ARTS AND HUMANITIES RESEARCH Multicultural and Interdisciplinary Perspectives Editor Eyiip Saritas Untested Ideas Research Center® New YorkCopyright © 2015 by Untested Ideas Research Center® reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means: electronic, electrostatic, magnetic, tape, mechanical photocopying, recording or ‘otherwise without the written permission ofthe Publisher. ‘To obtain permission(s) to use the material from this book for any ‘purpose, please submit a writen request to: Untested Ideas Research Center ‘Niagara Falls, NY 14305-1635 inoffice@untestedideas.com -/vwwvw.untestedideas.com ‘Additional color graphics may be available in the e-book version of this ook, ISBN 978-1-62520-047-1 Published by Untested Ideas Research Center®, New York Printed in the United States of America Chapter 1 Chapter 2 Chapter 3 CONTENTS Preface Eydp SARITAS {stanbulCniversiey Turkey ‘The Eifects of China's Open Policy on Chinese Studies Research in Turkey Eylip SARITAS IstarbulUniversity, Turkey An Analysis of the Culture Conflict in the Novel “East Wind~ West Wind” by Peat! S, Buck Eytp SARITAS Astanbultniversity, Turkey ‘An Overview of Aid Delivered to North Korea by China Eygp SARITAS IstanbulUniversvy, Turkey Research Methods in Turkish Translation History Mine VAZICL Istanbultniversty, Turkey A Discussion of the Presence of Philosophical ‘Thought in Chinese and Indian Cultures Erden Miray Yazgan YALKIN istanbulUniversity, Turkey An Examination of Aristotle’s Theory of Emotion Berk Ozcangiller ‘istanbulUniversity, Turkey ‘The Modemization Movements of Music Education and Culture during the Establishment Years of the ‘Turkish Republic Aygill GUNALTAY. ‘SlanbuiUniversty State Conservatory, Turkey 26 45 8 119.Chapter 6 An Examination of Aristotle's Theory of Emotion 1. Berk OZCANGILLER IstanbulUniversity, Turkey Aristotle's theory of emotion seems a tay to expla complicated, but I Antof Rhetoric. Aristotle describes emotions (pathe) in The Nicomachean Eth as follows: “By emotions’ (pathe) 1 mean appetite (epithumla), anger fear (phobos), confidence (tharsos), envy jones), joy (Kkhara), friendly feeling (philia), hatred (misos), longing (pothos), emulation (zelos), pity (eleos), ‘and in general the feelings that are accompanied by pleasure (hedone) or pain (lupe). And Aristotle defines emotions in The Ewdemian Ethics likewise: such things as anger, fear, and Vices, University Press, London, 1935, p. 248-24 theory based on the definitions of emotion given by Particularly The Nicomachean Ethics, The Eudemian Ethics and The CHAPTER 6 —ANEXAMINATION OF ARISTOTLE'S... 103 Aristotle defines emotion as a feeling accompanied by pleasure ‘and pain in above-cited passages. But in addition this feature, there is a to be considered: Cognition is another characteristic of emotion ides being accompanied by pleasure and pain. In Aristotle's thought oF emotions, emphasis is about opinions (doksal) that cause emotions.’ 4n example, Aristotle describes fear as a painful or a troubled fecling caused by the impression of an imminent evi that causes destruction ot pain. An another example of ity: “Pity may be defined as 4 kind of pain excited by the sight of evil, deadly or painful, which befalls one who does not deserve it; an evil which one might expect to come upon himself or one of his ftiends and when it seems near.” In both examples, there is an expectation, a representation in @ mind and an opinion. In the state of fear, there is an opinion or expectation ‘concerning the approaching danger. And in the state of pity, there isan opinion or expectation about evil, which befalls one who does not deserve it, may be come upon himself or one of his friends. And ‘cognition as such is equally applied to other emotions, Now we have to mention briefly the term epithumia that we can ‘translate it as appetite. As we mentioned above, Aristotle establishes two essential characteristics of emotions as being accompanied with pPlensure and pain and being cognitive, For example fear and anger have these two essential characteristics of emotions. But whether this condition applies to ap tite (epithumia) is the one of Aristotle's three kind the other kinds of desire are wish (boulesis) and thames). Desire genius of which appetite, spirited desire and wish are the species,* is the desire of the rational part of the soul the value that wish desires; appetite always desires pleasure (hed and spirited desire (thumos) desires a completely different value, ‘what is fine and beautiful (to kalon)? Appetite and spirited desifo OZCANGILLER common for