C ase Study
of the Month
VARIOUS CASE STUDIES ON
OPERATION AND CONTROL SCHEMES
FOR GRID SUB-STATION Contd….
1. Introduction: For the last few months, the response of the
readers to the case studies on various incidents is overwhelming.
Hence this month we are again choosing the write up on similar
kind of studies for developing the synchronisation of practical
CASE STUDY
observation to the theoretical concepts. The analysis of each
incident being supported by actual observations had been
described during the situation to add awareness amongst the
operation, testing and commissioning engineers to know the
cause of problems and be helpful for easy rectification of the
problems. This can also help to develop economic schemes for
the smooth running of the operation and control system in the
Grid Sub-Station.
2.1. Case of Induction on ONE limb for 33 KV VCB: At one
of the 132/33 KV Grid sub-station, it was reported by the grid
personnel that certain voltage gets induced on one of the limb for
the 33 KV VCB (Vacuum Circuit Breaker) even on Open condition.
Observations:
1. This grid was catering the 33KV system load to different
command areas by the use of 8 numbers of 33 KV feeders.
2. One of the 33 KV feeder was used to cater the load
to one of the radial connected structure with 33/11KV
system.
3. It was required to avail shutdown to work on that line
and also on 33/11 KV structure system at remote end.
50 ELECTRICAL MIR ROR || APRIL 2019 ||
Er P.K.Pattanaik, is presently working with OPTCL as Dy. General Manager
(Elect) in E & MR Division, Bhubaneswar- Odisha and associated with
the Protection and Control schemes of Electrical systems.
He is having 25 years of technical experience in Designing, Testing and
Commissioning of Protection Control and operational Schemes, project
Implementation, co-ordination, operations & maintenance of Electrical
Equipments at various LT/ HT/ EHT level Grid Sub- Stations. He has also
published around 70 technical papers in different national/international seminars/journals.
ele.pkpattanaik@optcl.co.in
4. But while opening of the isolator was attempted after
tripping of the breaker, it was observed with spark on
the R phase contact of the isolator.
5. On inquiry it was reported by the grid personnel that
for every time of availing the shutdown clearance such
incident used to occur.
6. So it was suspected that some problems might have
been developed in the VCB (Vacuum Circuit Breaker).
So diagnosis of the fault was decided to be done on
availing the shutdown of the VCB.
Action Taken:
1.On availing the system shutdown, the VCB was tested with
the followings
a. The IR value of the breaker was taken and found with
values in order.
b. The timing test was done and found with the values in
order for Y and B phase limb, but R phase result came
with fluctuated manner (Sometimes OK and sometimes
not.)
c. The continuity during OPEN and CLOSE condition was
also checked and also found in order.
d. But while doing for the Contact resistance measurement,
the result of all the phases in close condition was found
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 in order.
e. But during in OPEN condition, though it is not the
practice of diagnosis, but because of this special condition,
attempt was done for OPEN condition.
f. For OPEN condition it was observed with NO resistance
recording for the Y and B phase. But for the R phase
certain resistance was observed.
g. The vacuum bottle healthiness was checked and found
with ingress of moisture air and loss of vacuum. So the
bottle was replaced.
h. After replacement the testing was done, this time the
results improved but the pattern remained as before
with less spark during opening of the isolator.
i. Finally the decision was taken for the replacement of the
R phase limb. The limb was replaced and the problem
was solved thereafter.
2.2. NON-TRIPPING OF 33 KV FEEDER: At one of the 132/33KV
Grid sub-station, it was reported by the grid personnel that one
of the 33Kv outgoing feeder did not cause tripping on any side of
the system, though R phase conductor was grounded at one end.
Observations:
1. At 132/33 KV grid sub-station once one outgoing feeder
tripped with earth fault at the grid connected end with
no trip at the remote end.
2. As usual way the feeder was charged from the grid end.
3. This time the feeder stood OK, but it was reported by
the remote end of no voltage on R phase.
