BERMEJO VS.

BARRIOS
GR NO. 23614
February 27, 1970

DOCTRINE: Prospective application of the Rules of Court

FACTS:

- In G.R. No. L-23614, petitioner Pedro M. Bermejo and Julia "Doe" (her identity at the time was unknown) were charged in the city
court of Roxas City, on August 22, 1963, of the crime of falsification of public or official document in an information filed by the city
fiscal.
- That on or about the 25th day of February 1963, in Roxas City, the two accused prepared a document consisting of an amended
petition for habeas corpus stated and made it appear in the amended petition that the same was signed and sworn to by Jovita
Carmorin as one of the petitioners when in truth and in fact the said Jovita Carmorin never signed and swore to it, because it was in
fact the accused Julia "Doe" who signed and swore to that petition as Julia Carmorin.
- relying on the certification of the city fiscal that a preliminary investigation had been conducted the City Judge, Hon. Isidro O. Barrios,
issued, on August 24, 1963, an order for the arrest of accused Bermejo.
- Upon arraignment, Bermejo filed a motion to quash the information alleging in substance: (1) that the information did not charge an
offense because the amended petition for habeas corpus, allegedly falsified, is not a document contemplated under the provisions
of Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code; (2) that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over his person because the warrant issued
for his arrest was illegal, Judge Barrios having issued the same without first examining the witnesses under oath as required under
RA 3828.
- respondent City Judge denied the motion to quash
- MR filed by Bermejo -> denied; lack of merit -> certiorari and prohibition naming City Judge Isidro and City Fiscal Abela for GAD
- Petitioner Bermejo contends that notwithstanding his request to be present at the preliminary investigation, the same was conducted
in his absence or behind his back thus denying him his day in court.
- He also argued that Sec. 14, Rule 112 of ROC was applicable to him.

ISSUE:

W/N the petitioner has been denied his day in court

RULING:

NO. On March 11, 1963, a subpoena was issued to Atty. Pedro M. Bermejo requiring him to appear at the office of the city fiscal of Roxas
City on March 14, 1963 in an investigation. This subpoena was received by Bermejo on March 12, 1963, and on the same day he sent a
letter to the city fiscal, which was received by the latter in the afternoon of the same day, requesting that the investigation be postponed
to March 19, 1963. Bermejo was not entirely blameless if the preliminary investigation was conducted in his absence. It was he himself
who set the date of the investigation in his request for postponement, but he did not bother to come on the date he fixed

Furthermore, even assuming that the city fiscal did not notify petitioners, but had conducted the preliminary investigations ex parte,
their rights to due process could not have been violated for they are not entitled as of right to preliminary investigation. The numerous
authorities supporting this view are not rendered obsolete, as claimed by petitioners, because Section 14, Rule 112 of the new Rules of
Court invoked by them has no application in their cases, it appearing that the new Rules of Court took effect on January 1, 1964 while
the preliminary investigations conducted by the city fiscal were conducted in 1963. The Rules of Court are not penal statutes, and they
cannot be given retroactive effect.

The contention of Bermejo is untenable. In the case of U.S. v. Orera,6 a "document" is defined as a deed,
instrument or other duly authorized paper by which something is proved, evidenced or set forth. In U.S. v.
Asensi,7 this Court held that any instrument authorized by a notary public or a competent public official, with the
solemnities required by law, is a public document. Section 38, Rule 123 of the old Rules of Court, 8 enumerates
the following as public writings:
 (a) The written acts or records of the acts of the sovereign authority, of official bodies
and tribunals, and of public officers, legislative, judicial and executive, whether of the
Philippines, or of a foreign country;

(b) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private writings.

The same principle also obtains in the United States, that "defendant's pleadings and papers, which
were involved in civil actions and which were in custody of county clerk as ex-oficio clerk of superior
court in which action was pending, were 'public documents' and were within scope of subject matter
of statute making alteration of court records an offense."9 Considering that the petition for habeas
corpus (Special Proceedings No. V-2669) alleged the illegal confinement, or deprivation of liberty, of one
Soterania Carmorin, and that said petition was duly subscribed and sworn to before Clerk of Court
Leopoldo B. Dorado and filed with the Court of First Instance of Capiz, forming, therefore, a part of the
court records in said proceedings, it cannot be disputed that said petition is a public or official document as
contemplated in Articles 171 and 172 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner Bermejo, therefore, cannot
say that he committed no crime if it can be shown that, as charged in the information, he connived or
conspired with a certain Julia "Doe" in falsifying said petition by making it appear that Jovita Carmorin
placed her thumbmark therein when in fact she did not do so.

