FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 84464. June 21, 1991.]

SPOUSES JAIME AND TEODORA VILLANUEVA, Petitioners, v. THE HONORABLE

COURT OF APPEALS and CATALINA I. SANCHEZ, Respondents.

Franco L. Loyola for petitioners.

DECISION

CRUZ, J.:

The Regional Trial Court of Cavite dismissed a complaint for the annulment of a deed of sale,
holding that it was not spurious. It was reversed by the Court of Appeals, which found that the
vendor’s signature on the questioned document had indeed been forged. The petitioners are now
before us and urge that the decision of the trial court be reinstated.

In her complaint below, herein private respondent Catalina Sanchez, claiming to be the widow of
Roberto Sanchez, averred that her husband was the owner of a 275 sq. meter parcel of land
located at Rosario, Cavite, which was registered without her knowledge in the name of the herein
petitioners on the strength of an alleged deed of sale executed in their favor by her late husband
on February 7, 1968. Involving the report of a handwriting expert from the Philippine
Constabulary Criminal Investigation Service, who found that the signature on the document was
written by another person, she prayed that the deed of sale be annulled, that the registration of
the lot in the name of the petitioners be canceled, and that the lot be reconveyed to her. 1

In their answer, the petitioners questioned the personality of the private respondent to file the
complaint, contending that the late Roberto Sanchez was never married but had a common-law
wife by whom he had two children. On the merits, they claimed that Roberto Sanchez had
deeded over the lot to them in 1968 for the sum of P500.00 in partial settlement of a judgment
they had obtained against him. They had sued him after he had failed to pay a P1,300.00 loan
they had secured for him and which they had been forced to settle themselves to prevent
foreclosure of the mortgage on their property. 2

On the petitioner’s motion, the trial court required the examination of the deed of sale by the
National Bureau of Investigation to determine if it was a forgery. Trial proceeded in due time,
with the presentation by the parties of their testimonial and documentary evidence. On June 25,
1986, Judge Alejandro C. Silapan rendered judgment in favor of the petitioners.

In his decision, 3 the trial judge rejected the testimony of the handwriting experts from the PC
and the NBI, who had both testified that the standard signature of the late Roberto Sanchez and
the one written on the alleged deed of sale "were written by two different people." He cited Go
Fay v. Bank of the Philippine Islands, 4 in support of his action. Explaining the supposed
differences between the signatures, he said that Roberto Sanchez was "under serious emotional
stress and intensely angry" when he reluctantly signed the document after he had lost the case to
them, "with the added fact that they only wanted to accept his lot for P500.00 and not for the
settlement of the entire obligation of P1,300.00." At that, he said there were really no
fundamental differences between the signatures compared. Moreover, the signatures examined
were from 1970 to 1982 and did not include those written by Roberto Sanchez in 1968.

The decision also noted that Roberto Sanchez did not take any step to annul the deed of sale
although he had knowledge thereof as early as 1968. He thus allowed his action to prescribe
under Article 1431 of the Civil Code. As for the contract of a marriage submitted by the private
respondent, this should also be rejected because although the document was dated September 21,
1964, the Torrens certificate issued to Roberto Sanchez over the subject land on August 25,
1966, described his civil status as "single." It was also doubtful if she could bring the action for
reconveyance alone, even assuming she was the surviving spouse of Roberto Sanchez,
considering that he left illegitimate children and collateral relatives who were also entitled to
share in his estate.

As earlier stated, the decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals, 5 which held that the trial
court did err, as contended by the appellant, in holding that the deed of sale was not spurious;
that the action to annul it had already prescribed; that Catalina Sanchez was not the widow of
Roberto Sanchez; and that she had no capacity to institute the complaint.

Before us now, the petitioners fault the respondent court for a) upholding the testimony of the
expert witnesses against the findings of fact of the trial court; b) annulling the deed of sale; c)
declaring that the action to annul the deed of sale had not yet prescribed; d) not declaring the
private respondent guilty of estoppel; and e) not sustaining the decision of the trial
court.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

We see no reason to disturb the judgment of the Court of Appeals. It is consonant with the
evidence of record and the applicable law and jurisprudence.

The Court notes at the outset that Catalina Sanchez has proved her status as the widow of
Roberto Sanchez with her submission of the marriage contract denominated as Exhibit "A." 6
That evidence rendered unnecessary the presumption that "a man and a woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage" and may also
explain why Roberto Sanchez could not marry the woman by whom he supposedly had two
illegitimate children, assuming these persons did exist. It is strange that the trial court should
reject Exhibit "A" in favor of the Transfer Certificate of Title describing Roberto Sanchez as
"single," 7 disregarding the elementary principle that the best documentary evidence of a
marriage is the marriage contract itself. A Torrens certificate is the best evidence of ownership of
registered land, not of the civil status of the owner.

As the surviving spouse of Roberto Sanchez, the private respondent could validly file the
complaint for the recovery of her late husband’s property, without prejudice to the successional
rights of his other heirs. Parenthetically, (and curiously), although the supposed common-law
wife and her illegitimate children were never presented at the trial, their existence was readily
accepted by the trial court on the basis alone of the petitioner’s unsupported statements.

Coming now to the questioned signature, we find it significant that the examination by the NBI
was requested by the petitioners themselves but in the end it was the private respondent who
presented the NBI handwriting expert as her own witness. 8 The explanation is obvious. The
petitioners hoped to refute the findings of the PC handwriting expert with the findings of the NBI
handwriting expert, but as it turned out the findings of the two witnesses coincided. Both PC
Examiner Corazon Salvador and NBI Examiner Zenaida J. Torres expressed the informed view
that the signature on the deed of sale was not written by Roberto Sanchez. 9

They did not conjure this conclusion out of thin air but supported it with knowledgeable
testimony extensively given on direct and cross-examination on the various characteristics and
differences of the signatures they had examined and compared. 10 The trial judge said the
testimony of PC Examiner Salvador was not reliable because her examination of the document
was "done under circumstance not so trustworthy before the action was instituted." But he did
not consider the fact that her findings were corroborated by NBI Examiner Torres, who
conducted her own examination at the instance of the petitioners themselves and after the action
was instituted. It is worth noting that the competence of the two expert witnesses was never
assailed by the petitioners nor was it questioned by the trial judge. The petitioners also did not
present their own handwriting expert to refute the findings of the government handwriting
experts.

The Court has itself examined the signatures of Roberto Sanchez in the several instruments
among the records of this case, including those dating back to before 1968 11 and is inclined to
accept the findings of the handwriting experts. The case invoked by the petitioners is not
applicable because the differences in the signatures compared in the case at bar were, as the trial
judge found, caused not by time but by the tension gripping Roberto Sanchez when he signed the
deed of sale.chanrobles law library : red

Incidentally, the petitioners have not sufficiently established the reason for such tension, which
appears to be a mere conjecture of the trial judge. No proof was submitted about their filing of
the complaint against Roberto Sanchez. Petitioner Jaime Villanueva himself admitted under oath
that he did not read the decision in the case nor did he ask his lawyer how much had been
awarded against the defendant. 12 Nobody testified about Roberto’s state of mind when he
allegedly signed the document, and in Manila at that although the persons were residing in
Cavite. Even the witnesses to the Bilihan were not presented nor was any explanation for their
absence offered.

The explanation given by the petitioners for their delay in registering the deed of sale is not
convincing. That delay lasted for all of thirteen years. The petitioners suggest they are simple
peasants and did not appreciate the need for the immediate transfer of the property in their name.
They also say that they forgot. The evidence shows, however, that they understood the need for
registering their property for purposes of using it as collateral in case they wanted to borrow
money. It would appear that they thought of simulating the sale registering the subject lot when
their own lands were insufficient to secure a P100,000.00 loan their daughter wanted to borrow.

Concerning the question of prescription, we find that the applicable rule is not Article 1391 of
the Civil Code but Article 1410. Article 1391 provides that the action for annulment of a contract
prescribes in four years in cases where the vice consists of intimidation, violence, undue
influence, mistake, fraud or lack capacity. The deed of sale in question does not suffer from any
of these defects. The supposed vendee’s signature having been proved to be a forgery, the
instrument is totally void or inexistent as "absolutely simulated or fictitious" under Article 1409
of the Civil Code. According to Article 1410, "the action or defense for the declaration of the
inexistence of a contract does not prescribe."cralaw virtua1aw library

Finally, petitioners invoke Article 1431 of the Civil Code and contend that the respondent court
erred in not declaring the private respondent and her late husband estopped from questioning the
deed of sale until after fourteen years from its execution. The inference that Roberto Sanchez and
the private respondent knew about the instrument from that date has not been proved by the
evidence of record. Moreover, we fail to see the applicability of Article 1431, which provides
that "through estoppel an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the person
making it and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon." Neither the
private respondent nor her late husband has made any admission or representation to the
petitioners regarding the subject land that they are supposed to have relied upon.chanrobles
virtual lawlibrary

Our own finding is that the petitioners have not proved the validity and authenticity of the deed
of sale or even the circumstances that supposedly led to its execution by the late Roberto
Sanchez. On the contrary, we are convinced from the testimonies of the handwriting experts that
his signature had been forged on the questioned document and that he had not conveyed the
subject land to the petitioners. The deed of sale being a forgery, it was totally void or inexistent
and so could be challenged at any time, the action for its nullification being imprescriptible. The
private respondent, as the widow of Roberto Sanchez, has the capacity to sue for the recovery of
the land in question and is not estopped from doing so.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the challenged decision is AFFIRMED, with costs
against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Gancayco, J., is on leave.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 173540 January 22, 2014

PEREGRINA MACUA VDA. DE AVENIDO, Petitioner,

vs.
TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO, Respondent.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.ofthe Rules of Court, assailing the 31
August 2005 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 79444, which
reversed the 25 March 2003 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 8 of Davao
City, in a complaint for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriage· docketed as Civil Case No.
26, 908-98.

The Facts

This case involves a contest between two women both claiming to have been validly married to
the same man, now deceased.

