People vs.
Domingo indispensable parties allegedly rendered null and void the
FACTS: Domingo filed a Complaint for Specific Performance
with Damages5 against the Department of Public Works and
Highways (DPWH). Domingo averred that from April to
September 1992, he entered into seven contracts with the
DPWH Region III for the lease of his construction equipment
to said government agency. The lease contracts were allegedly
executed in order to implement the emergency projects of the
DPWH Region III, which aimed to control the flow of lahar
from Mt. Pinatubo in the adjacent towns in the provinces of
Tarlac and Pampanga. After the completion of the projects,
Domingo claimed that the unpaid rentals of the DPWH Region
III amounted to ₱6,320,163.05. Despite repeated demands,
Domingo asserted that the DPWH Region III failed to pay its
obligations. Domingo was, thus, compelled to file the above
case for the payment of the ₱6,320,163.05 balance, plus
₱200,000.00 as moral and compensatory damages,
₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages, and ₱200,000.00 as
attorney’s fees. Thereafter, summons was issued by the RTC.
The Proof of Service of the Sheriff dated May 9, 2002 stated,
that the undersigned personally served the copy of the
Summons together with the complaint issued in the above-
entitled case upon defendant The Department of Public Works
and Highways, Region III, San Fernando Pampanga on May 6,
2002 through Nora Cortez, Clerk III of said office as shown by
her signature and stamped mark received by said office
appearing on the original Summons. The original Summons
respectfully returned to the Court "DULY SERVED", for its
record and information. From the evidence presented by
[Domingo], testimonial and documentary, it was convincingly
proven that [Domingo] is entitled to the relief prayed for.
Considering that there was a long delay in the payment of the
obligation on the part of the [DPWH Region III], Article 2209
of the New Civil Code finds application as to imputation of
legal interest at six (6%) percent per annum, in the absence of
stipulation of interest on the amount due. Domingo filed a
Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution, asserting that the
DPWH Region III failed to file an appeal or a motion for new
trial and/or reconsideration despite its receipt of a copy of the
RTC decision on February 19, 2003. On March 20, 2003, the
RTC granted the aforesaid motion of Domingo. A Writ of
Execution was then issued on March 24, 2003, commanding
the sheriff to enforce the RTC Decision dated February 18,
2003. On August 27, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines,
represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed
with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Annulment of
Judgment with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
The Republic argued that it was not impleaded as an
indispensable party in Civil Case No. 333-M-2002. The seven
contracts sued upon in the trial court stated that they were
entered into by the Regional Director, Assistant Regional
Director and/or Project Manager of the DPWH Region III for
and in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, which
purportedly was the real party to the contract. Moreover, the
Republic averred that, under the law, the statutory
representatives of the government for purposes of litigation are
either the Solicitor General or the Legal Service Branch of the
Executive Department concerned. Since no summons was
issued to either of said representatives, the trial court never
acquired jurisdiction over the Republic. The absence of
subsequent acts of the trial court because of its lack of
authority to act, not only as to the absent parties, but even as to
those present. The Republic prayed for the annulment of the
RTC Decision dated February 18, 2003 and the dismissal of
the said case, without prejudice to the original action being
refiled in the proper court. On May 19, 2006, the Court of
Appeals promulgated its decision, dismissing the Petition for
Annulment of Judgment filed by the Republic.
ISSUE: If in the act by which the Republic consents to be
sued, no designation is made as to the officer to be served with
summons, then the process can only be served upon the
Solicitor General.
HELD: The Court finds merit in the Republic’s petition.
Summons is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the
action brought against him. Service of such writ is the means
by which the court acquires jurisdiction over his person.
Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is acquired
through coercive process, generally by the service of summons
issued by the court, or through the defendant's voluntary
appearance or submission to the court.
Section 13, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court states that:
SEC. 13. Service upon public corporations. – When the
defendant is the Republic of the Philippines, service may be
effected on the Solicitor General; in case of a province, city or
municipality, or like public corporations, service may be
effected on its executive head, or on such other officer or
officers as the law or the court may direct. (Emphasis ours.)
Jurisprudence further instructs that when a suit is directed
against an unincorporated government agency, which, because
it is unincorporated, possesses no juridical personality of its
own, the suit is against the agency's principal, i.e., the State.30
In the similar case of Heirs of Mamerto Manguiat v. Court of
Appeals,31 where summons was served on the Bureau of
Telecommunications which was an agency attached to the
Department of Transportation and Communications, we held
that:
Rule 14, Section 13 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure provides:
SEC. 13. Service upon public corporations. — When the
defendant is the Republic of the Philippines, service may be
effected on the Solicitor General; in case of a province, city or
municipality, or like public corporations, service may be
effected on its executive head, or on such other officer or
officers as the law or the court may direct.
It is clear under the Rules that where the defendant is the
Republic of the Philippines, service of summons must be made
on the Solicitor General. The BUTEL is an agency attached to
the Department of Transportation and Communications
created under E.O. No. 546 on July 23, 1979, and is in charge
of providing telecommunication facilities, including telephone
systems to government offices. It also provides its services to
augment limited or inadequate existing similar private
communication facilities. It extends its services to areas where
no communication facilities exist yet; and assists the private
sector engaged in telecommunication services by providing
and maintaining backbone telecommunication network. It is
indisputably part of the Republic, and summons should have
been served on the Solicitor General. In the instant case, the
Complaint for Specific Performance with Damages filed by
Domingo specifically named as defendant the DPWH Region
III. As correctly argued by the Republic, the DPWH and its
regional office are merely the agents of the former (the
Republic), which is the real party in interest in Civil Case No.
