surnamed Cruz, executed a
Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Candy Maker, Inc.5 The buyer declared Lot
No. 3138 for taxation purposes in 1999 under Tax Declaration Nos. 004-
18929, 004-18930 and 004-18931.6
On June 16, 1999, Candy Maker, Inc., as applicant, filed an application with
the MTC of Taytay, Rizal, for the registration of its alleged title over Lot No.
3138-A and Lot No. 3138-B under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529.
Acting thereon, the MTC issued an Order7 on June 18, 1999 directing the
applicant to cause the publication of the notice of initial hearing and for the
Deputy Sheriff to post the same. The Administrator of the Land Registration
Authority (LRA) and the Directors of the Land Management Bureau (LMB) and
Forest Management Bureau (FMB) were also instructed to submit their
respective reports on the status of the parcels of land before the initial
hearing scheduled on October 29, 1999.
The Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO) of
Antipolo City filed on August 18, 1999 his Report8 declaring that "[t]he land
falls within the Alienable and Disposable Zone, under Land Classification
Project No. 5-A, per L.C. Map No. 639 certified released on March 11, 1927"
and that the property is the subject of CENRO Case No. 520(97) entitled
Perpetua San Jose v. Almario Cruz. On the other hand, the LRA, in its
September 21, 1999 Report,9 recommended the exclusion of Lot No. 3138-B
on the ground that it is a legal easement and intended for public use, hence,
inalienable and indisposable.
On September 30, 1999, the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA)
approved Resolution No. 113, Series of 1993, providing that untitled
shoreland areas may be leased subject to conditions enumerated therein.
The applicant filed its Amended Application10 on December 15, 1999 for the
confirmation of its alleged title on Lot No. 3138, alleging therein that:
1. x x x the applicant is the President of CANDYMAKER[,] INC. and registered
owner of a parcel of land located at Panghulo Brgy. San Juan, Taytay, Rizal
with an area of TEN THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED SEVENTY ONE (10,971)
square meters and as fully described and bounded under Lot 3138-A plan
CSD-04-018302[,] copy of which and the corresponding technical descriptions
are hereto attached to form parts hereof;
xxxx
8. That for Lot 3138-A the applicant hereby prays for the benefit granted
under the Land Registration Act and/or under the benefits provided for by
P.D. No. 1529, as applicant and their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, public, continuous, and peaceful occupation and possession of the said
land since time immemorial in [the] concept of true owners and [adverse] to
the whole world; x x x11
On March 27, 2000, the MTC issued an Order12 admitting the Amended
Application and resetting the initial hearing to June 23, 2000. However, upon
the requests of the LRA for the timely publication of the Notice of Initial
Hearing in the Official Gazette,13 the court moved the hearing date to
September 22, 2000,14 then on January 26, 200115 and until finally, to June 15,
2001.16
On July 20, 2001, the Republic of the Philippines, the LLDA filed its
Opposition17 to the Amended Application in which it alleged that the lot
subject of the application for registration may not be alienated and disposed
since it is considered part of the Laguna Lake bed, a public land within its
jurisdiction pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4850, as amended. According
to the LLDA, the projection of Lot No. 3138-A, Cad-688-D Csd-04-018302 in its
topographic map based on the Memorandum18 of Engineer Christopher
Pedrezuela of the Engineering and Construction Division of the LLDA indicated
that it is "located below the reglementary lake elevation of 12.50 meters
referred to datum 10.00 meters below mean lower water" and under Section
41(11) of R.A. No. 4850, the property is a public land which forms part of the
bed of the Laguna Lake. This Memorandum was appended to the application.
At the hearing conducted on August 31, 2001, the applicant marked in
evidence the complementary copies of the Official Gazette and the People’s
Tonight as Exhibits "E-1" and "F-1," respectively.19
Except as to the LLDA and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), which was
represented by the duly deputized provincial prosecutor,20 the court, upon
motion of the applicant, issued an Order of general default.21
The applicant presented as witnesses its Treasurer, Fernando Co Siy, and
Antonio Cruz, one of the vendees.
Cruz testified that his grandparents owned the property,22 and after their
demise, his parents, the spouses Apolonio Cruz and Aquilina Atanacio Cruz,
inherited the lot;23 he and his father had cultivated the property since 1937,
planting palay during the rainy season and vegetables during the dry season;
his father paid the realty taxes on the property,24 and he (Cruz) continued
paying the taxes after his father’s death.25 Cruz insisted that he was the
rightful claimant and owner of the property.
Sometime in the 1980s, Apolonio Cruz executed an extrajudicial deed of
partition in which the property was adjudicated to Antonio Cruz and his
sisters, Felisa and Eladia, to the exclusion of their five (5) other siblings who
were given other properties as their shares.26 He did not know why his
ancestors failed to have the property titled under the Torrens system of
registration.27 He left the Philippines and stayed in Saudi Arabia from 1973 to
1983.28 Aside from this, he hired the services of an "upahan" to cultivate the
property.29 The property is about 3 kilometers from the Laguna de Bay, and is
usually flooded when it rains.30
Fernando Co Siy testified that the applicant acquired Lot No. 3138 from
siblings Antonio, Eladia and Felisa,31 who had possessed it since 1945;32 that
after paying the real estate taxes due thereon,33 it caused the survey of the
lot;34 that possession thereof has been peaceful35 and none of the former
owners claims any right against it;36 neither the applicant nor its predecessors-
in-interest received information from any government agency that the lot is a
public land;37 the subject lot is 3 kms. away from Laguna de Bay,38 above its
elevation and that of the nearby road;39 the property is habitable40 and was
utilized as a riceland at the time it was sold by the former owners;41 and that
he was aware that a legal easement is affecting the lot and is willing to
annotate it in the land title.42
On cross-examination by the LLDA counsel, Siy admitted that his knowledge as
to the distance of the lot with respect to the Laguna de Bay came from
"somebody residing in Taytay" and also from an adjacent owner of the lot;43
that the lot is submerged in water since there is no land fill yet;44 and that no
improvements had been introduced to the property.45
The LLDA moved for a joint ocular inspection of the parcels of land in order to
determine its exact elevation.46 On September 14, 2001, a Survey Team of the
Engineering and Construction Division of the LLDA, composed of Ramon D.
Magalonga, Virgilio M. Polanco, and Renato Q. Medenilla, conducted an actual
ground survey of the property. The team used a total station and digital
survey instrument to measure the elevation of the ground in reference to the
elevation of the lake water. A representative of the applicant witnessed the
survey. The team found that the lot is below the prescribed elevation of 12.50
m. and thus part of the bed of the lake; as such, it could not be titled to the
applicant. The team also reported that the property is adjacent to the highway
from the Manggahan Floodway to Angono, Rizal. The LLDA moved that the
application be withdrawn, appending thereto a copy of the Survey Report.47
The LLDA did not offer any testimonial and documentary evidence and agreed
to submit the case for decision based on its Opposition.
On October 12, 2001, the MTC rendered a Decision granting the application
for registration over the lots. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered[,] the court hereby rendered judgment
confirming title of the applicants over the real property denominated as Lot
3138-A Csd-04-018302 of Cad-688-D Cainta-Taytay Cadastre; Lot 3138-B Csd-
04-018302 of Cad 688-D Cainta-Taytay Cadastre.48
On appeal to the CA, the petitioner contended that the MTC did not acquire
jurisdiction over the application for registration since the actual copies of the
Official Gazette (O.G.) where the notice of hearing was published were not
adduced in evidence; the applicant likewise failed to establish exclusive
ownership over the subject property in the manner prescribed by law. The
petitioner argued further that the requirements of Section 23, par. 1 of P.D.
No. 1529, 49 as amended, are mandatory and jurisdictional, and that failure to
observe such requirements has a fatal effect on the whole proceedings. Citing
Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals50 and Register of Deeds of
Malabon v. RTC, Malabon, MM, Br. 170,51 the Republic averred that a mere
certificate of publication is inadequate proof of the jurisdictional fact of
publication because the actual copies of the O.G. must be presented at the
initial hearing of the case. Moreover, witnesses were not presented to prove
specific acts to show that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have
been in exclusive, open, continuous, and adverse possession of the subject
lots in the concept of the owner since June 12, 1945 or earlier, in accordance
with Sec. 14, par. 1 of P.D. No. 1529.52 It noted that the testimonies of the
applicant’s witnesses are more of conclusions of law rather than factual
evidence of ownership. Other than the general statement that they planted
rice and vegetables on the subject lots, their possession could properly be
characterized as mere casual cultivation since they failed to account for its
exclusive utilization since 1945 or earlier. After stressing that tax declarations
are not conclusive proof of ownership, it concluded that the subject lots
rightfully belong to the State under the Regalian doctrine.53
The applicant averred in its Appellee’s Brief54 that it had marked in evidence
the actual copy of the O.G. where the notice of initial hearing was published;
in fact, the MTC Decision stated that the copy of the O.G. containing the
notice was referred to as Exhibit "E-1." Moreover, Sec. 14, par. 1 of P.D. 1529
is inapplicable since it speaks of possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain. Instead, par. 4 of the same section55
should govern because the subject parcels of land are lands of private
ownership, having being acquired through purchase from its predecessors-in-
interest, who, in turn, inherited the same from their parents. It pointed out
that there were no adverse claims of interest or right by other private persons
and even government agencies like the Province of Rizal. Lastly, while tax
declarations and tax receipts do not constitute evidence of ownership, they
are nonetheless prima facie evidence of possession.
On May 21, 2004, the appellate court rendered judgment which dismissed the
appeal and affirmed in toto the Decision of the MTC,56 holding that the copy
of the O.G., where the notice was published, was marked as Exhibit "E-1"
during the initial hearing. On the issue of ownership over the subject lots, the
CA upheld the applicant’s claim that the parcels of land were alienable and
not part of the public domain, and that it had adduced preponderant evidence
to prove that its predecessors had been tilling the land since 1937, during
which palay and vegetables were planted. In fact, before the lots were
purchased, the applicant verified their ownership with the assessor’s office,
and thereafter caused the property to be surveyed; after the lots were
acquired in 1999 and a survey was caused by the applicant, no adverse claims
were filed by third persons. Further, the CA ruled that tax declarations or tax
receipts are good indicia of possession in the concept of the owner, which
constitute at least positive and strong indication that the taxpayer concerned
has made a claim either to the title or to the possession of the property.
The Republic, now petitioner, filed the instant Petition for Review on the
following issues:
A.
WHETHER THE LAND IN QUESTION MAYBE THE SUBJECT OF REGISTRATION.
B.
WHETHER THE COURT A QUO ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE RES
CONSIDERING ITS INALIENABLE CHARACTER.
C.
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT’S
FINDING THAT RESPONDENT COMPLIED WITH THE LEGAL REQUIREMENTS ON
POSSESSION AS MANDATED BY SECTION 14 OF P.D. NO. 1529.57
Petitioner asserts that the Engineer’s Survey Report58 and the Laguna de Bay
Shoreland Survey59 both show that Lot No. 3138-A is located below the
reglementary lake elevation, hence, forms part of the Laguna Lake bed. It
insists that the property belongs to the public domain as classified under
Article 502 of the Civil Code.60 Citing the ruling of this Court in Bernardo v.
Tiamson,61 petitioner avers that the subject lot is incapable of private
appropriation since it is a public land owned by the State under the Regalian
doctrine. On this premise, petitioner avers that the MTC did not acquire
jurisdiction over the subject matter, and as a consequence, its decision is null
and void.
Petitioner maintains that respondent failed to present incontrovertible
evidence to warrant the registration of the property in its name as owner. The
testimonies of the two witnesses only proved that the possession of the land
may be characterized as mere casual cultivation; they failed to prove that its
predecessors occupied the land openly, continuously, exclusively, notoriously
and adversely in the concept of owner since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
On the other hand, respondent argues that the Engineer’s Survey Report and
the Laguna de Bay Shoreland Survey have no probative value because they
were neither offered nor admitted in evidence by the MTC. It points out that
petitioner failed to invoke these reports in the appellate court.
It was only when the petition was filed with this Court that the respondent
learned of its existence. Petitioner’s reliance on the reports/survey is merely
an afterthought. The case of Bernardo v. Tiamson is irrelevant because the
factual issues are different from those of this case.
On April 28, 2005, respondent filed a Manifestation62 with this Court,
appending thereto the report63 conducted by the survey team of the LLDA
Engineering and Construction Division on April 12, 2005. It stated that the
10,971 sq m property subject of the case is below the 12.5 elevation, and that
the profile distance of the property from the actual lake waters is about 900
m. to 1 km.
The issues in this case are the following: (1) whether the MTC had jurisdiction
over the amended application; (2) whether the property subject of the
amended application is alienable and disposable property of the State, and, if
so, (3) whether respondent adduced the requisite quantum of evidence to
prove its ownership over the property under Section 14 of P.D. 1529.
The petition is meritorious.
On the first issue, we find and so rule that the MTC acquired jurisdiction over
respondent’s application for registration since a copy of the O.G. containing
the notice of hearing was marked and adduced in evidence as Exhibit "E-1."
The representative of the OSG was present during the hearing and interposed
his objection thereto.
On the second and third issues, we find and so rule that the property subject
of this application was alienable and disposable public agricultural land until
July 18, 1966. However, respondent failed to prove that it possesses
registerable title over the property.
Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by R.A. No. 1942,
reads:
Section 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands
of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein,
but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, nay apply to the
Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor,
under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation
of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the
filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by
war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
This provision was further amended by P.D. No. 1073 by substituting the
phrase "for at least thirty years" with "since June 12, 1945;" thus:
Sec. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII, of the
Public Land Act are hereby amended in the sense that these provisions shall
apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain which have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession, and occupation
by the applicant himself or through his predecessor-in-interest, under a bona
fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945.
Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration
Decree, provides:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. —The following persons may file in the proper Court
of First Instance [now Regional Trial Court] an application for registration of
title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim
of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier (emphasis supplied).
Applicants for confirmation of imperfect title must, therefore, prove the
following: (a) that the land forms part of the disposable and alienable
agricultural lands of the public domain; and (b) that they have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the same
under a bona fide claim of ownership either since time immemorial or since
June 12, 1945.64
Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly
within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. The
presumption is that lands of whatever classification belong to the State.65
Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified as alienable or
disposable to a private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable
public domain. Property of the public domain is beyond the commerce of man
and not susceptible of private appropriation and acquisitive prescription.
Occupation thereof in the concept of owner no matter how long cannot ripen
into ownership and be registered as a title.66 The statute of limitations with
regard to public agricultural lands does not operate against the State unless
the occupant proves possession and occupation of the same after a claim of
ownership for the required number of years to constitute a grant from the
State.67
No public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant from the
government, whether express or implied. It is indispensable that there be a
showing of a title from the State.68 The rationale for the period "since time
immemorial or since June 12, 1945" lies in the presumption that the land
applied for pertains to the State, and that the occupants or possessor claim an
interest thereon only by virtue of their imperfect title as continuous, open and
notorious possession.
A possessor of real property may acquire ownership thereof through
acquisitive prescription. In Alba Vda. de Raz v. Court of Appeals,69 the Court
declared that:
x x x [W]hile Art. 1134 of the Civil Code provides that ‘(o)wnership and other
real rights over immovable property are acquired by ordinary prescription
through possession of ten years,’ this provision of law must be read in
conjunction with Art. 1117 of the same Code. This article states that ‘x x x
(o)rdinary acquisitive prescription of things requires possession in good faith
and with just title for the time fixed by law.’ Hence, a prescriptive title to real
estate is not acquired by mere possession thereof under claim of ownership
for a period of ten years unless such possession was acquired con justo titulo
y buena fe (with color of title and good faith). The good faith of the possessor
consists in the reasonable belief that the person from whom he received the
thing was the owner thereof, and could transmit his ownership. For purposes
of prescription, there is just title when the adverse claimant came into
possession of the property through one of the recognized modes of
acquisition of ownership or other real rights but the grantor was not the
owner or could not transmit any right.70
To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an
applicant must conclusively establish the existence of a positive act of the
government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order, or
administrative action, investigation reports of the Bureau of Lands investigator
or a legislative act or statute.71 Until then, the rules on confirmation of
imperfect title do not apply. A certification of the Community Environment
and Natural Resources Officer in the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources stating that the land subject of an application is found to be within
the alienable and disposable site per a land classification project map is
sufficient evidence to show the real character of the land subject of the
application.72
The applicant is burdened to offer proof of specific acts of ownership to
substantiate the claim over the land.73 Actual possession consists in the
manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would
actually exercise over his own property.74 A mere casual cultivation of portions
of the land by the claimant does not constitute sufficient basis for a claim of
ownership; such possession is not exclusive and notorious as to give rise to a
presumptive grant from the State.75
In this case, the evidence on record shows that the property is alienable
agricultural land. Romeo Cadano of the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office, Antipolo Rizal, certified that the property "falls within the
Alienable and Disposable zone, under Land Classification Project No. 5-A, per
L.C. Map No. 639 certified released on March 11, 1927."76 However, under
R.A. No. 4850 which was approved on July 18, 1966, lands located at and
below the maximum lake level of elevation of the Laguna de Bay are public
lands which form part of the bed of said lake. Such lands denominated as
lakeshore areas are linear strips of open space designed to separate
incompatible element or uses, or to control pollution/nuisance, and for
identifying and defining development areas or zone. Such areas of the lake
with an approximate total area of 14,000 hectares form a strip of the lakebed
along its shores alternately submerged or exposed by the annual rising and
lowering of the lake water. They have environmental ecological significance
and actual potential economic benefits.
Under Section 1 of the law, the national policy of the State is to promote and
accelerate the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and
the surrounding provinces, cities and towns within the context of the national
and regional plans and policies for social and economic development and to or realty tax receipts evidencing payment of such taxes. Indeed,
carry out the development of the Laguna Lake region with due regard and while tax receipts and tax payment receipts themselves do not
adequate provisions for environmental management and control, convincingly prove title to the land,78 these are good indicia of
preservation of the quality of human life and ecological systems, and the possession in the concept of an owner, for no one in his right mind
prevention of undue ecological disturbances, deterioration and pollution. would pay taxes for a property that is not in his actual or, at least,
constructive possession.79 While tax receipts and declarations are
not incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they constitute, at the
The rapid expansion of Metropolitan Manila, the suburbs and the lakeshore
least, proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property,
town of Laguna de Bay, combined with current and prospective uses of the
particularly when accompanied by proof of actual possession of
lake for municipal-industrial water supply, irrigation, fisheries, and the like,
property.80 The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for
created deep concern on the part of the Government and the general public
taxation purposes not only manifests one’s sincere and honest
over the environmental impact of such development, on the water quality and
desire to obtain title to the property, but also announces an
ecology of the lake and its related river systems. The inflow of polluted water
adverse claim against the State and all other interested parties
from the Pasig River, industrial, domestic and agricultural wastes from
with an intention to contribute needed revenues to the
developed areas around the lake and the increasing urbanization have
government. Such an act strengthens one’s bona fide claim of
induced the deterioration of the lake, and that water quality studies have
acquisition of ownership.81
shown that the lake will deteriorate further if steps are not taken to check the
same. The floods in the Metropolitan Manila area and the lakeshore towns are
also influenced by the hydraulic system of the Laguna de Bay, and any scheme Fourth. When he testified on October 5, 2001, Antonio Cruz
of controlling the floods will necessarily involve the lake and its river systems. declared that he was "74 years old."82 He must have been born in
1927, and was thus merely 10 years old in 1937. It is incredible
that, at that age, he was already cultivating the property with his
This prompted then President Ferdinand E. Marcos to issue on October 17,
father. Moreover, no evidence was presented to prove how many
1978 P.D. 813 amending Rep. Act No. 4850. Under Section 6 of the law, the
cavans of palay were planted on the property, as well as the extent
LLDA is empowered to issue such rules and regulations as may be necessary to
of such cultivation, in order to support the claim of possession with
effectively carry out the policies and programs therein provided including the
a bona fide claim of ownership.
policies and projects of the LLDA, subject to the approval of the National
Economic Development Authority.
Fifth. Cruz testified that he hired a worker "upahan" to help him
cultivate the property. He, however, failed to state the name of the
In 1996, the Board of Directors of LLDA approved Resolution No. 113, series of
worker or to even present him as witness for the respondent.
1996 relating to the Environmental Uses Fee Systems and Approval of the
Work and Financial Plan for its operationalization in the Laguna de Bay Basin.
Section 5 of the Resolution provides that the LLDA as a matter of policy is to IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of
maintain all shoreland areas lying below elevation 12.50 meters as buffer zone the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 73278 is SET ASIDE. The Municipal Trial
in consonance with the LLDA policies, plans programs for the improvement of Court of Taytay, Rizal is DIRECTED to dismiss the application for registration of
the water quality and pollution and conservation of the water resources of the respondent Candymaker, Inc. in Land Registration Case No. 99-0031. No costs.
Laguna de Bay.
SO ORDERED.
As gleaned from the Survey Report of Magalonga, Polanco and Medenilla of
the LLDA based on the ocular inspection dated September 14, 2001 as well as
the Memorandum of Engineer Christopher Pedrezuela, the property is located
below the reglementary level of 12.50 m.; hence, part of the bed of the
Laguna de Bay, and, as such, is public land. Although the Report and
Memorandum were not offered as evidence in the MTC, the respondent
admitted in its Manifestation in this Court that the property is situated below
the 12.50 elevation based on the survey of Magalonga, Polanco and
Medenilla, the same survey team who conducted an ocular inspection of the
property on April 12, 2005, which thus confirmed the September 14, 2001
survey report. This is a judicial admission in the course of judicial proceedings
which is binding on it.77

Under R.A. No. 4850 and the issuances of LLDA, registerable rights acquired by
occupants before the effectivity of the law are recognized. However, the
respondent failed to adduce proof that its predecessors-in-interest had
acquired registerable title over the property before July 18, 1966:

First. Cruz failed to prove how his parents acquired ownership of

the property, and even failed to mention the names of his
grandparents. He likewise failed to present his father’s death
certificate to support his claim that the latter died in 1980. There is
likewise no evidence when his mother died.