4. With of non-supervising the availability of all voltages at
the remote end, the operators had charged the transformer
with loading on the LT side.
5. The situation was noticed, when the remote end consumers
reported of non-functioning of their 3 Phase loads and
problem of low voltage appearance on R phase.
6. The system was manually tripped from the grid end. Then
on patrolling the line, zone of fault was found. The R
phase jumper being snapped at a cut-point touched the
structure towards load side with grid side being open.
(Refer fig 2.2.1 above).
Faulty Point
earthing to Load
16.5KV
33KV
Fig 2.2.1
33KV side of 33/11KV
33KV side of 132/33KV
TFR at GRID end
Station TFR at LOAD end
7. During this situation, the voltmeter as connected at Load
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structure side, was found with no voltage on R phase.
But the Y and B phase voltage was found with required
magnitude.
Analysis:
1. During the first instance of fault, snapping of the line
might have resulted due to touching of any foreign
material with touching to earth structure. So the system
tripped at the Grid sub-station end due to occurrence
of earth fault. The grid end relay was provided with
Earth fault feature of directional in nature. Due to this
situation simultaneously voltage dip resulted with rise
of residual current.
2. But after occurrence of the fault, the load end operators
have the practice of hand tripping of the out-going
feeders for which they tripped the system. During this
second situation the load current on the R phase became
zero but the voltage at the Grid end does not become
zero. The voltage was getting from the BUS-PT of the
system.
3. The current on the healthy phases (Y and B Phase)
remained as per the load connection in the system.
So residual current remained in the system, but not
the residual voltage. So the tripping due to directional
feature at this end did not result.
4. Moreover at the Load end structure, the voltage on the
system became available across Y and B phase of Line
value of 33 KV and system was treated as single phasing
system.
5. The voltage across BR and RY could be the parallel path
of the voltage application on BR phases. The magnitude
shall become 16.5 KV on each (BR and RY system).
Though the R phase terminal has been suffered with
the earth connection at the fault point, but this single
point earthing in the system shall not cause any tripping
effect in the system due to abnormality of current. So
the tripping at both the end did not occur.
6. The non-directional feature as provided at the remote
end( Load structure end) was allowing the load till its
setting limit.
7. But due to un-equal voltage at the LT side of 33/11KV
system and complaint received from the consumer, the
16.5KV operator at the structure could able to know about the
unbalance supply condition.
8. So this situation of non-tripping at both end for the
second instance is justified according to the situation.
Action Taken:
1. The faulty portion was rectified by jointing the jumper
at the cut-point.
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Case Study
2. It was suggested to activate the residual voltage protection
at the load connected structure relay along with the
non-directional current feature.
3. The Grid end relay was also activated with –ve sequence
feature with proper setting of I2/I1.
4. Then the fault condition was simulated with physical
CASE STUDY OF THE MONTH
connection of earth to one of the phase and found with
successful outage at the both end.
Recommendation:
It is recommended that for the system with delta winding system,
should be activated with RESIDUAL VOLTAGE ACTIVATION in
the Relay. This feature could be helpful for tripping action at
the situation of un-balance voltage in the system.
2.3. Failure of SVL at one end: For a system with 132KV cable
arrangement along with overhead line, it was observed with
burning of the SVL (Sheath Voltage Limiter) at the supply end
due to the occurrence of the fault on the adjacent line.
Observations:
1. For a short line EHT system of 132 KV voltage level,
there was a connection of DC( Double Circuit) tower line
from the source end to the load end of total length of
4.1 Km.
2. Within this length, the initial part of the line was fed
with EHT cable of 300 meters from the source connected
end.
Stn A SVL
Direct link
Line-1
Relav
Cable 300mtrs OH line 3.8km
220/132auto
SVL
Direct earth
link
Line-2
Fig 2.3.1
3. One day phase to phase fault resulted on the Y and B
phase in the OH (Overhead line conductor section).