333-M-2002. Thus, as mandated by Section 13, Rule 14 of the
Rules of Court, the summons in this case should have been
served on the OSG.
Quite inexplicably, the Court of Appeals failed to apply, nay,
to even consider, the provisions of Section 13, Rule 14 of the
Rules of Court in rendering its assailed Decision. A perusal of
the Decision dated May 19, 2006 shows that the appellate
court mainly dissertated regarding the functions and
organizational structures of the DPWH and the OSG, as
provided for in the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, in
an attempt to demonstrate the relationship between the DPWH
and its regional offices, as well as to refute the claim that the
service of summons upon the Republic should be made
exclusively upon the OSG. Such an oversight on the part of
the Court of Appeals is most unfortunate given the relevance
and materiality of Section 13, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court to
the instant case, in addition to the fact that the Republic itself
quoted the aforesaid provision in its petition before the
appellate court.33
The Court, nonetheless, subscribes to the ruling of the Court of
Appeals that the Republic is not estopped from raising the
issue of jurisdiction in the case at bar in view of the alleged
entry of appearance of the OSG, in behalf of the Republic, in
the other civil cases supposedly filed by Domingo against the
DPWH Region III. As held by the appellate court, the other
civil cases presumably pertained to transactions involving
Domingo and the DPWH Region III, which were totally
different from the contracts involved in the instant case. The
fact that the OSG entered its appearance in the other civil
cases, notwithstanding that the summons therein were only
served upon the DPWH Region III, has no bearing in the case
now before us. All this indicates is that, despite the improper
service of summons in these other civil cases, there appeared
to be notice to the OSG and voluntary appearance on the
latter’s part.
Here, there was no indication, and Domingo did not insist
otherwise, that the OSG had any notice of the filing of Civil
Case No. 333-M-2002. Domingo speculates that, in the
subsequent civil actions against the DPWH Region III, the
latter most likely brought the said cases to the attention of the
OSG. On the other hand, Domingo opines that the DPWH
Region III apparently neglected to inform the OSG of the
pendency of Civil Case No. 333-M-2002. Accordingly,
Domingo asserted that he should not be faulted therefor. The
Court disagrees. Domingo ought to bear in mind that it is the
duty of the plaintiff to implead all the necessary or
indispensable parties for the complete determination of the
action.34 It was, thus, incumbent upon him to name and
implead the proper defendant in this case, i.e., the Republic,
and cause the service of summons to be made upon the officer
mandated by law, that is, the OSG. As Domingo failed to
discharge this burden, he cannot now be allowed to shift the
blame on the DPWH Region III or hold in estoppel the
OSG.1âwphi1
In sum, the Court holds that the Republic was not validly
served with summons in Civil Case No. 333-M-2002. Hence,
the RTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the
Republic. Consequently, the proceedings had before the trial
court and its Decision dated February 18, 2003 are hereby
declared void.
Trimica V. Polaris Marketing Corp; G.R. No. L-29887;
October 28, 1974
Doctrine:
Where the appearance in court of the president of a
corporation was in the capacity of counsel of another
corporation and not as representative or counsel of the first
corporation, such appearance cannot be construed as a
voluntary submission of said corporation to the court's
jurisdiction. The personality of the president of a corporation
is distinct from that of the corporation itself. In the absence of
summons on the corporation, a judgment against it is void for
lack of jurisdiction and lack of due process. [Separate
Personality of Corporation]
Facts:
Trimica (petitioner) filed a special civil action of
certiorari to set aside the lower court’s order to pay Polaris
Marketing (respondent).
Respondent sued the House of Fine Furnitures, Inc. in
the municipal court of Makati for the recovery of the price of
foam products. Fine Furnitures, through its counsel, Francisco
Capistrano, denied that it purchased foam products from
respondent. During the trial de novo, after respondent had
offered its evidence, Fine Furnitures presented as witnesses
Capistrano and Constantino Torre, the storekeeper of
petitioner. Torre testified that the foam products were actually
received and utilized by petitioner. Capistrano, testifying on
self-interrogation, revealed that he was the secretary of Fine
Furnitures and at the same time the president of Trimica, Inc.
and that the two companies had offices in his residence at
1831 Otis Street, Paco, Manila.
Due to such disclosure, respondent was ordered to
amend its complaint in order to implead Trimica, Inc. Later
on, the judge absolved Fine Furnitures from any liability, and
ordered petitioner to pay respondent’s claim. Petitioner argued
that such decision of the court was void due to lack of due
process since petitioner was never summoned. The lower court
reasoned that petitioner had been given its day in court
through Capistrano, its president, and that to retry the case
would just be a waste of time because of Capistrano's
admission that petitioner had used the foam
products. Petitioner contended that Capistrano's personality is
distinct from that of the petitioner. It was necessary to
summon petitioner in order that jurisdiction could have been
acquired over it.