Second. Cruz also failed to adduce in evidence the extrajudicial PACIFICO M. VALIAO, vs.REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
partition allegedly executed by his parents in 1980 where the
property was supposedly deeded to him and his sisters, Felisa and PERALTA, J.:
Eladia, to the exclusion of their five siblings.

Third. Cruz claimed that he and his parents cultivated the property
and planted palay and vegetables, and that they had been paying
the realty taxes over the property before his parents died.
However, no tax declarations under the names of the spouses
Apolonio Cruz and/or Eladia Cruz and his siblings were presented,
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court seeking to set aside the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 54811, which reversed the Decision3 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kabankalan, Negros Occidental, Branch 61, in
Land Registration Case No. 03, granting petitioners' application for registration
of title over a parcel of land located in Ilog, Negros Occidental.
The factual milieu of this case is as follows:
On August 11, 1987, petitioners4 Pacifico, Lodovico, Ricardo, Bienvenido, all
surnamed Valiao, and Nemesio Grandea filed with the RTC of Kabankalan,
Negros Occidental an application for registration of a parcel of land with an
area of 504,535 square meters, more or less, situated in Barrio Galicia,
Municipality of Ilog, Negros Occidental.
On June 20, 1988, private oppositors Macario Zafra and Manuel Yusay filed
their Motion to Dismiss the application on the following grounds: (1) the land
applied for has not been declared alienable and disposable; (2) res judicata
has set in to bar the application for registration; and (3) the application has no
factual or legal basis.
On August 24, 1988, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the application for registration
on the following grounds, among others: that neither the applicants nor their
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the land in question since June 12,
1945 or prior thereto; that the muniment/s of title and/or the tax
declaration/s and tax payments/receipts of applicants, if any, attached to or
alleged in the application, do/es not constitute competent and sufficient
evidence of a bona fide acquisition of the land applied for or of their open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation in the concept
of owner, since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto; that the parcel of land applied
for is a portion of public domain belonging to the Republic, which is not
subject to private appropriation; and that the present action is barred by a
previous final judgment in a cadastral case prosecuted between the same
parties and involving the same parcel of land.
On July 3, 1989, the RTC denied private oppositors' Motion to Dismiss. Trial
thereafter ensued.
In support of their application for registration, petitioners alleged that they
acquired the subject property in 1947, upon the death of their uncle Basilio
Millarez (Basilio), who purchased the land from a certain Fermin Payogao,
pursuant to a Deed of Sale5 dated May 19, 1916 entirely handwritten in
Spanish language. Basilio possessed the land in question from May 19, 1916
until his death in 1947. Basilio's possession was open, continuous, peaceful,
adverse, notorious, uninterrupted and in the concept of an owner. Upon
Basilio's death, the applicants as co-heirs possessed the said land until 1966,
when oppositor Zafra unlawfully and violently dispossessed them of their
property, which compelled them to file complaints of Grave Coercion and
Qualified Theft against Zafra. In support of their claim of possession over the
subject property, petitioners submitted in evidence Tax Declaration No.
95626 dated September 29, 1976 under the names of the heirs of Basilio
Millarez.
The RTC, in its Decision dated December 15, 1995, granted petitioners'
application for registration of the subject property, the dispositive portion of
which states:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court hereby orders and decrees
registration of Lot No. 2372 subject of the present proceedings and the
registration of title thereto, in favor of the applicants, who are declared the
true and lawful owners of said Lot No. 2372, except applicant Lodovico Valiao,
who sold his right to Macario Zafra.
Upon the finality of this decision, let the corresponding decree of registration
and Certificate of Title be issued in the name of the applicants, Heirs of Basilio
Millarez, namely: Pacifico Valiao, Ricardo Valiao, Bienvenido Valiao and
Nemesio Grandea, subject to the rights of private oppositors, Macario Zafra
and Manuel Yusay over said lot whose fishpond permits are declared VALID
and will expire on December 31, 2003.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.7
Aggrieved by the Decision, the private oppositors and the Republic, through
Assistant Prosecutor Josue A. Gatin, filed an appeal with the CA, which
reversed the trial court's findings in its Decision dated June 23, 2005. The CA
ruled that the classification of lands of the public domain is an exclusive
prerogative of the executive department of the government and in the
absence of such classification, the lands remain as unclassified until it is
released therefrom and rendered open to disposition. Further, there exists a
prior cadastral case involving the same parties herein and the same Lot No.
2372, which ruled that Lot No. 2372 belongs to the Republic. The CA held that
such judgment constitutes res judicata that bars a subsequent action for land
registration. It also ruled that the subject property is part of the inalienable
land of the public domain and petitioners failed to prove that they and their
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession of the land in question since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is GRANTED.
Accordingly, We REVERSE the Decision dated December 15, 1995 of the
Regional Trial Court, DENY the application for registration of title filed by
petitioners-appellees, DECLARE as moot and academic any and all claims of
private oppositors-appellants over Lot No. 2372, and DECLARE the subject
parcel of land to be inalienable and indisposable land belonging to the public
domain.
SO ORDERED.8
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the CA in a
Resolution dated November 17, 2005. Hence, the present petition with the
following issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT LOT NO. 2372 OF THE ILOG CADASTRE IS
ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE LAND OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE CLAIM OF PRESCRIPTION BY THE
APPLICANT WILL LIE ON LOT NO. 2372.
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IN
CAD. CASE NO. 23, ENTITLED LODOVICO VALIAO, ET, AL., VS.
MACARIO ZAFRA, ET, AL., AC G.R. NO. CV-68873, CONSTITUTES RES
JUDICATA AS FAR AS THIS APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION IS
CONCERNED.
IV
WHETHER OR NOT THE ALLEGED POSSESSION OF THE APPLICANTS
THROUGH THEIR PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST IS SUFFICIENT TO
SUSTAIN THEIR CLAIM FOR PRESCRIPTION.9
Petitioners claim that Lot No. 2372 is an alienable and disposable portion of
the public domain. The possession of applicants' predecessors-in interest
since 1916 until 1966 had been open, continuous and uninterrupted; thus,
converting the said land into a private land. The subject lot had already
become private in character in view of the length of time the applicants and
their predecessors-in-interest had possessed the subject lot, which entitles
them to the confirmation of their title. Petitioners further claim that prior
dismissal in a cadastral proceeding does not constitute res judicata in a
subsequent application for registration of a parcel of land.
In its Comment, the OSG submits that the issues to be resolved in the present been possessed for the required number of years is alienable and
petition, i.e., whether Lot No. 2372 is alienable and disposable land of the disposable.16
public domain and whether petitioners have the right to have the said
property registered in their name through prescription of time are questions
No such evidence was offered by the petitioners to show that the land in
of fact, which were already passed upon by the CA and no longer reviewable
question has been classified as alienable and disposable land of the public
by the Court, since findings of fact of the CA, when supported by sufficient
domain. In the absence of incontrovertible evidence to prove that the subject
evidence, are conclusive and binding on the parties. The OSG further claims
property is already classified as alienable and disposable, we must consider
that petitioners failed to prove that the subject lot is part of the alienable and
the same as still inalienable public domain.17 Verily, the rules on the
disposable portion of the public domain and that petitioners' application for
confirmation of imperfect title do not apply unless and until the land subject
land registration is already barred by a prior decision in a cadastral case.
thereof is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may
Lastly, the OSG asserts that petitioners did not present sufficient evidence to
form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain.1âwphi1
prove that their possession over the subject lot applied for had been open,
peaceful, exclusive, continuous and adverse.
With respect to the existence of a prior cadastral case, it appears that on July
11, 1966, the petitioners filed in Cadastral Case No. 23 of the then CFI of
Anent the propriety of filing a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Negros Occidental a petition to reopen the proceedings relative to three lots,
Court, the principle is well-established that this Court is not a trier of facts and
one of which is Lot No. 2372. The lower court, in its Order18 dated October 20,
that only questions of law may be raised. The resolution of factual issues is the
1980, held that Lot No. 2372 belongs to the Republic. It found that after the
function of the lower courts whose findings on these matters are received
subject lot was declared public land, it was found to be inside the communal
with respect and are, as a rule, binding on this Court. This rule, however, is
forest. On appeal, the CA, in its Decision19 dated August 7, 1984, found no
subject to certain exceptions. One of these is when the findings of the
reversible error and affirmed the decision of the cadastral court. Thereafter, a
appellate court are contrary to those of the trial court.10 Due to the
petition elevating the case to this Court was dismissed for lack of merit.20 In
divergence of the findings of the CA and the RTC, the Court will now re-
the present case, the CA, in its Decision dated June 23, 2005, ruled that such
examine the facts and evidence adduced before the lower courts.
judgment constitutes res judicata that will bar a subsequent action for land
registration on the same land.
Section 14 (1) of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1529, otherwise known as the
Property Registration Decree provides:
In Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals,21 the Court held that a judicial
declaration that a parcel of land is public, does not preclude even the same
SEC. 14. Who may apply. - The following persons may file in the proper Court applicant from subsequently seeking a judicial confirmation of his title to the
of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether same land, provided he thereafter complies with the provisions of Section
personally or through their duly-authorized representatives: 4822 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, and as long as said public
lands remain alienable and disposable. In the case at bar, not only did the
petitioners fail to prove that the subject land is part of the alienable and
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
disposable portion of the public domain, they failed to demonstrate that they
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have possessed and
of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim
occupied the subject land since June 12, 1945 or earlier as mandated by the
of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
law.

From the foregoing, petitioners need to prove that: (1) the land forms part of
It is settled that the applicant must present proof of specific acts of ownership
the alienable and disposable land of the public domain; and (2) they, by
to substantiate the claim and cannot just offer general statements which are
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, have been in open,
mere conclusions of law than factual evidence of possession.23 Actual
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject
possession consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a
land under a bona fide claim of ownership from June 12, 1945 or
nature as a party would actually exercise over his own property.24
earlier.11 These the petitioners must prove by no less than clear, positive and
convincing evidence.12
The testimonies of Nemesio and Pacifico as to their own and their
predecessors-in-interest's possession and ownership over the subject lot fail
Under the Regalian doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all lands
to convince Us. Petitioners claim that Basilio was in possession of the land way
of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted
back in 1916. Yet no tax declaration covering the subject property, during the
right to any ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within
period Basilio allegedly occupied the subject property, i.e., 1916 to 1947, was
private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly, public
presented in evidence. Other than the bare allegations of Nemesio and
lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural
Pacifico that Basilio allegedly introduced improvements on the subject
land or alienated to a private person by the State remain part of the
property, there is nothing in the records which would substantiate petitioners'
inalienable public domain.13 Unless public land is shown to have been
claim that Basilio was in possession of Lot No. 2372 since June 12, 1945 or
reclassified as alienable or disposable to a private person by the State, it
earlier, the period of possession required by law. Hence, petitioners' assertion
remains part of the inalienable public domain. Property of the public domain
that Basilio possessed the property in question from 1916 to 1947 is, at best,
is beyond the commerce of man and not susceptible of private appropriation
conjectural and self-serving.
and acquisitive prescription. Occupation thereof in the concept of owner no
matter how long cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a
title.14 The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership As regards petitioners' possession of the land in question from 1947 to 1966,
of the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration (or petitioners could only support the same with a tax declaration dated
claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application September 29, 1976. At best, petitioners can only prove possession since said
is alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible date. What is required is open, exclusive, continuous and notorious
evidence must be established that the land subject of the application (or possession by petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest, under a bona
claim) is alienable or disposable.15 fide claim of ownership, since June 12, 1945 or earlier.25 Petitioners failed to
explain why, despite their claim that their predecessors-in-interest have
possessed the subject properties in the concept of an owner even before June
There must be a positive act declaring land of the public domain as alienable
12, 1945, it was only in 1976 that they started to declare the same for
and disposable. To prove that the land subject of an application for
purposes of taxation. Moreover, tax declarations and receipts are not
registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of a
conclusive evidence of ownership or of the right to possess land when not
positive act of the government, such as a presidential proclamation or an
supported by any other evidence. The disputed property may have been
executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of
declared for taxation purposes in the names of the applicants for registration,
Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. The applicant may also
or of their predecessors-in-interest, but it does not necessarily prove
secure a certification from the government that the land claimed to have
ownership. They are merely indicia of a claim of ownership.26
Evidently, since the petitioners failed to prove that (1) the subject property
was classified as part of the disposable and alienable land of the public
domain; and (2) they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation thereof under
a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier, their application
for confirmation and registration of the subject property under PD 1529
should be denied.

WHEREFORE, the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.

CV No. 54811, which reversed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Kabankalan, Negros Occidental, Branch 61, in Land Registration Case No. 03,
is AFFIRMED. The application for registration of title filed by the petitioners
Pacifico Valiao, Lodovico Valiao, Ricardo Valiao, Bienvenido Valiao, and
Nemesio Grandea, over Lot No. 2372, with a total area of 504,535 square
meters, more or less, situated in Barrio Galicia, Municipality of Ilog, Negros
Occidental, is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs.LYDIA CAPCO DE TENSUAN,

Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of

Court seeking the reversal and setting aside of the Decision1 dated January 13
2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 84125, which affirmed the
Decision2 dated October 18, 2004 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of
Taguig City, Branch 74 in LRC Case No. 172 LRA Rec. No. N-701 08). The MeTC
confirmed the title of herein respondent, Lydia Capco de Tensuan Tensuan),
to the parcel of agricultural land, designated as Lot 1109-A, located at Ibayo,
Sta. Ana, Taguig City, with an area of 4,006 square meters subject property),
and ordered the registration of said property in her name.
The following facts are culled from the records:
On August 11, 1998, Tensuan, represented by her sister, Claudia C. Aruelo
(Aruelo), filed with the MeTC an Application for Registration3 of Lot Nos. 1109-
A and 1109-B, docketed as LRC Case No. 172. In her Application for
Registration, Tensuan alleged that:
2. That Applicant is the absolute owner and possessor of those two (2)
paraphernal parcels of land situated at Sta. Ana, Taguig, Metro Manila, within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, bounded and described as Lot 1109-A
and 1109-B in Conversion Subdivision Plan Swo-00-001456 as follows:
(a) Lot 1109-A, Swo-00-001456
"A PARCEL OF LAND (Lot 1109-A of the Plan Swo-00-001456, being
a conversion of Lot 1109, MCadm 590-D, Taguig, [Cadastral]
Mapping, L.R.C. Record No.), situated in Brgy. Sta. Ana, Mun. of
Taguig, Metro Manila, Island of Luzon.
x x x x"
(b) Lot 1109-B, Swo-00-001456
"A PARCEL OF LAND (Lot 1109-B, of plan Swo-00-001456, being a conversion
of Lot 1109, MCadm 590-D, Taguig Cadastral Mapping, L.R.C. Record No.),
situated in Sta. Ana, Mun. of Taguig, Metro Manila, Island of Luzon.
x x x x"
3. That said two (2) parcels of land at the last assessment for taxation were
assessed at Sixty Thousand Eight Hundred Twenty Pesos (₱60,820.00),
Philippine currency, under Tax Declaration No. D-013-01563 in the name of
the Applicant;
4. That to the best of the knowledge and belief of Applicant, there is no
mortgage, encumbrance or transaction affecting said two (2) parcels of land,
nor is there any other person having any interest therein, legal or equitable, or
in adverse possession thereof;
5. That Applicant has acquired said parcels of land by inheritance from her
deceased father, Felix Capco, by virtue of a "[Kasulatan] ng Paghahati-hati at
Pag-aayos ng Kabuhayan
" dated September 14, 1971, and Applicant specifically alleges that she and
her deceased father, as well as the latter’s predecessors-in-interest, have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
of the said lands under a bonafide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945,
and many years earlier, as in fact since time immemorial, as provided under
Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529;
6. That said parcels of land are and have been, since the inheritance thereof,
occupied by Applicant herself;
xxxx
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that after due notice, publication and
hearing, the paraphernal parcels of land hereinabove described be brought
under the operation of Presidential Decree No. 1529 and the same confirmed
in the name of Applicant.4 (Emphasis ours.)
On August 20, 1998, Tensuan filed an Urgent Ex Parte Motion to Withdraw Lot
1109-B from the Application for Registration and to Amend the
Application.5 According to Tensuan, she was withdrawing her Application for
Registration of Lot 1109-B because a review of Plan Swo-00-001456 had
revealed that said lot, with an area of 338 square meters, was a legal
easement. The MeTC, in its Order6 dated September 30, 1998, granted
Tensuan’s motion.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed an
Opposition to Tensuan’s Application for Registration on December 28, 1998.
The Republic argued that (1) neither Tensuan nor her predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of the subject property since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto; (2)
the muniment/s of title and/or tax declaration/s and tax payment receipt/s
attached to the application do/es not constitute competent and sufficient
evidence of a bona fide acquisition of the subject property or of Tensuan’s
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the
subject property in the concept of owner since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto;
(3) the claim of ownership in fee simple on the basis of Spanish title or grant
can no longer be availed of by Tensuan who failed to file an appropriate
application for registration within the period of six months from February 16,
1976, as required by Presidential Decree No. 892; and (4) the subject property
forms part of the public domain not subject of private appropriation.7
The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) also filed its own
Opposition8 dated February 12, 1999 to Tensuan’s Application for
Registration, averring as follows:
2. That projection of the subject lot in our topographic map based
on the technical descriptions appearing in the Notice of the Initial
Hearing indicated that the lot subject of this application for
registration is located below the reglementary lake elevation of
12.50 meters referred to datum 10.00 meters below mean lower
water. Site is, therefore, part of the bed of Laguna Lake considered
as public land and is within the jurisdiction of Laguna Lake
Development Authority pursuant to its mandate under R.A. 4850,
as amended. x x x;
3. That Section 41 of Republic Act No. 4850, states that, "whenever
Laguna Lake or Lake is used in this Act, the same shall refer to
Laguna de Bay which is that area covered by the lake water when it
is at the average annual maximum lake level of elevation of 12.50
meters, as referred to a datum 10.0 meters below mean lower low
water (MLLW). Lands located at and below such elevation are
public lands which form part of the bed of said lake (Section 14,
R.A. 4850, as amended, x x x);
4. That on the strength of the oppositor’s finding and applying the
above-quoted provision of law, herein applicant’s application for
registration of the subject land has no leg to stand on, both in fact
and in law;
5. That unless the Honorable Court renders judgment to declare
the land as part of the Laguna Lake or that of the public domain,
the applicant will continue to unlawfully posses, occupy and claim
the land as their own to the damage and prejudice of the
Government in general and the Laguna Lake Development
Authority in particular;
6. That moreover, the land sought to be registered remains
inalienable and indisposable in the absence of declaration by the
Director of Lands as required by law.9
During the initial hearing on February 18, 1999, Tensuan marked in evidence
the exhibits proving her compliance with the jurisdictional requirements for
LRC Case No. 172. There being no private oppositor, a general default against
the whole world, except the government, was declared.10
To prove possession, Tensuan presented two witnesses, namely, her sister
Aruelo and Remigio Marasigan (Marasigan).
Aruelo, who was then 68 years old, testified that Tensuan and her
predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the subject property even
before the Second World War. The subject property was originally owned by
Candida de Borja, who passed on the same to her only child, Socorro Reyes,
and the latter’s husband, Felix Capco (spouses Capco). The subject property
became part of the spouses Capco’s conjugal property. Aruelo and Tensuan
are among the spouses Capco’s children. During the settlement of Felix
Capco’s estate, the subject property was adjudicated to Tensuan, as
evidenced by the Kasulatan ng Paghahati at Pag-aayos ng Kabuhayan11 dated
September 14, 1971.12
Marasigan claimed that he had been cultivating the subject property for the
last 15 years, and he personally knew Tensuan to be the owner of said
property.13 Marasigan’s father was the caretaker of the subject property for
the Capcos for more than 50 years, and Marasigan used to help his father till
the same. Marasigan merely inherited the job as caretaker of the subject
property from his father.
Among the evidence Tensuan presented during the trial were: (1) the
Kasulatan ng Paghahati-hati at Pagaayos ng Kabuhayan dated September 14,
1971;14 (2) Tax declarations, the earliest of which was for the year 1948, in the
name of Candida de Borja, Tensuan’s grandmother;15 (3) Real property tax
payment receipts issued to Tensuan for 1998;16 (3) Blueprint copy of Plan
Swo-00-001456 surveyed for Lydia Capco de Tensuan;17 (4) Technical
description of the subject property, duly prepared by a licensed Geodetic
Engineer and approved by the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR);18 and (5) Certification dated July 29, 1999 from the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office of the DENR (CENRO-
DENR) which states that "said land falls within alienable and disposable land
under Project No. 27-B L.C. Map No. 2623 under Forestry Administrative
Order No. 4-1141 dated January 3, 1968."19
Engineer Ramon Magalona (Magalona) took the witness stand for oppositor
LLDA. He averred that based on the topographic map and technical
description of the subject property, the said property is located below the
prescribed lake elevation of 12.5 meters. Hence, the subject property forms
part of the Laguna Lake bed and, as such, is public land. During cross-
examination, Magalona admitted that the topographic map he was using as
basis was made in the year 1967; that there had been changes in the contour
of the lake; and that his findings would have been different if the topographic
map was made at present time. He likewise acknowledged that the subject
property is an agricultural lot. When Magalona conducted an ocular
inspection of the subject property, said property and other properties in the
area were submerged in water as the lake level was high following the recent
heavy rains.20
On May 26, 2000, an Investigation Report was prepared, under oath, by
Cristeta R. Garcia (Garcia), DENR Land Investigator, stating, among other
things, that the subject property was covered by a duly approved survey plan;
that the subject property is within the alienable and disposable zone classified
under Project No. 27-B, L.C. Map No. 2623; that the subject property is not
reserved for military or naval purposes; that the subject property was not
covered by a previously issued patent; that the subject property was declared
for the first time in 1948 under Tax Declaration No. 230 in the name of
Candida de Borja;21 that the subject property is now covered by Tax
Declaration No. D-013-01408 in the name of Lydia Capco de Tensuan; that the
subject property is agricultural in nature; and that the subject property is free
from adverse claims and conflicts. Yet, Garcia noted in the same report that
the "the applicant is not x x x in the actual occupation and possession of the
land" and "LLDA rep. by Atty. Joaquin G. Mendoza possesses the legal right to
file opposition against the application x x x."22 The Investigation Report was
submitted as evidence by the Republic.
In its Decision dated October 18, 2004, the MeTC granted Tensuan’s
Application for Registration, decreeing as follows:
WHEREFORE, from the evidences adduced and testimonies presented by the
parties, the Court is of the considered view that herein applicant has proven
by preponderance of evidence the allegations in the application, hence, this
Court hereby confirms the title of applicant LYDIA CAPCO DE TENSUAN
married to RODOLFO TENSUAN, of legal age, Filipino and a resident of No. 43
Rizal Street, Poblacion, Muntinlupa City to the parcel of agricultural land (Lot
1109-A, Mcadm 590-D, Taguig Cadastral Mapping) located at Ibayo-Sta. Ana,
Taguig, Metro Manila containing an area of Four Thousand Six (4,006) square
meters; and order the registration thereof in her name.
After the finality of this decision and upon payment of the corresponding
taxes due on said land subject matter of this application, let an order for
issuance of decree be issued.23
The Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals, insisting that the MeTC should
not have granted Tensuan’s Application for Registration considering that the
subject property is part of the Laguna Lake bed, hence, is not alienable and
disposable. The appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 84125.
In the herein assailed Decision of January 13, 2006, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the MeTC Decision, thus:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision dated
October 18, 2004 is AFFIRMED.24
Hence, the Republic filed the present Petition with the following assignment
of errors:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW
WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE TRIAL COURT’S GRANT OF THE
APPLICATION FOR LAND REGISTRATION OF [TENSUAN] DESPITE
HER FAILURE TO PROVE OPEN, ADVERSE, CONTINUOUS,
EXCLUSIVE AND NOTORIOUS POSSESSION IN THE CONCEPT OF AN
OWNER OF THE SUBJECT LAND FOR THIRTY YEARS.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW
WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE TRIAL COURT’S GRANT OF THE
APPLICATION FOR LAND REGISTRATION OF [TENSUAN] BECAUSE
THE SUBJECT LAND BEING PART OF THE LAGUNA LAKE BED IS NOT
ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE.25
The Republic contends that Tensuan failed to present incontrovertible
evidence to warrant the registration of the property in the latter’s name as
owner. Aruelo’s testimony that her father possessed the land even before the
Second World War and Marasigan’s claim that he and his father have been
tilling the land for a total of more than 65 years are doubtful considering that
the subject property is located below the reglementary lake elevation and is,
thus, part of the Laguna Lake bed. Also, the CENRO Certification is not
sufficient evidence to overcome the presumption that the subject property
still forms part of the public domain, and is not alienable and disposable. On
the other hand, Tensuan asserts that the Petition should be dismissed outright
for raising questions of fact. The findings of the MeTC and the Court of
Appeals that the subject property is alienable and disposable, and that
Tensuan and her predecessors-in-interest had been in open, adverse,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the same for the period
required by law, are supported by preponderance of evidence.
We find the instant Petition meritorious.
The Republic asserts that the assigned errors in its Petition are on questions of
law, but in reality, these questions delve into the sufficiency of evidence relied
upon by the MeTC and the Court of Appeals in granting Tensuan’s Application
for Registration of the subject property. It is basic that where it is the
sufficiency of evidence that is being questioned, it is a question of fact.26
In petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, this have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall
Court is limited to reviewing only errors of law, not of fact, unless the factual be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
findings complained of are devoid of support by the evidence on record, or
the assailed judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts.27 In Reyes v.
The requisites for the filing of an application for registration of title under
Montemayor,28 we did not hesitate to apply the exception rather than the
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree are: (1) that the property in
general rule, setting aside the findings of fact of the trial and appellate courts
question is alienable and disposable land of the public domain; and (2) that
and looking into the evidence on record ourselves, in order to arrive at the
the applicants by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
proper and just resolution of the case, to wit:
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation;
and that such possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provides that only questions of law shall be 12, 1945 or earlier.29 In Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic,30 we affirmed
raised in a Petition for Review before this Court. This rule, however, admits of our earlier ruling in Republic v. Naguit,31 that Section 14(1) of the Property
certain exceptions, namely, (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on Registration Decree merely requires the property sought to be registered as
speculations, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is already alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of title is filed.
discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misappreciation of facts; (5)
when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when, in making its findings, the
We proceed to determine first whether it has been satisfactorily proven
same are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when
herein that the subject property was already alienable and disposable land of
the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings are
the public domain at the time Tensuan filed her Application for Registration
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9)
on August 11, 1998.
when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and
reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; and (10) when the findings of
fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the
the evidence on record. State, and that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of
land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony. The same doctrine
also states that all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private
While as a general rule appellate courts do not usually disturb the lower
ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Consequently, the burden of
court’s findings of fact, unless said findings are not supported by or are totally
proof to overcome the presumption of ownership of lands of the public
devoid of or inconsistent with the evidence on record, such finding must of
domain is on the person applying for registration. Unless public land is shown
necessity be modified to conform with the evidence if the reviewing tribunal
to have been reclassified and alienated by the State to a private person, it
were to arrive at the proper and just resolution of the controversy. Thus,
remains part of the inalienable public domain.32
although the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are generally conclusive
on this Court, which is not a trier of facts, if said factual findings do not
conform to the evidence on record, this Court will not hesitate to review and As to what constitutes alienable and disposable land of the public domain, we
reverse the factual findings of the lower courts. In the instant case, the Court turn to our pronouncements in Secretary of the Department of Environment
finds sufficient basis to deviate from the rule since the extant evidence and and Natural Resources v. Yap33:
prevailing law support a finding different from the conclusion of the Court of
Appeals and the RTC. (Citations omitted.) The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into agricultural,
forest or timber. Meanwhile, the 1973 Constitution provided the following
Tensuan anchors her right to registration of title on Section 14(1) of divisions: agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement,
Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration mineral, timber or forest and grazing lands, and such other classes as may be
Decree, which reads: provided by law, giving the government great leeway for classification. Then
the 1987 Constitution reverted to the 1935 Constitution classification with
one addition: national parks. Of these, only agricultural lands may be
SEC. 14. Who may apply. – The following persons may file in the proper Court
alienated. x x x
of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
xxxx
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping
of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim with the presumption of State ownership, the Court has time and again
of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. emphasized that there must be a positive act of the government, such as an
official proclamation, declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land
for agricultural or other purposes. In fact, Section 8 of CA No. 141 limits
The aforequoted provision authorizes the registration of title acquired in
alienable or disposable lands only to those lands which have been "officially
accordance with Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise
delimited and classified."
known as the Public Land Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073,
which provides:
The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the
lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration (or
SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of
claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application
the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein,
is alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible
but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the
evidence must be established that the land subject of the application (or
Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
claim) is alienable or disposable. There must still be a positive act declaring
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title thereafter,
land of the public domain as alienable and disposable. To prove that the land
under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
subject of an application for registration is alienable, the applicant must
establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a
xxxx presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action;
investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a
statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the government
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
that the land claimed to have been possessed for the required number of
been in the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
years is alienable and disposable. (Citations and emphasis omitted.)
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a
bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945, except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to
As proof that the subject property is alienable and disposable, Tensuan
presented a Certification dated July 29, 1999 issued by the CENRO-DENR
which verified that "said land falls within alienable and disposable land under
Project No. 27-B L.C. Map No. 2623 under Forestry Administrative Order No.
4-1141 dated January 3, 1968." However, we have declared unequivocally
that a CENRO Certification, by itself, is insufficient proof that a parcel of land is
alienable and disposable. As we held in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.34:
It is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and
disposable.
The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had
approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain as
alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for
registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by
the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration must
present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary
and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These
facts must be established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable.
Respondent failed to do so because the certifications presented by
respondent do not, by themselves, prove that the land is alienable and
disposable.
Only Torres, respondent’s Operations Manager, identified the certifications
submitted by respondent. The government officials who issued the
certifications were not presented before the trial court to testify on their
contents. The trial court should not have accepted the contents of the
certifications as proof of the facts stated therein. Even if the certifications are
presumed duly issued and admissible in evidence, they have no probative
value in establishing that the land is alienable and disposable.
Public documents are defined under Section 19, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules
on Evidence as follows:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the
sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public
officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;
(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last
wills and testaments; and
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents
required by law to be entered therein.
Applying Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents referred to in
Section 19(a), when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an
official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having legal
custody of the record, or by his deputy x x x.
The CENRO is not the official repository or legal custodian of the issuances of
the DENR Secretary declaring public lands as alienable and disposable. The
CENRO should have attached an official publication of the DENR Secretary’s
issuance declaring the land alienable and disposable.
Section 23, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides: "Sec. 23.
Public documents as evidence. — Documents consisting of entries in public
records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie
evidence of the facts stated therein. All other public documents are evidence,
even against a third person, of the fact which gave rise to their execution and
of the date of the latter."
The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications do not
fall within the class of public documents contemplated in the first sentence of
Section 23 of Rule 132. The certifications do not reflect "entries in public
records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer," such as entries
made by the Civil Registrar in the books of registries, or by a ship captain in
the ship’s logbook. The certifications are not the certified copies or
authenticated reproductions of original official records in the legal custody of
a government office. The certifications are not even records of public
documents. The certifications are conclusions unsupported by adequate
proof, and thus have no probative value. Certainly, the certifications cannot
be considered prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.
The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications do not
prove that Lot 10705-B falls within the alienable and disposable land as
proclaimed by the DENR Secretary.
Such government certifications do not, by their mere issuance, prove the facts
stated therein.1âwphi1 Such government certifications may fall under the
class of documents contemplated in the second sentence of Section 23 of
Rule 132. As such, the certifications are prima facie evidence of their due
execution and date of issuance but they do not constitute prima facie
evidence of the facts stated therein.
The Court has also ruled that a document or writing admitted as part of the
testimony of a witness does not constitute proof of the facts stated therein.
Here, Torres, a private individual and respondent’s representative, identified
the certifications but the government officials who issued the certifications
did not testify on the contents of the certifications. As such, the certifications
cannot be given probative value. The contents of the certifications are hearsay
because Torres was incompetent to testify on the veracity of the contents of
the certifications. Torres did not prepare the certifications, he was not an
officer of CENRO or FMS-DENR, and he did not conduct any verification survey
whether the land falls within the area classified by the DENR Secretary as
alienable and disposable. (Emphases ours, citations omitted.)
While we may have been lenient in some cases35 and accepted substantial
compliance with the evidentiary requirements set forth in T.A.N. Properties,
we cannot do the same for Tensuan in the case at bar. We cannot afford to be
lenient in cases where the Land Registration Authority (LRA) or the DENR
oppose the application for registration on the ground that the land subject
thereof is inalienable. In the present case, the DENR recognized the right of
the LLDA to oppose Tensuan’s Application for Registration; and the LLDA, in its
Opposition, precisely argued that the subject property is part of the Laguna
Lake bed and, therefore, inalienable public land. We do not even have to
evaluate the evidence presented by the LLDA given the Regalian Doctrine.
Since Tensuan failed to present satisfactory proof that the subject property is
alienable and disposable, the burden of evidence did not even shift to the
LLDA to prove that the subject property is part of the Laguna Lake bed.
Given the lack of evidence that the subject property is alienable and
disposable, it becomes unnecessary for us to determine the other issue in this
case, i.e., whether Tensuan has been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation; and that such possession is under a
bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Regardless of the
character and length of her possession of the subject property, Tensuan
cannot acquire registerable title to inalienable public land.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated January 13,
2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 84125 and Decision dated
October 18, 2004 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Taguig City, Branch 74 in
LRC Case No. 172 LRA Rec. No. N-70 1 08) are SET ASIDE. The Application for
Registration of Lydia Capco de Tensuan is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
REMMAN ENTERPRISES, INC., REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
This resolves the petition for review on certiorari1 filed by Remman
Enterprises, Inc. (petitioner) under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to assail the
Decision2 dated May 23, 2008 and Resolution3 dated June 22, 2009 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 74418. The CA reversed the
Decision4 dated November 27, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig
City, Branch 155, in LR Case No. N-11379, which granted the petitioner's
application for land registration of three (3) parcels of land situated in Taguig,
Metro Manila (subject properties).
The petitioner, through its authorized representative Ronnie P. Inocencio
(Inocencio), filed with the RTC on June 4, 1998 an application for registration
of the subject properties situated in Barangay Napindan, Taguig, Metro
Manila, with an area of 27,477 square meters, 23,179 sq m and 45,636 sq m,
more particularly described as follows:
SWO-00-001771, being a conversion of Lot 3079, Mcadm-590-D, containing
an area of Twenty[-]Seven Thousand Four Hundred Seventy[-] Seven (27,477)
square meters, more or less; SWO-00-001768, being a conversion of Lot 3071,
Mcadm-590-D, containing an area of Twenty[-] Three Thousand One Hundred
Seventy[-]Nine (23,179) square meters, more or less; and SWO-00-001773,
being a conversion of Lot 3082, Mcadm-590-D, containing an area of Forty[-
]Five Thousand Six Hundred Thirty[-]Six (45,636) square meters, more or less,
all brought under the operation of the Property Registration Decree (PD 1529)
or Commonwealth Act 141, as amended x x x.5
The State, through the Office of the Solicitor General, interposed its
opposition to the application.1avvphi1 During the initial hearing of the case on
May 4, 1999, the petitioner presented and marked documentary evidence6 to
prove its compliance with jurisdictional requirements.7
On October 25, 1999, the petitioner was allowed to present its evidence
before the Branch Clerk of Court of the RTC. Inocencio, the petitioner’s sales
manager, testified that the subject properties were purchased on August 28,
1989 by the petitioner from sellers Magdalena Samonte, Jaime Aldana and
Virgilio Navarro. The properties were declared for taxation purposes on
August 9, 1989.After the sale, the petitioner occupied the properties and
planted thereon crops like rice, corn and vegetables.8
Witness Cenon Serquiña (Serquiña) supported the application for registration
by claiming that he had been the caretaker of the subject properties since
1957, long before the lots were purchased by the petitioner. Serquiña alleged
that no person other than the applicant and its predecessors-in-interest had
claimed ownership or rights over the subject properties.9
On November 27, 2001, the RTC rendered its Decision10 granting the
petitioner’s application. The decretal portion of its decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds the Applicant, Remman
Enterprises, Inc., represented in this matter by its representative, Ronnie P.
Inocencio, the absolute owner in fee simple of three (3) parcels of land, all
located at Barangay Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila, more particularly
described as follows:
1.) SWO-00-001771, being a conversion of Lot 3079, Mcadm-590-
D;
2.) SWO-00-001768, being a conversion of Lot 3071, Mcadm-590-
D; and
3.) SWO-00-001773, being a conversion of Lot 3082, Mcadm-590-D
together with their corresponding technical descriptions.
Once the foregoing Decision has become final, let the corresponding decree
of registration issue. SO ORDERED.11
Dissatisfied, the State appealed to the CA by alleging substantive and
procedural defects in the petitioner’s application. It argued that the identity of
the subject properties was not sufficiently established. The State further
claimed that the character and length of possession required by law in land
registration cases were not satisfied by the petitioner.
Finding merit in the appeal, the CA reversed the RTC decision. The dispositive
portion of the CA Decision dated May 23, 2008 reads:
WHEREFORE, the DECISION DATED NOVEMBER 27, 2001is REVERSEDand SET
ASIDE and this case is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.12
The CA explained that the survey plans and technical descriptions submitted
by the petitioner failed to establish the true identity of the subject properties.
The application should have been accompanied by the original tracing cloth
plan duly approved by the Director of Lands.13 The petitioner should have also
submitted a certification from the proper government office stating that the
properties were already declared alienable and disposable.14 The CA further
cited a failure to establish that the petitioner and its predecessors-in-interest
possessed the subject parcels of land under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945 or earlier.15
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari filed by the petitioner to assail the
CA’s dismissal of its application for land registration. The petitioner argues
that the identity of the subject properties was sufficiently established through
the submission of the original tracing cloth plans, survey plans and technical
descriptions. The alienable and disposable character of the properties was
also duly established via a certification issued by the Community Environment
and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR). Further, it claims that it and its predecessors-in-
interest possessed the parcels of land in the nature and within the length of
time required by law.
The petition is dismissible.
On the matter of proof of the subject property’s identity, jurisprudence
provides that the presentation of the original tracing cloth plan may be
dispensed with, subject however to certain conditions. Contrary to the
petitioner’s claim, the original clothing plans that cover the subject properties
do not form part of the case records. The Court has nonetheless held in
Republic v. Espinosa:16
As ruled in Republic v. Guinto-Aldana, the identity of the land, its boundaries
and location can be established by other competent evidence apart from the
original tracing cloth such as a duly executed blueprint of the survey plan and
technical description:
"Yet if the reason for requiring an applicant to adduce in evidence the original
tracing cloth plan is merely to provide a convenient and necessary means to
afford certainty as to the exact identity of the property applied for registration
and to ensure that the same does not overlap with the boundaries of the
adjoining lots, there stands to be no reason why a registration application
must be denied for failure to present the original tracing cloth plan, especially
where it is accompanied by piecesof evidence—such as a duly executed
blueprint of the survey plan and a duly executed technical description of the
property—which may likewise substantially and with as much certainty prove
the limits and extent of the property sought to be registered."17 (Citations
omitted)
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the CA’s dismissal of the petitioner’s
application for original registration was proper considering the latter’s failure
to sufficiently establish that the subject properties were already declared
alienable and disposable by the government. Its reliance on a Report,18 issued
by the CENRO, DENR National Capital Region, West Sector, was misplaced.
The Court ruled in Republic v. Medida:19
In Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,this Court explained that a Provincial
Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) or CENRO certification, by
itself, fails toprove the alienable and disposable character of a parcel of land.
We ruled:

[I]t is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable
and disposable. The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR
Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the
public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the
application for registration falls within the approved area per verification
through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land
registration must present a copy of the original classification approved by the
DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the
official records.These facts must be established to prove that the land is
alienable and disposable. Respondents failed to do so because the
certifications presented by respondent do not, by themselves, prove that the
land is alienable and disposable. x x x.

xxxx

The present rule on the matter then requires that an application for original
registration be accompanied by: (1) CENRO or PENRO Certification; and (2) a
copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and
certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. x x
x.20 (Citations omitted and emphasis in the original)

The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the

lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration, who
must provethat the properties subject of the application are alienable and
disposable.21 Even the notations on the survey plans submitted by the
petitioner cannot be admitted asevidence of the subject properties’
alienability and disposability. Such notations do not constitute
incontrovertible evidence to overcome the presumption that the subject
properties remain part of the inalienable public domain.22

Given the foregoing, the dismissal of the petitioner's application for

registration was proper. Under pertinent laws and jurisprudence, the
petitioner had to sufficiently establish that: first, the subject properties form
part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain; second, the
applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession anq occupation of the same; and third,
the possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or
earlier.23

Without sufficient proof that the subject properties had been declared
alienable and disposable, the Court finqs no reason to look further into the
petitioner's claim that the CA erred in' finding that it failed to satisfy the
nature and length of possession that could qualify for land registration.
WHEREFORE, the petition if DENIED. The Decision dated May 23, 2008 and
Resolution dated Jun~ 22, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
74418 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

