Hobbes

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Introduction – and Hobbes on Freedom

(1) Introduction to Hobbes

(2) Freedom (in the political sense)
(3) Freedom (in the psychological sense)

Introduction to Hobbes

• Context: The 17th century was an era of scientific discoveries and philosophical renewal.
The most famous personalities (some of which formed a network in which Hobbes par-
took): Francis Bacon († 1626), René Descartes (1596–1649), Hugo Grotius (1583–1645),
Baruch Spinoza (1632–1677), Galileo Galilei († 1642), Isaac Newton (* 1642), Leibniz
(1646–1716)
• 1588 Thomas Hobbes is born in Westport (Wiltshire). (About 80 miles east of London.)
• 1608 Hobbes graduates from Oxford (20 years old!) and becomes a tutor of a wealthy
family
• 1634 Visits Galileo in Florence and Mersenne (scientist, philosopher and theologian,
friend of Descartes) in Paris.
• 1641 Mersenne invites Hobbes to write objections to Descartes Meditations.
• 1646 Begins work on the Leviathan.
• 1651 Publishes the Leviathan.
• 1679 Dies on December 4.
• 1683 Oxford condemns and burns De cive and Leviathan.
Hobbes thinks of himself as a innovator or reformer of philosophy, particularly of political
philosophy. (Therefore a rejection of the “School”)
Why do we read Hobbes, Leviathan?—This book shaped much of modern political thought.
Hobbes pursues somewhat the ideas of Machiavelli.
What is the Leviathan about?—Man as such is evil (cf. Machiavelli), and by himself, man
would find himself in a “war of all against all.” For the sake of his own security, he renounces
on part of his power and entrusts it to the sovereign, i. e. the state or government (“com-
monwealth”), which has absolute power and protects the individual.
Ch. 28.27, p. 210

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Why the name “Leviathan”?— In the Bible, Job 41:33–34, Leviathan appears as “King of the
Proud.” For Hobbes, Leviathan represents the powerful governor. He is “King of the
Proud,” because it is man’s pride (and selfishness) that compels him to submit himself to a
government.
Hobbes tried to develop his philosophical and political thought with a strict scientific
method. Thus he gives a lot of weight to definition of terms. Then he draws conclusions
from these definitions, showing what they imply.

Freedom (Chapters 21 & 6)

Freedom in the political sense:

Hobbes’s understanding of Liberty and Freedom:

• Freedom is absence of impediments and may be applied to in- 21.1, p. 136
animate creatures, irrational creatures and rational creatures.
(We could call this freedom in the political sense)
• A free-man is he who—due to his strength and intelligence—is 21.2, 1st sentence, p. 136
not hindered in doing what he wants to do.
• Freedom is compatible with necessity: man acts voluntarily when 21.4, p. 137
his actions proceed from his will [without impediment], but his
will and desire and inclination proceed from some cause, which goes back to God. Thus
our actions proceed from necessity.

Does that make sense? Can we still call it freedom if all our
actions are necessary?
In other words: Is free will compatible with determinism?

Determinism and Free will

Determinism is true Determinism is false

Compatibilists: Incompatibilist Incompatibilist “Luck argument”

there still is FW skeptics: libertarians: (against libertarians):
there is no FW there is FW “free” choices result
from luck, not FW

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Freedom in the psychological sense:

What does Hobbes think about what we might call freedom in the psychological sense?
Hobbes actually has a rather mechanistic understanding of freewill:

Hobbes has a naturalistic explanation of deliberation. Acts of will 6.49, p. 33

result from deliberation, and deliberation is some sort of bundle of appetites, aversions,
hopes and fears. (Deliberation is a passion, cf. 6.55; beasts also deliberate, 6.51.)
The will is the last appetite in deliberation. 6.53, p. 33

How do we decide between good and bad? This depends entirely on 6.57–58, p. 34

the consequences. We are to foresee the chain of consequences. When the good conse-
quences outweigh the evil ones, the consequences on the whole are to be considered good.
A good deliberation consists in a good foresight of the consequences of action. This leads to
success. Felicity [= happiness] consists in success. Does it? [Objection: then why do success-
ful people sometimes commit suicide?]