human beings and animals but plants have only the faculties of growth and nutrition, Beings that have the faculty is does not mean that animals have emotions; for emotion requires to cognition, but there is no reason in animals. Reason is the distinctive feature of human beings. Thus we can’t say that animals have emotions. Feelings, as hunger and thirst, desires to being satis ( with this kind of desire, i.e. appetite. And if itis not controlled by the virtue of temperance (Sophrosyne), appetite acts intemperately; living as such is not approprite for human, chastened state- and the direction of (epithumetikon) ive according to reason (logas).” !? In that passage it is said that epithumia, i.e. appetite can be in ‘accordance with reason, but this doesn’t happen like an emotion as angry ot fear; for we can’t speak of opinions or thoughts in appet The feelings as such cannot be changed by the way of persuasion,” In ‘other words an emotion like an angry can be quitened or excited in ng, contrary to this ease, hunger cannot be annihilated; chat AN EXAMINATION OF ARISTOTLE’S tos only it can be avoided from its excessiveness but cannot be ignored. kkinds of desire asks for what itis good and the desire of appetite is a pleasure." The virtue of temperance keeps under control this pleasure reasonably but cannot extinguish or as in the case of hunger and thirst, it cannot change the feeling which one has, through the propositions as “you are not hungry” or ‘you are not thirsty’. It is only the feelings of pleasure and pain that appetite (epithumta) shares with emotion (Pathos), Both hungry man and angry man feels a pain. However, the anger can be convinced by the way of reason but appetite cannot. As to appetite Aristotle says that: “whereas appetite leads a man on without While appetite is Ethies and Eudamian Rhetoric. For emoti be a feeling of anger to the person who prevents his eating, But in this case the feeling of Inunger doesn’t change the judgment. Appetites just require being satisfied. In such cases the changes which would take place in ‘of judgments explain by thinking about emotions or ‘0 appetite only looks for being satisfied. And emotions such fas anger originate ffom thought, but not appetite, Aristotle says that ‘when desire of appetite is strong, the power of rational thinking is106 OZCANGILLER disappeared, whereas an angry man while deciding to take revenge, though itis defective, he can reason out Insofar we studied on the problem of appetite's relation emotion, AS we have seen, Aristotle counts appetite as emot Nicomachean Ethies and Eudamian Ethics but not in The Art of Rhetoric. And now we can proceed to Aristotle's general views on emotions. logical part pursues wisdom and good; and it has to rule the entire soul. Soul's appettive part pursues immedi sensual pleasures and avoid ffom suffering. And soul’s intermediate Part, ie, spirited part is a place that emotions connected with sel ee and selfaffimmation dwell in! In addition to this, Socrates shes three mixed kind of pleasure and pain in’ Platon’s there are mixtures that have their origin in the body and confined to the soul; and then there are mixtures of pleasure and pain found in both body and soul.”” Among these mixtures only the mixed pleasures and pains belong to soul are revealed through the emotions as ‘anger, fear, missing, grief, love, envy and jealousy.” ‘Conceming this issue Fortenbaugh says that itis important here to reduce all of the emotions into a one class and to distinguish emotions from mixed pleasures and pains based on physical states.” Socrates sels apart emotions as anger and fear from physical desires but he is not Xs ly of the filse opinions.” Because of to the body; there are mixtures found in the soul and they are 17 using the “with” 1s, Protarkhos don’t agree with Sokrates, since in thet case opinions accompany with pleasures and pains extemally.” Sokeates states that emotions such as anger and fear can be ungrounded and false.” : ‘The relation of emotion with cognition was discussed at ‘Academia and Aristotle made a great contribution to the discussion to other kinds of emotion. ; ; ‘According to Aristotle, emotions are constituted by the judgments ‘or considerations about one's ovin situation. Assessment is a kind of 3t that is made about an event which is perceived or imagined. sense emotions bear a more resemblance to thoughts rather than brute feelings, sensations Emotions come about with pleasure and pain bbut these feelings do not constitute the emotion apart ftom the thought to which they attach, Thoughts provide