4. But surprisingly it was observed with puncture of SVL
of the other line on R phase at the supply end grid
portion.
5. Some abnormality of tripping resulted due to problem
in the tripping contacts at the supply end.
6. At the supply end of the system, the DP relay actuated
as per the fault occurrence. The tripping annunciation
occurred as YB to Earth with fault current of 5.6 Kamp.
But the breaker did not trip due to wrong assignment of
52 ELECTRICAL MIR ROR || APRIL 2019 ||
contacts. So the up-stream system at this station tripped
on the actuation of 220 KV transformers and resulted
with blackout of the system.
7. The relay at the radial fed station did not trip on this
line. But the DP (Distance Protection) relay on the
adjacent line at the radial end tripped. So in between
these two stations, the tripping resulted at one of the
line at one end only. The pattern of tripping is shown
in the figure 2.3.1 (Refer Fig 2.3.1).
8. The healthy and punctured SVL is also shown in the fig
2.3.2 (Refer Fig 2.3.2) and Fig 2.3.3.
9. On referring the figure 2.3.1, the fault occurrence could
be described as follows. Actual fault resulted at 1.2 Kms
from Station-A on Line-1 on the phases Y and B with
ground. Now the relay at this station should have to
trip, as source being connected to this station. But due
to problem in the contact assignment on the relay, this
breaker did not trip. The relay at the load end connection
(Station-B) did not actuate because of radial feeding
station.
10. Due to non-tripping of Line-1 breaker at Station A,
the up-stream 220 KV system tripped and resulted with
Blackout.
11. Simultaneously due to delay in the actual tripping of
the system, the healthy line (Line-2) at remote end
(Station-B), on seeing the fault on forward direction
Stn B caused tripping in zone-2. But the relay on this line
Load
(Line-2) at station-A did not trip due to fault being seen
Connected as reverse zone with more time selection as compared
to relay setting at Station-B.
12. The reason of puncturing of SVL on R phase at Station-A
on Line-2 could be analysed as follows.
a. The use of SVL on the cable system has been taken here
at the source end with solid grounding at the remote
end i.e at 300mtr end from Station-A.
b. Such system of using SVL at one end with solid grounding
at the other end of the cable is to avoid circulating
current in the sheath and unnecessary heating of the
cable.
c. But during this incident, actual fault had been resulted on
Line-1 at a close distance of 1.2 Kms from station-A, with
a phase fault condition of YB to ground. This situation
resulted the severe voltage dip on Y and B phase. Now
due to this, the voltage magnitude on healthy R phase
shall be raised severely. This incident of voltage rise
on the healthy R phase shall also be available on the
healthy line( Line-2).
d. If earthing of the system for the cable arrangement
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Case Study

shall not be taken correctly, then there shall be transfer Faulty Point
Between R and Y
of voltage on the sheath and if the magnitude of the
voltage on the sheath increases above the limit of the
allowable, then the SVL may puncture, as like resulted
in this system.
33KV
Action Taken
CASE STUDY OF THE MONTH

1. The punctured SVL was replaced by a good one.

33KV side of 132/33 33KV side of 33/11KV
2. The earthing system at both end of the cable for both KV TFR at GRID end
Fig 2.4.1
station TFR at LOAD end
the lines were reviewed and strengthened with the use
of earth mat.
3. The DP relay was tested separately and the output Affected Insulators
contacts were assigned properly for the tripping of the Breaker Limbs
line.
4. The relay gradation was also done and the line was
charged OK.
2.4. Case of puncturing of Main Bus isolators: At one of the Fig 2.4.2
132/33KV grid sub-station, phase to phase fault resulted on one
of the 33 KV outgoing feeder at around 1Kms from the source
end (Grid connected end). Because of this fault, the breaker
insulator and isolator of main bus isolator got punctured. Fault RY
Phase
Observations:
1. The affected 33KV feeder was of a low loaded feeder 5. So it was observed with heavy spark at the faulty zone
with loading of 1 MWatt only. due to repeated striking of phase conductors.