SAAD AGRO-INDUSTRIES, INC.,

The instant petition for review assails the Decision and Resolution of the Court
of Appeals dated 18 July 2001 and 18 March 2002 in CA-G.R. CV No. 64097,
reversing and setting aside the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu,
Branch 11, Cebu City in Civil Case No. CEB-17173.
The antecedents follow.
On 18 October 1967, Socorro Orcullo (Orcullo) filed her application for Free
Patent for Lot No. 1434 of Cad-315-D, a parcel of land with an area of 12.8477
hectares located in Barangay Abugon, Sibonga, Cebu. Thereafter, on 14
February 1971, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources issued Free
Patent No. 473408 for Lot No. 1434, while the Registry of Deeds for the
Province of Cebu issued Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 0-6667 over the
said lot.1 Subsequently, the subject lot was sold2 to SAAD Agro- Industries, Inc.
(petitioner) by one of Orcullo's heirs.
Sometime in 1995, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor
General, filed a complaint3 for annulment of title and reversion of the lot
covered by Free Patent No. 473408 and OCT No. 0-6667 and reversion of Lot
No. 1434 of Cad-315-D to the mass of the public domain, on the ground that
the issuance of the said free patent and title for Lot No. 1434 was irregular
and erroneous, following the discovery that the lot is allegedly part of the
timberland and forest reserve of Sibonga, Cebu. The discovery was made after
Pedro Urgello filed a letter-complaint with the Regional Executive Director of
the Forest Management Sector, Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) Region VII, Cebu City, about the alleged illegal cutting of
mangrove trees and construction of dikes within the area covered by Urgello's
Fishpond Lease Agreement.4 On 14 July 1995, Urgello filed a complaint-in-
intervention against the heirs of Orcullo, adopting the allegations of
respondent.5 However, the heirs failed to file their answer to the complaint
and were thus declared in default.6
In its Decision7 dated 15 May 1999, the trial court dismissed the complaint,
finding that respondent failed to show that the subject lot is part of the
timberland or forest reserve or that it has been classified as such before the
issuance of the free patent and the original title. According to the trial court,
the issuance of the free patent and title was regular and in order, and must be
accorded full faith. Considering the validity of the free patent and the OCT,
petitioner's purchase of the property was also declared legal and valid. The
trial court also denied the complaint-in-intervention filed by Urgello.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals in its Decision8 reversed and set aside the trial
court's judgment. It held that timber or forest lands, to which the subject lot
belongs, are not subject to private ownership, unless these are first classified
as agricultural lands. Thus, absent any declassification of the subject lot from
forest to alienable and disposable land for agricultural purposes,9 the officers
erred in approving Orcullo's free patent application and in issuing the OCT;
hence, title to the lot must be cancelled.10 Consequently, the Court of Appeals
invalidated the sale of the lot to petitioner. However, it declared that Urgello's
Fishpond Lease Agreement may continue until its expiration because lease
does not pass title to the lessee; but thereafter, the lease should not be
renewed. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals decreed:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another one issued declaring
Free Patent No. 473408 and the corresponding OCT [No.] 0-6667
as NULL and VOID ab initio.
SAAD Agro-Industries, Inc. is directed to surrender the owner's
duplicate copy of OCT [No.] 0-6667 to the Register of Deeds of
Cebu City.
The Register of Deeds of Cebu City is hereby ordered to cancel OCT
[No.] 0-6667 and all other transfer certificates of title that may
have been subsequently issued.
Lot No. 1434, CAD 315[-]D located at Barangay Abugon, Sibonga,
Cebu, subject matter of this case, is hereby REVERTED as part of
[the] public domain and to be classified as timberland.11
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration, claiming insufficiency of evidence and
failure to consider pertinent laws, proved futile as it was dismissed for lack of
merit. The Court of Appeals categorically stated that there was a
preponderance of evidence showing that the subject lot is within the
timberland area.12
Petitioner now claims that the Court of Appeals erred in relying on the DENR
officer's testimony. It claims that the testimony was a mere opinion to the
effect that if there was no classification yet of an area, such area should be
considered as a public forest. Such opinion was premised on the officer's
construction of a provision of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705, otherwise
known as the Revised Forestry Code,13 the pertinent portion of which reads:
Those still to be classified under the present system shall continue
to remain as part of the public forest.14
Petitioner points out that P.D. No. 705 took effect on 19 May 1975, or long
after the issuance of the free patent and title in question. Thus, the provision
stating that all public lands should be considered
as "part of the public forests" until a land classification team has declassified
them is applicable only after the effectivity of P.D. No. 705 and cannot be
made retroactive to cover and prejudice vested rights acquired prior to the
effectivity of said law, petitioner concludes.15 It adds that if the subject lot was
encompassed by the term "public forest," the same should have been
designated as a "Timberland Block," not as Cadastral Lot No. 1434, CAF-315-D,
Sibonga Cadastre which was the designation made by the Republic prior to
1972.16
Petitioner also questions the Court of Appeals' reliance on the land
classification map (L.C. Map) presented by respondent. The trial court had
previously declared L.C. Map No. 2961 as inadmissible, finding that "the
plaintiff has not duly proved the authenticity and contents." According to
petitioner, the L.C. Map presented in court is neither a certified true copy nor
one attested to be a true copy by any DENR official having legal custody of the
original thereof, and thus should not have been made the basis of the
cancellation of the free patent and title.17
Petitioner further contends that the projection survey conducted by the DENR
to determine if the subject lot falls within the forest area "is not clear, precise
and conclusive," since the foresters who conducted the survey used a
magnetic box compass, an unreliable and inaccurate instrument, whose
results are easily affected by high tension wires and stones with iron
minerals.18
Finally, petitioner claims that respondent failed to overcome the presumption
of regularity of the issuance of the free patent and title in favor of Socorro
Orcullo.
In sum, petitioner asserts that respondent failed to show that the subject lot is
inside the timberland block, thereby casting doubt on the accuracy of the
survey conducted by the Bureau of Forestry and the opinions of DENR
officers. Since respondent is the original plaintiff in the reversion case, the
burden is on it to prove that the subject lot is part of the timberland block,
petitioner adds.
There is merit in the petition.
Under the Regalian doctrine or jura regalia, all lands of the public domain
belong to the State, and the State is the source of any asserted right to
ownership in land and charged with the conservation of such
patrimony.19 Under this doctrine, lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly
within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.20 In instances
where a parcel of land considered to be inalienable land of the public domain
is found under private ownership, the Government is allowed by law to file an
action for reversion,21 which is an action where the ultimate relief sought is to
revert the land to the government under the Regalian doctrine. Considering
that the land subject of the action originated from a grant by the government,
its cancellation is a matter between the grantor and the grantee.22
It has been held that a complaint for reversion involves a serious controversy,
involving a question of fraud and misrepresentation committed against the
government and it is aimed at the return of the disputed portion of the public
domain. It seeks to cancel the original certificate of registration, and nullify
the original certificate of title, including the transfer certificate of title of the
successors-in-interest because the same were all procured through fraud and
misrepresentation.23 Thus, the State, as the party alleging the fraud and
misrepresentation that attended the application of the free patent, bears that
burden of proof. Fraud and misrepresentation, as grounds for cancellation of
patent and annulment of title, should never be presumed but must be proved
by clear and convincing evidence, mere preponderance of evidence not even
being adequate.24
It is but judicious to require the Government, in an action for reversion, to
show the details attending the issuance of title over the alleged inalienable
land and explain why such issuance has deprived the State of the claimed
property.
In the instant case, the Solicitor General claimed that "Free Patent No. 473408
and Original Certificate of Title No. 0-6667 were erroneously and irregularly
obtained as the Bureau of Lands (now Lands Management Bureau) did not
acquire jurisdiction over the land subject thereof, nor has it the power and
authority to dispose of the same through [a] free patent grant, hence, said
patent and title are null and void ab initio."25 It was incumbent upon
respondent to prove that the free patent and original title were truly
erroneously and irregularly obtained. Unfortunately, respondent failed to do
so.
The Court finds that the findings of the trial court rather than those of the
appellate court are more in accord with the law and jurisprudence.
In concluding that the subject parcel of land falls within the timberland or
forest reserve, the Court of Appeals relied on the testimony of Isabelo R.
Montejo that as it had remained unclassified until 1980 and consequently
became an unclassified forest zone, it was incapable of private appropriation.
The pertinent portions of Montejo's testimony read:
Q: And in that particular [R]evised Forestry Code, there is that
statement that unless classified by a land classification team, an
area can never be released.
A: Yes sir.
xxx
Q: Prior to 1980, there was no classification was [sic] ever of the
lands of the public domain in the town of Sibonga?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: In other words, nobody knew in the whole DNR before and now
DENR what areas were timberland and what areas are not
timberland in the town of Sibonga prior to 1980?
A: Yes, sir, that is why the law states that if there is no classification
should be [sic] considered as the public forest in order to protect
the resources.26
Obviously, respondent's counsel and witness were referring to P.D. No. 705
particularly Section 13 thereof which reads:
CHAPTER II
CLASSIFICATION AND SURVEY
SEC. 13. System of Land Classification.—The Department Head
shall study, devise, determine and prescribe the criteria, guidelines
and methods for the proper and accurate classification and survey
of all lands of the public domain into agricultural, industrial or
commercial, residential, settlement, mineral, timber or forest, and
grazing lands, and into such other classes as now or may hereafter
be provided by law, rules and regulations.
In the meantime, the Department Head shall simplify through
inter-bureau action the present system of determining which of
the unclassified lands of the public domain are needed for forest
purposes and declare them as permanent forest to form part of
the forest reserves. He shall declare those classified and
determined not to be needed for forest purposes as alienable and
disposable lands, the administrative jurisdiction and management
of which shall be transferred to the Bureau of Lands: Provided,
That mangrove and other swamps not needed for shore protection
and suitable for fishpond purposes shall be released to, and be
placed under the administrative jurisdiction and management of,
the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources. Those still to be
classified under the Present system shall continue to remain as part
of the public forest. (Emphasis supplied.)
Reliance on this provision is highly misplaced. P.D. No. 705 was promulgated
only on 19 May 1975, or four (4) years after the free patent and title were
awarded to Orcullo. Thus, it finds no application in the instant case. Prior
forestry laws, including P.D. No. 389,27 which was revised by P.D. No. 705,
does not contain a similar provision. Article 4 of the Civil Code provides that
"laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided." The
Court does not infer any intention on the part of then President Marcos to
ordain the retroactive application of Sec. 13 of P.D. No. 705. Thus, even
assuming for the nonce that subject parcel was unclassified at the time
Orcullo applied for a free patent thereto, the fact remains that when the free
patent and title were issued thereon in 1971, respondent in essence
segregated said parcel from the mass of public domain. Thus, it can no longer
be considered unclassified and forming part of the public forest as provided in
P.D. No. 705.
Respondent's main basis for asserting that the subject lot is part of the
timberland or forest reserve is a purported L.C. Map No. 2961.28 However, at
the hearing on 6 June 1997, the trial court denied admission of the map for
the purpose of showing that the subject lot falls within a timberland reserve
after respondent had failed to submit either a certified true copy or an official
publication thereof.29 The Court observes that the document adverted to is a
mere photocopy of the purported original, and not the blue print as insisted
by respondent.30 A mere photocopy does not qualify as competent evidence
of the existence of the L.C. Map. Under the best evidence rule, the original
document must be produced, except:
1. When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be
produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
2. When the original is in the custody or under the control of the
party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to
produce it after reasonable notice;
3. When the original consists of numerous accounts or other
documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss
of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the
general result of the whole; and
4. When the original is a public record in the custody of a public
officer or is recorded in a public office.31
In this case, respondent claims that the presentation of the original L.C. Map is
unnecessary since it is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in the
public office.32 Evidence, indeed, is admissible when the original of a
document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office.
However, to prove its contents, there is a need to present a certified copy
issued by the public officer in custody thereof.33 In addition, while the L.C.
Map may be considered a public document and prima facie evidence of the
facts stated therein,34 the map, to be admissible for any purpose, must be
evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the Besides, the records do not show that respondent has considered the lot in
officer having legal custody of the record.35 question as forest reserve prior to the issuance of Free Patent No. 473408 and
OCT No. 0-6667. To declare the land now as forest land on the authority of
L.C. Map No. 2961 approved only in 1980, and opinions based on the said
The rules of admissibility must be applied uniformly. The same rule holds true
map, would unduly deprive petitioner of their registered property.
when the Government is one of the parties. The Government, when it comes
to court to litigate with one of its citizens, must submit to the rules of
procedure and its rights and privileges at every stage of the proceedings are The Regalian doctrine is well-enshrined not only in the present Constitution,
substantially in every respect the same as those of its citizens; it cannot have a but also in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions. The Court has always recognized
superior advantage. This is so because when a sovereignty submits itself to and upheld the Regalian doctrine as the basic foundation of the State's
the jurisdiction of the court and participates therein, its claims and rights are property regime. Nevertheless, in applying this doctrine, we must not lose
justiciable by every other principle and rule applicable to the claims and rights sight of the fact that in every claim or right by the Government against one of
of the private parties under similar circumstances.36 Failure to abide by the its citizens, the paramount considerations of fairness and due process must be
rules on admissibility renders the L.C. Map submitted by respondent observed. Respondent in this case failed to show that the subject lot is part of
inadmissible as proof to show that the subject lot is part of the forest reserve. timberland or forest reserve it adverted to. In the face of the uncontroverted
status of Free Patent No. 473408 and OCT No. 0-6667 as valid and regular
issuances, respondent's insistence on the classification of the lot as part of the
Some officers from the CENRO office in Argao, Cebu testified that they
forest reserve must be rejected.
personally saw the subject lot and that it falls within the timberland or forest
reserve. Ultimately, however, the basis of their declaration is the L.C. Map
which respondent failed to present in accordance with the rules on WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
admissibility. Two foresters in fact testified that the subject lot was a dated 16 July 2001 and the Resolution dated 18 March 2002 are REVERSED
mangrove area.37 The foresters who conducted the survey may have been and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court dated 15 May 1999
competent and their techniques reliable; nevertheless, the observation that dismissing the complaint for reversion and the complaint-in-intervention is
mangroves grow in the subject lot is not conclusive as to the nature of the REINSTATED.
land at present or at the time the free patent and title were issued. Assuming
that the area is covered by mangroves when they surveyed it, there is no
SO ORDERED.
proof that it was not planted with trees and crops at the time Orcullo applied
for free patent. Respondent was also unable to establish that the subject lot
has "very deep and muddy soil" or are "mudflats," such that it is unsuitable for
fruit and non-fruit bearing trees.38 Yet these are factual matters which the
Court does not generally delve into. As it is, a mere declaration from the said
officers, without any other supporting evidence, is not sufficient to establish
that the area in question is part of the forest reserve.

Even assuming that the L.C. Map submitted by respondent is admissible in

evidence, still the land in question can hardly be considered part of the
timberland or forest reserve. L.C. Map No. 2961, which purports to be the
"correct map of the areas demarcated as permanent forest pursuant of the
provisions of P.D. No. 705 as amended"39 was made only in 1980. Thus, the
delineation of the areas was made nine (9) years after Orcullo was awarded
the free patent over the subject lot.

In Republic v. Court of Appeals,40 the Court, finding that the disputed land was
classified as timberland 25 years after private individuals had commenced
their continuous possession and cultivation thereof in good faith, declared
that they have the better right. The Court held:

It is not disputed that the aforesaid Land Classification Project No.

3, classifying the 22-hectare area as timberland, was certified by
the Director of Lands only on December 22, 1924, whereas the
possession thereof by private respondents and their predecessor-
in-interest commenced as early as 1909. While the Government
has the right to classify portions of public land, the primary right of a
private individual who possessed and cultivated the land in good
faith much prior to such classification must be recognized and
should not be prejudiced by after-events which could not have been
anticipated. Thus, We have held that the Government, in the first
instance may, by reservation, decide for itself what portions of
public land shall be considered forestry land, unless private interests
have intervened before such reservation is made.41 (Emphasis
supplied.)

Obviously, private interests have intervened before classification was made

pursuant to P.D. No. 705. Not only has Orcullo by herself and through her
predecessors-in-interest cultivated and possessed the subject lot since 1930, a
free patent was also awarded to her and a title issued in her name as early as ISAGANI CRUZ vs.SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES,
1971. In fact, it appears that the issuance of the free patent and certificate of
title was regular and in order. Orcullo complied with the requisites for the
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition and
acquisition of free patent provided under Commonwealth Act No. 141 (Public
mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain
Land Act), as certified by the Director of Lands and approved by the Secretary
provisions of Republic Act No. 8371 (R.A. 8371), otherwise known as the
of Agriculture and Natural Resources.42
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations (Implementing Rules).
In its resolution of September 29, 1998, the Court required respondents to
comment.1 In compliance, respondents Chairperson and Commissioners of the
National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), the government agency
created under the IPRA to implement its provisions, filed on October 13, 1998
their Comment to the Petition, in which they defend the constitutionality of
the IPRA and pray that the petition be dismissed for lack of merit.
On October 19, 1998, respondents Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and Secretary of the Department
of Budget and Management (DBM) filed through the Solicitor General a
consolidated Comment. The Solicitor General is of the view that the IPRA is
partly unconstitutional on the ground that it grants ownership over natural
resources to indigenous peoples and prays that the petition be granted in
part.
On November 10, 1998, a group of intervenors, composed of Sen. Juan
Flavier, one of the authors of the IPRA, Mr. Ponciano Bennagen, a member of
the 1986 Constitutional Commission, and the leaders and members of 112
groups of indigenous peoples (Flavier, et. al), filed their Motion for Leave to
Intervene. They join the NCIP in defending the constitutionality of IPRA and
praying for the dismissal of the petition.
On March 22, 1999, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) likewise filed a
Motion to Intervene and/or to Appear as Amicus Curiae. The CHR asserts that
IPRA is an expression of the principle of parens patriae and that the State has
the responsibility to protect and guarantee the rights of those who are at a
serious disadvantage like indigenous peoples. For this reason it prays that the
petition be dismissed.
On March 23, 1999, another group, composed of the Ikalahan Indigenous
People and the Haribon Foundation for the Conservation of Natural
Resources, Inc. (Haribon, et al.), filed a motion to Intervene with attached
Comment-in-Intervention. They agree with the NCIP and Flavier, et al. that
IPRA is consistent with the Constitution and pray that the petition for
prohibition and mandamus be dismissed.
The motions for intervention of the aforesaid groups and organizations were
granted.
Oral arguments were heard on April 13, 1999. Thereafter, the parties and
intervenors filed their respective memoranda in which they reiterate the
arguments adduced in their earlier pleadings and during the hearing.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following provisions of the IPRA
and its Implementing Rules on the ground that they amount to an unlawful
deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as well as
minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian
doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution:
"(1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of ancestral domains,
and Section 3(b) which, in turn, defines ancestral lands;
"(2) Section 5, in relation to section 3(a), which provides that ancestral
domains including inalienable public lands, bodies of water, mineral and other
resources found within ancestral domains are private but community property
of the indigenous peoples;
"(3) Section 6 in relation to section 3(a) and 3(b) which defines the
composition of ancestral domains and ancestral lands;
"(4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous
peoples over the ancestral domains;
(5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous
peoples over the ancestral lands;
"(6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the indigenous peoples in
the harvesting, extraction, development or exploration of minerals and other
natural resources within the areas claimed to be their ancestral domains, and
the right to enter into agreements with nonindigenous peoples for the
development and utilization of natural resources therein for a period not
exceeding 25 years, renewable for not more than 25 years; and
"(7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the responsibility to
maintain, develop, protect and conserve the ancestral domains and portions
thereof which are found to be necessary for critical watersheds, mangroves,
wildlife sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas, forest cover or
reforestation."2
Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition
of "ancestral domains" and "ancestral lands" which might even include private
lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) violate the rights of
private landowners.3
In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining the
powers and jurisdiction of the NCIP and making customary law applicable to
the settlement of disputes involving ancestral domains and ancestral lands on
the ground that these provisions violate the due process clause of the
Constitution.4
These provisions are:
"(1) sections 51 to 53 and 59 which detail the process of
delineation and recognition of ancestral domains and which vest
on the NCIP the sole authority to delineate ancestral domains and
ancestral lands;
"(2) Section 52[i] which provides that upon certification by the
NCIP that a particular area is an ancestral domain and upon
notification to the following officials, namely, the Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources, Secretary of Interior and
Local Governments, Secretary of Justice and Commissioner of the
National Development Corporation, the jurisdiction of said officials
over said area terminates;
"(3) Section 63 which provides the customary law, traditions and
practices of indigenous peoples shall be applied first with respect
to property rights, claims of ownership, hereditary succession and
settlement of land disputes, and that any doubt or ambiguity in the
interpretation thereof shall be resolved in favor of the indigenous
peoples;
"(4) Section 65 which states that customary laws and practices
shall be used to resolve disputes involving indigenous peoples; and
"(5) Section 66 which vests on the NCIP the jurisdiction over all
claims and disputes involving rights of the indigenous peoples."5
Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the NCIP
Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, which provides that "the
administrative relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the President is
characterized as a lateral but autonomous relationship for purposes of policy
and program coordination." They contend that said Rule infringes upon the
President’s power of control over executive departments under Section 17,
Article VII of the Constitution.6
Petitioners pray for the following:
"(1) A declaration that Sections 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 52[I], 57, 58, 59, 63, 65
and 66 and other related provisions of R.A. 8371 are
unconstitutional and invalid;
"(2) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Chairperson
and Commissioners of the NCIP to cease and desist from
 implementing the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371 and its
Implementing Rules;

"(3) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of

the Department of Environment and Natural Resources to cease
and desist from implementing Department of Environment and
Natural Resources Circular No. 2, series of 1998;

"(4) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of

Budget and Management to cease and desist from disbursing
public funds for the implementation of the assailed provisions of
R.A. 8371; and

"(5) The issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the

Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources to comply with
his duty of carrying out the State’s constitutional mandate to
control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization and
conservation of Philippine natural resources."7

After due deliberation on the petition, the members of the Court voted as
follows:

Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan filed an opinion,
which the Chief Justice and Justices Bellosillo, Quisumbing, and Santiago join,
sustaining the validity of the challenged provisions of R.A. 8371. Justice Puno
also filed a separate opinion sustaining all challenged provisions of the law
with the exception of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of NCIP Administrative Order
No. 1, series of 1998, the Rules and Regulations Implementing the IPRA, and
Section 57 of the IPRA which he contends should be interpreted as dealing
with the large-scale exploitation of natural resources and should be read in
conjunction with Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. On the other
hand, Justice Mendoza voted to dismiss the petition solely on the ground that
it does not raise a justiciable controversy and petitioners do not have standing
to question the constitutionality of R.A. 8371.

Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the petition. Justice
Panganiban filed a separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3 (a)(b),
5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and related provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. He
reserves judgment on the constitutionality of Sections 58, 59, 65, and 66 of
the law, which he believes must await the filing of specific cases by those
whose rights may have been violated by the IPRA. Justice Vitug also filed a
separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3(a), 7, and 57 of R.A. 8371
are unconstitutional. Justices Melo, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and De
Leon join in the separate opinions of Justices Panganiban and Vitug.

As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not
obtained, the case was redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the
voting remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED.

Attached hereto and made integral parts thereof are the separate opinions of
Justices Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, and Panganiban.

SO ORDERED.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, EULALIO OCOL,

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of

Court which seeks the reversal of the Decision2 dated February 20, 2013, and
Resolution3 dated July 26, 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
96879. The CA affirmed the Order4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in LRC
Case No. N-11598 granting respondents' application for registration and
confirmation of title over three (3) parcels of land located at Barangay
Calzada, Taguig City with a total area of 11,380 square meters.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryOn September 19, 2008,5 respondents, Heirs of
Spouses Tomasa Estacio and Eulalio Ocol filed with the RTC of Pasig City,
Branch 266 an application for land registration under Presidential Decree No.
1529 (PD 1529) otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree. The
application covers three (3) parcels of land described as follows: a) Lot 2
under approved survey plan Ccs-00-000258 with an area of 3,731 square
meters; b) Lot 1672-A under approved subdivision plan Csd-00-001798
consisting of 1,583 square meters; c) a lot under approved survey plan Cvn-
00-000194 consisting of 6,066 square meters.6 The total assessed value of the
parcels of land is P288,970.007chanrobleslaw
On October 6, 2008, the RTC issued a Notice of Initial Hearing, copy furnished
the Land Registration Authority (LRA). The notice was sent to the Official
Gazette for publication and was served on all the adjoining owners. It was
likewise posted conspicuously on each parcel of land included in the
application.8 During the initial hearing on January 13, 2010, respondents, by
counsel, presented the jurisdictional requirements (Exhibits "A" to "I" and
their sub-markings). There being no private oppositor, an Order of General
Default was issued except against the Republic of the Philippines.
At the ex-parte presentation of evidence on January 22, 2010, respondents
Rosa Ocol, 72 years old, and Felipe Ocol, 70 years old, testified that they are
the children of the late Tomasa Estacio and Eulalio Ocol (Exhibits "U" and "V").
They inherited the subject lots from their father and mother who died on
February 1, 1949 and March 22, 1999, respectively. When Felipe Ocol was
only about eight years old and Rosa was still in grade school, their parents
developed and cultivated the subject lots as rice fields. In the 1940's, there
were only a few houses around their house. At present, one of the lots is
residential while the two remaining lots have become idle. Their parents and
grandparents had been in continuous, actual and physical possession of the
lots without any interruption for more than sixty five (65) years. Felipe and
Rosa have been in possession of the land for more than fifty (50) years. There
is n0 existing mortgage or encumbrance over the said lots.9chanrobleslaw
Respondents presented witness Antonia Marcelo who was 85 years old at the
time she testified. She is the neighbor of Tomasa Estacio and Eulalio Ocol
in Barangay Calzada where she has been residing for more than fifty (50)
years. She testified that during her childhood days, she used to play on the
subject lots and had seen the spouses Ocol cultivate the lots by planting
vegetables, rice and trees.10chanrobleslaw
In support of their application, respondents presented documentary evidence
which sought to establish the following:
1. The first lot which is Lot 2 of the conv. Subd. plan Ccs-00-000258
with an area of 3,731 square meters was declared for taxation
purposes in the names of Tomasa Estacio and Eulalio Ocol in the
years 1966, 1974, 1979, 1985, 2000 and 2002 (Exhibits "T" to "T-
7");
2. The second lot which is Lot 1672-A under approved subdivision
plan Csd-00-001798 consisting of 1,583 square meters was
declared for taxation purposes in the names of Tomasa Estacio and
Eulalio Ocol in the years 1942, 1949, 1966, 1974, 1979, 1985,
1994, 2000 and 2002 (Exhibits "R" to "R-10");
3. The third lot which is a lot under approved survey plan CVN-00-
000194 consisting of 6,066 square meters, being a conversion of
Lot 1889, MCadm, 590-D Taguig Cadastral Mapping, was declared
for taxation purposes in the names of Tomasa Estacio and Eulalio
Ocol in the years 1949, 1974, 1979, 1985, 2000 and 2002 (Exhibits
"S" to "S-6");
4. The subject lots used to have larger areas but certain portions
were taken and designated as legal easements. On December 17,
2009, the real property tax on the subject lots, declared in the
names of Tomasa Estacio and Eulalio Ocol as owners, were paid
(Exhibits "Q", "Q-1" and "Q-2");
5. The subject lots were surveyed for Tomasa Vda. de Ocol as
evidenced by the Geodetic Engineers' Certificates and Conversion
Subdivision Plans (Exhibits "J", "K", "L", "P", "P-1", and "P-2");
6. The subject lots are verified to be within alienable and disposable
land under Project No. 27-B Taguig Cadastral Mapping as per LC
Map No. 2623 approved on January 3, 1968 as evidenced by
Certifications dated January 28, 2010 issued by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources-National Capital Region
(Exhibits "J-3, "K-2" and "L-3").11
On February 11, 2010, respondents formally offered their documentary
evidence. The RTC set the case for presentation of evidence of the
government on April 16, 2010. On the date of the hearing, there was no
appearance from the government. Hence, the court, upon motion of
applicants, considered the case submitted for resolution.
On August 12, 2010, the RTC issued an Order granting the respondents'
application for registration of title to the subject
properties, viz.:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered thus: the title of the heirs of
Tomasa Estacio and Eulalio Ocol, namely, Rosa Ocol; and Felipe Ocol, to the
three (3) parcels of land above-described is hereby CONFIRMED.
Upon the finality of the judgment, let the proper Decree of Registration and
Certificates of Title be issued to the applicants pursuant to Section 39 of P.D.
1529.
Let two (2) copies of this Order be furnished the Land registration Authority
Administrator Benedicta B. Ulep thru Salvador L. Oriel, the Chief of the Docket
Division of said Office, East Avenue, Quezon City.
SO ORDERED.12chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The RTC found that respondents were able to prove that their predecessors-
in-interest possessed the subject lots from 1966 until 2002 with respect to the
first lot; from 1942 to 2002, with respect to the second lot; and from 1949 to
2002 with respect to the third lot, as shown in the tax declarations. The court
posited that even if the subject lots were declared as alienable and disposable
public land only on January 3, 1968, respondents had already "acquired title
to the land according to P.D. 1529" by virtue of the continued possession of
the respondents and their predecessors-in-interest from January 3, 1968 to
the present.13chanrobleslaw
A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioner raising the following
grounds:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(a) Respondents did not comply with the requirements in acquiring
ownership of the subject lots by prescription because the few tax
declarations of respondents failed to substantiate the requirement
of open, continuous, notorious and exclusive possession of the
subject lots for the required period as stated in the case of Wee vs.
Republic;14
(b) The evidence is insufficient to establish the nature of possession
because the testimony of witness Antonia Marcelo with regard to
the cultivation of the subject properties by spouses Ocol does not
convincingly prove possession and enjoyment of the subject lots to
the exclusion of other people;
(c) There was no declaration, either in the form of a law or a
presidential proclamation, showing that the lots are no longer
intended for public use or for the development of national wealth,
or that it has been converted to patrimonial property as stated in
the case of Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic.15
The Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the RTC on February 15, 2011.

The RTC opined that the case of Wee vs. Republic16 is not applicable in the
instant case because the parcels of land involved in the said case are
"unirrigated ricefields". In the instant case, the first and third lots are ricefields
while the second lot is a residential one as shown in the tax declarations. The
RTC averred that, even prior to the dates stated in the tax declarations
specifically during the 1940s, spouses Tomasa and Eulalio Ocol had started
planting rice on the first and third lots as testified to by respondents. The
testimony was corroborated by witness Antonia Marcelo, who is 15 years
older than the respondents, when she testified that she played on the subject
lots and had seen the spouses Ocol cultivate the same by planting vegetables,
rice and trees in the 1930s. As to the second lot, the RTC gave credence to the
testimony of respondents that in the 1940s, respondents' house was already
erected on the said lot. According to the court, such is proof that the lot has
been used for residential purposes even prior to 1942 which is the earliest
date of the tax declaration on the lot.
The RTC further held that the case of Heirs of Malabanan vs. Republic17 does
not apply in the case at bar because the said case involved a 71,324-square-
meter lot, while the subject lots have a total area of 11,380 square meters
only. The court pointed out that respondents are not just entitled to a grant of
their application under Section 14(1) of PD 1529 but also under Section 14(2)
of the same law because respondents had proven that their predecessors-in-
interest were in possession of the subject lands earlier than 1945. Thus, there
is no need for an express government manifestation that the property is
patrimonial, or that such is no longer intended for public service or for the
development of national wealth.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed an appeal before the CA. In a Decision dated
February 20, 2013, the CA affirmed the Decision of the RTC. The fallo of the
Decision states:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED, and the Order dated August 12,
2010, of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 266, in L.R.C. Case No.
N-11598 (LRA Record No. N-79393) is AFFIRMED IN TOTO.
SO ORDERED.18chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In affirming the RTC Order, the CA made the following
ratiocinations:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In the case at bar, the applicants-appellees seek the confirmation of their
ownership to the subject lands not based on prescription, but based on their
claim that "they have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain under a bonafide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier".
(Section 14[1], PD 1529). The requirement of prior declaration that the
property is patrimonial property of the State, therefore, does not apply. As
explained in Heirs of Malabanan, for application based on Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree, it is enough that the property is alienable and
disposable property of the State and the applicant has been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject
land under a bonafide claim of ownership from June 12, 1945 or earlier. Both
of these requirements are present in this case.19chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioner but the same was
denied by the CA on July 26, 2013.
Hence, this petition, raising the following errors:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
1. THE RECORD IS BEREFT OF PROOF THAT THE SUBJECT
PROPERTIES HAD BEEN CLASSIFIED AS ALIENABLE AND
DISPOSABLE;
2. THE RECORD IS BEREFT OF PROOF THAT RESPONDENTS
HAVE BEEN IN OPEN, CONTINUOUS, EXCLUSIVE AND
NOTORIOUS POSSESSION Of THE SUBJECT LOTS UNDER
A BONA FIDE CLAIM OF OWNERSHIP SINCE JUNE 12,
1945, OR EARLIER;
3. ALTERNATIVELY, RESPONDENTS CANNOT INVOKE
PRESCRIPTION UNDER SECTION 14(2) OF PRESIDENTIAL
DECREE NO. 1529. THE SUBJECT LOTS HAVE NOT BEEN
CONVERTED INTO PATRIMONIAL PROPERTY OF THE
STATE.20
On the first ground, petitioner states that respondents failed to present a
copy of the original certification, approved by the DENR Secretary and
certified as a true copy by the legal custodian, which would support
respondents' claim that the subject lands are alienable and disposable. The
certification of Senior Forest Management Specialist Corazon D. Calamno and
Chief of the Forest Utilization and Law Enforcement Division of the DENR
should not be treated as sufficient compliance with the requirements of the
law because she was not presented during trial to testify on the contents of
the certification.
On the second ground, petitioner argues that there is insufficient evidence of
acts of dominion on the part of respondents and their predecessors-in-
interest for the following reasons:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(a) Respondents did not explain how the properties were acquired.
The only explanation as to the acquisition of Lot 1672-A was that it
was first acquired from a certain Gregorio, without even
mentioning the date of acquisition as well as any document
evidencing the same.21
(b) It was unusual for respondents' parents to possess and occupy
three (3) parcels of land that are not contiguous to one another;
(c) Respondents were able to present a tax receipt only for the year
2009;
(d) In terms of improvements, respondents did not go to the extent of
specifying whether fences were erected on the lots. While they
claim that crops were planted, it did not appear that they
exclusively and continuously enjoyed the possession of the lots;
(e) While respondents consistently affirm the development of the lots
as ricefields, they failed to consider the fact that the second lot, Lot
1672-A, is a residential land as stated on the tax declaration of the
land.
On the third ground, petitioner avers that respondents cannot invoke
prescription under Section 14(2) of P.D. 1529 because they failed to present
the necessary documents which would show that the subject properties are
no longer intended for public service or no longer used for the development
of the national wealth. They did not present a declaration in the form of a law
or a Presidential Proclamation.
In their Comment,22 respondents counter that the certifications issued by the
DENR constitute substantial compliance with the legal requirement, and that
with their continuous possession of the subject lots for more than thirty (30)
years, they had acquired ownership over the subject lots through prescription
under Section 14(2) of P.D. 1529.
In Reply,23 petitioner maintains that respondents failed to establish their
compliance with the requisites for original registration either under Section 14
(1) or Section 14 (2) of P.D. No. 1529. The certifications of Senior Forest
Management specialist Corazon C. Calamno and the Chief of the Forest
Utilization and Law Enforcement Division of the DENR did not comply with the
legal requirements for lack of approval by the DENR Secretary and for lack of
certification by its legal custodian. Respondents failed to establish that the
State expressly declared, either through a law or a presidential proclamation,
that the parcels ofland are no longer retained for public service or the
development of national wealth, or that they had been converted into
patrimonial properties. Without such, the subject lots remain part of public
dominion.
Petitioner further maintains that the tax declarations do not represent regular
assertion of ownership because of the large gaps in the years between
declarations. Such sporadic assertion of alleged ownership does not prove
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation in the
concept of an owner. And that, since the parcels of land are not contiguous,
alleged possession and occupation over one parcel of land cannot prove
possession and occupation over the other parcels of land.24chanrobleslaw

The petition is meritorious.
Under the Regalian Doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all lands
of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted
right to any ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within
private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly, public
lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural
land, or alienated to a private person by the State, remain part of the
inalienable public; domain. The burden of proof in overcoming the
presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the
person applying for registration, who must prove that the land subject of the
application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be presented to establish that the land subject
of the application is alienable or disposable.25cralawredchanrobleslaw
Section 14 (1) of PD 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration
Decree provides:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
SEC. 14. Who may apply. - The following persons may file in the proper Court
of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary(1) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or
earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under
the provision of existing laws.
xxx
In the Order of the RTC granting the registration of the subject lots, it was
stated that respondents had "acquired title to the land according to P.D.
1529" by virtue of the continued possession of the respondents and their
predecessors-in-interest from January 3, 1968 to present. On motion for
reconsideration, however, the court added that respondents are not just
entitled to a grant of their application under Section 14(2) of the P.D. 1529,
but also under Section 14(1) of the same law because respondents had
proven that their predecessors-in-interest were in possession of the subject
lots earlier than 1945. The CA explained, however, that the confirmation of
the ownership to the subject lots is not based on prescription, but on Section
14 (1), since it was established that the lots are alienable and disposable, and
the applicants are in continuous possession thereof since June 12, 1945 or
earlier.
To distinguish between registration under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 from
the one filed under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529, this Court held in the case
of Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic:26
Section 14(1) mandates registration on the basis of possession, while Section
14(2) entitles registration on the basis of prescription. Registration under
Section 14(1) is extended under the aegis of the Property Registration Decree
and the Public Land Act while registration under Section 14(2) is made
available both by the Property Registration Decree and the Civil
Code.27chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Registration under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 is based on possession and
occupation of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain since
June 12, 1945 or earlier, without regard to whether the land was susceptible
to private ownership at that time. The applicant needs only to show that the
land had already been declared alienable and disposable at any time prior to
the filing of the application for registration.28chanrobleslaw
On the other hand, registration under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529 is based
on acquisitive prescription and must comply with the law on prescription as
provided by the Civil Code. In that regard, only the patrimonial property of the
State may be acquired by prescription pursuant to the Civil Code. For
acquisitive prescription to set in, therefore, the land being possessed and
occupied must already be classified or declared as patrimonial property of the
State. Otherwise, no length of possession would vest any right in the
possessor ifthe property has remained land of the public
dominion.29chanrobleslaw
Moreover, Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 refers to the judicial confirmation of
imperfect or incomplete titles to public land acquired under Section 48(b) of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, or the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No.
1073.30 Under Section 14(1), respondents need to prove that: (1) the land
forms part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain; and (2)
they, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, have been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the
subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership from June 12, 1945 or
earlier. These the respondents must prove by no less than clear, positive and
convincing evidence.31chanrobleslaw
In the case at bar, the first requirement was not satisfied. To prove that the
subject property forms part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain, the respondents presented three certifications - two are dated
January 29, 2010 (Exhibits "J-3" and "K-2") and one is dated January 28, 2010
(Exhibits "L-3") - issued by Senior Forest Management Specialist Corazon D.
Calamno and Chief of the Forest Utilization and Law Enforcement Division of
the DENR-National Capital Region.32 The certification attests that the lots are
verified to be within alienable and disposable land under Project No. 27-B
Taguig Cadastral Mapping as per LC Map No. 2623 approved on January 3,
1968, thus:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
This is to certify that the tract of land as shown and described at the reverse
side hereof xxx as surveyed by Geodetic Engineer Jose S. Agres, Jr. for Tomasa
Vda de Ocol is verified to be within the Alienable and Disposable Land, under
Project No. 27-B of Taguig City as per LC Map 2623, approved on January 3,
1968.33chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
However, the certifications presented by the respondents are insufficient to
prove that the subject properties are alienable and disposable. We reiterate
the standing doctrine that land of the public domain, to be the subject of
appropriation, must be declared alienable and disposable either by the
President or the Secretary of the DENR. Applicants must present a copy of the
original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as true
copy by the legal custodian of the records. In Republic of the Philippines v.
T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,34 this Court explicitly ruled:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Further, it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO35 to certify that a land is
alienable and disposable. The applicant for land registration must prove that
the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land
of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of
the application for registration falls within the approved area per verification
through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land
registration must present a copy of the original classification approved by the
DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official
records. These facts must be established to prove that the land is alienable and
disposable. Respondent failed to do so because the certifications presented by
respondent do not, by themselves, prove that the land is alienable and
disposable.36chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In Republic v. Bantigue Point Development Corporation,37 this Court deemed it
appropriate to reiterate the ruling in T.A.N. Properties,
viz.:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The Regalian doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to
the State. The applicant for land registration has the burden of overcoming
the presumption of State ownership by establishing through incontrovertible
evidence that the land sought to be registered is alienable or disposable based
on a positive act of the government. We held in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties,
Inc. that a CENRO certification is insufficient to prove the alienable and
disposable character of the land sought to be registered. The applicant must
also show sufficient proof that the DENR Secretary has approved the land
classification and released the land in question as alienable and disposable.
Thus, the present rule is that an application for original registration must be
accompanied by (1) a CENRO or PENRO Certification; and (2) a copy of the
original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true
copy by the legal custodian of the official records.
Here, respondent Corporation only presented a CENRO certification in
support of its application. Clearly, this falls short of the requirements for
original registration.38chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Similarly, in Republic v. Cortez,39 this Court declared
that:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
xxx. To prove that the subject property forms part of the alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, Cortez adduced in evidence a survey
plan Csd-00-000633 (conversion-subdivision plan of Lot 2697, MCadm 594-D,
Pateros Cadastral Mapping) prepared by Geodetic Engineer Oscar B.
Fernandez and dertified by the Lands Management Bureau of the DENR. The
said survey plan contained the following
annotation:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
This survey is inside L.C. Map No. 2623, Project No. 29, classified as cuienable
& disposable by the Bureau of Forest Development on Jan. 3, 1968.
However, Cortez' reliance on the foregoing annotation in the survey plan is
amiss; it ciloes not constitute incontrovertible evidence to overcome the
presumption that the subject property remains part of the inalienable public
domain. In Republic of the Philippines v. Tri-Plus Corporation,40 the Court
clarified that, the applicant must at the very least submit a certification froi:n
the proper government agency stating that the parcel of land subject of he
application for registration is indeed alienable and
disposable, viz.:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
It must be stressed that incontrovertible evidence must be presented to
establish that the land subject of the application is alie table or disposable.
In the present case, the only evidence to prove the character of the subject
lands as required by law is the notation appearinin the Advance Plan stating in
effect that the said properties are alienable and disposable. However, this is
hardly the kind of proof required by law. To prove that the land subject of an
application for registration is alienable, an appficant must establish the
existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential
proclamation or an executive order, an administrative action, investigation
reports of Bureau of Lands investigators, andla legislative act or statute. The
applicant may also secure certification from the Government that the lands
applied: for are alienable and disposable. In the case at bar, while the Advance
Plan bearing the notation was certified by the Lands Management Services of
the DENR, the cert fication refers only to the technical correctness of the survey
plotted in the said plan and has nothing to do wh tsoever with the nature and
character of the property surveyed. Respondents failed to submit a
certification fromithe proper government agency to prove that the lands
subject for registration are indeed alienable and
disposable.41chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Clearly, the aforestated doctrine unavoidably means that the mere
certification issued by the DENR does not suffice to support the application for
registration, because the applicant must also submit a copy of the original
classification of the land as alienable and disposable as approved by the DENR
Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official
records.42chanrobleslaw
Hence, in the instant case, the DENR certifications that were presented by the
respondents in support of their application for registration are not sufficient
to prove that the subject properties are indeed classified by the DENR
Secretary as alienable and disposable. It is still imperative for the respondents
to present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR
Secretary, which must be certified by the legal custodian thereof as a true
copy. Accordingly, the lower courts erred in granting the application for
registration in spite o£ the failure of the respondents to prove by well-nigh
incontrovertible evidence that the subject properties are alienable and
disposable.43chanrobleslaw
Anent the second requirement, the tax declarations do not prove
respondents' assertion. Although respondents claim that they possessed the
subject lots through their predecessors-in-interest since the 1930s, their tax
declarations belie the same. The earliest tax declarations presented for the
first lot was issued only in 1966, while the earliest tax declaration for the third
lot was issued in 1949.
If it is true that the parents of respondents had been in possession of the
properties in the 1930s as testified to by witness Antonia Marcelo, why was
the first lot declared for taxation purposes for the first time only in 1966, and
the third lot was declared only in 1949? While belated declaration of a
property for taxation purposes does not necessarily negate the fact of
possession, tax declarations or realty tax payments of property are,
nevertheless, good indicia of possession in the concept of an owner, for no
one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his
actual or, at least, constructive possession.44chanrobleslaw
That the subject properties were first declared for taxation purposes only in
those mentioned years gives rise to the presumption that the respondents
claimed ownership or possession of the subject properties starting in the year
1966 only with respect to the first lot; and year 1949, with respect to the third
lot.45 The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes
not only manifests one's sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the
property, but also announces an adverse claim against the State and all other
interested parties with an intention to contribute needed revenues to the
government. Such an act strengthens ones bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership.46chanrobleslaw
Likewise, this Court notes that the tax declarations on the subject properties
presented by the respondents were only for the years 1966, 1974, 1979,
1985, 2000 and 2002 with respect to the first lot (Lot 2 of the conv. Subd. plan
Ccs-00-000258 with an area of 3,731 square meters); for the years 1942,
1949, 1966, 1974, 1979, 1985, 1994, 2000 and 2002 with respect to the
second lot (Lot 1672-A under approved subdivision plan Csd-00-001798
consisting of 1,583 square meters); for the years 1949, 1974, 1979, 1985,2000
and 2002 with respect to the third lot (a lot under approved survey plan CVN-
00-000194 consisting of 6,066 square meters being a conversion of Lot 1889,
MCadm, 590-D Taguig Cadastral Mapping).
Thus, there are only six tax declarations for the first lot, nine tax declarations
for the second lot and five tax declarations for the third lot within the alleged
actual and physical possession of the lands without any interruption for more
than sixty five (65) years. In Wee v. Republic of the Philippines,47 this Court
stated that:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
It bears stressing that petitioner presented only five tax declarations (for the
years 1957, 1961, 1967, 1980 and 1985) for a claimed possession and
occupation of more than 45 years (1945-1993). This type of intermittent and
sporadic assertion of alleged ownership does not prove open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation. In any event, in the
absence of other competent evidence, tax declarations do not conclusively
establish either possession or declarant's right to registration of
title.48chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Moreover, this Court emphasizes that respondents paid the taxes due on the
parcels of land subject of the application only in 2009, a year after the filing of
the application. There is no showing of any tax payments before 2009. This
Court held in the case of Tan, et al. vs. Republic:49
Tax declarations per se do not qualify as competent evidence of actual
possession for purposes of prescription. More so, if the payment of the taxes
due on the property is episodic, irregular and random such as in this case.
Indeed, how can the petitioners claim of possession for the entire prescriptive
period be ascribed any ounce of credibility when taxes were paid only on
eleven (11) occasions within the 40-year period from 1961 to
2001?50chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
From the foregoing, this Court doubts the respondents' claim that their
predecessors-in-interest have been in continuous, exclusive, and adverse
possession and occupation thereof in the concept of owners from June 12,
1945, or earlier. The evidence presented by the respondents does not prove
title thru possession and occupation of public land under Section 14(1) of P.D.
1529.
Further, the RTC ruled that with the continuous possession of the subject lots
for more than 30 years, respondents had acquired ownership over the subject
lots through prescription under Section 14(2) of P.D. 529. This view was
adopted by the respondents in their Comment,51 to the petition.
An application for original registration of land of the public domain under
Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529 must show not only that
the land has previously been declared alienable and disposable, but also that
the land has been declared patrimonial property of the State at the onset of
the 30-year or 10-year period of possession and occupation required under
the law on acquisitive prescription.52chanrobleslaw
It was elucidated in Heirs of Malabanan53 that possession and occupation of
an alienable and disposable public land for the periods provided under the
Civil Code will not convert it to patrimonial or private property. There must be
an express declaration that the property is no longer intended for public
service or the development of national wealth. In the absence thereof, the
property remains to be alienable and disposable and may not be acquired by
prescription under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529.
This Court, therefore, stresses that there must be an official declaration by the
State that the public dominion property is no longer intended for public use,
public service, or for the development of national wealth before it can be
acquired by prescription; that a mere declaration by government officials that
a land of the public domain is already alienable and disposable would not
suffice for purposes of registration under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529. The
period of acquisitive prescription would only begin to run from the time that
the State officially declares that the public dominion property is no longer
intended for public use, public service, or for the development of national
wealth54.