IN THE MATTER TO DECLARE IN CONTEMPT OF

COURT HON. SIMEON A. DATUMANONG in the latter’s
capacity as Secretary of the Department of Public Works
and Highways. JIMMIE F. TEL-EQUEN
G.R. No. 150274
August 4, 2006

DOCTRINE: Applicability to pending actions; retroactivity

FACTS:
- The Ombudsman Task Force on Public Works and Highways filed with the Office of the Ombudsman an administrative
complaint for dishonesty, falsification of official documents, grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty, violation of office
rules and regulations, and conduct prejudicial to the service against petitioner Tel-Equen and several others, relative to the
anomalous payment of P553,900.00 of the bailey bridge components owned by the govt.
- Administrative Adjudication Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman found respondents guilty
- On March 2, 2000, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification and two co-accused guilty as charged and dismissed
them from the service Petitioner, together with his two co-accused, appealed from the decision to the SC.
- While appeal was still pending, Secretary Datumanong issued the assailed Memorandum Order dismissing the petitioners
from service.
- Hence, the instant petition to cite Secretary Datumanong in contempt of court. Petitioner contends that in issuing the
Memorandum Order despite knowledge of the pendency of G.R. No. 144694, Secretary Datumanong committed a
contumacious act, a gross and blatant display of abuse of discretion and an unlawful interference with the proceedings
before the Court.
- Under A.O. No. 07 dated 10 April 1990 particularly Sec. 7 thereof, except “when the penalty is public censure or reprimand,
suspension of not more than one month, or a fine not equivalent to one month salary, the decision shall be final and
unappealable. In all other cases, the decision shall become final after the expiration of ten (10) days from receipt thereof
by the respondent, unless a motion for reconsideration or petition for certiorari, shall have been filed by him as prescribed
in Section 27 of R.A. 6770.”
 It is clear from the above provision that the punishment imposed upon petitioner is not among those listed as final and
unappealable An appeal timely filed, such as the one filed in the instant case, will stay the immediate implementation
of the decision.
ISSUE:
W/N Sec. Datumanong should be cited for contempt of court
RULING:
NO. The issuance of the Memorandum Order by Secretary Datumanong was not a contumacious conduct tending, directly or
indirectly, to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice. A conduct, to be contumacious, implies willfulness,
bad faith or with deliberate intent to cause injustice, which is not so in the case at bar.
At most, it may be considered only an error of judgment or a result of confusion considering the different rules regarding
execution of decisions pending appeal.
The remedy of the petitioner is not to file a petition to cite him in contempt of court but to elevate the error to the higher court
for review and correction. However, two events supervened since the filing of this petition that would support its dismissal.
First, on March 28, 2005, the Court in G.R. No. 144694 affirmed the decisions of the Court of Appeals and Administrative
Adjudication Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman ordering petitioner dismissed from the service for dishonesty,
falsification of public documents, misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Second, Section 7,
Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman was amended by Administrative Order No. 17 wherein
the pertinent provision on the execution of decisions pending appeal is now essentially similar to Section 47 of the Uniform
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service thus:
“An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. In case the penalty is suspension or removal and the
respondent wins such appeal, he shall be considered as having been under preventive suspension and shall be paid
the salary and such other emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the suspension or removal.”
Well-settled is the rule that procedural laws are construed to be applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the
time of their passage, and are deemed retroactive in that sense and to that extent.
As a general rule, the retroactive application of procedural laws cannot be considered violative of any personal rights
because no vested right may attach to nor arise therefrom. In the case at bar, the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman are clearly procedural and no vested right of the petitioner is violated as he is considered preventively suspended
while his case is on appeal. Moreover, in the event he wins on appeal, he shall be paid the salary and such other emoluments
that he did not receive by reason of the suspension or removal. Besides, there is no such thing as a vested interest in an office,
or even an absolute right to hold office. Excepting constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as regards salary
and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an office.

