G.R. No. 102955. March 22, 1993.
of Cebu, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ADRIAN ENRIQUEZ y
GARCES, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Escasinas Partners & Company for accused-appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; PRESUMPTIONS; REGULAR PERFORMANCE OF
OFFICIAL DUTIES; STANDS IN THE ABSENCE OF STRONGER PROOF TO
OVERCOME THEREOF. — A reading of the testimony of the accused reveals
that there was no improper or ill-motive that may be attributed to Narcom
Agents, Sgt. Inding and Sgt. Misa, to frame him up. Neither was there any
allegation that said Narcom Agents made any extortion attempt on him. On
the contrary, the accused testified that he is in good terms with Sgt. Inding.
On the part of Sgt. Misa, accused knew him only at the Narcom office. As We
have held in the case of People v. Como, (202 SCRA 200) the defense that
accused was framed up by the police officers requires stronger proof because
of the presumption that public officers acted in the regular performance of
their official duties. There is nothing in the record to suggest that the Narcom
Agents were compelled by any motive other than to accomplish their mission
to capture a drug pusher in the execution of the crime. Hence, We find the
claim of the accused that he was framed by the prosecution witnesses or
there was extortion on their part as unbelievable.
2. ID.; ID.; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; NOT AFFECTED BY MINOR
DISCREPANCY IN THEIR TESTIMONIES. — The questions as to who frisked the
accused's pocket is a minor detail that does not destroy the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses. Total recall or perfect symmetry is not required. As
long as the witnesses concur on material points, slight differences in their
remembrance of the details do not reflect on the essential veracity of their
testimony.
3. ID.; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; PROSECUTION OF ACTION; ALL PERSON WHO
APPEAR RESPONSIBLE SHALL BE CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION. — Going to
the contention of the Solicitor General that it is highly suspect for the
prosecution to charge only the accused in the information and not include a
certain Bienvenido Genonsalao whom the members of the buy-bust
operation team identified in their joint affidavit as the person who handed
the accused some sticks of marijuana and who had escaped. Section 1, Rule
110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that "(a)ll criminal actions
must be commenced either by complaint or information in the name of the
People of the Philippines against all persons who appear to be responsible
therefore." The law makes it a legal duty for prosecuting officers to file the
charges against whomsoever the evidence may show to be responsible for an
offense. This does not mean, however, that they shall have no discretion at
all; their discretion lies in determining whether the evidence submitted
justify a reasonable belief that a person has committed an offense. What the
rule demands is that all persons who appear responsible shall be charged in
the information, which implies that those against whom no sufficient
evidence of guilt exists are not required to be included. Hence, it is
discretionary on the part of the fiscal whether to include Bienvenido
Genonsalao depending on the evidence available to him.
4. CRIMINAL LAW; DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT (R.A. NO. 6425); SALE OF
PROHIBITED DRUGS; REQUIRES MERELY THE CONSUMMATION OF THE
SELLING TRANSACTION. — The offense of illegal sale of marijuana requires
merely the consummation of the selling transaction whereby the accused
hands over the sticks of marijuana upon the agreement of the poseur buyer
to exchange it for money. In the case at bar, prosecution witness Sgt. Inding
positively and categorically identified the accused Adrian Enriquez as the
person who sold the marijuana cigarettes to him.
DECISION
CAMPOS, JR., J p:
Accused Adrian Enriquez y Garces seeks a reversal of the decision * dated
September 16, 1991 in Criminal Case No. 21734 of the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu, 7th Judicial Region, Branch 8, finding him guilty of having violated
Article II, Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425 otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
On April 23, 1991, the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor filed an information
charging the accused with violation of Article II, Section 4 of the Dangerous
Drugs Act committed as follows:
"That on or about the 19th day of April, 1991 at around 7:00 o'clock in the
evening, more or less, in Barangay Perrelos, Municipality of Carcar, Province
above-named accused with deliberate intent and without any permit or
license issued by any government agency, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver, distribute and give away ten (10)
sticks of handrolled Indian hemp cigarette, commonly known as "Marijuana"
to an informant, and the latter gave to the accused the buy money of
TWENTY PESOS (P20.00) with Serial No. LU716642 and likewise recovered
were 47 sticks of Marijuana cigarette and 59 stick (sic) surrendered by the
accused, classified and in violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
CONTRARY TO LAW." 1
On May 21, 1991, the accused, assisted by his counsel, pleaded not guilty to
the information. 2
After due trial, the trial court rendered its decision finding the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
"The Foregoing Considered, this Court finds the accused ADRIAN ENRIQUEZ Y
GARCES, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of selling marijuana
cigarettes as defined and penalized in accordance with Sec. 4 Art. II RA 6425
as amended by BP Blg. 179, and hereby imposes upon him the penalty of LIFE
IMPRISONMENT, and a fine of P20,000.00 with costs against him. The 10, 47,
and 59 sticks of marijuana cigarettes are hereby FORFEITED in favor of the
government.
So Ordered." 3
From the judgment of conviction, the accused appealed, assigning the
following as the errors 4 allegedly committed by the trial court:
I
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE TOTALITY OF EVIDENCE
PRESENTED BY MERELY RELYING ON THE TESTIMONIES OF RICARDO INDING.
II
THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT HAS NOT BEEN PROVED BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT, HENCE IS ENTITLED TO AN ACQUITTAL.
As gathered from the evidence presented by the prosecution, a surveillance
on the person of the accused was conducted on April 17 and 18, 1991 by Sgt.
Inding, a member of the 7th Narcotics Unit of the Philippine National Police
(PNP) in Lahug, Cebu City 5 based on a report received from a concerned
citizen that there are drug pushers in the area. 6 During his surveillance, Sgt.
Inding stayed in the store at the corner going to the residence of the accused
7 . He was able to identify the person of the accused, and to observe the
activity of the accused in the illegal business dealing in drugs. He saw many
teenagers coming in and out of the residence of the accused and he
personally noticed that these teenagers handed over some money to the
accused and the latter in turn gave them thinly rolled cigarette to each of the
former. 8
On April 19, 1991 at about 7:00 o'clock in the evening, Lt. Ughoc, Staff Sgt.
Eduardo Misa, Sgt. Inding and some other narcotics agents, all of the 7th
Narcotics Regional Unit 9 went to Perrelos, Carcar, Cebu to conduct a buy-
bust operation. 10 After being briefed by their team leader, Lt. Ughoc, for
more or less 45 minutes, 11 they proceeded to their target area. They
stopped more or less 200 meters from the house and walked towards the
residence of the accused. 12
Sgt. Inding, who was disguised as an addict or a drug user (wearing black
sunglasses and short pants), proceeded directly to the accused's residence
while his back-up stayed at a distance of more or less 10 meters from his
position. 13 At the entrance of the accused's residence, he was seen by the
accused, who immediately approached him. Sgt. Inding offered to buy 10
sticks of marijuana cigarettes. Immediately, the accused handed him the 10
sticks and got the money. 14
After having received the 10 sticks of marijuana, Sgt. Inding's companions
immediately effected the arrest. 15 A body search on the accused yielded 47
sticks of marijuana cigarettes hidden in his back pocket while 59 sticks of
marijuana cigarettes were voluntarily surrendered by the accused. 16
A Chemistry Report submitted by Lt. Myrna Ariola, Chief of the Chemistry
and Physical Identification Section, PNP, Crime Laboratory, Region 7, Cebu
City states that the 10, 47 and 59 sticks are positive for marijuana. 17
Accused presented a different version of what transpired. He testified that A I don't have any knowledge about that.
for the last 20 years, he has been engaged in poultry raising, piggery and so
forth, and during market days he goes to Sibonga, San Fernando, Carcar
Q When did you see these 10 sticks of marijuana the first time?
proper, Montalongon to sell dog chains, tawas, hair puller, hammer, saw,
chisel, carborundum (grinding stone) etcetera in these places. 18 In the
evening of April 19, 1991 he was in his house. Wilfredo Da-an and Franco A Here in court.
Garces were also there. Da-an introduced Garces to him because the latter
wanted to borrow money. That was the only occasion that Garces was there. Q What about the 47 sticks of marijuana cigarettes in a (sic) separate 59
19 While talking with Garces, somebody arrived with a plastic bag and said sticks surrendered by you, where did you see these sticks of marijuana
he wanted to buy "tawas" or alum. He invited him inside the house. As soon cigarettes?
as the visitor entered, accused suddenly heard a loud banging of the door
from outside. Thereafter, persons with drawn guns rushed inside the house
and he heard the cocking of firearms. 20 He protested. As a matter of fact, he A Here in court.
called the attention of an elder brother, but a gun was pointed at his mouth.
He was told to accompany them otherwise he will be killed. He was then Q What happened at the Narcom?
brought to the Narcom Headquarters in Lahug. On the jeep was the person
who went up the house carrying the plastic bag. At the Narcom Office he
inquired about the identity of the person who was carrying the plastic bag A I was placed inside the cell.
but no answer was given him. 21
Q No interrogation?
Accused insisted that the 10 sticks of marijuana cigarettes were planted and
that he saw the 47 and 59 sticks for the first time in court during the trial. 22 A No investigation.
On the other hand, the Solicitor General recommended the acquittal of the
accused because of the existence of alleged major contradictions in the
Q You mean after you were brought to the Narcom headquarters, no
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, Sgt. Inding and Sgt. Misa.
interrogation method? You were just placed inside?

We do not agree with the recommendation of the Solicitor General.

A Nothing, but there was somebody who called by telephone.

It is a matter of fact that opium, marijuana or any other prohibited drug can
Q Who was that fellow?
easily be planted by some corrupt law enforcement agents on innocent
victims as a convenient vehicle of extortion. Many such persons would rather
buy peace than risk a prosecution however false it may be. In any case, the A Somebody called me while I was in the cell and in the telephone he told me
courts must be vigilant. A handy defense in such cases is that it is a frame-up if I have P10 thousand I will be freed. I was even wondering who was that
and that the police attempted to extort from the accused. Extreme caution fellow.
must be exercised in appreciating such defense. It is just as easy to concoct
as it is to make a frame-up. At all time, the police, the prosecution, and the Q You were at the Narcom. You were fetched by the military that there was
courts must always be on guard against these hazards in the administration somebody who tries (sic) to call you by phone?
of criminal justice. 23

A Yes, sir.
In the case at bar, the defense tried to prove the alleged "planted evidence"
and extortion attempt through the testimony of prosecution witness, Sgt.
Misa. A careful reading of the transcript of stenographic notes of Sgt. Misa's Q Did you not ask him who was he?
testimony does not impress upon Us any doubt or suspicion which the
defense would want this Court to believe. At most, the testimony of Sgt. Misa A No, sir.
shows that he is not accustomed to the rudiments of trial. His failure to
promptly answer the questions propounded on him was not due to any
intent to conceal but may be said to be due to the injection of statements Q Did you mention willingness to do payment or what?
made by the defense counsel after each question. The atmosphere of the
court room during the trial coupled with interruptions by counsel can affect A No, sir.
the accuracy and manner of a witness in answering questions. 24
Q What did you tell him?
Another evidence which the defense wants this Court to look into is the
testimony of defense witness Elpidio Escano which according to the defense
A I told him to come and we will talk.
"materially corroborated in material points the oral testimony of the
accused". 25 Unfortunately, the transcript of stenographic notes of his
testimony was not submitted to this Court hence We cannot go over the Q Did you use the telephone of Major Hasan?
same. 26 However, a reading of the summarized testimony of said witness by
the trial court shows that his testimony materially contradicted that of the A The telephone of (sic) his office.
accused. Accused testified that at around 7:00 o'clock in the evening of April
19, 1991, Wilfredo Da-an and Franco Garces were in his house. While he was
talking with Franco Garces, a person whom he cannot identify and who Q The telephone in (sic) his table?
brought with him a plastic bag also arrived at his house. 27 If the testimony
of witness Elpidio Escano is to be believed, he would have seen Franco A Yes, sir.
Garces inside the house together with Wilfredo Da-an since according to him
his house is only 5 meters away from the house of the accused. 28
Q Where was Major Hasan when somebody made the call?

Neither is the testimony of Wilfredo Da-an of any help to the accused.

Wilfredo Da-an testified that after the accused was arrested, he ran out of A He was not in his office.
the house of the accused and there he met Franco Garces who was asking
him if accused has money to loan him 29 which testimony again materially Q Who was the official on duty?
contradicted that of the accused.
A Inding and Misa.
The testimony of the accused imputing extortion and planted evidence or
frame-up against the members of the buy-bust operation team is reproduced
Q Do you know this Misa?
as follows:

A Yes, Narcom Agent.

"Court —

Q How did you happen to know him?

Q The Information says a total of 10 sticks of marijuana, planted or not?

A I only knew him at the office.

A Planted.

Q What was your dealing with him?

Q Where?
A He only said, Enriquez you have a telephone call. categorically identified the accused Adrian Enriquez as the person who sold
the marijuana cigarettes to him. The only instance linking Genonsalao to the
offense is that the accused ordered him to get the 10 sticks of marijuana
Q How did you know he was Misa?
cigarettes. Hence his participation was not sufficiently established which may
be the reason why the fiscal did not include him in the information.
A I inquired from other prisoners.
The Solicitor General also finds "it highly incredible for accused to be still
Q Do you know Inding? calling out to Genonsalao to give him some sticks of marijuana when he has
in his back pocket 47 sticks of marijuana cigarettes." 33
A Yes, sir, also at the Narcom office.
The foregoing does not strike Us as highly incredible because the 47 sticks of
Q That was the first time you met him? marijuana found in the possession of the accused were "probably intended
for a different purpose like another sale or its direct use by the possessor."
34
A Yes, sir.

The Solicitor General also finds it incredible that Sgt. Misa who was a
Q Was he not making arrangement with you? member of the entrapment team would not be apprised of the details of
their operation, i.e. the marked money which constitutes the next if not
A No, sir. equally most important piece of evidence as the prohibited merchandise. 35

Q Are you sure? It will be noted that Sgt. Misa was designated as the back-up of poseur-buyer
Sgt. Inding. He was not the poseur-buyer hence it is understandable that he
was not apprised of the facts about the marked money. Besides, evidence on
A Yes, sir. record shows that it was Sgt. Inding who recovered the marked money from
the accused. He also identified the same during the trial.
Q You are in good terms with him as of today?
Lastly, the questions as to who frisked the accused's pocket is a minor detail
A Yes, sir?. that does not destroy the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. Total recall
or perfect symmetry is not required. As long as the witnesses concur on
material points, slight differences in their remembrance of the details do not
Q Are you in good term with him as of today?
reflect on the essential veracity of their testimony. 36

A Yes, sir, he is good Inding.

Q This Misa you are in good term with him as of today?
A I have not talked with Misa.
Q You know (sic) Inding and Misa both of them only after your arrest?
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing findings, We hold that the evidence
was sufficient to sustain the verdict, finding the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime as charged. The findings of the trial Court are
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

A Yes, sir." 30

A reading of the aforequoted testimony of the accused reveals that there

was no improper or ill-motive that may be attributed to Narcom Agents, Sgt.
Inding and Sgt. Misa, to frame him up. Neither was there any allegation that
said Narcom Agents made any extortion attempt on him. On the contrary,
the accused testified that he is in good terms with Sgt. Inding. On the part of
Sgt. Misa, accused knew him only at the Narcom office.

As We have held in the case of People v. Como, 31 the defense that accused
was framed up by the police officers requires stronger proof because of the
presumption that public officers acted in the regular performance of their
official duties. There is nothing in the record to suggest that the Narcom
Agents were compelled by any motive other than to accomplish their mission
to capture a drug pusher in the execution of the crime. Hence, We find the
claim of the accused that he was framed by the prosecution witnesses or
there was extortion on their part as unbelievable.

Going now to the contention of the Solicitor General that it is highly suspect
for the prosecution to charge only the accused in the information and not
include a certain Bienvenido Genonsalao whom the members of the buy-bust
operation team identified in their joint affidavit (Exhibit 2) as the person who
handed the accused some sticks of marijuana and who had escaped.

Section 1, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that "(a)ll
criminal actions must be commenced either by complaint or information in
the name of the People of the Philippines against all persons who appear to
be responsible therefore." (Emphasis supplied.) The law makes it a legal duty
for prosecuting officers to file the charges against whomsoever the evidence
may show to be responsible for an offense. This does not mean, however,
that they shall have no discretion at all; their discretion lies in determining
whether the evidence submitted justify a reasonable belief that a person has
committed an offense. What the rule demands is that all persons who appear
responsible shall be charged in the information, which implies that those
against whom no sufficient evidence of guilt exists are not required to be
included. 32 Hence, it is discretionary on the part of the fiscal whether to
include Bienvenido Genonsalao depending on the evidence available to him.

The offense of illegal sale of marijuana requires merely the consummation of

the selling transaction whereby the accused hands over the sticks of
marijuana upon the agreement of the poseur buyer to exchange it for
money. In the case at bar, prosecution witness Sgt. Inding positively and
G.R. No. 45815 May 18, 1990
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
LIBERTAD LAGON and HON. JUDGE ISIDRO O. BARRIOS, AS PRESIDING JUDGE
OF THE CITY COURT OF ROXAS CITY, respondents.
FELICIANO, J.:
On 7 July 1976, a criminal information was filed with the City Court of Roxas
City and docketed as Criminal Case No. 7362, charging private respondent
Libertad Lagon with the crime of estafa under paragraph 2(d) of Article 315
of the Revised Penal Code. The information charged that the accused had
allegedly issued a check in the amount of P4,232.80 as payment for goods or
merchandise purchased, knowing that she did not have sufficient funds to
cover the check, which check therefore subsequently bounced.
The case proceeded to trial and the prosecution commenced the
presentation of its evidence. However, in an Order dated 2 December 1976,
the City Court dismissed the information upon the ground that the penalty
prescribed by law for the offense charged was beyond the court's authority
to impose. The judge held that the jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal
action is determined by the law in force at the time of the institution of the
action, and not by the law in force at the time of the commission of the
crime. At the time of the alleged commission of the crime in April 1975,
jurisdiction over the offense was vested by law in the City Court. However, by
the time the criminal information was filed, paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of
the Revised Penal Code had already been amended and the penalty
imposable upon a person accused thereunder increased, which penalty was
beyond the City Court's authority to impose. Accordingly, the court dismissed
the information without prejudice to its being refiled in the proper court.
Hence this Petition for Review brought by the People, arguing that the City
Court of Roxas City had jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 7362 and that it
had erred in issuing its Order dismissing the case. Because the Petition for
Review was signed by the City Fiscal and Assistant City Fiscal of Roxas City as
counsel for the People, the Court referred the petition to the Office of the
Solicitor General for comment. Responding to the Court's resolution, the
then acting Solicitor General Vicente Mendoza stated that the Office of the
Solicitor General, having been previously consulted by the Assistant City
Fiscal of Roxas City, agreed with the position taken by the latter that the City
Court had jurisdiction over the criminal case involved, and asked that the
petition be given due course.
After deliberation on the instant Petition for Review, the Court considers that
petitioner has failed to show that the City Court had committed reversible
error in dismissing the criminal information in Criminal Case No. 7362
without prejudice to its refiling in the proper court.
Under the penultimate paragraph of Section 87 of the Judiciary Act of 1948,
as amended, the law governing the subject matter jurisdiction of municipal
and city courts in criminal cases in 1975 and 1976, "[municipal judges in the
capitals of provinces and sub-provinces and judges of city courts shall have
like jurisdiction as the Court of First Instance to try parties charged with an
offense within their respective jurisdictions, in which the penalty provided by
law does not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for not more than
six (6) years or fine not exceeding P6,000.00 or both . . . ." It appears that at
the time of the commission of the offense charged on 5 April 1975, the
penalty imposable for the offense charged under paragraph 2(d) in relation
to the third sub-paragraph of the first paragraph, Article 315 of the Revised
Penal Code, was arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional
in its minimum period; at that time therefore, the offense clearly fell within
the jurisdiction of the City Court of Roxas City.
At the time of the institution of the criminal prosecution on 7 July 1976, the
penalty imposable for the offense charged in Criminal Case No. 7362 had
been increased by P.D. No. 818 (effective 22 October 1975) to prision mayor
in its medium period.
It is firmly settled doctrine that the subject matter jurisdiction of a court in
criminal law matters is properly measured by the law in effect at the time of
the commencement of a criminal action, rather than by the law in effect at
the time of the commission of the offense charged. 1 Thus, in accordance
with the above rule, jurisdiction over the instant case pertained to the then
Court of First Instance of Roxas City considering that P.D. No. 818 had
increased the imposable penalty for the offense charged in Criminal Case No.
7362 to a level-in excess of the minimum penalty which a city court could
impose.
The real question raised by the petitioner is: would application of the above-
settled doctrine to the instant case not result in also applying Presidential
Decree No. 818 to the present case, in disregard of the rule against
retroactivity of penal laws? Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code permits
penal laws to have retroactive effect only "insofar as they favor the person
guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, . . . " We do not believe so.
In the first place, subject-matter jurisdiction in criminal cases is determined
by the authority of the court to impose the penalty imposable under the
applicable statute given the allegations of a criminal information. In People
v. Purisima,2 the Court stressed that:
xxx xxx xxx
. . . The issue here is one of jurisdiction, of a court's
legal competence to try a case ab origine. In criminal
prosecutions, it is settled that the jurisdiction of the
court is not determined by what may be meted out to
the offender after trial, or even by the result of the
evidence that would be presented at the trial, but by
the extent of the penalty which the law imposes for the
misdemeanor, crime or violation charged in the
complaint. If the facts recited in the complaint and the
punishment provided for by law are sufficient to show
that the court in which the complaint is presented has
jurisdiction, that court must assume
jurisdiction. 3 (Citations omitted; Emphasis supplied.)
The same rule was set forth and amplified in People v. Buissan, 4 in the
following terms:
xxx xxx xxx
. . . in criminal prosecutions, jurisdiction of the court is
not determined by what may be meted out to the
offender after trial (People v. Cuello, 1 SCRA 814) or
even by the result of the evidence that would be
presented during the trial (People v. Co Hick 62 Phil.
503) but by the extent of the penalty which the law
imposes, together with other legal obligations, on the
basis of the facts as recited in the complaint or
information (People v. Purisima, 69 SCRA 347)
constitutive of the offense charged, for once
jurisdiction is acquired by the court in which the
information is filed, it is retained regardless whether
the evidence proves a lesser offense than that charged
in the information (People v. Mision, 48 O.G.
1330) 5 (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, it may be that after trial, a penalty lesser than the maximum imposable
under the statute is proper under the specific facts and circumstances proven
at the trial. In such a case, that lesser penalty may be imposed by the trial
court (provided it had subject-matter jurisdiction under the rule above
referred to) even if the reduced penalty otherwise falls within the exclusive
jurisdiction of an inferior court.
In People v. Buissan, 6 the Court also said:
xxx xxx xxx
. . . It is unquestionable that the Court of First Instance,
taking cognizance of a criminal case coming under its
jurisdiction, may, after trial, impose a penalty that is
proper for a crime within the exclusive competence of a
municipal or city court as the evidence would warrant.
It may not be said, therefore, that the Court of First
Instance would be acting without jurisdiction if in a
simple seduction case, it would impose penalty of not
more than six months of imprisonment, if said case, for
the reason already adverted to, be held to fall under
the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, not a city
or municipal court. 7 (Emphasis supplied.)
In the case at bar, the increased penalty provided for the offense charged in
Criminal Case No. 7362 by P.D. No. 818 (prison mayor in its medium period) is
obviously heavier than the penalty provided for the same offense originally
imposed by paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code (up
to prision correccional in its minimum period).
Should the criminal information be refiled in the proper court, that is, the
proper Regional Trial Court, that court may not impose that more onerous
penalty upon private respondent Libertad Lagon (assuming the evidence
shows that the offense was committed before 22 October 1975). But the
Regional Trial Court would remain vested with subject-matter jurisdiction to
try and decide the (refiled) case even though the penalty properly imposable,
given the date of the commission of the offense charged, should be the lower
penalty originally provided for in paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised
Penal Code which is otherwise within the exclusive jurisdiction of the City
Court of Roxas City. In other words, the circumstance that P.D. No. 818 would
be inapplicable to the refiled case would not result in the Regional Trial Court
losing subject-matter jurisdiction, nor in the case falling back into the City
Court's exclusive jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to DENY the Petition for Review for lack of
merit. The Order dated 2 December 1976 of the public respondent Presiding
Judge of the City Court of Roxas City is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.

Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 168168 September 14, 2005
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
EDGARDO DIMAANO, Appellant.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
On January 26, 1996, Maricar Dimaano charged her father, Edgardo Dimaano
with two (2) counts of rape and one (1) count of attempted rape in the
complaints which read as follows:
Criminal Case No. 96-125
That sometime in the year 1993 in the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, by means of force and intimidation, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the
undersigned complainant Maricar Dimaano y Victoria, who is his own
daughter, a minor 10 years of age, against her will and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.1
Criminal Case No. 96-150
That on or about the 29th day of December 1995, in the Municipality of
Paraaque, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
carnal knowledge of the undersigned complainant Maricar Dimaano y
Victoria, who is his own daughter, a minor 12 years of age, against her will
and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
Criminal Case No. 96-151
That on or about the 1st day of January 1996, in the Municipality of
Paraaque, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, try and attempt to rape one
Maricar Dimaano y Victoria, thus commencing the commission of the crime
of Rape, directly by overt acts, but nevertheless did not perform all the acts
of execution which would produce it, as a consequence by reason of cause
other than his spontaneous desistance that is due to the timely arrival of the
complainant's mother.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
Appellant pleaded not guilty to the charges.4 Thereafter, trial on the merits
ensued.
Complainant was born on August 26, 1983, and was 10 years old when she
was first sexually abused in the morning of September 1993. While inside
their house in Sucat, Paraaque, appellant entered her room and laid down
beside her. He removed her clothes and asked her to lie face down then
inserted his penis into her anus. Complainant cried and felt so much pain, but
she kept the incident to herself as her father might hurt her.5
A few days later, appellant again ravished her. After removing his clothes, he
asked her to lie on her side facing him and to place her thigh over his. While
in that position, appellant inserted his penis into her vagina which caused
tremendous pain.6 As in the first incident, complainant kept the ordeal to
herself. It was only in November 1995 that she confided the sexual abuses to
her mother.
On December 29, 1995, appellant again assaulted her daughter. While
leaning on the kitchen sink, he raised her t-shirt, fondled and kissed her
breasts. He then removed their shorts, fondled her vagina and inserted his
penis, but when her brother Edwin went out of his room, appellant
immediately asked her to dress up.7
The last sexual assault happened in the afternoon of January 1, 1996.
Appellant laid complainant down on the sofa then placed himself on top of
her and made pumping motion even with their shorts on. Appellant stopped
only when he heard the arrival of his wife.8
On January 3, 1996, complainant and her mother visited a relative in Cainta,
Rizal, who upon learning of the abuses done by the appellant, advised them
to go to Camp Crame where they filed a complaint.9 The Medico-Legal Officer
at the PNP Crime Laboratory examined complainant and found her to have
suffered deep healed hymenal lacerations and was in a non-virgin state.10
Appellant denied the accusations against him. He testified that he married
Maria Loreto V. Dimaano on December 25, 1976 and begot three children
with her, namely, Edwin, Eric, and Maricar. He alleged that he worked in
several companies abroad11 but admitted that he was in the Philippines in
September 1993. He contended though that he could not have raped
complainant because he was always in the office from 7:00 a.m. until 9:00
p.m. waiting to be dispatched to another assignment overseas.12
He claimed it was impossible for him to rape his daughter on December 29,
1995 or January 1, 1996 because there were other people in the house. He
argued that had he raped complainant, then she would not have
accompanied him to the Paraaque Police Station and Barangay Hall of San
Antonio to apply for police clearance and barangay I.D., and to Uniwide
Shopping Center at Sucat, Paraaque, where they applied for membership at
the Video City Club.13 He also maintained that the fact that his daughter was
in a non-virgin state did not conclusively prove that he was responsible for it
because it is also possible that his daughter had sexual intercourse with
another man her age.14
The trial court found the testimony of complainant to be spontaneous and
credible. She narrated the obscene details of her harrowing experience which
no girl of tender age would have known unless she herself had experienced
it. It found the delay in reporting the rape understandable due to the fear
complainant had of her father who had moral ascendancy over her. Also, the
quarrel between complainant's parents was not sufficient motive for the wife
to lodge a serious charge of rape against appellant. It disregarded the
Compromise Agreement and the Salaysay sa Pag-uurong ng Sumbong since
complainant was not assisted by a lawyer when she signed the same.
Besides, she testified in open court that she was pursuing the case against
her father. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the accused Edgardo Dimaano is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crimes of rape (2 counts) and the crime of
attempted rape. For the rape committed in September 1993, he is sentenced
to a penalty of reclusion perpetua. For the rape on December 29, 1995, he is
imposed the supreme penalty of death. And for the crime of attempted rape,
applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act No. 4103 as amended), he is
sentenced to a penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prision
correccional medium to 10 years and 1 day to 12 years of prision
mayor maximum. He is ordered to indemnify the victim the amount of
P50,000.00 and to pay exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000.00.
SO ORDERED.15
The Court of Appeals affirmed with modifications the decision of the trial
court, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 31 May 2000 of the
Regional Trial Court of Paraaque City, Branch 257 convicting accused-
appellant Edgardo Dimaano of the crime of rape is AFFIRMED with the
following MODIFICATIONS:
In Criminal Case No. 96-125, the accused-appellant EDGARDO DIMAANO as
found guilty of rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code and
sentenced to a penalty of reclusion perpetua is also ordered to pay the victim
MARICAR DIMAANO Php50,000.00 as civil indemnity; Php50,000.00 as moral
damages and Php25,0000.00 as exemplary damages.
In Criminal Case No. 96-150, the accused-appellant EDGARDO DIMAANO, as
found guilty of qualified rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Section 11 of Republic Act 7659, and sentenced to death
penalty, is also ordered to pay the victim MARICAR DIMAANO Php75,000.00
as civil indemnity; Php75,000.00 as moral damages and Php25,000.00 as
exemplary damages.
In Criminal Case No. 96-151, the accused-appellant EDGARDO DIMAANO as
found guilty of attempted rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended by Section 11 of Republic Act 7659, is hereby sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of 4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 6 years of prision
correccional as minimum to 8 years and 1 day to 10 years of prision mayor as
maximum. Accused-appellant is also ordered to pay the victim MARICAR
DIMAANO Php30,000.00 as civil indemnity, Php25,000.00 as moral damages,
and Php10,000.00 as exemplary damages.
In accordance with Sec. 13, Rule 124 of the Amended Rules to Govern Review
of Death Penalty Cases (A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, effective 15 October 2004), this
case is CERTIFIED to the Supreme Court for review.
Let the entire record of this case be elevated to the Supreme Court.
SO ORDERED.16 A: No, Maam.

In his Brief, appellant raises the following issues: Q: Why not?

I. WHETHER OR NOT THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE A: Because I was afraid of my father.
PROSECUTION HAS OVERCOME THE PRESUMPTION OF
INNOCENCE OF THE ACCUSED.
Q: Why are you afraid of your father?

II. WHETHER OR NOR THE VOLUNTARY AND DUE EXECUTION OF

A: Because he might hurt me.
THE AFFIDAVIT OF DESISTANCE BY THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT
SHOULD HAVE BEEN DULY CONSIDERED AS A FACTOR WHICH PUT
TO DOUBT THE REASONS BEHIND THE FILING OF THE CRIMINAL Q: After that incident in September 1993, do you recall any other incident
CHARGES OF RAPE AGAINST HEREIN ACCUSED.17 that occurred?

Appellant contends that if complainant's accusations were true, then she A: There is, Maam.
could have reported them to the authorities when she accompanied him to
Paraaque Police Station and the Barangay Hall of San Antonio or to their Q: When was it?
relatives when she had the opportunity to do so. He also argues that had the
trial court considered the Compromise Agreement and Sinumpaang Salaysay
ng Pag-uurong ng Sumbong, it would have known that complainant was only A: After a few days after the first incident.
pressured by her mother into filing the complaint.
Q: After he entered your room, what happened next?
We are not persuaded.
A: He laid beside me and he removed my clothes.
This credibility given by the trial court to the rape victim is an important
aspect of evidence which appellate courts can rely on because of its unique Q: What did your father do with the clothes he was wearing?
opportunity to observe the witnesses, particularly their demeanor, conduct
and attitude during direct and cross-examination by counsel.18 Absent any
showing that the trial judge overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some A: He removed his clothes.
facts or circumstances of weight which would affect the result of the case, his
assessment of credibility deserves the appellate court's highest respect.19 Q: After removing his clothes, what happened next, if any?

It is likewise well established that the testimony of a rape victim is generally A: We were lying in my bed and he asked me to lie on my side ' pinatagilid
given full weight and credit, more so if she is a minor. The revelation of an niya ako.
innocent child whose chastity has been abused deserves full credit, as her
willingness to undergo the trouble and the humiliation of a public trial is an
Q: After he asked you to lie down on your side, what happened next, if any?
eloquent testament to the truth of her complaint. In so testifying, she could
only have been impelled to tell the truth, especially in the absence of proof
of ill motive.20 A: He asked me to raise my right leg and placed it on his side because he was
then lying on his side.
In the case at bar, the trial court and the Court of Appeals gave credence to
the testimony of the complainant who was only 12 years old when she Q: After he asked you to place your right thigh over his left thigh, what
narrated to the court the violations of her person as follows: happened next, if any?

For rape committed in September 1993: A: He inserted his penis into my organ.21

ATTY. AMBROSIO: For rape committed on December 29, 1995:

When was the first time that he committed sexual assault upon you? Q: On December 29, 1995, do you remember of any unusual incident that
happened?
A: September 1993.
A: There was, Maam.
COURT:
Q: What is that incident?
No specific date?
A: I was raped by my father on that day.
A: I cannot remember, Maam.
Q: Where were you on that day when you said he raped you?
ATTY. AMBROSIO:
A: I was then at the kitchen of our house.
Can you remember how old were you at that time?
Q: What were you doing at the kitchen at that time?
A: 10 years old, Maam.
A: I was then sitting at our dining set.
Q: So, after he removed your T-shirt, bra and pan(t)y and shorts, what
happened next, if anything happened? Q: What about your father, what he doing?

A: He asked me to lie face down. Pinadapa po niya ako. A: He was cooking.

Q: After he asked you to lie face down, what happened next? Q: What happened while sitting at the dining set, if any?

RECORD: The witness is crying. A: He told me to approach him.

A: He inserted in my anus ' ipinasok niya ang titi niya sa puwet ko. Q: After you approached him, what happened next?

Q: Did you tell anybody about what happened to you? A: I was leaning then at the kitchen sink and he asked me to embrace him.
 Q: What happened after you embraced him? Q: What about your father, how was he dressed at that time?

A: After that, he raised my T-shirt. A: Shorts and T-shirt.

Q: After raising your T-shirt, what happened next? Q: After raising your bra and T-shirt, what happened next?

