EVIDENCE | B2015
CASE DIGESTS
Heirs of Clemena v. Heirs of Bien
September 11, 2006
Corona, J.
Rañeses, Roberto Miguel O.
SUMMARY: Irene Bien (predecessor of the Heirs of Bien) filed a case
for recovery of possession and ownership of several parcels of land,
one being the land covered by Tax Dec. 5299, against Pedro Clemenñ a y
Zurbano. One of Pedro Clemenñ a y Zurbano’s statements in his answer
said that the land was in his exclusive possession. While the case was
pending resolution, the parties were substituted by their respective
heirs. The RTC ruled in favor of the Heirs of Clemenñ a, but
subsequently reconsidered its findings, stating that none of the parties
proved their ownership of the subject land. The CA affirmed the RTC,
but reversed the RTC’s findings with regard to the land covered by Tax
Dec. 5299. It awarded damages to the Heirs of Bien, as well as stating
that it was the Heirs of Bien who had ownership over the land. When
the case reached the SC, the Heirs of Clemenñ a claimed that they should
not be liable for damages because, for one, they never took possession
of the SC. The SC dismissed such claim, stating that they were bound
by the statement of Pedro Clemenñ a y Zurbano, which amounted to a
judicial admission.
DOCTRINE: An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the
course of proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The
admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made
through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. (Sec.
4, Rule 129, RoC)
A judicial admission conclusively binds the party making it. He cannot
thereafter contradict it. The exception is found only in those rare
instances when the trial court, in the exercise of its discretion and
because of strong reasons to support its stand, may relieve a party
from the consequences of his admission.
FACTS: The subject land in this case, covered with Tax Dec. No. 5299,
with a surface area of more or less 20,644 sq. m., was one of three lots
involved in two consolidated cases for recovery of possession and
ownership filed by Irene Bien (predecessor of the respondents) against
Pedro Clemenñ a y Zurbano (predecessor of the petitioner).
Bien’s averments as found in the complaint:
1. She acquired the land by purchase from Victoriano Napa in a
deed of sale.
2. Napa acquired the same lot by purchase from Francisco
Barrameda who bought the land from the administrator of the
estate of Pedro Clemenñ a y Conde.
3. Ever since Pedro Clemenñ a y Zurbano was removed as
administrator of the said estate in 1939 deliberately continued
to occupy and usurp the possession and use of the subject land.
4. The defendant has also refused to relinquish the possession of
the same to the lawful owner, considering he has no right or
any color of title.
5. The plaintiff (Bien) will suffer damages and in fact has suffered
damages beginning Oct. 1943 at the rate of 25 cavans of palay
per harvest of 50 cavans yearly.
Pedro Clemeña y Zurbano’s answer:
1. The land was his and was in his exclusive possession.
2. Claim of ownership based on a sale by the estate of the late
Pedro Clemenñ a y Conde to his predecessor-in-interest.
Neither of the parties lived to see the end of the trial, being succeeded
by their heirs. Case was then re-raffled to the RTC of Legaspi City in Nov.
1994.
Ruling of the RTC:
1. Ruled in favor of the Heirs of Clemenñ a, declaring them as the
absolute owners of the subject land.
2. Subsequently reconsidered its findings and ruled that both
parties failed to prove their respective claims. Therefore, the
land belonged to the original owner.
a. The land covered by Tax Dec. No. 5299 was not
included in the lands sold by the estate of Pedro
Clemenñ a y Conde to Francisco Barrameda
(predecessor of Irene Bien).
b. Neither was it included in the sale executed by Special
Administrator Salustiano Zubeldia in favor of Jesus

Salazar (predecessor-in-interest of the Heirs of
Clemenñ a).
c. The Heirs of Clemenñ a, in their MR, no longer disputes
the ownership of the Heirs of Bien as regards another
parcel of land [Tax Dec. 5681] involved in another case,
the latter have been declared as owners thereof.
d. No damages are due the Heirs of Bien, as there was no
proof that the Heirs of Clemenñ a entered and occupied
a portion of the abovementioned property.
e. Another parcel of land [Tax Dec. No. 5685] was
included in the sale executed by Special Administrator
Zubeldia to Jesus Salazar, and the deed of sale is earlier
than the sale executed in favor of Barameda. Therefore,
the Heirs of Clemenñ a are declared the owners thereof.
Ruling of the CA: Affirmed the ruling of the RTC regarding the other
two parcels of land, but reversed the ruling on the ownership of the
land covered by Tax Dec. No. 5299 (subject land in this case).
 Awarded the Heirs of Bien P118,000 in damages as
compensation for their having been deprived of possession and
the owner’s share in the harvest.
 Based the finding of ownership in favor of the Heirs of Bien on
some documents of sale.
 Based the amount of damages on the testimony of George
Clemenñ a1.
1
“Q: This second parcel of land described in the SECOND cause of action which is Tax No.
5299, what kind of land is this?
A: Riceland.
Q: How big is this parcel of land?
A: More or less, two (2) hectares.
Q: What is the average owner’s share of the harvest?
A: About fifty cavans of palay.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: From the time you filed this case in the year 1943, who had been receiving the owner’s
share from this property, known as Tax No. 5299?
A: The late Pedro Clemenñ a y Zurbano when he was still alive and then his children after
his death.”
EVIDENCE | B2015
CASE DIGESTS
The motion for reconsideration of the Heirs of Clemenñ a was denied.
ISSUES: WON the Heirs of Clemenñ a should be liable for damages
awarded by the CA to the Heirs of Bien.
RULING: Yes, they should be liable for damages.
RATIO:
Arguments of the Heirs of Clemeña:
They no longer dispute the ownership the subject parcel of land.
However, they claim that they should not be liable for damages because:
1. They never took possession of the subject lot.
2. The evidence the CA rlied on to determine the amount of
damages, as it was based on the testimony of one of the
plaintiffs, was self-serving and therefore could not have been a
proper basis for such an award.
Supreme Court:
1. The Heirs of Clemenñ a’s contention that the land was never in
their possession must be dismissed.
a. Pedro Clemenñ a y Zurbano’s alleged in his answer that
the land with Tax Dec. 5299 was in his exclusive
possession.
He likewise testified on the changes in the price of a cavan of palay over the years, thus:
“Q: What was the current average price of palay after liberation, starting from the year
1945 up to 1950?
A: About Fifteen (P15.00) Pesos a sack.
Q: How about after 1950 to 1960?
A: The same.
Q: How about from 1960 to 1970?
A: At present, it is Twenty Five (P25.00) Pesos per cavan.”
We believe, in the exercise of discretion, that the [respondents] are entitled to an award of
damages in the amount of P118,000 computed in the following manner: P1,500.00 (50
cavans multiplied by two [the number of harvests in a year] multiplied by P15.00)
multiplied by 27 years (1943 to 1970) and P2,700.00 (50 cavans multiplied by two [the
number of harvests in a year] multiplied by P25.00) multiplied by 31 years (1971-2001).