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Moral Realism

(1) Hobbes’s view of ethics / moral philosophy

(2) The inclination to power
(3) The worth of a human being
(4) The “natural condition” of man

Premise: What is Ethics, in Hobbes’s View?

As is typical for his time (not only for secular philosophy, but also for the catholic moral
teaching of this period), the focus is not on the virtues and on the attainment of happiness,
but on obligations imposed on us by a “law of nature,” see 15.40, p. 100: moral philosophy is
the science of the laws of nature. (The next class will deal with law of nature).
The reason for this might lie in the idea that the fundamental inclinations are not good.

Ultimate end / Greatest good

There is no ultimate end, because happiness does not consist in the repose of mind, but in a
continuous progress of desire, from one thing to another. (11.1, p. 57)

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Moral virtues
No systematic account is given of the moral virtues. (Chapter 8 is about intellectual virtues.)
In any event, Hobbes thinks that the moral virtues have nothing to do with the mean of pas-
sions (15.40, p. 100), and the “science of virtue and vice” really comes down to the doctrine
of laws of nature.
Not surprisingly, then, important Aristotelian virtues are not prominent in Hobbes:
• “intemperance” is not discussed at all;
• if you look into the index and search for all the places where he talks about courage, you
will easily see that he has no systematic account of courage, let alone of the virtues.
Furthermore, virtue is understood as an eminence (8.1, p. 38).
This idea is different from Aristotle: For Aristotle, virtue consists in an excellence.—Not
in the sense of an eminence over others, but as an excellence in comparison to the natural
dispositions that are not informed by good habituation.

Power and Worth (chapter 10)

For Aristotle, the principle that motivates all actions is happiness.

What is it for Hobbes?

The most general inclination of man power. 11.2, p. 58

Definition: “The power of man . . . is his present means to obtain 10.1, p. 50

some future apparent good. . . .”

Power lies in:
• Having servants (10.3)
• Having friends (10.3)
• Riches joined with liberality, because it procures friends and servants (10.4)
• Reputation of power is power (10.5)
• Good success ⇒ reputation of wisdom or good fortune ⇒ people fear or rely on that
person (10.8)
• Reputation of prudence ⇒ We commit the government of ourselves more willingly to a
prudent man (10.10) [Note: “reputation of prudence” = Machiavelli: to seem to be just,
Prince, ch. 18, p. 55]
• Nobility (where it is considered a privilege) (10.11)
• Eloquence
Hobbes even understands the worth of a human being in terms of power:

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Worth of man: = his price, “so much as would be given for the use 10.16, p. 51
of his power,” and dependent on the need and judgment of an-
other.
Dignity = the “public worth,” i.e., the value the state gives to an indi- 10.18, p. 52

vidual.
Honorable: “whatsoever possession, action, or quality is an argu- 10.37 & 10.40, p. 53

ment and sign of power.”

Good fortune is honorable (as a sign of the favor of God). Virtues (magnanimity, liberal-
ity, hope, courage, confidence) are honorable, because they are a sign of power.
What Hobbes does not say is whether there is an intrinsic value to the human being!

The Natural Condition (“all against all”) (Chapter 13)

Premise: All men are more or less equal, both in strength of body (the weakest can still kill
the strongest) and intellectual capacities (prudence is experience; equal time bestows equal
experience on men). (13.1–2, pp. 74–75).
If men desire the same thing, which they cannot both have, they 13.3, p. 75

become enemies.

What would Aristotle propose in such a situation?

For Aristotle, such a situation calls for the virtue of justice, for the question is not what I
want to have, but what I am entitled to have: “to each according to his deserts.”
We will see that he even goes a step further than that: a noble person will renounce on
his advantage for the sake of the other; thereby he gains nobility, while the other has the
material advantage (EN 9.8). (But Hobbes seems to be a thoroughgoing materialist, so it
seems that for him all good [that is, desirable] things are material things.)
From this equality → diffidence → need for security → anticipation: 13.4, p. 75

the use of force and ruses to master the other men.