Respondent Tecla Hoybia Avenido (Tecla) instituted on 11 November 1998, a Complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Peregrina Macua Vda. de Avenido (Peregrina) on the
ground that she (Tecla), is the lawful wife of the deceased Eustaquio Avenido (Eustaquio). In her
complaint, Tecla alleged that her marriage to Eustaquio was solemnized on 30 September 1942
in Talibon, Bohol in rites officiated by the Parish Priest of the said town. According to her, the
fact of their marriage is evidenced by a Marriage Certificate recorded with the Office of the
Local Civil Registrar (LCR) of Talibon, Bohol. However, due to World War II, records were
destroyed. Thus, only a Certification3 was issued by the LCR.

During the existence of Tecla and Eustaquio’s union, they begot four (4) children, namely:
Climaco H. Avenido, born on 30 March 1943; Apolinario H. Avenido, born on 23 August 1948;
Editha A. Ausa, born on 26 July 1950, and Eustaquio H. Avenido, Jr., born on 15 December
1952. Sometime in 1954, Eustaquio left his family and his whereabouts was not known. In 1958,
Tecla and her children were informed that Eustaquio was in Davao City living with another
woman by the name of Buenaventura Sayson who later died in 1977 without any issue.

In 1979, Tecla learned that her husband Eustaquio got married to another woman by the name of
Peregrina, which marriage she claims must be declared null and void for being bigamous – an
action she sought to protect the rights of her children over the properties acquired by Eustaquio.
On 12 April 1999, Peregrina filed her answer to the complaint with counterclaim,4 essentially
averring that she is the legal surviving spouse of Eustaquio who died on 22 September 1989 in
Davao City, their marriage having been celebrated on 30 March 1979 at St. Jude Parish in Davao
City. She also contended that the case was instituted to deprive her of the properties she owns in
her own right and as an heir of Eustaquio.

Trial ensued.

Tecla presented testimonial and documentary evidence consisting of:

1) Testimonies of Adelina Avenido-Ceno (Adelina), Climaco Avenido (Climaco) and

Tecla herself to substantiate her alleged prior existing and valid marriage with (sic)
Eustaquio;

2) Documentary evidence such as the following:

a. Certification of Loss/Destruction of Record of Marriage from 1900 to 1944

issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar, Municipality of Talibon, Bohol;5

b. Certification of Submission of a copy of Certificate of Marriage to the Office of

the Civil Registrar General, National Statistics Office (NSO), R. Magsaysay
Blvd., Sta Mesa, Manila;6

c. Certification that Civil Registry records of births, deaths and marriages that
were actually filed in the Office of the Civil Registrar General, NSO Manila,
started only in 1932;7

d. Certification that Civil Registry records submitted to the Office of the Civil
Registrar General, NSO, from 1932 to the early part of 1945, were totally
destroyed during the liberation of Manila;8

e. Certification of Birth of Apolinario Avenido;9

f. Certification of Birth of Eustaquio Avenido, Jr.;10

g. Certification of Birth of Editha Avenido;11

h. Certification of Marriage between Eustaquio Sr., and Tecla issued by the Parish
Priest of Talibon, Bohol on 30 September 1942;12

i. Certification that record of birth from 1900 to 1944 were destroyed by Second
World War issued by the Office of the Municipal Registrar of Talibon, Bohol,
that they cannot furnish as requested a true transcription from the Register of
Birth of Climaco Avenido;13
 j. Certificate of Baptism of Climaco indicating that he was born on 30 March
1943 to spouses Eustaquio and Tecla;14

k. Electronic copy of the Marriage Contract between Eustaquio and Peregrina.15

On the other hand, Peregrina testified on, among others, her marriage to Eustaquio that took
place in Davao City on 3 March 1979; her life as a wife and how she took care of Eustaquio
when he already had poor health, as well as her knowledge that Tecla is not the legal wife, but
was once a common law wife of Eustaquio.16 Peregrina likewise set forth documentary evidence
to substantiate her allegations and to prove her claim for damages, to wit:

1) Marriage Contract17 between Pregrina and the late Eustaquio showing the date of
marriage on 3 March 1979;

2) Affidavit of Eustaquio executed on 22 March 1985 declaring himself as single when

he contracted marriage with the petitioner although he had a common law relation with
one Tecla Hoybia with whom he had four (4) children namely: Climaco, Tiburcio, Editha
and Eustaquio, Jr., all surnamed Avenido;18

3) Letter of Atty. Edgardo T. Mata dated 15 April 2002, addressed to the Civil Registrar
of the Municipality of Alegria, Surigao del Norte;19 and

4) Certification dated 25 April 2002 issued by Colita P. Umipig, in her capacity as the
Civil Registrar of Alegria, Surigao del Norte.20

In addition, as basis for the counterclaim, Peregrina averred that the case was initiated in bad
faith so as to deprive her of the properties she owns in her own right and as an heir of Eustaquio;
hence, her entitlement to damages and attorney’s fees.

On 25 March 2003, the RTC rendered a Decision21 denying Tecla’s petition, as well as
Peregrina’s counter-claim. The dispositive portion thereof reads:

For The Foregoing, the petition for the "DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE" filed
by petitioner TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO against respondent PEREGRINA MACUA is hereby
DENIED.

The "COUNTERCLAIM" filed by respondent PEREGRINA MACUA against petitioner

TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO is hereby DISMISSED.22

Not convinced, Tecla appealed to the CA raising as error the trial court’s alleged disregard of the
evidence on the existence of her marriage to Eustaquio.

In its 31 August 2005 Decision,23 the CA ruled in favor of Tecla by declaring the validity of her
marriage to Eustaquio, while pronouncing on the other hand, the marriage between Peregrina and
Eustaquio to be bigamous, and thus, null and void. The CA ruled:
The court a quo committed a reversible error when it disregarded (1) the testimonies of
[Adelina], the sister of EUSTAQUIO who testified that she personally witnessed the wedding
celebration of her older brother EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla] on 30 September 1942 at Talibon,
Bohol; [Climaco], the eldest son of EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla], who testified that his mother
[Tecla] was married to his father, EUSTAQUIO, and [Tecla] herself; and (2) the documentary
evidence mentioned at the outset. It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the
marriage contract, both constituting the condition sine qua non, for the introduction of secondary
evidence of its contents, were shown by the very evidence the trial court has disregarded.24

Peregrina now questions the said ruling assigning as error, among others, the failure of the CA to
appreciate the validity of her marriage to Eustaquio. For its part, the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), in its Memorandum25 dated 5 June 2008, raises the following legal issues:

1. Whether or not the court can validly rely on the "presumption of marriage" to overturn
the validity of a subsequent marriage;

2. Whether or not secondary evidence may be considered and/or taken cognizance of,
without proof of the execution or existence and the cause of the unavailability of the best
evidence, the original document;

and

3. Whether or not a Certificate of Marriage issued by the church has a probative value to
prove the existence of a valid marriage without the priest who issued the same being
presented to the witness stand.26

Our Ruling

Essentially, the question before us is whether or not the evidence presented during the trial
proves the existence of the marriage of Tecla to Eustaquio.

The trial court, in ruling against Tecla’s claim of her prior valid marriage to Eustaquio relied on
Tecla’s failure to present her certificate of marriage to Eustaquio. Without such certificate, the
trial court considered as useless the certification of the Office of the Civil Registrar of Talibon,
Bohol, that it has no more records of marriages during the period 1900 to 1944. The same thing
was said as regards the Certification issued by the National Statistics Office of Manila. The trial
court observed:

Upon verification from the NSO, Office of the Civil Registrar General, Manila, it, likewise,
issued a Certification (Exhibit "B") stating that:

records from 1932 up to early part of 1945 were totally destroyed during the liberation of Manila
on February 4, 1945. What are presently filed in this office are records from the latter part of
1945 to date, except for the city of Manila which starts from 1952. Hence, this office has no way
of verifying and could not issue as requested, certified true copy of the records of marriage
between [Eustaquio] and [Tecla], alleged to have been married on 30th September 1942, in
Talibon, Bohol.27

In the absence of the marriage contract, the trial court did not give credence to the testimony of
Tecla and her witnesses as it considered the same as mere self-serving assertions. Superior
significance was given to the fact that Tecla could not even produce her own copy of the said
proof of marriage. Relying on Section 3 (a) and Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the
trial court declared that Tecla failed to prove the existence of the first marriage.

The CA, on the other hand, concluded that there was a presumption of lawful marriage between
Tecla and Eustaquio as they deported themselves as husband and wife and begot four (4)
children. Such presumption, supported by documentary evidence consisting of the same
Certifications disregarded by the trial court, as well as the testimonial evidence especially that of
Adelina Avenido-Ceno, created, according to the CA, sufficient proof of the fact of marriage.
Contrary to the trial court’s ruling, the CA found that its appreciation of the evidence presented
by Tecla is well in accord with Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

We uphold the reversal by the CA of the decision of the trial court. Quite recently, in Añonuevo
v. Intestate Estate of Rodolfo G. Jalandoni,28 we said, citing precedents, that:

While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is not
regarded as the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage. Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of
marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a
person’s birth certificate may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between his
parents.

The error of the trial court in ruling that without the marriage certificate, no other proof of the
fact can be accepted, has been aptly delineated in Vda de Jacob v. Court of Appeals.29 Thus:

It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract, both
constituting the conditio sine qua non for the introduction of secondary evidence of its contents,
were shown by the very evidence they have disregarded. They have thus confused the evidence
to show due execution and loss as "secondary" evidence of the marriage. In Hernaez v. Mcgrath,
the Court clarified this misconception thus:

x x x [T]he court below was entirely mistaken in holding that parol evidence of the execution of
the instrument was barred. The court confounded the execution and the contents of the
document. It is the contents, x x x which may not be proven by secondary evidence when the

instrument itself is accessible. Proofs of the execution are not dependent on the existence or non-
existence of the document, and, as a matter of fact, such proofs of the contents: due execution,
besides the loss, has to be shown as foundation for the inroduction of secondary evidence of the
contents.

xxxx
Evidence of the execution of a document is, in the last analysis, necessarily collateral or primary.
It generally consists of parol testimony or extrinsic papers. Even when the document is actually
produced, its authencity is not necessarily, if at all, determined from its face or recital of its
contents but by parol evidence. At the most, failure to produce the document, when available, to
establish its execution may effect the weight of the evidence presented but not the admissibility
of such evidence.