Issue: Whether or not the court acquired jurisdiction over
petitioner.
Held:
No, it did not. The Court rules that no jurisdiction
was acquired over Trimica, Inc. because it was never
summoned. The appearance in court of its president,
Capistrano, was in the capacity of counsel for Fine Furnitures
and not as representative or counsel of Trimica, Inc. Hence,
such appearance cannot be construed as a voluntary
submission of Trimica, Inc. to the court's jurisdiction. The fact
that Capistrano, the president of Trimica, Inc., appeared in
court as counsel for Fine Furnitures and was aware of the
joinder of Trimica, Inc. as a defendant, was not a valid excuse
for dispensing with the rudimentary requirements that Trimica,
Inc. should be summoned, that a copy of the amended
complaint should be served upon it in due course, that it
should be afforded an opportunity to file an answer with
defenses and that a trial should be held to determine its
liability.
ELLICE AGRO-INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION v.
YOUNG
Facts:
Respondents and (EAIC), represented by its alleged corporate
secretary and attorney-in-fact, Domingo, entered into a
Contract to Sell wherein EAIC agreed to sell to the
respondents a 30,000 square-meter portion of a parcel of land
located in Lutucan, Sariaya, Quezon. Pursuant to the Contract
to Sell, respondents paid EAIC, through Domingo, the partial
payment for the acquisition of the subject property. Despite
such payment, EAIC failed to deliver to respondents the
owners duplicate certificate of title of the subject property and
the corresponding deed of sale as required under the Contract
to Sell. Respondents had their Affidavit of Adverse Claim and
then filed a Complaint for specific performance against EAIC
and Domingo before the RTC. Consequently, respondents
caused the annotation of a Notice of Lis Pendens. The initial
attempt to serve the summons and a copy of the complaint and
its annexes on EAIC, through Domingo, on Rizal Street,
Sariaya, Quezon, was unsuccessful as EAIC could not be
located in the said address. Another attempt was made to serve
the alias summons on EAIC at 996 Maligaya Street,
Singalong, Manila, the residence of Domingo. The second
attempt to serve the alias summons to Domingo was, this time,
successful. EAIC, represented by Domingo, filed its Answer
with Counterclaim.
Respondent Wee sent Gala, EAICs Chairman and President, a
letter, seeking a conference with the latter relating to the
execution of an absolute deed of sale pursuant to the Contract
to Sell entered into between EAIC and respondents. In
response, the Robles Ricafrente Aguirre Sanvicente & Cacho
Law Firm, introducing itself to be the counsel of EAIC, sent
Wee a letter informing him of Domingos lack of authority to
represent EAIC.
On the scheduled pre-trial conference, neither Domingo nor
her counsel appeared. As a result of EAICs failure to appear in
the pre-trial conference, respondents were allowed to present
their evidence ex parte, pursuant to Section 5, Rule 18 of the
Rules of Court.
Following the presentation of evidence ex parte, the RTC
rendered its Decision ordering EAIC to deliver the owners
duplicate copy of the TCT and to execute a final deed of sale
in favor of respondents. No motion for reconsideration or
notice of appeal was filed by EAIC, hence, the said RTC
decision became final and executory.
Roughly seven months after the finality of the RTC Decision,
EAIC, represented by Gala, filed its Petition for Relief from
Judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court of the RTC
Decision before the same court. The petition for relief from
judgment was premised on the alleged fraud committed by
Domingo. RTC denied the petition for relief from judgment
for being clearly filed out of time under Section 3, Rule 38 of
the Rules of Court.
EAIC, represented by Gala, initiated the Petition for
Annulment of Judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court
of the RTC Decision before the CA.
CA dismissed the petition for annulment of judgment.
EAICs MR was denied by the CA in its Resolution, hence, this
petition for review.
Issues:
The CA erred in ruling that there was valid service of
summons upon petitioner corporation.
The CA erred in ruling that Domingo was a Director of
petitioner corporation at the time summons was served upon
her and in denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Held:
The Court finds merit in the petition.
It is a settled rule that jurisdiction over the defendant is
acquired either upon a valid service of summons or the
defendants voluntary appearance in court. When the defendant
does not voluntarily submit to the courts jurisdiction or when
there is no valid service of summons, any judgment of the
court which has no jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant is null and void. The purpose of summons is not
only to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant,
but also to give notice to the defendant that an action has been
commenced against it and to afford it an opportunity to be
heard on the claim made against it. The requirements of the
rule on summons must be strictly followed, otherwise, the trial
court will not acquire jurisdiction over the defendant.
Section 13, Rule 14 of the 1964 Rules of Civil Procedure, the
applicable rule on service of summons upon a private
domestic corporation then, provides:
Sec. 13. Service upon private domestic corporation
or partnership. If the defendant is a corporation
organized under the laws of the Philippines or a
partnership duly registered, service may be made
on the president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent,
or any of its directors.
Based on the above-quoted provision, for service of summons
upon a private domestic corporation, to be effective and valid,
should be made on the persons enumerated in the rule.
Conversely, service of summons on anyone other than the
president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent, or director, is not
valid. The purpose is to render it reasonably certain that the
corporation will receive prompt and proper notice in an action
against it or to insure that the summons be served on a
representative so integrated with the corporation that such
person will know what to do with the legal papers served on
him.