A: He held my breast. A: While he was kissing my breast, we were already lying on the sofa, then he
went on top of me.
Q: After that, what happened next?
Q: After he went on top of you, what happened next, if any?
A: He kept kissing my breast.
A: He was forcing to insert his penis while we were still wearing shorts.
Q: How many times did he kiss your breast?
Q: So, you mean to say, you were still wearing shorts at that time?
A: Many times.
A: Yes, Maam.
Q: What happened next after he kissed you breast?
Q: What happened next when he was forcing to push his penis into your
vagina?
A: He put my shorts down.

A: It did not push through because my mother suddenly arrived.23

Q: After putting your shorts down, what happened next, if any?

The trial court believed the complainant and held that:

A: He also put down my panty.

The testimony of Maricar of her ignominious experience contains all the

Q: After putting down your panty, what happened next, if any?
indicia of truth. It is spontaneous, direct and clear. It is vivid and complete
with details. Her testimony is truthful and convincing. Her credibility is
A: He held my organ. beyond question.

ATTY. MALLARES: The Court believes that at her tender age, Maricar could not make public the
offense, undergo the troubles and humiliation of public trial and endure the
At this juncture, Your Honor, may we request witness to be more specific ordeal of testifying to all its gory details if she has not in fact been raped. The
with respect to organ. Court believes that a girl who is only twelve (12) years old would not
ordinarily file a rape complaint against anybody, much less her own father, if
it is not true.24
ATTY. AMBROSIO:

We have painstakingly reviewed the evidence on record and found no cogent

When you say organ', what do you mean? reason to disturb the findings of the trial court and the appellate court.

A: Pekpek. Contrary to appellant's assertion, complainant's credibility was not

diminished by her failure to report the sexual abuses to the authorities and
COURT: Proceed. her relatives despite opportunities to do so. Delay in reporting the rape
incidents, especially in the face of threats of physical violence, cannot be
taken against the victim, more so when the lecherous attacker is her own
ANSWER: father. Strong apprehensions brought about by fear, stress, or anxiety can
easily put the offended party to doubt or even distrust what should
After he held my vagina, he also put down his shorts and brief. otherwise be a positive attitude of bringing the culprit to justice. The Court
has thus considered justified the filing of complaints for rape months, even
years, after the commission of the offense.25
Q: After putting down his shorts and brief, what happened next?

In the case at bar, the delay of more than two years is not an indication that
A: He inserted his penis into my vagina.22
the charges were fabricated for complainant's reactions were consistent with
reason. Her complete obedience to appellant, her lack of struggle and the
For Attempted rape committed on January 1, 1996: studied silence she kept about her ordeal were all brought about by genuine
fear posed by her own father against her.
Q: Do you recall of any incident that happened on Jan 1, 199[6] 3:00 to 4:00
P.M.? Appellant's reliance on complainant's affidavit of desistance deserves scant
consideration. A survey of our jurisprudence reveals that the court attaches
A: We were in our sala on the sofa. no persuasive value to a desistance, especially when executed as an
afterthought. The unreliable character of this document is shown by the fact
that it is quite incredible that a victim, after going through the trouble of
Q: When you say 'we', who are those you are referring to? having the appellant arrested by the police, positively identifying him as the
person who raped her, enduring the humiliation of a physical examination of
A: Me and my father. her private parts, repeating her accusations in open court and recounting her
anguish in detail, will suddenly turn around and declare that she is no longer
interested in pursuing the case.26
Q: While you and your father were in the living room and on the sofa, what
happened?
Too, complainant repudiated the affidavit of desistance in open court by
stating that no lawyer assisted her when she affixed her signature27 and had
A: While we were on the sofa, my father was then raising my T-shirt and shown her resolve to continue with the prosecution of the cases.28 Besides,
kissing my breast. the trial court is not bound to dismiss the cases, as it is still within its
discretion whether or not to proceed with the prosecution,29 considering that
Q: What were you wearing at that time? the compromise agreement and the affidavit of desistance were executed
long after the cases have been filed in court.
A: Shorts, T-shirt, bra and panty.
Moreover, a criminal offense is an outrage to the sovereign State and to the
State belongs the power to prosecute and punish crimes.30 By itself, an
Q: What did your father do with your shorts, T-shirt and bra?
affidavit of desistance is not a ground for the dismissal of an action, once it
has been instituted in court. A private complainant loses the right or absolute
A: He raised them. privilege to decide whether the rape charge should proceed, because the
case was already filed and must therefore continue to be heard by the trial
court.31
In addition, a careful scrutiny of the affidavit of desistance reveals that
complainant never retracted her allegation that she was raped by her father.
Neither did she give any exculpatory fact that would raise doubts about the
rape. All she stated in the affidavit was that she had decided to withdraw the
complaints after the appellant agreed not to disturb the complainant; to
consent to annul his marriage; allow his wife to solely manage the conjugal
properties; and entrust the custody of his children to his wife. Rather than
contradict, this affidavit reinforces complainant's testimony that appellant
raped her on several occasions.
The gravamen of the offense of rape is sexual congress with a woman by
force and without consent.1âwphi1 If the woman is under 12 years of age,
proof of force and consent becomes immaterial not only because force is not
an element of statutory rape, but the absence of a free consent is presumed.
Conviction will therefore lie, provided sexual intercourse is proven. But if the
woman is 12 years of age or over at the time she was violated, sexual
intercourse must be proven and also that it was done through force,
violence, intimidation or threat.32
We have ruled that in incestuous rape of a minor, actual force or intimidation
need not even be employed where the overpowering moral influence of
appellant, who is private complainant's father, would suffice. The moral and
physical dominion of the father is sufficient to cow the victim into submission
to his beastly desires.33 The instant case is no exception. Appellant took
advantage of his moral and physical ascendancy to unleash his lechery upon
his daughter.
Hence, under the above circumstances, we affirm the trial court's conviction
in Criminal Case Nos. 96-125 and 96-150 for the crimes of rape committed in
September 1993 and on December 29, 1995. However, we acquit appellant
in Criminal Case No. 96-151 for the crime of attempted rape for failure to
allege in the complaint the specific acts constitutive of attempted rape.
The complaint for attempted rape in Criminal Case No. 96-151 is again
quoted as follows:
That on or about the 1st day of January 1996, in the Municipality of
Paraaque, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, try and attempt to rape one
Maricar Dimaano y Victoria, thus commencing the commission of the crime
of Rape, directly by overt acts, but nevertheless did not perform all the acts
of execution which would produce it, as a consequence by reason of cause
other than his spontaneous desistance that is due to the timely arrival of the
complainant's mother.
CONTRARY TO LAW.34
For complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state the name of the
accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the
offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and
the place wherein the offense was committed.35 What is controlling is not the
title of the complaint, nor the designation of the offense charged or the
particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, these being mere
conclusions of law made by the prosecutor, but the description of the crime
charged and the particular facts therein recited.36 The acts or omissions
complained of must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to enable a person
of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged,
and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment. No information for a
crime will be sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly allege the
elements of the crime charged. Every element of the offense must be stated
in the information. What facts and circumstances are necessary to be
included therein must be determined by reference to the definitions and
essentials of the specified crimes. The requirement of alleging the elements
of a crime in the information is to inform the accused of the nature of the
accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably prepare his defense.
The presumption is that the accused has no independent knowledge of the
facts that constitute the offense.37
Notably, the above-cited complaint upon which the appellant was arraigned
does not allege specific acts or omission constituting the elements of the
crime of rape. Neither does it constitute sufficient allegation of elements for
crimes other than rape, i.e., Acts of Lasciviousness. The allegation therein
that the appellant 'tr[ied] and attempt[ed] to rape the complainant does not
satisfy the test of sufficiency of a complaint or information, but is merely a
conclusion of law by the one who drafted the complaint. This insufficiency
therefore prevents this Court from rendering a judgment of conviction;
otherwise we would be violating the right of the appellant to be informed of
the nature of the accusation against him.
The trial court correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua in Criminal
Case No. 96-125 as the rape was committed in September 1993 prior to the
effectivity of R.A. No. 7659, otherwise known as the Death Penalty Law, on
December 31, 1993. Prior to R.A. No. 7659, Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code imposes the penalty of reclusion perpetua for the the crime of rape,
when committed against a woman who is under 12 years old or is demented.
Anent the rape in Criminal Case No. 96-150 which was committed on
December 29, 1995, Article 335, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, thus applies.
It provides:
ART. 335. When and how rape is committed. - Rape is committed by having
carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed
with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a
parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity
within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the
victim.
In Criminal Case No. 96-150, appellant was correctly sentenced to death as
the special qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship were
properly alleged in the information and proved during trial by the
testimonies of the complainant, her mother and the appellant himself; they
were also supported by the photocopy of the marriage certificate and birth
certificate, respectively.
In the case of People v. Cayabyab,38 this Court, in affirming the death penalty,
held that a photocopy of the birth certificate is admissible to prove the age of
the victim, as the original thereof is a public record in the custody of a public
officer. The admission of this secondary evidence is one of the exceptions to
the 'best evidence rule under Section 3, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence. Further, we held that production of the original may be dispensed
with, in the trial court's discretion, whenever the opponent does not bona
fide dispute the contents of the document and no other useful purpose will
be served by requiring its production.
Indubitably, the marriage and birth certificates are public records in the
custody of the local civil registrar who is a public officer. The presentation,
therefore of their photocopies is admissible as secondary evidence to prove
their contents. It is also well to note that appellant did not dispute their
contents when offered as evidence to prove relationship and minority.
Having failed to raise a valid and timely objection against the presentation of
this secondary evidence the same became a primary evidence, and deemed
admitted and the other party is bound thereby.39
Anent the awards of damages, the Court of Appeals correctly modified the
awards of civil indemnity and exemplary damages, which the trial court
lumped together for all the crimes committed, by separately awarding the
sums of P50,000.0040 and P75,000.0041 as civil indemnity in Criminal Case
Nos. 96-125 and 96-150, respectively, and P25,000.0042 as exemplary
damages, for each count of rape, in line with the prevailing jurisprudence.
The award of civil indemnity, which is in the nature of actual or
compensatory damages, is mandatory upon a conviction for rape.43 On the
other hand, exemplary damages is awarded when the commission of the
offense is attended by an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or
qualifying.44
Finally, the awards of P50,000.0045 and P75,000.0046 as moral damages in
Criminal Case Nos. 96-125 and 96-150, respectively, by the Court of Appeals
are also sustained in line with the prevailing jurisprudence. The award of
moral damages is automatically granted in rape cases without need of
further proof other than the commission of the crime because it is assumed
that a rape victim has actually suffered moral injuries entitling her to such
award. 47
WHEREFORE , the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.00263
affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque City, Branch
257, in Criminal Cases Nos. 96-125 and 96-150, finding appellant Edgardo
Dimaano GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape committed
against his own daughter, Maricar Dimaano, and sentencing him to reclusion
perpetua and DEATH, respectively; and ordering him to pay the complainant
in Criminal Case No. 96-125 the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, and in
Criminal Case No. 96-150 the amounts of 75,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages,
is AFFIRMED. Appellant is however ACQUITTED for the crime of attempted
rape in Criminal Case No. 96-151 for failure of the complaint to allege the
specific acts or omissions constituting the offense.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 143193 June 29, 2005
MELBAROSE R. SASOT and ALLANDALE R. SASOT, petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, The Honorable court of of appeals, and
REBECCA G. SALVADOR, Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 1, Manila, respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
The case subject of the present special civil action for certiorari is a criminal
prosecution against petitioners for unfair competition under Article 189 of
the Revised Penal Code, filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila
(Branch 1), and docketed as Criminal Case No. 98-166147.1
Some time in May 1997, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
conducted an investigation pursuant to a complaint by the NBA Properties,
Inc., against petitioners for possible violation of Article 189 of the Revised
Penal Code on unfair competition. In its Report dated June 4, 1997, the NBI
stated that NBA Properties, Inc., is a foreign corporation organized under the
laws of the United States of America, and is the registered owner of NBA
trademarks and names of NBA basketball teams such as "USA Basketball,"
"Chicago Bulls," "Orlando Magic," "Los Angeles Lakers," "Rockets," "Phoenix
Suns," "Bullets," "Pacers," "Charlotte Hornets," "Blazers," "Denver Nuggets,"
"Sacramento Kings," "Miami Heat," Utah Jazz," "Detroit Pistons," "Milwaukee
Bucks," "Seattle Sonics," "Toronto Raptors," "Atlanta Hawks," "Cavs," "Dallas
Mavericks," "Minnesota Timberwolves," and "Los Angeles Clippers." These
names are used on hosiery, footwear, t-shirts, sweatshirts, tank tops,
pajamas, sport shirts, and other garment products, which are allegedly
registered with the Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer.
The Report further stated that during the investigation, it was discovered
that petitioners are engaged in the manufacture, printing, sale, and
distribution of counterfeit "NBA" garment products. Hence, it recommended
petitioners’ prosecution for unfair competition under Article 189 of the
Revised Penal Code.2
In a Special Power of Attorney dated October 7, 1997, Rick Welts, as
President of NBA Properties, Inc., constituted the law firm of Ortega, Del
Castillo, Bacorro, Odulio, Calma & Carbonell, as the company’s attorney-in-
fact, and to act for and on behalf of the company, in the filing of criminal,
civil and administrative complaints, among others.3 The Special Power of
Attorney was notarized by Nicole Brown of New York County and certified by
Norman Goodman, County Clerk and Clerk of the Supreme Court of the State
of New York. Consul Cecilia B. Rebong of the Consulate General of the
Philippines, New York, authenticated the certification.4 Welts also executed a
Complaint-Affidavit on February 12, 1998, before Notary Public Nicole J.
Brown of the State of New York.5
Thereafter, in a Resolution dated July 15, 1998, Prosecution Attorney Aileen
Marie S. Gutierrez recommended the filing of an Information against
petitioners for violation of Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code.6 The
accusatory portion of the Information reads:
That on or about May 9, 1997 and on dates prior thereto, in the City of
Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
above named accused ALLANDALE SASOT and MELBAROSE SASOT of
Allandale Sportslines, Inc., did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously manufacture and sell various garment products bearing the
appearance of "NBA" names, symbols and trademarks, inducing the public to
believe that the goods offered by them are those of "NBA" to the damage
and prejudice of the NBA Properties, Inc., the trademark owner of the "NBA".
CONTRARY TO LAW.7
Before arraignment, petitioners filed a Motion to Quash the Information on
the following grounds:
I. THAT THE FACTS CHARGED DO NOT CONSTITUTE AN OFFENSE
II. AND THIS HONORABLE COURT HAD NO JURISDICTION OVER THE OFFENSE
CHARGED OR THE PERSON OF THE ACCUSED8
In support of the foregoing, petitioners argue that the fiscal should have
dismissed Welts’s complaint because under the rules, the complaint must be
sworn to before the prosecutor and the copy on record appears to be only a
fax transmittal.9 They also contend that complainant is a foreign corporation
not doing business in the Philippines, and cannot be protected by Philippine
patent laws since it is not a registered patentee. Petitioners aver that they
have been using the business name "ALLANDALE SPORTSLINE, INC." since
1972, and their designs are original and do not appear to be similar to
complainant’s, and they do not use complainant’s logo or design.10
The trial prosecutor of the RTC-Manila (Branch 1), Jaime M. Guray, filed his
Comment/Opposition to the motion to quash, stating that he has the original
copy of the complaint, and that complainant has an attorney-in-fact to
represent it. Prosecutor Guray also contended that the State is entitled to
prosecute the offense even without the participation of the private offended
party, as the crime charged is a public crime.11
The trial court sustained the prosecution’s arguments and denied petitioners’
motion to quash in its Order dated March 5, 1999.12
Petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals
(CA) docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 52151 which was dismissed per its Decision
dated January 26, 2000.13 According to the CA, the petition is not the proper
remedy in assailing a denial of a motion to quash, and that the grounds
raised therein should be raised during the trial of the case on the
merits.14 The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for certiorari is hereby
DISMISSED. Respondent court is hereby ordered to conduct further
proceedings with dispatch in Criminal Case No. 98-166147.
SO ORDERED.15
Petitioners sought reconsideration of the Decision but this was denied by the
CA.16
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, with issues raised as follows:
1. WHETHER A FOREIGN CORPORATION NOT ENGAGED AND LICENSE (sic) TO
DO BUSINESS IN THE PHILIPPINES MAY MAINTAIN A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR
UNFAIR COMPETITION.
2. WHETHER AN OFFICER OF A FOREIGN CORPORATION MAY ACT IN BEHALF
OF A CORPORATION WITHOUT AUTHORITY FROM ITS BOARD OF DIRECTORS.
3. WHETHER A FOREIGN CORPORATION NOT ENGAGED IN BUSINESS AND
WHOSE EMBLEM IT SOUGHT TO PROTECT IS NOT IN ACTUAL USE IS ENTITLED
TO THE PROTECTION OF THE PHILIPPINE LAW.
4. WHETHER THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY
ASSUMED JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE AND THE PERSONS OF THE
ACCUSED.
5. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT DISMISSED
THE PETITION.17
Petitioners reiterate the argument that the complaint filed by Rick Welts of
the NBA Properties, Inc., is defective and should have been dismissed by the
fiscal because it should have been personally sworn to by the complainant
before the investigating prosecutor. They also reiterate the claim that Welts
failed to show any board resolution showing his authority to institute any
action in behalf of the company, and that the NBA’s trademarks are not being
actually used in the Philippines, hence, they are of public dominion and
cannot be protected by Philippine patent laws. Petitioners further contend
that they have not committed acts amounting to unfair competition.18
The Office of the Solicitor General appeared in behalf of the People, and filed
its Amended Comment to the petition, praying for its dismissal, arguing that
the CA did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the
petition for reasons stated in its Decision dated January 26, 2000.19
The petition must be denied.
The Court has consistently held that a special civil action for certiorari is not
the proper remedy to assail the denial of a motion to quash an
information.20 The proper procedure in such a case is for the accused to enter
a plea, go to trial without prejudice on his part to present the special
defenses he had invoked in his motion to quash and, if after trial on the
merits, an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner
authorized by law.21 Thus, petitioners should not have forthwith filed a
special civil action for certiorari with the CA and instead, they should have
gone to trial and reiterate the special defenses contained in their motion to
quash. There are no special or exceptional circumstances22 in the present
case such that immediate resort to a filing of a petition for certiorari should
be permitted. Clearly, the CA did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing the petition.
Moreover, the Court does not find any justification for the quashal of the
Information filed against petitioners.
For one, while petitioners raise in their motion to quash the grounds that the printing, selling, and distributing counterfeit "NBA" garment
facts charged do not constitute an offense and that the trial court has no products.32
jurisdiction over the offense charged or the person of the accused,23 their
arguments focused on an alleged defect in the complaint filed before the
Consequently, if the information is valid on its face, and there is no showing
fiscal, complainant’s capacity to sue and petitioners’ exculpatory defenses
of manifest error, grave abuse of discretion and prejudice on the part of
against the crime of unfair competition.
public prosecutor, as in the present case, the trial court should respect such
determination.33
Section 3, Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which was then
in force at the time the alleged criminal acts were committed, enumerates
More importantly, the crime of Unfair Competition punishable under Article
the grounds for quashing an information, to wit:
189 of the Revised Penal Code34 is a public crime. It is essentially an act
against the State and it is the latter which principally stands as the injured
a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense; party. The complainant’s capacity to sue in such case becomes immaterial.

b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the
offense charged or the person of the accused;
c) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to
do so;
In La Chemise Lacoste, S.A. vs. Fernandez,35 a case akin to the present
dispute, as it involved the crime of Unfair Competition under Article 189 of
the Revised Penal Code, and the quashal of search warrants issued against
manufacturers of garments bearing the same trademark as that of the
petitioner, the Court succinctly ruled that:

d) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;
e) That more than one offense is charged except in those cases in
which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various
offenses;
f) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
g) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a
legal excuse or justification; and
h) That the accused has been previously convicted or in jeopardy
of being convicted, or acquitted of the offense charged.
Nowhere in the foregoing provision is there any mention of the defect in the
complaint filed before the fiscal and the complainant’s capacity to sue as
grounds for a motion to quash.
For another, under Section 3, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure, a complaint is substantially sufficient if it states the known
address of the respondent, it is accompanied by complainant’s affidavit and
his witnesses and supporting documents, and the affidavits are sworn to
before any fiscal, state prosecutor or government official authorized to
administer oath, or in their absence or unavailability, a notary public who
must certify that he personally examined the affiants and that he is satisfied
that they voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits. All these have
been duly satisfied in the complaint filed before Prosecution Attorney Aileen
Marie S. Gutierrez. It must be noted that even the absence of an oath in the
complaint does not necessarily render it invalid.24 Want of oath is a mere
defect of form, which does not affect the substantial rights of the defendant
on the merits.25
In this case, Welts’s Complaint-Affidavit contains an acknowledgement by
Notary Public Nicole Brown of the State of New York that the same has been
subscribed and sworn to before her on February 12, 1998,26 duly
authenticated by the Philippine Consulate. While the copy on record of the
complaint-affidavit appears to be merely a photocopy thereof, Prosecution
Attorney Gutierrez stated that complainant’s representative will present the
authenticated notarized original in court,27 and Prosecutor Guray manifested
that the original copy is already on hand.28 It is apt to state at this point that
the prosecutor enjoys the legal presumption of regularity in the performance
of his duties and functions, which in turn gives his report the presumption of
accuracy.29
More important is the nature of the case which led to this petition. What
preceded this petition for certiorari was a letter-complaint filed before the
NBI charging Hemandas with a criminal offense, i.e., violation of Article 189
of the Revised Penal Code. If prosecution follows after the completion of the
preliminary investigation being conducted by the Special Prosecutor the
information shall be in the name of the People of the Philippines and no
longer the petitioner which is only an aggrieved party since a criminal offense
is essentially an act against the State. It is the latter which is principally the
injured party although there is a private right violated. Petitioner's capacity
to sue would become, therefore, of not much significance in the main case.
We cannot allow a possible violator of our criminal statutes to escape
prosecution upon a far-fetched contention that the aggrieved party or victim
of a crime has no standing to sue.
In upholding the right of the petitioner to maintain the present suit before
our courts for unfair competition or infringement of trademarks of a foreign
corporation, we are moreover recognizing our duties and the rights of
foreign states under the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property to which the Philippines and France are parties. We are simply
interpreting and enforcing a solemn international commitment of the
Philippines embodied in a multilateral treaty to which we are a party and
which we entered into because it is in our national interest to do
so.36 (Emphasis supplied)
Lastly, with regard to petitioners’ arguments that the NBA Properties, Inc., is
not entitled to protection under Philippine patent laws since it is not a
registered patentee, that they have not committed acts amounting to unfair
competition for the reason that their designs are original and do not appear
to be similar to complainant’s, and they do not use complainant’s logo or
design, the Court finds that these are matters of defense that are better
ventilated and resolved during trial on the merits of the case.
WHERFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Let the records of this
case be REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch 24) where
Criminal Case No. 98-166147 is presently assigned, for further proceedings
with reasonable dispatch.
SO ORDERED.

Moreover, records show that there are other supporting documents from
which the prosecutor based his recommendation, to wit:

(1) The NBI Report dated June 4, 1997, containing an account of

the investigation conducted from April 30, 1997 to May 9, 1997,
and the subsequent search and seizure of several items from
petitioners’ establishment;30

(2) The letter dated May 8, 1997 from the law firm of Ortega, Del
Castillo, Bacorro, Odulio, Calma & Carbonell to the NBI, seeking
assistance in stopping the illegal manufacture, distribution and
sale of "fake products bearing the ‘NBA’ trademark, and in
prosecuting the proprietors of aforesaid factory;"31 and

(3) The Joint Affidavit executed by Rechie D. Malicse and Dalisay

P. Bal-ot of the Pinkerton Consulting Services (Phils.) Inc., which
was certified to by Prosecution Attorney Gutierrez, attesting to
their findings that petitioners were found to be manufacturing,
 SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 129472. April 12, 2005]
MARCELO LASOY and FELIX BANISA, Petitioners, v. HON. MONINA A.
ZENAROSA, PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC, BR. 76, QUEZON CITY, and THE PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
After an information has been filed and the accused had been arraigned,
pleaded guilty and were convicted and after they had applied for probation,
may the information be amended and the accused arraigned anew on the
ground that the information was allegedly altered/tampered
with?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In an Information filed by Assistant City Prosecutor Evelyn Dimaculangan-
Querijero dated 03 July 1996,1 accused Marcelo Lasoy and Felix Banisa were
charged as follows:
That on or about the 2nd day of July, 1996, in Quezon City, Philippines, the
above-named accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually
helping each other, not having been authorized by law to sell, dispense,
deliver, transport or distribute any prohibited drug, did, then and there,
willfully, unlawfully sell or offer for sale a total of 42.410 grams of dried
marijuana fruiting tops, a prohibited drug, in violation of said law.
The case docketed as Criminal Case No. 96-66788 was assigned and raffled to
Branch 103 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, presided by
Judge Jaime N. Salazar, Jr.
Upon arraignment, both accused pleaded guilty and were sentenced on 16
July 1996 in this wise:2
On arraignment accused MARCELO LASOY and FELIX BANISA with the
assistance of [their] counsel Atty. Diosdado Savellano entered a plea of
GUILTY to the crime charged against them in the information.
ACCORDINGLY, the court hereby find[s] accused MARCELO LASOY and FELIX
BANISA, GUILTY of Violation of Section 4, Republic Act 6425 and they are
hereby sentenced to suffer a jail term of SIX (6) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY
and the period during which said accused are under detention is hereby
deducted pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act 5127.
The evidence in this case which is the 42.410 grams of dried marijuana
fruiting tops is hereby ordered confiscated in favor of the government. The
Property Custodian is ordered to turn over said evidences to the Dangerous
Drugs Board for proper disposition.
On the same date, both accused applied for probation under Presidential
Decree No. 968, as amended.3
On 28 August 1996, plaintiff People of the Philippines, thru Assistant City
Prosecutor Ma. Aurora Escasa-Ramos, filed two separate motions, first, to
admit amended Information,4 and second, to set aside the arraignment of
the accused, as well as the decision of the trial court dated 16 July 1996.5 In
plaintiff's motion to admit amended information, it alleged:
1. That for some unknown reason both accused herein were charged of (sic)
Violation of Sec. 4, Art. II, R.P. 6425.
That on or about the 2nd day of July, 1996, in Quezon City, Philippines, the
above-named accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually
helping each other, not having been authorized by law to sell, dispense,
deliver, transport or distribute any prohibited drug, did, then and there,
willfully, unlawfully sell, or offer for sale a total of 42.410 grams of dried
marijuana fruiting tops, a prohibited drug, in violation of said law.
When in truth and in fact the said accused should be charged for
transportation and delivery, with intent to sell and to gain, of Forty-Five (45)
pieces of dried marijuana fruiting tops weighing 42.410 kilos from La Trinidad
to Metro Manila.
2. That it is imperative to file an amended information in order to make it
conformable to the evidence on hand.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing it is most respectfully prayed that the
herewith attached Amended Information against both accused be admitted
and subsequently set for arraignment and trial.6 (Emphasis
supplied)ςrαlαωlιbrαrÿ
Resolving the motions, the trial court, in its Order dated 03 September
1996,7 held:
The Motion to Admit Amended Information is hereby DENIED, as this court
has already decided this case on the basis that the accused was arrested in
possession of 42.410 grams of marijuana and it is too late at this stage to
amend the information.
Another Order8 of the same date issued by the trial court resolved the
second motion in the following manner:
The Motion to Set Aside the Arraignment of the Accused as well as the
Decision dated July 16, 1996, filed by the Public Prosecutor is hereby
GRANTED, it appearing from the published resolution of the Supreme Court
dated October 18, 1995, in G.R. No. 119131 Inaki Gulhoran and Galo Stephen
Bobares v. Hon. FRANCISCO H. ESCANO, JR. in his capacity as Presiding Judge
of Regional Trial Court, Leyte Branch 12, Ormoc City which was dismissed by
this court on August 20, 1996, the jurisdiction over drug of small quantity as
in the case at bar should be tried by the Metropolitan Trial Court, although
under the statute of R.A. 7659 which took effect on December 31, 1993 the
penalty for possession or use of prohibited or regulated drugs is from prision
[correccional] to reclusion temporal which indeterminate penalty and under
the rule on jurisdiction the court which has jurisdiction over a criminal case is
dependent on the maximum penalty attached by the statute to the crime.
The amended Information reads:
That on or about the 2nd day of July, 1996, in Quezon City, Philippines, the
above-named accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually
helping each other, not having been authorized by law to sell, dispense,
deliver, transport or distribute any prohibited drug, did, then and there,
willfully unlawfully sell or offer for sale a total of 42.410 kilos of dried
marijuana fruiting tops, a prohibited drug, in violation of said law.9
This second information was assigned to Branch 76 of the RTC of Quezon City
presided by Judge Monina A. Zenarosa,10 docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-
96-67572.
Both accused filed a Motion to Quash11 which was opposed12 by the People in
its Comment/Opposition filed before the trial court. Subsequently, while the
motion to quash before the RTC was as yet unresolved, both accused filed
before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari13 which they later moved
to withdraw "to pave the way for Branch 76 of the RTC of Quezon City to act
judiciously on their motion to quash. ''14 The Court of Appeals in its
Resolution dated 15 November 199615 noted the motion and considered the
petition withdrawn.
In its now assailed resolution dated 14 February 1997,16 the trial court denied
accused's motion to quash, and scheduled the arraignment of the accused
under the amended information. Accused's Motion for
Reconsideration,17 duly opposed by the prosecution,18 was denied by the trial
court in its Order dated 16 April 1997.19 Hence, the instant Petition
for Certiorari with prayer for injunction and temporary restraining
order20 based on the following grounds:21
A) WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT THERE IS NO VALID INFORMATION AND, THEREFORE, THE
ACCUSED CANNOT CLAIM THE RIGHT AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY;
andcralawlibrary
B) WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
RECOGNIZE THAT THE RTC, BRANCH 103, HAD JURISDICTION OVER the case,
docketed as Criminal CASE NO. Q-96-66799.22
In this Court's resolution dated 23 July 1997,23 respondents were required to
comment on the Petition. They submitted their Comment on 18 November
1998.24 Accused filed their Reply25 on 02 March 2000. In compliance with the
Court's resolution dated 29 March 2000,26 accused and respondents
submitted their memoranda, respectively, on 26 May 200027 and 26 July
2000.28
To invoke the defense of double jeopardy, the following requisites must be
present: (1) a valid complaint or information; (2) the court has jurisdiction to
try the case; (3) the accused has pleaded to the charge; and (4) he has been
convicted or acquitted or the case against him dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent.29
The issues boil down to whether or not the first information is valid and
whether or not the RTC, Branch 103, where the first information was filed
and under which Criminal Case No. Q-96-66788 was tried, had jurisdiction to
try the case.
On the issue of validity of the information, accused and respondents
submitted opposing views - - accused insisting on its validity, whereas
respondents asserted that the accused were arraigned under an invalid
information. Alleging that there being an alteration on the first information,
hence it failed to reflect the true quantity of drugs caught in possession of
the accused, the prosecution insisted that the first information under which
accused were arraigned is invalid.
In accord with the view of the prosecution, the trial court denied the
accused's motion to quash, stating:30
. . . [I]n the instant case, it must be recalled that the earlier information filed
against the accused appeared to be sufficient in form. It was discovered,
however, that an alteration was made as to the weight of the marijuana
fruiting tops which was placed at only 42.410 grams when the correct
amount should have been in kilos. This fraudulent alteration necessarily
vitiated the integrity of the proceedings such that despite the plea of guilt
made by the accused it would not bar a subsequent prosecution for the
correct offense.
Generally speaking to entitle accused to the plea of former jeopardy, the
prior proceedings must have been valid, and the lack of any fundamental
requisite which would render void the judgment would also make ineffective
a plea of jeopardy based on such proceedings.
Fraudulent or collusive prosecution. A verdict of acquittal procured by
accused by fraud and collusion is a nullity and does not put him in jeopardy;
and consequently it is no bar to a second trial for the same offense.
Similarly, a conviction of a criminal offense procured fraudulently or by
collusion of the offender, for the purpose of protecting himself from further
prosecution and adequate punishment, is no bar to a subsequent
prosecution for the same offense, either on the ground that the conviction is
void because of the fraud practiced, or that the state is not in any sense a
party to it and therefore not bound by it. (22 Corpus Juris Secundum, pp.
244-245)
It is impossible to believe that the accused were not aware of the deceitful
maneuvering which led to the erasure of the true weight of the marijuana
fruiting tops as alleged in the information.
They cannot pretend not to know the exact amount of prohibited stuff for
which they were charged before the information was tampered with.
They could not feign innocence when they participated in that charade when
they pleaded guilty upon arraignment.
Consequently, their plea to the lesser offense considering the decreased
weight in the now altered information which merited a much lighter penalty
was irregularly obtained. Hence, they cannot be considered as put in
jeopardy by the proceedings in court which was tainted with fraud.
The accused should not be allowed to make a mockery of justice or to trifle
with the courts by participating in a grand deception of pleading guilty to a
lesser offense knowing that they participated/acquiesced to such tampering
and then tell the court that they would be placed in jeopardy for the second
time.
We do not agree with the trial court.
FIRST, it cannot be denied that the request for appropriate inquest
proceedings dated 03 July 1996 addressed to the City Prosecutor of Quezon
City and received by Prosecutor Querijero, stated that the accused were
apprehended "for conspiring, confederating and mutually helping with each
other in facilitating and effecting the transportation and delivery . . . of forty
five pieces of dried marijuana leaves (already in bricks) and weighing
approximately forty-five kilos. ''31
In the joint affidavit of the poseur-buyer, PO3 Ernesto Jimenez Viray, Jr., and
arresting officer SPOI Inadio U. Ibay, Jr., it is stated that the accused were
caught with approximately 45 kilos of dried marijuana fruiting tops.32 For
some unknown reasons, however, the Information filed against the accused
reflected a much lesser quantity, i.e., 42.410 grams.
The question is whether this is sufficient to consider the first Information
under which the accused were arraigned invalid.
Pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court under Rule 110 are hereunder
quoted:
Section 4. Information defined. - An information is an accusation in writing
charging a person with an offense subscribed by the fiscal and filed with the
court.
In Alvizo v. Sandiganbayan,33 this Court citing People v. Marquez affirmed:34
It should be observed that section 3 of Rule 110 defines an information as
nothing more than "an accusation in writing charging a person with an
offense subscribed by the fiscal and filed with the court."
An information is valid as long as it distinctly states the statutory designation
of the offense and the acts or omissions constitutive thereof.35
In other words, if the offense is stated in such a way that a person of ordinary
intelligence may immediately know what is meant, and the court can decide
the matter according to law, the inevitable conclusion is that the information
is valid. It is not necessary to follow the language of the statute in the
information. The information will be sufficient if it describes the crime
defined by law.36
Applying the foregoing, the inescapable conclusion is that the first
information is valid inasmuch as it sufficiently alleges the manner by which
the crime was committed. Verily the purpose of the law, that is, to apprise
the accused of the nature of the charge against them, is reasonably complied
with.
Furthermore, the first information, applying Rule 110,37 Section 6, shows on
its face that it is valid.
Section 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. - A complaint or
information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation
of the offense by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate
time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense
was committed.
SECOND, and with respect specifically to the trial court's point of view that
the accused cannot claim their right against double jeopardy because they
"participated/acquiesced to the tampering," we hold that while this may not
be far-fetched, there is actually no hard evidence thereof.38 Worse, we
cannot overlook the fact that accused were arraigned, entered a plea of
guilty and convicted under the first information. Granting that
alteration/tampering took place and the accused had a hand in it, this does
not justify the setting aside of the decision dated 16 July 1996. The alleged
tampering/alteration allegedly participated in by the accused may well be the
subject of another inquiry.
In Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines v. People,39 the Court affirming the finality of a
decision in a criminal case, citing Section 7, Rule 120 of the 2000 Rules on
Criminal Procedure, stated:
A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be modified or
set aside before it becomes final or before appeal is perfected. Except where
the death penalty is imposed a judgment [of conviction] becomes final after
the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has
been partially or totally satisfied or served, or when the accused has waived
in writing his right to appeal, or has applied for probation.
Indeed, the belated move on the part of the prosecution to have the
information amended defies procedural rules, the decision having attained
finality after the accused applied for probation and the fact that amendment
is no longer allowed at that stage.
Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure is emphatic:
Sec. 14. Amendment. 'The information or complaint may be amended, in
substance or form, without leave of court, at any time before the accused
pleads; and thereafter and during the trial as to all matters of form, by leave
and at the discretion of the court, when the same can be done without
prejudice to the rights of the accused.
If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in
charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or
information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper offense in
accordance with Rule 119, Section 11, provided the accused would not be
placed thereby in double jeopardy, and may also require the witnesses to
give bail for their appearance at the trial.
In Sanvicente v. People,40 this Court held that given the far-reaching scope of
an accused's right against double jeopardy, even an appeal based on an
alleged misappreciation of evidence will not lie. The only instance when
double jeopardy will not attach is when the trial court acted with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, such as where the
prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its case or where the trial
was a sham. Respondent People of the Philippines argues, citing the case
of Galman v. Sandiganbayan41 that the trial was a sham. We do not agree
with the respondent as the trial in the Galman case was considered a mock
trial owing to the act of a then authoritarian president who ordered the
therein respondents Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan to rig the trial and who
closely monitored the entire proceedings to assure a predetermined final
outcome of acquittal and total absolution of the respondents-accused
therein of all the charges.42
The Constitution is very explicit. Article III, Section 21, mandates that no
person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. In
this case, it bears repeating that the accused had been arraigned and
convicted. In fact, they were already in the stage where they were applying
for probation. It is too late in the day for the prosecution to ask for the
amendment of the information and seek to try again accused for the same
offense without violating their rights guaranteed under the Constitution.
There is, therefore, no question that the amendment of an information by
motion of the prosecution and at the time when the accused had already
been convicted is contrary to procedural rules and violative of the rights of
the accused.
exclusively try and decide cases of KIDNAPPING AND/OR KIDNAPPING FOR
RANSOM, ROBBERY IN BAND, ROBBERY COMMITTED AGAINST A BANKING
OR FINANCIAL INSTITUTION, VIOLATION OF THE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF
1972, AS AMENDED, regardless of the quantity of the drugs involved.
This issue is further settled by the concurring opinion of Chief Justice Hilario
G. Davide, Jr., in People v. Velasco:44
. . . [A]ll drug-related cases, regardless of the quantity involved and the
penalty imposable pursuant to R.A. No. 7659, as applied/interpreted
in People v. Simon (G.R. No. 93028, 29 July 1994; 234 SCRA 555), and of the
provisions of R.A. No. 7691 expanding the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan
Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, still fall within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts, in view of Section 39 of R.A. No.
6425 (the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972). R.A. No. 7659 and R.A. No. 7691
have neither amended nor modified this Section.
Wherefore, premises considered, the instant petition is Granted. The Orders
dated 14 February 1997 and 16 April 1997 issued by the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City, Branch 76, are set aside. Criminal Case No. Q-96-67572 is
ordered Dismissed. Accused Marcelo Lasoy and Felix Banisa are forthwith
ordered released from detention45 unless there may be valid reasons for
their further detention.
SO ORDERED.