The Court of Appeals, as well as the trial court, tried to justify its stand on this issue by relying
on Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete. But even there, we said that "marriage may be prove[n] by other
competent evidence.

Truly, the execution of a document may be proven by the parties themselves, by the swearing
officer, by witnesses who saw and recognized the signatures of the parties; or even by those to
whom the parties have previously narrated the execution thereof. The Court has also held that
"[t]he loss may be shown by any person who [knows] the fact of its loss, or by any one who ha[s]
made, in the judgment of the court, a sufficient examination in the place or places where the
document or papers of similar character are usually kept by the person in whose custody the
document lost was, and has been unable to find it; or who has made any other investigation
which is sufficient to satisfy the court that the instrument [has] indeed [been] lost."

In the present case, due execution was established by the testimonies of Adela Pilapil, who was
present during the marriage ceremony, and of petitioner herself as a party to the event. The
subsequent loss was shown by the testimony and the affidavit of the officiating priest, Monsignor
Yllana, as relevant, competent and admissible evidence. Since the due execution and the loss of
the marriage contract were clearly shown by the evidence presented, secondary evidence–
testimonial and documentary–may be admitted to prove the fact of marriage.30

As correctly stated by the appellate court:

In the case at bench, the celebration of marriage between [Tecla] and EUSTAQUIO was
established by the testimonial evidence furnished by [Adelina] who appears to be present during
the marriage ceremony, and by [Tecla] herself as a living witness to the event. The loss was
shown by the certifications issued by the NSO and LCR of Talibon, Bohol. These are relevant,
competent and admissible evidence. Since the due execution and the loss of the marriage
contract were clearly shown by the evidence presented, secondary evidence – testimonial and
documentary – may be admitted to prove the fact of marriage. In PUGEDA v. TRIAS, the

Supreme Court held that "marriage may be proven by any competent and relevant evidence. The
testimony by one of the parties to the marriage or by one of the witnesses to the marriage has
been held to be admissible to prove the fact of marriage. The person who officiated at the
solemnization is also competent to testify as an eyewitness to the fact of marriage."

xxxx

The court a quo committed a reversible error when it disregarded (1) the testimonies of
[Adelina], the sister of EUSTAQUIO who testified that she personally witnessed the wedding
celebration of her older brother EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla] on 30 September 1942 at Talibon,
Bohol; [Climaco], the eldest son of EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla], who testified that his mother
[Tecla] was married to his father, EUSTAQUIO, and [Tecla] herself; and (2) the documentary
evidence mentioned at the outset. It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the
marriage contract, both constituting the condition sine qua non for the introduction of secondary
evidence of its contents, were shown by the very evidence the trial court has disregarded.31

The starting point then, is the presumption of marriage.

As early as the case of Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,32 this Court has elucidated on the rationale
behind the presumption:

The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage.1âwphi1 Marriage
in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the
maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law
leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are
presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in
fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not
what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of
decency and of law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is that a man and
a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage. (Sec. 334, No. 28) Semper – praesumitur pro matrimonio – Always presume marriage.

In the case at bar, the establishment of the fact of marriage was completed by the testimonies of
Adelina, Climaco and Tecla; the unrebutted the certifications of marriage issued by the parish
priest of the Most Holy Trinity Cathedral of Talibon, Bohol.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 79444 is AFFIRMED. The marriage between petitioner Peregrina Macua
Avenido and the deceased Eustaquio Avenido is hereby declared NULL and VOID. No
pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985

ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner,

vs.
HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch CX, Regional Trial
Court of the National Capital Region Pasay City and RICHARD UPTON respondents.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:\

In this Petition for certiorari and Prohibition, petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn seeks to set aside
the Orders, dated September 15, 1983 and August 3, 1984, in Civil Case No. 1075-P, issued by
respondent Judge, which denied her Motion to Dismiss said case, and her Motion for
Reconsideration of the Dismissal Order, respectively.

The basic background facts are that petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private
respondent is a citizen of the United States; that they were married in Hongkong in 1972; that,
after the marriage, they established their residence in the Philippines; that they begot two
children born on April 4, 1973 and December 18, 1975, respectively; that the parties were
divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982; and that petitioner has re-married also in Nevada,
this time to Theodore Van Dorn.

Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner in Civil Case No. 1075-P of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch CXV, in Pasay City, stating that petitioner's business in Ermita,
Manila, (the Galleon Shop, for short), is conjugal property of the parties, and asking that
petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that private respondent be
declared with right to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the
ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before
the Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no
community property" as of June 11, 1982. The Court below denied the Motion to Dismiss in the
mentioned case on the ground that the property involved is located in the Philippines so that the
Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. The denial is now the subject of this certiorari
proceeding.

Generally, the denial of a Motion to Dismiss in a civil case is interlocutory and is not subject to
appeal. certiorari and Prohibition are neither the remedies to question the propriety of an
interlocutory order of the trial Court. However, when a grave abuse of discretion was patently
committed, or the lower Court acted capriciously and whimsically, then it devolves upon this
Court in a certiorari proceeding to exercise its supervisory authority and to correct the error
committed which, in such a case, is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. 1 Prohibition would then
lie since it would be useless and a waste of time to go ahead with the proceedings. 2 Weconsider
the petition filed in this case within the exception, and we have given it due course.

For resolution is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged conjugal
property in the Philippines.

Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from laying claim on the alleged conjugal
property because of the representation he made in the divorce proceedings before the American
Court that they had no community of property; that the Galleon Shop was not established
through conjugal funds, and that respondent's claim is barred by prior judgment.

For his part, respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada Court cannot prevail
over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy; that the acts and
declaration of a foreign Court cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public policy, divest
Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction.

For the resolution of this case, it is not necessary to determine whether the property relations
between petitioner and private respondent, after their marriage, were upon absolute or relative
community property, upon complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. The
pivotal fact in this case is the Nevada divorce of the parties.

The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had obtained jurisdiction over petitioner
who appeared in person before the Court during the trial of the case. It also obtained jurisdiction
over private respondent who, giving his address as No. 381 Bush Street, San Francisco,
California, authorized his attorneys in the divorce case, Karp & Gradt Ltd., to agree to the
divorce on the ground of incompatibility in the understanding that there were neither community
property nor community obligations. 3 As explicitly stated in the Power of Attorney he executed
in favor of the law firm of KARP & GRAD LTD., 336 W. Liberty, Reno, Nevada, to represent
him in the divorce proceedings:

xxx xxx xxx

You are hereby authorized to accept service of Summons, to file an Answer,

appear on my behalf and do an things necessary and proper to represent me,
without further contesting, subject to the following:

1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on the ground of incompatibility.

2. That there is no community of property to be adjudicated by the Court.

3. 'I'hat there are no community obligations to be adjudicated by the court.

xxx xxx xxx 4

There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the
United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance,
private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. What he is
contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same
being contrary to local law and public policy.

It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, 5 only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according
to their national law. 6 In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the
marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As
stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794,
799:

The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a
court of competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic
relation of husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The marriage
tie when thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a
wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides,
in the nature of a penalty. that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as
well as the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage.

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He
would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise
control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which
validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped
by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal
property.

To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still
married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq.
of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe
respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to
be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated
against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted, and respondent Judge is hereby ordered to dismiss the
Complaint filed in Civil Case No. 1075-P of his Court.

Without costs.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 152577 September 21, 2005

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners,

vs.
CRASUS L. IYOY, Respondent.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner
Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, prays for the
reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62539, dated 30 July 2001,1
affirming the Judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 22, in Civil
Case No. CEB-20077, dated 30 October 1998,2 declaring the marriage between respondent
Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy null and void on the basis of Article 36 of the Family
Code of the Philippines.

The proceedings before the RTC commenced with the filing of a Complaint3 for declaration of
nullity of marriage by respondent Crasus on 25 March 1997. According to the said Complaint,
respondent Crasus married Fely on 16 December 1961 at Bradford Memorial Church, Jones
Avenue, Cebu City. As a result of their union, they had five children – Crasus, Jr., Daphne,
Debbie, Calvert, and Carlos – who are now all of legal ages. After the celebration of their
marriage, respondent Crasus discovered that Fely was "hot-tempered, a nagger and extravagant."
In 1984, Fely left the Philippines for the United States of America (U.S.A.), leaving all of their
five children, the youngest then being only six years old, to the care of respondent Crasus. Barely
a year after Fely left for the U.S.A., respondent Crasus received a letter from her requesting that
he sign the enclosed divorce papers; he disregarded the said request. Sometime in 1985,
respondent Crasus learned, through the letters sent by Fely to their children, that Fely got
married to an American, with whom she eventually had a child. In 1987, Fely came back to the
Philippines with her American family, staying at Cebu Plaza Hotel in Cebu City. Respondent
Crasus did not bother to talk to Fely because he was afraid he might not be able to bear the
sorrow and the pain she had caused him. Fely returned to the Philippines several times more: in
1990, for the wedding of their eldest child, Crasus, Jr.; in 1992, for the brain operation of their
fourth child, Calvert; and in 1995, for unknown reasons. Fely continued to live with her
American family in New Jersey, U.S.A. She had been openly using the surname of her American
husband in the Philippines and in the U.S.A. For the wedding of Crasus, Jr., Fely herself had
invitations made in which she was named as "Mrs. Fely Ada Micklus." At the time the
Complaint was filed, it had been 13 years since Fely left and abandoned respondent Crasus, and
there was no more possibility of reconciliation between them. Respondent Crasus finally alleged
in his Complaint that Fely’s acts brought danger and dishonor to the family, and clearly
demonstrated her psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage. Such
incapacity, being incurable and continuing, constitutes a ground for declaration of nullity of
marriage under Article 36, in relation to Articles 68, 70, and 72, of the Family Code of the
Philippines.