In the present case, the pertinent document showing EAICs
composition at the time the summons was served upon it,
through Domingo, will readily reveal that she was not its
president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent or director. Due
to this fact, the Court is of the view that her honest belief that
she was the authorized corporate secretary was clearly
mistaken because she was evidently not the corporate
secretary she claimed to be. In view of Domingos lack of
authority to properly represent EAIC, the Court is constrained
to rule that there was no valid service of summons binding on
it.
MA. IMELDA M. MANOTOC vs. HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS
[G.R. No. 130974. August 16, 2006.]
FACTS: Based on paragraph two of the Complaint, the trial
court issued a Summons addressed to petitioner at Alexandra
Homes, E2 Room 104, at No. 29 Meralco Avenue, Pasig City.
The Summons and a copy of the Complaint were allegedly
served upon (Mr.) Macky de la Cruz, an alleged caretaker of
petitioner at the condominium unit mentioned earlier. When
petitioner failed to file her Answer, the trial court declared her
in default. Petitioner, filed a Motion to Dismiss 6 on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction of the trial court over her person
due to an invalid substituted service of summons.
Trial court rejected Manotoc’s Motion to Dismiss and relied
on the presumption that the sheriff’s substituted service was
made in the regular performance of official duty, and such
presumption stood in the absence of proof to the contrary.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Substituted service was valid.
HELD: NO. Requirements for Substituted Service, Section 8
of Rule 14 of the old Revised Rules of Court which applies to
this case can be broken down to the following requirements:
(1)Impossibility of Prompt Personal Service (2)Specific
Details in the Return (3)A Person of Suitable Age and
Discretion (4)A Competent Person in Charge
A meticulous scrutiny of the aforementioned Return readily
reveals the absence of material data on the serious efforts to
serve the Summons on petitioner Manotoc in person. There is
no clear valid reason cited in the Return why those efforts
proved inadequate, to reach the conclusion that personal
service has become impossible or unattainable outside the
generally couched phrases of “on many occasions several
attempts were made to serve the summons . . . personally,” “at
reasonable hours during the day,” and “to no avail for the
reason that the said defendant is usually out of her place
and/or residence or premises.”
Before resorting to substituted service, a plaintiff must
demonstrate an effort in good faith to locate the defendant
through more direct means. Respondent Trajano failed to
demonstrate that there was strict compliance with the
requirements of the then Section 8, Rule 14 (now Section 7,
Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), the
proceedings held before the trial court perforce must be
annulled.
De Dios vs CA, Lopingco
80491 / Aug 12, 1992
Topic: Amendments and Supplemental Pleadings
Doctrine: Only when new causes of actions are alleged in an
amended complaint filed before the defendant appeared in
court that another summons must be served on the defendant
with the amended complaint.
Facts:
1. Veterans Bank conveyed a parcel of land under a
conditional sale to Averdi Marketing and Development
Corporation. Artie Vergel de Dios, as General Manager of
Averdi, transferred his rights to Eduardo Lopingco subject
to the terms and agreement specified in their
Memorandum of Agreement.
2. Lopingco filed with the RTC a complaint against De Dios
and Veterans Bank for the recession of his contract with
De Dios. Copies of the complaint were sent to De Dios
and Veterans Bank.
3. Lopingco filed an amended complaint and at the same
time served a copy thereof to De Dios by registered mail.
4. On the same day, but after the filing of the amended
complaint, the law firm representing De Dios filed its
entry of appearance and motion for extension of time to
file responsive pleading. RTC granted the motion but only
for 10 days.
5. De Dios filed an omnibus motion asking that he be
furnished a copy of the amended complaint. Lopingco
objected on the ground that the copy had already been
sent directly to De Dios by registered mail “because at the
time said copy was mailed, there was as yet no
appearance of counsel for said defendant”
6. RTC declared De Dios in default upon presentation of a
certification from the Makati Central PO that De Dios had
received a copy of the amended complaint.
7. De Dios filed a motion for new trial alleging the error of
the RTC for declaring him on default although he had not
been served a copy of the amended complaint and his
omnibus motion had not yet been resolved. RTC denied
the motion. CA affirmed the RTC.
8. De Dios argues that since the amended complaint
completely replaced the original complaint, the latter was
stricken from the record and considered non-existent and
so was the summons that accompanied it. As the amended
complaint was a completely new pleading, a new
summons should have been issued requiring the
defendants to answer the same. For failing to do this and
thereafter declaring him in default, the trial court denied
him the right to be heard in violation of due process.
Issue:
Whether a new summons should have been issued due to the
complaint being amended.
Held: no new summons on the amended complaint was
necessary
 The rule is that it is only when new causes of action are
alleged in an amended complaint filed before the
defendant has appeared in court that another summons
 must be served on the defendant with the amended
complaint.