i. This statement took on the character of a
judicial admission as stated in Sec. 4, Rule
129 of the RoC.
1. A judicial admission conclusively
binds the party making it. He
cannot thereafter contradict it. The
exception is found only in those
rare instances when the trial court,
in the exercise of its discretion and
because of strong reasons to
support its stand, may relieve a
party from the consequences of his
admission.
ii. The rule on judicial admissions found its way
into black-letter law only in 1964, but its
contents had been supplied by much older
case law.
1. Irlanda v. Pitargue: acts or facts
admitted do not require proof and
cannot be contradicted unless it can
be shown that the admission was
made through palpable mistake.
2. Ramirez v. Orientalist Co.: An
admission made in a pleading can not
be controverted by the party making
such admission; and all proof
submitted by him contrary thereto or
inconsistent therewith should simply
be ignored by the court, whether
objection is interposed by the
opposite party or not
3. Cunanan v. Amparo: the allegations,
statements, or admissions contained
in a pleading are conclusive as against
the pleader. A party cannot
subsequently take a position contrary
to, or inconsistent with, his pleadings.
b. Given the above pronouncements, the Heirs of
Clemenñ a can no longer say that were never in
possession of the land.
EVIDENCE | B2015
CASE DIGESTS
i. They are bound by the admission of Pedro
Clemenñ a y Zurbano.
ii. Such statement cannot be contradicted
without any showing of palpable mistake.
c. Furthermore, the issue of possession is a question of
fact. Questions of this nature cannot be raised in a
petition for review on certiorari as the remedy is
confined to pure questions of law.
i. The Heirs of Clemenñ a invoke the exceptions to
the doctrine, namely: (1) the factual findings
of the trial court and the CA are contradictory;
(2) the decision sought to be reviewed is
against the law and in complete disregard of
the rules on evidence; (3) there was grave
abuse of discretion in the appreciation of
facts; and (4) the CA failed to notice relevant
facts and evidence which if properly
considered would justify a different
conclusion.
ii. The case does not fall within any of the above.
2. As for the testimony of Gregorio Clemenñ a, the Heirs of Clemenñ a
claim that it is self-serving and therefore an improper basis for
the damages awarded to the Heirs of Bien, the same must be
dismissed.
a. “Self-serving evidence,” perhaps owing to its
descriptive formulation, is a concept much
misunderstood.
b. The term is employed as a weapon to devalue and
discredit a party’s testimony favorable to his cause.
That, it seems, is the sense in which petitioners are
using it now. This is a grave error.
c. “Self-serving evidence” is not to be taken literally to
mean any evidence that serves its proponent’s
interest.
i. The term, if used with any legal sense, refers
only to acts or declarations made by a party in
his own interest at some place and time out of
court, and it does not include testimony that
he gives as a witness in court.
 EVIDENCE | B2015
CASE DIGESTS

d. Evidence of this sort is excluded on the same ground

as any hearsay evidence, that is, lack of opportunity for
cross-examination by the adverse party and on the
consideration that its admission would open the door
to fraud and fabrication.
i. In contrast, a party’s testimony in court is
sworn and subject to cross-examination by
the other party, and therefore, not susceptible
to an objection on the ground that it is self-
serving.
e. The Heirs of Clemenñ a never once alleged, much less
tried to show, that his testimony was inaccurate or
untrue. As already observed, petitioners’ objection is
founded solely on the mere fact that he, being a
plaintiff, was a witness interested in the outcome of
the case.
f. Now, it is true that a party’s interest may to some
extent affect his credibility as a witness To insist
otherwise would be the height of naiveteé . Nonetheless,
the SC cannot subscribe to the view, implicit in
petitioners’ argument, that a party’s testimony
favorable to himself must be disregarded on account
solely of his interest in the case.

DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The April

4, 2002 decision and October 1, 2002 resolution of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 50912 are AFFIRMED.