Fely filed her Answer and Counterclaim4 with the RTC on 05 June 1997. She asserted therein
that she was already an American citizen since 1988 and was now married to Stephen Micklus.
While she admitted being previously married to respondent Crasus and having five children with
him, Fely refuted the other allegations made by respondent Crasus in his Complaint. She
explained that she was no more hot-tempered than any normal person, and she may had been
indignant at respondent Crasus on certain occasions but it was because of the latter’s
drunkenness, womanizing, and lack of sincere effort to find employment and to contribute to the
maintenance of their household. She could not have been extravagant since the family hardly had
enough money for basic needs. Indeed, Fely left for abroad for financial reasons as respondent
Crasus had no job and what she was then earning as the sole breadwinner in the Philippines was
insufficient to support their family. Although she left all of her children with respondent Crasus,
she continued to provide financial support to them, as well as, to respondent Crasus.
Subsequently, Fely was able to bring her children to the U.S.A., except for one, Calvert, who had
to stay behind for medical reasons. While she did file for divorce from respondent Crasus, she
denied having herself sent a letter to respondent Crasus requesting him to sign the enclosed
divorce papers. After securing a divorce from respondent Crasus, Fely married her American
husband and acquired American citizenship. She argued that her marriage to her American
husband was legal because now being an American citizen, her status shall be governed by the
law of her present nationality. Fely also pointed out that respondent Crasus himself was presently
living with another woman who bore him a child. She also accused respondent Crasus of
misusing the amount of ₱90,000.00 which she advanced to him to finance the brain operation of
their son, Calvert. On the basis of the foregoing, Fely also prayed that the RTC declare her
marriage to respondent Crasus null and void; and that respondent Crasus be ordered to pay to
Fely the ₱90,000.00 she advanced to him, with interest, plus, moral and exemplary damages,
attorney’s fees, and litigation expenses.

After respondent Crasus and Fely had filed their respective Pre-Trial Briefs,5 the RTC afforded
both parties the opportunity to present their evidence. Petitioner Republic participated in the trial
through the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu.6

Respondent Crasus submitted the following pieces of evidence in support of his Complaint: (1)
his own testimony on 08 September 1997, in which he essentially reiterated the allegations in his
Complaint;7 (2) the Certification, dated 13 April 1989, by the Health Department of Cebu City,
on the recording of the Marriage Contract between respondent Crasus and Fely in the Register of
Deeds, such marriage celebration taking place on 16 December 1961;8 and (3) the invitation to
the wedding of Crasus, Jr., their eldest son, wherein Fely openly used her American husband’s
surname, Micklus.9

Fely’s counsel filed a Notice,10 and, later on, a Motion,11 to take the deposition of witnesses,
namely, Fely and her children, Crasus, Jr. and Daphne, upon written interrogatories, before the
consular officers of the Philippines in New York and California, U.S.A, where the said witnesses
reside. Despite the Orders12 and Commissions13 issued by the RTC to the Philippine Consuls of
New York and California, U.S.A., to take the depositions of the witnesses upon written
interrogatories, not a single deposition was ever submitted to the RTC. Taking into account that
it had been over a year since respondent Crasus had presented his evidence and that Fely failed
to exert effort to have the case progress, the RTC issued an Order, dated 05 October 1998,14
considering Fely to have waived her right to present her evidence. The case was thus deemed
submitted for decision.

Not long after, on 30 October 1998, the RTC promulgated its Judgment declaring the marriage of
respondent Crasus and Fely null and void ab initio, on the basis of the following findings –

The ground bearing defendant’s psychological incapacity deserves a reasonable consideration.

As observed, plaintiff’s testimony is decidedly credible. The Court finds that defendant had
indeed exhibited unmistakable signs of psychological incapacity to comply with her marital
duties such as striving for family unity, observing fidelity, mutual love, respect, help and
support. From the evidence presented, plaintiff adequately established that the defendant
practically abandoned him. She obtained a divorce decree in the United States of America and
married another man and has establish [sic] another family of her own. Plaintiff is in an
anomalous situation, wherein he is married to a wife who is already married to another man in
another country.

Defendant’s intolerable traits may not have been apparent or manifest before the marriage, the
FAMILY CODE nonetheless allows the annulment of the marriage provided that these were
eventually manifested after the wedding. It appears to be the case in this instance.

Certainly defendant’s posture being an irresponsible wife erringly reveals her very low regard for
that sacred and inviolable institution of marriage which is the foundation of human society
throughout the civilized world. It is quite evident that the defendant is bereft of the mind, will
and heart to comply with her marital obligations, such incapacity was already there at the time of
the marriage in question is shown by defendant’s own attitude towards her marriage to plaintiff.

In sum, the ground invoked by plaintiff which is defendant’s psychological incapacity to comply
with the essential marital obligations which already existed at the time of the marriage in
question has been satisfactorily proven. The evidence in herein case establishes the
irresponsibility of defendant Fely Ada Rosal Iyoy, firmly.

Going over plaintiff’s testimony which is decidedly credible, the Court finds that the defendant
had indeed exhibited unmistakable signs of such psychological incapacity to comply with her
marital obligations. These are her excessive disposition to material things over and above the
marital stability. That such incapacity was already there at the time of the marriage in question is
shown by defendant’s own attitude towards her marriage to plaintiff. And for these reasons there
is a legal ground to declare the marriage of plaintiff Crasus L. Iyoy and defendant Fely Ada
Rosal Iyoy null and void ab initio.15

Petitioner Republic, believing that the afore-quoted Judgment of the RTC was contrary to law
and evidence, filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court, though, in its
Decision, dated 30 July 2001, affirmed the appealed Judgment of the RTC, finding no reversible
error therein. It even offered additional ratiocination for declaring the marriage between
respondent Crasus and Fely null and void, to wit –

Defendant secured a divorce from plaintiff-appellee abroad, has remarried, and is now
permanently residing in the United States. Plaintiff-appellee categorically stated this as one of his
reasons for seeking the declaration of nullity of their marriage…

Article 26 of the Family Code provides:

"Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force
in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

"WHERE A MARRIAGE BETWEEN A FILIPINO CITIZEN AND A FOREIGNER IS

VALIDLY CELEBRATED AND A DIVORCE IS THEREAFTER VALIDLY OBTAINED
ABROAD BY THE ALIEN SPOUSE CAPACITATING HIM OR HER TO REMARRY, THE
FILIPINO SPOUSE SHALL LIKEWISE HAVE CAPACITY TO REMARRY UNDER
PHILIPPINE LAW."

The rationale behind the second paragraph of the above-quoted provision is to avoid the absurd
and unjust situation of a Filipino citizen still being married to his or her alien spouse, although
the latter is no longer married to the Filipino spouse because he or she has obtained a divorce
abroad. In the case at bench, the defendant has undoubtedly acquired her American husband’s
citizenship and thus has become an alien as well. This Court cannot see why the benefits of Art.
26 aforequoted can not be extended to a Filipino citizen whose spouse eventually embraces
another citizenship and thus becomes herself an alien.

It would be the height of unfairness if, under these circumstances, plaintiff would still be
considered as married to defendant, given her total incapacity to honor her marital covenants to
the former. To condemn plaintiff to remain shackled in a marriage that in truth and in fact does
not exist and to remain married to a spouse who is incapacitated to discharge essential marital
covenants, is verily to condemn him to a perpetual disadvantage which this Court finds abhorrent
and will not countenance. Justice dictates that plaintiff be given relief by affirming the trial
court’s declaration of the nullity of the marriage of the parties.16

After the Court of Appeals, in a Resolution, dated 08 March 2002,17 denied its Motion for
Reconsideration, petitioner Republic filed the instant Petition before this Court, based on the
following arguments/grounds –

I. Abandonment by and sexual infidelity of respondent’s wife do not per se constitute

psychological incapacity.
II. The Court of Appeals has decided questions of substance not in accord with law and
jurisprudence considering that the Court of Appeals committed serious errors of law in ruling
that Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code is inapplicable to the case at bar.18

In his Comment19 to the Petition, respondent Crasus maintained that Fely’s psychological
incapacity was clearly established after a full-blown trial, and that paragraph 2 of Article 26 of
the Family Code of the Philippines was indeed applicable to the marriage of respondent Crasus
and Fely, because the latter had already become an American citizen. He further questioned the
personality of petitioner Republic, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, to institute
the instant Petition, because Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines authorizes the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to the trial court, not the Solicitor General, to intervene on
behalf of the State, in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages.

After having reviewed the records of this case and the applicable laws and jurisprudence, this
Court finds the instant Petition to be meritorious.

The totality of evidence presented during trial is insufficient to support the finding of
psychological incapacity of Fely.

Article 36, concededly one of the more controversial provisions of the Family Code of the
Philippines, reads –

ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

Issues most commonly arise as to what constitutes psychological incapacity. In a series of cases,
this Court laid down guidelines for determining its existence.

In Santos v. Court of Appeals,20 the term psychological incapacity was defined, thus –

". . . [P]sychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity
that causes a party to be truly cognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of
the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and
fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has
been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated…21

The psychological incapacity must be characterized by –

(a) Gravity – It must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out
the ordinary duties required in a marriage;

(b) Juridical Antecedence – It must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage,
although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and

(c) Incurability – It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the
means of the party involved.22

More definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code
of the Philippines were handed down by this Court in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,23
which, although quite lengthy, by its significance, deserves to be reproduced below –

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish
the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article
on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally
"inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family
and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes
their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified,
(b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not
physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must
convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an
extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them,
could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be
given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists
and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage.
The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's."
The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must
have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be
relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to
marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job…
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other
words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element
in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same
Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also
be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church
in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts…

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General
issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for
his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along
with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days
from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General
shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.24

A later case, Marcos v. Marcos,25 further clarified that there is no requirement that the
defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a
condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological
incapacity. Such psychological incapacity, however, must be established by the totality of the
evidence presented during the trial.

Using the guidelines established by the afore-mentioned jurisprudence, this Court finds that the
totality of evidence presented by respondent Crasus failed miserably to establish the alleged
psychological incapacity of his wife Fely; therefore, there is no basis for declaring their marriage
null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines.