us to identify emotions; by this ‘way although emotions sometimes present themselves to us through the physiological or physical flings, those felings are not significative enough to convey precisely what is an emotion we are experiencing So thoughts, as pertaining to human beings, are the constitutive causes of emotions. : a Aristotle, the question of essence (i est) and the question of ‘cause (dia ti) are identical”': “To know the essence of a thing is the larly with emotions knowing fopes, ans. Hugh Treden ‘rest, London, 1960,the esc cntain bing ale wo give a veremoton hs an ficient caus at at ‘This distinction between peactical and ‘non-prg pl, emotions lke anger and ar have fal cmce oto fy an fein The Hl ns ige and the final cause of fear is to seek some place fe bee but mercy has not a final cause as such, However, comi 7 = costo esse tn is pasage Ate Je dees detec fare coin. We sen vee of than spi a tion \is feature of emotion there are two , ie fete of emai sy, an enein i accompany sn ned by pens pain and sony an eaten can change a jdgmen. For sop emotions as anger, fear or pity are a Sie peepee sccompanied by pain and can cause aa feel: en eee ig ey and pathy ik one srt of hing: wen they are ing angry or hostile ti ik ie oat ly ent te mne f a different when they feel friendly to he man who eomes before than or judgment, th he as having done little wrong, Teaal ost they take the oppose me (anshve geodhoes t «hig awl poe iappens, they think that it certainly will happen and be good ‘Side : On His Psychology, Ethies, Politics 20.28, c .s are cognitive, they can be changed by reasoned they can affect to judgments and change them. This yea case peculiar to emotions. Therefore Aristotle suggests the orator tat he has to be knowledge of emotions and aware of three issues. And hhe exemplify the issues by using the emotion of anger: “We must arrange what we have 10 say about each of them under three heads. Take, for instance, the emotion of anger: here we must discover what the state of mind of angry people is, who the people are with whom they usu angry, and on what grounds they get angry with them. not enough to know one oF even two of these points; unless ‘we know all three, we shall be unable to arouse anger in anyone. The same is true ofthe other emotions.""” ‘Aristotle, peculiarly in The Art of Rhetoric, elaborates the issue of emotions and defines emotions in detail. Aristotle explains emotions fone by one in detail in order that orators have an influence on audience but at the same time he gives insight into the emotions with regards to ‘ethics. After the analyzing of emotions, we see that one more time; the ‘emotions are cognitive, accompanied by pleasure and pain and can change the judgments of persons. And i addition to these features, he ‘adds one mare that emotions have objects and causes. {In On The Soul Aristotle examines the soul as having three parts; first of them is nutritive part of soul and it is common with plants; second one is the sensitive part of soul and is common with animals; ‘hird and lst one is rational part of soul and belongs to human beings. First two parts of soul don't participate in reason. So itis necessary that ‘we keep apart these two parts from the ortenbaugh indicates that Aristotle's which he makes this division in ethical Qe 3 prise, The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Orfos ‘w.R ftp Jonatian Bares, Princeton U Complete Works ‘Arsole, Oo the Soul, Parva NsHo OZCANGILLER sensitive parts from rational part whi ‘of comparing the human beings with plant (On this issue Aristotle says in The Nicomachean “happiness is the chief good seems a logical fmetions ate not essential to bipart ethical psychology. Emotions as anger and fear pscyhological bipartite division." And now we shall look over the relation between emotions and moral virtue, the young’s connection ‘with moral virtue and last whether animals have emotions or not vides the soul two parts as 1 works, And rational part practical, Theoretical side 1d necessary principles, whereas practical side concerns with contingent and relative things. Besides irrational part are side that has no share in and growth and the other that can be considered rational part of soul are called intellectual virtues (@ianoetikai aretai) and the virtues relsted with the irrational but in a sense being counted as rational by means of obeying the reason are called moral/ethical al virtues are come about by the result of habit derives from the habit (ethos) with a litle alteration Emotions are belonged to irrational part of soul