2. The BUS voltage at the 132/33 KV sub-station was of 6. At the grid end following abnormalities were found.
33.76KV due to less number of loading feeders being a. The breaker limb was found flashed with partial damage
in the circuit. of both phase insulation stacks.
3. The pattern of fault occurrence was of RY phase –phase b. The main bus side isolators, particularly of R and B
voltage at 1 Km from the Grid sub-station. phase were found with severe damage of the insulator
4. This RY phase fault resulted due to touching of R and Y stacks towards line end. The Y phase stack was also
phase conductor for the heavy air swing in the system. found with damage but not that severe as compared
( Refer Fig 2.4.1 and 2.4.2) to the R and B phase.
c. The CT insulator stacks were also found with flashing
but no any such damage.

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 d. The relay current as recorded of 18.7 KAmpere with fault
indications being RY on the feeder connected relay.
e. All the incomers (3 Numbers of transformers were in
parallel) had also tripped with recording of fault current
being in the range of 6.2- 7 Kampere.
f. Total blackout resulted in the system, due to the outage
of all the three incomers (33 KV side of the transformers).
Action Taken:
1. Shutdown was availed for replacement of the damaged
insulator stacks and the damaged limbs of the breakers.
2. The damaged insulator stacks of the main bus isolators
were completely changed with the new isolator setup.
3. The flashing insulators were cleaned and washed as
found with no any such damage.
4. Then the system was charged and stood OK.
5. But on the same line and approximately at 1.2 Kms
from the grid sub-station end, similar kind of another
fault resulted on same R and Y phase due to touching
each other for the air swing.
6. But this time no any eventualities were observed, the line
tripped along with all the incomers. The total blackout
resulted without damage in the system.
7. The fault current was recorded of 15.8 KAmpere with
incomer current being in the range of 5.3 Kamp.
8. After such incident, the clearance problem in the line
was also attended by changing the cross arm of the pole
and positioning of another pole in between to reduce
the sag.
9. The concept of fault free zone was also initiated with
awareness to the downstream utilities.
Fault free Zone: Developing of a zone up to 2 Kms from the
Grid Sub-station on the out-going
feeders maintaining with all the
following factors.
a. Proper statutory electrical
clearance between the
conductors and earth.
b. Tree-touching clearance.
c. Proper Pole earthing
d. Maintaining of correct
insulator stacks with correct
jumpering at the cut points.
e. Earthing connection of the
gantry pole/tower to the
main earth mat of the
sub-station.
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Analysis:
1. During the first incident and because of repeated phase
to phase fault, the fault loop current becomes high with
its source being driven from the Grid supply.
2. The momentary voltage dip occurred on these two phases
due to air swinging touch of these two conductors. At
the same time the voltage on the healthy phase (Here
it was B phase) would be high.
3. This momentary high voltage on B-phase being available
across the insulators and earth would be resulting the
earth tracking in case of less creepage distance on any
of the insulators. The reason of lesser creepage might
be due to old insulators being deposited with dusts and
other foreign particles.
4. During such incident there would be abnormal variation
of both voltage and current. Voltage variation would
have been resulted due to re-striking nature of phase
to phase conductors. Variation of current would be due
to phase to phase fault incidences.
Note: In this incident repeated touch of RY phase conductors
had been resulted due to severe wind swing before
outage of the supply system.
5. So the weak links in the conductors got damaged due
to flow of heavy current and flashing on the insulators
resulted due to earth tracking current path across the
insulator stacks.
6. But during the second incident, no any such eventualities
resulted. All the insulators had been replaced by the
new one with neither of dust deposition nor reduction of
creepage distance. Only current rise resulted as per the
fault loop impedance and availability of voltage across
the fault. The successful outage also resulted due to the
correct operation of the relays in the system.
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