Since such dominion over the others is necessary, “it ought to be allowed him” [it is ok].
Summary: the principal causes of quarrel are competition [13.3], 13.6, p. 76

diffidence [13.4], glory [13.5].

Without a common power, there is a “war of all against all.” 13.8, p. 76

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 He expresses this also in the famous quote: homo homini lupus—“Man is a wolf to man.”1
This situation of war has a disastrous effect on human activity, from 13.9, p. 76

the most basic (agriculture) to the most advanced (sciences). In the continuous fear and
danger of violent death, the life of man is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.”
Where there is no common power, there is no law ⇒ there is no justice or injustice (13.13,
p. 78.)

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The Origin of the State in a Contract (or “Covenant”)

(1) Natural laws and contracts

(2) Justice
(3) Hobbes’s “contract theory of State”

Natural laws and Rights of nature

By nature, man is allowed to do anything whatsoever to preserve his nature, for it is thus that
Hobbes defines the “right of nature”:
“The Right of Nature, which writers commonly call jus naturale, is 14.1, p. 79

the liberty each man hath to use his own power, as he will himself, for the preservation of
his own nature, that is to say, of his own life; and consequently, of doing anything which, in
his own judgment and reason, he shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto.”
For Hobbes, a right indicates some kind of freedom, whereas a law implies some obligation.
Accordingly, the “law of nature” is this:
A Law of Nature (lex naturalis) is a precept or general rule, found 14.3, p. 79

out by reason, by which a man is forbidden to do that which is destructive of his life, or ta-
keth away the means of preserving the same; and to omit that by which he thinketh it may
be best preserved.
Why is this important? Because from this it follows that, if need be, one has a right to kill
another. In the natural condition, “every man has a right to everything, even to one an-
other’s body. (14.4, p. 80)
⇒ there is no security

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From the proverb by Titus Maccius Plautus (254–184 B.C.), Asinaria 2.4.88: “Lupus est homo homini. . . .”
Hobbes cites it in De cive (Epistola dedicatoria).

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Hobbes’s List of the Laws of Nature

From the lack of security follows the 1st law of nature: “to seek peace and follow it.” (14.4,
p. 80)
⇒ 2nd law of nature:
– to be willing to renounce on one’s right to all things for the sake of peace,
– and to content oneself with the liberty that others would grant him or her (14.5,
p. 80)
Terminology:
• Renouncing vs. transferring rights (14.7):
– Renouncing: he does not care to whose advantage will be his right
– Transferring: he wants (a) specific person(s) to benefit
• Contract = a mutual transfer one’s right (14.9, see also 14.16)
• A covenant = when one of the contractors delivers and waits for the other to deliver
(14.11)
• 3rd (“justice”): “that men perform their covenants made” (15.1, p. 89)
• 4th (“gratitude”): I should act so as not to disappoint those who are generous to me.
(paraphrase)(15.16, p. 95)
• 5th (“complaisance”): everyone should “strive to accommodate himself to the rest.”
(15.17, p. 95)
• 6th (“pardon”): pardon the offenses of those who ask for pardon. (15.18, p. 96)
• 7th (“revenge”): retribution of evil is to be with an eye to the good to come rather than to
the past evil (15.19, p. 96) ⇒ punishment should be for the purpose of correction only
. . . and so forth; there are 12 more, for the total of 19.

Some Comments about the Laws of Nature in General

All of the laws of nature come down to the “Golden Rule”: “Do not that to another, which
thou wouldst not have done to thyself.” (15.35, p. 99)
Interestingly, Hobbes thinks that the laws of nature are eternal and that there are things
(such as injustice, pride, etc.) that are always bad. (15.38, p. 99–100)

Justice (15.1–15)
Justice is “the constant will of giving to every man his own” [i.e., what is due to him] (= the
definition of the scholastics that Hobbes appropriates). (15.3, p. 89)
• Now where there is no “own” (i.e., no property), there is no injustice;
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• Where there is no state (“commonwealth”), there is no property, because in that situa-
tion all men have right to all things (cf. 14.4)
⇒ According to 15.3, the nature of justice consists in keeping valid covenants (and presup-
poses the existence of a common power, see also 13.13)
– Injustice is the non-performance of a covenant (15.2).
– Recall that the third law of nature is that men perform their covenants (15.1)