 In determining whether a different cause of action is
introduced by amendments to the complaint, the court
must ascertain if the defendant shall be required to answer
for a liability or legal obligation wholly different from
that which was stated in the original complaint.
o An amendment will not be considered as stating
a new cause of action if the facts alleged in the
amended complaint show substantially the same
wrong with respect to the same transaction, or if
what are alleged refer to the same matter but are
more fully and differently stated, or where
averments which were implied are made in
express terms, and the subject of the controversy
or the liability sought to be enforced remains the
same.
 in the case at bar, the amended pleading shows that it
merely supplemented an incomplete allegation
regarding the subject property. The purpose of the
amendment was merely to include the additional
information that the subject property "was and is still
under litigation and the contract was entered into without
the knowledge and approval of the litigants or of
competent judicial authority."
o It is clear from a comparison of the allegations
appearing in the original complaint and in the
amended complaint that the cause of action of
the private respondent had not been changed.
The amended complaint also asked for the
rescission of the Memorandum of Agreement
and the Addendum and the return of the sum of P
725,000.00 which had been given by Lopingco
to the petitioner as down payment on the subject
property. Plainly, what was sought to be
enforced against the petitioner both in the
original complaint and in the amended complaint
was his obligation to refund the said sum to the
private respondent. The amended complaint did
not change the cause of action but simply
advanced the above-quoted additional
information.
 The trial court was correct in holding that when the
private respondent sent by registered mail a copy of the
amended complaint directly to the petitioner, he was
acting in accordance with Sec. 2 of Rule 13 of the Rules
of Court, allowing direct service on a party if not
represented by counsel. At the time the amended
complaint was filed, the defendant was not yet
represented by counsel, which entered its appearance only
after the private respondent had filed his amended
complaint.
o It is noteworthy that the trial court cautiously
suspended resolution of the motion to declare the
petitioner in default until the private respondent
shall have furnished proof of service of the
amended complaint upon the petitioner. It was
only on December 6, 1984, after the private
respondent had submitted the above-quoted
certification, that the trial court declared the
petitioner in default.
o As the trial court granted the motion for
extension before declaring the petitioner in
default, he cannot say that it had unduly favored
the private respondent. Neither has the petitioner
been denied due process, for he was given
adequate opportunity, even extended by ten days
more beyond the reglementary period, to file his
answer to the amended complaint
G.R. No. 147369 October 23, 2003
Spouses PATRICK JOSE and RAFAELA JOSE,
petitioners, vs. Spouses HELEN BOYON and ROMEO
BOYON, respondents.
Doctrine: In general, substituted service can be availed of
only after a clear showing that personal service of summons
was not legally possible. Also, service by publication is
applicable in actions in rem and quasi in rem, but not in
personal suits such as the present one which is for specific
performance.
Facts: Petitioners Patrick and Rafaela Jose lodged a complaint
for specific performance against Respondents Helen and
Romeo Boyon to compel them to facilitate the transfer of
ownership of a parcel of land subject of a controverted sale.
The action was lodged before the Regional Trial Court of
Muntinlupa. On July 21, 1998, respondent judge, through the
acting Branch Clerk of Court of Branch 276 of the RTC of
Muntinlupa City, issued summons to the respondents. As per
return of the summons, substituted service was resorted to by
the process server allegedly because efforts to serve the
summons personally to the respondents failed.
On December 9, 1998, petitioners filed before the trial court
an Ex-parte Motion for Leave of Court to Effect Summons by
Publication. On December 28, 1998, public respondent issued
an Order granting the Ex-parte Motion for Leave of Court to
Effect Summons by Publication.
The respondent judge, sans a written motion, issued an Order
declaring herein respondents in default for failure to file their
respective answers. As a consequence of the declaration of
default, petitioners were allowed to submit their evidence ex-
parte.
The CA held that the trial court had no authority to issue the
questioned Resolution and Orders. According to the appellate
court, the RTC never acquired jurisdiction over respondents
because of the invalid service of summons upon them. First,
the sheriff failed to comply with the requirements of
substituted service of summons, because he did not specify in
the Return of Summons the prior efforts he had made to locate
them and the impossibility of promptly serving the summons
upon them by personal service. Second, the subsequent
summons by publication was equally infirm, because the
Complaint was a suit for specific performance and therefore
an action in personam.
Issue: WON the summons by publication is proper?
Held: NO. It must be noted that extraterritorial service of
summons or summons by publication applies only when the
action is in rem or quasi in rem. The first is an action against
the thing itself instead of against the defendant’s person; in the
latter, an individual is named as defendant, and the purpose is
to subject that individual’s interest in a piece of property to the
obligation or loan burdening it.
In the instant case, what was filed before the trial court was an
action for specific performance directed against respondents.
While the suit incidentally involved a piece of land, the
ownership or possession thereof was not put in issue, since
they did not assert any interest or right over it. Moreover, this
Court has consistently declared that an action for specific
performance is an action in personam. Having failed to serve
the summons on respondents properly, the RTC did not validly
acquire jurisdiction over their persons. Consequently, due
process demands that all the proceedings conducted
subsequent thereto should be deemed null and void.