and also moral ‘onal part; so emotions enter into states that virtues are related with We don’t endow with virtues but we have to for gaining them. In other words altough virtues tute, yet we develop and realize them by the way of being active, So men became just by doing just acts likewise become seis) arise out of like activities." Besides Ar with pleasures and ps pleasure and pains and the moral virtue is also the virtue of this part;consequently Aristotle suggests pleasures and pain: at moral virtwe is concemed is by reason of pleasures and pains thi ‘become bad, by pursuing and avoiding these —ither the pleasures and ‘can mention goodness or evil, ie, virtue or virtueless only for attitude towards something or someone. So virtue is a matter of choice,” @ state of character, is a choice of what ‘and emotions. But the intermediate is not same every person. Aristotle states that those are ‘connected with moral virtue and he goes on like that because it ig lated with emotions and actions; and excess, deficiency or mediate oceur in these things.® So moral virtue is a faculty of CHAPTER —ANEXAMINATION OF ARISTOTLE'S te ‘acting in right time, in right motive, in right way and towards right persons or objects in singly events; that is, it is ability of finding or choosing what is an intermediate, ‘Asistotle says about the issue as follows: “Virtue, then, is a state concemed with choice, lying in a mean relative to us, this being determined by reason and in the way in which the man of practical wisdom would determine it, Now it is @ mean between two vices, that which depends on excess and that which depend on defect; and again it is a mean because the vices respectively fall short of ‘or exceed what is right in both passions and actions, w virtue both finds and chooses that which is intermediate, Hience in respect of its substance and the states its essence is a mean, with regard to what is best and right itis an extreme,“ seen, emotions have an itmmediate connection with moral or bad by themselves; the reason of cexecessiveness or defectiveness; in tale oc choice of person against the situations that can be considered as bad or good, For Aristotle emotions are not the diseases that we have to get rid of them; in addition that Aristotle don’t say they have to be suppressed and swept away; he ive a untroubled life by choosing a what is intermadieate without incline to excessiveness or defectiveness in emotions, Moral virtues which provide us to find an intermediate in ‘emotions, acquire with habit and require to time and activi “Aristotle adds these descriptions to the matter of moral virtue: “For both children and brates have the natural dispositions to ‘these qualities but without thought these are evidently ‘hurtful. Only we seem fo see this much, that, while one may be led astray by them, as a strong body which moves without sight may stumble badly because of its lack of sight, ‘a man once acquires thought that makes a difference in action; and his state, while still like what it was, will then be excellence in the strict sense. Therefore, as in the part of us * op. elt p31, Loahs7-1 10785.14 OZCANGILLER which forms opinions there are two types, cleverness and $0 too in the moral part there are two types, natural excellence and excellence in the strict sense, ad of these the later involves practical wisdom.5° tn hie passge iis unite with practical wisdom Virtue, First it is necessary has to be devel ‘got adopt a habit in a ri he ve mnoel ‘wisdom is the faculty of children, the young ones or isnot effective in every ‘adult person; but as in general the reason is matured in adult persons, Practical reason is also effective in these ages. Aristotle says, “for irtue makes the aim right, and practical wisdom the things leading to voluntarily and for this reason he or she is responsible for them; and human beings are distinguished from the animals by the fealure of being responsible Aristotle was impressed by a remarkable relation between the youth and the emotions. According to him, the youth inclines. t ‘emotionality and fee from thinking.” In The Nicomachean Ethics ted with emotions pursues to benefit but for itself ‘And the youth’s state is as such. When Aristotle describes the state of emotion ofthe youth, oder persons and the middle-aged persons in The Art of Rhetorie’s second book, he states thatthe youths seek aller the noble actions, the old persons look for the benefit and the middle-aged Persons can behave as both ofthem and have a most appropriate way of behavior.” According to Aristotle, as yet the youth lack