SEC. 22 ex-post facto law case digest

Go v. Sunbanun - G.R. No. 168240, February 9, 2011
When a procedural rule is amended for the benefit of litigants for the furtherance of the administration of justice, it
shall be retroactively applied to likewise favor actions then pending, as equity delights in equality.
Facts:
In November 2000, respondents filed a suit for damages against defendants, Aurora, her husband Yiu Wai
Sang, and Yiu-Go Employment Agency. The respondents claimed that the spouses occupied the ground floor portion
of their house under a one-year lease contract and had used the premises as the business office of Yiu-Go Employment
Agency. Aurora on the contrary denied all of it and demanded actual damages as she claimed that she works in Hong
Kong on a no-work-no-pay basis and the suit would result in spending airfare and lost earnings. After the respondents
concluded their presentation of evidence, Aurora moved on October 28, 2002 that her testimony be taken by deposition
upon written interrogatories, as she was unsure as to when she could come home to the Philippines considering that her
work schedule as a court interpreter in Hong Kong is erratic. She averred that arrangements have already been made
with the Philippine consulate in Hong Kong to take her deposition. Over the objection of the respondents, the RTC
granted Aurora's motion on November 21, 2002. However, Aurora's deposition was taken only on January 28,
2004 after her follow-up letter dated November 7, 2003 to the Philippine consulate. Before this deposition was taken,
the RTC in its December 1, 2003 Order already deemed the defendants to have waived their right to present their
evidence and considered the case submitted for resolution since more than a year had elapsed from the date the RTC
granted Aurora's motion to have her testimony be taken by deposition. Again, only Aurora moved for
reconsideration and prayed that the December 1, 2003 Order be recalled and instead admit the deposition. She attributed
the delay of her deposition-taking to the consulate's fault, as she was passed from one officer to another or no officer
was available. On January 26, 2004, the RTC rendered judgment finding only Aurora liable and ordering her to pay
moral damages, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs. The trial court disregarded her two-page transcript of
deposition when it received the same on March 5, 2004. Aurora's former counsel of record, Atty. Ycong, belatedly
discovered about this adverse judgment when he received from respondents' counsel a Motion to Direct Issuance of
Entry of Judgment and Writ of Execution on March 16, 2004. It turned out that although he had already previously
informed the court of his new office address, the court mistakenly sent the January 26, 2004 Decision to his former
office address. He raised this in his opposition to the motion filed by the respondents. Finding this point meritorious,
the court denied respondents' motion, ruling that the judgment against Aurora has not yet attained finality as the 15-
day period to appeal, counted from March 16, 2004, has not yet lapsed. Aurora filed her Motion for Reconsideration on
March 31, 2004, the last day to file her appeal. The court in its April 27, 2004 Order denied said motion. Atty. Ycong
received the notice of denial on May 6, 2004, thus giving his client a day left to file her appeal. Explaining that his
client is busy campaigning for elections; and that they have yet to discuss the pros and cons of appealing the case, Atty.
Ycong sought for the relaxation of the procedural rules by filing an extension of 15 days to file Aurora's notice of
appeal.
Atty. Ycong thereafter filed the Notice of Appeal on May 11, 2004.
Rtc denied notice of appeal: defendant-Go’s running for an elective post. Such is no excuse. MR also denied
CA Dismissed petition:

However, the CA on December 8, 2004, dismissed the petition (docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 85897) for being
procedurally flawed, viz:

1) The Verification/Certification of Non-Forum Shopping is signed by only one petitioner without a Special
Power of Attorney/Secretary’s Certificate authorizing her to represent the two (2) other petitioners;

2) The Affidavit of Service shows that respondents were personally served copies of the petition but lacks
explanation why service of the petition with this Court was not done personally (Section 11, Rule 13 of the
Revised Rules of Court);

3) Counsel for petitioners failed to indicate his PTR and IBP numbers;

4) Certified true [sic] copies of the assailed decision dated January 26, 2004 attached to the petition is a mere
photocopy of a certified true copy;

Issue: WON the amended procedural rules shall retroactively apply.

Ruling: Aurora had almost lost her statutory privilege to appeal, but in view of our ruling on Neypes v. Court of
Appeals, 37 we shall grant Aurora's petition. ADT

Our Ruling

The signatures/authorizations of Sang and Yiu-Go Employment Agency in the verification and certification on non-
forum shopping are not necessary.