In Republic v. Rizalvo, Jr.,55 this Court reiterated the ruling in Malabanan,

viz.:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
On this basis, respondent would have been eligible for application for
registration because his claim of ownership and possession over the subject
property even exceeds thirty (30) years. However, it is jurisprudentially clear
that the thirty (30)-year period of prescription for purposes of acqmring
ownership and registration of public land under Section 14 (2) of P.D. No.
1529 only begins from the moment the State expressly declares that the
public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the
development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted
into patrimonial. xxx
In this case, there is no evidence showing that the parcels of land in question
were within an area expressly declared by law either to be the patrimonial
property of the State, or to be no longer intended for public service or the
development of the national wealth.

Evidently, there being no compliance, with either the first or second

paragraph of Section 14 of PD 1529, the Regalian presumption stands and
must be enforced in this case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals

dated February 20, 2013, in CA-G.R. CV No. 96879, affirming the Decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 266, in LRC Case No. N-11598,
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The application for registration and confirmation
of title filed by respondents Heirs of Spouses Tomasa Estacio and Eulalio Ocol
over three parcels of land, with a total area of eleven thousand three hundred
eighty (11,380) square meters situated at Barangay Calzada, Taguig City,
Metro Manila, is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.chan robles virtuallawlibrary

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. SPOUSES GO D E C I S I O N

Public land remains inalienable unless it is shown to have been reclassified

and alienated to a private person.1

This resolves a Petition for Review assailing the Court of Appeals Decision
dated January 21, 2011 and Resolution dated June 6, 2011 in CA-G.R. CV No.
93000, which affirmed the Decision of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities dated
December 12, 2008 issuing the Decree of Registration for Lot No. 4699-B of
Subdivision Plan Csd-04-022290-D in favor of the Spouses Danilo and Amorlina
Go.
On August 26, 2006, respondents Spouses Danilo and Amorlina Go (the
Spouses Go) applied for the registration and confirmation of title over
Cadastral Lot No. 4699-B (Lot No. 4699-B), a parcel of land in Barangay
Balagtas, Batangas City covering an area of 1,000 square meters.2
The Spouses Go registered Lot No. 4699-B in their names for taxation
purposes. They had paid the real property taxes, including the arrears, from
1997 to 2006, as shown in Tax Declaration No. 026-04167.3 They had also
established a funeral parlor, San Sebastian Funeral Homes, on the
lot.4 According to them, there were no other claimants over the property.5
The Spouses Go claimed to be in an open, continuous, exclusive, notorious,
and actual possession of the property for seven (7) years since they bought
it.6 They also tacked their possession through that of their predecessors-in-
interest, as follows:
Sometime in 1945,7 Anselmo de Torres (Anselmo) came to know that his
parents, Sergia Almero and Andres de Torres (the Spouses de Torres),8 owned
Lot No. 4699,9 a bigger property where Lot No. 4699-B came from. According
to Anselmo, the Spouses de Torres paid the real property taxes during their
lifetime and planted bananas, mangoes, calamansi, and rice on this lot.10 His
mother, Sergia Almero (Sergia), allegedly inherited Lot No. 4699 from her
parents, Celodonio and Eufemia Almero (the Spouses Almero).11
In the 1960s, Anselmo and his siblings inherited Lot No. 4699 from their
parents upon their deaths.12
One of Anselmo's sisters, Cristina Almero de Torres Corlit (Cristina), then built
a residential house on Lot No. 4699-B,13 declaring this parcel of land under her
name for tax purposes, as evidenced by Tax Declaration No. 026-
03492.14 Meanwhile, Anselmo and his other siblings built their homes on
another portion of Lot No. 4699.15 Anselmo, who was then 28 years old,
started living in the eastern portion from 1966.16
On January 26, 2000, the Spouses Go bought Lot No. 4699-B from the
previous owners, siblings Anselmo, Bernardo Almero de Torres, Leonila
Almero de Torres Morada, and Cristina, as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute
Sale.17
On August 26, 2006, the Spouses Go (respondents) applied for the registration
and confirmation of title of Lot No. 4699-B.18 They attached the Report dated
January 31, 2007 of Special Land Investigator I Ben Hur Hernandez
(Hernandez) and the Certification dated January 29, 2008 of Forester I Loida
Maglinao (Maglinao) of the Batangas City Community Environment and
Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the Calamba, Laguna, Batangas, Rizal,
and Quezon (CALABARZON) Region of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR).19
Hernandez's January 31, 2007 Report and Maglinao's January 29, 2008
Certification stated that the property was located in an alienable and
disposable zone20 since March 26, 1928, under Project No. 13, Land
Classification Map No. 718.21 No patent or decree was previously issued over
the property.22
On November 3, 2006, the Republic of the Philippines (petitioner) opposed
respondents' application for registration for the following reasons: 1) Lot No.
4699-B was part of the public domain; 2) neither the Spouses Go nor their
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of the property since June 12, 1945 or
even before then; 3) the tax declaration and payment were not competent or
sufficient proof of ownership, especially considering that these were relatively
recent.23
Anselmo and his siblings had no proof of their inheritance. He claimed that
the office having custody of the documentary proof of their inheritance was
burned24 and they no longer had the original copy of the documents.25
In the Decision26 dated December 12, 2008, the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
confirmed the title of the lot in the name of the Spouses Go. The dispositive
portion read:
Considering that the applicants have duly established essential facts in
support of the application, the Court hereby confirms title to Lot 4699-B, Cad
264 Batangas Cadastre covered in approved plan Csd-04-22290-D, containing
an area of ONE THOUSAND (1,000) SQUARE METERS situated at Barangay
Balagtas, Batangas City in the name of Spouses Danilo Go and Amorlina A. Go,
of legal age, Filipino and residents of San Jose Subdivision, Barangay San
Sebastian, Lipa City.
Once the Decision becomes final, let the corresponding Decree of Registration
be issued.
SO ORDERED.27
Petitioner appealed directly to the Court of Appeals. In the Decision28 dated
January 21, 2011, the Court of Appeals denied the
appeal:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED. The
assailed Decision, dated December 12, 2008, of the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities (MTCC), Branch 2, Pallocan West, Batangas City in Land Registration
Case No. 2006-162, is AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.29
Petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration,30 which was denied on June 6,
2011.31
Petitioner elevated32 the case before this Court, arguing that Maglinao
testified having investigated only 200 square meters of the 1,000-square-
meter land for registration.33 She also admitted that her certification was
based on the approved plan and not on the Land Classification Map. She
certified the lot only to determine "the point or monument of the entire or
whole area" and not to identify its alienable character. Thus, petitioner argues
that Maglinao's certification should not have been used to determine that the
land was alienable and disposable.34
Petitioner assails respondents' failure to submit a copy of the original
classification map that bears the DENR Secretary's approval and its legal
custodian's certification as a true copy.35Petitioner argues that a CENRO
Certification is insufficient to establish that a land applied for registration is
alienable.36
In the Resolution dated August 15, 2011, this Court required respondents to
submit a certified true copy of any Presidential or DENR Secretary's issuance
stating Lot No. 4699-B as alienable and disposable.37
In their Compliance38 dated September 25, 2011, the Spouses Go attached a
certified photocopy of the CENRO Certification dated January 29,
2008,39 which this Court noted.40 In the Resolution dated November 14, 2011,
this Court informed the Spouses Go that the CENRO Certification was not the
submission required of them.41
On June 20, 2012, the Spouses Go's counsel, Atty. Jose Amor M. Amorado,
was ordered "to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or
held in contempt" for failure to comply with this Court's August 15, 2011
Resolution.42 The Spouses Go manifested that they had already complied with
this Court's Resolution through their September 25, 2011 Compliance.43 They
re-attached the CENRO Certification dated January 29, 2008.44
On September 24, 2012, this Court resolved45 to require respondents to file
their Comment. The Spouses Go failed to do so, which led this Court to again
require46 their counsel to show cause for their failure to comply with the
September 24, 2012 Resolution.
In their Compliance47 dated August 15, 2013, the Spouses Go informed this
Court that they would dispense with the filing of their Comment.
For resolution before this Court is whether the Court of Appeals erred in
issuing the Spouses Go a Decree of Registration over Lot No. 4699-B.
I

Any application for confirmation of title under Commonwealth Act No.
14148 already concedes that the land is previously public.
For a person to perfect one's title to the land, he or she may apply with the
proper court for the confirmation of the claim of ownership and the issuance
of a certificate of title over the property.49 This process is also known as
judicial confirmation of title.50
Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended51 by Presidential
Decree No. 1073,52 states who can apply for judicial confirmation of
title:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands
of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein,
but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the
Court of First Instance [Regional Trial Court] of the province where the land is
located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of
title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
....
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have
been in the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim
of acquisition or ownership, except as against the government, since July
twenty-sixth, eighteen hundred and ninety-four, except when prevented by
war or force majeure. Those shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. (Emphasis
supplied)
Commonwealth Act No. 141 is a special law that applies to agricultural lands
of the public domain, not to forests, mineral lands, and national parks.53 The
requisite period of possession and occupation is different from that of land
classification.
In an application for judicial confirmation of title, an applicant already holds
an imperfect title to an agricultural land of the public domain after having
occupied it from June 12, 1945 or earlier.54 Thus, for purposes of obtaining an
imperfect title, the date it was classified is immaterial.55
Classifying a land of the public domain as agricultural is essential only to
establish the applicant's "eligibility for land registration, not the ownership or
title over it."56Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic of the
Philippines57 explained:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
[T]he applicant's imperfect or incomplete title is derived only from possession
and occupation since June 12, 1945, or earlier. This means that the character
of the property subject of the application as alienable and disposable
agricultural land of the public domain determines its eligibility for land
registration, not the ownership or title over it.58
In Malabanan, the Court En Banc affirmed that June 12, 1945 is the
"reckoning point of the requisite possession and occupation" and not of the
land classification as alienable and disposable:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
[T]he choice of June 12, 1945 as the reckoning point of the requisite
possession and occupation was the sole prerogative of Congress, the
determination of which should best be left to the wisdom of the lawmakers.
Except that said date qualified the period of possession and occupation, no
other legislative intent appears to be associated with the fixing of the date of
June 12, 1945. Accordingly, the Court should interpret only the plain and
literal meaning of the law as written by the legislators.
[A]n examination of Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act indicates that
Congress prescribed no requirement that the land subject of the registration
should have been classified as agricultural since June 12, 1945, or
earlier.59 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the land may be declared alienable and disposable at any time, not
necessarily before June 12, 1945. The moment that the land is declared
alienable and disposable, an applicant may then initiate the proceedings for
the judicial confirmation of title.
On the other hand, for the requisite duration of possession, an applicant must
have had possession of the property under a bona fide claim of ownership or
acquisition, from June 12, 1945 or earlier. Such possession must have also
been open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious.60
Under Section 11(4)(a) of Commonwealth Act No, 141, the judicial
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles, which the law describes as
"judicial legalization," allows for agricultural public lands to be disposed of by
the State and acquired by Filipino citizens.61
Meanwhile, Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 152962 provides for the
procedure to register a title under the Torrens
system:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 14. Who may apply. — The following persons may file in the proper
Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945,
or earlier.
Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 does not vest or create a title to
a public land that has already existed or has been vested under
Commonwealth Act No. 141.63 The procedure of titling under Presidential
Decree No. 1529 "simply recognizes and documents ownership and provides
for the consequences of issuing paper titles."64
Thus, under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, and
Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, Filipino citizens applying for the
judicial confirmation and registration of an imperfect title must prove several
requisites. First, they must prove that they, by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest, have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession of the property. Second, it must be settled that the
applicants' occupation is under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership
since June 12, 1945 or earlier, immediately before the application was filed.
Third, it should be established that the land is an agricultural land of public
domain. Finally, it has to be shown that the land has been declared alienable
and disposable.65
The Spouses Go's possession, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest, does not meet the statutory requirements.
The evidence the Spouses Go submitted to prove their required length of
possession consist of Anselmo's testimony, Cristina's sole Tax Declaration, and
the Spouses Go's sole Tax Declaration. Other than these pieces of evidence,
the Spouses Go could not support their claim of possession in the concept of
an owner, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, from June
12, 1945 or earlier.
The records do not show that the Spouses Go's predecessors-in-interest
fenced the original 3,994-square-meter Lot No. 4699, claiming it as exclusively
theirs or that they introduced improvements on it since June 12, 1945 or
earlier. Cristina built a residential house on Lot No. 4699-B66 when her parents
died in the 1960s,67 while Anselmo started living in the eastern portion of Lot
No. 4699 in 1966 when he was 28 years old.68 These events happened at least
15 years after 1945. Moreover, the siblings could not produce any
documentary proof of their alleged inheritance of this land from their
parents.69
Apart from Cristina's single tax declaration and the Spouses Go's single tax
declaration covering even Cristina's arrears from 1997 to 2000, nothing in the
records shows that the Spouses Go's predecessors-in-interest religiously paid
real property taxes. Payment of real property taxes is a "good indicia of the
possession in the concept of owner for no one in his [or her] right mind would
be paying taxes for a property that is not in his [or her] actual, or at the least
constructive, possession."70
Anselmo only gave bare assertions that his parents paid the real property
taxes during their lifetime.71 Neither did the Spouses Go give any proof of the
alleged tax payments of the Spouses de Torres or of Anselmo's grandparents,
the Spouses Almero.
Although not adequate to establish ownership, a tax declaration may be a
basis to infer possession.72 This Court has highlighted that where tax
declaration was presented, it must be the 1945 tax declaration because June
12, 1945 is material to the case.73 The specific date must be ascertained;
otherwise, applicants fail to comply with the requirements of the
law.74 In Republic v. Manna Properties:75
It is unascertainable whether the 1945 tax declaration was issued on, before
or after 12 June 1945. Tax declarations are issued any time of the year. A tax
declaration issued in 1945 may have been issued in December 1945. Unless
the date and month of issuance in 1945 is stated, compliance with the
reckoning date in [Commonwealth Act No.] 141 cannot be
established.76 (Emphasis in the original)
II
Even assuming that there is sufficient evidence to establish their claim of
possession in the concept of an owner since June 12, 1945, the Spouses Go
nevertheless failed to prove the alienable and disposable character of the
land.
The 1987 Constitution declares that the State owns all public lands.77 Public
lands are classified into agricultural, mineral, timber or forest, and national
parks. Of these four (4) types of public lands, only agricultural lands may be
alienated. Article XII, Sections 2 and 3 of the Constitution
provide:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum,
and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or
timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the
State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall
not be alienated . . .
Section 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or
timber, mineral lands, and national parks. Agricultural lands of the public
domain may be further classified by law according to the uses [to] which they
may be devoted. Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to
agricultural lands . . . (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, an applicant has the burden of proving that the public land has been
classified as alienable and disposable.78 To do this, the applicant must show a
positive act from the government declassifying the land from the public
domain79 and converting it into an alienable and disposable land.80 "[T]he
exclusive prerogative to classify public lands under existing laws is vested in
the Executive Department."81 In Victoria v. Republic:82
To prove that the land subject of the application for registration is alienable,
an applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government
such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative
action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative
act or statute. The applicant may secure a certification from the government
that the lands applied for are alienable and disposable, but the certification
must show that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and
released the land of the public domain as alienable and
disposable[.]83 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Section X(1)84 of the DENR Administrative Order No. 1998-24 and Section
IX(1)85 of DENR Administrative Order No. 2000-11 affirm that the DENR
Secretary is the approving authority for "[l]and classification and release of
lands of the public domain as alienable and disposable." Section 4.6 of DENR
Administrative Order No. 2007-20 defines land classification as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Land classification is the process of demarcating, segregating, delimiting and
establishing the best category, kind, and uses of public lands. Article XII,
Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines provides that lands of the
public domain are to be classified into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral
lands, and national parks.
These provisions, read with Victoria v. Republic86 establish the rule that before
an inalienable land of the public domain becomes private land, the DENR
Secretary must first approve the land classification into an agricultural land
and release it as alienable and disposable.87 The DENR Secretary's official acts
"may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by
the officer having legal custody of the record, or by his deputy."88
The CENRO or the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Officer will
then conduct a survey to verify that the land for original registration falls
within the DENR Secretary-approved alienable and disposable zone.89
The CENRO certification is issued only to verify the DENR Secretary issuance
through a survey. "Thus, the CENRO Certification should have been
accompanied by an official publication of the DENR Secretary's issuance
declaring the land alienable and disposable."90 A CENRO certification, by itself,
is insufficient to prove the alienability and disposability of land sought to be
registered.91 In Republic v. Lualhati:92
[I]t has been repeatedly ruled that certifications issued by the CENRO, or
specialists of the DENR, as well as Survey Plans prepared by the DENR
containing annotations that the subject lots are alienable, do not constitute
incontrovertible evidence to overcome the presumption that the property
sought to be registered belongs to the inalienable public domain. Rather, this
Court stressed the importance of proving alienability by presenting a copy of
the original classification of the land approved by the DENR Secretary and
certified as true copy by the legal custodian of the official records.93 (Emphasis
supplied)
Here, in its Decision94 dated December 12, 2008, the Court of Appeals
concluded that the January 29, 2008 CENRO Certification, which stated that
Lot No. 4699-B was within alienable and disposable zone, was conclusive
proof that this land applied for registration was alienable. This Court
disagrees.
To establish that a land is indeed alienable and disposable, applicants must
submit the application for original registration with the CENRO certification
and a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and
certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records.95
Judicially entrenched96 is the rule that it is the DENR Secretary who has the
authority to approve land classification and release a land of public domain as
alienable and disposable. In Republic v. T.A.N. Properties:97
[I]t is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable
and disposable. The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR
Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the
public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the
application for registration falls within the approved area per verification
through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land
registration must present a copy of the original classification approved by the
DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the
official records. These facts must be established to prove that the land is
alienable and disposable.98
Republic v. Hanover99 ruled that a CENRO certification does not constitute
incontrovertible proof that a piece of land is alienable and disposable. This is
because "the CENRO is not the official repository or legal custodian of the
issuances of the DENR Secretary declaring the alienability and disposability of
public lands."100Republic v. Vda. De Joson explained:101
This doctrine unavoidably means that the mere certification issued by the
CENRO or PENRO did not suffice to support the application for registration,
because the applicant must also submit a copy of the original classification of
the land as alienable and disposable as approved by the DENR Secretary and
certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records.102
III
The pieces of evidence the Spouses Go adduced fall short of the requirements
of the law.
First, the Spouses Go failed to present a certified true copy of the original
classification of the DENR Secretary. This Court has given them enough
chances to prove their claim. As a rule, this Court can only consider the
evidence submitted before the trial court.103 Nevertheless, this Court gave
respondents the opportunity to submit "a certified true copy of the
Presidential or Department of Environment and Natural Resources Secretary's
issuance declaring the property alienable and disposable."104 They failed to
comply despite being given a show-cause order.105
This Court also required them to file their Comment on petitioner's opposition
to their original registration.106 Instead of complying, they asked that their
Comment be dispensed with.107
Second, although the Spouses Go submitted a CENRO certification stating that
the land was verified to be within alienable and disposable zone under Project
No. 13, Land Classification Map No. 718, Maglinao, the person who issued the
CENRO Certification, testified otherwise. She admitted in her testimony that,
she certified the lot only to determine "the point or monument of the entire
or whole area" and not to identify its alienable character.108

The Spouses Go have the burden to show that the land for registration is
alienable or disposable,109 which they miserably failed to do so. Without the
original land classification approved by the DENR Secretary, the Spouses Go's
application for registration must be denied.110 The land remains inalienable.