of practical ‘wisdom, they have to be educated with the thought of ‘what way, and then the habit has to be approved this is the perfectness. Practical —* Emotions or in general passions (pathe) are not the involuntary automatic movements. An individual performs the emotions CHAPTER —ANEXAMINATION OF ARISTOTLE'S us ‘An individual's part related to moral virtue shapes before the rational part. Due to this the youth's characters have to be strengthened with an appropriate education. In Aristotelian terms, this is the perfect state of hhuman’s irrational part and the aim of moral education. By this means an individual makes faculty of reason. ‘As we mentioned above, the emotions belong to irrational part of ‘soul but even so in the meaning of listening to reason they can be seen 1s rational. Thus the emotions are cognitive and thoughts are indispensable conditions for the emotions, Even if the rational part has not been developed yer in the youth, they have an ability to listen the reason and moreover they acquire to the faculty of reason when they become mature, By this way they will have an opportunity to the realization of complete virtue. ‘As to animals, none of these things can be occurred. For the ‘animals have only the faculties of sensation, nutrition and growth, but the faculty of thinking is particular to human beings." And since the faculty of thinking does not exist in the animals, the emotions also cannot exist in animals. The emotions are cognitive and opinions or thoughts are the effective causes of them. But properties as judging on an opinion, a thought or an event are not found in the animals. They have a feature of sensation and this faculty is functional for sensual pleasure and pain, The animals have not been equipped with a capacity they are lack of this faculty, ‘is metaphorical to saying that the 1® For the emotion as fear requires to they cannot be virtuous or animals are moderate or mea opinion or thought as regards a bad thing will be happening. Fear is an expectation of an approaching evil and for this reason it is impossible for the beings which are devoid of reason and only move with the sensation of pleasure and pain.* There is an analogy between dog's ‘wagging the tail when it sees his master and a man’s waving at his 80-2, 41432414618, Bs ‘On His Psychology, Ethics, Polis ores, *Y,W. Rarenaugh, Aristotle on Emotion, p. 68.ile OZCANGILLER friend when he sees him. However these attitudes are different, dog's behavior takes place with imagination (phantasia) but the man’ behavior comes about with cognition.®* Insofar we examined the concept of emotion, its distinguishing features, especially the distinction between appetite and emotion, relation of moral virtue to emotion and last the relation of emotions ‘moral virtue to youth and animals. When Aristotle defines the emotions in The Nicomachean Ethics and Eudamian Ethics, he classifies appetite as an emotion. But according to The Art of Rhetoric in which Aristotle analyzes the emotions elaborately, we sce that he din the appetite in the classification of emotions. This is because appetite accompanies with the pleasure and pain as an emotion, it hhasn’t the power of cognition and cannot be annihilated by the means ‘of thoughts, The appetites like hunger thirst or sexual desire is the feelings that cannot be put away, but only can be moderate through the virtues. Thus the feeling of appetite ‘and animals share with, But there is @ faculty that makes an emoti peculiar to human beings epart from the other beings; and we call this as the faculty of thinking, Although the emotions belong to the irrational part of the soul according to Aristote's division of the sou in a sense they are considered as rational inasmuch as listen to reason So contrary to feeling like hunger and thirst, the emotions can be ruled by reason. In addition to having cognitiveness, one more distinctive feature of the emotions is to change the judgments. For Aristotle the yhuman beings are also under the influence of an emotion while they make a decision about something or someone, And in The Art of le writes about the impact of emotional state on the decisions, The other feature related to the emotions is that we cannot assess them as evil or good, since they are not effective but passive feelings. What can be appreciated as good or evil is their excessiveness ‘or deficiency. To be good is the capability of finding an intermediate in ‘emotions and actions. Finding an intermediate in emotions and actions is @ connection with moral virtue. Human beings are judged by the ‘measure