In filing a certiorari petition, one aggrieved by a court’s judgment, order or resolution must verify his/her petition and
must also attach a sworn certification of non-forum shopping.28 In dismissing Aurora’s petition, the CA cited as one
of its grounds the lack of signatures or authorizations of Sang and Yiu-Go Employment Agency in the verification
and certification of non-forum shopping. Such signatures, however, may be dispensed with as these parties are not
involved in the petition. Although the caption in Aurora’s petition before the CA erroneously included Sang and Yiu-
Go Employment Agency as petitioners, its contents reveal that it is solely Aurora who is the ‘person aggrieved,’ as
she is the one who assailed before the CA the RTC’s Order that denied her notice of appeal and, hence, she should be
the one who should sign the petition. Notably, Aurora is the only one held liable by the trial court for damages and
thus is the one interested in filing an appeal and in elevating the case to the CA. Moreover, only Aurora filed her
answer before the RTC while Sang and Yiu-Go Employment Agency did not file any.
Non-submission of certified true copy of the January 26, 2004 Decision and copies of the Complaint and Answer not
fatal.

Another ground cited by the CA was the non-submission of the certified true copy of the January 26, 2004 Decision
as well as the failure to attach copies of the complaint and answer in Aurora’s petition.

The second paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 65 requires the submission of a certified true copy of the judgment, order
or resolution subject of the petition as well as the submission of copies of all pleadings and documents relevant to the
petition. "The initial determination of what pleadings, documents or order are relevant and pertinent to the petition
rests on the petitioner. [Should the CA opine that additional documents must be submitted together with the petition,
it may] (a) dismiss the petition under the last paragraph of [Section 3,] Rule 46 of the Rules of Court; (b) order the
petitioner to submit the required additional pleadings, documents, or order within a specific period of time; or (c)
order the petitioner to file an amended petition appending thereto the required pleadings, documents or order within a
fixed period."29 We emphasize that not all pleadings and parts of case records are required to be attached, but only
those which are material and pertinent that they may provide the basis for a determination of a prima facie case for
abuse of discretion.30

Thus, we agree with the petitioner that the CA required pleadings

immaterial to the issue presented before it. The questioned subject of certiorari does not touch upon the substantive
merits of the suit for damages against Aurora but actually involves the refusal of the trial court to entertain her notice
of appeal due to late filing. The complaint and answer are not indispensable at all in the resolution of this issue, the
contents of which are already summarized in the January 26, 2004 Decision attached to the petition. Furthermore,
since Aurora’s petition assails the May 12 and June 10, 2004 Orders of the RTC, it is the certified true copies of these
orders that are required to be attached to the petition. On the other hand, photocopy of the January 26, 2004 Decision
will suffice, as this document is material and pertinent to the petition.

Failure to indicate PTR and IBP Official Receipt Numbers not fatal.

The failure of petitioner’s former counsel, Atty. Ycong, to indicate in the petition before the CA his PTR and IBP
numbers for the year 2004 was obviously an oversight. A perusal of the records of the case would show that counsel
had duly paid the required dues for that year and that his PTR and IBP receipt numbers are indicated in the pleadings
he had filed with the RTC.31 Although he omitted to indicate the numbers on Aurora’s CA petition, the same numbers
were nevertheless stated on his Notice of Change of Address, around two months before the appellate court issued the
questioned December 8, 2004 Resolution.

Rules on perfecting appeals must be strictly complied with; liberal application available only under exceptional
circumstances.

Whenever practicable, personal service and personal filing of pleadings are always the preferred modes of service.
Under Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, should one deviate from the general rule, it is mandatory for
him/her to submit a written explanation why the pleading was not personally filed/served. Otherwise, the court has
the discretion to consider the paper as not filed. Petitioner should be aware that a court, in reasonably exercising
discretionary power to dismiss a petition that violated the rule on written explanation for resorting to modes other
than personal service, also has to take into account another factor, i.e., the prima facie merit of the pleading sought to
be expunged for violation of Section 11.32 For this reason, we do not find any grave abuse on the part of the CA in
exercising its discretion to dismiss Aurora’s petition.