COLLADO-LACORTE VS RABENA
FACTS:
This case arose from a letter of complaint on the improper
service of summons made by Ernesto Rabena, Process Server
of the Court in Vigan City, relative to Civil Case entitled
Moneyline Lending Investors Inc., v. Rowell Mark D. Abero
& Ernesto R. Rabena, which was raffled off to Branch 51,
Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan City, presided by Judge
Alma Crispina B. Collado-Lacorte.
summons upon defendants Rowell Mark D. Abero and Ernesto
R. Rabena were served, through substituted service, upon
Elvira Abero and Anita Rabena, respectively. The service was
made without stating in the Return the facts and circumstances
surrounding the failed personal service; the date and time of
the attempts on personal service; the inquiries made to locate
the defendants; the names of the occupants of the defendants'
alleged residence, and all other acts done, though futile, to
serve the summons on defendants. Hence, the substituted
service on the defendants was improper, as it failed to comply
with the requirements prescribed by the Rules of Court, and
deviated from the ruling of the Supreme Court in Ma. Imelda
M. Manotoc v. Court of Appeals. Accordingly, the court did
not acquire jurisdiction over their persons.
ISSUE: whether or not Eduardo Rabena failed to fulfill his
duty with utmost diligence as a process server
HELD: YES
As stated in Manotoc vs Ca: In an action strictly in personam,
personal service on the defendant is the preferred mode of
service, that is, by handing a copy of the summons to the
defendant in person. If defendant, for excusable reasons,
cannot be served with the summons within a reasonable
period, then substituted service can be resorted to. While
substituted service of summons is permitted, "it is
extraordinary in character and in derogation of the usual
method of service." Hence, it must faithfully and strictly
comply with the prescribed requirements and circumstances
authorized by the rules. Indeed, "compliance with the rules
regarding the service of summons is as much important as the
issue of due process of jurisdiction.
The requirements for substituted service as stated in Sec. 8
Rule 14 is that If the defendant cannot be served within a
reasonable time as provided in the preceding section [personal
service on defendant], service may be effected (a) by leaving
copies of the summons at the defendant's residence with some
person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or
(b) by leaving the copies at defendant's office or regular place
of business with some competent person in charge thereof.
Requirements to effect a valid substituted service:
We can break down this section into the following
requirements to effect a valid substituted service:
(1) Impossibility of Prompt Personal Service
 The party relying on substituted service or the sheriff
must show that defendant cannot be served promptly
or there is impossibility of prompt service.
 Section 8, Rule 14 provides that the plaintiff or the
sheriff is given a "reasonable time" to serve the
summons to the defendant in person, but no specific
time frame is mentioned.
'Reasonable time' is defined as "so much time as is necessary
under the circumstances for a reasonably prudent and diligent
man to do, conveniently, what the contract or duty requires
that should be done, having regard for the rights and
possibility of loss, if any, to the other party."
Under the Rules, the service of summons has no set period.
However, when the court, clerk of court, or the plaintiff asks
the sheriff to make the return of the summons and the latter
submits the return of summons, then the validity of the
summons lapses. The plaintiff may then ask for an alias
summons if the service of summons has failed. What then is a
reasonable time for the sheriff to effect a personal service in
order to demonstrate impossibility of prompt service? To the
plaintiff, "reasonable time" means no more than seven (7)
days since an expeditious processing of a complaint is what
a plaintiff wants. To the sheriff, "reasonable time" means
15 to 30 days because at the end of the month, it is a
practice for the branch clerk of court to require the sheriff
to submit a return of the summons assigned to the sheriff
for service. The Sheriff's Return provides data to the Clerk of
Court, which the clerk uses in the Monthly Report of Cases to
be submitted to the Office of the Court Administrator within
the first ten (10) days of the succeeding month. Thus, one
month from the issuance of summons can be considered
"reasonable time with regard to personal service on the
defendant.
Sheriffs are asked to discharge their duties on the service of
summons with due care, utmost diligence, and reasonable
promptness and speed so as not to prejudice the expeditious
dispensation of justice. Thus, they are enjoined to try their best
efforts to accomplish personal service on defendant. On the
other hand, since the defendant is expected to try to avoid and
evade service of summons, the sheriff must be resourceful,
persevering, canny, and diligent in serving the process on the
defendant. For substituted service of summons to be available,
there must be several attempts by the sheriff to personally
serve the summons within a reasonable period [of one month]
which eventually resulted in failure to prove impossibility of
prompt service. "Several attempts" means at least three (3)
tries, preferably on at least two different dates. In addition,
the sheriff must cite why such efforts were unsuccessful. It is
only then that impossibility of service can be confirmed or
accepted.
(2) Specific Details in the Return
The sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons:
 the facts and circumstances surrounding the
attempted personal service.
 The efforts made to find the defendant and the
reasons behind the failure must be clearly narrated in
detail in the Return.
 The date and time of the attempts on personal service,
the inquiries made to locate the defendant,
 the name/s of the occupants of the alleged residence
or house of defendant and
 all other acts done, though futile, to serve the
summons on defendant must be specified in the
Return to justify substituted service.
 The form on Sheriff's Return of Summons on
Substituted Service prescribed in the Handbook for
Sheriffs published by the Philippine Judicial
Academy requires a narration of the efforts made to
find the defendant personally and the fact of failure.
 Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 5 dated
November 9, 1989 requires that impossibility of
prompt service should be shown by stating the efforts
made to find the defendant personally and the failure
of such efforts, which should be made in the proof of
service.
G.R. NO. 184333 : April 1, 2013
SIXTO N. CHU, Petitioner, v. MACH ASIA TRADING
CORPORATION,
FACTS:
Respondent Mach Asia Trading Corporation is a corporation
engaged in importing dump trucks and heavy equipments.