FINALLY, on the issue of jurisdiction, the case of Gulhoran and Bobares v.

Escano, Jr.,43 upon which both trial courts justified their claim of jurisdiction,
was actually based on this Court's resolution dated 18 October 1995 where
this Court held:

The criminal jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial

Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts under Section 32 (2) of B. P. 129, as
amended by Rep. Act 7691 has been increased to cover offenses punishable
with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of
the fine (Administrative Cir. No. 09-94, June 14, 1994). It appears that the
imposable penalties applicable to the subject cases are within the range
of prision correccional, a penalty not exceeding six years, thus falling within
the exclusive original jurisdiction of the MTC. It follows that the RTC has no
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the charges against petitioners.

If we apply the resolution of this Court quoted above, it would seem that the
Metropolitan Trial Court has jurisdiction over the case under the first
Information. Following that argument, the decision dated 16 July 1996 of the
RTC Branch 103 was rendered without jurisdiction, thus, accused may not
invoke the right against double jeopardy.

Nonetheless, we cannot uphold this view owing to the fact that a later
resolution superseding the resolution cited by the trial courts, specifically
Administrative Order No. 51-96 dated 03 May 1996, vests the RTC with
jurisdiction to try Criminal Case No. Q-96-67572. The resolution provides:

RE: SPECIAL COURTS FOR KIDNAPPING, ROBBERY, DANGEROUS DRUGS,

CARNAPPING AND OTHER HEINOUS CRIMES UNDER R.A. NO. 7659

Pursuant to Sec. 23 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, in the interest of speedy and
efficient administration of justice and subject to the guidelines hereinafter
set forth, the following Regional Trial Court branches are hereby designated
to exclusively try and decide cases of KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM, ROBBERY
IN BAND, ROBBERY COMMITTED AGAINST A BANKING OR FINANCIAL
INSTITUTION, VIOLATION OF THE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 1972, AS
AMENDED, AND VIOLATION OF THE ANTI-CARNAPPING ACT OF 1972, AS
AMENDED, AND OTHER HEINOUS CRIMES defined and penalized under Rep.
Act No. 7659, committed within their respective territorial jurisdictions:

...

11. Branch 103, Quezon City, presided over by RTC JUDGE JAIME N. SALAZAR,
JR.

Subsequently, A.M. No. 96-8-282-RTC dated 27 August 1996, Re: Clarification

on the applicability of Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 51-96 in
relation to Section 20 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, declared:

. . . [T]he Court Resolved to AMEND the prefatory paragraph in

Administrative Order No. 5-96, to read:

Pursuant to Section 23 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 in the interest of speedy

administration of justice and subject to the guidelines hereinafter set forth,
the following Regional Trial Court branches are hereby designated to
G.R. No. L-45266 November 24, 1988
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LEOPOLDO PARDILLA, RUDY MANZANO and REYNALDO PARDILLA, accused-
appellants.
G.R. No. L-48450 November 24, 1988
LEOPOLDO PARDILLA, RUDY MANZANO and REYNALDO MANZANO,
petitioners,
vs.
DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, respondent.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Ramon A. Gonzales for accused-appellants.
BIDIN, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo,
Branch II, in Criminal Case No. 4079 * dated August 20, 1976, finding all the
accused: Leopoldo Pardilla, Rudy Manzano and Reynaldo Pardilla guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder although the information
filed charged them with the crime of homicide, and sentencing Rudy
Manzano and Reynaldo Pardilla to death while imposing life imprisonment
on Leopoldo Pardilla in view of his old age. This decision includes the case of
Leopoldo Pardilla, not as appellant, but as one of the petitioners in G.R. No.
L-48450, a petition for Habeas Corpus filed by all the abovementioned
accused which by resolution of the Court dated March 22, 1984 was
consolidated together with this case (L-45266).
The dispositive portion of the appealed decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, all accused,
namely: Rudy Manzano, Reynaldo Pardilla and
Leopoldo Pardilla are hereby found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder which was
erroneously denominated as homicide. Rudy Manzano
and Reynaldo Pardilla are hereby sentenced to death
while Leopoldo Pardilla is hereby sentenced to life
imprisonment in view of his old age. We are imposing
this maximum penalty in view of the presence of three
aggravating circumstances, namely: conspiracy which
we concluded as equal or synonymous with evident
premeditation and therefore, qualified the killing as
murder and the aggravating circumstances of superior
strength and means to weaken the defense.
On account of the penalty imposed, the Indeterminate
Sentence Law does not apply.
All accused are jointly and severally condemned to
indemnify the heirs of the late Alfredo Solinap, Sr. the
sum of Twelve Thousand (Pl2,000.00) Pesos by way of
death compensation plus funeral and burial expenses
of Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos, and to pay the
costs.
The effects of crime are confiscated in favor of the
State.
The convicts shall suffer no subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency in view of the penalty imposed.
The bail bonds for the provisional liberty of all the
accused are hereby cancelled and all convicts are
ordered committed to jail. No bail bond is fixed in case
they should appeal.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 22)
The accused were charged with homicide in an information dated May 12,
1975 which alleges:
The undersigned Provincial Fiscal accuses LEOPOLDO
PARDILLA, RUDY MANZANO and REYNALDO PARDILLA
of the crime of HOMICIDE, committed as follows:
That on or about February 28, 1975, in the Municipality
of Pototan, Province of Iloilo, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Court, the above-named accused
conspiring, confederating together and mutually
helping each other, armed with a sharp-pointed knife
known as pinote and canes, with intent to kill, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
beat and stab ALFREDO SOLINAP, SR. with the weapons
they were then provided, inflicting upon him stab
wound at the breast and a lacerated wound on the
head which caused the death of said ALFREDO
SOLINAP, SR.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Rollo, p. 2)
The evidence of the prosecution consisted principally of the testimonies of
two alleged eyewitnesses: Cesar Polistico, a tricycle driver and Norberto
Barrios, a 16-year old student; Blas Provido, the police officer to whom
Leopoldo Pardilla surrendered the butcher's knife and its scabbard and Dr.
Gracia Buenvenida who examined the deceased.
The testimony of Cesar Polistico who narrated the incident from its initial
stage up to its conclusion is summarized by the trial court as follows:
According to prosecution witness Polistico, in the
afternoon of February 28, 1975, he was in the store of
Sgt. Pepito Pari-an at Barrio Lumbo, Pototan, Iloilo, to
buy cigarettes, when the incident took place. There
were some people thereat, among whom was the
deceased, Alfredo Solinap, Sr. Shortly upon Polistico's
arrival, the accused Reynaldo Pardilla and Rudy
Manzano arrived. Reynaldo Pardilla stood by the
roadside while Rudy Manzano sat on a bench. When
Alfredo Solinap, Sr. noticed their presence, he stood
up. At this point, Reynaldo Pardilla shouted "Bert."
Hearing what Reynaldo uttered, Solinap approached
Reynaldo and asked him, "What do you intend to do?
Are you going to surround me?" When Reynaldo made
no reply, Solinap confronted Rudy Manzano who was
seated on the bench, and asked him the same
questions he asked Reynaldo. Rudy answered,
"Brother, I have nothing to do with it." Not contented
with Rudy Manzano's reply, Solinap approached
Reynaldo again. This time their bad blood was
intensifying and Polistico had to separate them, telling
Reynaldo to go home. Reynaldo agreed to go home but
he shouted to Solinap, "'Wait for me there." He
(Polistico), also asked Solinap to go home, but his
house was far and before he could go home, the three
accused arrived and the fight that caused Solinap's
death began.
Rudy Manzano returned running with a butcher's knife
and a chako (two shortpieces of wooden batons joined
together loosely by a chain and used in Chinese martial
art), and upon reaching Solinap, he gave Solinap a kick
in the back and the deceased fell. As soon as Solinap
stood up, the other two accused, Leopoldo Pardilla and
his son Reynaldo Pardilla arrived, coming from behind
Solinap. Leopoldo was armed with a knife and a cane,
while his son Reynaldo has a bayonet. As Leopoldo and
Reynaldo were from behind, upon catching up with
Solinap, Leopoldo hit his head (Solinap) with his cane
and again Solinap fell for the second time. Upon falling,
all three accused ganged upon him. In the melee that
ensued after Solinap fell, the latter was never able to
rise for, he was wounded on his left chest. He died
right where he fell. (Rollo, pp. 7-9).
The testimony of Norberto Barrios is as follow:
Norberto Barrios, 16 years of age, single, and a student
testified that at about 6:00 P.M. of February 28, 1975
he was walking on the road in Brgy. Lumbo, Pototan,
Iloilo, in front of the store of Sgt. Pepito Pari-an (Tsn.
Nov. 28, 1975, p.5); that he met Rudy Manzano going
towards the store of Sgt. Pari-an holding a butcher's
knife and a chaco (Ibid, p. 6); that Rudy was running
towards Alfredo Solinap whom he kicked upon meeting
the latter and Solinap fell with his face on the ground
(Ibid, p. 7); that after Solinap fell, Rudy stabbed with a
butcher's knife 3 times but he was not hit as Alfredo
moved backward (Ibid, p. 8), that Rudy followed
Alfredo who bumped against the wall of a store (Ibid,
p. 9); that Leopoldo and Reynaldo at that time were
 running towards Alfredo, Reynaldo carrying a butcher's
knife and Leopoldo also carrying a butcher's knife (Ibid,
p. 10); that Alfredo was able to stand up when
Reynaldo stabbed him once on the chest (Ibid, pp. 10-
11); that after Reynaldo stabbed Alfredo, Leopoldo hit
Alfredo with his cane on the head more than 5 times
(Ibid, pp. 11-12); that Cesar Polistico was about meters
away when Alfredo was stabbed by Reynaldo and
beaten by Leopoldo (Ibid, p. 13). (Rollo, p. 179;
Appellants' Brief, p. 179).
Police officer Blas Provido testified that accused Leopoldo Pardilla
surrendered to him a butcher's knife and the scabbard, after which he
brought the latter to the town hall where Leopoldo was detained. He
reported the matter to his immediate superior and it was entered in the
police blotter (ibid, p. 180). Dr. Gracia Buenvenida testified that when she
examined the deceased Alfredo Solinap, she found that he has one stab
wound on the chest and a lacerated wound on the head and that she issued a
medical certificate, Exhibit "B". (Ibid).
On the other hand, the evidence for the defense consisted of the testimonies
of Patrolman Elias Piamonte, and of the accused themselves.
Finding the testimony of Piamonte of no substantial evidentiary value, the
trial court limited the discussion to the testimonies of the three accused.
As presented by the defense, the testimonies are as follows:
According to Rudy Manzano, at about 5:30 to 6:30 of
February 28, 1975, he was strolling near the dike when
he met Reynaldo Pardilla at the side of a road, 20 to 30
meters from the store of Sgt. Pepito Parian (tsn, June
15, 1976, p. 62); that while walking with Reynaldo, the
latter called for his nephew "Bert" in their house (Ibid,
pp. 67-68); that suddenly Alfredo came out of the store
of Parian and asked them saying: "Are you plotting
against me? and Reynaldo answered:" "I cannot
understand what you are talking about Tay Pidong"
(Ibid, p. 70); that he (Rudy) sat on a bench on the store
while Reynaldo and Alfredo were talking (Ibid, pp. 70-
71); that he noticed that Alfredo tried to box Reynaldo
who ran away towards his house (Ibid, p. 71); that
when Reynaldo left, Alfredo went towards him and
said: "You also?"(Ibid, p. 72); that he answered "I have
nothing to do", and Alfredo slapped him on the left
cheek and he (Alfredo) stepped back and pulled out a
butcher's knife (Ibid, p. 73); that since he has nowhere
to run he raised his body and with both legs kicked
Alfredo who fell, and immediately he jumped out of
the place and ran away (Ibid, pp. 75-76); that upon
reaching the house he stayed there the whole evening
(Ibid, p. 77).
Reynaldo Pardilla testified that on February 28, 1975 at
about 5:30 to 6:00 P.M. he and Rudy Manzano were at
the end of the dike where they used to pass in Brgy.
Lumbo (sic) about to go to his (Rudy) house (Tsn, June
15, 1976, p. 5); that while they were approaching the
store of Parian he looked back and shouted "Bert" 3
times, referring to his nephew Gilbert Pardilla for the
purpose of telling the latter to take the carabao out of
the sugar plantation (Ibid, p. 6); that after shouting
"Bert" for the second time, Alfredo came out from the
store of Parian and said: "Are you plotting against
me?" and he (Reynaldo) answered: "Tay Pidong I don't
understand you"; that Alfredo continued to approach
him, so he moved backward and then Alfredo boxed
him, but he was not hit, and so he moved backward
and ran away (Ibid, p. 8); that he went home, which is
about 100 meters away and did not return to the store
anymore, and learned that Alfredo died when his
father arrived that evening (Ibid, p. 9); that his father
told him that he killed Alfredo because if he did not kill
him, he would have been killed by Alfredo (Ibid, p. 10);
that he told them that he is going to the municipal
building to surrender (Ibid, p. 11).
Leopoldo Pardilla testified that on February 28, 1975,
at about 6:00 P.M. while going home, he dropped at
the store of Parian (Tsn, June 16, 1976, pp. 46-47); that
he saw Alfredo Solinap standing at the side of the road
(Ibid, p. 47)-. that upon seeing him, Alfredo
approached him and said: "You filed a case" and at the
same time he thrust his butcher's knife towards him
(Leopoldo), but the latter parried the blow and
returned the thrust, hitting him (Alfredo) on the left
chest (Ibid, pp. 49-50); that Alfredo reeled towards the
back part of the store of Parian on bamboo stump
(pusog) and fell to the ground while he (Leopoldo)
continued on his way home (Ibid, p. 51); that Norberto
Barrios and Cesar Polistico were not there at that time
(Ibid, 51-52); that when he arrived home he told his
wife, his son and his grandson that he killed Alfredo
because had he not done so, Alfredo would have killed
him (Ibid, p. 52); ... (Rollo, pp. 180-182; Appellants'
Brief).
To recapitulate the theory of the defense is to the effect that Leopoldo
Pardilla killed Alfredo Solinap, Sr. in self defense. Rudy Manzano and
Reynaldo Pardilla did not have any participation in the killing because at the
time of the encounter, both of them were already at home.
Finding the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses more credible, the trial
court, as above-stated, convicted the accused of Murder and sentenced them
to death with the exception of Leopoldo Pardilla who because of old age was
sentenced to life imprisonment.
On September 1, 1976, the accused filed their notice of appeal from the
decision of the trial court. However, on September 10, 1976, the said accused
filed a motion to withdraw their notice of appeal and on September 12, 1976,
filed instead a motion for the reconsideration of said decision, contending
that since they were charged with homicide, they cannot be convicted of
murder; that while the decision finds that there was superior strength or
means employed to weaken the defense, the same was not alleged in the
information and can only be considered, if ever, as an aggravating
circumstance in the crime of homicide, but not a circumstance that would
qualify the offense as murder; that the allegation of conspiracy is not
equivalent to an allegation that the offense was committed with evident
premeditation; and that since the information charges homicide, and
conviction cannot be more than the penalty prescribed for said crime, the
accused should be released on their bail bonds, pending appeal, at the
discretion of the court. The trial court, however, denied the motion on
November 11, 1976.
On December 3, 1976, the accused filed with this Court a petition for
certiorari and mandamus with preliminary injunction, G.R. L-45149 (Pardilla
v. Adil), to annul and set aside the same decision, upon the ground that
conspiracy, which the trial court found to be synonymous with evident
premeditation, could not qualify the crime as Murder, but may be
appreciated only, if ever, as an aggravating circumstance of Homicide.
The records of Criminal Case No. 4079 were elevated to the Court on
December 21, 1976 for the automatic review of the decision, docketed as
G.R. No. L-45266. On February 9, 1977, this Court gave notice to the counsel
of appellant to file the Brief of Appellants within thirty (30) days from receipt
of notice, but on February 16, 1977, the appellants filed a motion to suspend
the proceeding in L-45266 until this Court shall have resolved G.R. No. 45149
(Rollo, p. 36). Consequently, this Court dismissed G.R. No.
L-45149 in its Resolution of March 30, 1978 for the reason that the issue
raised therein is involved in the decision under automatic review (Resolution
of this Court En Banc, August 6, 1979, Rollo, p. 50).
On June 28, 1978, the accused filed their petition for Habeas Corpus, G.R. No.
L-48450, praying for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, ordering the
Bureau of Prisons, respondent therein, to produce the bodies of petitioners
before the Court, to show cause of their Imprisonment and after hearing,
that judgment be rendered setting aside the decision of the Court of First
Instance in Criminal Case No. 4079 and ordering petitioners to be released on
their original bonds in said case, pending resolution of a new decision by the
said court for the offense of homicide. The Court issued the Writ of Habeas
Corpus on July 12, 1978 returnable to this Court on July 19, 1978. On July 19,
1978, the Solicitor General submitted a return of the writ and answer to
petition praying for the dismissal of the petition on the ground that
petitioners therein are lawfully detained in the National Penitentiary by
virtue of a decision rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, finding
them guilty of the crime of murder.
Taking note of the fact that the gravest offense by which accused-petitioner
therein may be found guilty is only homicide, this Court considered the
petition for Habeas Corpus as a petition for bail and an incident in case G.R.
No. L-45266, and ruled in its Resolution dated August 6, 1979 that it is
consistent with equity and justice that they should be released on bail
pending determination of the criminal case against them on the merits. The
Court ordered the release from custody of accused Rudy Manzano and
Reynaldo Pardilla upon their filing of bond in the amount of P20,000.00 each,
but declared the judgment of the lower court insofar as accused Leopoldo
Pardilla is concerned to have already become final and executory since the
latter did not file a notice of his intention to appeal the decision (Rollo, L-
45266, p. 57). The Court approved the bailbond of Reynaldo Pardilla and
ordered his release on September 18, 1981 (Rollo, p. 157). Rudy Manzano
was similarly released on September 20, 1983 (Rollo, p. 117).
On October 12, 1979, the accused filed a motion for reconsideration of the
Resolution of the Court dated August 6, 1979 on the ground that it would be
unjust to grant bail to Reynaldo Pardilla and Rudy Manzano who were
sentenced to death, while denying the same right to Leopoldo Pardilla whose
sentence is life imprisonment and praying that the petition in L-48450 be
treated as it is intended to be, a petition for habeas corpus, and not a mere
motion for bail in L-45266, and thereafter, said petition be granted. On
October 31, 1979, they filed a motion to suspend filing of appellants' brief in
L-45266 until their motion for reconsideration shall have been resolved,
which motion was granted by the Court in its Resolution dated November 20,
1979.
On January 1, 1980, the Solicitor General filed for the People of the
Philippines (G.R. No. L-45266) and the Director of Prisons (G.R. No. L-48450) a
comment on the accused's motion for reconsideration of the Resolution
dated August 6, 1979 with the proposition that in order for accused-
petitioner's objection to the Resolution in question be obviated, the
Resolution be modified by allowing Leopoldo Pardilla to proceed with the
petition for habeas corpus while maintaining the Resolution with respect to
Rudy Manzano and Reynaldo Pardilla by treating the same petition as a
motion for bail and as an incident in case G.R. No. L-45266.
In their reply to comment filed on February 2, 1980, the accused objected to
the recommendation of the Solicitor General, contending that if Leopoldo
Pardilla is entitled to a decision on his petition for habeas corpus on the
ground that the decision below is not merely erroneous but void, then, there
is no basis for a different treatment to Rudy Manzano and Reynaldo Pardilla
who are questioning the lower Court's decision on the same ground.
On March 22, 1984, the Court resolved: (1) to hold in abeyance the
resolution of the accused-petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the
resolution of August 6, 1979, praying that the petition in L-48450 be treated
as it is intended to be, a petition for habeas corpus, and not a mere motion
for bail in L-45266; (2) to set aside the resolution of November 20, 1979
which granted the accused-appellants' motion praying that the period for the
filing of the appellants' brief in G.R. No. L-45266 be suspended pending the
resolution of their motion for reconsideration in G.R. No. L-48450; and (3) to
require the accusedappellants to file the appellant's brief which should also
discuss the case of Leopoldo Pardilla who did not appeal, within thirty (30)
days from notice of the resolution.
After several extensions granted by the Court, the brief for the accused-
appellants was filed with the court on July 23, 1984 and the brief for the
plaintiff-appellee, on November 15, 1984. Appellant's reply brief was filed on
April 2, 1985.
Accused-appellants assign the following errors:
I As shown by the testimony of prosecution eyewitness Cesar Polistico, there
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED OF MURDER WHEN THEY WERE ONLY
CHARGED OF HOMICIDE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING ALL THE
ACCUSED GUILTY OF MURDER BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT. (Appellants Brief pp. 182-183).
In the petition for Habeas Corpus filed by the accused in L-48450, this Court
had the occasion to rule on the question of whether or not the lower court
erred in convicting the accused of murder when they were only charged with
homicide. In the Resolution of August 6, 1979, the Court stated:
We take note of the fact that the information filed
against the accused does not allege any qualifying
circumstance. The gravest offense therefore, for which
they may be found guilty is only homicide. For this
reason, the instant petition shall be considered as a
petition for bail and an incident in Case G.R. No. L-
45266. It is consistent with equity and justice that the
accused should be released on bail pending
determination of the criminal case against them on the
merits ... (Rollo, p. 56)
By and large, the above ruling of this Court is but a reiteration of a well-
settled doctrine that where the charge is homicide, the accused cannot be
convicted of murder (People v. Simon, 10 SCRA 280 [1964]; People v.
Bautista, 28 SCRA 184 [1969]; and People v. San Miguel, 124 SCRA 733
[1983]). More importantly, it was established that the words "conspiring
together, confederating with and mutually helping one another" contained in
the information, simply convey the allegation of conspiracy, and does not
necessary result in a charge of murder. (People v. San Miguel, supra).
There is no dispute that the deceased sustained only one stab wound on the
chest and a lacerated wound on the head. Leopoldo Pardilla admitted having
stabbed the deceased although in self-defense. The trial court did not give
credence to his plea and convicted all three accused of murder. Leopoldo
Pardilla did not appeal so that the decision of the trial court has become final
and executory insofar as he is concerned. And when a sentence has already
become final because the accused has already begun serving the same, the
case can no longer be reopened with a view to its modification (De Leon vs.
Hon. Rodriguez, et al., 107 Phil. 759; Bustamante vs. Maceren, 48 SCRA 155;
Sec. 7,
Rule 120).<äre||anº•1àw>
However, as regards the two other accused in order to implicate and/or hold
them liable for the crime committed by Leopoldo Pardilla, conspiracy must
be proven.
It is a well settled rule that conspiracy must be established by positive and
conclusive evidence. It cannot be based on mere conjectures but must be
established as a fact. The same degree of proof required to establish the
crime is necessary to support a finding of the presence of conspiracy; that is,
it must be shown to exist as clearly and convincingly as the commission of
the offense itself (People v. Palon, 127 SCRA 529, 537 [1984] citing: People v.
Custodia 47 SCRA 289 [1972] People v. Drilon, Jr. 123 SCRA 79 [1983]).
It is likewise settled that conspiracy while inferable from the circumstances
must still be proved clearly and convincingly, according to jurisprudence as
the commission of the crime itself (People v. Benavides, 127 SCRA 189
[1984], citing: People v. Cerdena, 51 Phil. 393 [1928]; People v. Dorico, 54
SCRA 172 [1973]).
Equally beyond dispute is the rule that Appellate Courts will not generally
disturb the factual findings of the trial court, considering that it is in a better
position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses themselves and
observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial but this
does not apply where the lower court overlooked certain facts of substance
and value that if considered, would affect the result of the case (People v.
Royeras, 130 SCRA 265 [1984]).
A careful review of the records shows that the trial court did not only fail to
consider certain circumstances which negate the presence of conspiracy but
also overlooked certain contradictions and inconsistencies in the testimonies
of the prosecution witnesses which do not refer to minor and collateral
matters but on the contrary, render their version highly improbable and
contrary to human experience.
was no sign of aggression on the part of the two accused Reynaldo Pardilla
and Rudy Manzano, when they arrived at the scene of the incident on that
fatal day. In fact, it was the deceased who belligerently taunted and
confronted them with the query as to what they intend to do. Reynaldo did
not reply while Rudy answered in a gentle manner: "Brother, I have nothing
to do with it." Not contented with Rudy's answer, the deceased again
approached Reynaldo. It was then that Polistico tried to separate them and
told Reynaldo to go home and the latter did. (Decision, Crim. Case No. 4079,
p. 6). Clearly, therefore, aggression originated from the deceased Alfredo
Solinap, Sr. and the existence of conspiracy is belied by the surrounding
circumstances.
The trial court then assumed that when the three accused returned and went
after the deceased, they have already planned for about 30 minutes in the
house of Reynaldo on how they would attack the deceased (Ibid, p.13).
Apart from the fact that the time estimated to have elapsed was pure
calculation, such speed in planning and conspiracy is indeed beyond belief.
More than that, the testimonies of both prosecution witnesses show that
they did not even arrive together and that although all three accused were
allegedly armed with knives, chaco, canes or batons, which they repeatedly
used in hitting the accused, the latter sustained only one stab wound on the
chest which Leopoldo admitted to have inflicted on the accused in self-
defense while the lacerated wound on the head was caused by the fall of the
deceased on the ground (Rollo, L-45266, p. 191).
In fact there is no longer any reason or purpose for the accused to plot and
conspire against the deceased. The records show that earlier, Leopoldo,
President of the Samahang Nayon in Barangay Lumbo was maltreated by the
deceased who was reputedly troublesome by nature, in a jeepney before the
incident. But far from resorting to violence, Leopoldo opted to avail of legal
remedies by filing a complaint of less serious physical injuries (Ibid).
It is therefore evident, that it was the deceased who had an axe to grind
against accused Leopoldo, and coupled with the fact that the deceased was
drunk at the time, the theory of the defense that it was the deceased who
accosted Leopoldo and stated "You filed a case" and at the same time
thrusting a butcher's knife toward Leopoldo who parried it and returned the
thrust against him with his own butcher's knife, appears to be more credible
and more in accord with the physical evidence. Thus, the absence of multiple
injuries that should have resulted from the alleged simultaneous attack on
the deceased by three (3) alleged assailants, one of whom is an arnis
enthusiast while the other two were young and agile opponents who were
supposed to have given the deceased flying kicks, not to mention wrestling
and stabbing, is an indication that such violence and attack as described by
the prosecution witnesses were not used on the deceased. Implied
conspiracy was based on non-existent factual premises. As ruled by this
Court, physical evidence is of the highest order and speaks more eloquently
than all witnesses put together (People v. Bardaje, 99 SCRA 388 [1980]).