of their reaction, which is a state of emotion oF his actions to the impact which they suffer. The faculty of reason is important for choosing the intermediate in the emotions or actions since it will lead W.W, Frtnbaugh ope et, 9 9.96 CHAPTERG —ANEXAMINATIONOF ARISTOTLE’S... 117 us to what is good and what is right. But according to Aristotle reason can be matured in # man only when helshe is at adulthood age. For this eason a man act upon his/her emotions, but not reason when he'she is ‘young. Therefore Aristotle says that the young ones can behave senty by obeying the elders’ advices as the emotions obey to reason. As for the relation of animals with emotions and being qual ‘200d oF evil, Aristotle indicates that they have not en emotion and itis not right to judge them as good or evil since they have not a reason, For this reason they are not responsible for their acts, because they cannot reason. And since they have not the faculty of cognition, they have not ‘an emotion, 00. References Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, Topica, trans, Hugh Tredennink and E. S. Forster, Loeb, Ve |, Harvard University Press, London, 1960. ‘Aristotle, On The Soul, Parva Naturalia, On Breath, trans, W. S. ‘Het, Loeb, Vol. VIII, Harvard University Press, Londoa, 1987. Aristotle, Athenian Constitution, The Eudemian Ethics, Virtues, and Vices, trans. H. Rackham, Loeb, Vol. XX, Harvard University ‘London, 1935. isn Pltce tne Rack, Loeb, Vl XX Harvard ‘University Press, London, 1932. pant tae rot Rear nee Hey Prn, och ‘Volume XXII, Harvard University Press, London, 1926. Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, trans. David Ross, edit Lesley Brown, Oxford University Press (Oxford’s World Classics), New Aristotel Lae Ao ev. Zeki Ozcan, Istanbul, Alfa Yaymlan, 2001. istotle, The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revisied Oxford a veaston, oe ‘trans. W. Rhys Roberts, edit. by Jonathan ‘Barnes, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1991. “Taming Ree frat Merd .y”, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Ed. David ;, New York, Oxford University Press, C. XXX, SummerHig OZCANGILLER ‘Nancy Sherman, Stoic Warriors, New york, Oxford Univesity Press, 200: Plato, Re Paul Shorey, Loeb, Vol I, Books 1-5, Harvard London, 1937, 2 Plato, Republic Paul Shorey, Loeb, Vol, Il, Books 6-10, ty Press, London, 1942. 3 to Complete Works, edit, by John M. Cooper, ‘rans. Dorothea Frede, Hackett Publishing lis, 1997, ‘Simo Knuuttila ve Juha Sihvola, “How the Philosophical Analysis of Emotions in Hellenistic Philosophy, Ed. Juha Sihvola ve Troels Engberg-Pedersen, Sop luwer Academic Publishers, 1998, ace library. qucensu.ca/bistream/1974/1910/1/Avistotlea dltheEmotionsforweb pat. 4 W. V. Hams, “ Saving the gaivspeva: A note on Aristotle's Definition of Anger”, The Classical Quarterly, New Series, C.XLVM, No, 1997, W. W. Fortenbaugh, Aristotle on Emotion, 2. edit, London, Duckworth, 2002, 'W. W. Fortenbaugh, Aristotle's Practical Side : On His Psychology, Ethies, Poities and Rhetories, Leiden, Brill, 2006, : Chapter 7 The Modernization Movements of Music Education and Culture during the Establishment Years of the Turkish Republic ‘Aygill GUNALTAY istanbulUniversity State Conservatory, Turkey Introduction Today, if there still exists a modern and contemporary music ‘education and culture in Turkey, one should know it is because of the reforms made during the frst years of the establishment of Republic of ‘course, before the Republic was established, there had been traditional music education and culture, which had a long history during the Ottoman Empire era, The westernization efforts made during the last years of the Ottoman Empire had also an important impact on music education and culture as well. Though the Sultan's were very interested in music themselves so that some of them were performers and/or composers and at the end of 19" century the sarail was more interested in Western Cl Music, the advance movement of improving a contemporary music education and culture ‘was implemented after the Republic had been established. With the reforms had been made both in mi the other reforms in many different fields right after the establishment of Republic, today in our global world, Turkey has achieved a very successful in the field along its peers. In this paper, the development elong to the establishment years of the Republic, which had given rise to future horizons and had shaped the contemporary music education and culture in Turkey, will be examined ‘with concrete examples from the era.