In sum, the Court of Appeals gravely erred in affirming the trial court's
Decision that granted the Spouses Go's application for registration of Lot No.
4699-B. The Spouses Go failed to adequately prove their claim of possession
in the concept of an owner since June 12, 1945. They likewise failed to
establish that the land applied for registration is alienable and disposable.
Thus, their occupation of this land, no matter how long, cannot ripen into
ownership and cannot be registered as a title.111

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated

January 21, 2011 and Resolution dated June 6, 2011 in CA-G.R. CV No. 93000,
which affirmed the Decision of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities dated
December 12, 2008, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The application for
registration of the Spouses Danilo Go and Amorlina Go of Lot No. 4699-B of
Subdivision Plan Csd-04-022290-D is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

HEIRS OF LEOPOLDO DELFIN v. NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY

.:Under Commonwealth Act No. 141, a claimant may acquire alienable and
disposable public land upon evidence of exclusive and notorious possession of
the land since June 12, 1945. The period to acquire public land by acquisitive
prescription under Presidential Decree No. 1529 begins to run only after the
promulgation of a law or a proclamation by the President stating that the land
is no longer intended for public use or the development of national wealth.

This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure praying that the assailed February 26, 2010
Decision2 and July 2, 2010 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
 No. 80017 be reversed, and that the May 20, 2002 Decision4 of the Regional
Trial Court in Civil Case No. II-1801 be reinstated.
The Regional Trial Court's May 20, 2002 Decision awarded compensation to
Leopoldo and Soledad Delfin (Delfin Spouses) for an Iligan City property
subsequently occupied by respondent National Housing Authority.
The assailed Court of Appeals Decision reversed the Regional Trial Court's May
20, 2002 Decision and dismissed the Delfin Spouses' complaint seeking
compensation. The assailed Court of Appeals Resolution denied their Motion
for Reconsideration.
In a Complaint for "Payment of Parcel(s) of Land and Improvements and
Damages"5 the Delfin Spouses claimed that they were the owners of a 28,800
square meter parcel of land in Townsite, Suarez, Iligan City (the "Iligan
Property").6 They allegedly bought the property in 1951 from Felix Natingo
and Carlos Carbonay, who, allegedly, had been in actual possession of the
property since time immemorial.7 The Delfin Spouses had been declaring the
Iligan Property in their names for tax purposes since 1952,8 and had been
planting it with mangoes, coconuts, corn, seasonal crops, and vegetables.9
They farther alleged that, sometime in 1982, respondent National Housing
Authority forcibly took possession of a 10,798 square meter portion of the
property.10 Despite their repeated demands for compensation, the National
Housing Authority failed to pay the value of the property.11 The Delfin Spouses
thus, filed their Complaint.12
They asserted that the property's reasonable market value was not less than
P40 per square meter13 and that its improvements consisting of fruit-bearing
trees should be valued at P13,360.00 at the time of taking.14 They similarly
claimed that because the National Housing Authority occupied the property,
they were deprived of an average net yearly income of P10,000.00.15
In its Answer,16 the National Housing Authority alleged that the Delfin
Spouses' property was part of a military reservation area.17 It cited
Proclamation No. 2151 (actually, Proclamation No. 2143, the National Housing
Authority made an erroneous citation) as having supposedly reserved the area
in which property is situated for Iligan City's slum improvement and
resettlement program, and the relocation of families who were dislocated by
the National Steel Corporation's five-year expansion program.18
According to the National Housing Authority, Proclamation No. 2151 also
mandated it to determine the improvements' valuation.19 Based on the study
of the committee it created, the value of the property was supposedly only
P4.00 per square meter, regardless of the nature of the improvements on it.20
It emphasized that among all claimants, only the Delfin Spouses and two
others remained unpaid because of their disagreement on the property's
valuation.21
The National Housing Authority failed to appear during the pre-trial
conference.22 Upon the Delfin Spouses' motion, the Regional Trial Court
declared the National Housing Authority in default.23 The case was set for the
ex-parte reception of the Delfin Spouses' evidence.24
On May 20, 2002, the Regional Trial Court rendered a Decision in favor of the
Delfin Spouses.25cralawred The dispositive portion of the Decision read:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, and by virtue of the existence of
preponderance of evidence, the Court hereby enters a judgment in favor of
spouses-plaintiffs Leopoldo Delfin and Soledad Delfin against defendant
National Housing Authority, its agents or representative/s ordering to pay the
former the following, to wit:
1) P400,000.00 representing the reasonable market value of a portion
of the land taken by the defendant containing an area of 10,000
square meters at the rate of P40.00 per square meters plus legal
interest per annum from the filing in Court of the complaint until
fully paid;
2) P13,360.00 representing the value of the permanent improvements
that were damaged and destroyed plus legal interest per annum
from the time of the filing of this case until fully paid;
3) P10,000.00, representing attorney's fees;
4) The costs of this suit.26
The Regional Trial Court stated that it had no reason to doubt the evidence
presented by the Delfin Spouses:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
On this regards (sic), the Court finds no reason to doubt the veracity of the
plaintiff['s evidence], there being none to controvert the same. If said.
evidence did not ring true, the defendant should have and could have easily
destroyed their probatory value. Such indifference can only mean that
defendant had not (sic) equitable rights to protect or assert over the disputed
property together with all the improvements existing thereon. This, the
defendant did not do so and the Court finds no cogent reasons to disbelieve
or reject the plaintiffs categorical declarations on the witness stand under a
solemn oath, for the same are entitled to full faith and credence. Indeed, if
the defendant National Housing Authority have been blinded with the
consequence of their neglect and apathy, then defendant have no right to
pass on to the spouses-plaintiffs of their negligence and expect the Court to
come to their rescue. For it is now much too late in the day to assail the
decision which has become final and executory.27ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The National Housing Authority filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but this
was denied in the Regional trial Court's September 10, 2002 Resolution.28
On the National Housing Authority's appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered
the assailed February 26, 2010 Decision reversing the Regional Trial Court:29
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Consequently, appellees' complaint for compensation is DISMISSED
for lack of merit. The property taken by appellant NHA and for which
compensation is sought by appellees is hereby DECLARED land of the public
domain.30ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The Court of Appeals ruled that the characterization of the property is no
longer an issue because the National Housing Authority already conceded that
the property is disposable public land by citing Proclamation No. 2151, which
characterized the property as "a certain disposable parcel of public
land."31 However, the Delfin Spouses supposedly failed to establish their
possession of the property since June 12, 1945, as required in Section 48(b) of
the Public Land Act.32
During the pendency of their petition before the Court of Appeals. Both
Leopoldo and Soledad Delfin both passed away. Lepoldo passed away on
February 3, 2005 and Soledad on June 22, 2004. Their surviving heirs, Emelita
D. Fabrigar and Leonilo C. Delfin filed a Motion for Substitution before the
Court of Appeals, which was not acted upon.33
In its assailed July 2, 2010 Resolution,34 the Court of Appeals denied the
Motion for Reconsideration filed by the heirs of the Delfin Spouses.
Hence, this petition which was filed by the surviving heirs of the Delfin
Spouses, Emelita D. Fabrigar and Leonilo C. Delfin (petitioners).35
For resolution is the issue of whether petitioners are entitled to just
compensation for the Iligan City property occupied by respondent National
Housing Authority.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
I
The right to be justly compensated whenever private property is taken for
public use cannot be disputed. Article III, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution
states that
Section 9. Private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The case now hinges on whether the petitioners and their predecessors-in-
interests have been in possession of the Iligan Property for such duration and
under such circumstances as will enable them to claim ownership.
Petitioners argue that they and their predecessors-in-interests' open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the Iligan Property for
more than 30 years converted the property from public to private.36 They then
posit that they acquired ownership of the property through acquisitive
prescription under Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529.37
Petitioners also assert that the Court of Appeals disregarded certifications and
letters from government agencies, which support their claims, particularly,
their and their predecessors-in-interest's possession since June 12, 1945.38
Respondent counters, citing the Court of Appeals Decision, that petitioners
cannot rely on'Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 because the
property was not yet declared private land when they filed their
Complaint.39chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
II
Petitioners are erroneously claiming title based on acquisitive prescription
under Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529.
Section 14 reads in full:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper
Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945,
or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription
under the provision of existing laws.
(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned
river beds by right of accession or accretion under the existing
laws.
(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner
provided for by law.
Where the land is owned in common, all the co-owners shall file the
application jointly.
Where the land has been sold under pacto de retro, the vendor a retro may
file an application for the original registration of the land, provided, however,
that should the period for redemption expire during the pendency of the
registration proceedings and ownership to the property consolidated in the
vendee a retro, the latter shall be substituted for the applicant and may
continue the proceedings.
A trustee on behalf of his principal may apply for original registration of any
land held in trust by him, unless prohibited by the instrument creating the
trust. [Emphasis supplied]ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
For acquisitive prescription to set in pursuant to Section 14(2) of Presidential
Decree No. 1529, two (2) requirements must be satisifled: first, the property is
established to be private in character; and second the applicable prescriptive
period under existing laws had passed.
Property - such as land - is either of public dominion or private ownership.40
"Land is considered of public dominion if it either: (a) is intended for public
use; or (b) belongs to the State, without being for public use, and is intended
for some public service or for the development of the national wealth."41 Land
that belongs to the state but which is not or is no longer intended for public
use, for some public service or for the development of the national wealth, is
patrimonial property;42 it is property owned by the State in
its private capacity. Provinces, cities, and municipalities may also hold
patrimonial lands.43
Private property "consists of all property belonging to private persons, either
individually or collectively,"44 as well as "the patrimonial property of the State,
provinces, cities, and municipalities."45
Accordingly, only publicly owned lands which are patrimonial in character are
susceptible to prescription under Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree No.
1529. Consistent with this, Article 1113 of Civil Code demarcates properties of
the state, which are not patrimonial in character, as being not susceptible to
prescription:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Art. 1113. All things which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of
prescription, unless provided. Property of the State or any of its subdivisions
not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of
prescription.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Contrary to petitioners' theory then, for prescription to be viable, the publicly-
owned land must be patrimonial or private in character at the onset.
Possession for thirty (30) years does not convert it into patrimonial property.
For land of the public domain to be converted into patrimonial property, there
must be an express declaration - "in the form of a law duly enacted by
Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly
authorized by law"46 - that "the public dominion property is no longer
intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that
the property has been converted into patrimonial."47
This Court's 2009 Decision in Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic48 explains:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states that "[p]roperty of public
dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall
form part of the patrimonial property of the State". It is this provision that
controls how public dominion property may be converted into patrimonial
properly susceptible to acquisition by prescription. After all, Article 420 (2)
makes clear that those property "which belong to the State, without being for
public use, and are intended for some public service or for the development
of the national wealth" are public dominion property. For as long as the
property belongs to the State, although already classified as alienable or
disposable, it remains property of the public dominion if when * it is
"intended for some public service or for the development of the national
wealth".
Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public
dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the
development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted
into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property, even if
classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion,
pursuant to Article 420 (2), and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription.
It is only when such alienable and disposable lands are expressly declared by
the State to be no longer intended for public service or for the development
of the national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin to
run. Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or
a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by
law.49ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
This was reiterated in this Court's 2013 Resolution in Heirs of Malabanan v.
Republic:50
[W]hen public land is no longer intended for public service or for the
development of the national wealth, thereby effectively removing the land
from the ambit of public dominion, a declaration of such conversion must be
made in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or by a Presidential
proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law to that
effect.51ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Attached to the present Petition was a copy of a May 18, 1988 supplemental
letter to the Director of the Land Management Bureau.52 This referred to an
executive order, which stated that petitioners' property was no longer needed
for any public or quasi-public purposes:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
That it is very clear in the 4th Indorsement of the Executive Secretary dated
April 24, 1954 the portion thereof that will not be needed for any public or
quasi-public purposes, be disposed in favor of the actual occupants under the
administration of the Bureau of Lands (copy of the Executive Order is
herewith attached for ready reference)53ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
However, a mere indorsement of the executive secretary is not the law or
presidential proclamation required for converting land of the public domain
into patrimonial property and rendering it susceptible to prescription. There
then was no viable declaration rendering the Iligan property to have been
patrimonial property at the onset. Accordingly, regardless of the length of
petitioners' possession, no title could vest on them by way of
prescription.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
III
While petitioners may not claim title by prescription, they may, nevertheless,
claim title pursuant to Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (the
Public Land Act).
Section 48 enabled the confirmation of claims and issuance of titles in favor of
citizens occupying or claiming to own lands of the public domain or an interest
therein. Section 48 (b) specifically pertained to those who "have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and, occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition
or ownership, since June 12, 1945":
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Sec. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of
the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein,
but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the
Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor
under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and, occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a
bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945,
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation
of title, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These
shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a government grant and shall be entitled to
a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. (As
amended by PD 1073.)
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act therefore requires that two (2) requisites
be satisfied before claims of title to public domain lands may be confirmed:
first, that the land subject of the claim is agricultural land; and second, open,
continuous, notorious, and exclusive possession of the land since June 12,
1945.
The need for the land subject of the claim to have been classified as
agricultural is in conformity with the constitutional precept that "[a]lienable
lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands."54 As
explained in this Court's 2013 Resolution in Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Whether or not land of the public domain is alienable and disposable primarily
rests on the classification of public lands made under the Constitution. Under
the 1935 Constitution, lands of the public domain were classified into three,
namely, agricultural, timber and mineral. Section 10, Article XTV of the 1973
Constitution classified lands of the public domain into seven, specifically,
agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral,
timber or forest, and grazing land, with the reservation that the law might
provide other classifications. The 1987 Constitution adopted the classification
under the 1935 Constitution into agricultural, forest or timber, and mineral,
but added national parks. Agricultural lands may be further classified by law
according to the uses to which they may be devoted. The identification of
lands according to their legal classification is done exclusively by and through
a positive act of the Executive Department.
Based on the foregoing, the Constitution places a limit on the type of public
land that may be alienated. Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution, only agricultural lands of the public domain may be alienated; all
other natural resources may not be.
Alienable and disposable lands of the State fall into two categories, to wit: (a)
patrimonial lands of the State, or those classified as lands of private
ownership under Article 425 of the Civil Code, without limitation; and (b)
lands of the public domain, or the public lands as provided by the
Constitution, but with the limitation that the lands must only be agricultural.
Consequently, lands classified as forest or timber, mineral, or national parks
are not susceptible of alienation or disposition unless they are reclassified as
agricultural. A positive act of the Government is necessary to enable such
reclassification, and the exclusive prerogative to classify public lands under
existing laws is vested in the Executive Department, not in the
courts.55ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
As the Court of Appeals emphasized, respondent has conceded that the Iligan
property was alienable and disposable land:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
As to the first requirement: There was no need for appellees to establish that
the property involved was alienable and disposable public land. This
characterization of the property is conceded by [respondent] who cites
Proclamation No. 2151 as declaring that the disputed property was a certain
disposable parcel of public land.56ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
That the Iligan property was alienable and disposable, agricultural land, has
been admitted. What is claimed instead is that petitioners' possession is
debunked by how the Iligan Property was supposedly part of a military
reservation area57 which was subsequently reserved for Iligan City's slum
improvement and resettlement program, and the relocation of families who
were dislocated by the National Steel Corporation's five-year expansion
program.58
Indeed, by virtue of Proclamation No. 2143 (erroneously referred to by
respondent as Proclamation No. 2151) certain parcels of land in Barrio Suarez,
Iligan City were reserved for slum-improvement and resettlement program
purposes.59 The proclamation characterized the covered area as "disposable
parcel of public land":
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREAS, a certain disposable parcel of public land situated at Barrio Suarez,
Iligan City consisting of one million one hundred seventy-four thousand eight
hundred fifty-three (1,174,853) square meters, more or less, has been chosen
by National Steel Corporation and the City Government of Iligan with the
conformity of the National Housing/Authority, as the most suitable site for the
relocation of the families to be affected/dislocated as a result of National Steel
Corporation's program and for the establishment of a slum improvement and
resettlement project in the City of Iligan;60ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
However, even if the Iligan Property was subsumed by Proclamation No. 2143,
the same proclamation recognized private rights, which may have already
attached, and the rights of qualified free patent applicants:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by
virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do hereby reserve for relocation of
the families to be affected/dislocated by the 5-year expansion program of the
National Steel Corporation and for the slum improvement and resettlement
project of the City of Iligan under the administration and disposition of the
National Housing Authority, subject to private rights, if any there be, Lot 5258
(portion) of the Iligan Cadastre, which parcel of land is of the public domain,
situated in Barrio Suarez, City of Iligan and more particularly described as
follows:
....
This Proclamation is subject to the condition that the qualified free patent
applicants occupying portions of the aforedescribed parcel of land, if any, may
be compensated for the value of their respective portions and existing
improvements thereon, as may be determined by the National Housing Deputy Public Land Inspector Pio Lucero, Jr.'s letters to the Director of Land
Authority.61ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary nevertheless attest to a previous finding that the property had already been
occupied as early as June 1945.
Whatever rights petitioners (and their predecessors-in-interest) may have had
over the Iligan property was, thus, not obliterated by Proclamation No. 2143.
Having shown that the requisites of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act have
On the contrary, the Proclamation itself facilitated compensation.
been satisfied and having established their rights to the Iligan Property, it
follows that petitioners must be compensated for its taking.
More importantly, there is documentary evidence to the effect that the Iligan
Property was not even within the area claimed by respondent. In a letter62 to
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Court of Appeals Decision
the Director of Lands, dated December 22, 1987, Deputy Public Land
dated February 26, 2010 and Resolution dated July 2, 2010 in CA-G.R. CV No.
Inspector Pio Lucero, Jr. noted that:
80017 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court's Decision dated
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
May 20, 2002 in Civil Case No. II-1801 is REINSTATED.
That this land known as Lot No. 5258, Cad. 292, Iligan Cadastre which portion
was claimed also by the Human Settlement and/or National Housing
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
Authority; but the area applied for by Leopoldo Delfin is outside the claim of
the said agency as per certification issued dated June 10, 1988; copy of which
is herewith attached for ready reference;63ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The same letter likewise indicated that the Iligan Property was already
occupied by June 1945 and that it had even been released for agricultural
purposes in favor of its occupants.64 Accordingly, the Deputy Public Land
Inspector recommended the issuance of a patent in favor of petitioner
Leopoldo Delfin:65
Upon investigation conducted by the undersigned in the premises of the land,
it was found and ascertained that the land applied for by Leopoldo Delfrn was
first entered, occupied, possessed and cultivated by him since the year June,
1945 up to the present; he have already well improved the land and
introduced some considerable improvements such as coconut trees and
different kinds of fruit trees which are presently all fruit bearing trees;
declared the same for taxation purposes and taxes have been paid every year;
and that there is no other person or persons who bothered him in his peaceful
occupation and cultivation thereof;chanrobleslaw

Records of this Office show that said land was surveyed and claimed by the
Military Reservation, but the portion of which has been released in favor of
the actual occupants and the area of Leopoldo Delfin is one of the portions
released for agricultural purposes;chanrobleslaw

....