In resume, the totality of the foregoing circumstances, shows without

question the improbability and reasonable doubt of the allegations of the
prosecution witnesses. The prosecution has not discharged its burden of
proving its accusation beyond reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is Reversed insofar as appellants

are concerned and accused Reynaldo Pardilla and Rudy Manzano are
Acquitted, but as ruled by this Court in the resolution of August 6, 1979, the
sentence of life imprisonment imposed on Leopoldo Pardilla has already
become final and executory insofar as he is concerned because he did not file
a notice of his intention to appeal.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 164733 September 21, 2007
MICHAEL JOHN Z. MALTO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Whereas, mankind owes to the child the best it has to give. (Final preambular
clause of the Declaration of the Rights of the Child)
This is a petition for review1 of the decision2 dated July 30, 2004 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 25925 affirming with modification the
decision3 of Branch 109 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City in Criminal
Case No. 00-0691 which found petitioner Michael John Z. Malto guilty for
violation of paragraph 3, Section 5(a), Article III of RA 7610,4 as amended.
Petitioner was originally charged in an information which read:
The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses MICHAEL JOHN Z. MALTO
of VIOLATION OF SECTION 5(b), ARTICLE III, REPUBLIC ACT 7610, AS
AMENDED, committed as follows:
That on or about and sometime during the month of November 1997 up to
1998, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Michael John. Z. Malto, a
professor, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously induce
and/or seduce his student at Assumption College, complainant, AAA, a minor
of 17 years old, to indulge in sexual intercourse for several times with him as
in fact said accused had carnal knowledge.
Contrary to law.5
This was subsequently amended as follows:
The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses MICHAEL JOHN Z. MALTO
of VIOLATION OF SECTION 5(a), ARTICLE III, REPUBLIC ACT 7610, AS
AMENDED, committed as follows:
That on or about and sometime during the month of November 1997 up to
1998, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Michael John. Z. Malto, a
professor, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take
advantage and exert influence, relationship and moral ascendancy and
induce and/or seduce his student at Assumption College, complainant, AAA,
a minor of 17 years old, to indulge in sexual intercourse and lascivious
conduct for several times with him as in fact said accused has carnal
knowledge.
Contrary to law.6
Petitioner did not make a plea when arraigned; hence, the trial court entered
for him a plea of "not guilty." After the mandatory pre-trial, trial on the
merits proceeded.
The prosecution established the following:
At the time of the incident, private complainant AAA was 17 years old.7 She
was a college student at the Assumption College in San Lorenzo Village,
Makati City. Petitioner, then 28, was her professor in her Philosophy II class
in the first semester of the school year 1997 to 1998.
On July 18, 1997, AAA was having lunch with her friends when petitioner
joined their group. He told them to address him simply as "Mike." He handed
them his organizer and asked them to list down their names and contact
numbers.
On October 3, 1997, while AAA and her friends were discussing the movie
Kama Sutra, petitioner butted in and bragged that it was nothing compared
to his collection of xxx-rated films. To the shock of AAA’s group, he lectured
on and demonstrated sexual acts he had already experienced. He then
invited the group to view his collection.
On October 10, 1997, petitioner reiterated his invitation to AAA and her
friends to watch his collection of pornographic films. Afraid of offending
petitioner, AAA and two of her friends went with him. They rode in his car
and he brought them to the Anito Lodge on Harrison St. in Pasay City. They
checked in at a "calesa room." Petitioner was disappointed when he found
out there was neither a video cassette player (on which he could play his
video tapes) nor an x-rated show on the closed-circuit television. He
suggested that they just cuddle up together. AAA and her friends ignored him
but he pulled each of them towards him to lie with him in bed. They resisted
until he relented.
AAA and her friends regretted having accepted petitioner’s invitation. For
fear of embarrassment in case their classmates got wind of what happened,
they agreed to keep things a secret. Meanwhile, petitioner apologized for his
actuations.
Thereafter, petitioner started to show AAA amorous attention. He called her
on the phone and paged8 her romantic messages at least thrice a day. When
semestral break came, his calls and messages became more frequent. Their
conversation always started innocently but he had a way of veering the
subject to sex. Young, naive and coming from a broken family, AAA was soon
overwhelmed by petitioner’s persistence and slowly got attracted to him. He
was the first person to court her. Soon, they had a "mutual understanding"
and became sweethearts.
When AAA secured her class card in Philosophy II at the start of the second
semester, petitioner told her that he gave her a final grade of "3." She
protested, stating that her mid-term grade was "1.2." He gave her a grade of
"1.5" when she promised not to disclose his intimate messages to her to
anyone. He also cautioned her not to tell anyone about their affair as it could
jeopardize his job.
On November 19, 1997, at around 11:00 a.m., AAA agreed to have lunch with
petitioner outside the premises of the college. Since she was not feeling well
at that time, he asked her to lie down in the backseat of his car. She was
surprised when he brought her to Queensland Lodge9 on Harrison St. in
Pasay City. Once inside the motel room, he kissed her at the back and neck,
touched her breasts and placed his hand inside her blouse. She resisted his
advances but he was too strong for her. He stopped only when she got angry
at him.
On November 26, 1997, petitioner asked AAA to come with him so that they
could talk in private. He again brought her to Queensland Lodge. As soon as
they were inside the room, he took off his shirt, lay down in bed and told her,
"halika na, dito na tayo mag-usap." She refused but he dragged her towards
the bed, kissed her lips, neck and breasts and unsnapped her brassiere. She
struggled to stop him but he overpowered her. He went on top of her,
lowered her pants and touched her private part. He tried to penetrate her
but she pushed him away forcefully and she sat up in bed. He hugged her
tightly saying, "Sige na, AAA, pumayag ka na, I won’t hurt you." She refused
and said, "Mike, ayoko." He angrily stood up saying, "Fine, hindi na tayo mag-
uusap. Don’t come to the faculty room anymore. You know I need this and if
you will not give in or give it to me, let us end this." She replied, "Mike, hindi
pa ako ready and it was you who said it will be after my debut" on December
3, 1997. He insisted that there was no difference between having sex then
and after her debut. He told her, "kung hindi ko makukuha ngayon, tapusin
na natin ngayon." Pressured and afraid of his threat to end their relationship,
she hesitantly replied "Fine." On hearing this, he quickly undressed while
commenting "ibibigay mo rin pala, pinahirapan mo pa ako" and laughed.
They had sexual intercourse.
In July 1999, AAA ended her relationship with petitioner. She learned that he
was either intimately involved with or was sexually harassing his students in
Assumption College and in other colleges where he taught. In particular, he
was dismissed from the De La Salle University-Aguinaldo for having sexual
relations with a student and sexually harassing three other students. His
employment was also terminated by Assumption College for sexually
harassing two of his students. It was then that AAA realized that she was
actually abused by petitioner. Depressed and distressed, she confided all that
happened between her and petitioner to her mother, BBB.
On learning what her daughter underwent in the hands of petitioner, BBB
filed an administrative complaint in Assumption College against him. She also
lodged a complaint in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasay City which
led to the filing of Criminal Case No. 00-0691.
In his defense, petitioner proffered denial and alibi. He claimed that the
alleged incidents on October 3, 1997 and October 10, 1997 did not happen.
He spent October 3, 1997 with his colleagues Joseph Hipolito and AJ Lagaso
while he was busy checking papers and computing grades on October 10,
1997. The last time he saw AAA during the first semester was when she
submitted her final paper on October 18, 1997.
On November 19, 1997, between 10:30 a.m. and 1:00 p.m., he sorted out
conflicts of class schedules for the second semester at the Assumption
College. On November 26, 1997, he was at St. Scholastica’s College (where he
was also teaching) preparing a faculty concert slated on December 12, 1997.
At lunch time, he attended the birthday treat of a colleague, Evelyn Bancoro.
On November 29, 1997, he attended AAA’s 18th birthday party. That was the
last time he saw her.
According to petitioner, AAA became his sweetheart when she was already
19 years old and after he was dismissed from Assumption College. On
December 27 and 28, 1998, they spent time together, shared their worries,
problems and dreams and kissed each other. On January 3, 1999, he brought
her to Queensland Lodge where they had sexual intercourse for the first
time. It was repeated for at least 20 times from January 1999 until they broke
up in July 1999, some of which were done at either his or her house when no
one was around.
The trial court found the evidence for the prosecution sufficient to sustain
petitioner’s conviction. On March 7, 2001, it rendered a decision finding
petitioner guilty.10 The dispositive portion read:
In view of the foregoing, the Court finds the accused Michael John Malto y
Zarsadias guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Article III, Section
5(a)[,] paragraph 3 of RA 7610[,] as amended and hereby sentences him
to reclusion temporal in its medium period or an imprisonment of seventeen
(17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and to pay
civil indemnity in the amount of Php 75,000.00 and moral and exemplary
damages of Php 50,000.00 to minor complainant with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.11
Petitioner questioned the trial court’s decision in the CA. In a decision dated
July 30, 2004,12 the appellate court affirmed his conviction even if it found
that his acts were not covered by paragraph (a) but by paragraph (b) of
Section 5, Article III of RA 7610. It further observed that the trial court failed
to fix the minimum term of indeterminate sentence imposed on him. It also
ruled that the trial court erred in awarding ₱75,000 civil indemnity in favor of
AAA as it was proper only in a conviction for rape committed under the
circumstances under which the death penalty was authorized by
law.13 Hence, the CA modified the decision of the trial court as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of conviction is AFFIRMED, with
the MODIFICATION that (1) appellant MICHAEL JOHN MALTO y ZARSADIAS is
hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of Eight (8) Years and One (1)
Day of prision mayor as minimum, to Seventeen (17) Years, Four (4) Months
and One (1) Day of reclusion temporal as maximum; and (2) the sum of
₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity is DELETED.14
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner contends that the CA erred in sustaining his conviction although it
found that he did not rape AAA. For him, he should have been acquitted
since there was no rape. He also claims that he and AAA were sweethearts
and their sexual intercourse was consensual.
Petitioner is wrong.
The Offense Stated in the Information Was Wrongly Designated
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused is entitled to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him.15 Pursuant thereto, the
complaint or information against him should be sufficient in form and
substance. A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the
accused; the designation of the offense by the statute; the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party;
the approximate date of the commission of the offense and the place where
the offense was committed.16
The complaint or information shall state the designation of the offense given
by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense and specify
its qualifying and aggravating circumstances.17 If there is no designation of
the offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the
statute punishing it.18 The acts or omissions constituting the offense and the
qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and
concise language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but
in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know
what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment.19
The designation of the offense in the information against petitioner was
changed from "violation of Section 5(b), Article III" of RA 7610 to "violation of
Section 5(a), Article III" thereof. Paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 5, Article III
of RA 7610 provide:
Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children, whether
male or female, who, for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to
the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited
in prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion
perpetua shall be imposed upon the following:
(a) Those who engage in or promote, facilitate or induce child
prostitution which include, but are not limited to, the following:
1. Acting as a procurer of a child prostitute;
2. Inducing a person to be a client of a child prostitute
by means of written or oral advertisements or other
similar means;
3. Taking advantage of influence or relationship to
procure a child as a prostitute;
4. Threatening or using violence towards a child to
engage him as a prostitute; or
5. Giving monetary consideration, goods or other
pecuniary benefit to a child with intent to engage such
child in prostitution.
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to
other sexual abuse: Provided, That when the victim is under
twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted
under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No.
3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious
conduct, as the case may be: Provided, that the penalty for
lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of
age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period; and
xxx xxx x x x(emphasis supplied)
The elements of paragraph (a) are:
1. the accused engages in, promotes, facilitates or induces child
prostitution;
2. the act is done through, but not limited to, the following
means:
a. acting as a procurer of a child prostitute;
b. inducing a person to be a client of a child prostitute
by means of written or oral advertisements or other
similar means;
c. taking advantage of influence or relationship to
procure a child as a prostitute;
d. threatening or using violence towards a child to
engage him as a prostitute or
e. giving monetary consideration, goods or other
pecuniary benefit to a child with intent to engage such
child in prostitution;
3. the child is exploited or intended to be exploited in prostitution
and
4. the child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.
On the other hand, the elements of paragraph (b) are:
1. the accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct;
2. the act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or
subjected to other sexual abuse and
3. the child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.
Paragraph (a) essentially punishes acts pertaining to or connected with child
prostitution. It contemplates sexual abuse of a child exploited in prostitution.
In other words, under paragraph (a), the child is abused primarily for profit.
On the other hand, paragraph (b) punishes sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct not only with a child exploited in prostitution but also with a child
subjected to other sexual abuse. It covers not only a situation where a child is
abused for profit but also one in which a child, through coercion, intimidation
or influence, engages in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct.20
The information against petitioner did not allege anything pertaining to or
connected with child prostitution. It did not aver that AAA was abused for
profit. What it charged was that petitioner had carnal knowledge or
committed sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct with AAA; AAA was
induced and/or seduced by petitioner who was her professor to indulge in
sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct and AAA was a 17-year old minor.
These allegations support a charge for violation of paragraph (b), not
paragraph (a), of Section 5, Article III, RA 7610.
The Real Nature of the Offense is Determined by Facts Alleged in the
Information, Not By the Designation
The designation in the information of the specific statute violated is
imperative to avoid surprise on the accused and to afford him the
opportunity to prepare his defense accordingly. However, the failure to
designate the offense by statute,21 or to mention the specific provision
penalizing the act,22 or an erroneous specification of the law violated23 does
not vitiate the information if the facts alleged clearly recite the facts
constituting the crime charged.24 What controls is not the title of the
information or the designation of the offense but the actual facts recited in
the information.25 In other words, it is the recital of facts of the commission
of the offense, not the nomenclature of the offense, that determines the
crime being charged in the information.26
The facts stated in the amended information against petitioner correctly
made out a charge for violation of Section 5(b), Article III, RA 7610. Thus,
even if the trial and appellate courts followed the wrong designation of the
offense, petitioner could be convicted of the offense on the basis of the facts
recited in the information and duly proven during trial.
Petitioner violated Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610, as amended
The first element of Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610 pertains to the act or
acts committed by the accused. The second element refers to the state or
condition of the offended party. The third element corresponds to the
minority or age of the offended party.
The first element was present in this case. Petitioner committed lascivious
conduct against and had sexual intercourse with AAA in the following
instances: (1) on November 19, 1997, when he kissed her at the back and
neck, touched her breasts and placed his hand inside her blouse to gratify his
lust; (2) on November 26, 1997, when, with lewd designs, he dragged her
towards the bed of the motel room and forcibly kissed her on the lips, neck
and breasts and (3) when he exerted moral influence on her and pressured
her until she surrendered herself to him on November 26, 1997. His acts
were covered by the definitions of sexual abuse and lascivious conduct under
Section 2(g) and (h) of the Rules and Regulations on the Reporting and
Investigation of Child Abuse Cases promulgated to implement the provisions
of RA 7610, particularly on child abuse:
(g) "Sexual abuse" includes the employment, use, persuasion,
inducement, enticement or coercion of a child to engage in, or
assist another person to engage in, sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct or the molestation, prostitution, or incest with
children;
(h) "Lascivious conduct" means the intentional touching, either
directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast,
inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the
genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person, whether of the same or
opposite sex, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade,
or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality,
masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or public area of
a person. (emphasis supplied)
The second element was likewise present here. The following
pronouncement in People v. Larin27 is significant:
A child is deemed exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual
abuse, when the child indulges in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct (a)
for money, profit, or any other consideration; or (b) under the coercion
or influence of any adult, syndicate or group. (emphasis supplied)
On November 19, 1997, due to the influence of petitioner, AAA indulged in
lascivious acts with or allowed him to commit lascivious acts on her. This was
repeated on November 26, 1997 on which date AAA also indulged in sexual
intercourse with petitioner as a result of the latter’s influence and moral
ascendancy. Thus, she was deemed to be a "child subjected to other sexual
abuse" as the concept is defined in the opening paragraph of Section 5,
Article III of RA 7610 and in Larin.
The third element of the offense was also satisfied. Section 3 (a), Article I of
RA 7610 provides:
SECTION 3. Definition of Terms. –
(a) "Children" refers [to] persons below eighteen (18) years of age or those
over but are unable to fully take care of themselves or protect themselves
from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a
physical or mental disability or condition; (emphasis supplied)
On November 19, 2007 and November 26, 2007, AAA was a child as she was
below 18 years of age. She was therefore within the protective mantle of the
law.
Since all three elements of the crime were present, the conviction of
petitioner was proper.
Violation of Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610 and Rape are Separate and
Distinct Crimes
Petitioner was charged and convicted for violation of Section 5(b), Article III
of RA 7610, not rape. The offense for which he was convicted is punished by
a special law while rape is a felony under the Revised Penal Code.28 They
have different elements.29 The two are separate and distinct crimes. Thus,
petitioner can be held liable for violation of Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610
despite a finding that he did not commit rape.
Consent of the Child is Immaterial in Criminal Cases Involving Violation of
Section 5, Article III of RA 7610
Petitioner claims that AAA welcomed his kisses and touches and consented
to have sexual intercourse with him. They engaged in these acts out of
mutual love and affection. But may the "sweetheart theory" be invoked in
cases of child prostitution and other sexual abuse prosecuted under Section
5, Article III of RA 7610? No.
The sweetheart theory applies in acts of lasciviousness and rape, felonies
committed against or without the consent of the victim. It operates on the
theory that the sexual act was consensual. It requires proof that the accused
and the victim were lovers and that she consented to the sexual relations.30
For purposes of sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct in child abuse
cases under RA 7610, the sweetheart defense is unacceptable. A child
exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse cannot validly give
consent to sexual intercourse with another person.
The language of the law is clear: it seeks to punish
[t]hose who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a
child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse.
Unlike rape, therefore, consent is immaterial in cases involving violation of
Section 5, Article III of RA 7610. The mere act of having sexual intercourse or
committing lascivious conduct with a child who is exploited in prostitution or
subjected to sexual abuse constitutes the offense. It is a malum prohibitum,
an evil that is proscribed.
A child cannot give consent to a contract under our civil laws.31 This is on the
rationale that she can easily be the victim of fraud as she is not capable of
fully understanding or knowing the nature or import of her actions. The
State, as parens patriae, is under the obligation to minimize the risk of harm
to those who, because of their minority, are as yet unable to take care of
themselves fully.32 Those of tender years deserve its protection.33
The harm which results from a child’s bad decision in a sexual encounter may
be infinitely more damaging to her than a bad business deal. Thus, the law
should protect her from the harmful consequences34 of her attempts at adult
sexual behavior.35 For this reason, a child should not be deemed to have
validly consented to adult sexual activity and to surrender herself in the act
of ultimate physical intimacy under a law which seeks to afford her special
protection against abuse, exploitation and discrimination. (Otherwise, sexual
predators like petitioner will be justified, or even unwittingly tempted by the
law, to view her as fair game and vulnerable prey.) In other words, a child is
presumed by law to be incapable of giving rational consent to any lascivious
act or sexual intercourse.361âwphi1
This must be so if we are to be true to the constitutionally enshrined State
policy to promote the physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual and social well-
being of the youth.37 This is consistent with the declared policy of the State
Accordingly, the petition is hereby DENIED. Petitioner Michael John Z. Malto
is hereby found guilty of violating Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610, as
amended, for which he is sentenced to 14 years and 8 months of reclusion
temporal as minimum to 20 years of reclusion temporal as maximum. He is
further ordered to pay AAA ₱50,000 as civil indemnity and ₱50,000 for moral
damages.

Costs against petitioner.

[T]o provide special protection to children from all forms of abuse, neglect,
cruelty, exploitation and discrimination, and other conditions prejudicial to
their development; provide sanctions for their commission and carry out a SO ORDERED.
program for prevention and deterrence of and crisis intervention in
situations of child abuse, exploitation, and discrimination.38 (emphasis
supplied)

as well as to

intervene on behalf of the child when the parents, guardian, teacher or

person having care or custody of the child fails or is unable to protect the
child against abuse, exploitation, and discrimination or when such acts
against the child are committed by the said parent, guardian, teacher or
person having care and custody of the same.39 (emphasis supplied)

This is also in harmony with the foremost consideration of the child’s best
interests in all actions concerning him or her.

The best interest of children shall be the paramount consideration in all

actions concerning them, whether undertaken by public or private social
welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities, and legislative
bodies, consistent with the principles of First Call for Children as enunciated
in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. Every effort shall
be exerted to promote the welfare of children and enhance their
opportunities for a useful and happy life.40 (emphasis supplied)

Petitioner May Enjoy the Benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law

The penalty prescribed for violation of the provisions of Section 5, Article III
of RA 7610 is reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua.
In the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the proper
imposable penalty is reclusion temporal in its maximum period, the medium
of the penalty prescribed by the law.41 Notwithstanding that RA 7610 is a
special law, petitioner may enjoy the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence
Law.42 Since the penalty provided in RA 7610 is taken from the range of
penalties in the Revised Penal Code, it is covered by the first clause of Section
1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.43 Thus, he is entitled to a maximum
term which should be within the range of the proper imposable penalty
of reclusion temporal in its maximum period (ranging from 17 years, 4
months and 1 day to 20 years) and a minimum term to be taken within the
range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the law: prision
mayor in its medium period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period
(ranging from 8 years and 1 day to 14 years and 8 months).

The Award of Damages Should Be Modified

The trial court awarded AAA ₱75,000 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000 as moral
and exemplary damages. The CA deleted the award for civil indemnity. It
correctly reasoned that the award was proper only in a conviction for rape
committed under the circumstances under which the death penalty is
authorized by law. Consistent, however, with the objective of RA 7610 to
afford children special protection against abuse, exploitation and
discrimination and with the principle that every person who contrary to law,
willfully or negligently causes damage to another shall indemnify the latter
for the same,44 civil indemnity to the child is proper in a case involving
violation of Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610. Every person criminally liable
is civilly liable.45 The rule is that, in crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant
shall be liable for all damages which are the natural and probable
consequences of the act or omission complained of.46 Thus, ₱50,000 civil
indemnity ex delicto shall be awarded in cases of violation of Section 5(b),
Article III of RA 7610.47

Moreover, the CA erred in affirming the grant of ₱50,000 as "moral and

exemplary damages." The rule is that, in every case, trial courts must specify
the award of each item of damages and make a finding thereon in the body
of the decision.48 Thus, moral damages and exemplary damages should be
separate items of award.

AAA testified that she was "emotionally devastated" and "lost touch of her
inner self" as a result of what petitioner did to her. Because of the mental
anxiety and wounded feelings caused by petitioner to her, she had several
sessions with the dean for student affairs49 and the guidance counselor of
Assumption College as well as with a psychiatrist. This was corroborated by
her mother and the dean of student affairs of Assumption College. Thus, she
is entitled to moral damages of ₱50,000. However, in the absence of an
aggravating circumstance, the grant of exemplary damages is unwarranted.50
G.R. No. 175602 January 18, 2012
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
PO2 EDUARDO VALDEZ and EDWIN VALDEZ, Accused-Appellants.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The sufficiency of the allegations of the facts and circumstances constituting
the elements of the crime charged is crucial in every criminal prosecution
because of the ever-present obligation of the State to duly inform the
accused of the nature and cause of the accusation.
The accused were tried for and convicted of three counts of murder on
January 20, 2005 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 86, in Quezon City.
They were penalized with reclusion perpetua for each count, and ordered to
pay to the heirs of each victim ₱93,000.00 as actual damages, ₱50,000.00 as
civil indemnity, and ₱50,000.00 as moral damages.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) upheld the RTC on July 18, 2006,
subject to the modification that each accused pay to the heirs of each victim
₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, ₱25,000.00 as
temperate damages, and ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages, plus costs of
suit.1
The accused came to the Court to seek acquittal. On May 9, 2007, however,
accused Edwin Valdez filed a motion to withdraw appeal, which the Court
granted on October 10, 2007, thereby deeming Edwin’s appeal closed and
terminated.2 Hence, the Court hereby resolves only the appeal of PO2
Eduardo Valdez.
Antecedents
The Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City charged the two accused in
the RTC with three counts of murder for the killing of Ferdinand Sayson,
Moises Sayson, Jr., and Joselito Sayson, alleging:
Criminal Case No. 00-90718
That on or about the 1st day of March, 2000, in Quezon City, Philippines, the
above-named accused conspiring together, confederating with and mutually
helping each other, with intent to kill, qualified with treachery, evident
premeditation and abuse of superior strength did, then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, assault, attack and employ personal violence
upon the person of one FERDINAND SAYSON Y DABOCOL by then and there
shooting him with a gun, hitting him on his head, thereby inflicting upon him
serious and mortal wound which was the direct and immediate cause of his
death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said FERDINAND
SAYSON Y DABOCOL.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
Criminal Case No. 00-90719
That on or about the 1st day of March, 2000, in Quezon City, Philippines, the
above-named accused conspiring together, confederating with and mutually
helping each other, with intent to kill, qualified with treachery, evident
premeditation and abuse of superior strength did, then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, assault, attack and employ personal violence
upon the person of one MOISES SAYSON, JR. Y DABOCOL by then and there
shooting him several times with a gun, hitting him on his face and chest,
thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal wound which was the direct
and immediate cause of his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs
of the said MOISES SAYSON, JR. Y DABOCOL.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
Criminal Case No. 00-90720
That on or about the 1st day of March, 2000, in Quezon City, Philippines, the
above-named accused conspiring together, confederating with and mutually
helping each other, with intent to kill, qualified with treachery, evident
premeditation and abuse of superior strength did, then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, assault, attack and employ personal violence
upon the person of one JOSELITO SAYSON Y DABOCOL by then and there
shooting him with a gun, hitting him on his back, thereby inflicting upon him
serious and mortal wound which was the direct and immediate cause of his
death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said JOSELITO SAYSON
Y DABOCOL.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) summarized the State’s evidence of
guilt as follows:
On March 1, 2000, at around 8:00 o’clock in the evening, Estrella Sayson,
(Estrella) was at the canteen (which also includes a jai alai betting station)
located at 77 Corregidor Street, Bago Bantay, Quezon City. Estrella was
preparing for the celebration of the birthday of her second husband,
Wilfredo Lladones, which was held later in the evening. Estrella’s son, the
deceased Moises Sayson, a former policeman, and his wife, Susan Sayson
(Susan) owned the said canteen and managed the betting station. At about
9:00 o’clock in the evening, Estrella’s other sons Joselito Sayson (Joselito) and
Ferdinand Sayson (Ferdinand) arrived at the canteen to greet their
stepfather. Estrella’s family and other visitors ate and enjoyed themselves at
the party (pp. 3-5, TSN, November 29, 2000; pp. 3-6, TSN, February 6, 2001;
pp. 3-4, TSN, July 31, 2001).
At about 10:00 o’clock in the evening, the celebration was interrupted with
the arrival of Eduardo and Edwin, who alighted from a motorcycle in front of
the jai alai fronton. Eduardo and Edwin asked the jai alai teller, Jonathan
Rubio (Jonathan), to come out. Jonathan was then attending to customers
who were buying jai alai tickets. Moises approached Eduardo and Edwin and
tried to reason with them. Estrella saw Eduardo and Edwin armed with guns.
She tried to prevent Moises from going near Edwin and Eduardo. Moises did
not heed his mother’s warning. He went out and advised Eduardo and Edwin
not to force Jonathan to go out of the fronton. Estrella then heard one of the
accused-appellants threaten Moises with the words "Gusto mo unahin na
kita?" Moises replied "huwag." Successive shots were thereafter heard.
Moises fell and was continuously fired upon even after he was sprawled on
the ground. Ferdinand immediately approached the scene to help his brother
Moises. Ferdinand, however was shot on the left temporal portion of his
head and fell. Somebody told Joselito to run away, but he was hit at the back
while running. Joselito fell on a burger machine (pp. 7-11, TSN, November 29,
2000; pp. 6-10, TSN, February 6, 2001; pp. 5-10, TSN, July 31, 2001; pp. 2-6,
September 5, 2001).
After shooting the Sayson brothers, Eduardo and Edwin escaped from the
scene of the crime (p. 10, TSN, February 6, 2001).6
In turn, the appellant’s brief filed by the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO)
rendered the version of the accused, to wit:
xxx [A]t about 10:00 o’clock in the evening, Heidi dela Cruz (a barbecue
vendor) and Noel Valad-on (a tricycle driver) saw accused Edwin Valdez alight
from a bus. The latter bought P100.00 worth of barbecue from Heidi then
proceeded towards home. He was walking along Corregidor Street when
Heidi saw Jun Sayson (Moises), then holding a gun, block his (Edwin’s) way.
Jun Sayson poked a gun at accused Edwin, shouting, ‘Putang-ina mo,
papatayin kita’. The latter raised both his hands and said ‘Wag kuya Jun,
maawa ka.’
Accused Eduardo Valdez (a policeman), then carrying his 6-year old child, was
walking when his way was likewise blocked but this time, by the siblings
Joselito and Ferdinand as well as their stepfather. Joselito twisted one of his
(Eduardo’s) hands at his back while his (Joseltio’s) stepfather held the other.
Ferdinand fired a gun but accused Eduardo was able to evade. Joselito, who
was positioned behind Eduardo, was hit. He slumped and bled. He asked
Heidi to inform his family that he was hit. Heidi ran away. She saw Jun
(Moises) and accused Edwin grappling. Thereafter, she heard gunshots.
Accused Eduardo ducked during the firing. He pretended to be dead.
Ferdinand stopped firing. Accused Eduardo’s son approached him crying.
Accused thereafter, brought his son home, took his service firearm and on his
way back to the scene of the incident when he met General Jesus Almadin,
his commanding officer (CO). He reported the incident and sought for advice.
He was told to take a rest and go back on (sic) the following day. He
accompanied his CO to Camp Crame. He surrendered his firearm to Sr./Insp.
Rodolfo Araza of the CIU. Accused Edwin Valdez likewise surrendered (TSN
dated 05 February 2003; pp. 3-9; 12 March 2003, pp. 2-16; 11 August 2003,
pp. 2-18, 1 September 2003, pp. 3-10; 15 October 2003, pp. 2-8; 03
December 2003, pp. 2-4; 18 February 2004, pp. 2-9; 24 March 2004, pp. 3-9;
10 April 2004, pp. 2-7; 07 June 2004, pp. 2-25).7
The RTC convicted the two accused of three counts of murder and sentenced
them to suffer reclusion perpetua for each count of murder.8
On appeal, the CA affirmed the convictions.9
Issues
In this appeal, PO2 Valdez assails the credibility of the State’s witnesses by
pointing to inconsistencies and weaknesses in their testimonies; challenges
the finding of conspiracy between the accused; and contends that the State
did not establish the qualifying circumstance of treachery.10
Ruling
The Court affirms the convictions, but holds PO2 Valdez guilty only of three
counts of homicide due to the failure of the informations to allege the facts
and circumstances constituting treachery.
First of all, PO2 Valdez insists that the State’s witnesses (Susan Sayson,
Marites Sayson and Estrella Sayson) did not really see the events as they
transpired; and that they wrongly identified the two accused as the persons
who had shot and killed the victims; and that the victims were themselves
the aggressors.
The CA rejected PO2 Valdez’s insistence, holding thus:
In their Brief, the accused-appellants desperately attempted to discredit the
testimonies of witnesses Susan, Marites and Estrella. They claimed that a
perusal of Estrella’s testimony would cast doubt on her statement that she
actually witnessed the shooting incident. The accused-appellants claimed
that Estrella Sayson did not actually see who allegedly threatened her son
Moises with the words "Gusto mo unahin na kita?" The accused-appellants
also claimed that Estrella also failed to see who shot Moises. They likewise
assailed the testimonies of Susan and Marites as being incredible. They said
that Susan testified that she was in a state of shock after the incident and
that she could not speak; yet she was still able to give her statement on the
same day the incident allegedly happened. The accused-appellants also said
that Marites testified that she was only about five (5) meters away from
them (accused-appellants) when they alighted from their motorcycle; but
that, "interestingly," she only learned from her husband Joselito that the
accused-appellants were looking for a certain Jonathan.
We are not persuaded. In her testimony, Estrella satisfactorily explained her
purported failure to see who between the accused-appellants threatened
Moises with the words "Gusto mo unahin kita?" and who shot her son
Moises, by pointing out that she was then facing Moises because she was
preventing him from approaching the accused-appellants, who were armed
with short firearms. Estrella categorically stated that she saw the accused-
appellants alight from their motorcycle on March 1, 2000. She could not have
been mistaken about the identity of the accused-appellants for the simple
reason that they are her neighbors and that their (the accused-appellants’)
father is her "cumpadre." When the incident happened, the accused-
appellants were about eight (8) to ten (10) meters away from where she and
her son Moises were standing. She also saw with her own eyes how her son
Moises fell after she heard successive bursts of gunshots (approximately [9]
shots) coming from where the accused-appellants were standing.11
Considering that the CA thereby affirmed the trial court’s findings of fact, its
calibration of the testimonies of witnesses and its assessment of their
probative weight, as well as its conclusions, the Court accords high respect, if
not conclusive effect, to the CA’s findings.12 The justification for this is that
trial court was in the best position to assess the credibility of witnesses by
virtue of its firsthand observation of the demeanor, conduct and attitude of
the witnesses under grilling examination. The only time when a reviewing
court was not bound by the trial court’s assessment of credibility arises upon
a showing of a fact or circumstance of weight and influence that was
overlooked and, if considered, could affect the outcome of the case.13 No
such fact or circumstance has been brought to the Court’s attention.
It is not trite to remind that a truth-telling witness is not always expected to
give an error-free testimony because of the lapse of time and the treachery
of human memory; and that inaccuracies noted in testimony may even
suggest that the witness is telling the truth and has not been rehearsed.14 To
properly appreciate the worth of testimony, therefore, the courts do not
resort to the individual words or phrases alone but seek out the whole
impression or effect of what has been said and done.15
Secondly, PO2 Valdez argues that the three victims were themselves the
aggressors who had attacked to kill him and his brother. He narrated during
the trial that he dodged the bullet fired from the gun of Ferdinand (one of
the victims), causing the bullet to fatally hit Joselito (another victim); that he
played dead to avoid being shot at again, and walked away with his terrified
son only after the way was clear for them to leave; and that he heard
gunshots while Edwin and Jun (the third victim) grappled for control of a gun,
and assumed that the gunshots had hit and killed Jun and Ferdinand.16
The argument of PO2 Valdez is bereft of factual merit.
It is fundamental that the question as to who between the accused and the
victim was the unlawful aggressor is a question of fact addressed to the trial
court for determination based on the evidence on record.17 The records show
that the version of PO2 Valdez was contrary to the established facts and
circumstances showing that he and Edwin, then armed with short firearms,
had gone to the jai alai betting station of Moises to confront Jonathan Rubio,
the teller of the betting booth then busily attending to bettors inside the
booth; that because the accused were calling to Rubio to come out of the
booth, Moises approached to pacify them, but one of them threatened
Moises: Gusto mo unahin na kita?; that immediately after Moises
replied: Huwag!, PO2 Valdez fired several shots at Moises, causing him to fall
to the ground; that PO2 Valdez continued firing at the fallen Moises; that
Ferdinand (another victim) rushed to aid Moises, his brother, but Edwin shot
Ferdinand in the head, spilling his brains; that somebody shouted to Joselito
(the third victim) to run; that Edwin also shot Joselito twice in the back; and
that Joselito fell on a burger machine. The shots fired at the three victims
were apparently fired from short distances.
The testimonial accounts of the State’s witnesses entirely jibed with the
physical evidence. Specifically, the medico-legal evidence showed that
Ferdinand had a gunshot wound in the head;18 that two gunshot wounds
entered Joselito’s back and the right side of his neck;19 and that Moises
suffered a gunshot wound in the head and four gunshot wounds in the
chest.20 Also, Dr. Wilfredo Tierra of the NBI Medico-Legal Office opined that
the presence of marginal abrasions at the points of entry indicated that the
gunshot wounds were inflicted at close range.21 Given that physical evidence
was of the highest order and spoke the truth more eloquently than all
witnesses put together,22 the congruence between the testimonial
recollections and the physical evidence rendered the findings adverse to PO2
Valdez and Edwin conclusive.1avvphi1
Thirdly, conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit the
felony.23 Proof of the actual agreement to commit the crime need not be
direct because conspiracy may be implied or inferred from their
acts.24 Herein, both lower courts deduced the conspiracy between the
accused from the mode and manner in which they perpetrated the killings.
We are satisfied that their deduction was warranted.
Based on the foregoing, PO2 Valdez cannot now avoid criminal responsibility
for the fatal shooting by Edwin of Ferdinand and Joselito. Both accused were
convincingly shown to have acted in concert to achieve a common purpose
of assaulting their unarmed victims with their guns. Their acting in concert
was manifest not only from their going together to the betting station on
board a single motorcycle, but also from their joint attack that PO2 Valdez
commenced by firing successive shots at Moises and immediately followed
by Edwin’s shooting of Ferdinand and Joselito one after the other. It was also
significant that they fled together on board the same motorcycle as soon as
they had achieved their common purpose.
To be a conspirator, one did not have to participate in every detail of the
execution; neither did he have to know the exact part performed by his co-
conspirator in the execution of the criminal acts.25 Accordingly, the existence
of the conspiracy between PO2 Valdez and Edwin was properly inferred and
proved through their acts that were indicative of their common purpose and
community of interest.26
And, fourthly, it is unavoidable for the Court to pronounce PO2 Valdez guilty
of three homicides, instead of three murders, on account of the informations
not sufficiently alleging the attendance of treachery.
Treachery is the employment of means, methods, or forms in the execution
of any of the crimes against persons which tend to directly and specially
insure its execution, without risk to the offending party arising from the
defense which the offended party might make.27 It encompasses a wide
variety of actions and attendant circumstances, the appreciation of which is
particular to a crime committed. Corollarily, the defense against the
appreciation of a circumstance as aggravating or qualifying is also varied and
dependent on each particular instance. Such variety generates the actual
need for the State to specifically aver the factual circumstances or particular
acts that constitute the criminal conduct or that qualify or aggravate the
liability for the crime in the interest of affording the accused sufficient notice
to defend himself.
It cannot be otherwise, for, indeed, the real nature of the criminal charge is
determined not from the caption or preamble of the information, or from the
specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, which are
mere conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of the facts in the
complaint or information.28 In People v. Dimaano,29 the Court elaborated:
For complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state the name of the
accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the
offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and
the place wherein the offense was committed. What is controlling is not the
title of the complaint, nor the designation of the offense charged or the
particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, these being mere
conclusions of law made by the prosecutor, but the description of the crime
charged and the particular facts therein recited. The acts or omissions
complained of must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to enable a person and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months). Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged, the minimum of the indeterminate sentence is taken from prision mayor, and
and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment. No information for a the maximum from the medium period of reclusion temporal. Hence, the
crime will be sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly allege the Court imposes the indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision mayor as
elements of the crime charged. Every element of the offense must be stated minimum to 17 years of reclusion temporal as maximum for each count of
in the information. What facts and circumstances are necessary to be homicide.
included therein must be determined by reference to the definitions and
essentials of the specified crimes. The requirement of alleging the elements
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on July 18,
of a crime in the information is to inform the accused of the nature of the
2006 is MODIFIED by finding PO2 Eduardo Valdez guilty beyond reasonable
accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably prepare his defense.
doubt of three counts of HOMICIDE, and sentencing him to suffer for each
The presumption is that the accused has no independent knowledge of the
count the indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision mayor as minimum
facts that constitute the offense. [emphasis supplied]
to 17 years of reclusion temporal as maximum; and to pay to the respective
heirs of the late Ferdinand Sayson, Moises Sayson, Jr., and Joselito Sayson
The averments of the informations to the effect that the two accused "with the amounts of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages,
intent to kill, qualified with treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of and ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages.
superior strength did xxx assault, attack and employ personal violence upon"
the victims "by then and there shooting [them] with a gun, hitting [them]" on
The accused shall pay the costs of suit.
various parts of their bodies "which [were] the direct and immediate cause of
[their] death[s]" did not sufficiently set forth the facts and circumstances
describing how treachery attended each of the killings. It should not be SO ORDERED.
difficult to see that merely averring the killing of a person by shooting him
with a gun, without more, did not show how the execution of the crime was
directly and specially ensured without risk to the accused from the defense
that the victim might make. Indeed, the use of the gun as an instrument to
kill was not per se treachery, for there are other instruments that could serve
the same lethal purpose. Nor did the use of the term treachery constitute a
sufficient averment, for that term, standing alone, was nothing but a
conclusion of law, not an averment of a fact. In short, the particular acts and
circumstances constituting treachery as an attendant circumstance in murder
were missing from the informations.