Indeed, judicial notice may be taken that personal service is impracticable considering the distance between Cebu and
Manila, and that Musa v. Amor33 supports Aurora’s argument that a written explanation why service was not done
personally might have been superfluous considering the evident distance between the appellate court and the place
where the petition was posted. It must be emphasized, however, that provisions with respect to the rules on the
manner and periods for perfecting appeals are strictly applied and are only relaxed in very exceptional circumstances
on equitable considerations.34 In the case at bar, the reason behind the filing of an extension of time to file her notice
of appeal was not per se, a compelling and a highly exceptional one. Just as it is the lawyer’s duty to safeguard her
client’s interest, it is the responsibility of the client to make herself available to her counsel and open the lines of
communication, even during the busy election period, for their discussions of legal options. She is obliged to be
vigilant in fighting for her cause and in protecting her rights. It is Aurora's duty, "as a client, to be in touch with [her]
counsel so as to be constantly posted about the case. [She] is mandated to inquire from [her] counsel about the status
and progress of the case from time to time and cannot expect that all [she] has to do is sit back, relax and await the
outcome of the case."35 Additionally, "motions for extension are not granted as a matter of right but in the sound
discretion of the court, and lawyers should never presume that their motions for extension or postponement will be
granted or that they will be granted the length of time they pray for." 36

In spite of petitioner’s error, the ‘fresh period rule’ amendment as held in Neypes v. Court of Appeals will be applied
to her benefit

In Neypes we held that a litigant is given another fresh period of 15 days to perfect an appeal after receipt of the order
of denial of his/her motion for reconsideration/new trial before the RTC. We said:

To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to
appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to
file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing
a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.

Henceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the
Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the
Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to
the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The
new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the
order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any
final order or resolution.

"[P]rocedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage,
there being no vested rights in the rules of procedure." Neypes, which we rendered in September 2005, has been
applied retroactively to a number of cases wherein the original period to appeal had already lapsed subsequent to the
denial of the motion for reconsideration. Aurora's situation is no exception, and thus she is entitled to benefit from the
amendment of the procedural rules.

The denial of Aurora's Motion for Reconsideration of the trial court's January 26, 2004 decision was received by her
former counsel on May 6, 2004. Sans her motion for extension to file a notice of appeal, with the fresh period rule
under Neypes, she still has until May 21, 2004 to file her notice of appeal and thus, had timely filed her notice of
appeal on May 11, 2004

NEYPES vs. CA G.R. No. 141524 September 14, 2005 appeal, BP 129, Rule 41, Rules of Court

OCTOBER 6, 2017

FACTS:

Petitioners Neypes, et al. filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of land and/or reconveyance and/or
reversion with preliminary injunction against the Bureau of Forest Development, Bureau of Lands, Land Bank of the
Philippines and the heirs of Bernardo del Mundo.

The trial court dismissed petitioners complaint on the ground that the action had already prescribed. Petitioners
allegedly received a copy of the order of dismissal on March 3, 1998 and, on the 15th day thereafter or on March 18,
1998, filed a motion for reconsideration. On July 1, 1998, the trial court issued another order dismissing the motion
for reconsideration which petitioners received on July 22, 1998. Five days later, on July 27, 1998, petitioners filed a
notice of appeal and paid the appeal fees on August 3, 1998.
 On August 4, 1998, the court a quo denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was filed eight days late.This
was received by petitioners on July 31, 1998. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but this too was denied in
an order dated September 3, 1998.

Via a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65, petitioners assailed the dismissal of the notice of
appeal before the CA.

In the appellate court, petitioners claimed that they had seasonably filed their notice of appeal. They argued
that the 15-day reglementary period to appeal started to run only on July 22, 1998 since this was the day they
received the final order of the trial court denying their motion for reconsideration. When they filed their notice of
appeal on July 27, 1998, only five days had elapsed and they were well within the reglementary period for appeal.

On September 16, 1999, the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the petition.

ISSUE:

WHETHER THE CA ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION AND IN RULING AND AFFIRMING THE
DECISION OR ORDER OF THE RESPONDENT HON. ANTONIO M. ROSALES THAT PETITIONERS
APPEAL WAS FILED OUT OF TIME WHEN PETITIONERS RECEIVED THE LAST OR FINAL ORDER OF
THE COURT ON JULY 22, 1998 AND FILED THEIR NOTICE OF APPEAL ON JULY 27, 1998 AND PAID THE
APPEAL DOCKET FEE ON AUGUST 3, 1998.

RULING:

The foregoing issues essentially revolve around the period within which petitioners should have filed their
notice of appeal.