Petitioner Sixto N. Chu purchased on installment one (1)
Hitachi Excavator, one (1) motorgrader and one (1) payloader.
Petitioner made down payments with the balance payable in
12 monthly installments through Land Bank postdated checks.
However, upon presentment of the checks for encashment,
they were dishonored by the bank either by reason of “closed
account,” “drawn against insufficient funds,” or “payment
stopped.” Respondent filed a complaint before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City for sum of money, replevin,
attorney’s fees and damages against the petitioner. The RTC
issued an Order allowing the issuance of a writ of replevin on
the subject heavy equipments. Sheriff Cortes proceeded at
petitioner’s given address for the purpose of serving the
summons, together with the complaint, writ of replevin and
bond. However, the Sheriff failed to serve the summons
personally upon the petitioner, since the latter was not there.
The Sheriff then resorted to substituted service by having the
summons and the complaint received by a certain Rolando
Bonayon, a security guard of the petitioner. Petitioner failed to
file any responsive pleading. Upon motion the RTC issued an
Order declaring defendant in default and, thereafter, allowed
respondent to present its evidence ex parte. The RTC rendered
a decision against the petitioner. On appeal, the CA affirmed
the RTC Decision.
ISSUE:
Was the substituted service of summons to the security guard
considered to be a valid as to acquire jurisdiction over the
person of petitioner Chu?
HELD: NO.
As a rule, summons should be personally served on the
defendant. It is only when summons cannot be served
personally within a reasonable period of time that substituted
service may be resorted to. Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of
Court provides:
“SEC. 7. Substituted service. – If, for justifiable causes, the
defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as
provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a)
by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant’s residence
with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing
therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant’s office or
regular place of business with some competent person in
charge thereof.”
It is to be noted that in case of substituted service, there should
be a report indicating that the person who received the
summons in the defendant’s behalf was one with whom the
defendant had a relation of confidence, ensuring that the latter
would actually receive the summon. Clearly, it was not shown
that the security guard who received the summons in behalf of
the petitioner was authorized and possessed a relation of
confidence that petitioner would definitely receive the
summons. This is not the kind of service contemplated by law.
Thus, service on the security guard could not be considered as
substantial compliance with the requirements of substituted
service. The service of summons is a vital and indispensable
ingredient of due process. As a rule, if defendants have not
been validly summoned, the court acquires no jurisdiction
over their person, and a judgment rendered against them is
null and void. Since the RTC never acquired jurisdiction over
the person of the petitioner, the judgment rendered by the
court could not be considered binding upon him for being null
and void.
Laude v. Judge Ginez-Jabalde, et al.
G.R. No. 217456, 24 November 2015
FACTS: This involves the celebrated case of Jeffrey
“Jennifer” Laude (Jennifer) killed at the Celzone Lodge on
Ramon Magsaysay Drive in Olongapo City allegedly by 19-
year-old US Marine L/CPL Joseph Scott Pemberton
(Pemberton). A Complaint for murder was filed by Jennifer’s
sibling, Marilou S. Laude, against Pemberton before the
Office of the City Prosecutor which Information was later
filed with the RTC in Olongapo City.
On 19 December 2014, Pemberton surrendered personally to
the RTC Judge and was later arraigned. On the same day of
Arraignment petitioner Laude filed an Urgent Motion to
Compel the Armed Forces of the Philippines to Surrender the
Custody of Accused to the Olongapo City Jail and a Motion to
Allow Media Coverage. The motion was scheduled on 22
December 2014, 2PM. According to petitioners, they were
only able to serve the Motion on Pemberton’s counsel through
registered mail. In any case, they claim to have also “furnished
a copy of the [M]otion personally … at the hearing of the
[M]otion. On 23 December 2014, the Urgent Motion was
denied, as well as its motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE: Are the averments of the petitioner, which the 3-day
notice rule should be should be liberally applied due to the
timing of the arrest and arraignment, tenable?
RULING: NO. Rule 15, Section 4 of the Rules of Court
clearly makes it a mandatory rule that the adverse party be
given notice of hearing on the motion at least three days prior.
Failure to comply with this notice requirement renders the
motion defective consistent with protecting the adverse party’s
right to procedural due process.
While the general rule is that a motion that fails to comply
with the requirements of Rule 15 is a mere scrap of paper, an
exception may be made and the motion may still be acted
upon by the court, provided doing so will neither cause
prejudice to the other party nor violate his or her due process
rights. The adverse party must be given time to study the
motion in order to enable him or her to prepare properly and
engage the arguments of the movant. In this case, the general
rule must apply because Pemberton was not given sufficient
time to study petitioners’ Motion, thereby depriving him of his
right to procedural due process.