To discharge its burden of informing him of the charge, the State must
specify in the information the details of the crime and any circumstance that
aggravates his liability for the crime. The requirement of sufficient factual
averments is meant to inform the accused of the nature and cause of the
charge against him in order to enable him to prepare his defense. It
emanates from the presumption of innocence in his favor, pursuant to which
he is always presumed to have no independent knowledge of the details of
the crime he is being charged with. To have the facts stated in the body of
the information determine the crime of which he stands charged and for
which he must be tried thoroughly accords with common sense and with the
requirements of plain justice, for, as the Court fittingly said in United States v.
Lim San: 30

From a legal point of view, and in a very real sense, it is of no concern to the
accused what is the technical name of the crime of which he stands charged.
It in no way aids him in a defense on the merits. xxx. That to which his
attention should be directed, and in which he, above all things else, should
be most interested, are the facts alleged. The real question is not did he
commit a crime given in the law some technical and specific name, but did he
perform the acts alleged in the body of the information in the manner
therein set forth. If he did, it is of no consequence to him, either as a matter
of procedure or of substantive right, how the law denominates the crime
which those acts constitute. The designation of the crime by name in the
caption of the information from the facts alleged in the body of that pleading
is a conclusion of law made by the fiscal. In the designation of the crime the
accused never has a real interest until the trial has ended. For his full and
complete defense he need not know the name of the crime at all. It is of no
consequence whatever for the protection of his substantial rights. The real
and important question to him is, "Did you perform the acts alleged in the
manner alleged?" not "Did you commit a crime named murder." If he
performed the acts alleged, in the manner stated, the law determines what
the name of the crime is and fixes the penalty therefor. It is the province of
the court alone to say what the crime is or what it is named. xxx. (emphasis
supplied)

A practical consequence of the non-allegation of a detail that aggravates his

liability is to prohibit the introduction or consideration against the accused of
evidence that tends to establish that detail. The allegations in the
information are controlling in the ultimate analysis. Thus, when there is a
variance between the offense charged in the information and that proved,
and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense
proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved included in the
offense charged, or of the offense charged included in the offense
proved.31 In that regard, an offense charged necessarily includes the offense
proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as
alleged in the information, constitute the latter; an offense charged is
necessarily included in the offense proved when the essential ingredients of
the former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter.32

We now fix the penalty for each count of homicide.

Pursuant to Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for homicide
is reclusion temporal.33 There being no circumstances modifying criminal
liability, the penalty is applied in its medium period (i.e., 14 years, 8 months
G.R. No. L-65017 November 13, 1989
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
STALIN GUEVARRA y PAPASIN accused-appellant.
The Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Pedro A. Venida for accused-appellant.
SARMIENTO, J.:
Stalin Guevarra was convicted of murder by the Court of First Instance (now
Regional Trial Court) of Oriental Mindoro. 1 On appeal, the then Intermediate
Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) rendered judgment on August 17,
1983, increasing the indeterminate penalty from "TEN (10) YEARS and ONE
(1) DAY, of prision mayor, as minimum, to SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS and FOUR
(4) MONTHS, of reclusion temporal, as maximum, to indemnify the heirs of
the deceased in the amount of P12,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency and to pay the costs," imposed by the trial court,
to reclusion perpetua, and affirmed in all other respects the appealed
decision. 2 However, considering that this case involves a capital offense, the
appellate court could not enter judgment. Conformably, therefore,
to Daniel, 3 Ramos, 4 Galang, 5 and similar cases the entire records were
certified and elevated to us for review.
The facts are as follows:
On November 29, 1980, Joselito de los Reyes, twenty-three years of age,
assistant chief security guard at "Baklad" Naujan Oriental Mindoro, together
with Teofilo Martinez, a thirty-two year-old fisherman of Bancurro Naujan
attended a dance sponsored by the San Agustin Barangay High School.
Teofilo saw Eduardo Romero (still at large) and Stalin Guevarra together at
the dance hall. The affair was interrupted abruptly when someone stoned
the school. At about midnight, Joselito and Teofilo went home to Bancurro.
Together with them were Rosabel , Magno and Babylyn Martinez, both
students, seventeen and seventeen and eighteen years of age, respectively.
Along the way, Teofilo held a flashlight to illuminate the rocky path whereon
Joselito, Rosabel, and Babylyn walked. Suddenly, they were waylaid by Stalin
and Eduardo. Stalin, 27 years old, went immediately behind Joselito, and
embraced him with both hands. 6 Joselito struggled from the clutches of
Stalin but in vain; the firm embrace locked the whole body and both arms of
Joselito. Facing the hapless Joselito, Eduardo got his knife from his pocket,
opened it, 7 and thrust the shiny and pointed end of the weapon at the right
side of Joselito's body just below his navel. 8 "May tama ako," were the
words uttered by Joselito just before he fell to the ground. 9 Teofilo, Babylyn,
and Rosabel froze where they stood. The abruptness of the incident petrified
them. But after the stabbing the assailants fled in the direction of San Agustin
and disappeared in the dark. The beam of light from the flashlight Teofilo
carried, however, was sufficient to enable him and his two female
companions to witness clearly the stabbing of Joselito and to recognize the
appellant and Eduardo Romero, both known to them (Teofilo, Babylyn, and
Rosabel), as the perpetrators of the crime.
Bathed in blood, the victim was pedalled in a tricycle to the Naujan Police
Station. Unfortunately, Private First Class (Pfc) Henry Aceremo, the officer-in-
charge, was not able to get an ante mortem statement because the victim
could hardly talk.10 He was hovering between life and death when he was
rushed to the clinic of Dr. Nicolas B. Balbin.
As a result of the mortal wound inflicted by Eduardo Romero, Joselito died.
Dr. Nicolas B. Balbin who conducted a post mortem examination, certified
that the cause of death was hemorrhage within the adbominal cavity, and
that the wound might have been caused by a sharp-bladed instrument,
probably a "balisong." 11
As a consequence, Pfcs Bautista and Aceremo accompanied by Rosabel and
Babylyn, went to the house of the appellant where he was found drunk. As to
Eduardo, he vanished from the barrio without a trace.
Subsequently, an information was filed stating:
That on or about the 29th day of November, 1980 at
around 12:00 o'clock in the evening, in Barangay San
Agustin II, Municipality of
Naujan, Province of Oriental Mindoro, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above named accused, with deliberate intent to kill, by
means of treachery and evident premeditation,
conspiring and confabulating with Eduardo Romero,
who is still at large and therefore no preliminary
investigation has yet been conducted against him, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and stab with a sharp- pointed
instrument one Joselito delos Reyes, who was then
unaware and helpless, inflicting upon the latter a fatal
stab wound, as a result of which caused his udden and
unexpected death.
That in the commission of the offense, the qualifying
circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation,
in addition to the aggravating circumstances of
superior strength and nocturnity, were present.
Contrary to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. 12
After trial, the trial court found Stalin Guevarra guilty and imposed the
penalty adverted to at the outset.
The appellant vehemently denies killing Joselito de los Reyes. He argues that
if indeed he had embraced the victim from behind to facilitate the
commission of the crime without posing any danger to his supposed co-
conspirator or ,without fear of reprisal from the victim, then he could have
fled the scene out of a sense of guilt, out of fear, or to avoid arrest and
ultimate imprisonment. He did not leave his barrio, however, instead, a few
hours after the alleged commission of the crime, he was found by the
policemen boiling and eating bananas with the Hernandez girls. He quotes:
"It has been truly said, since long ago that the wicked teeth, even when no
man pursueth whereas the righteous are brave as the lion." 13
We can not accept the appellant's submission. As a review of the records
shows, after the stabbing incident, both the appellant and Eduardo Romero
hastily fled into the night. This flight from the stabbing scene is a strong
indication of a guilty mind. 14 In small localities where people generally know
one another and are inclined, nay, expected, to show great concern for
neighbors and even nodding acquaintances who fall victim to cruel and
inhuman acts, it would have been natural for the appellant, if indeed he was
innocent of the crime charged, to have gone to the succor of the fallen
Joselito; he would have taken him to the nearest hospital. Or, at the very
least, he could have reported the incident to the local police authorities. But
he did neither of these Good Samaritan acts. By his account, he went home,
obviously confident that he was not Identified as it was nighttime. While it
may be true that Romero escaped and remains at large, the appellant,
appearing like a brave lion, stayed home, Yet it now appears that he did so
not because he was innocent but because he believed he could not be
Identified. But he was wrong. He was clearly and positively Identified by the
prosecution eyewitnesses. Teofilo Martinez recognized Stalin as the person
who embraced the victim to ensure the killing 15 of Joselito. Rosabel Magno,
one of the student companions of Joselito, pointed an accusing finger at
Stalin as one of the culprits. 16 Babylyn Martinez, likewise, Identified the
appellant as the one who immobilized the hands of the victim to render him
vulnerable to the assault of Eduardo.17
In his attempt to absolve himself of guilt, the appellant contends that there is
an absolute variance between the allegations in the information and the
proofs presented by the prosecution witnesses. But Rosabel Magno's
testimony on cross-examination showed her unwavering Identification of
Stalin Guevarra as a co-perpetrator of the killing of Joselito.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Now, you stated that a
stabbing incident transpired
while you and your companions
were walking towards the
direction of your respective
houses. Please tell the Court
what happened?
A. We were walking side by side,
sir. While we were walking side
by side on our way there was a
sudden appearance of two
persons one of whom was Stalin
Guevarra, one of those persons
who appeared went immediately
behind Joselito de los Reyes and
embraced the latter and
immediately thereafter Eduardo
Romero stabbed Jose de los
Reyes. 18
Q. Please tell the court?
 A. I told the police investigators
that Eduardo Romero stabbed
Joselito while Stalin
Guevarra embraced Joselito. 19
xxx xxx xxx
The defense deposits that the prosecution witnesses uttered contradictory
statements, in effect trying to raise doubts as to their veracity.
First, the appellant points out that Teofilo Martinez contradicted his own
testimony:
xxx xxx xxx
Q. When you arrived there at the
dance at ten o'clock of
November 29, 1980, in the
evening, did you see Eduardo
Romero and Stalin Guevarra at
the dance.
A. Yes, sir.
Yet, 12 pages later, he did not see them:
Q. Let us go now to the incident
in the dance floor. You stated
that you did not see the accused
Stalin Guevarra and Romero
dancing. In what part of the
dance floor or in the dance hall
were they before the incident in
question?
A. It was already on our way
home when we saw them.
Q. So, while you were witnessing
the dance you did not see them
in the dance hall that evening?
A. That is right, sir. 20
xxx xxx xxx
The alleged contradictions are minor inconsistencies. Whether or not Teofilo
saw Stalin at the dance is immaterial. That has nothing to do with the
stabbing of the victim. At any rate, Teofilo's narration of the incident was
replete with details, clear and straight-forward, which is a convincing
indication that he had actually witnessed the killing of Joselito. Hence, the
trivial and unimportant details that the appellant emphasizes do not detract
from the veracity of the testimony of the prosecution witnesses.
Secondly, Stalin contends that he could not have embraced Joselito to give
Eduardo Romero the chance to stab the former as he was not at the scene of
the crime in the evening of November 29, 1980 at about 12:00 o'clock
midnight.
This defense of alibi was not established at all.
Alibi is one of the weakest of all defenses. lt can be easily concocted. To
sustain the defense of alibi, the accused must not only prove satisfactorily
that he was at some other place at the time the crime happened, but more
so, that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the place where
the crime was committed. 21
The very evidence for the defense convinces us that it was physically possible
for the appellant to be where the prosecution witnesses testified he was, at
the scene of the crime, and then rush away to his house after the fatal
incident. The place where the stabbing took place is only about seventy
meters from the appellant's house.
xxx xxx xxx
He Stalin Guevarra) however, admitted that he and his
companions were walking towards the direction of his
house on the same evening of November 29, 1980,
where they were about seventy (70) meters away from
the place of the incident. The testimony of the accused
was corroborated by defense witnesses Myra
Hernandez and Julio Guevarra when they took the
witness stand. 22
xxx xxx xxx
We have stated, time and again, the almost inflexible rule that alibi cannot
prevail over the positive testimony of prosecution witnesses and their clear
Identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime. 23 In the instant
case, prosecution witness Teofilo Martinez, who carried a flashlight,
positively and clearly pinpointed the appellant as one of the assailants.
Likewise, Babylyn Martinez and Rosabel Magno, the female companions of
the deceased, sufficiently corroborated Teofilo Martinez's Identification of
Stalin.
Thirdly, the appellant disputes the finding that he had conspired and
confabulated with Eduardo to attack, assault, and stab Joselito. Thus, he
denies conspiracy. We do not agree.
Conspiracy, it is true, is "always predominantly 'mental in composition'
because it consists primarily of a meeting of minds and an intent." 24 Hence,
direct proof is not essential to establish it. By its nature, conspiracy is
planned in utmost secrecy, it can rarely be proved by direct evidence. 25
Although here there is no well founded evidence that the appellant and
Romero had conferred and agreed to kill Joselito, their complicity can be
justified by circumstantial evidence, that is, their community of purpose and
their unity of design in the contemporaneous or simultaneous performance
of the act of assaulting the deceased. 26
The appellant cooperated with Romero in the commission of the offense
by another act without which it would not have been accomplished.
Therefore, the appellant is guilty as a principal by indispensable cooperation
under Article 17, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code. The requisites for
criminal liability under this provision are: 1) participation in the criminal
resolution, i.e., there is either anterior conspiracy or unity of criminal
purpose and intention immediately before or simultaneously with the
commission of the crime charged; and 2) cooperation in the commission of
the offense by performing another act without which it would not have been
accomplished. 27
At the locus criminis was the appellant. His presence did not merely give aid
or support, but emboldened the attacker as the victim was immobilized by
the appellant.
There can be no question that the appellant's act in holding the victim from
behind immediately before the latter was stabbed by Eduardo constitutes a
positive and an overt act towards the realization of a common criminal
intent, although the intent may be classified as instantaneous. 28 The act was
impulsively done on the spur of the moment. It sprang from the turn of
events, thereby uniting with the criminal design of the slayer immediately
before the commission of the offense. That is termed as implied
conspiracy. 29 The appellant's voluntary and indispensable cooperation was a
concurrence of the criminal act to be executed. Consequently, he is a co-
conspirator by indispensable cooperation, although the common desire or
purpose was never bottled up by a previous undertaking.
It can be safely inferred that the appellant was animated to cooperate in the
taking of the 'life of the deceased. Had it not been of the appellant's embrace
of the victim from behind, the latter could have fought back, parried the
thrust, or could have even run away.
If, indeed, the appellant intended to save the deceased from the attack, he
could have wrestled for the "balisong" from Eduardo's hands and prevented
the assault. Or, he could have placed himself between the assailant and the
victim, instead of grabbing him from behind and holding both his arms. The
appellant's actuations thus belie his claimed innocence.
True, the appellant did not inflict any wound or injury materially contributing
to the death of the victim. But, as already stated, his act of immobilizing
Joselito's arms establishes the indispensable cooperation required by law to
make him equally guilty with Romero who alone stabbed and wounded the
former.
Curiously, appellant Stalin Guevarra filed in the Court a motion to withdraw
his appeal, dated July 22, 1985. He expressed that he was no longer
interested in his appeal and manifested his willingness to serve his sentence
and subsequently apply for executive clemency or parole. Considering that
the appellant in his motion was un-assisted by counsel, the Court denied the
motion.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the crime committed by the appellant is
"murder as the killing is qualified by evident premeditation." We do no agree.
Not one of the three basic elements of evident premeditation was proven, to
wit: First, the time when the offender determined to commit the crime itself,
second, an act manifestly indicating that the culprit had tenaciously clung to
his obsession to commit the crime; and third, a sufficient lapse of time
between the determination and the execution to allow him to reflect upon
the consequence of his act. On the other hand, what the evidence on record
shows is that both the appellant and Romero, assaulted the victim
spontaneously and cooperated fully. This circumstance, we rule, precludes
evident premidatation.

Be that as it may, the crime committed is still murder, the killing being
qualified by treachery. The evidence shows beyond reasonable doubt that
the attack by Romero, with the indispensable cooperation of the appellant,
was so sudden and unexpected as to deprive the victim of any opportunity to
defend himself or to inflict retaliation.

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION as

to the civil indemnity which is hereby increased to P30,000.00.

Costs against the appelant.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 146458. January 20, 2003
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. CAPT. MARCIAL LLANTO Y
LEUTERIO, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
The one battle the accused Capt. Marcial Llanto lost was fought against
himself. He utterly failed to measure up to the yardstick of an officer and a
gentleman when he was subdued by the beast in him and he committed
lechery upon his minor kin.
On February 29, 2000, an information for rape was filed against the accused
Llanto, viz:
That on or about (the) twelfth day of November, 1999 at Pasay City and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
actuated by lust, with use of a knife, through force, violence and
intimidation, and by taking advantage of his moral ascendancy over his
twelve (12) year old minor niece MARIA CRISTY T. BALISI, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of Ma. Cristy T.
Balisi against her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice in whatever
amounts may be awarded to her under provisions of the Civil Code.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[1cräläwvirtualibräry
The accused pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued.
The records show that Ma. Cristy Balisi was born to Gertrudes Balisi and Raul
Balisi on December 20, 1986. Her parents separated when she was six
months old and from then on her maternal grandmother took care of her
until she was eight years old. Her mother lives with her (Cristys) uncle in
Litex, Quezon City while her father lives with his common law wife in
Calamba, Laguna.
In 1995, Cristy was entrusted to the care of the accused and his wife, Felicitas
Balisi Llanto, the sister of Cristys father. The accused is a member of the
Philippine Air Force. They lived in Clark Airbase, then moved to Mactan
Airbase, Lapu-Lapu City, Cebu, and in 1999, transferred to a house in Villamor
Airbase in Pasay City.
On November 12, 1999, only Cristy and the accused were home. The
accuseds wife was then in Tuguegarao, Cagayan, while one of their two sons
was in Laguna and the other was in Cebu. At about 9:00 p.m., while Cristy
was studying downstairs, the accused told her that it was already time to go
to bed. The accused pulled her to his room upstairs, removed her shirt, bra
and panty. Cristy cried. He tied her hands, mashed her breasts, kissed her
private part, and inserted his two fingers into her vagina, causing her pain. He
inserted his organ into her private part. The whole time, she could not fight
the accused as he tied her hands and held a knife. After satiating his lust, he
threatened her not to tell on him, then untied her hands. That was not the
first time the accused ravished her. When they lived in Cebu, the accused
violated her about three times a week when only the two of them were left
in the house.
The next day, November 13, 1999, Cristy told the accused that she would go
to school, but instead proceeded to her aunt, Dolores Balisi, the sister of the
accuseds wife. She divulged to Dolores her ordeal in the hands of the
accused. Dolores brought her to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
where Cristy executed a sworn statement[2 and filled out a complaint
sheet.[3 Dr. Annabelle Soliman examined her and made a medico-genital
report.
Cristy denied the claims of the accuseds family that they scolded her for
repeatedly stealing money from them. She also explained that she did not
include in her sworn statement that the accused tied her hands when he
committed the lechery on her because she was not asked what the accused
did first before consummating coitus with her.[4cräläwvirtualibräry
Dr. Annabelle Soliman, medico-legal officer of the NBI, testified that she
examined Cristy Balisi on November 17, 1999 upon her complaint that the
accused had been raping her since 1996, the last of which was on November
12, 1999. Cristy was twelve years old at the time of the examination. The
findings showed that the victims hymen was tall, thick, intact, and distensible
or elastic and there was no sign of extra-genital injury. During the
examination on Cristy, a tube 2.5 centimeters in diameter was inserted into
her hymenal opening without any injury. Her hymenal opening is wide at 2.5
centimeters in diameter so as to allow complete penetration by an average-
sized adult Filipino male organ in full erection, about 2.5 centimeters,
without producing genital/hymenal injury.[5 Dr. Soliman opined that it is
possible for the hymen to remain intact even if it had been penetrated
several times as the rupture of the hymen depends on the manner of
insertion and the opening of the orifice. If the insertion is gentle, it might not
break the hymen. If a woman is struggling when being raped, the penis might
not fully penetrate the hymen, thus leaving it intact.[6cräläwvirtualibräry
Rosalina Chiong, NBI agent, corroborated Cristys testimony that she filled out
a complaint sheet.[7 Chiong prepared a request for medico-legal
examination[8 then took the victims sworn statement.[9 She also received a
copy of the examination results.[10 During her testimony, Chiong presented
a photocopy of a certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar indicating
that Cristy was born to Gertrudes Tullawan and Raul Balisi on December 20,
1986.[11cräläwvirtualibräry
The accused took the witness stand. He is a captain of the Philippine Air
Force assigned as officer-in-charge at the Air Force Holding Center of
Villamor Air Base. Previously, he was assigned at Camp Lapu-Lapu, Laoag,
Cebu City. He is married and has two children, Jessel aged 25 and Jonnel, 24.
He narrated that Cristy started to live with his family in 1994 when she was
eight years old. Although she is only his niece, her father being the younger
brother of his wife, he and his wife treated Cristy like a real daughter. They
cared for her, supported her schooling and provided her food, clothing and
other needs. Cristy loved him and his wife and had been like a good daughter
to them.
When the accused was assigned at Villamor Air Base in Pasay, Cristy stayed
with the accuseds wife at Clark Air Base. In 1996, when the accused was
transferred to the Visayas Command, the accuseds family, along with Cristy,
moved to Cebu. The accused stayed in the Bachelor Officers Quarters in
Camp Lapu-Lapu, Cebu while Cristy resided with the accuseds wife at the
Junior Officers Quarters at Mactan Air Base, Lapu-Lapu, Cebu, an hours drive
from where the accused was staying. He rarely went home to Mactan Air
Base because of his hectic schedule.
In June 1999, the accused was re-assigned to Manila. The accused, his wife
Felicitas and Cristy transferred to San Pedro, Laguna and stayed with Felicitas
sister, Elizabeth Balisi. From there, they transferred to the Airmens Village on
July 16, 1999.
On November 12, 1999, the alleged date of the rape, the accused was with
his elder son, Jessel, at Mahada Alpha, Barangay Mayapa, Calamba, Laguna.
He left Villamor Air Base at 2:00 p.m. and arrived at Mahada Alpha at 5:00
p.m. At past 5:00 p.m., he met his son Jessel outside the factory of Yukusha,
Philippines where the latter worked. He informed Jessel that his younger
brother Jonnel called up to ask about his petition papers for Canada. After
they talked, Jessel borrowed the accuseds car and had a joy ride with his co-
workers while the accused proceeded to the house Jessel rented. The
accused talked with Alma Saberola, the daughter of Jessels landlord. When
Jessel arrived at about 7:30 p.m., he told the accused that the cars headlights
were not functioning. The accused checked the headlights and tried to fix
them in vain. So, he decided to spend the night in Jessels place as it was
difficult to drive in the dark. He left Calamba the following morning at 7:00
a.m.
Cristy repeatedly stole money from the accused and his wife, but asked for
forgiveness. At first, the accused forgave her, but the last straw came on
November 13, 1999 when he came home from Calamba. He found out that
the one thousand pesos in the pocket of his pants hanging on the wall was
missing. When Cristy arrived, he confronted her about it. The accused and his
wife severely scolded her and even threatened her with a hammer to reform
her, but she did not say a word and just went out of the room. The accused
followed her and she returned five hundred pesos as she had already spent
the other five hundred. Later that day, he brought Cristy to Calamba to tell
Jessel that he was fed up with her, then the two went back home to Villamor
Air Base. He decided to stop financing her schooling and to return her to her
parents. At 8:00 p.m., the accused went to his office and spent the night
there. The following day, the accused found out that Cristy ran away from
home. He asked her whereabouts from her relatives and classmates and
learned that Cristy did not go to school nor was she with her Aunt Dolores or
her father. He did not report the matter to the barangay and police
authorities, nor did he make it known at the Villamor Air Base. He suggests
that she ran away because of his decision to stop supporting her schooling.
The accused claims that Cristy filed charges of rape against him upon
instigation of her mother, Gertrudes Tullawan, and a certain Silverio Escobar
to extort his P500,000.00 retirement benefits. Escobar, an NBI agent who
was his wifes kababayan, called him up one time and told him that a
complaint was filed against him, then asked for P500,000.00. The accused did
not give Escobar the money as his conscience was clear. Besides, he did not
have any money. The following day, the accused received a subpoena. It was
then that he learned that Cristy, accompanied by her mother, filed a
complaint against him.
It appears that Cristy filed another complaint for rape against the accused
and the case is pending at the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu.[12cräläwvirtualibräry
The son of the accused, Jessel Llanto, corroborated his fathers testimony that
he was with him on November 12, 1999. His father visited him in Calamba,
Laguna to ask if the petition papers for Canada had already been sent by his
aunt, his fathers sister. They met at about 5:30 at the factory where Jessel
worked. They then proceeded to Jessels place at about 6:00 p.m. and there
talked about the petition papers. Alma Saberola and the other children of
Jessels landlord and some of Jessels friends were there. After about an hour,
Jessel borrowed the accuseds car and with a friend named Jonathan and
another companion, went to a friends place at Palo Alto, Calamba, Laguna.
On their way home, they passed a very big hump, but they were not able to
slow down, causing the front of the car to jerk and destroy the headlights.
When they reached home, Jessel told his father that the headlights were not
working. As it was dangerous to drive in the dark, his father decided to spend
the night there and left the following morning for Villamor Air Base. Later
that day, at around 6:00 p.m., his father returned to Calamba with Cristy and
told Jessel that he would return Cristy to her parents as he was fed up with
her stealing. Jessel treated Cristy like his younger sister and begged his father
to give her another chance.[13cräläwvirtualibräry
Alma Saberola, Jessels landlady and sister of Jessels co-worker, corroborated
the accuseds testimony. She met the accused when he visited Jessel in her
house on November 12, 1999. The accused arrived in her house at about 5:30
p.m. while Jessel was out for a joy ride using the accuseds car. When Jessel
brought the car home, its headlights no longer functioned. The accused thus
decided to spend the night at Jessels place and left at about 7:00 a.m. the
following day.[14cräläwvirtualibräry
Felicitas Balisi, wife of the accused, testified for the defense. She is the older
sister of Raul, Cristys father. She has two children with the accused. In 1993,
when Cristy was only seven years old, she started living with her and her
family. Felicitas was not particularly delighted with Cristy as she was hard-
headed and not nice. She repeatedly stole money from them from the time
she started living with them. She and her husband brought Cristy with them
wherever he was assigned, first at Clark Air Base, then at Mactan Air Base in
Cebu City. In June 1999, Felicitas family stayed with her sister, Elizabeth
Balisi, in San Pedro, Laguna as the accused was assigned at Villamor Air Base
in Pasay. The following month, Cristy no longer lived with Felicitas family.
Felicitas rented a house for Cristy and her mother, Gertrudes Tullawan. They
were later joined by Cristys brother, Teodoro, who used to live with Felicitas
sister, Dolores Balisi, as the latter supported his studies.
In November 1999, the accused confided to her that he had a problem with a
certain Silverio Escobar who was asking for half a million pesos from him.
Escobar was a neighbor of the Balisis in Ogak, Norte, Tuguegarao and he used
to play with Felicitas in the Balisi residence in their childhood days. Escobar
also asked money from Felicitas in October 1999 when she was in
Tuguegarao. He threatened her that if she did not give the amount, he would
kill her husband. Escobar represented to her that he was an NBI agent, but
Felicitas learned from the Chief of the Operation Unit of the NBI that he was
not. She saw Escobar talk with Cristys mother several times from September
to November 1999. In the year 2000, he reiterated his demand for money,
but this time in whatever amount she could afford. He told Felicitas that the
accused raped Cristy. She was shocked and refused to believe him, and told
him that she had no money at that time. But as he was insistent, she gave
him P1,000.00, in addition to the P5,000.00 she gave him in October. Felicitas
contradicted herself in another part of her testimony and stated that she
learned of the rape charges filed by Cristy against her husband in 1999, but
could not remember the exact date as her memory was dulled by an
operation for myoma she underwent.[15cräläwvirtualibräry
Dolores Balisi, elder sister of Cristys father, sided with the accused. She
refuted Cristys testimony that right after the accused raped her, Cristy
reported to her and she accompanied Cristy to the NBI, then the latter stayed
with her. Dolores went to the accuseds house on November 1, 1999 and
observed that the relationship between Cristy and the accused seemed
normal; Cristy did not reveal to her anything unusual about their relationship.
Even the accused and his wife spoke highly of Cristy as a very good and
obedient girl. After Dolores saw Cristy and her mother on the last week of
November 1999, she never saw Cristy again. Cristys mother, Gertrudes
Tullawan, informed her that she was already in the custody of the DSWD.
According to Dolores, a certain Silverio Escobar often goes to her house and
talks to Tullawan who lived with Dolores for about a year, from July 1999 to
March 25, 2000. Escobar introduced himself as an NBI agent, but Dolores
learned from her friends that he was lying. Cristys brother also lived with
Dolores for four years.[16cräläwvirtualibräry
The defense also offered the testimony of Arsenio C. Pascual, surgeon and
lawyer, and Dr. Marilyn Ricardo, gynecologist, for them to give their expert
opinion regarding the medical certificate Dr. Soliman issued. They were
supposed to testify that although the finding that the hymen is intact is
dispensable in rape cases in general, it negates the charge of rape in Cristys
case as she claimed to have been raped at least three times. But the trial
court did not allow the presentation of these two witnesses as according to
it, this Court has ruled that a medical certificate is not even necessary in rape
cases. The prosecution likewise pointed out that their testimonies were not
necessary as the Court has ruled that there could be sexual intercourse
without laceration of the hymen and they never examined the
victim.[17cräläwvirtualibräry
The trial court upheld the version of the prosecution and sentenced the
accused to the supreme penalty of death, viz:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds the accused Capt.
Marcial Llanto y Leuterio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of RAPE and is
hereby sentence (sic) to DEATH and ordered to pay the victim civil indemnity
in the amount of Php 75,000.00 and moral damages in the amount of Php
50,000.00.[18cräläwvirtualibräry
Hence, the case is before us on automatic review. The defense assails the
decision on the ground that the trial court misappreciated the facts and
misapplied the law, and gravely abused its discretion in not admitting the
testimonies of their medico-legal experts.
The appeal is partially meritorious.
The accused avers that the trial court erred in believing Cristys testimony
that he raped her in Cebu thrice a week because the accused stayed at the
Bachelor Officers Quarters, an hours drive away from where the complainant
and the accuseds family stayed. That she was not raped on November 12,
1999 in Pasay City nor thrice a week in Cebu is confirmed by the
gynecological examination conducted upon her, which showed that her
hymen was intact and there was no injury to her external genitalia. The trial
court gravely abused its discretion, according to the defense, when it refused
to admit the testimonies of their medical experts who would have given their
expert opinion that it was improbable for the victim to have been raped
three times a week and her hymen to have remained
intact.[19cräläwvirtualibräry
That Cristy was allegedly raped by the accused in many instances other than
on November 12, 1999 and her hymen remained intact do not lend support
to the cause of the accused. In People v. Caballes,[20 the fourteen year-old
victim was raped nine times by her father in a span of four months. The first
time she was raped, her father poked a knife at her, similar to the instant
case. He had his way with her daughter without the latter struggling as she
was afraid. She felt pain in her organ. In the other eight rape instances, the
victim also acceded to her fathers advances as he threatened her. A medical
examination upon the victim showed that the victims hymen was thick and
very elastic. It had no lacerations and remained intact. The examining
physician presented by the prosecution opined that it is possible for a
womans hymen to remain intact even after having been raped if it is lax,
thick and elastic. She testified, viz:
Q-Is it possible for a woman to be raped 9 times and still would not sustain
any injury or laceration in her hymen?
A-As I said depending on the degree of penetration and the force of the
penetration. And also depending on the kind of hymen a woman has.
Q-Can you explain a little more on that?
A-As I said if the woman has a thick, elastic or lax hymen and just a very slight
degree of penetration like 1/8, 1/4 fractions proportion, then the hymen may
not break. . .[21cräläwvirtualibräry
The trial court convicted the accused of all nine counts of rape. On appeal to
this Court, among the accuseds assignment of errors was that the victims
intact hymen was inconsistent with her charges of rape. This Court upheld
the conviction as jurisprudence is replete with rulings that mere entry of the
male organ into the lips of the female organ, without rupture of the hymen
or laceration of the vagina, is sufficient to warrant conviction.
In People v. Santos,[22 the accused was charged of raping the helpless eight-
year old complainant. He assailed the credibility of the victim as according to
him it was impossible for her to have been raped up to twenty times, but her
hymen remained intact. The Court found no merit in the accuseds
contention, viz:
We find no merit in the contention of accused-appellant. Dr. Cenido
thoroughly discussed these intriguing hymenal qualities, but the accused-
appellant would, understandably so, pretend to find the whole concept as
obscure. He said that, as a general rule, a hymen that is intact would negate
prior sexual intercourse but that the rule was not absolute as penetration can
happen with or without rupturing the hymen. He confirmed that there were Fiscal Barrera: And what did you feel when he inserted his two fingers inside
women whose hymens remained intact even after giving birth owing to the your vagina?
fact that their hymens must be very elastic. . .
A: I felt pain. It is (sic) painful.
The doctors conclusions do not establish a novice medical nor legal theory.
Our jurisprudence is replete with cases which would easily lay waste any
Q: During the time he fondle (sic) your breasts and put his two fingers inside
attempt by accused-appellant to dent the credibility of the victim. The fact
your vagina, did you fight back?
that there was no deep penetration of the victims vagina and that her hymen
was still intact does not negate the commission of rape. Rape can be
consummated even with the slightest penetration. It is enough that there is A: No, sir.
proof of entrance of the male organ into the labia or pudendum of the
female organ (footnotes omitted), or a penetration, however slight of the Q: Why?
external genitalia (footnotes omitted). 23 (emphasis supplied)

A: Because my hands were tied. I could not fight as my two hands were tied
Applying these rulings to the case at bar, it is possible for the victims hymen and he was holding a knife and I was afraid.
to remain intact despite repeated sexual intercourse. Dr. Soliman testified
that during the examination on Cristy, a tube 2.5 centimeters in diameter
was inserted into her hymenal opening without any injury. Her hymenal Q: After he mashed your breast and inserted his two fingers inside your
opening is wide at 2.5 centimeters in diameter so as to allow complete vagina while your two hands were tied, what happened next?
penetration by an average-sized adult Filipino male organ in full erection,
about 2.5 centimeters, without producing genital/hymenal A: He inserted his penis inside my vagina.
injury.[24 Likewise, whether the accuseds penis fully or only partially
penetrated the victims genitalia, it is still possible that her hymen would
remain intact because it was thick and distensible or elastic. We stated Q: What did you feel when he inserted his penis inside your vagina?
in People v. Aguinaldo[25 that the strength and dilability of the hymen varies
from one woman to another such that it may be so elastic as to stretch A: I felt pain.
without laceration during intercourse, or on the other hand, may be so
resistant that its surgical removal is necessary before intercourse can
Q: What happened after he inserted his penis inside your vagina?
ensue[26 In some cases even, the hymen is still intact even after the woman
has given birth.[27cräläwvirtualibräry
A: He threatened me not to tell anyone about what happened.
In view of Dr. Solimans medical examination and opinion and the foregoing
rulings of this Court that support the finding that a thick and elastic hymen Q: What happened next after he threatened you?
can remain intact despite several instances of sexual intercourse, we find
that the trial court was not in error in not admitting the expert testimonies of A: He untied me. He removed the tie on my hands.[29cräläwvirtualibräry
the defense witnesses who did not examine Cristy.