The only substantial evidence presented by respondent Crasus before the RTC was his testimony,
which can be easily put into question for being self-serving, in the absence of any other
corroborating evidence. He submitted only two other pieces of evidence: (1) the Certification on
the recording with the Register of Deeds of the Marriage Contract between respondent Crasus
and Fely, such marriage being celebrated on 16 December 1961; and (2) the invitation to the
wedding of Crasus, Jr., their eldest son, in which Fely used her American husband’s surname.
Even considering the admissions made by Fely herself in her Answer to respondent Crasus’s
Complaint filed with the RTC, the evidence is not enough to convince this Court that Fely had
such a grave mental illness that prevented her from assuming the essential obligations of
marriage.
It is worthy to emphasize that Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines contemplates
downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital
obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the errant
spouse.26 Irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and
abandonment, by themselves, also do not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under the
said Article.27

As has already been stressed by this Court in previous cases, Article 36 "is not to be confused
with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifest
themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the
celebration of marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness
of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume."28

The evidence may have proven that Fely committed acts that hurt and embarrassed respondent
Crasus and the rest of the family. Her hot-temper, nagging, and extravagance; her abandonment
of respondent Crasus; her marriage to an American; and even her flaunting of her American
family and her American surname, may indeed be manifestations of her alleged incapacity to
comply with her marital obligations; nonetheless, the root cause for such was not identified. If
the root cause of the incapacity was not identified, then it cannot be satisfactorily established as a
psychological or mental defect that is serious or grave; neither could it be proven to be in
existence at the time of celebration of the marriage; nor that it is incurable. While the personal
examination of Fely by a psychiatrist or psychologist is no longer mandatory for the declaration
of nullity of their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines, by virtue of
this Court’s ruling in Marcos v. Marcos,29 respondent Crasus must still have complied with the
requirement laid down in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina30 that the root cause of the
incapacity be identified as a psychological illness and that its incapacitating nature be fully
explained.

In any case, any doubt shall be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.31 No less than
the Constitution of 1987 sets the policy to protect and strengthen the family as the basic social
institution and marriage as the foundation of the family.32

II

Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines is not applicable to the case at
bar.

According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines –

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one of the couple
getting married is a Filipino citizen and the other a foreigner at the time the marriage was
celebrated. By its plain and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot be applied to the
case of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained her divorce,
she was still a Filipino citizen. Although the exact date was not established, Fely herself
admitted in her Answer filed before the RTC that she obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus
sometime after she left for the United States in 1984, after which she married her American
husband in 1985. In the same Answer, she alleged that she had been an American citizen since
1988. At the time she filed for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and pursuant to the
nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, she was still
bound by Philippine laws on family rights and duties, status, condition, and legal capacity, even
when she was already living abroad. Philippine laws, then and even until now, do not allow and
recognize divorce between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could not have validly obtained a
divorce from respondent Crasus.

III

The Solicitor General is authorized to intervene, on behalf of the Republic, in proceedings for
annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages.

Invoking Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines, respondent Crasus argued that only
the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to the RTC may intervene on behalf of the State in
proceedings for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriages; hence, the Office of the
Solicitor General had no personality to file the instant Petition on behalf of the State. Article 48
provides –

ART. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall
order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps
to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not fabricated or
suppressed.

That Article 48 does not expressly mention the Solicitor General does not bar him or his Office
from intervening in proceedings for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriages. Executive
Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, appoints the Solicitor
General as the principal law officer and legal defender of the Government.33 His Office is tasked
to represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials
and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers.
The Office of the Solicitor General shall constitute the law office of the Government and, as
such, shall discharge duties requiring the services of lawyers.34

The intent of Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines is to ensure that the interest of the
State is represented and protected in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of
marriages by preventing collusion between the parties, or the fabrication or suppression of
evidence; and, bearing in mind that the Solicitor General is the principal law officer and legal
defender of the land, then his intervention in such proceedings could only serve and contribute to
the realization of such intent, rather than thwart it.
Furthermore, the general rule is that only the Solicitor General is authorized to bring or defend
actions on behalf of the People or the Republic of the Philippines once the case is brought before
this Court or the Court of Appeals.35 While it is the prosecuting attorney or fiscal who actively
participates, on behalf of the State, in a proceeding for annulment or declaration of nullity of
marriage before the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor General takes over when the case is elevated
to the Court of Appeals or this Court. Since it shall be eventually responsible for taking the case
to the appellate courts when circumstances demand, then it is only reasonable and practical that
even while the proceeding is still being held before the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor General
can already exercise supervision and control over the conduct of the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal therein to better guarantee the protection of the interests of the State.

In fact, this Court had already recognized and affirmed the role of the Solicitor General in
several cases for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages that were appealed before it,
summarized as follows in the case of Ancheta v. Ancheta36 –

In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals [268 SCRA 198 (1997)], this Court laid down the
guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 48 of the Family Code, one of which
concerns the role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the State:

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General
issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for
his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along
with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days
from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General
shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
[Id., at 213]

This Court in the case of Malcampo-Sin v. Sin [355 SCRA 285 (2001)] reiterated its
pronouncement in Republic v. Court of Appeals [Supra.] regarding the role of the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the State…37

Finally, the issuance of this Court of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,38 which became effective on 15 March 2003,
should dispel any other doubts of respondent Crasus as to the authority of the Solicitor General
to file the instant Petition on behalf of the State. The Rule recognizes the authority of the
Solicitor General to intervene and take part in the proceedings for annulment and declaration of
nullity of marriages before the RTC and on appeal to higher courts. The pertinent provisions of
the said Rule are reproduced below –

Sec. 5. Contents and form of petition. –

…
(4) It shall be filed in six copies. The petitioner shall serve a copy of the petition on the Office of
the Solicitor General and the Office of the City or Provincial Prosecutor, within five days from
the date of its filing and submit to the court proof of such service within the same period.

Sec. 18. Memoranda. – The court may require the parties and the public prosecutor, in
consultation with the Office of the Solicitor General, to file their respective memoranda in
support of their claims within fifteen days from the date the trial is terminated. It may require the
Office of the Solicitor General to file its own memorandum if the case is of significant interest to
the State. No other pleadings or papers may be submitted without leave of court. After the lapse
of the period herein provided, the case will be considered submitted for decision, with or without
the memoranda.

Sec. 19. Decision. –

(2) The parties, including the Solicitor General and the public prosecutor, shall be served with
copies of the decision personally or by registered mail. If the respondent summoned by
publication failed to appear in the action, the dispositive part of the decision shall be published
once in a newspaper of general circulation.

(3) The decision becomes final upon the expiration of fifteen days from notice to the parties.
Entry of judgment shall be made if no motion for reconsideration or new trial, or appeal is filed
by any of the parties, the public prosecutor, or the Solicitor General.

Sec. 20. Appeal. –

(2) Notice of Appeal. – An aggrieved party or the Solicitor General may appeal from the decision
by filing a Notice of Appeal within fifteen days from notice of denial of the motion for
reconsideration or new trial. The appellant shall serve a copy of the notice of appeal on the
adverse parties.

Given the foregoing, this Court arrives at a conclusion contrary to those of the RTC and the
Court of Appeals, and sustains the validity and existence of the marriage between respondent
Crasus and Fely. At most, Fely’s abandonment, sexual infidelity, and bigamy, give respondent
Crasus grounds to file for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code of the
Philippines, but not for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the same Code.
While this Court commiserates with respondent Crasus for being continuously shackled to what
is now a hopeless and loveless marriage, this is one of those situations where neither law nor
society can provide the specific answer to every individual problem.39
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 62539, dated 30 July 2001, affirming the Judgment of the RTC of Cebu City,
Branch 22, in Civil Case No. CEB-20077, dated 30 October 1998, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.

The marriage of respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy remains valid and
subsisting.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, Respondent.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later naturalized as a
foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can the
Filipino spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law?

Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the Court to make a definite ruling on this
apparently novel question, presented as a pure question of law.

In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails the Decision1 dated May 15, 2002, of the
Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23 and its Resolution2 dated July
4, 2002 denying the motion for reconsideration. The court a quo had declared that herein
respondent Cipriano Orbecido III is capacitated to remarry. The fallo of the impugned Decision
reads:

WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family Code
and by reason of the divorce decree obtained against him by his American wife, the petitioner is
given the capacity to remarry under the Philippine Law.

IT IS SO ORDERED.3

The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court, are as follows.

On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United
Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a
son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.

In 1986, Cipriano’s wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few
years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.

Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and
then married a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him currently live at 5566
A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel, California.

Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the
petition, the court granted the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied.

In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF THE

FAMILY CODE4

The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not applicable to the
instant case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated
between a Filipino citizen and an alien. The proper remedy, according to the OSG, is to file a
petition for annulment or for legal separation.5 Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no law that
governs respondent’s situation. The OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation and not of
judicial determination.6

For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to his case but insists that
when his naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree which capacitated her to remarry, he is
likewise capacitated by operation of law pursuant to Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.7

At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry filed before the trial court actually
constituted a petition for declaratory relief. In this connection, Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of
Court provides:

RULE 63

DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES

Section 1. Who may file petition—Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other
written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation,
ordinance, or other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an
action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or
validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
 ...

The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy;
(2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) that the party
seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) that the issue is ripe for judicial
determination.8

This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage between two
Filipino citizens where one later acquired alien citizenship, obtained a divorce decree, and
remarried while in the U.S.A. The interests of the parties are also adverse, as petitioner
representing the State asserts its duty to protect the institution of marriage while respondent, a
private citizen, insists on a declaration of his capacity to remarry. Respondent, praying for relief,
has legal interest in the controversy. The issue raised is also ripe for judicial determination
inasmuch as when respondent remarries, litigation ensues and puts into question the validity of
his second marriage.

Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code apply to
the case of respondent? Necessarily, we must dwell on how this provision had come about in the
first place, and what was the intent of the legislators in its enactment?

Brief Historical Background

On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No. 209,
otherwise known as the "Family Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof
states:

All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.

On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order No. 227
was likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second
paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:

ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force
in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce
is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)

On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to govern the situation presented by the case
at hand. It seems to apply only to cases where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the
parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The instant case is one where at the time the
marriage was solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was
naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting her capacity to
remarry, and indeed she remarried an American citizen while residing in the U.S.A.

Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings9 on the Family Code, the Catholic Bishops’
Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) registered the following objections to Paragraph 2 of
Article 26:

1. The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against those whose spouses are Filipinos who
divorce them abroad. These spouses who are divorced will not be able to re-marry, while the
spouses of foreigners who validly divorce them abroad can.