Petitioners admit that they personally furnished Pemberton a
copy of the Urgent Motion to Compel the Armed Forces of the
Philippines to Surrender Custody of Accused to the Olongapo
City Jail only during the hearing. They attempt to elude the
consequences of this belated notice by arguing that they also
served a copy of the Motion by registered mail on
Pemberton’s counsel. They also attempt to underscore the
urgency of the Motion by making a reference to the Christmas
season and the “series of legal holidays” where courts would
be closed. To compound their obfuscation, petitioners claim
that the hearing held on December 22, 2014, attended by
Pemberton’s counsel sufficiently satisfied the rationale of the
three-day notice rule. These circumstances taken together do
not cure the Motion’s deficiencies. Even granting that
Pemberton’s counsel was able to comment on the motion
orally during the hearing, which incidentally was set for
another incident, it cannot be said that Pemberton was able to
study and prepare for his counterarguments to the issues raised
in the Motion. Judge Ginez-J abalde was correct to deny the
Urgent Motion to Compel the Armed Forces of the Philippines
to Surrender Custody of Accused to the Olongapo City Jail
based on noncompliance of procedural rules. To rule
otherwise would be to prejudice Pemberton’s rights as an
accused.
Nation Petroleum Gas VS RCBC
G.R. No. 183379 August 17, 2015
DOCTRINE: Jurisdiction over the service of summons
FACTS:
Respondent filed against petitioner a Complaint5 for civil
damages arising from estafa in relation to violations of the
Trust Receipts Law. after an ex parte hearing was conducted,
respondent’s prayer for a writ of preliminary attachment was
granted and the corresponding writ was issued.6 Thereafter,
Sheriff Leodel N. Roxas served upon petitioners a copy of the
summons, complaint, application for attachment, respondent’s
affidavit and bond, and the order and writ of attachment.
Petitioners filed through counsel a Special Appearance with
Motion to Dismiss8 on November 15, 2006. They asserted that
the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the corporation
since the summons was improperly served upon Claudia
Abante (Abante), who is a mere liaison officer and not one of
the corporate officers specifically enumerated in Section 11,
Rule 14 of the Rules. the RTC denied petitioners’ motion to
dismiss and ruled that there was valid service of summons. CA
affirmed RTC decision.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT
ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF THE
DEFENDANT CORPORATION BY SERVICE OF
SUMMONS UPON ITS MERE EMPLOYEE.
RULING: YES.
Service of summons on Domestic Corporation, partnership or
other juridical entity is governed by Section 11, Rule 14 of the
Rules, which states:
SECTION 11. Service upon domestic private juridical entity. –
When the defendant is a corporation, partnership or
association organized under the laws of the Philippines with a
juridical personality, service may be made on the president,
managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary,
treasurer, or in-house counsel.
In this case, Abante proceeded to receive the summons and
accompanying documents only after receiving instructions to
do so from Melinda Ang, an individual petitioner herein and
the petitioner corporation’s corporate secretary. It is clear,
therefore, that Abante, in so receiving the summons, did so in
representation of Ang who, as corporate secretary, is one of
the officers competent under the Rules of Court to receive
summons on behalf of a private juridical person. Thus, while it
may be true that there was no direct, physical handing of the
summons to Ang, the latter could at least be charged with
having constructively received the same, which in Our view,
amounts to a valid service of summons.
SUNRISE GARDEN CORP vs CA
FACTS: In 1999, Antipolo City constructed a city road to
connect Barangay Cupang and Marcos Highway. Sunrise
Garden Corporation was an affected landowner. Its property
was located in Barangay Cupang, which Sunrise Garden
Corporation planned to develop into a memorial park. The city
road project, thus, became a joint project of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Antipolo, Barangay Cupang, Barangay
Mayamot, and Sunrise Garden Corporation. Hardrock
Aggregates, Inc., prevented Sunrise Garden Corporation's
contractor from using an access road to move the construction
equipment. Sunrise Garden Corporation filed a Complaint for
damages with prayer for temporary restraining order and writ
of preliminary injunction against Hardrock Aggregates, Inc.
While the Complaint was pending, informal settlers started to
encroach on the area of the proposed city road. The trial court
granted Sunrise Garden Corporation's Motion.

On January 29, 2003, the trial court issued an Order stating

that since First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. could
not prove ownership over the properties, then First Alliance
Real Estate Development, Inc. or any of its hired security
agencies must comply with the Amended Writ of Preliminary
Injunction. K-9 Security Agency and First Alliance Real
Estate Development, Inc. filed a Motion for Reconsideration
reiterating their arguments that since the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over them, the Writ of Preliminary
Injunction could not be enforced against them. First Alliance
Real Estate Development, Inc. and K-9 Security Agency's
Motion for Reconsideration was denied.

ISSUE: Whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over

respondent

HELD: No. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other

grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance.
Prescinding from the foregoing, it is thus clear that:

(1) Special appearance operates as an exception to the general

rule on voluntary appearance;

(2) Accordingly, objections to the jurisdiction of the court over

the person of the defendant must be explicitly made, i.e., set
forth in an unequivocal manner; and

(3) Failure to do so constitutes voluntary submission to the

jurisdiction of the court, especially in instances where a
pleading or motion seeking affirmative relief is filed and
submitted to the court for resolution.

The appearance of respondent First Alliance Real Estate

Development, Inc. and K-9 Security Agency should not be
deemed as a voluntary appearance because it was for the
purpose of questioning the jurisdiction of the trial court. The
records of this case show that the defense of... lack of
jurisdiction was raised at the first instance and repeatedly
argued by K-9 Security Agency and respondent First Alliance
Real Estate Development, Inc. in their pleadings.