Cristys affidavit also shows that she was threatened with a knife every time
Alternatively, the accused argues that even assuming he had sexual the accused raped her, so she did not fight the accused, viz:
intercourse with Cristy, it was not shown that he had his way with her
through violence or intimidation.[28 Quite the contrary, Cristys testimony
shows that she was intimidated. She was afraid and not able to fight and 6. T: Ano ang ginawa ng Tito MARCIAL mo at inirereklamo mo siya ngayon?
resist the accuseds advances because he held a knife and tied her hands, viz:
S: Ni-rape po niya ako.
Q: What did you do when he removed your T-shirt, shorts, bra and panty?
7. T: Kailan ka ni-rape ng Tito MARCIAL mo?
A: I just keep (sic) on crying. I was crying.
S: December 1, 1996.
Q: Did you not fight back when he removed your T-shirt, shorts, bra and
panty? 8. T: Ilang beses kang ni-rape ng Tito MARCIAL mo?

A: No. sir. S: Maraming beses na po.

Q: Why? T: Natatandaan mo pa ba ang mga petsa?

A: Because I was afraid of him. S: Hindi po.

Q: Why were you afraid of him? T: Kailan yung huling insidente?

A: I was afraid because he was holding a knife. S: November 12, 1999.

Q: And after removing your T-shirt, shorts, bra and panty and you felt afraid
because he was holding a knife, what happened next?
A: He tied my both hands.
Q: Will you demonstrate how the accused tied your both hands? Witness
demonstrating by raising her two hands and putting them at the back of her
head. After the accused Marcial Llanto tied your hands at your back, what
happened?
xxx
18. T: Papaano ka nire-rape ng Tito MARCIAL mo?
S: Pinapahiga ako sa kama. Hinuhubaran ako, pinapatungan ako tapos ay
ipinapasok niya yung ari niya sa ari ko.
19. T: Bakit hindi ka humihingi ng tulong tuwing nire-rape ka ng Tito MARCIAL
mo?

A: He started touching me by mashing my breasts.

S: Natatakot po ako dahil palagi siyang may hawak ng (sic) kutsilyo na may
tela sa tuwing nire-rape niya ako.
Q: Besides mashing or touching your breast, what else did he do?
20. T: Para saan yung tela?
A: He kissed my vagina.
S: Iyon po ang ipinanghahawak niya sa kutsilyo.[30cräläwvirtualibräry
Q: What else happened?

Physical resistance need not be proved in rape when intimidation is exercised

Witness: He inserted his two fingers inside my vagina. upon the victim and the latter submits herself, against her will, to the rapists
advances because of fear for her life and personal safety.[31 It suffices that
the intimidation produces fear in the mind of the victim that if she did not
submit to the bestial demands of the accused, something far worse would
befall her at the time she was being molested. As held by the Court, (i)f
resistance would nevertheless be futile because of intimidation, then offering
none at all does not mean consent to the assault so as to make the victims
submission to the sexual act voluntary.[32 We have ruled in several rape
cases that threatening the victim with bodily injury while holding a knife or
a bolo constitutes intimidation sufficient to bring a woman to submission to
the lustful desires of the molester.[33cräläwvirtualibräry
The accused stresses that rape is hard to prove, but harder for him to
disprove, though innocent. Especially when the allegation of rape is based
solely on the testimony of the complaining witness, the latters story should
be carefully examined and the accused should not be convicted unless the
testimony is impeccable. In assessing Cristys credibility, the accused implores
the Court to consider her bad character, shown by her frequently going out
with male companions and coming home late[34 and her penchant for lying
such as her alleged report of the rape to Dolores Balisi which the latter
denied. Likewise, the accused faults the trial court for discarding Dolores
testimony because blood is thicker than water, so Dolores was expected to
side with the accused. Following this reasoning of the trial court, the accused
argues that there was more reason for Dolores to come to Cristys aid
because she is a relative by blood, being the daughter of Dolores brother,
while the accused is only a relative by affinity.[35 The accused suggests that
Cristy merely fabricated the rape charges to extort his P500,000.00
retirement benefits and to retaliate against him because he scolded her for
stealing money from him and his wife, neglecting her duties at home, and
frequently watching television and gossiping with their neighbors. It was
simply inconceivable for the accused to rape Cristy whom he treated like a
family member.
The accused cannot fault the trial court for relying on Cristys sole eyewitness
account in convicting him. This Court has long held that the testimony of a
sole eyewitness is sufficient to support a conviction so long as it is clear,
straightforward and worthy of credence by the trial court.[36 Neither does
the self-serving evidence of the accused convince us that Cristy was merely
instigated by her mother to file the rape complaint to extort his P500,000.00
retirement benefits. Nor does the imputation of Cristys bad character affect
her credibility as the victims character is immaterial in a rape
case.[37 Likewise, the testimonies of the defense witnesses on her alleged
stealing are inconsistent and not worthy of credence. The accused testified
that Cristy repeatedly stole money from him and his wife, but at the same
time said that she was like a good daughter to them. His wife Felicitas, on the
other hand, testified that Cristy was hard-headed and not nice and
repeatedly stole money from her and her husband since she started living
with them in 1993. Felicitas sister, Dolores, stated that the accused and
Felicitas spoke highly of Cristy as a good and obedient girl. Considering these
inconsistent testimonies, we are not convinced with the accuseds allegation
that Cristy filed the rape charges in retaliation to his scolding her for stealing
money and deciding to stop financing her schooling.
On the contrary, we have consistently taken judicial notice of the fact that no
woman, especially one so young like Cristy, would concoct a tale of
defloration, allow the examination of her private parts, and undergo the
expense, trouble, inconvenience and trauma of a public trial if she were not
motivated by the desire to have the culprit apprehended and
punished.[38 Cristys testimony deserves credence over the testimonies of
the accused and the trial court correctly held, viz:
In this particular case, the minor complainant has been under the care of the
accused Marcial Llanto and Felicitas Balisi Llanto for a period of four years
providing for her sustenance, support and education and it would be
unbelievable that a child of such tender age, not exposed to the ways of the
world would impute a crime so serious as rape to the person who took care
of her, supported her and sent her to school if it is not true and she is
motivated by the desire to have the accused apprehended and punished to
vindicate her honor.[39cräläwvirtualibräry
Anent the accuseds alibi, suffice it to say that the defense of alibi is
inherently weak and easily fabricated.[40 This cannot prevail over Cristys
positive identification, unless buttressed by strong evidence of non-
culpability.[41cräläwvirtualibräry
The trial court erred, however, when it meted out to the accused the
supreme penalty of death under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code
which provides that the death penalty shall be imposed when the victim is
under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant,
step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third
civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.[42 The
information reads, viz:
That on or about (the) twelfth day of November, 1999 at Pasay City and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
actuated by lust, with use of a knife, through force, violence and
intimidation, and by taking advantage of his moral ascendancy over his
twelve (12) year old minor niece MARIA CRISTY T. BALISI, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of Ma. Cristy T.
Balisi against her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice in whatever
amounts may be awarded to her under provisions of the Civil
Code.[43cräläwvirtualibräry
The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which took effect on December 1,
2000, require both qualifying and aggravating circumstances to be alleged in
the information, viz:
SEC. 8. Designation of the offense. The complaint or information shall state
the designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or
omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances. . .
SEC. 9. Cause of the accusation. The acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances
must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the
language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of
common understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its
qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce
judgment.
While the rape in the case at bar was committed on November 12, 1999, we
shall give retroactive application to Secs. 8 and 9, supra, as they are favorable
to the accused.
In a catena of cases, we have ruled that the allegation that the accused is the
uncle of the victim and the latter is his niece is not specific enough to satisfy
the special qualifying circumstance of relationship under Art. 266-B, supra.
In People v. Lachica,[44 we held:
If the offender is merely a relation not a parent, ascendant, step-parent, or
guardian or common law spouse of the mother of the victim it must be
alleged in the Information that he is a relative by consanguinity or affinity [as
the case may be] within the third civil degree. (People v. Libo-on, GR No.
136737, May 23, 2001, per Gonzaga-Reyes, J.; People v. Banihit, 339 SCRA 86,
96, August 25, 2000, per Ynares-Santiago, J. both citing People v. Ferolino,
329 SCRA 719, 735, April 5, 2000, per Davide, CJ.) Moreover, even if the
relationship by consanguinity or affinity is alleged in the Information, it is still
necessary to allege further that such relationship is within the third civil
degree. . .[45 (emphasis supplied)
Consequently, because of the defect in the information, the accused can only
be held liable for simple rape.
At any rate, the prosecution was not able to prove beyond reasonable doubt
the kinship between the accused and the victim. We ruled in People v.
Capili,[46 viz:
In People v. Liban (345 SCRA 453 [2000]), where the age of the victim was at
issue, the Court ruled that the testimony of the victim was insufficient to
establish her minority, but that, further thereto, the prosecution should
present corroborative evidence. In the instant case, the bare statement in
passing of Melissa that appellant is an uncle, without any corroborating
testimonial or documentary evidence to clearly establish that relationship,
would be insufficient to pass the test set in Liban.[47 (emphasis supplied)
In the case at bar, the prosecution failed to corroborate Cristys testimony
that the accused is her uncle, being the husband of her fathers sister. The
accused himself admitted that his wife, Felicitas, is the sister of Cristys father,
Raul. Felicitas and her sister, Dolores, confirmed the accuseds testimony.
However, we cannot consider their testimonies corroborative of Cristys
testimony. Well-settled is the doctrine that the prosecution bears the burden
of proving all the elements of a crime, including the qualifying circumstances,
thus the testimonies of the defense witnesses cannot be used to benefit the
prosecution, to the disadvantage of the accused.[48cräläwvirtualibräry
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, we AFFIRM the decision of the trial court with
the MODIFICATION that the accused-appellant is found guilty of the crime of
simple rape and sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of reclusion
perpetua with all its accessory penalties and to pay the victim P50,000.00 as
civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages. Costs against the accused-
appellant.
SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 143468-71. January 24, 2003
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. FREEDIE LIZADA @
FREDIE LIZADA, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is an automatic review of the Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 54, finding accused-appellant Freedie Lizada guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of four (4) counts of qualified rape and meting on him the
death penalty for each count.
I. The Charges
Accused-appellant2 was charged with four (4) counts of qualified rape under
four separate Informations. The accusatory portion of each of the four
Informations reads:
That sometime in August 1998 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, with lewd designs, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, by means of force, violence and intimidation upon the person of
one ANALIA ORILLOSA y AGOO, by then and there embracing her, kissing and
touching her private parts, thereafter removing her skirt and panty, placing
himself on top of her and trying to insert his penis into her vagina and
succeeded in having carnal knowledge with the said ANALIA ORILLOSA y
AGOO, against her will and consent.
Contrary to law.
XXX
That on or about November 5, 1998, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the
said accused, with lewd designs, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, by means of force, violence and intimidation upon the person of
one ANALIA ORILLOSA Y AGOO, by then and there embracing her, kissing and
touching her private parts, thereafter removing her skirt and panty, placing
himself on top of her and trying to insert his penis into her vagina and
succeeded in having carnal knowledge with the said ANALIA ORILLOSA Y
AGOO, against her will and consent.
Contrary to law.
XXX
That on or about October 22, 1998, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, with lewd designs, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, by means of force, violence and intimidation upon the person of
one ANALIA ORILLOSA Y AGOO, by then and there embracing her, kissing and
touching her private parts, thereafter removing her skirt and panty, placing
himself on top of her and trying to insert his penis into her vagina and
succeeded in having carnal knowledge with the said ANALIA ORILLOSA Y
AGOO, against her will and consent.
Contrary to law.
XXX
That on or about September 15, 1998, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the
said accused, with lewd designs, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, by means of force, violence and intimidation upon the person of
one ANALIA ORILLOSA Y AGOO, by then and there embracing her, kissing and
touching her private parts, thereafter removing her skirt and panty, placing
himself on top of her and trying to insert his penis into her vagina and
succeeded in having carnal knowledge with the said ANALIA ORILLOSA Y
AGOO, against her will and consent.
Contrary to law.3cräläwvirtualibräry
The four (4) Informations were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 99-171390,
99-171391, 99-171392 and 99-171393, respectively.
Accused-appellant was arraigned on April 15, 1999, assisted by counsel de
parte and entered a plea of not guilty to each of the charges.4 A joint trial
then ensued.
II. Evidence of the Prosecution5
Ricardo Orillosa and his wife, Rose Orillosa, natives of San Isidro, Bohol, had
three (3) children, namely: Analia, who was born on December 18,
1985;6 Jepsy, who was 11 years old, and Rossel, who was nine years old.
However, the couple decided to part ways and live separately. Rose left
Bohol and settled in Manila with her young children. She worked as a
waitress to make both ends meet.
In 1994, Rose met accused-appellant. They decided to live together as
husband and wife at No. 1252 Jose Abad Santos Street, Moriones, Tondo,
Manila. In 1996, Rose resigned from her job as a waitress. She secured a loan,
bought a truck and used it for her business.
In the meantime, Rose secured a loan anew and used the proceeds thereof
to put up a video shop in her house. She sold Avon products from house to
house to augment her income. Whenever she was out of their house, Rossel
and Analia took turns in tending the video shop and attending to customers.
Sometime in 1996, Analia was in her room when accused-appellant entered.
He laid on top of her, removed her T-shirt and underwear. He then inserted
his finger in her vagina. He removed his finger and inserted his penis in her
vagina. Momentarily, she felt a sticky substance coming out from his penis.
She also felt pain in her sex organ. Satiated, accused-appellant dismounted
but threatened to kill her if she divulged to anyone what he did to her.
Accused-appellant then returned to his room. The incident lasted less than
one hour. Petrified by the threats on her life, Analia kept to herself what
happened to her.7cräläwvirtualibräry
Sometime in August 1997, accused-appellant entered again the room of
Analia, placed himself on top of her and held her legs and arms. He then
inserted his finger into her sex organ (fininger niya ako). Satiated, accused-
appellant left the room. During the period from 1996 to 1998, accused-
appellant sexually abused private complainant two times a week.
On November 5, 1998, at about 3:00 p.m., Analia was in the sala of their
house studying her assignments. Accused-appellant was also in the sala.
Rossel tended the video shop while his mother was away. Analia went into
her room and lay down in bed. She did not lock the door of the room because
her brother might enter any time. She wanted to sleep but found it difficult
to do so. Accused-appellant went to his room next to the room of Analia. He,
however, entered the room of Analia. He was wearing a pair of short pants
and was naked from waist up. Analia did not mind accused-appellant
entering her room because she knew that her brother, Rossel was around.
However, accused-appellant sat on the side of her bed, placed himself on top
of her, held her hands and legs and fondled her breasts. She struggled to
extricate herself. Accused-appellant removed her panty and touched her sex
organ. Accused-appellant inserted his finger into her vagina, extricated it and
then inserted his penis into her vagina. Accused-appellant ejaculated. Analia
felt pain in her sex organ. Momentarily, Rossel passed by the room of Analia
after drinking water from the refrigerator, and peeped through the door. He
saw accused-appellant on top of Analia. Accused-appellant saw Rossel and
dismounted. Accused-appellant berated Rossel and ordered him to go to his
room and sleep. Rossel did. Accused-appellant then left the room. Analia
likewise left the room, went out of the house and stayed outside for one
hour. Rose arrived home at 6:00 p.m. However, Analia did not divulge to her
mother what accused-appellant had just done to her.
On November 9, 1998, at about 3:00 p.m., Rose left the house. Accused-
appellant was in the sala of the house watching television. Analia tended the
video shop. However, accused-appellant told Analia to go to the sala. She
refused, as nobody would tend the video shop. This infuriated accused-
appellant who threatened to slap and kick her.
Analia ignored the invectives and threats of accused-appellant and stayed in
the video shop. When Rose returned, a heated argument ensued between
accused-appellant and Analia. Rose sided with her paramour and hit Analia.
This prompted Analia to shout. Ayoko na, ayoko na. Shortly thereafter, Rose
and Analia left the house on board the motorcycle driven by her mother in
going to Don Bosco Street, Moriones, Tondo, Manila, to retrieve some tapes
which had not yet been returned. When Rose inquired from her daughter
what she meant by her statement, ayoko na, ayoko na, she told her mother
that accused-appellant had been touching the sensitive parts of her body and
that he had been on top of her. Rose was shocked and incensed. The two
proceeded to Kagawad Danilo Santos to have accused-appellant placed
under arrest. On November 10, 1998, the two proceeded to the Western
Police District where Analia gave her Affidavit-Complaint to PO1 Carmelita
Nocum in the presence of SPO2 Fe H. Avindante. She related to the police
investigator that accused-appellant had touched her breasts and arms in
August, 1998, September 15, 1998, October 22, 1998 and on November 5,
1998, at 3:00 p.m. Analia then submitted herself to genitalia examination by
Dr. Armie Umil, a medico-legal officer of the NBI. The medico-legal officer
interviewed Analia, told him that she was raped in May, 1997 at 3:00 p.m.
and November 5, 1998 at 3:00 p.m.8cräläwvirtualibräry
Dr. Umil prepared and signed a report on Living Case No. MO-98-1265 which
contained her findings during her examination on Analia, thus:
 xxx
Fairly nourished, conscious, coherent, cooperative, ambulatory subject.
Breasts, developed, hemispherical, firm. ----, brown, 3.0 cms. in diameter.
Nipples brown, protruding, 0.7 cms. in diameter.
No extragenital physical injuries noted.
GENITAL EXAMINATION:
Pubic hair, fully grown, moderate. Labia majora and minora, coaptated.
Fourchette, tense. Vetibular mucosa, pinkish. Hymen, tall, thick, intact.
Hymenal orifice measures, 1.5 cms. in diameter. Vaginal walls, tight.
Rugosities, prominent.
CONCLUSIONS:
1). No evident sign of extragenital physical injuries noted on the body of the
subject at the time of examination.
2). Hymen, intact and its orifice small (1.5 cms. in diameter) as to preclude
complete penetration by an average-sized adult Filipino male organ in full
erection without producing any genital injury.9cräläwvirtualibräry
Subsequently, Analia told her mother that mabuti na lang iyong panghihipo
lang ang sinabi ko. When Rose inquired from her daughter what she meant
by her statement, Analia revealed to her mother that accused-appellant had
sexually abused her. On December 15, 1998, Analia executed a Dagdag na
Salaysay ng Paghahabla and charged accused-appellant with rape.10
III. The Defenses and Evidence of Accused-Appellant
Accused-appellant testified in his defense. He declared that after a month of
courtship, he and Rose agreed in 1994 to live together as husband and wife.
He was then a utility worker with the Navotas Branch of the Philippine
Banking Corporation. Rose, on the other hand, was a waitress at the Golden
Bird beer house at Rizal Avenue, Manila.
Accused-appellant denied having raped Analia. He claimed that he loved the
children of Rose as if they were his own children. He took care of them, as in
fact he cooked and prepared their food before they arrived home from
school. At times, he ironed their school uniforms and bathed them, except
Analia who was already big. Analia was hard-headed because she disobeyed
him whenever he ordered her to do some errands. Because of Analias
misbehavior, accused-appellant and Rose oftentimes quarreled. Rose even
demanded that accused-appellant leave their house. Another irritant in his
and Roses lives were the frequent visits of the relatives of her husband.
Sometime in 1997, accused-appellant was retrenched from his employment
and received a separation pay of P9,000.00 which he used to put up the VHS
Rental and Karaoke from which he earned a monthly income of P25,000.00.
While living together, accused-appellant and Rose acquired two colored
television sets, two VHS Hi-fi recorders, one VHS player, one washing
machine, one scooter motor, two VHS rewinders, one sala set, one compact
disc player and many other properties.
Accused-appellant ventured that Rose coached her children Analia and
Rossel to testify against him and used them to fabricate charges against him
because Rose wanted to manage their business and take control of all the
properties they acquired during their coverture. Also, Rose was so
exasperated because he had no job.
IV. The Verdict
On May 29, 2000, the trial court rendered judgment against accused-
appellant finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of four (4) counts of
rape, defined and penalized in the seventh paragraph, no. 1, Art. 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, and meted on him the death penalty for each count. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
From all the evidence submitted by the prosecution, the Court concludes
that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged
against him in these four (4) cases, convicts him thereof, and sentences him
to DEATH PENALTY in each and every case as provided for in the seventh
paragraph, no. 1, Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code.
SO ORDERED.11
V. Assigned Errors of the Trial Court
Accused-appellant assailed the decision of the court a quo and averred in his
brief that:
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT MAKING A FINDING OF
FACT IN ITS DECISION AND SUCH FAILURE IS A REVERSIBLE ERROR.12
XXX
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-
APPELLANT OF FOUR (4) COUNTS OF RAPE DESPITE FAILURE OF THE
PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.13
VI. Findings of the Court
On the first assignment of error, accused-appellant contends that the
decision of the trial court is null and void as it failed to comply with the
requirements of Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution and Section
1, Rule 36 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. He avers that
the court a quo made no findings of facts in its decision. The trial court
merely summarized the testimonies of the witnesses of the prosecution and
those of accused-appellant and his witnesses, and forthwith set forth the
decretal portion of said decision. The trial court even failed to state in said
decision the factual and legal basis for the imposition of the supreme penalty
of death on him. The Solicitor General, on the other hand, argues that there
should be no mechanical reliance on the constitutional provision. Trial courts
may well-nigh synthesize and simplify their decisions considering that courts
are harassed by crowded dockets and time constraints. Even if the trial court
did not elucidate the grounds as the legal basis for the penalties imposed,
nevertheless the decision is valid. In any event, the Solicitor General
contends that despite the infirmity of the decision, there is no need to
remand the case to the trial court for compliance with the constitutional
requirement as the Court may resolve the case on its merits to avoid delay in
the final disposition of the case and afford accused-appellant his right to a
speedy trial.
The contention of accused-appellant is well-taken. Article VIII, paragraph 14
of the 1987 Constitution provides that no decision shall be rendered by any
court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law
on which it is based. This requirement is reiterated and implemented by Rule
120, Section 2 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, which
reads:
SEC. 2. Form and contents of judgment.The judgment must be written in the
official language, personally and directly prepared by the judge and signed by
him and shall contain clearly and distinctly a statement of the facts proved or
admitted by the accused and the law upon which the judgment is based.
If it is of conviction, the judgment shall state (a) the legal qualification of the
offense constituted by the acts committed by the accused, and the
aggravating or mitigating circumstances attending the commission thereof, if
there are any; (b) the participation of the accused in the commission of the
offense, whether as principal, accomplice, or accessory after the fact; (c) the
penalty imposed upon the accused; and (d) the civil liability or damages
caused by the wrongful act to be recovered from the accused by the
offended party, if there is any, unless the enforcement of the civil liability by
a separate action has been reserved or waived.14cräläwvirtualibräry
The purpose of the provision is to inform the parties and the person reading
the decision on how it was reached by the court after consideration of the
evidence of the parties and the relevant facts, of the opinion it has formed
on the issues, and of the applicable laws. The parties must be assured from a
reading of the decision of the trial court that they were accorded their rights
to be heard by an impartial and responsible judge.15 More substantial
reasons for the requirement are:
For one thing, the losing party must be given an opportunity to analyze the
decision so that, if permitted, he may elevate what he may consider its errors
for review by a higher tribunal. For another, the decision if well-presented
and reasoned, may convince the losing party of its merits and persuade it to
accept the verdict in good grace instead of prolonging the litigation with a
useless appeal. A third reason is that decisions with a full exposition of the
facts and the law on which they are based, especially those coming from the
Supreme Court, will constitute a valuable body of case law that can serve as
useful references and even as precedents in the resolution of future
controversies.16cräläwvirtualibräry
The trial court is mandated to set out in its decision the facts which had been
proved and its conclusions culled therefrom, as well as its resolution on the
issues and the factual and legal basis for its resolution.17 Trial courts should
not merely reproduce the respective testimonies of witnesses of both parties
and come out with its decretal conclusion.
In this case, the trial court failed to comply with the requirements under the
Constitution and the Rules on Criminal Procedure. It merely summarized the
testimonies of the witnesses of the prosecution and of accused-appellant on
direct and cross examinations and merely made referral to the documentary
evidence of the parties then concluded that, on the basis of the evidence of
the prosecution, accused-appellant is guilty of four (4) counts of rape and
sentenced him to death, on each count.
The trial court even failed to specifically state the facts proven by the
prosecution based on their evidence, the issues raised by the parties and its
resolution of the factual and legal issues, as well as the legal and factual
bases for convicting accused-appellant of each of the crimes charged. The
trial court rendered judgment against accused-appellant with
the curt declaration in the decretal portion of its decision that it did so based
on the evidence of the prosecution. The trial court swallowed hook, line and
sinker the evidence of the prosecution. It failed to explain in its decision why
it believed and gave probative weight to the evidence of the prosecution.
Reading the decision of the trial court, one is apt to conclude that the trial
court ignored the evidence of accused-appellant. The trial court did not even
bother specifying the factual and legal bases for its imposition of the
supreme penalty of death on accused-appellant for each count of rape. The
trial court merely cited seventh paragraph, no. 1, Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code. The decision of the trial court is a good example of what a
decision, envisaged in the Constitution and the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, should not be.
The Court would normally remand the case to the trial court because of the
infirmity of the decision of the trial court, for compliance with the
constitutional provision. However, to avert further delay in the disposition of
the cases, the Court decided to resolve the cases on their merits considering
that all the records as well as the evidence adduced during the trial had been
elevated to the Court.18 The parties filed their respective briefs articulating
their respective stances on the factual and legal issues.
In reviewing rape cases, this Court is guided by the following principles: (1) to
accuse a man of rape is easy but to disprove it is difficult though the accused
may be innocent; (2) considering the nature of things, and only two persons
are usually involved in the crime of rape, the testimony of the complainant
should be scrutinized with great caution; (3) the evidence for the prosecution
must stand or fall on its own merits and not be allowed to draw strength
from the weakness of the evidence of the defense.19 By the very nature of
the crime of rape, conviction or acquittal depends almost entirely on the
credibility of the complainants testimony because of the fact that usually
only the participants can testify as to its occurrence. However, if the accused
raises a sufficient doubt as to any material element of the crime, and the
prosecution is unable to overcome it with its evidence, the prosecution has
failed to discharge its burden of proving the guilt of the accused beyond cavil
of doubt and hence, the accused is entitled to an acquittal.
Anent the second assignment of error, we will resolve the same for
convenience, as follows:
Re: CRIMINAL CASES NOS. 99-171392 and 99-171393 (covering the crime of
rape committed on or about October 22, 1998 and on or about September
15, 1998)
Accused-appellant avers that the prosecution failed to adduce the requisite
quantum of evidence that he raped the private complainant precisely on
September 15, 1998 and October 22, 1998. Moreover, the medical findings of
Dr. Armie Umil show that the hymen of the private complainant was intact
and its orifice so small as to preclude complete penetration by an average
size adult Filipino male organ in full erection without producing any genital
injury. The physical evidence belies private complainants claim of having
been deflowered by accused-appellant on four different occasions. The
Office of the Solicitor General, for its part, contends that the prosecution
through the private complainant proved the guilt of accused-appellant for
the crime charged on both counts.
The contention of accused-appellant does not persuade the Court. The
private complainant testified that since 1996, when she was only eleven
years old, until 1998, for two times a week, accused-appellant used to place
himself on top of her and despite her tenacious resistance, touched her arms,
legs and sex organ and inserted his finger and penis into her vagina. In the
process, he ejaculated. Accused-appellant threatened to kill her if she
divulged to anyone what he did to her.20 Although private complainant did
not testify that she was raped on September 15, 1998 and October 22, 1998,
nevertheless accused-appellant may be convicted for two counts of rape, in
light of the testimony of private complainant.
It bears stressing that under the two Informations, the rape incidents are
alleged to have been committed on or about September 15, 1998 and on or
about October 22, 1998. The words on or about envisage a period, months or
even two or four years before September 15, 1998 or October 22, 1998. The
prosecution may prove that the crime charged was committed on or about
September 15, 1998 and on or about October 22, 1998.
In People vs. Gianan,21 this Court affirmed the conviction of accused-
appellant of five (5) counts of rape, four of which were committed in
December 1992 (two counts) and one each in March and April, 1993 and in
November, 1995 and one count of acts of lasciviousness committed in
December 1992, on a criminal complaint for multiple rape, viz:
That sometime in November 1995, and some occasions prior and/or
subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of Dasmarias, Province of Cavite, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
with lewd designs, taking advantage of his superior strength over the person
of his own twelve (12) year old daughter, and by means of force, violence
and intimidation, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
have repeated carnal knowledge of Myra M. Gianan, against her will and
consent, to her damage and prejudice.22cräläwvirtualibräry
On the contention of accused-appellant in said case that his conviction for
rape in December 1992 was so remote from the date (November 1995)
alleged in the Information, so that the latter could no longer be considered as
being as near to the actual date at which the offense was committed as
provided under Section 11, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, as
amended, this Court held:
Accused-appellant nevertheless argues that his conviction for rape in
December 1992 is so remote from the date (November 1995) alleged in the
information, so that the latter could no longer be considered as being as near
to the actual date at which the offense was committed as provided under
Rule 110, 11.
This contention is also untenable. In People v. Garcia, this Court upheld a
conviction for ten counts of rape based on an information which alleged that
the accused committed multiple rape from November 1990 up to July 21,
1994, a time difference of almost four years which is longer than that
involved in the case at bar. In any case, as earlier stated, accused-appellants
failure to raise a timely objection based on this ground constitutes a waiver
of his right to object.23cräläwvirtualibräry
Moreover, when the private complainant testified on how accused-appellant
defiled her two times a week from 1996 until 1998, accused-appellant raised
nary a whimper of protest. Accused-appellant even rigorously cross-
examined the private complainant on her testimony on direct examination.
The presentation by the prosecution, without objection on the part of
accused-appellant, of evidence of rape committed two times a week from
1996 until 1998 (which includes September 15, 1998 and October 22, 1998)
to prove the charges lodged against him constituted a waiver by accused-
appellant of his right to object to any perceived infirmity in, and in the
amendment of, the aforesaid Informations to conform to the evidence
adduced by the prosecution.
The barefaced fact that private complainant remained a virgin up to 1998
does not preclude her having been repeatedly sexually abused by accused-
appellant. The private complainant being of tender age, it is possible that the
penetration of the male organ went only as deep as her labia. Whether or
not the hymen of private complainant was still intact has no substantial
bearing on accused-appellants commission of the crime.24 Even the slightest
penetration of the labia by the male organ or the mere entry of the penis
into the aperture constitutes consummated rape. It is sufficient that there be
entrance of the male organ within the labia of the pudendum.25 In People vs.
Baculi, cited in People vs. Gabayron,[26] we held that there could be a finding
of rape even if despite repeated intercourse over a period of four years, the
complainant still retained an intact hymen without injury. In these cases, the
private complainant testified that the penis of accused-appellant gained
entry into her vagina:
Fiscal Carisma
(continuing)
After your underwear was removed by the accused, what happened next?
Witness:
He laid himself on top of me, sir.
Q What did he do while he was on top of you?
A He inserted his finger (Finenger nya ako, ipinatong nya yong ano nya)
Q Can you please describe more specifically what is this and I quote Pinatong
nya yong ano nya and where did he place it?
A His organ, sir.
Q Where did he place his organ?
A In my organ, sir. (sa ari ko po.)
Q At this very juncture madam witness, what did you feel?
A I felt pain, sir, and I also felt that there was a sticky substance that was
coming out, sir.27 (Underlining supplied)
We agree with accused-appellant that he is guilty only of two counts of
simple rape, instead of qualified rape. The evidence on record shows that
accused-appellant is the common-law husband of Rose, the mother of
private complainant. The private complainant, as of October 1998, was still
13 years old, and under Article 335 as amended by Republic Act 7659, the
minority of the private complainant, concurring with the fact that accused-
appellant is the common-law husband of the victims mother, is a special
qualifying circumstance warranting the imposition of the death
penalty.28 However, said circumstance was not alleged in the Informations as
required by Section 8, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
which was given retroactive effect by this Court because it is favorable to the
accused.29 Hence, even if the prosecution proved the special qualifying
circumstance of minority of private complainant and relationship, the
accused-appellant being the common-law husband of her mother, accused-
appellant is guilty only of simple rape. Under the given law, the penalty for
simple rape is reclusion perpetua. Conformably with current jurisprudence,
accused-appellant is liable to private complainant for civil indemnity in the
amount of P50,000.00 and moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 for
each count of rape, or a total of P200,000.00.
Re: Criminal Cases Nos. 99-171390 and 99-171391 (covering the crime
committed on or about August 1998 and November 5, 1998)
Accused-appellant avers that (a) the Information in Criminal Case No. 99-
171390 is defective because the date of the offense on or about August 1998
alleged therein is too indefinite, in violation of Rule 110, Section 11 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure which reads:
Sec. 11. Date of commission of the offense.It is not necessary to state in the
complaint or information the precise date the offense was committed except
when it is a material ingredient of the offense. The offense may be alleged to
have been committed on a date as near as possible to the actual date of its
commission. (11a)30cräläwvirtualibräry
Accused-appellant further asserts that the prosecution failed to prove that
he raped private complainant in August 1998. Hence, he argues, he should be
acquitted of said charge. The Office of the Solicitor General, for its part,
argued that the date on or about August 1998 is sufficiently definite. After
all, the date of the commission of the crime of rape is not an essential
element of the crime. The prosecution adduced conclusive proof that
accused-appellant raped private complainant on or about August 1998, as
gleaned from her testimony during the trial.
The Court does not agree with accused-appellant. It bears stressing that the
precise date of the commission of the crime of rape is not an essential
element of the crime. Failure to specify the exact date when the rape was
committed does not render the Information defective. The reason for this is
that the gravamen of the crime of rape is carnal knowledge of the private
complainant under any of the circumstances enumerated under Article 335
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Significantly, accused-appellant did
not even bother to file a motion for a bill of particulars under Rule 116,
Section 9 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure before he was
arraigned. Indeed, accused-appellant was duly arraigned under the
Information and entered a plea of not guilty to the charge without any plaint
on the sufficiency of the Information. Accused-appellant even adduced his
evidence after the prosecution had rested its case. It was only on appeal to
this Court that accused-appellant questioned for the first time the sufficiency
of the Information filed against him. It is now too late in the day for him to do
so. Moreover, in People vs. Salalima,31 this Court held that:
Failure to specify the exact dates or time when the rapes occurred does
not ipso facto make the information defective on its face. The reason is
obvious. The precise date or time when the victim was raped is not an
element of the offense. The gravamen of the crime is the fact of carnal
knowledge under any of the circumstances enumerated under Article 335 of
the Revised Penal Code. As long as it is alleged that the offense was
committed at any time as near to the actual date when the offense was
committed an information is sufficient. In previous cases, we ruled that
allegations that rapes were committed before and until October 15, 1994,
sometime in the year 1991 and the days thereafter, sometime in November
1995 and some occasions prior and/or subsequent thereto and on or about
and sometime in the year 1988 constitute sufficient compliance with Section
11, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
In this case, although the indictments did not state with particularity the
dates when the sexual assaults took place, we believe that the allegations
therein that the acts were committed sometime during the month of March
1996 or thereabout, sometime during the month of April 1996 or thereabout,
sometime during the month of May 1996 or thereabout substantially
apprised appellant of the crimes he was charged with since all the elements
of rape were stated in the informations. As such, appellant cannot complain
that he was deprived of the right to be informed of the nature of the cases
filed against him. Accordingly, appellants assertion that he was deprived of
the opportunity to prepare for his defense has no leg to stand on.
The prosecution proved through the testimony of private complainant that
accused-appellant raped her two times a week in 1998. As in Criminal Cases
Nos. 99-171392 and 99-171393, accused-appellant is guilty only of simple
rape.
As to the crime of rape subject of Criminal Case No. 99-171391, accused-
appellant avers that he is not criminally liable of rape. We agree with
accused-appellant. The collective testimony of private complainant and her
younger brother Rossel was that on November 5, 1998, accused-appellant
who was wearing a pair of short pants but naked from waist up, entered the
bedroom of private complainant, went on top of her, held her hands,
removed her panty, mashed her breasts and touched her sex organ.
However, accused-appellant saw Rossel peeping through the door and
dismounted. He berated Rossel for peeping and ordered him to go back to
his room and to sleep. Accused-appellant then left the room of the private
complainant. The testimony of private complainant on direct examination
reads:
Fiscal Carisma:
Q In between 1996 and August 1997?
A Yes, sir, sometimes two (2) times a week.
Q In November of 1998, do you recall of any unusual experience that
happened to you again?
A Yes, sir.
Q What was this unusual experience of yours?
A He laid himself on top of me, sir.
Q You said he whom are you referring to?
A Freedie Lizada Jakosalem, sir.
Q The same person you pointed to earlier?
A Yes, sir.
Q You said he placed himself on top of you in November, 1998, what did he
do while he was on top of you?
A Hes smashing my breast and he was also touching my arms and my legs,
sir.
Q What else if any madam witness?
A He was also touching my sex organ, sir.
Q What else, if any?
Atty. Estorco:
May we take note of the same objection your honor, the prosecution - - -
Court:
Same ruling. Let the complainant continue considering that she is crying and
still young.
Witness:
None else, sir.
Fiscal Carisma: A He held me first in my arms and then my legs, sir.