That the applicant caused the survey of the land under Sgs-12-000099,
approved by the Regional Land Director, Region XII, Bureau of Lands, Cotabato
City on April 3, 1979 (see approved plan attached hereof);chanrobleslaw

In view hereof, it is therefore respectfully recommended that the entry of the

application be now confirmed and that patent be yes issued in favor of
Leopoldo Delfin.66ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
A May 18, 1988 supplemental letter to the Director of the Land Management
Bureau further stated:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
That the land applied for by Leopoldo Delfin is a portion of Lot No. 5258, Cad.
292, Iligan Cadastre which was entered, occupied and possessed by the said
applicant since the year June 1945 up to the present; well improved the same
and introduced some considerable improvements such as different kinds of
fruit trees, coconut trees and other permanent improvements
thereon;chanrobleslaw

....

That is very clear in the 4th Indorsement of the Executive Secretary dated April
24, 1954 the portion thereof that will not be needed for any public or quasi-
public purposes, be disposed in favor of the actual occupants under the G.R. No. 193618, November 28, 2016
administration of the Bureau of Lands[.]67ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Clearly then, petitioners acquired title over the Iligan Property pursuant to HEIRS OF LEOPOLDO DELFIN AND SOLEDAD DELFIN, NAMELY EMELITA D.
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. FABRIGAR AND LEONILO C. DELFIN, Petitioners, v. NATIONAL HOUSING
AUTHORITY, Respondent.
First, there is no issue that the Iligan Property had already been declared to be
alienable and disposable land. Respondent has admitted this and Deputy DECISION
Public Land Inspector Pio Lucero, Jr.'s letters to the Director of Land attest to
this.
LEONEN, J.:
Second, although the Delfin Spouses' testimonial evidence and tax
declarations showed that their possession went only as far back as 1952,
Under Commonwealth Act No. 141, a claimant may acquire alienable and
disposable public land upon evidence of exclusive and notorious possession of
the land since June 12, 1945. The period to acquire public land by acquisitive
prescription under Presidential Decree No. 1529 begins to run only after the
promulgation of a law or a proclamation by the President stating that the land
is no longer intended for public use or the development of national wealth.
This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure praying that the assailed February 26, 2010
Decision2 and July 2, 2010 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 80017 be reversed, and that the May 20, 2002 Decision4 of the Regional
Trial Court in Civil Case No. II-1801 be reinstated.
The Regional Trial Court's May 20, 2002 Decision awarded compensation to
Leopoldo and Soledad Delfin (Delfin Spouses) for an Iligan City property
subsequently occupied by respondent National Housing Authority.
The assailed Court of Appeals Decision reversed the Regional Trial Court's May
20, 2002 Decision and dismissed the Delfin Spouses' complaint seeking
compensation. The assailed Court of Appeals Resolution denied their Motion
for Reconsideration.
In a Complaint for "Payment of Parcel(s) of Land and Improvements and
Damages"5 the Delfin Spouses claimed that they were the owners of a 28,800
square meter parcel of land in Townsite, Suarez, Iligan City (the "Iligan
Property").6 They allegedly bought the property in 1951 from Felix Natingo
and Carlos Carbonay, who, allegedly, had been in actual possession of the
property since time immemorial.7 The Delfin Spouses had been declaring the
Iligan Property in their names for tax purposes since 1952,8 and had been
planting it with mangoes, coconuts, corn, seasonal crops, and vegetables.9
They farther alleged that, sometime in 1982, respondent National Housing
Authority forcibly took possession of a 10,798 square meter portion of the
property.10 Despite their repeated demands for compensation, the National
Housing Authority failed to pay the value of the property.11 The Delfin Spouses
thus, filed their Complaint.12
They asserted that the property's reasonable market value was not less than
P40 per square meter13 and that its improvements consisting of fruit-bearing
trees should be valued at P13,360.00 at the time of taking.14 They similarly
claimed that because the National Housing Authority occupied the property,
they were deprived of an average net yearly income of P10,000.00.15
In its Answer,16 the National Housing Authority alleged that the Delfin
Spouses' property was part of a military reservation area.17 It cited
Proclamation No. 2151 (actually, Proclamation No. 2143, the National Housing
Authority made an erroneous citation) as having supposedly reserved the area
in which property is situated for Iligan City's slum improvement and
resettlement program, and the relocation of families who were dislocated by
the National Steel Corporation's five-year expansion program.18
According to the National Housing Authority, Proclamation No. 2151 also
mandated it to determine the improvements' valuation.19 Based on the study
of the committee it created, the value of the property was supposedly only
P4.00 per square meter, regardless of the nature of the improvements on it.20
It emphasized that among all claimants, only the Delfin Spouses and two
others remained unpaid because of their disagreement on the property's
valuation.21
The National Housing Authority failed to appear during the pre-trial
conference.22 Upon the Delfin Spouses' motion, the Regional Trial Court
declared the National Housing Authority in default.23 The case was set for the
ex-parte reception of the Delfin Spouses' evidence.24
On May 20, 2002, the Regional Trial Court rendered a Decision in favor of the
Delfin Spouses.25cralawred The dispositive portion of the Decision read:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, and by virtue of the existence of
preponderance of evidence, the Court hereby enters a judgment in favor of
spouses-plaintiffs Leopoldo Delfin and Soledad Delfin against defendant
National Housing Authority, its agents or representative/s ordering to pay the
former the following, to wit:
1) P400,000.00 representing the reasonable market value of a portion
of the land taken by the defendant containing an area of 10,000
square meters at the rate of P40.00 per square meters plus legal
interest per annum from the filing in Court of the complaint until
fully paid;
2) P13,360.00 representing the value of the permanent improvements
that were damaged and destroyed plus legal interest per annum
from the time of the filing of this case until fully paid;
3) P10,000.00, representing attorney's fees;
4) The costs of this suit.26
The Regional Trial Court stated that it had no reason to doubt the evidence
presented by the Delfin Spouses:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
On this regards (sic), the Court finds no reason to doubt the veracity of the
plaintiff['s evidence], there being none to controvert the same. If said.
evidence did not ring true, the defendant should have and could have easily
destroyed their probatory value. Such indifference can only mean that
defendant had not (sic) equitable rights to protect or assert over the disputed
property together with all the improvements existing thereon. This, the
defendant did not do so and the Court finds no cogent reasons to disbelieve
or reject the plaintiffs categorical declarations on the witness stand under a
solemn oath, for the same are entitled to full faith and credence. Indeed, if
the defendant National Housing Authority have been blinded with the
consequence of their neglect and apathy, then defendant have no right to
pass on to the spouses-plaintiffs of their negligence and expect the Court to
come to their rescue. For it is now much too late in the day to assail the
decision which has become final and executory.27ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The National Housing Authority filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but this
was denied in the Regional trial Court's September 10, 2002 Resolution.28
On the National Housing Authority's appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered
the assailed February 26, 2010 Decision reversing the Regional Trial Court:29
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Consequently, appellees' complaint for compensation is DISMISSED
for lack of merit. The property taken by appellant NHA and for which
compensation is sought by appellees is hereby DECLARED land of the public
domain.30ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The Court of Appeals ruled that the characterization of the property is no
longer an issue because the National Housing Authority already conceded that
the property is disposable public land by citing Proclamation No. 2151, which
characterized the property as "a certain disposable parcel of public
land."31 However, the Delfin Spouses supposedly failed to establish their
possession of the property since June 12, 1945, as required in Section 48(b) of
the Public Land Act.32
During the pendency of their petition before the Court of Appeals. Both
Leopoldo and Soledad Delfin both passed away. Lepoldo passed away on
February 3, 2005 and Soledad on June 22, 2004. Their surviving heirs, Emelita
D. Fabrigar and Leonilo C. Delfin filed a Motion for Substitution before the
Court of Appeals, which was not acted upon.33
In its assailed July 2, 2010 Resolution,34 the Court of Appeals denied the
Motion for Reconsideration filed by the heirs of the Delfin Spouses.
Hence, this petition which was filed by the surviving heirs of the Delfin
Spouses, Emelita D. Fabrigar and Leonilo C. Delfin (petitioners).35
For resolution is the issue of whether petitioners are entitled to just
compensation for the Iligan City property occupied by respondent National
Housing Authority.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
I
The right to be justly compensated whenever private property is taken for
public use cannot be disputed. Article III, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution
states that
Section 9. Private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The case now hinges on whether the petitioners and their predecessors-in-
interests have been in possession of the Iligan Property for such duration and
under such circumstances as will enable them to claim ownership.
Petitioners argue that they and their predecessors-in-interests' open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the Iligan Property for
more than 30 years converted the property from public to private.36 They then
posit that they acquired ownership of the property through acquisitive
prescription under Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529.37
Petitioners also assert that the Court of Appeals disregarded certifications and
letters from government agencies, which support their claims, particularly,
their and their predecessors-in-interest's possession since June 12, 1945.38
Respondent counters, citing the Court of Appeals Decision, that petitioners
cannot rely on'Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 because the
property was not yet declared private land when they filed their
Complaint.39chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
II
Petitioners are erroneously claiming title based on acquisitive prescription
under Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529.
Section 14 reads in full:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper
Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945,
or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription
under the provision of existing laws.
(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned
river beds by right of accession or accretion under the existing
laws.
(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner
provided for by law.
Where the land is owned in common, all the co-owners shall file the
application jointly.
Where the land has been sold under pacto de retro, the vendor a retro may
file an application for the original registration of the land, provided, however,
that should the period for redemption expire during the pendency of the
registration proceedings and ownership to the property consolidated in the
vendee a retro, the latter shall be substituted for the applicant and may
continue the proceedings.
A trustee on behalf of his principal may apply for original registration of any
land held in trust by him, unless prohibited by the instrument creating the
trust. [Emphasis supplied]ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
For acquisitive prescription to set in pursuant to Section 14(2) of Presidential
Decree No. 1529, two (2) requirements must be satisifled: first, the property is
established to be private in character; and second the applicable prescriptive
period under existing laws had passed.
Property - such as land - is either of public dominion or private ownership.40
"Land is considered of public dominion if it either: (a) is intended for public
use; or (b) belongs to the State, without being for public use, and is intended
for some public service or for the development of the national wealth."41 Land
that belongs to the state but which is not or is no longer intended for public
use, for some public service or for the development of the national wealth, is
patrimonial property;42 it is property owned by the State in
its private capacity. Provinces, cities, and municipalities may also hold
patrimonial lands.43
Private property "consists of all property belonging to private persons, either
individually or collectively,"44 as well as "the patrimonial property of the State,
provinces, cities, and municipalities."45
Accordingly, only publicly owned lands which are patrimonial in character are
susceptible to prescription under Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree No.
1529. Consistent with this, Article 1113 of Civil Code demarcates properties of
the state, which are not patrimonial in character, as being not susceptible to
prescription:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Art. 1113. All things which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of
prescription, unless provided. Property of the State or any of its subdivisions
not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of
prescription.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Contrary to petitioners' theory then, for prescription to be viable, the publicly-
owned land must be patrimonial or private in character at the onset.
Possession for thirty (30) years does not convert it into patrimonial property.
For land of the public domain to be converted into patrimonial property, there
must be an express declaration - "in the form of a law duly enacted by
Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly
authorized by law"46 - that "the public dominion property is no longer
intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that
the property has been converted into patrimonial."47
This Court's 2009 Decision in Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic48 explains:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states that "[p]roperty of public
dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall
form part of the patrimonial property of the State". It is this provision that
controls how public dominion property may be converted into patrimonial
properly susceptible to acquisition by prescription. After all, Article 420 (2)
makes clear that those property "which belong to the State, without being for
public use, and are intended for some public service or for the development
of the national wealth" are public dominion property. For as long as the
property belongs to the State, although already classified as alienable or
disposable, it remains property of the public dominion if when * it is
"intended for some public service or for the development of the national
wealth".
Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public
dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the
development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted
into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property, even if
classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion,
pursuant to Article 420 (2), and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription.
It is only when such alienable and disposable lands are expressly declared by
the State to be no longer intended for public service or for the development
of the national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin to
run. Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or
a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by
law.49ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
This was reiterated in this Court's 2013 Resolution in Heirs of Malabanan v.
Republic:50
[W]hen public land is no longer intended for public service or for the
development of the national wealth, thereby effectively removing the land
from the ambit of public dominion, a declaration of such conversion must be
made in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or by a Presidential
proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law to that
effect.51ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Attached to the present Petition was a copy of a May 18, 1988 supplemental
letter to the Director of the Land Management Bureau.52 This referred to an
executive order, which stated that petitioners' property was no longer needed
for any public or quasi-public purposes:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
That it is very clear in the 4th Indorsement of the Executive Secretary dated
April 24, 1954 the portion thereof that will not be needed for any public or
quasi-public purposes, be disposed in favor of the actual occupants under the
administration of the Bureau of Lands (copy of the Executive Order is
herewith attached for ready reference)53ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
However, a mere indorsement of the executive secretary is not the law or
presidential proclamation required for converting land of the public domain
into patrimonial property and rendering it susceptible to prescription. There
then was no viable declaration rendering the Iligan property to have been
patrimonial property at the onset. Accordingly, regardless of the length of
petitioners' possession, no title could vest on them by way of
prescription.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
III
While petitioners may not claim title by prescription, they may, nevertheless,
claim title pursuant to Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (the
Public Land Act).
Section 48 enabled the confirmation of claims and issuance of titles in favor of
citizens occupying or claiming to own lands of the public domain or an interest
therein. Section 48 (b) specifically pertained to those who "have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and, occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition
or ownership, since June 12, 1945":
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Sec. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of
the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein,
but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the
Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor
under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and, occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a
bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945,
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation
of title, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These
shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a government grant and shall be entitled to
a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. (As
amended by PD 1073.)
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act therefore requires that two (2) requisites
be satisfied before claims of title to public domain lands may be confirmed:
first, that the land subject of the claim is agricultural land; and second, open,
continuous, notorious, and exclusive possession of the land since June 12,
1945.
The need for the land subject of the claim to have been classified as
agricultural is in conformity with the constitutional precept that "[a]lienable
lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands."54 As
explained in this Court's 2013 Resolution in Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Whether or not land of the public domain is alienable and disposable primarily
rests on the classification of public lands made under the Constitution. Under
the 1935 Constitution, lands of the public domain were classified into three,
namely, agricultural, timber and mineral. Section 10, Article XTV of the 1973
Constitution classified lands of the public domain into seven, specifically,
agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral,
timber or forest, and grazing land, with the reservation that the law might
provide other classifications. The 1987 Constitution adopted the classification
under the 1935 Constitution into agricultural, forest or timber, and mineral,
but added national parks. Agricultural lands may be further classified by law
according to the uses to which they may be devoted. The identification of
lands according to their legal classification is done exclusively by and through
a positive act of the Executive Department.
Based on the foregoing, the Constitution places a limit on the type of public
land that may be alienated. Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution, only agricultural lands of the public domain may be alienated; all
other natural resources may not be.
Alienable and disposable lands of the State fall into two categories, to wit: (a)
patrimonial lands of the State, or those classified as lands of private
ownership under Article 425 of the Civil Code, without limitation; and (b)
lands of the public domain, or the public lands as provided by the
Constitution, but with the limitation that the lands must only be agricultural.
Consequently, lands classified as forest or timber, mineral, or national parks
are not susceptible of alienation or disposition unless they are reclassified as
agricultural. A positive act of the Government is necessary to enable such
reclassification, and the exclusive prerogative to classify public lands under
existing laws is vested in the Executive Department, not in the
courts.55ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
As the Court of Appeals emphasized, respondent has conceded that the Iligan
property was alienable and disposable land:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
As to the first requirement: There was no need for appellees to establish that
the property involved was alienable and disposable public land. This
characterization of the property is conceded by [respondent] who cites
Proclamation No. 2151 as declaring that the disputed property was a certain
disposable parcel of public land.56ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
That the Iligan property was alienable and disposable, agricultural land, has
been admitted. What is claimed instead is that petitioners' possession is
debunked by how the Iligan Property was supposedly part of a military
reservation area57 which was subsequently reserved for Iligan City's slum
improvement and resettlement program, and the relocation of families who
were dislocated by the National Steel Corporation's five-year expansion
program.58
Indeed, by virtue of Proclamation No. 2143 (erroneously referred to by
respondent as Proclamation No. 2151) certain parcels of land in Barrio Suarez,
Iligan City were reserved for slum-improvement and resettlement program
purposes.59 The proclamation characterized the covered area as "disposable
parcel of public land":
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREAS, a certain disposable parcel of public land situated at Barrio Suarez,
Iligan City consisting of one million one hundred seventy-four thousand eight
hundred fifty-three (1,174,853) square meters, more or less, has been chosen
by National Steel Corporation and the City Government of Iligan with the
conformity of the National Housing/Authority, as the most suitable site for the
relocation of the families to be affected/dislocated as a result of National Steel
Corporation's program and for the establishment of a slum improvement and
resettlement project in the City of Iligan;60ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
However, even if the Iligan Property was subsumed by Proclamation No. 2143,
the same proclamation recognized private rights, which may have already
attached, and the rights of qualified free patent applicants:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by
virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do hereby reserve for relocation of
the families to be affected/dislocated by the 5-year expansion program of the
National Steel Corporation and for the slum improvement and resettlement
project of the City of Iligan under the administration and disposition of the
National Housing Authority, subject to private rights, if any there be, Lot 5258
(portion) of the Iligan Cadastre, which parcel of land is of the public domain,
situated in Barrio Suarez, City of Iligan and more particularly described as
follows:
....
Clearly then, petitioners acquired title over the Iligan Property pursuant to
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act.
First, there is no issue that the Iligan Property had already been declared to be
alienable and disposable land. Respondent has admitted this and Deputy
Public Land Inspector Pio Lucero, Jr.'s letters to the Director of Land attest to
this.

This Proclamation is subject to the condition that the qualified free patent Second, although the Delfin Spouses' testimonial evidence and tax
applicants occupying portions of the aforedescribed parcel of land, if any, may declarations showed that their possession went only as far back as 1952,
be compensated for the value of their respective portions and existing Deputy Public Land Inspector Pio Lucero, Jr.'s letters to the Director of Land
improvements thereon, as may be determined by the National Housing nevertheless attest to a previous finding that the property had already been
Authority.61ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary occupied as early as June 1945.
Whatever rights petitioners (and their predecessors-in-interest) may have had
Having shown that the requisites of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act have
over the Iligan property was, thus, not obliterated by Proclamation No. 2143.
been satisfied and having established their rights to the Iligan Property, it
On the contrary, the Proclamation itself facilitated compensation.
follows that petitioners must be compensated for its taking.
More importantly, there is documentary evidence to the effect that the Iligan
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Court of Appeals Decision
Property was not even within the area claimed by respondent. In a letter62 to
dated February 26, 2010 and Resolution dated July 2, 2010 in CA-G.R. CV No.
the Director of Lands, dated December 22, 1987, Deputy Public Land
80017 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court's Decision dated
Inspector Pio Lucero, Jr. noted that:
May 20, 2002 in Civil Case No. II-1801 is REINSTATED.
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
That this land known as Lot No. 5258, Cad. 292, Iligan Cadastre which portion
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
was claimed also by the Human Settlement and/or National Housing
Authority; but the area applied for by Leopoldo Delfin is outside the claim of
the said agency as per certification issued dated June 10, 1988; copy of which
is herewith attached for ready reference;63ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The same letter likewise indicated that the Iligan Property was already
occupied by June 1945 and that it had even been released for agricultural
purposes in favor of its occupants.64 Accordingly, the Deputy Public Land
Inspector recommended the issuance of a patent in favor of petitioner
Leopoldo Delfin:65
Upon investigation conducted by the undersigned in the premises of the land,
it was found and ascertained that the land applied for by Leopoldo Delfrn was
first entered, occupied, possessed and cultivated by him since the year June,
1945 up to the present; he have already well improved the land and
introduced some considerable improvements such as coconut trees and
different kinds of fruit trees which are presently all fruit bearing trees;
declared the same for taxation purposes and taxes have been paid every year;
and that there is no other person or persons who bothered him in his peaceful
occupation and cultivation thereof;chanrobleslaw

Records of this Office show that said land was surveyed and claimed by the
Military Reservation, but the portion of which has been released in favor of
the actual occupants and the area of Leopoldo Delfin is one of the portions
released for agricultural purposes;chanrobleslaw

....

That the applicant caused the survey of the land under Sgs-12-000099,
approved by the Regional Land Director, Region XII, Bureau of Lands, Cotabato
City on April 3, 1979 (see approved plan attached hereof);chanrobleslaw

In view hereof, it is therefore respectfully recommended that the entry of the

application be now confirmed and that patent be yes issued in favor of
Leopoldo Delfin.66ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
A May 18, 1988 supplemental letter to the Director of the Land Management
Bureau further stated:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
That the land applied for by Leopoldo Delfin is a portion of Lot No. 5258, Cad.
292, Iligan Cadastre which was entered, occupied and possessed by the said
applicant since the year June 1945 up to the present; well improved the same
and introduced some considerable improvements such as different kinds of
fruit trees, coconut trees and other permanent improvements
thereon;chanrobleslaw

....

That is very clear in the 4th Indorsement of the Executive Secretary dated April
24, 1954 the portion thereof that will not be needed for any public or quasi-
public purposes, be disposed in favor of the actual occupants under the
administration of the Bureau of Lands[.]67ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary