2. Spouses Del Prado vs.
Caballero - Parties agreed on purchase price of P40,000 for a pre-determined area of 4,000 sqm, more
14.) Mapalo vs. Mapalo
15.) Payongayong vs.CA
20.) Chiao vs. Alcantara
or less.
In a contract of sale of land mass, it is well-established that the specific boundaries stated in
the contract must control over any statement wrt to area contained within its boundaries
- “More or less” is defined as approximately, or which intend to cover slight or unimportant
inaccuracies in quantity. This implies both parties assume risk of ordinary discrepancy.
-The Court, however, held that a discrepancy of 10,475 square meters cannot be considered a
slight difference in quantity. The difference in the area is sizeable and too substantial to be
overlooked. It is not a reasonable excess or deficient that should be deemed included in the
deed of sale.
Key words: Donation, Fraud
Narcisos (buyers of the fraudulently-donated land of Maximo, who subsequently registered
the land) were not buyers in good faith. Aside from the fact that all the parties in these cases
are neighbors, except Maximo Mapalo, were aware of the nature and extent of the interest of
Maximo Mapalo their vendor, over the land before and at the time the deed of sale was
executed. The Narcisos were purchaser-in-value but not purchasers in good faith. Why did
Pacifico Narciso still go to the spouses Mapalo and ask them to permit their brother Maximo to
dispose of the above-described land? This act of Narciso is a conclusive manifestation that they
did not only have prior knowledge of the ownership of said spouses over the western half
portion in question but they also have recognized said ownership. It also shows their prior
knowledge of the want of dominion on the part of their vendor Maximo over the whole land
and also of the flaw of his title thereto. (Note: NOT a case of double sale)
Key words: Double Sale: First recorded in registry in good faith
Payongayongs did not cause the cancellation of the certificate of title of Mendoza and procure
one in their names, nor did they had their claims annotated on the same title. Thus, at the time
of the sale of the property to respondents, only the mortgages in favor of MESALA appeared
on the annotations of encumbrances on Mendoza’s title. In respondents’ (Salvador’s) case,
they did not only rely upon Mendoza’s title but Rosalia personally inspected the property and
verified with the Registry of Deeds if Mendoza was indeed the registered owner. Thus,
respondents indeed purchase the property in good faith and accordingly acquired valid and
indefeasible title. Court applied Art. 1544 wrt first registration in good faith, giving preferential
rights to respondent Salvadors (2nd buyers) who had the sale registered. But first purchaser
Payongayong may bring action for damages against sellers.
MINORITY and Ratification; valid

21.) Mercado and Mercado vs Espiritu
22.) Matabuena vs. Cervantes
24.) Ching vs Goyanko –
Ramon Alcantara, in his minority, may not be allowed to execute the deed of sale, but his act
of ratification, the contract was given a binding effect. Doctrine in Mercado vs. Espiritu applies
and it is not necessary for his vendee to actually part with cash, as long as the contract is
supported by a valid consideration.
That about one month after the date of the conveyance, the appellee informed the appellants
of his minority, is of no moment, because appellee's previous misrepresentation had already
estopped him from disavowing the contract. Said belated information merely leads to the
inference that the appellants in fact did not know that the appellee was a minor on the date of
the contract.
Sale of Real Estate by Minors is Valid
The courts, in their interpretation of the law, have laid down the rule that the sale of real
estate, made by minors who pretend to be of legal age, when it fact they are not, is valid, and
they will not be permitted to excuse themselves from the fulfillment of the obligations
contracted by them, or to have them annulled in pursuance of the provisions of Law 6 title 19,
of the 6th Partida; and the judgment that holds such a sale to valid and absolves the purchaser
from the complaint filed against him does not violate the laws relative to the sale of minors'
property, nor the juridical rules established in consonance therewith.
Donation without Marriage; Prohibition applies to common law relationship
While Article 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a donation between the spouses
during marriage, policy consideration of the most exigent character as well as the
dictates of morality requires that the same prohibition should apply to a common-law
relationship.
As earlier ruled, if the policy of the law is to prohibit donations in favor of the other
consort and his descendants because of fear of undue and improper pressure and
influence upon the donor, then there is every reason to apply the same prohibitive
policy to persons living together as husband and wife without the benefit of nuptials.
The lack of validity of the donation by the deceased to appellee does not necessarily
result in appellant having exclusive right to the disputed property. As a widow,
Cervantes is entitled to one-half of the inheritance, and the surviving sister to the other
half.
Article 1001, Civil Code: Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the
widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the
brothers and sisters or their children to the other half.
Conveyance made in favor of his Common-Law Wife is null and void. Public
Policy

25.) Rubias vs. Batiller –
26.) Distajo vs CA
27.) Valencia vs. Cabanting
The proscription against sale of property between spouses applies even to common law
relationships.
The contract of sale was null and void for being contrary to morals and public policy pursuant
to Article 1409 and Article 1352 (contracts with unlawful cause produce no effect). The sale
was made by a husband in favor of a concubine after he had abandoned his family and left the
conjugal home where his wife and children lived and from whence they derived their support.
The sale was subversive of the stability of the family, a basic social institution which public
policy cherishes and protects.
-Donations between spouses during marriage are prohibited because that would destroy the
system of conjugal partnership, a basic policy in civil law. It was also designed to prevent the
exercise of undue influence by one spouse over the other, as well as to protect the institution
of marriage, which is the cornerstone of family law. This also applies to a couple living as
husband and wife without benefit of marriage.
Sale of Lawyer from Father in Law. VOID by virtue of 1491 (5) and 1409 (7)
Void sale by virtue of 1491 (5) in relation to 1409 (7) which provides that contracts expressly
prohibited or declared void by law are inexistent” and that these contracts “cannot be
ratified. Neither can the right to set up the defense of illegality be waived.”
WHAT IS IT ABOUT: MOTHER HAS LOTS OF PARCELS OF LAND
The consent of the principal removes the transaction out of the prohibition in Article 1491(2)
Under paragraph (2) of the above article, the prohibition against agents purchasing property
in their hands for sale or management is not absolute. It does not apply if the principal
consents to the sale of the property in the hands of the agent or administrator. In this case, the
deeds of sale signed by Iluminada Abiertas shows that she gave consent to the sale of the
properties in favor of her son, Rufo, who was the administrator of the properties. Thus, the
consent of the principal Iluminada Abiertas removes the transaction out of the prohibition
contained in Article 1491(2).
Lawyer bought parcel of land pending litigation (pending Certiorari proceeding):
ACT IS PROHIBITED AND LAWYER SUSPENDED *Legal ethics?
The prohibition in Article 1491(5) applies only to the sale or assignment of property which is
the subject of litigation to the persons disqualified therein. For the prohibition to operate, the
sale or assignment must take place during the pendency of the litigation involving the
property.
In the case at bar, while it is true that Atty. Arsenio Fer. Cabanting purchased the lot after
finality of judgment, there was still a pending certiorari proceeding. A thing is said to be in

28.) RAMOS vs NGASEO –
29.) Fornlida vs. RTC Branch 164 –
Fiestan vs CA
Ordonio vs Eduarte
litigation not only if there is some contest or litigation over it in court, but also from the
moment that it becomes subject to the judicial action of the judge.
Logic indicates, in certiorari proceedings, that the appellate court may either grant or dismiss
the petition. Hence, it is not safe to conclude, for purposes under Art. 1491 that the litigation
has terminated when the judgment of the trial court become final while a certiorari connected
therewith is still in progress. Thus, purchase of the property by Atty. Cabanting in this case
constitutes malpractice in violation of Art. 1491 and the Canons of Professional Ethics. Clearly,
this malpractice is a ground for suspension.
Lawyer sale. Mere demand for delivery of the litigated property does not cause the transfer of
ownership, hence, not a prohibited transaction within the contemplation of Article 1491.
REPRIMANDED ONLY.
In this case, there was no actual acquisition of the property in litigation since the respondent
only made a written demand for its delivery which the complainant refused to comply.
The prohibition on purchase is all embracing to include not only sales to private individuals but
also public or judicial sales.
MORTGAGED TO ATTY’S FEES then acquired after foreclosure= PROHIBITED;
VOID.
The fact that the property in question was first mortgaged by the client to his lawyer and only
subsequently acquired by the latter in a foreclosure sale long after the termination of the case
will not remove it from the scope of the prohibition for at the time the mortgage was executed
the relationship of lawyer and client still existed, the very relation of trust and confidence
sought to be protected by the prohibition, when a lawyer occupies a vantage position to press
upon or dictate terms to a harassed client. Considering that the mortgage contract, entered
into in contravention of Article 1491 of the Civil Code, is expressly prohibited by law, the same
must be held inexistent and void ab initio
SPECIAL AGENCY: The prohibition DOES NOT apply where the sale of the property in dispute
was made under a special power inserted in or attached to the real estate mortgage
pursuant to Section 5 of Act No. 3135, as amended, a special law which governs extra-judicial
foreclosure of real estate mortgage. The power to foreclose is not an ordinary agency that
contemplates exclusively the representation of the principal by the agent but is primarily an
authority conferred upon the mortgagee for the latter’s own protection. By virtue of the
exception, the title of the mortgagee-creditor over the property cannot be impeached or
defeated on the ground that the mortgagee cannot be a purchaser at his own sale.
ASSIGNMENT TO LAWYER PROHIBITED
 The prohibition APPLIES when, for example, a lawyer has not paid for the property and it was
merely ASSIGNED to him in consideration of legal services rendered at a time when the
property is still subject of a pending case.
Daroy vs Abecia Prohibition DOES NOT apply to the sale of a parcel of land, acquired by a client to satisfy a
judgment in his favor, to his attorney as long as the property was not the subject of the
litigation.
Mahusay vs. BE San Diego This case is a sale of real property where the purchase price is not paid in full. The unpaid
seller’s remedy is either an action to collect the balance or to rescind the contract within the
time allowed by law. Since rescission is no longer an option considering that petitioners have
been in possession of the properties for a considerable period of time, BE San Diego is
entitled to receive the unpaid balance of the purchase price, plus legal interest, commencing
when respondent filed the Complaint for Specific Performance with the RTC, which shall be
considered as judicial demand. Another 12% interest per annum shall be paid on the amount
due and owing as of and from the date of finality of the Decision until full payment.
Balantakbo vs. CA The area embraced within the stated boundaries prevails over the area set forth in the
descriptions which must have been based on mere estimates, and that the buyer was entitled
to receive all that was included within the boundaries thus stated in the deed of sale.
In case of conflict between the area described and the actual boundaries of the land, which
should prevail? It is well-settled that what really defines a piece of land is not the area,
calculated with more or less certainty mentioned in the description, but the boundaries
therein laid down, as enclosing the land and indicating its limits. Court repeatedly ruled: where
land is sold for a lump sum and not so much per unit of measure or number, the boundaries of
the land stated in the contract determine the effects and scope of the sale, not the area
thereof. Hence, the vendors are obligated to deliver all the land included within the
boundaries, regardless of whether the real area should be greater or smaller than that recited
in the deed. This is particularly true where the area is described as "humigit kumulang," that is,
more or less, pursuant to Art. 1542 of the Civil Code: “…but if, besides mentioning the
boundaries, which is indispensable in every conveyance of real estate, its area or
number should be designated in the contract, the vendor shall be bound to deliver
all that is included within said boundaries, even when it exceeds the area or
number specified in the contract…”
Roble vs. CA The rule that the vendor is obliged to deliver everything within the boundaries, inasmuch as it
is the entirety thereof that distinguishes the determinate object admits of an exception. A
vendee of land, when sold in gross or with the description more or less with reference to its

Villarey Transit vs. Ferrer
Delfin vs. Valdez
Carbonell vs CA
area, does not thereby ipso facto take all risk of quantity in the land. The use of “more or less”
or similar words in designating quantity covers only a reasonable excess or deficiency. In the
case at bar, the parties described the subject land as “having an approximate area of 240
square meters more or less.” An area of 644 square meters more is not reasonable excess or
deficiency, to be deemed included in the deed of sale
The sale between Fernando and Villarey is valid such that the rightful ownership of the
certificates still belong to Villarey being the prior purchaser in good faith and value thereof.
Article 1544 paragraph 1 provides that "If the same thing should have been sold to different
vendees, the ownership shall be transferred to the person who may have first taken
possession thereof in good faith, if it should be movable property.” What was acquired by
Ferrer in the sheriff’s sale was only the right which Fernando had in the certificate of public
convenience on the day of the sale.
NO double sale. There is only one: the sale of Lot No. 3-D-1 by Josefina to the petitioner Delfin.
Article 1544 presupposes the existence of 2 valid and binding contracts of sale. Since the first
sale was null and void by reason of Lagon's breach of the express terms and conditions at his
own fault before the second sale. Josefina had full and complete ownership over the subject
lot at the time of the second sale, the obligation to return to Lagon the sum of money
originally she received. This title and ownership of Lot No. 3-D-1 was effectively transferred
from Josefina to Delfin with the issuance of a clean new TCT in the name of Delfin upon the
registration of the second sale.
Applied paragraph 2 of Article 1544. If there is inscription, as in the case at bar, prior
registration in good faith is a pre-condition to superior title.
When Carbonell bought the lot from Poncio, she was the only buyer and the title was still in
Poncio’s name. Carbonell was not aware and she could not have been aware of any sale to
Infante as there was no such sale to Infante then. Hence, Carbonell's prior purchase of the land
was made in good faith. Her good faith subsisted and continued to exist when she recorded
her adverse claim four (4) days prior to the registration of Infante's deed of sale. Carbonell's
good faith did not cease after Poncio told her of his second sale of the same lot to Infante.
Because of that information, Carbonell wanted an audience with Infante, which desire
underscores Carbonell's good faith. With an aristocratic disdain unworthy of the good breeding
of a good Christian and good neighbor, Infante snubbed Carbonell like a leper and refused to
see her. So Carbonell did the next best thing to protect her right she registered her adverse
claim. Under the circumstances, this recording of her adverse claim should be deemed to have
been done in good faith and should emphasize Infante's bad faith when she registered her
 deed of sale four (4) days later. Carbonell is declared lawful owner.
-The vendee who first registers the sale in good faith in Registry of Deeds has a preferred right
over another vendee who has not registered his title even if the latter is in actual possession of
the immovable property. More credit is given to registration than to actual possession.
- In this case, Carbonell, as the first vendee, has still a better right. His good faith when he
purchased the land subsisted and continued to exist when he registered the sale. <- S sold the
parcel of land to B and then to C, who both acted in good faith. After acquiring knowledge of
the second sale to C, B registered the sale.
Yared vs. Tiongco There is an EXCEPTION to the rule that every person dealing with a property registered under
the Torrens title need not inquire further but only has to rely on the title. This is when the
party has actual knowledge of facts that would impel a reasonably cautious man to make such
inquiry or when the purchaser has some knowledge of a defect or the lack of title in his vendor
or of sufficient facts to induce a reasonably prudent man to inquire into the status of the title
of the property in litigation. The presence of anything which excites or arouses suspicion
should then prompt the vendee to look beyond the certificate and investigate the title of the
vendor appearing on the face of said certificate. One who falls within the exception can neither
be denominated an innocent purchaser for value nor a purchaser in good faith and hence does
not merit the protection of the law.
In this case, when the subject properties were sold to Catalino Torre and subsequently to
Doronila, respondent Jose was not in possession of the said properties. Such fact should have
put the vendees on guard and should have inquired on the interest of the respondent Jose
regarding the subject properties. But regardless of such defect on transfer to third persons, the
properties again reverted back to respondent Jose. Respondent Jose cannot claim lack of
knowledge of the defects surrounding the cancellation of the OCTs over the properties and
benefit from his fraudulent actions. The subsequent sale of the properties to Catalino Torre
and Doronila will not cure the nullity of the certificates of title obtained by respondent Jose on
the basis of the false and fraudulent Affidavit of Adjudication.
- An action for reconveyance despite the lapse of more than ten (10) years from the issuance
of title to the land and declared that said action, when based on fraud, is imprescriptible as
long as the land has not passed to an innocent buyer for value. Court defined an innocent
purchaser for value as one who buys property of another, without notice that some other
person has a right to, or interest in, such property and pays a full and fair price for the same, at
the time of such purchase, or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other
persons in the property. He is one who buys the property with the belief that the person from
 whom he receives the thing was the owner and could convey title to the property. A
purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man on his guard and
still claim that he acted in good faith.
Cardente vs. IAC COURT: Bad faith attended Rubins when they purchased the entire property from Palanay and
subsequently registered their title thereto. By reason of such bad faith, their title is null and
void.
Applied ART. 1544. Although second vendees (Rubins) registered the sale in their favor while
Cardentes, the first buyers, did not, mere registration of the sale is not enough. Good faith
must concur with the registration. Bad faith renders the registration nothing but an exercise
in futility.
Rubin's presumed good faith has been sufficiently overcome when their confirmation of their
deed of sale admitted the previous sale of the one hectare portion to Cardentes. Thus, the
previous sale, was well known and acknowledged by Mr. Ruperto.
Further, the notorious and continuous possession and full enjoyment by Cardentes of the
disputed property for 4 years long before Rubins purchased the same from Palanay bolsters
bad faith by Rubins. That possession would have been enough to arouse the suspicion of
Rubins as to the ownership of the entire area which they were about to buy.
Court warned: that a buyer of real property which is in the possession of persons other than
the seller must be wary and should investigate the rights of those in possession. Otherwise,
without such inquiry, the buyer can hardly be regarded as a buyer in good faith.
Rubin’s total lack of action against the actual occupants of a good portion of the land described
in their torrens title is an acceptance on their part of the existence of the prior sale and their
resignation to the fact that they did not own the one-hectare portion occupied by the
Cardentes. Their 17 years of inaction and silence depict a realization of lack of right.
Bautista vs. CA Double SALE. The first sale between registered owner Dionisio Santiago (who later died) in
favor of spouses Salvador was never registered although they have been in uninterrupted
possession since 1970 up to the present, first as lessees and later on as owners.
The second sale was made by Dionisio Santiago's heirs, Maria dela Cruz vda. de Santiago and
son Jose Santiago, in favor of petitioners Bautista on August 10, 1983, nearly a year after the
Dionisio's death. This 2nd sale was recorded and TCT No. 106251 was issued in the name of 2nd
buyers, the Bautistas.
Article 1544. Where the thing sold twice is an immovable, the one who acquires it and first
records it in the Registry of Property, both made in good faith, shall be deemed the owner. The
requirement of the law is two-fold: acquisition in good faith and registration in good faith.

Cruz vs. Cabana
Radiowealth Finance vs. Palileo
Mere registration of title is not enough, good faith must concur with the registration. To be
entitled to priority, the second purchaser must not only establish prior recording of his deed
but must have acted in good faith, without knowledge of the existence of another alienation
by the vendor to another.
Petitioners Bautistas are NOT BUYERS IN GOOD FAITH. They did not buy the land from the
registered owner, Dionisio Santiago. They bought it from his heirs, Maria dela Cruz and Jose
Santiago. Where a purchaser buys from one who is not the registered owner himself, the law
requires a higher degree of prudence even if the land object of the transaction is registered.
One who buys from one who is not the registered owner is expected to examine not only the
certificate of title but all factual circumstances necessary for him to determine if there are any
flaws in the title.
I-n order to fulfill of good faith, buyers of land possessed by persons not the vendor must
inquire and investigate into the rights or title of those in possession of that land. The absence
of such inquiry will remove them from the realm of bona fide acquisition.
While petitioners Bautistas claim to have so inquired, they did so from the vendors who were
not the registered owner. Buying land from one not the registered owner should have put the
buyer on guard over defects in the title or the capacity to transfer of the vendor.
Seller, respondent Leodegaria Cabana, sold the land twice: First to her co-respondents spouses
Teofilo Legaspi and Iluminada Cabana and later to petitioner Abelardo Cruz (now deceased).
The title was registered in Cruz’s name on February 9, 1971, it appears that he knew of the
prior sale to Spouses Cabana as he was informed in the ORD of Quezon that the defendants-
spouses registered their document of sale on May 13, 1965 under the Register of Deeds.
Right of ownership and title to the land must be resolved in favor of the defendants- spouses
Cabana. Why?
First, Cruz was not in good faith in registering the title in his name.
Second, the defendants-spouses registered the deed of absolute sale ahead of Cruz (2nd
buyer). Said spouses were not only able to obtain the title because at that time, the owner's
duplicate certificate was still with the PNB.
Third, Cabanas have been in possession all along of the land in question. Priority of possession
stands good in favor of herein defendants-spouses.
The Court held CA correctly applied Article 1544 of the Civil Code.
Article 1544 does not apply to unregistered land.
Defendant spouses Enrique Castro and Herminia R. Castro sold to Manuelito Palileo a parcel of
unregistered coconut land. Sale was notarized Deed of Absolute Sale but was not registered in
 the Registry of Property. Later, a judgment was rendered against seller Enrique T. Castro
to pay Radiowealth Finance Company. Provincial Sheriff levied upon and finally sold at public
auction the subject land to Radiowealth. After the period of redemption has expired, a deed of
final sale was also executed. Both the certificate of sale and the deed of final sale were
registered with the Registry of Deeds. Manuelito Palileo filed an action for quieting of title over
the same and he won. CA affirmed this. Radiowealth appealed to CA.
Had the property in question been a registered land, this case would have been decided in
favor of petitioner since it was petitioner that had its claim first recorded in the Registry of
Deeds, pursuant to 1544. Only then a bona fide purchaser of a registered land at an execution
sale acquires a good title as against a prior transferee, if such transfer was unrecorded.

Applying Section 35, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, the Court held that Article 1544
cannot be invoked to benefit the purchaser at the execution sale though the latter was a buyer
in good faith and even if this second sale was registered. This purchaser of unregistered land at
a sheriff’s execution sale only steps into the shoes of the judgment debtor, and merely
acquires the latter's interest in the property sold as of the time the property was levied upon.
Thus, CA correctly held that the execution sale of the unregistered land in favor of Radiowealth
is of no effect because the land no longer belonged to the judgment debtor as of the time of
the said execution sale.
Hanopol vs. Pilapil Double sale of unregistered land.
Hanopol claims ownership of the land by virtue of a series of purchases effected in 1938 by
means of private instruments, executed by the former owners. Pilapil asserts title to the
property on the strength of a duly notarized deed of sale executed in his favor by the same
owners on December 3, 1945, which deed of sale was registered in the Registry of Deeds of
Leyte on August 20, 1948 under the provisions of Act No. 3344. Lower court favored Pilapil.
-1544 does not apply. Under Act No. 3344, registration of documents affecting unregistered
land is “without prejudice to a third party with a better right.” The quoted phrase has been
held to mean that the mere registration of a sale in one’s favor does not give him any right
over the land if the vendor was not anymore the owner of the land, having previously sold the
same to somebody else, even if the earlier sale was unrecorded. In the case at bar, there
appears to be no clear evidence of Hanopol's possession of the land. In fact, in his complaint
against the vendors, Hanopol alleged that the former owners Siapos took possession of the
same land under claim of ownership in 1945 and were in such possession at the time of the
filing of the complaint against them in 1948. Consequently, since the Siapos were in actual
occupancy of the property under claim of ownership, when they sold the said land to Pilapil in
1945, such possession was transmitted to the latter, at least constructively, with the execution
of the notarial deed of sale. Thus, even on this score, Hanopol cannot have a better right than
appellee Pilapil who, according to the trial court, "was not shown to be a purchaser in bad
faith".