With what part of his body did he touch your sex organ? Q He held you first by your arms, is that what you are trying to tell us?

Atty. Estorco: Fiscal Carisma:

Your Honor, that is - - - Already answered your honor, he held the arms and then the legs.

Court: Court:

May answer. Already answered.

Fiscal Carisma: Atty. Balaba:

I will re-propound the question, your honor. Q Your honor, I am just trying to - -

You said that he touched your sex organ, will you tell the court with what Court:
part of his body, did he touch your sex organ?
Proceed.
Witness:
Atty. Balaba:
With his hands, sir.
Q He held your arms with his two hands?
Q What about after November 1998 - - -was this the last incident, this
unusual thing that you experienced from the hands of the accused was this
A Only with one hand, sir.
that last time, the one you narrated in November 1998?

Q Which hand were you touched?

A Yes, sir.32cräläwvirtualibräry

A I do not know which hand, sir.

On cross-examination, the private complainant testified, thus:

Q Which arm of yours was held by Freedie Lizada?

Atty. Balaba:

A I could not recall, sir.

Q Who was that somebody who entered the room?

Q Which side of your body was Freedie Lizada at that time?

A My stepfather Freedie Lizada, sir.

A I cannot recall, sir.

Q He was fully dressed at that time, during the time, is that correct?

Q What was the position of Freedie Lizada when he held your arms?
A Yes, sir, he was dressed then, sir.

A He was sitting on our bed, sir.

Q And he had his pants on, is that correct?

Q Which side of your bed was Freedie Lizada sitting on?

A He was wearing a short pants, sir.

A I do not know, sir. I cannot recall.

Q Was it a T-shirt that he had, at that time or a polo shirt?

Atty. Balaba:
A He was not wearing any shirt then, sir, he was naked.

Can we take a recess your honor?

Q When you realized that somebody was entering the room were you not
afraid?
Court:
A No, sir, I was not afraid.
How long will it take you to finish your cross?
Q What happened when you realized that somebody entered the room, and
the one who entered was your stepfather, Freedie Lizada? Atty. Balaba:

A I did not mind him entering the room because I know that my brother was We will confront the witness with so many things your honor.
around but suddenly I felt that somebody was holding me.
Court:
Q He was holding you, where were you when he held you?
Yes, thats why I am asking you how long will it take you to finish your cross?
A I was in the bed, sir, lying down.
Atty. Balaba:
Q You were lying down?
About another hour, sir.
A Yes, sir.
Court:
Q What part of the body did the accused Freedie Lizada touched you?
So we will be finished by 11:15, proceed.
A My two arms, my legs and my breast, sir.
Atty. Balaba:
Q Do you mean to tell us that he was holding your two arms and at the same
time your legs, is that what you are trying to tell us?
You cannot also remember which leg was held by Freedie Lizada? A Because I was thirsty, sir.

A I cannot recall, sir. Q So you went to the fridge to get some water?

Q When this happened, did you not shout for help? A Yes, sir.

A I did not ask for help, I was motioning to resist him, so that he would go Q And what happened as you went inside your house to get some water?
out, sir. I was struggling to free myself from him, sir.
A I saw my stepfather removing the panty of my sister and he touched her
Q And you were not able to extricate yourself from him? and then he laid on top of her, sir.

A I was not able to extricate myself, sir. Q Do you see your stepfather inside the courtroom now?

Q You were struggling with one arm of Lizada holding your arm, and the A Yes, sir.
other hand was holding your leg, is that what you are trying to tell us?
Q Will you point to him?
A No, sir, its not like that.
A He is the one, sir.
Q Could you tell us, what happened, you did not shout for help and you were
trying to extricate yourself, what happened?
Court Interpreter:

A He suddenly went out of the room, sir.

Witness pointing to a male person who when asked answers to the name
Freedie Lizada.
Q Now, he went - - -
Fiscal Carisma:
Court:
Q This thing that your father was that your stepfather did to your elder sister,
You did not shout during that time? did you see this before or after you went to the fridge to get some water?

A No, your honor.33cräläwvirtualibräry A I already got water then, sir.

Rossel, the nine-year old brother of the private complainant corroborated in Q What did you do as you saw this thing being done by your stepfather to
part his sisters testimony. He testified on direct examination, thus: your elder sister?

Fiscal Carisma: (continuing) A I was just looking at them when he saw me, sir.

Q Now, on November 2, 1998 do you recall where you were at about 3:00 Q Who, you saw who? You are referring to the accused Freedie Lizada?
oclock?
A Yes, sir.
A I was outside our house, sir.
Q So, what did you do as you were seen by your stepfather?
Q Where was your house again, Mr. witness, at that time? Where was your
house at that date, time and place? At that date and time?
A He scolded me, he shouted at me, he told me something and after that he
went to the other room and slept, sir.34cräläwvirtualibräry
A 1252 Jose Abad Santos, Tondo, Manila, sir.
Rossel testified on cross-examination, thus:
Court:
Q So you got thirsty, is that correct, and went inside the house?
Q The same address?
A Yes, sir.
A Yes, sir.
Q And you took a glass of water from the refrigerator?
Fiscal Carisma:
A Yes, sir.
Q On that date, time and place, do your recall where your sister Anna Lea
Orillosa was?
Q And it was at this time that you saw the accused Freedie Lizada touching
your sister?
A Yes, sir.
A Yes, sir.
Q Where was she?
Q Where was this refrigerator located?
A She was sleeping, sir.
A In front of the room where my sister sleeps, sir.
Q Now, on that date, time and place you said you were outside your house,
did you stay the whole afternoon outside your house?
Q So the door of your sisters room was open?

A No, sir.
A Yes, sir.

Q Where did you go next?

Q And --- okay, you said your sister was sleeping. What was the position of
your sister when you said the accused removed her panty?
A Inside, sir.
A She was lying straight, but she was resisting, sir.
Q For what purpose did you get inside your house?
Q Were you noticed by your sister at that time?
A No, sir. Fiscal Carisma:

Q And your sister did not call for help at that time? The question is vague, your honor.

A No, sir. Atty. Balaba:

Q And all this time you saw the accused doing this, from the refrigerator Because he said that removing the hand ---
where you were taking a glass of water?
Fiscal Carisma:
A Yes, sir.
He said removing the panty.
Q Did you not say something to the accused?
Atty. Balaba:
A No, sir, I was just looking.
Is that panty? Im sorry.
Q So your sister was lying down when the accused removed her panty, is that
what you are trying to tell us?
Q So, the accused was touching with his right hand the left thigh of your
sister ---
A Yes, sir.
Fiscal Carisma:
Q And where was the - - - and the accused saw you when he was removing
the panty of your sister?
The right thigh.

A Not yet, sir, but after a while he looked at the refrigerator because he
Atty. Balaba:
might be thirsty.

Q Rather the right thigh of your sister and with his left hand removing the
Q So---you said the accused was touching your sister. What part of her body
panty, is that what you are telling to tell us?
was touched by the accused?

A Yes, sir.
A Here, sir.

Q And your sister all the time was trying to ---was struggling to get free, is
Court Interpreter:
that not correct?

Witness pointing at the lower portion of the body.

A Yes, sir, she was resisting. (witness demonstrating)

Atty. Balaba:
Q She was struggling --- was the accused able to remove the panty?

Q You saw with what hand was the accused touching your sister?
A Yes, sir.

A Yes, sir.
Q And all the time you were there looking with the glass of water in your
hand?
Q What hand was he touching your sister?
A Yes, sir.35cräläwvirtualibräry
A This hand, sir.
In light of the evidence of the prosecution, there was no introduction of the
Court Interpreter: penis of accused-appellant into the aperture or within the pudendum of the
vagina of private complainant. Hence, accused-appellant is not criminally
liable for consummated rape.36cräläwvirtualibräry
Witness raising his right hand.

The issue that now comes to fore is whether or not accused-appellant is

Atty. Balaba:
guilty of consummated acts of lasciviousness defined in Article 336 of the
Revised Penal Code or attempted rape under Article 335 of the said Code, as
Q And which part of your sisters body was the accused touching with his right amended in relation to the last paragraph of Article 6 of the Revised Penal
hand? Your sisters body was the accused touching with his right hand? Code. In light of the evidence on record, we believe that accused-appellant is
guilty of attempted rape and not of acts of lasciviousness.
A Her right leg, sir.
Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code reads:
Q How about his left hand, what was the accused doing with his left hand?
Art. 336. Acts of Lasciviousness.Any person who shall commit any act of
A Removing her panty, sir. lasciviousness upon other persons of either sex, under any of the
circumstances mentioned in the preceding article, shall be punished
by prision correccional.37cräläwvirtualibräry
Q Removing her?

For an accused to be convicted of acts of lasciviousness, the prosecution is

A Panty, sir. burdened to prove the confluence of the following essential elements:

Q Which hand of your sister was being removed with the left hand of the 1. That the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness.
accused?

2. That it is done under any of the following circumstances:

Court:

a. By using force or intimidation; or

Which?

b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;

Atty. Balaba: or

Which hand, which hand?

c. When the offended party is under 12 years of age.38cräläwvirtualibräry
Lewd is defined as obscene, lustful, indecent, lecherous. It signifies that form
of immorality which has relation to moral impurity; or that which is carried
on a wanton manner.39cräläwvirtualibräry
The last paragraph of Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code reads:
There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a
felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution
which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other
than his own spontaneous desistance.
The essential elements of an attempted felony are as follows:
1. The offender commences the commission of the felony directly by overt
acts;
2. He does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the
felony;
3. The offenders act be not stopped by his own spontaneous desistance;
4. The non-performance of all acts of execution was due
to cause or accident other than his spontaneous
desistance.40cräläwvirtualibräry
The first requisite of an attempted felony consists of two elements, namely:
(1) That there be external acts;
(2) Such external acts have direct connection with the crime intended to be
committed.41cräläwvirtualibräry
An overt or external act is defined as some physical activity or deed,
indicating the intention to commit a particular crime, more than a mere
planning or preparation, which if carried out to its complete termination
following its natural course, without being frustrated by external obstacles
nor by the spontaneous desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and
necessarily ripen into a concrete offense.42 The raison detre for the law
requiring a direct overt act is that, in a majority of cases, the conduct of the
accused consisting merely of acts of preparation has never ceased to be
equivocal; and this is necessarily so, irrespective of his declared intent. It is
that quality of being equivocal that must be lacking before the act becomes
one which may be said to be a commencement of the commission of the
crime, or an overt act or before any fragment of the crime itself has been
committed, and this is so for the reason that so long as the equivocal quality
remains, no one can say with certainty what the intent of the accused is.43 It
is necessary that the overt act should have been the ultimate step towards
the consummation of the design. It is sufficient if it was the first or some
subsequent step in a direct movement towards the commission of the
offense after the preparations are made.44 The act done need not constitute
the last proximate one for completion. It is necessary, however, that the
attempt must have a causal relation to the intended crime.45 In the words of
Viada, the overt acts must have an immediate and necessary relation to the
offense.46cräläwvirtualibräry
Acts constitutive of an attempt to commit a felony should be distinguished
from preparatory acts which consist of devising means or measures
necessary for accomplishment of a desired object or end.47 One perpetrating
preparatory acts is not guilty of an attempt to commit a felony. However, if
the preparatory acts constitute a consummated felony under the law, the
malefactor is guilty of such consummated offense.48 The Supreme Court of
Spain, in its decision of March 21, 1892, declared that for overt acts to
constitute an attempted offense, it is necessary that their objective be
known and established or such that acts be of such nature that they
themselves should obviously disclose the criminal objective necessarily
intended, said objective and finality to serve as ground for designation of the
offense.49cräläwvirtualibräry
There is persuasive authority that in offenses not consummated as the
material damage is wanting, the nature of the action intended (accion fin)
cannot exactly be ascertained but the same must be inferred from the nature
of the acts executed (accion medio).50 Hence, it is necessary that the acts of
the accused must be such that, by their nature, by the facts to which they are
related, by circumstances of the persons performing the same, and by the
things connected therewith, that they are aimed at the consummation of the
offense. This Court emphasized in People vs. Lamahang[51] that:
The relation existing between the facts submitted for appreciation and the
offense which said facts are supposed to produce must be direct; the
intention must be ascertained from the facts and therefore it is necessary, in
order to avoid regrettable instances of injustice, that the mind be able to
cause a particular injury.52cräläwvirtualibräry
If the malefactor does not perform all the acts of execution by reason of his
spontaneous desistance, he is not guilty of an attempted felony.53 The law
does not punish him for his attempt to commit a felony.54 The rationale of
the law, as explained by Viada:
La Ley, en efecto, no hiere sino a pesar suyo; prefiere impedir el crimen que
castigarlo. Si el autor de la tentativa, despues de haber comenzado a ejecutar
el delito por actos exteriores, se detiene, por un sentimiento libre y
espontaneo, en el borde del abismo, salvo esta. Es un llamamiento al
remordimiento, a la conciencia, una gracia un perdon que concede la Ley al
arrepentimiento voluntario.55cräläwvirtualibräry
As aptly elaborated on by Wharton:
First, the character of an attempt is lost when its execution is voluntarily
abandoned. There is no conceivable overt act to which the abandoned
purpose could be attached. Secondly, the policy of the law requires that the
offender, so long as he is capable of arresting an evil plan, should be
encouraged to do so, by saving him harmless in case of such retreat before it
is possible for any evil consequences to ensue. Neither society, nor any
private person, has been injured by his act. There is no damage, therefore, to
redress. To punish him after retreat and abandonment would be to destroy
the motive for retreat and abandonment.56cräläwvirtualibräry
It must be borne in mind, however, that the spontaneous desistance of a
malefactor exempts him from criminal liability for the intended crime but it
does not exempt him from the crime committed by him before his
desistance.57cräläwvirtualibräry
In light of the facts established by the prosecution, we believe that accused-
appellant intended to have carnal knowledge of private complainant. The
overt acts of accused-appellant proven by the prosecution were not mere
preparatory acts. By the series of his overt acts, accused-appellant had
commenced the execution of rape which, if not for his spontaneous
desistance, will ripen into the crime of rape. Although accused-appellant
desisted from performing all the acts of execution however his desistance
was not spontaneous as he was impelled to do so only because of the sudden
and unexpected arrival of Rossel. Hence, accused-appellant is guilty only of
attempted rape.58 In a case of similar factual backdrop as this case, we held:
Applying the foregoing jurisprudence and taking into account Article 6 of the
Revised Penal Code, the appellant can only be convicted of attempted rape.
He commenced the commission of rape by removing his clothes, undressing
and kissing his victim and lying on top of her. However, he failed to perform
all the acts of execution which should produce the crime of rape by reason of
a cause other than his own spontaneous desistance, i.e., by the timely arrival
of the victims brother. Thus, his penis merely touched Mary Joys private
organ. Accordingly, as the crime committed by the appellant is attempted
rape, the penalty to be imposed on him should be an indeterminate prison
term of six (6) years of prision correccional as minimum to twelve (12) years
of prision mayor as maximum.
The penalty for attempted rape is prision mayor which is two degrees lower
than reclusion perpetua.59 Accused-appellant should be meted an
indeterminate penalty the minimum of which should be taken from prision
correccional which has a range of from six months and one day to six years
and the maximum of which shall be taken from the medium period of prision
mayor which has a range of from eight years and one day to ten years,
without any modifying circumstance. Accused-appellant is also liable to
private complainant for moral damages in the amount of P25,000.00.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 54, is SET ASIDE. Another judgment is hereby rendered as
follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 99-171390, accused-appellant is hereby found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of simple rape under Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code as amended and is hereby meted the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. Accused-appellant is also hereby ordered to pay private
complainant Analia Orillosa the amounts of P50,000.00 by way of civil
indemnity and P50,000.00 by way of moral damages;
2. In Criminal Case No. 99-171391, accused-appellant is hereby found guilty
of attempted rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended
in relation to Article 6 of the said Code and is hereby meted an indeterminate
penalty of from six years of prision correccional in its maximum period, as
minimum to ten years of prision mayor in its medium period, as maximum.
Accused-appellant is hereby ordered to pay private complainant Analia
Orillosa the amount of P25,000.00 by way of moral damages; and,
3. In Criminal Cases Nos. 99-171392 and 99-171393, accused-appellant is
hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of simple rape,
defined in Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended and is hereby
meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count. Accused-appellant is
hereby ordered to pay to private complainant Analia Orillosa the amount
of P50,000.00 by way of civil indemnity and the amount of P50,000.00 by
way of moral damages for each count, or a total amount of P200,000.00.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. NO. 184537 April 23, 2010
QUINTIN B. SALUDAGA and SPO2 FIEL E. GENIO, Petitioners,
vs.
The HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, 4th DIVISION and the PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of
the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order assailing the July 14,
2008 Resolution1 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. SB-08 CRM 0263,
denying the Motion for Preliminary Investigation filed by the petitioners who
were charged with a violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, and
the denial of their Motion for Reconsideration done in open court on August
13, 2008.
An Information2 dated September 13, 2000 charging both petitioners with
having violated Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, by causing undue
injury to the government, reads:
The undersigned Graft Investigation Officer of the Office of the Ombudsman-
Visayas, accuses QUINTIN B. SALUDAGA and SPO2 FIEL E. GENIO, for
VIOLATION OF SECTION 3(e) OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3019, AS AMENDED (THE
ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT), committed as follows:
That in or about the months of November and December, 1997, at the
Municipality of Lavezares, Province of Northern Samar, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused, public
officials, being the Municipal Mayor and PNP Member of Lavezares, Northern
Samar in such capacity and committing the offense in relation to office,
conniving, confederating and mutually helping with one another, and with
the late Limpio Legua, a private individual, with deliberate intent, with
evident bad faith and manifest partiality, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously enter into a Pakyaw Contract for the Construction
of Barangay Day Care Centers for Barangays Mac-arthur and Urdaneta,
Lavezares, Northern Samar, each in the amount of FORTY-EIGHT THOUSAND
FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (₱48,500.00), Philippine Currency, or a total amount of
NINETY-SEVEN THOUSAND PESOS (₱97,000.00), Philippine Currency, without
conducting a competitive public bidding, thus depriving the government the
chance to obtain the best, if not, the most reasonable price, and thereby
awarding said contracts to Olimpio Legua, a non-license contractor and non-
accredited NGO, in violation of Sec. 356 of Republic Act No. 7160 (The Local
Government Code) and COA Circular No. 91-368, to the damage and
prejudice of the government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
This case was initially raffled to the Third Division of Sandiganbayan and was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 26319.
In a Resolution3 promulgated on June 14, 2002, the Third Division granted
petitioners’ Motion to Quash and dismissed the information "for failure of
the prosecution to allege and prove the amount of actual damages caused
the government, an essential element of the crime charged."
In a Memorandum4 dated July 1, 2003, the Ombudsman directed the Office
of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) to study the possibility of having the
information amended and re-filed with the Sandiganbayan.
Thus, the OSP re-filed the Information5 dated August 17, 2007, this time,
docketed as Criminal Case No. SB-08 CRM 0263, with the Fourth Division of
the Sandiganbayan, charging the petitioners for violation of Section 3(e) of
R.A. No. 3019, by giving unwarranted benefit to a private person, to the
prejudice of the government.
The information, subject of the petition, now reads:
The undersigned Prosecutor of the Office of the Special Prosecutor/Office of
the Ombudsman, hereby accuses, MAYOR QUINTIN B. SALUDAGA and SPO2
FIEL E. GENIO, for the violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act 3019, as
amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
committed as follows:
That in or about the months of November and December, 1997 at the
Municipality of Lavezares, Province of Northern Samar, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused QUINTIN B.
SALUDAGA, a high ranking public official being then the Mayor of Lavezares,
Northern Samar, and committing the crime herein charged while in the
discharge of his official administrative function, conspiring and conniving
with accused SPO2 FIEL B. GENIO, a member of Lavezares Police Force (PNP)
and with the late OLIMPIO LEGUA, a private individual, with deliberate
intent, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally give
unwarranted benefit or advantage to the late Olimpio Legua, a non-license
contractor and non-
accredited NGO, through evident bad faith and manifest partiality by then
and there entering into a Pakyaw Contract with the latter for the
Construction of Barangay Day Care Centers for barangays Mac-Arthur and
Urdaneta, Lavezares, Northern Samar, in the amount of FORTY EIGHT
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P48,500.00) each or a total of NINETY
SEVEN THOUSAND PESOS (P97,000.00) Philippine Currency, without the
benefit of a competitive public bidding to the prejudice of the Government
and public interest.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Preliminary Investigation6 dated June 4, 2008
which was strongly opposed by the prosecution in its Opposition7 dated June
18, 2008.
Petitioners contend that the failure of the prosecution to conduct a new
preliminary investigation before the filing of the second Information
constituted a violation of the law because the latter charged a different
offense–that is, violation of Section 3(e) by giving unwarranted benefit to
private parties. Hence, there was a substitution of the first Information. They
argue that assuming that no substitution took place, at the very least, there
was a substantial amendment in the new information and that its submission
should have been preceded by a new preliminary investigation. Further, they
claim that newly discovered evidence mandates re-examination of the
finding of a prima facie cause to file the case.
On July 14, 2008, the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division issued the assailed
Resolution denying the petitioners’ motion for preliminary investigation. The
graft court found that there is no substituted information or substantial
amendment that would warrant the conduct of a new preliminary
investigation. It gave the following ratiocination:
The re-filed information did not change the nature of the offense charged,
but merely modified the mode by which accused committed the offense. The
substance of such modification is not such as to necessitate the conduct of
another preliminary investigation.
Moreover, no new allegations were made, nor was the criminal liability of
the accused upgraded in the re-filed information. Thus, new preliminary
investigation is not in order.
The dispositive portion of the Resolution states:
Finding the arguments of accused-movants indefensible, the sufficiency of
the information must be sustained.
WHEREFORE, having established the sufficiency of the Information, the
motion under consideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly,
the arraignment of both accused shall proceed as scheduled.8
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration9 dated August 6, 2008,
submitting that the two Informations substantially charged different
offenses, such that the present information constituted a substitution that
should have been preceded by a new preliminary investigation.
On August 13, 2008, in a hearing for the arraignment of petitioners, the
Sandiganbayan denied the Motion10 in open court.
Hence, petitioners interpose the present petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction and temporary restraining order under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court anchored on the following grounds:
I
The Honorable Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it refused to order the
preliminary investigation of the case a quo, when the second Information in
the instant case constituted substituted Information whose submission
required the conduct of preliminary investigation.
II
The Honorable Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it refused to order the
conduct of a preliminary investigation of the case a quo, since the second
Information therein contained substantial amendments whose submission
required the conduct of preliminary investigation.
III
The Honorable Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it refused to order the
preliminary investigation of the case a quo, although the newly discovered
evidence mandates due re-examination of the finding that prima facie cause
existed to file the case a quo.11
From the arguments raised by petitioners, the core issue is whether or not
the two (2) ways of violating section 3(e) of Republic Act 3019, namely: (a) by
causing undue injury to any party, including the Government; or (b) by giving
any private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference
constitute two distinct and separate offenses that would warrant a new or
another preliminary investigation.
In its Comment12 dated January 12, 2009, respondent People of the
Philippines, represented by the Office of the Special Prosecutor, counters
that there is no substituted information in contemplation of law and
jurisprudence that would require the conduct of another preliminary
investigation. There is no newly-discovered evidence that would lead to a
different determination should there be another preliminary investigation
conducted.
In their Reply,13 dated April 24, 2009, petitioners insist that the offenses
charged in the first and second Information are not the same, and what
transpired was a substitution of Information that required prior conduct of
preliminary investigation. Even assuming there was no substitution,
substantial amendments were made in the second Information, and that its
submission should have been preceded by a new preliminary investigation.
We find no merit in this petition.
Petitioners were charged with a violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 or
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act which reads:
Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers.- In addition to acts or
omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following
shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby
declared to be 0unlawful:
xxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or
giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference
in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This
provision shall apply to officers and employees charged with the grant of
licenses or permits or other concessions.
The essential elements of the offense are as follows:
1. The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative,
judicial or official functions;
2. He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith
or inexcusable negligence; and
3. That his action caused any undue injury to any party, including
the government, or giving any private party unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.14
In a string of decisions, the Court has consistently ruled:
R.A. 3019, Section 3, paragraph (e), as amended, provides as one of its
elements that the public officer should have acted by causing any undue
injury to any party, including the Government, or by giving any private party
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
functions. The use of the disjunctive term "or" connotes that either act
qualifies as a violation of Section 3 paragraph (e), or as aptly held in Santiago,
as two (2) different modes of committing the offense. This does not however
indicate that each mode constitutes a distinct offense, but rather, that an
accused may be charged under either mode or under both.15
The afore-stated ruling is consistent with the well-entrenched principle of
statutory construction that "The word or is a disjunctive term signifying
disassociation and independence of one thing from the other things
enumerated; it should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it
ordinarily implies, as a disjunctive word."16
Contrary to the argument of petitioners, there is no substituted information.
The Information dated August 17, 2007 filed in Criminal Case No. SB-08 CRM
0263 charged the same offense, that is, violation of Section 3(e) of Republic
Act No. 3019. Only the mode of commission was modified. While
jurisprudence, the most recent being Talaga, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan,17 provides
that there are two (2) acts or modes of committing the offense, thus: a) by
causing any undue injury to any party, including the government; or b) by
giving any private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference, it
does not mean that each act or mode constitutes a distinct offense. An
accused may be charged under either mode18 or under both should both
modes concur.19
Petitioners’ reliance on the Teehankee v. Madayag,20 ruling that, "in
substitution of information another preliminary investigation is entailed and
that the accused has to plead anew to the new information" is not applicable
to the present case because, as already stated, there is no substitution of
information there being no change in the nature of the offense charged.
Consequently, petitioners cannot invoke the principle enunciated in Villaflor
v. Vivar,21 that failure to conduct a new preliminary investigation is
tantamount to a violation of their rights. While it is true that preliminary
investigation is a statutory and substantive right accorded to the accused
before trial, the denial of petitioners’ claim for a new investigation, however,
did not deprive them of their right to due process. An examination of the
records of the case discloses that there was a full-blown preliminary
investigation wherein both petitioners actively participated.
Anent the contention of petitioners that the information contained
substantial amendments warranting a new preliminary investigation, the
same must likewise fail.1avvphi1
Petitioners erroneously concluded that giving undue injury, as alleged in the
first Information, and conferring unwarranted benefits, alleged in the second
Information, are two distinct violations of, or two distinct ways of violating
Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, and that such shift from giving undue
injury to conferring unwarranted benefit constituted, at the very least, a
substantial amendment. It should be noted that the Information is founded
on the same transaction as the first Information, that of entering into a
Pakyaw Contract for the construction of barangay day care centers for
barangays Mac-Arthur and Urdaneta, Lavezares, Northern Samar. Thus, the
evidentiary requirements for the prosecution and defense remain the same.
To bolster their claim for a reinvestigation of the offense, petitioners cited
the case of Matalam v. Sandiganbayan.22 The same is inapplicable to
petitioners’ case. In Matalam, there was indeed a substantial amendment
which entitled the accused to another preliminary investigation. The recital
of facts constituting the offense charged therein was definitely altered. In the
original information, the prohibited act allegedly committed by the petitioner
was the illegal and unjustifiable refusal to pay the monetary claims of the
private complainants, whereas in the amended information, it is the illegal
dismissal from the service of the private complainants. In the case at bar,
there is no substantial amendment to speak of. As discussed previously, the
Information in Criminal Case No. 26319 was already dismissed by the Third
Division of the Sandiganbayan in view of the petitioners’ Motion to Quash. As
such, there is nothing more to be amended.
The Court is not unaware of the case of People v. Lacson,23 where it was
written:
The case may be revived by the State within the time-bar either by the
refiling of the Information or by the filing of a new Information for the same
offense or an offense necessarily included therein. There would be no need
of a new preliminary investigation. However, in a case wherein after the
provisional dismissal of a criminal case, the original witnesses of the
prosecution or some of them may have recanted their testimonies or may
have died or may no longer be available and new witnesses for the State
have emerged, a new preliminary investigation must be conducted before an
Information is refiled or a new Information is filed. A new preliminary
investigation is also required if aside from the original accused, other persons
are charged under a new criminal complaint for the same offense or
necessarily included therein; or if under a new criminal complaint, the
original charge has been upgraded; or if under a new criminal complaint, the
criminal liability of the accused is upgraded from that as an accessory to that
as a principal. The accused must be accorded the right to submit counter-
affidavits and evidence.
No such circumstance is obtaining in this case, because there was no
modification in the nature of the charged offense.1avvphi1 Consequently, a
new preliminary investigation is unnecessary and cannot be demanded by
the petitioners.
Finally, the third assigned error, that newly discovered evidence mandates
due re-examination of the finding of prima facie cause to file the case,
deserves scant consideration. For petitioners, it is necessary that a new
investigation be conducted to consider newly discovered evidence, in
particular, the Affidavit of COA Auditor Carlos G. Pornelos, author of the
audit report. We are not convinced.

Under Section 2, Rule 121 of the Rules of Court, the requisites for newly
discovered evidence are: (a) the evidence was discovered after trial (in this
case, after investigation); (b) such evidence could not have been discovered
and produced at the trial with reasonable diligence; and (c) that it is material,
not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching, and is of such weight
that, if admitted, will probably change the judgment.24

The Pornelos affidavit, which petitioners claim as newly-discovered, was

executed by affiant way back in November 29, 2000, as correctly found by
the Sandiganbayan. Clearly, it cannot be considered as newly found evidence
because it was already in existence prior to the re-filing of the case. In fact,
such sworn affidavit was among the documents considered during the
preliminary investigation. It was the sole annexed document to petitioners’
Supplement to Motion for Reinvestigation,25 offered to dispute the charge
that no public bidding was conducted prior to the execution of the subject
project.

More important is the prosecution’s statement in its Memorandum that,

"after a careful re-evaluation of the documentary evidence available to the
prosecution at the time of the filing of the initial Information, and at the time
of the re-filing of the Information, the prosecution insists on the finding of
probable cause, an exercise within the exclusive province of the Office of the
Ombudsman."26

Worthy of note is the case of Soriano v. Marcelo,27 viz:

Case law has it that the determination of probable cause against those in
public office during a preliminary investigation is a function that belongs to
the Office of the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman has the discretion to
determine whether a criminal case, given its attendant facts and
circumstances, should be filed or not. It is basically his call.

Without good and compelling reasons, the Court cannot interfere in the
exercise by the Office of the Ombudsman of its investigatory and prosecutory
powers.28 The only ground upon which it may entertain a review of the Office
of the Ombudsman’s action is grave abuse of discretion.29

Grave abuse of discretion is an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal

to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act in contemplation of law as when
the judgment rendered is not based on law and evidence but on caprice,
whim and despotism.30

The special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is
intended to correct errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The writ of certiorari is directed
against a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
function that acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion means such capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. To
justify the issuance of the writ of certiorari, the abuse of discretion must be
grave, as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as
to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform
the duty enjoined, or to act at all, in contemplation of law, as to be
equivalent to having acted without jurisdiction.31

The case at bench discloses no evident indication that respondent

Sandiganbayan acted with arbitrariness, whim or caprice. It committed no
error in refusing to order the conduct of another preliminary investigation.
As sufficiently explained by the prosecution, a new preliminary investigation
is not necessary as there was neither a modification of the nature of the
offense charged nor a new allegation. Such conduct of preliminary
investigation anew will only delay the resolution of the case and would be an
exercise in futility in as much as there was a complete preliminary
investigation actively participated by both petitioners.

In view of the foregoing, we hold that the public respondent committed no

grave abuse of discretion in issuing its Resolution of July 14, 2008, denying
petitioners’ motion for preliminary investigation in Criminal Case No. SB-08
CRM 0263.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 184800 May 5, 2010
WONINA M. BONIFACIO, JOCELYN UPANO, VICENTE ORTUOSTE AND
JOVENCIO PERECHE, SR., Petitioners,
vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI, BRANCH 149, and JESSIE JOHN P.
GIMENEZ, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Via a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, petitioners Wonina M. Bonifacio,
et al. assail the issuances of Branch 149 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Makati (public respondent) – Order1 of April 22, 2008 which denied their
motion to quash the Amended Information indicting them for libel, and Joint
Resolution2 of August 12, 2008 denying reconsideration of the first issuance.
Private respondent Jessie John P. Gimenez3 (Gimenez) filed on October 18,
2005, on behalf of the Yuchengco Family ("in particular," former Ambassador
Alfonso Yuchengco and Helen Y. Dee (Helen) and of the Malayan Insurance
Co., Inc. (Malayan),4 a criminal complaint,5 before the Makati City
Prosecutor’s Office, for thirteen (13) counts of libel under Article 355 in
relation to Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) against Philip Piccio,
Mia Gatmaytan and Ma. Anabella Relova Santos, who are officers of Parents
Enabling Parents Coalition, Inc. (PEPCI), John Joseph Gutierrez, Jeselyn
Upano, Jose Dizon, Rolanda Pareja, Wonina Bonifacio, Elvira Cruz, Cornelio
Zafra, Vicente Ortueste, Victoria Gomez Jacinto, Jurencio Pereche, Ricardo
Loyares and Peter Suchianco, who are trustees of PEPCI, Trennie Monsod, a
member of PEPCI (collectively, the accused), and a certain John Doe, the
administrator of the website www.pepcoalition.com.
PEPCI appears to have been formed by a large group of disgruntled
planholders of Pacific Plans, Inc. (PPI) - a wholly owned subsidiary of Great
Pacific Life Assurance Corporation, also owned by the Yuchengco Group of
Companies (YGC) - who had previously purchased traditional pre-need
educational plans but were unable to collect thereon or avail of the benefits
thereunder after PPI, due to liquidity concerns, filed for corporate
rehabilitation with prayer for suspension of payments before the Makati RTC.
Decrying PPI’s refusal/inability to honor its obligations under the educational
pre-need plans, PEPCI sought to provide a forum by which the planholders
could seek redress for their pecuniary loss under their policies by maintaining
a website on the internet under the address of www.pepcoalition.com.
Gimenez alleged that PEPCI also owned, controlled and moderated on the
internet a blogspot6 under the website
address www.pacificnoplan.blogspot.com, as well as a yahoo e-
group7 at no2pep2010@yahoogroups.com. These websites are easily
accessible to the public or by anyone logged on to the internet.
Gimenez further alleged that upon accessing the above-stated websites in
Makati on various dates from August 25 to October 2, 2005, he "was
appalled to read numerous articles [numbering 13], maliciously and
recklessly caused to be published by [the accused] containing highly
derogatory statements and false accusations, relentlessly attacking the
Yuchengco Family, YGC, and particularly, Malayan."8 He cited an article which
was posted/published on www.pepcoalition.com on August 25, 2005 which
stated:
Talagang naisahan na naman tayo ng mga Yuchengcos. Nangyari na ang mga
kinatatakutan kong pagbagsak ng negotiation because it was done
prematurely since we had not file any criminal aspect of our case. What is
worse is that Yuchengcos benefited much from the nego. x x x . That is the
fact na talagang hindi dapat pagtiwalaan ang mga Yuchengcos.
LET’S MOVE TO THE BATTLEFIELD. FILE THE CRIMINAL CASES IN COURT, BSP
AND AMLC AND WHEREVER. Pumunta tayong muli sa senado, congreso,
RCBC Plaza, and other venues to air our grievances and call for boycott ng
YGC. Let us start within ourselves. Alisin natin ang mga investments and
deposits natin sa lahat ng YGC and I mean lahat and again convince friends to
do the same. Yung mga nanonood lang noon ay dapat makisali na talaga
ngayon specially those who joined only after knowing that there was a
negotiation for amicable settlements.
FOR SURE MAY TACTICS PA SILANG NAKABASTA SA ATIN. LET US BE READY
FOR IT BECAUSE THEY HAD SUCCESSFULLY LULL US AND THE NEXT TIME THEY
WILL TRY TO KILL US NA. x x x 9 (emphasis in the original)
By Resolution of May 5, 2006,10 the Makati City Prosecutor’s Office, finding
probable cause to indict the accused, filed thirteen (13) separate
Informations11 charging them with libel. The accusatory portion of one
Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 06-876, which was raffled off to
public respondent reads:
That on or about the 25th day of August 2005 in Makati City, Metro Manila,
Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, being then the trustees of Parents Enabling Parents Coalition
and as such trustees they hold the legal title to the
website www.pepcoalition.com which is of general circulation, and
publication to the public conspiring, confederating and mutually helping with
one another together with John Does, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously and publicly and maliciously with intention of attacking the
honesty, virtue, honor and integrity, character and reputation of complainant
Malayan Insurance Co. Inc., Yuchengco Family particularly Ambassador
Alfonso Yuchengco and Helen Dee and for further purpose exposing the
complainant to public hatred and contempt published an article imputing a
vice or defect to the complainant and caused to be composed, posted and
published in the said website www.pepcoalition.com and injurious and
defamatory article as follows:
Talagang naisahan na naman tayo ng mga Yuchengcos. Nangyari na ang mga
kinatatakutan kong pagbagsak ng negotiation. x x x x x x x x x
For sure may tactics pa silang nakabasta sa atin. Let us be ready for it
because they had successfully lull us and the next time they will try to kill us
na. x x x
A copy of the full text of the foregoing article as published/posted
in www.pepcoalition.com is attached as Annex "F" of the complaint.
That the keyword and password to be used in order to post and publish the
above defamatory article are known to the accused as trustees holding legal
title to the above-cited website and that the accused are the ones
responsible for the posting and publication of the defamatory articles that
the article in question was posted and published with the object of the
discrediting and ridiculing the complainant before the public.
CONTRARY TO LAW.12
Several of the accused appealed the Makati City Prosecutor’s Resolution by a
petition for review to the Secretary of Justice who, by Resolution of June 20,
2007,13 reversed the finding of probable cause and accordingly directed the
withdrawal of the Informations for libel filed in court. The Justice Secretary
opined that the crime of "internet libel" was non-existent, hence, the
accused could not be charged with libel under Article 353 of the RPC.14
Petitioners, as co-accused,15 thereupon filed on June 6, 2006, before the
public respondent, a Motion to Quash16 the Information in Criminal Case No.
06-876 on the grounds that it failed to vest jurisdiction on the Makati RTC;
the acts complained of in the Information are not punishable by law since
internet libel is not covered by Article 353 of the RPC; and the Information is
fatally defective for failure to designate the offense charged and the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense of libel.
Citing Macasaet v. People,17 petitioners maintained that the Information
failed to allege a particular place within the trial court’s jurisdiction where
the subject article was printed and first published or that the offended
parties resided in Makati at the time the alleged defamatory material was
printed and first published.
By Order of October 3, 2006,18 the public respondent, albeit finding that
probable cause existed, quashed the Information, citing Agustin v.
Pamintuan.19 It found that the Information lacked any allegations that the
offended parties were actually residing in Makati at the time of the
commission of the offense as in fact they listed their address in the
complaint-affidavit at Yuchengco Tower in Binondo, Manila; or that the
alleged libelous article was printed and first published in Makati.
The prosecution moved to reconsider the quashal of the
Information,20 insisting that the Information sufficiently conferred jurisdiction
on the public respondent. It cited Banal III v. Panganiban21 which held that
the Information need not allege verbatim that the libelous publication was
"printed and first published" in the appropriate venue. And it pointed out
that Malayan has an office in Makati of which Helen is a resident. Moreover,
the prosecution alleged that even assuming that the Information was
deficient, it merely needed a formal amendment.
Petitioners opposed the prosecution’s motion for reconsideration,
contending, inter alia, that since venue is jurisdictional in criminal cases, any
defect in an information for libel pertaining to jurisdiction is not a mere
matter of form that may be cured by amendment.22
By Order of March 8, 2007,23 the public respondent granted the
prosecution’s motion for reconsideration and accordingly ordered the public
prosecutor to "amend the Information to cure the defect of want of venue."
The prosecution thereupon moved to admit the Amended Information dated
March 20, 2007,24 the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the 25th day of August 2005 in Makati City, Metro Manila,
Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, being then the trustees of Parents Enabling Parents Coalition
and as such trustees they hold the legal title to the
website www.pepcoalition.com which is of general circulation, and
publication to the public conspiring, confederating together with John
Does, whose true names, identities and present whereabouts are still
unknown and all of them mutually helping and aiding one another, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and publicly and maliciously
with intention of attacking the honesty, virtue, honor and integrity, character
and reputation of complainant Malayan Insurance Co. Inc., Yuchengco Family
particularly Ambassador Alfonso Yuchengco and Helen Dee and for further
purpose exposing the complainant to public hatred and contempt published
an article imputing a vice or defect to the complainant and caused to be
composed, posted and published in the said
website www.pepcoalition.com, a website accessible in Makati City, an
injurious and defamatory article, which was first published and accessed by
the private complainant in Makati City, as follows:
x x x x (emphasis and underscoring in the original; italics supplied)
Petitioners moved to quash the Amended Information25 which, they alleged,
still failed to vest jurisdiction upon the public respondent because it failed to
allege that the libelous articles were "printed and first published" by the
accused in Makati; and the prosecution erroneously laid the venue of the
case in the place where the offended party accessed the internet-published
article.
By the assailed Order of April 22, 2008, the public respondent, applying Banal
III, found the Amended Information to be sufficient in form.
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration26 having been denied by the public
respondent by Joint Resolution of August 12, 2008, they filed the present
petition for Certiorari and Prohibition faulting the public respondent for:
1. NOT FINDING THAT THE ACTS ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION
ARE NOT PUNISHABLE BY LAW;
2. ADMITTING AN AMENDED INFORMATION WHOSE
JURISDICTIONAL ALLEGATIONS CONTINUES TO BE DEFICIENT; and
3. NOT RULING THAT AN AMENDMENT IN THE INFORMATION FOR
THE PURPOSE OF CURING JURISDICTIONAL DEFECTS IS ILLEGAL.27
With the filing of Gimenez’s Comment28 to the petition, the issues are: (1)
whether petitioners violated the rule on hierarchy of courts to thus render
the petition dismissible; and (2) whether grave abuse of discretion attended
the public respondent’s admission of the Amended Information.
The established policy of strict observance of the judicial hierarchy of
courts,29 as a rule, requires that recourse must first be made to the lower-
ranked court exercising concurrent jurisdiction with a higher court.30 A regard
for judicial hierarchy clearly indicates that petitions for the issuance of
extraordinary writs against first level courts should be filed in the RTC and
those against the latter should be filed in the Court of Appeals.31 The rule is
not iron-clad, however, as it admits of certain exceptions.
Thus, a strict application of the rule is unnecessary when cases brought
before the appellate courts do not involve factual but purely legal
questions.32
In the present case, the substantive issue calls for the Court’s exercise of its
discretionary authority, by way of exception, in order to abbreviate the
review process as petitioners raise a pure question of law involving
jurisdiction in criminal complaints for libel under Article 360 of the RPC –
whether the Amended Information is sufficient to sustain a charge for
written defamation in light of the requirements under Article 360 of the RPC,
as amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 4363, reading:
Art. 360. Persons responsible.—Any person who shall publish, exhibit or
cause the publication or exhibition of any defamation in writing or by similar
means, shall be responsible for the same.
The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the editor or business
manager of a daily newspaper, magazine or serial publication, shall be
responsible for the defamations contained therein to the same extent as if he
were the author thereof.
The criminal action and civil action for damages in cases of written
defamations, as provided for in this chapter shall be filed simultaneously or
separately with the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the
libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the offended
parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense:
Provided, however, That where one of the offended parties is a public officer
whose office is in the City of Manila at the time of the commission of the
offense, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the City of
Manila or of the city or province where the libelous article is printed and first
published, and in case such public officer does not hold office in the City of
Manila, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province
or city where he held office at the time of the commission of the offense or
where the libelous article is printed and first published and in case one of the
offended parties is a private individual, the action shall be filed in the Court
of First Instance of the province or city where he actually resides at the time
of the commission of the offense or where the libelous matter is printed and
first published x x x. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Venue is jurisdictional in criminal actions such that the place where the crime
was committed determines not only the venue of the action but constitutes
an essential element of jurisdiction.33 This principle acquires even greater
import in libel cases, given that Article 360, as amended, specifically provides
for the possible venues for the institution of the criminal and civil aspects of
such cases.
In Macasaet,34 the Court reiterated its earlier pronouncements in Agbayani v.
Sayo35 which laid out the rules on venue in libel cases, viz:
For the guidance, therefore, of both the bench and the bar, this Court finds it
appropriate to reiterate our earlier pronouncement in the case of Agbayani,
to wit:
In order to obviate controversies as to the venue of the criminal action for
written defamation, the complaint or information should contain allegations
as to whether, at the time the offense was committed, the offended party
was a public officer or a private individual and where he was actually residing
at that time. Whenever possible, the place where the written defamation
was printed and first published should likewise be alleged. That allegation
would be a sine qua non if the circumstance as to where the libel was printed
and first published is used as the basis of the venue of the action. (emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
It becomes clear that the venue of libel cases where the complainant is a
private individual is limited to only either of two places, namely: 1) where the
complainant actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense; or
2) where the alleged defamatory article was printed and first published. The
Amended Information in the present case opted to lay the venue by availing
of the second. Thus, it stated that the offending article "was first published
and accessed by the private complainant in Makati City." In other words, it
considered the phrase to be equivalent to the requisite allegation of printing
and first publication.
The insufficiency of the allegations in the Amended Information to vest
jurisdiction in Makati becomes pronounced upon an examination of the
rationale for the amendment to Article 360 by RA No. 4363. Chavez v. Court
of Appeals36 explained the nature of these changes:
Agbayani supplies a comprehensive restatement of the rules of venue in
actions for criminal libel, following the amendment by Rep. Act No. 4363 of
the Revised Penal Code:
"Article 360 in its original form provided that the venue of the criminal and
civil actions for written defamations is the province wherein the libel was
published, displayed or exhibited, regardless of the place where the same
was written, printed or composed. Article 360 originally did not specify the
public officers and the courts that may conduct the preliminary investigation
of complaints for libel.
Before article 360 was amended, the rule was that a criminal action for libel
may be instituted in any jurisdiction where the libelous article was published
or circulated, irrespective of where it was written or printed (People v. Borja,
43 Phil. 618). Under that rule, the criminal action is transitory and the injured
party has a choice of venue.
Experience had shown that under that old rule the offended party could
harass the accused in a libel case by laying the venue of the criminal action in
a remote or distant place.
Thus, in connection with an article published in the Daily Mirror and the
Philippine Free Press, Pio Pedrosa, Manuel V. Villareal and Joaquin Roces
were charged with libel in the justice of the peace court of San Fabian,
Pangasinan (Amansec v. De Guzman, 93 Phil. 933).

To forestall such harassment, Republic Act No. 4363 was enacted. It lays
down specific rules as to the venue of the criminal action so as to prevent the
offended party in written defamation cases from inconveniencing the
accused by means of out-of-town libel suits, meaning complaints filed in
remote municipal courts (Explanatory Note for the bill which became
Republic Act No. 4363, Congressional Record of May 20, 1965, pp. 424-5;
Time, Inc. v. Reyes, L-28882, May 31, 1971, 39 SCRA 303, 311).

x x x x (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Clearly, the evil sought to be prevented by the amendment to Article 360 was
the indiscriminate or arbitrary laying of the venue in libel cases in distant,
isolated or far-flung areas, meant to accomplish nothing more than harass or
intimidate an accused. The disparity or unevenness of the situation becomes
even more acute where the offended party is a person of sufficient means or
possesses influence, and is motivated by spite or the need for revenge.

If the circumstances as to where the libel was printed and first published are
used by the offended party as basis for the venue in the criminal action, the
Information must allege with particularity where the defamatory article was
printed and first published, as evidenced or supported by, for instance, the
address of their editorial or business offices in the case of newspapers,
magazines or serial publications. This pre-condition becomes necessary in
order to forestall any inclination to harass.

The same measure cannot be reasonably expected when it pertains to

defamatory material appearing on a website on the internet as there would
be no way of determining the situs of its printing and first publication. To
credit Gimenez’s premise of equating his first access to the defamatory
article on petitioners’ website in Makati with "printing and first publication"
would spawn the very ills that the amendment to Article 360 of the RPC
sought to discourage and prevent. It hardly requires much imagination to see
the chaos that would ensue in situations where the website’s author or
writer, a blogger or anyone who posts messages therein could be sued for
libel anywhere in the Philippines that the private complainant may have
allegedly accessed the offending website.

For the Court to hold that the Amended Information sufficiently vested
jurisdiction in the courts of Makati simply because the defamatory article
was accessed therein would open the floodgates to the libel suit being filed
in all other locations where the pepcoalition website is likewise accessed or
capable of being accessed.1avvphi1

Respecting the contention that the venue requirements imposed by Article

360, as amended, are unduly oppressive, the Court’s pronouncements in
Chavez37 are instructive:

For us to grant the present petition, it would be necessary to abandon the

Agbayani rule providing that a private person must file the complaint for libel
either in the place of printing and first publication, or at the complainant’s
place of residence. We would also have to abandon the subsequent cases
that reiterate this rule in Agbayani, such as Soriano, Agustin, and Macasaet.
There is no convincing reason to resort to such a radical action. These
limitations imposed on libel actions filed by private persons are hardly
onerous, especially as they still allow such persons to file the civil or criminal
complaint in their respective places of residence, in which situation there is
no need to embark on a quest to determine with precision where the libelous
matter was printed and first published.

(Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

IN FINE, the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in

denying petitioners’ motion to quash the Amended Information.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of April 22, 2008
and the Joint Resolution of August 12, 2008 are hereby SET ASIDE. The
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Br. 149 is hereby DIRECTED TO QUASH
the Amended Information in Criminal Case No. 06-876 and DISMISS the case.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 164015 February 26, 2009
RAMON A. ALBERT, Petitioner,
vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for certiorari1 of the Resolutions dated 10 February
20042 and 3 May 20043 of the Sandiganbayan. The 10 February 2004
Resolution granted the prosecution’s Motion to Admit the Amended
Information. The 3 May 2004 Resolution denied the Motion For
Reconsideration of petitioner Ramon A. Albert (petitioner).
The Facts
On 24 March 1999, the Special Prosecution Officer (SPO) II of the Office of
the Ombudsman for Mindanao charged petitioner and his co-accused, Favio
D. Sayson and Arturo S. Asumbrado, before the Sandiganbayan with violation
of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (RA 3019) or the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act in Criminal Case No. 25231. The Information alleged:
The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer II of the Office of the
Ombudsman for Mindanao hereby accuses RAMON A. ALBERT, FAVIO D.
SAYSON, and ARTURO S. ASUMBRADO for (sic) violation of Section 3(e) R.A.
3019, as amended, committed as follows:
That in (sic) or about May 1990 and sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in
the City of Davao, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, accused RAMON A. ALBERT, a public officer, being then the President
of the National Home Mortgage and Finance Corporation, occupying the said
position with a salary grade above 27, while in the performance of his official
function, committing the offense in relation to his office, taking advantage of
his official position, conspiring and confederating with accused FAVIO D.
SAYSON, then the Project Director of CODE Foundation Inc. and accused
ARTURO S. ASUMBRADO, then the President of the Buhangin Residents and
Employees Association for Development, Inc., acting with evident bad faith
and manifest partiality and or gross neglect of duty, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and criminally cause undue injury to the government and
public interest, enter and make it appear in Tax Declaration Nos. D-3-1-7691
and D-3-1-7692 that two parcels of real property particularly described in the
Certificate of Titles Nos. T-151920 and T-151921 are residential lands which
Tax Declarations accused submitted to the NHMFC when in truth and in fact,
as accused well knew, the two pieces of real property covered by Certificate
of Titles Nos. T-151920 and T-151921 are agricultural land, and by reason of
accused’s misrepresentation, the NHMFC released the amount of
₱4,535,400.00 which is higher than the loanable amount the land could
command being agricultural, thus causing undue injury to the government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
On 26 March 1999, a Hold Departure Order was issued by the Sandiganbayan
against petitioner and his co-accused.
On 25 May 1999, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss Criminal Case No.
25231 on the following grounds: (1) the accused (petitioner) was denied due
process of law; (2) the Office of the Ombudsman did not acquire jurisdiction
over the person of the accused; (3) the constitutional rights of the accused to
a speedy disposition of cases and to a speedy trial were violated; and (4) the
resolution dated 26 February 1999 finding the accused guilty of violation of
Section 3(e) of RA 3019 is not supported by evidence.5
On 18 December 2000, pending the resolution of the Motion to Dismiss,
petitioner filed a Motion to Lift Hold Departure Order and to be Allowed to
Travel. The prosecution did not object to the latter motion on the condition
that petitioner would be "provisionally" arraigned.6 On 12 March 2001,
petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to Amend Motion to Lift Hold Departure
Order and to be Allowed to Travel. The following day, or on 13 March 2001,
the Sandiganbayan arraigned petitioner who entered a plea of "not guilty." In
the Resolution dated 16 April 2001, the Sandiganbayan granted petitioner’s
Urgent Motion to Amend Motion to Lift Hold Departure Order and to be
Allowed to Travel.
On 26 November 2001, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s Motion to
Dismiss and ordered the prosecution to conduct a reinvestigation of the case
with respect to petitioner. In a Memorandum dated 6 January 2003, the SPO
who conducted the reinvestigation recommended to the Ombudsman that
the indictment against petitioner be reversed for lack of probable cause.
However, the Ombudsman, in an Order dated 10 March 2003, disapproved
the Memorandum and directed the Office of the Special Prosecutor to
proceed with the prosecution of the criminal case. Petitioner filed a Motion
for Reconsideration of the Order of the Ombudsman.
In a Resolution promulgated on 16 May 2003, the Sandiganbayan scheduled
the arraignment of petitioner on 24 July 2003. However, in view of the
pending motion for reconsideration of the order of the Ombudsman, the
arraignment was reset to 2 October 2003.
In a Manifestation dated 24 September 2003, the SPO informed the
Sandiganbayan of the Ombudsman’s denial of petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration. On even date, the prosecution filed an Ex-Parte Motion to
Admit Amended Information. During the 2 October 2003 hearing, this ex-
parte motion was withdrawn by the prosecution with the intention of filing a
Motion for Leave to Admit Amended Information. The scheduled
arraignment of petitioner was reset to 1 December 2003.7
On 7 October 2003, the prosecution filed a Motion for Leave to Admit
Amended Information. The Amended Information reads:
The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer I of the Office of Special
Prosecutor, hereby accuses RAMON A. ALBERT, FAVIO D. SAYSON, and
ARTURO S. ASUMBRADO for (sic) violation of Section 3(e) R.A. 3019, as
amended, committed as follows:
That in (sic) or about May 1990 and sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in
the City of Davao, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, accused RAMON A. ALBERT, a public officer, being then the President
of the National Home Mortgage and Finance Corporation, occupying the said
position with a salary grade above 27, while in the performance of his official
function, committing the offense in relation to his office, taking advantage of
his official position, conspiring and confederating with accused FAVIO D.
SAYSON, then the Project Director of CODE Foundation Inc. and accused
ARTURO S. ASUMBRADO, then the President of the Buhangin Residents and
Employees Association for Development, Inc., acting with evident bad faith
and manifest partiality and/or gross inexcusable negligence, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and criminally cause undue injury to the
government and public interest, enter and make it appear in Tax Declaration
Nos. D-3-1-7691 and D-3-1-7692 that two parcels of real property particularly
described in the Certificate of Titles Nos. T-151920 and T-151921 are
residential lands which Tax Declarations accused submitted to the NHMFC
when in truth and in fact, as accused well knew, the two pieces of real
property covered by Certificate of Titles Nos. T-151920 and T-151921 are
agricultural land, and by reason of accused’s misrepresentation, the NHMFC
released the amount of ₱4,535,400.00 which is higher than the loanable
amount the land could command being agricultural, thus causing undue
injury to the government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.8
Petitioner opposed the motion, alleging that the amendment made on the
information is substantial and, therefore, not allowed after arraignment.
The Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
In its Resolution of 10 February 2004,9 the Sandiganbayan granted the
prosecution’s Motion to Admit Amended Information. At the outset, the
Sandiganbayan explained that "gross neglect of duty" which falls under
Section 3(f) of RA 3019 is different from "gross inexcusable negligence" under
Section 3(e), and held thus:
In an information alleging gross neglect of duty, it is not a requirement that
such neglect or refusal causes undue injury compared to an information
alleging gross inexcusable negligence where undue injury is a constitutive
element. A change to this effect constitutes substantial amendment
considering that the possible defense of the accused may divert from the one
originally intended.
It may be considered however, that there are three modes by which the
offense for Violation of Section 3(e) may be committed in any of the
following:
1. Through evident bad faith;
2. Through manifest partiality;
3. Through gross inexcusable negligence.
Proof of the existence of any of these modes in connection with the
prohibited acts under said section of the law should suffice to warrant
conviction.10
However, the Sandiganbayan also held that even granting that the
amendment of the information be formal or substantial, the prosecution
could still effect the same in the event that the accused had not yet
undergone a permanent arraignment. And since the arraignment of
petitioner on 13 March 2001 was merely "provisional," then the prosecution
may still amend the information either in form or in substance.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the
Sandiganbayan in its Resolution of 3 May 2004. Hence this petition.
The Issues
The issues raised in this petition are:
1. WHETHER THE SANDIGANBAYAN GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ADMITTING THE
AMENDED INFORMATION; AND
2. WHETHER THE SANDIGANBAYAN GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN FURTHER
PROCEEDING WITH THE CASE DESPITE THE VIOLATION OF THE RIGHT OF THE
ACCUSED TO A SPEEDY TRIAL.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit.
On Whether the Sandiganbayan
Should Admit the Amended Information
Section 14 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
Sec. 14. Amendment or Substitution.-- A complaint or information may be
amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before
the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal
amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done
without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.
xxx
Petitioner contends that under the above section, only a formal amendment
of the information may be made after a plea. The rule does not distinguish
between a plea made during a "provisional" or a "permanent" arraignment.
Since petitioner already entered a plea of "not guilty" during the 13 March
2001 arraignment, then the information may be amended only in form.
An arraignment is that stage where in the mode and manner required by the
rules, an accused, for the first time, is granted the opportunity to know the
precise charge that confronts him.11 The accused is formally informed of the
charges against him, to which he enters a plea of guilty or not guilty. As an
indispensable requirement of due process, an arraignment cannot be
regarded lightly or brushed aside peremptorily.12
The practice of the Sandiganbayan of conducting "provisional" or
"conditional" arraignments is not sanctioned by the Revised Internal Rules of
the Sandiganbayan or by the regular Rules of Court.13 However, in People v.
Espinosa,14 this Court tangentially recognized such practice, provided that the
alleged conditions attached thereto should be "unmistakable, express,
informed and enlightened." Moreover, the conditions must be expressly
stated in the Order disposing of the arraignment; otherwise, the arraignment
should be deemed simple and unconditional.15
In the present case, the arraignment of petitioner is reflected in the Minutes
of the Sandiganbayan Proceedings dated 13 March 2001 which merely states
that the "[a]ccused when arraigned entered a plea of not guilty. The Motion
to Travel is granted subject to the usual terms and conditions imposed on
accused persons travelling (sic) abroad."16 In the Resolution of 16 April
2001,17 the Sandiganbayan mentioned the arraignment of petitioner and
granted his Urgent Motion to Amend Motion to Lift Hold Departure Order
and to be Allowed to Travel, setting forth the conditions attendant thereto
which, however, were limited only to petitioner’s itinerary abroad; the
setting up of additional bailbond; the required appearance before the clerk
of court; and written advice to the court upon return to the Philippines.
Nothing on record is indicative of the provisional or conditional nature of the
arraignment. Hence, following the doctrine laid down in Espinosa, the
arraignment of petitioner should be deemed simple and unconditional.
The rules mandate that after a plea is entered, only a formal amendment of
the Information may be made but with leave of court and only if it does not
prejudice the rights of the accused.
Petitioner contends that replacing "gross neglect of duty" with "gross
inexcusable negligence" is a substantial amendment of the Information
which is prejudicial to his rights. He asserts that under the amended
information, he has to present evidence that he did not act with "gross
inexcusable negligence," evidence he was not required to present under the
original information. To bolster his argument, petitioner refers to the 10
February 2004 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan which ruled that the change
"constitutes substantial amendment considering that the possible defense of
the accused may divert from the one originally intended."18lawphil.net
We are not convinced.
Petitioner is charged with violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 which provides
as follows:
SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers.— In addition to acts or omissions
of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall
constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to
be unlawful:
xxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or
giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference
in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This
provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government
corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other
concessions.
This crime has the following essential elements:19
1. The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative,
judicial or official functions;
2. He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith
or gross inexcusable negligence; and
3. His action caused any undue injury to any party, including the
government, or gave any private party unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.
The second element provides the different modes by which the crime may be
committed, that is, through "manifest partiality," "evident bad faith," or
"gross inexcusable negligence."20 In Uriarte v. People,21 this Court explained
that Section 3(e) of RA 3019 may be committed either by dolo, as when the
accused acted with evident bad faith or manifest partiality, or by culpa, as
when the accused committed gross inexcusable negligence. There is
"manifest partiality" when there is a clear, notorious, or plain inclination or
predilection to favor one side or person rather than another.22 "Evident bad
faith" connotes not only bad judgment but also palpably and patently
fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious
wrongdoing for some perverse motive or ill will.23 "Evident bad faith"
contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or
with some motive or self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes.24 "Gross
inexcusable negligence" refers to negligence characterized by the want of
even the slightest care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is
a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with conscious
indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be affected.25
The original information filed against petitioner alleged that he acted with
"evident bad faith and manifest partiality and or (sic) gross neglect of duty."
The amended information, on the other hand, alleges that petitioner acted
with "evident bad faith and manifest partiality and/or gross inexcusable
negligence." Simply, the amendment seeks to replace "gross neglect of duty"
with "gross inexcusable negligence." Given that these two phrases fall under
different paragraphs of RA 3019—specifically, "gross neglect of duty" is
under Section 3(f) while "gross inexcusable negligence" is under Section 3(e)
of the statute—the question remains whether or not the amendment is
substantial and prejudicial to the rights of petitioner.
The test as to when the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the
amendment of a complaint or information is when a defense under the
complaint or information, as it originally stood, would no longer be available
after the amendment is made, and when any evidence the accused might
have, would be inapplicable to the complaint or information as
amended.26 On the other hand, an amendment which merely states with
additional precision something which is already contained in the original
information and which, therefore, adds nothing essential for conviction for
the crime charged is an amendment to form that can be made at
anytime.27lavvphil

In this case, the amendment entails the deletion of the phrase "gross neglect
of duty" from the Information. Although this may be considered a substantial
amendment, the same is allowable even after arraignment and plea being
beneficial to the accused.28 As a replacement, "gross inexcusable negligence"
would be included in the Information as a modality in the commission of the
offense. This Court believes that the same constitutes an amendment only in
form. In Sistoza v. Desierto,29 the Information charged the accused with
violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, but specified only "manifest partiality"
and "evident bad faith" as the modalities in the commission of the offense
charged. "Gross inexcusable negligence" was not mentioned in the
Information. Nonetheless, this Court held that the said section is committed
by dolo or culpa, and although the Information may have alleged only one of
the modalities of committing the offense, the other mode is deemed
included in the accusation to allow proof thereof.30 In so ruling, this Court
applied by analogy the pronouncement in Cabello v. Sandiganbayan31 where
an accused charged with willful malversation was validly convicted of the
same felony of malversation through negligence when the evidence merely
sustained the latter mode of perpetrating the offense. The Court held that a
conviction for a criminal negligent act can be had under an information
exclusively charging the commission of a willful offense upon the theory that
the greater includes the lesser offense. Thus, we hold that the inclusion of
"gross inexcusable negligence" in the Information, which merely alleges
"manifest partiality" and "evident bad faith" as modalities in the commission
of the crime under Section 3(e) of RA 3019, is an amendment in form.

On Whether Petitioner’s
Right to a Speedy Trial was Violated

Petitioner contends that the complaint-affidavit against him was filed on 15

June 1992, but it was resolved by the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao
only on 26 February 1999, or after a period of almost seven (7) years. Four
(4) years thereafter, the SPO, upon reinvestigation of the case,
recommended that the case against petitioner be dismissed for lack of
probable cause, but this recommendation was denied by the Ombudsman. A
Motion for Leave to Admit Amended Information was later filed by the
prosecution and granted by the Sandiganbayan in the questioned Resolution
of 10 February 2004. Thus, petitioner maintains that it took the Office of the
Ombudsman twelve (12) years since the initial filing of the complaint-
affidavit in 1992 to charge accused with the offense under the Amended
Information, in violation of petitioner’s right to a speedy trial.

Petitioner’s contentions are futile.

The right of an accused to a speedy trial is guaranteed under Section 16,

Article III of the Philippine Constitution which provides: "All persons shall
have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-
judicial, or administrative bodies." This right, however, is deemed violated
only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and
oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked
for and secured; or when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of
time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried.32 A simple
mathematical computation of the period involved is not sufficient. We
concede that judicial proceedings do not exist in a vacuum and must contend
with the realities of everyday life.33

After reviewing the records of the case, we believe that the right of
petitioner to a speedy trial was not infringed upon. The issue on the
inordinate delay in the resolution of the complaint-affidavit filed against
petitioner and his co-accused and the filing of the original Information
against petitioner was raised in petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss, and was duly
addressed by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution denying the said motion. It
appears that the said delays were caused by the numerous motions for
extension of time to file various pleadings and to reproduce documents filed
by petitioner’s co-accused, and that no actual preliminary investigation was
conducted on petitioner. The Sandiganbayan properly held that a
reinvestigation of the case as to petitioner was in order. Although the
reinvestigation inadvertently resulted to further delay in the proceedings,
this process could not have been dispensed with as it was done for the
protection of the rights of petitioner himself. It is well-settled that although
the conduct of an investigation may hold back the progress of a case, it is
necessary so that the accused's right will not be compromised or sacrificed at
the altar of expediency.34 The succeeding events appear to be parts of a valid
and regular course of judicial proceedings not attended by delays which can
be considered vexatious, capricious, oppressive, or unjustified. Hence,
petitioner’s contention of violation of his right to a speedy trial must fail.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. We AFFIRM the Resolutions dated 10

February 2004 and 3 May 2004 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No.
25231.

SO ORDERED.