Hobbes’s Contract Theory of State (or the Cause of a Commonwealth)

In order to get ourselves “out from that miserable condition of 17.1, p. 106

war,” people need to be tied by the fear of punishment to the performance of their cove-
nants and of the laws of nature. ⇒ The need for the state (“commonwealth”).
“Covenants without the sword are but words, and of no strength to secure a man at all.”
Why? – because the laws of nature are contrary to our natural inclinations. (17.2)
How is this commonwealth created? 17.13, p. 109

• People must confer all their power upon one man or an assembly of men
• They submit their will and judgment
Thereby they will be “real unity,” which is greater than by consent or concord.
Hobbes defines the commonwealth: “And in him consisteth the Essence of the Common-
wealth; which (to define it,) is one person, of whose acts a great multitude, by mutual covenants one
with another, have made themselves every one the author, to the end he may use the strength and means
of them all, as he shall think expedient, for their peace and common defence.” (17.13)
Aristotle is skeptical about such unity, see his critique of Plato – he argues against his prem-
ise that “the greater unity of the state, the better”:
• The nature of a state is plurality; if it becomes a unity, it is no longer a state, but a family
or an individual. (Pol. 2.2.1261a15–23)
• A state is made up of different kinds of men (1261a23) ⇒ a city is not by nature one
(1261b6)
• Unity is not created by making them equal, but by the principle of compensation, that is,
by justice. (1261a24–31)
• For the sake of self-sufficiency, a lesser degree of unity is more desirable than a greater
(1261b10–15).

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A commonwealth can come about either by force (“commonwealth by acquisition”) or by
agreement (“commonwealth by institution”). (17.15) He talks about the “commonwealth by
institution” in chapter 18.

Commonwealth by Institution
The text of the Opera latina (OL) is clearer than that of the English 18.1 note 1, p. 110
edition:
• “A commonwealth is instituted when men, coming together voluntarily,
• agree, every one with every one,
• that they will all obey whatever man or assembly the greater part, by their votes, shall give
the right of bearing the person of them all.
• Each of them, then, is obliged to obey him whom the greater part elected, and is to be
considered the author of all his actions, whether he voted for him or not.” (OL 18.1)
On account of this transfer of rights, the sovereign has “supreme power” (OL) over the
people. (18.2)
“Disclaimer”: It is not lawful to make such a new state when one is obliged by an existing
state, such as by a monarchy. (18.3)

Sovereign Power
st
Once by means of a covenant the people have transferred their 1 ¶ of 18.4, p. 111

rights to the sovereign, the sovereign cannot breach the covenant [by definition], and the
subjects they cannot be freed from their subjection. (Cf. 21.7)
In addition to these two points . . .
• The subjects cannot change the form of government (18.3)
• Sovereign power cannot be forfeited (18.4)
. . . Hobbes makes these claims:
• It is unjust to resist the Sovereign who was elected by a majority (18.5)
• Whatever the Sovereign does cannot2 be an injury to any of his subjects ⇒ it is unjust to
accuse the Sovereign of any injustice (18.6)
• Whatever the Sovereign does is unpunishable (18.7)
• The Sovereign has the right of censorship (18.9)
• He has the right of judicature (18.11)
• Of making peace and war (18.12)

2
“Cannot” in the sense of “it is impossible / unthinkable” not in the sense of “should not.”

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• Of choosing counselors, ministers, etc. (18.13)
“. . . nothing the sovereign representative can do to a subject, on what pretence soever, can
properly be called injustice, or injury, because every subject is author of every act the sover-
eign doth, so that he never wanteth right to anything (otherwise than as he himself is the
subject of God, and bound thereby to observe the laws of nature).” (21.7, p. 138) (In other
words, the sovereign cannot be considered reprehensible with regard to the subject’s rights,
no matter what he does to them.)

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