First and foremost, the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process. It is merely a
statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. Thus, one
who seeks to avail of the right to appeal must comply with the requirements of the Rules. Failure to do so often leads
to the loss of the right to appeal. The period to appeal is fixed by both statute and procedural rules. BP 129, as
amended, provides:

Sec. 39. Appeals. The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of
any court in all these cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final order, resolution, award,
judgment, or decision appealed from. Provided, however, that in habeas corpus cases, the period for appeal shall be
(48) forty-eight hours from the notice of judgment appealed from. x x x

Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:

SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. ― The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from the notice of
the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of
appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from the notice of judgment or final order.

The period to appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No motion for
extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed. (emphasis supplied)

Based on the foregoing, an appeal should be taken within 15 days from the notice of judgment or final order
appealed from.

A final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more for the court to do with
respect to it. It is an adjudication on the merits which, considering the evidence presented at the trial, declares
categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are; or it may be an order or judgment that dismisses an
action.
 Under Rule 41, Section 3, petitioners had 15 days from notice of judgment or final order to appeal the
decision of the trial court. On the 15th day of the original appeal period (March 18, 1998), petitioners did not file a
notice of appeal but instead opted to file a motion for reconsideration. According to the trial court, the MR only
interrupted the running of the 15-day appeal period. It ruled that petitioners, having filed their MR on the last day of
the 15-day reglementary period to appeal, had only one (1) day left to file the notice of appeal upon receipt of the
notice of denial of their MR.

Petitioners, however, argue that they were entitled under the Rules to a fresh period of 15 days from receipt
of the final order or the order dismissing their motion for reconsideration.

In Quelnan and Apuyan, both petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the trial court.
We ruled there that they only had the remaining time of the 15-day appeal period to file the notice of appeal.

We consistently applied this rule in similar cases, premised on the long-settled doctrine that the perfection of
an appeal in the manner and within the period permitted by law is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional. The rule
is also founded on deep-seated considerations of public policy and sound practice that, at risk of occasional error, the
judgments and awards of courts must become final at some definite time fixed by law.

` Prior to the passage of BP 129, Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court read:

Sec. 3. How appeal is taken. Appeal maybe taken by serving upon the adverse party and filing with the trial court
within thirty (30) days from notice of order or judgment, a notice of appeal, an appeal bond, and a record on appeal.
The time during which a motion to set aside the judgment or order or for new trial has been pending shall be
deducted, unless such motion fails to satisfy the requirements of Rule 37.

xxx

In National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority and Authority v. Municipality of Libmanan, however, we
declared that appeal is an essential part of our judicial system and the rules of procedure should not be applied rigidly.
This Court has on occasion advised the lower courts to be cautious about not depriving a party of the right to appeal
and that every party litigant should be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his
cause, free from the constraint of technicalities.

In de la Rosa v. Court of Appeals, we stated that, as a rule, periods which require litigants to do certain acts
must be followed unless, under exceptional circumstances, a delay in the filing of an appeal may be excused on
grounds of substantial justice. There, we condoned the delay incurred by the appealing party due to strong
considerations of fairness and justice.

In setting aside technical infirmities and thereby giving due course to tardy appeals, we have not been
oblivious to or unmindful of the extraordinary situations that merit liberal application of the Rules. In those situations
where technicalities were dispensed with, our decisions were not meant to undermine the force and effectivity of the
periods set by law. But we hasten to add that in those rare cases where procedural rules were not stringently applied,
there always existed a clear need to prevent the commission of a grave injustice. Our judicial system and the courts
have always tried to maintain a healthy balance between the strict enforcement of procedural laws and the guarantee
that every litigant be given the full opportunity for the just and proper disposition of his cause.

The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules in all courts. It has the sole prerogative to
amend, repeal or even establish new rules for a more simplified and inexpensive process, and the speedy
disposition of cases.
 To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal
their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in
the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for
reconsideration.

Henceforth, this fresh period rule shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal Trial
Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of
Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by
certiorari to the Supreme Court.

The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order
denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution.

We thus hold that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal within the fresh period of 15 days,
counted from July 22, 1998 (the date of receipt of notice denying their motion for reconsideration).

Petitioners here filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998 or five days from receipt of the order denying
their motion for reconsideration on July 22, 1998. Hence, the notice of appeal was well within the fresh appeal period
of 15 days, as already discussed.

Rules of procedure may be applied retroactively to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their
passage. (Valenzuela v. Court of Appeals, 416 Phil. 289 [2001] as cited in Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 1995

--