2. This is the beginning of the recognition of the validity of divorce even for Filipino citizens.
For those whose foreign spouses validly divorce them abroad will also be considered to be
validly divorced here and can re-marry. We propose that this be deleted and made into law only
after more widespread consultation. (Emphasis supplied.)

Legislative Intent

Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of Paragraph
2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision
Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the
alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.

Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo,
Jr.10 The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The
Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the
Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine
law.

Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the
parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them obtains a foreign citizenship by
naturalization?

The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of Appeals.11 In Quita,
the parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got married. The wife became a
naturalized American citizen in 1954 and obtained a divorce in the same year. The Court therein
hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no
longer married under Philippine law and can thus remarry.

Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold that
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the
time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes
naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise
be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of
the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the
interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous
results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according to its
spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A statute may therefore be
extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its
spirit or intent.12

If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to
the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as coming within the contemplation of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26.

In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article
26 as follows:

1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner;
and

2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating the latter to remarry.

In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid
marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the
naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly,
the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case.
Thus Cipriano, the "divorced" Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.

We are also unable to sustain the OSG’s theory that the proper remedy of the Filipino spouse is
to file either a petition for annulment or a petition for legal separation. Annulment would be a
long and tedious process, and in this particular case, not even feasible, considering that the
marriage of the parties appears to have all the badges of validity. On the other hand, legal
separation would not be a sufficient remedy for it would not sever the marriage tie; hence, the
legally separated Filipino spouse would still remain married to the naturalized alien spouse.

However, we note that the records are bereft of competent evidence duly submitted by
respondent concerning the divorce decree and the naturalization of respondent’s wife. It is settled
rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not
evidence.13

Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his allegation that his wife
was naturalized as an American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree can be
recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.14 Such foreign law must also be proved
as our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws must be
alleged and proved.15 Furthermore, respondent must also show that the divorce decree allows his
former wife to remarry as specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no
evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to enter into another marriage.

Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family
Code (E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino
citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried,
also to remarry. However, considering that in the present petition there is no sufficient evidence
submitted and on record, we are unable to declare, based on respondent’s bare allegations that
his wife, who was naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had
remarried an American, that respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could
only be made properly upon respondent’s submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The assailed
Decision dated May 15, 2002, and Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of
Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are hereby SET ASIDE.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 186571 August 11, 2010

GERBERT R. CORPUZ, Petitioner,

vs.
DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondents.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Laoag City, Branch 11, elevated via a petition for review on certiorari2 under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court (present petition).

Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship
through naturalization on November 29, 2000.3 On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married
respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City.4 Due to work and other
professional commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding. He returned to the
Philippines sometime in April 2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that his
wife was having an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada
and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted
Gerbert’s petition for divorce on December 8, 2005. The divorce decree took effect a month
later, on January 8, 2006.5

Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another Filipina to love.
Desirous of marrying his new Filipina fiancée in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City
Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyn’s marriage
certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official of the National Statistics
Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that the marriage between him and Daisylyn still subsists under
Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized
by a competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982.6

Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or
declaration of marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC. Although summoned, Daisylyn did
not file any responsive pleading but submitted instead a notarized letter/manifestation to the trial
court. She offered no opposition to Gerbert’s petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a
similar case herself but was prevented by financial and personal circumstances. She, thus,
requested that she be considered as a party-in-interest with a similar prayer to Gerbert’s.

In its October 30, 2008 decision,7 the RTC denied Gerbert’s petition. The RTC concluded that
Gerbert was not the proper party to institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign
divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can
avail of the remedy, under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,8 in order for
him or her to be able to remarry under Philippine law.9 Article 26 of the Family Code reads:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative intent behind the enactment of
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, as determined by the Court in Republic
v. Orbecido III;10 the provision was enacted to "avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married
to the Filipino spouse."11

THE PETITION

From the RTC’s ruling,12 Gerbert filed the present petition.13

Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially for declaratory relief, similar to that
filed in Orbecido; he, thus, similarly asks for a determination of his rights under the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. Taking into account the rationale behind the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, he contends that the provision applies as well to the
benefit of the alien spouse. He claims that the RTC ruling unduly stretched the doctrine in
Orbecido by limiting the standing to file the petition only to the Filipino spouse – an
interpretation he claims to be contrary to the essence of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code. He considers himself as a proper party, vested with sufficient legal interest, to
institute the case, as there is a possibility that he might be prosecuted for bigamy if he marries his
Filipina fiancée in the Philippines since two marriage certificates, involving him, would be on
file with the Civil Registry Office. The Office of the Solicitor General and Daisylyn, in their
respective Comments,14 both support Gerbert’s position.

Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition
of a foreign divorce decree.

THE COURT’S RULING

The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
as the substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse

The resolution of the issue requires a review of the legislative history and intent behind the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.

The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages – void15 and voidable16
marriages. In both cases, the basis for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of
the marriage exists before or at the time of the marriage. Divorce, on the other hand,
contemplates the dissolution of the lawful union for cause arising after the marriage.17 Our
family laws do not recognize absolute divorce between Filipino citizens.18

Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages between a Filipino and an alien,
President Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative powers under the Freedom
Constitution,19 enacted Executive Order No. (EO) 227, amending Article 26 of the Family Code
to its present wording, as follows:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO 227 effectively incorporated
into the law this Court’s holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.20 and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera.21 In
both cases, the Court refused to acknowledge the alien spouse’s assertion of marital rights after a
foreign court’s divorce decree between the alien and the Filipino. The Court, thus, recognized
that the foreign divorce had already severed the marital bond between the spouses. The Court
reasoned in Van Dorn v. Romillo that:

To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino spouse] has to be considered still married to
[the alien spouse] and still subject to a wife's obligations x x x cannot be just. [The Filipino
spouse] should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render
support to [the alien spouse]. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible
rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the
ends of justice are to be served.22

As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law "to avoid the absurd situation
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is
no longer married to the Filipino spouse."23 The legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino
spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the doubts created by the divorce decree.
Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse
a substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved,
capacitating him or her to remarry.24 Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted
precisely for that purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding, would be of no significance
to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of severing the marital
bond;25 Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute divorces cannot be
subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of the second paragraph
in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the direct exception to this rule and serves as basis for
recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien
spouse.

Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not
limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree
capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise
capacitated to contract another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however, can make a
similar declaration for the alien spouse (other than that already established by the decree), whose
status and legal capacity are generally governed by his national law.26

Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC was correct in limiting the applicability of the provision
for the benefit of the Filipino spouse. In other words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under
this provision.

The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the party with legal
interest to petition for its recognition in this jurisdiction

We qualify our above conclusion – i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens – with the complementary statement that this
conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerbert’s petition before the RTC. In other words,
the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not
necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign
divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the
alien’s national law have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a
presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules
of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments. This Section states:

SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.—The effect of a judgment or final order of
a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as
follows:

(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or final order
is conclusive upon the title of the thing; and

(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is
presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by
a subsequent title.

In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient to
clothe a party with the requisite interest to institute an action before our courts for the recognition
of the foreign judgment. In a divorce situation, we have declared, no less, that the divorce
obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the divorce is valid
according to his or her national law.27

The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that
our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained
that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered
by a tribunal of another country."28 This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity
must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the alien’s applicable national
law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself.29 The recognition may be
made in an action instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party
invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.

In Gerbert’s case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien,
recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign
authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This Section requires
proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody
of the documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be
(a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the
Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office.

The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as well as the
required certificates proving its authenticity,30 but failed to include a copy of the Canadian law
on divorce.31 Under this situation, we can, at this point, simply dismiss the petition for
insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate to remand the case to
the RTC to determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce law.

We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action, given the Article 26 interests
that will be served and the Filipina wife’s (Daisylyn’s) obvious conformity with the petition. A
remand, at the same time, will allow other interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and
overcome a petitioner’s presumptive evidence of a right by proving want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to state, every
precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with our laws before a recognition is made, as the
foreign judgment, once recognized, shall have the effect of res judicata32 between the parties, as
provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.33

In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of reciprocal recognition
of foreign judgments between nations, the res judicata effect of the foreign judgments of divorce
serves as the deeper basis for extending judicial recognition and for considering the alien spouse
bound by its terms. This same effect, as discussed above, will not obtain for the Filipino spouse
were it not for the substantive rule that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
provides.

Considerations beyond the recognition of the foreign divorce decree

As a matter of "housekeeping" concern, we note that the Pasig City Civil Registry Office has
already recorded the divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate based on the
mere presentation of the decree.34 We consider the recording to be legally improper; hence, the
need to draw attention of the bench and the bar to what had been done.

Article 407 of the Civil Code states that "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil
status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register." The law requires the entry in the civil
registry of judicial decrees that produce legal consequences touching upon a person’s legal
capacity and status, i.e., those affecting "all his personal qualities and relations, more or less
permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or
illegitimate, or his being married or not."35

A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one, affecting a person’s legal
capacity and status that must be recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753 or the Law on Registry of Civil
Status specifically requires the registration of divorce decrees in the civil registry:

Sec. 1. Civil Register. – A civil register is established for recording the civil status of persons, in
which shall be entered:

(a) births;

(b) deaths;

(c) marriages;
 (d) annulments of marriages;

(e) divorces;

(f) legitimations;

(g) adoptions;

(h) acknowledgment of natural children;

(i) naturalization; and

(j) changes of name.

xxxx

Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. — The local registrars shall keep and preserve in their offices the
following books, in which they shall, respectively make the proper entries concerning the civil
status of persons:

(1) Birth and death register;

(2) Marriage register, in which shall be entered not only the marriages solemnized but
also divorces and dissolved marriages.

(3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption, change of name and naturalization register.

But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the law and the
submission of the decree by themselves do not ipso facto authorize the decree’s registration. The
law should be read in relation with the requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign
judgment before it can be given res judicata effect. In the context of the present case, no judicial
order as yet exists recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry
Office acted totally out of turn and without authority of law when it annotated the Canadian
divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate, on the strength alone of the
foreign decree presented by Gerbert.

Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the requirement of a court
recognition, as it cited NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982,36 and Department of Justice Opinion
No. 181, series of 198237 – both of which required a final order from a competent Philippine
court before a foreign judgment, dissolving a marriage, can be registered in the civil registry, but
it, nonetheless, allowed the registration of the decree. For being contrary to law, the registration
of the foreign divorce decree without the requisite judicial recognition is patently void and
cannot produce any legal effect.1avvphi1

Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition that the RTC may extend to the
Canadian divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize the cancellation of the entry in the civil
registry. A petition for recognition of a foreign judgment is not the proper proceeding,
contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the cancellation of entries in the civil registry.

Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that "no entry in a civil register shall be changed or
corrected, without judicial order." The Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code
by specifically providing for a special remedial proceeding by which entries in the civil registry
may be judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the
jurisdictional and procedural requirements that must be complied with before a judgment,
authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be annotated in the civil registry. It also requires,
among others, that the verified petition must be filed with the RTC of the province where the
corresponding civil registry is located;38 that the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim
any interest must be made parties to the proceedings;39 and that the time and place for hearing
must be published in a newspaper of general circulation.40 As these basic jurisdictional
requirements have not been met in the present case, we cannot consider the petition Gerbert filed
with the RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as requiring two
separate proceedings for the registration of a foreign divorce decree in the civil registry – one for
recognition of the foreign decree and another specifically for cancellation of the entry under Rule
108 of the Rules of Court. The recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule
108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule
108 of the Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate adversarial proceeding41 by which the
applicability of the foreign judgment can be measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional
infirmities, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari, and REVERSE the October
30, 2008 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 11, as well as its February
17, 2009 order. We order the REMAND of the case to the trial court for further proceedings in
accordance with our ruling above. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Civil Registrar
General. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

G.R. No. 221029, April 24, 2018

 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. MARELYN TANEDO MANALO,
Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (Rules) seeks to
reverse and set aside the September 18, 2014 Decision1 and October 12, 2015 Resolution2 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 100076. The dispositive portion of the Decision
states:

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated 15 October 2012 of the
Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, First Judicial Region, Branch 43, in SPEC. PROC. NO.
2012-0005 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Let a copy of this Decision be served on the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila.

SO ORDERED.3

The facts are undisputed.

On January 10, 2012, respondent Marelyn Tanedo Manalo (Manalo) filed a petition for
cancellation of entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila, by virtue of a
judgment of divorce rendered by a Japanese court.

Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and in substance, Branch 43 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Dagupan City set the case for initial hearing on April 25, 2012. The petition and
the notice of initial hearing were published once a week for three consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation. During the initial hearing, counsel for Manalo marked the
documentary evidence (consisting of the trial court's Order dated January 25, 2012, affidavit of
publication, and issues of the Northern Journal dated February 21-27, 2012, February 28 - March
5, 2012, and March 6-12, 2012) for purposes of compliance with the jurisdictional requirements.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance for petitioner Republic of the
Philippines authorizing the Office of the City Prosecutor of Dagupan to appear on its behalf.
Likewise, a Manifestation and Motion was filed questioning the title and/or caption of the
petition considering that, based on the allegations therein, the proper action should be a petition
for recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment.

As a result, Manalo moved to admit an Amended Petition, which the court granted. The
Amended Petition, which captioned that it is also a petition for recognition and enforcement of
foreign judgment, alleged:

2. That petitioner is previously married in the Philippines to a Japanese national named

YOSHINO MINORO as shown by their Marriage Contract x x x;
3. That recently, a case for divorce was filed by herein [petitioner] in Japan and after due
proceedings, a divorce decree dated December 6, 2011 was rendered by the Japanese Court x x
x;

4. That at present, by virtue of the said divorce decree, petitioner and her divorced Japanese
husband are no longer living together and in fact, petitioner and her daughter are living
separately from said Japanese former husband;

5. That there is an imperative need to have the entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San
Juan, Metro Manila cancelled, where the petitioner and the former Japanese husband's marriage
was previously registered, in order that it would not appear anymore that petitioner is still
married to the said Japanese national who is no longer her husband or is no longer married to
her; furthermore, in the event that petitioner decides to be remarried, she shall not be bothered
and disturbed by said entry of marriage;

6. That this petition is filed principally for the purpose of causing the cancellation of entry of the
marriage between the petitioner and the said Japanese national, pursuant to Rule 108 of the
Revised Rules of Court, which marriage was already dissolved by virtue of the aforesaid divorce
decree; [and]

7. That petitioner prays, among others, that together with the cancellation of the said entry of her
marriage, that she be allowed to return and use. her maiden surname, MANALO.4

Manalo was allowed to testify in advance as she was scheduled to leave for Japan for her
employment. Among the documents that were offered and admitted were:

1. Court Order dated January 25, 2012, finding the petition and its attachments to be sufficient in
form and in substance;

2. Affidavit of Publication;

3. Issues of the Northern Journal dated February 21-27, 2012, February 28 - March 5, 2012, and
March 6-12, 2012;

4. Certificate of Marriage between Manalo and her former Japanese husband;

5. Divorce Decree of the Japanese court;

6. Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippine Consulate General in Osaka, Japan of the

Notification of Divorce; and

7. Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce.5

The OSG did not present any controverting evidence to rebut the allegations of Manalo.
On October 15, 2012, the trial court denied the petition for lack of merit. In ruling that the
divorce obtained by Manalo in Japan should not be recognized, it opined that, based on Article
15 of the New Civil Code, the Philippine law "does not afford Filipinos the right to file for a
divorce, whether they are in the country or living abroad, if they are married to Filipinos or to
foreigners, or if they celebrated their marriage in the Philippines or in another country" and that
unless Filipinos "are naturalized as citizens of another country, Philippine laws shall have control
over issues related to Filipinos' family rights and duties, together with the determination of their
condition and legal capacity to enter into contracts and civil relations, including marriages."6

On appeal, the CA overturned the RTC decision. It held that Article 26 of the Family Code of the
Philippines (Family Code) is applicable even if it was Manalo who filed for divorce against her
Japanese husband because the decree they obtained makes the latter no longer married to the
former, capacitating him to remarry. Conformably with Navarro, et al. v. Exec. Secretary
Ermita, et al.7 ruling that the meaning of the law should be based on the intent of the lawmakers
and in view of the legislative intent behind Article 26, it would be the height of injustice to
consider Manalo as still married to the Japanese national, who, in turn, is no longer married to
her. For the appellate court, the fact that it was Manalo who filed the divorce case is
inconsequential. Cited as similar to this case was Van Dorn v. Judge Romillo, Jr.8 where the
marriage between a foreigner and a Filipino was dissolved through a divorce filed abroad by the
latter.

The OSG filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied; hence, this petition.

We deny the petition and partially affirm the CA decision.

Divorce, the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage, are of two
types: (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii, which terminates the marriage, and (2)
limited divorce or a mensa et thoro, which suspends it and leaves the bond in full force.9 In this
jurisdiction, the following rules exist:

1. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it.10

2. Consistent with Articles 1511 and 1712 of the New Civil Code, the marital bond between two
Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by an absolute divorce obtained abroad.13

3. An absolute divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in
the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws.14

4. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, the former is allowed to contract a
subsequent marriage in case the absolute divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry.15

On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino signed into law Executive Order (E.O.) No.
209, otherwise known as The Family Code of the Philippines, which took effect on August 3,
1988.16 Shortly thereafter, E.O. No. 227 was issued on July 17, 1987.17 Aside from amending
Articles 36 and 39 of the Family Code, a second paragraph was added to Article 26.18 This
provision was originally deleted by the Civil Code Revision Committee (Committee), but it was
presented and approved at a Cabinet meeting after Pres. Aquino signed E.O. No. 209.19 As
modified, Article 26 now states:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

Paragraph 2 of Article 26 confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a

foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of
the dissolution of the marriage.20 It authorizes our courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce
decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow divorce.21 Philippine courts cannot try
the case on the merits because it is tantamount to trying a divorce case.22 Under the principles of
comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by a spouse of foreign nationality,
but the legal effects thereof, e.g., on custody, care and support of the children or property
relations of the spouses, must still be determined by our courts.23

According to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Committee, the idea of the amendment
is to avoid the absurd situation of a Filipino as still being married to his or her alien spouse,
although the latter is no longer married to the former because he or she had obtained a divorce
abroad that is recognized by his or her national law.24 The aim was that it would solve the
problem of many Filipino women who, under the New Civil Code, are still considered married to
their alien husbands even after the latter have already validly divorced them under their (the
husbands') national laws and perhaps have already married again.25

In 2005, this Court concluded that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 applies to a case where, at the time
of the celebration of the marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them
acquired foreign citizenship by naturalization, initiated a divorce proceeding, and obtained a
favorable decree. We held in Republic of the Phils. v. Orbecido III:26

The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of Appeals. In Quita, the
parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got married. The wife became a
naturalized American citizen in 1954 and obtained a divorce in the same year. The Court therein
hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no
longer married under Philippine law and can thus remarry.

Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold that
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the
time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes
naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise
be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of
the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. x x x
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to
the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as coming within the contemplation of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26.

In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article
26 as follows:

1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner; and

2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating the latter to remarry.27

Now, the Court is tasked to resolve whether, under the same provision, a Filipino citizen has the
capacity to remarry under Philippine law after initiating a divorce proceeding abroad and
obtaining a favorable judgment against his or her alien spouse who is capacitated to remarry.
Specifically, Manalo pleads for the recognition and enforcement of the divorce decree rendered
by the Japanese court and for the cancellation of the entry of marriage in the local civil registry
"in order that it would not appear anymore that [she] is still married to the said Japanese national
who is no longer her husband or is no longer married to her; [and], in the event that [she] decides
to be remarried, she shall not be bothered and disturbed by said entry of marriage," and to return
and to use her maiden surname.

We rule in the affirmative.

Both Dacasin v. Dacasin28 and Van Dorn29 already recognized a foreign divorce decree that was
initiated and obtained by the Filipino spouse and extended its legal effects on the issues of child
custody and property relation, respectively.

In Dacasin, post-divorce, the former spouses executed an Agreement for the joint custody of
their minor daughter. Later on, the husband, who is a US citizen, sued his Filipino wife to
enforce the Agreement, alleging that it was only, the latter who exercised sole custody of their
child. The trial court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction, on the ground, among others,
that the divorce decree is binding following the "nationality rule" prevailing in this jurisdiction.
The husband moved to reconsider, arguing that the divorce decree obtained by his former wife is
void, but it was denied. In ruling that the trial court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit but not to
enforce the Agreement, which is void, this Court said:

Nor can petitioner rely on the divorce decree's alleged invalidity - not because the Illinois court
lacked jurisdiction or that the divorce decree violated Illinois law, but because the divorce was
obtained by his Filipino spouse - to support the Agreement's enforceability. The argument that
foreigners in this jurisdiction are not bound by foreign divorce decrees is hardly novel. Van Dorn
v. Romillo settled the matter by holding that an alien spouse of a Filipino is bound by a divorce
decree obtained abroad. There, we dismissed the alien divorcee's Philippine suit for accounting
of alleged post-divorce conjugal property and rejected his submission that the foreign divorce
(obtained by the Filipino spouse) is not valid in this jurisdiction x x x.30

Van Dorn was decided before the Family Code took into effect. There, a complaint was filed by
the ex-husband, who is a US citizen, against his Filipino wife to render an accounting of a
business that was alleged to be a conjugal property and to be declared with right to manage the
same. Van Dorn moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action was barred by
previous judgment in the divorce proceedings that she initiated, but the trial court denied the
motion. On his part, her ex-husband averred that the divorce decree issued by the Nevada court
could not prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy;
that the acts and declaration of a foreign court cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public
policy, divest Philippine courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction. In
dismissing the case filed by the alien spouse, the Court discussed the effect of the foreign divorce
on the parties and their conjugal property in the Philippines. Thus:

There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the
United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance,
private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. What he is
contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same
being contrary to local law and public policy.

It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according
to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the
marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As
stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794,
799:

"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a court of
competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife,
and to free them both from the bond. The marriage tie, when thus severed as to one party, ceases
to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law.
When the law provides, in the nature of a penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry again, that
party, as well as the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage."

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He
would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise
control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which
validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped
by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal
property.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still
married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq.
of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe
respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to
be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated
against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.31

In addition, the fact that a validly obtained foreign divorce initiated by the Filipino spouse can be
recognized and given legal effects in the Philippines is implied from Our rulings in Fujiki v.
Marinay, et al.32 and Medina v. Koike.33

In Fujiki, the Filipino wife, with the help of her first husband, who is a Japanese national, was
able to obtain a judgment from Japan's family court, which declared the marriage between her
and her second husband, who is a Japanese national, void on the ground of bigamy. In resolving
the issue of whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a
foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign
citizen on the ground of bigamy, We ruled:

Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment
nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the
judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For the same reason he has the
personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay and
Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.

There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the
integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it. There is also no
doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil
registry, which compromises the public record of his marriage. The interest derives from the
substantive right of the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances) his most
intimate human relation, but also to protect his property interests that arise by operation of law
the moment he contracts marriage. These property interests in marriage include the right to be
supported "in keeping with the financial capacity of the family" and preserving the property
regime of the marriage.

Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution, but a spouse's right in
a marriage extends further to relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and Obligations
between Husband and Wife") of the Family Code. x x x34

On the other hand, in Medina, the Filipino wife and her Japanese husband jointly filed for
divorce, which was granted. Subsequently, she filed a petition before the RTC for judicial
recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry pursuant to Paragraph 2 of
Article 26. The RTC denied the petition on the ground that the foreign divorce decree and the
national law of the alien spouse recognizing his capacity to obtain a divorce decree must be
proven in accordance with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.
This Court agreed and ruled that, consistent with Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, et al.35 and Garcia v.
Recio,36 the divorce decree and the national law of the alien spouse must be proven. Instead of
dismissing the case, We referred it to the CA for appropriate action including the reception of
evidence to determine and resolve the pertinent factual issues.

There is no compelling reason to deviate from the above-mentioned rulings. When this Court
recognized a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by the Filipino spouse and
extended its legal effects on the issues of child custody and property relation, it should not stop
short in likewise acknowledging that one of the usual and necessary consequences of absolute
divorce is the right to remarry. Indeed, there is no longer a mutual obligation to live together and
observe fidelity. When the marriage tie is severed and ceased to exist, the civil status and the
domestic relation of the former spouses change as both of them are freed from the marital bond.

The dissent is of the view that, under the nationality principle, Manalo's personal status is subject
to Philippine law, which prohibits absolute divorce. Hence, the divorce decree which she
obtained under Japanese law cannot be given effect, as she is, without dispute, a national not of
Japan, but of the Philippines. It is said that a contrary ruling will subvert not only the intention of
the framers of the law, but also that of the Filipino people, as expressed in the Constitution. The
Court is, therefore, bound to respect the prohibition until the legislature deems it fit to lift the
same.

We beg to differ.

Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of "a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry. " Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only
requires that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not demand
that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree
was granted. It does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the
respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding. The Court is bound by the words of the statute;
neither can We put words in the mouths of the lawmakers.37 "The legislature is presumed to
know the meaning of the words, to have used words advisedly, and to have expressed its intent
by the use of such words as are found in the statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the
words of a statute there should be no departure."38

Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the word "obtained" should be interpreted to mean that
the divorce proceeding must be actually initiated by the alien spouse, still, the Court will not
follow the letter of the statute when to do so would depart from the true intent of the legislature
or would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act.39 Laws
have ends to achieve, and statutes should be so construed as not to defeat but to carry out such
ends and purposes.40 As held in League of Cities of the Phils., et al. v. COMELEC, et al.:41

The legislative intent is not at all times accurately reflected in the manner in which the resulting
law is couched. Thus, applying a verba legis or strictly literal interpretation of a statute may
render it meaningless and lead to inconvenience, an absurd situation or injustice. To obviate this
aberration, and bearing in mind the principle that the intent or the spirit of the law is the law
itself, resort should be to the rule that the spirit of the law controls its letter.
To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is
effective in the country where it was rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The
provision is a corrective measure to address an anomaly where the Filipino spouse is tied to the
marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country.42
Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a favorable decree
dissolving the marriage bond and capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will have the
same result: the Filipino spouse will effectively be without a husband or wife. A Filipino who
initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the same place and in "like circumstance as a Filipino
who is at the receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding. Therefore, the subject provision
should not make a distinction. In both instance, it is extended as a means to recognize the
residual effect of the foreign divorce decree on Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien spouses
are severed by operation of the latter's national law.

Conveniently invoking the nationality principle is erroneous. Such principle, found under Article
15 of the Civil Code, is not an absolute and unbending rule. In fact, the mere existence of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is a testament that the State may provide for an exception thereto.
Moreover, blind adherence to the nationality principle must be disallowed if it would cause
unjust discrimination and oppression to certain classes of individuals whose rights are equally
protected by law. The courts have the duty to enforce the laws of divorce as written by the
Legislature only if they are constitutional.43

While the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification and that its
decision is accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice, such classification may be
subjected to judicial review.44 The deference stops where the classification violates a
fundamental right, or prejudices persons accorded special protection by the Constitution.45 When
these violations arise, this Court must discharge its primary role as the vanguard of constitutional
guaranties, and require a stricter and more exacting adherence to constitutional limitations.46 If a
legislative classification impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or
operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class strict judicial scrutiny is required since it
is presumed unconstitutional, and the burden is upon the government to prove that the
classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and that it is the least restrictive
means to protect such interest.47

"Fundamental rights" whose infringement leads to strict scrutiny under the equal protection
clause are those basic liberties explicitly or implicitly guaranteed in the Constitution.48 It
includes the right of procreation, the right to marry, the right to exercise free speech, political
expression, press, assembly, and so forth, the right to travel, and the right to vote.49 On the other
hand, what constitutes compelling state interest is measured by the scale of rights and powers
arrayed in the Constitution and calibrated by history.50 It is akin to the paramount interest of the
state for which some individual liberties must give way, such as the promotion of public interest,
public safety or the general welfare.51 It essentially involves a public right or interest that,
because of its primacy, overrides individual rights, and allows the former to take precedence over
the latter.52
Although the Family Code was not enacted by the Congress, the same principle applies with
respect to the acts of the President, which have the force and effect of law unless declared
otherwise by the court. In this case, We find that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 violates one of the
essential requisites53 of the equal protection clause.54 Particularly, the limitation of the provision
only to a foreign divorce decree initiated by the alien spouse is unreasonable as it is based on
superficial, arbitrary, and whimsical classification.

A Filipino who is married to another Filipino is not similarly situated with a Filipino who is
married to a foreign citizen. There are real, material and substantial differences between them.
Ergo, they should not be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and liabilities imposed.
Without a doubt, there are political, economic, cultural, and religious dissimilarities as well as
varying legal systems and procedures, all too unfamiliar, that a Filipino national who is married
to an alien spouse has to contend with. More importantly, while a divorce decree obtained abroad
by a Filipino against another Filipino is null and void, a divorce decree obtained by an alien
against his or her Filipino spouse is recognized if made in accordance with the national law of
the foreigner.55

On the contrary, there is no real and substantial difference between a Filipino who initiated a
foreign divorce proceedings and a Filipino who obtained a divorce decree upon the instance of
his or her alien spouse. In the eyes of the Philippine and foreign laws, both are considered as
Filipinos who have the same rights and obligations in a alien land. The circumstances
surrounding them are alike. Were it not for Paragraph 2 of Article 26, both are still married to
their foreigner spouses who are no longer their wives/husbands. Hence, to make a distinction
between them based merely on the superficial difference of whether they initiated the divorce
proceedings or not is utterly unfair. Indeed, the treatment gives undue favor to one and unjustly
discriminate against the other.

Further, the differentiation in Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is arbitrary. There is inequality in

treatment because a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by a Filipino citizen
against his or her alien spouse would not be recognized even if based on grounds similar to
Articles 35, 36, 37 and 38 of the Family Code.56 In filing for divorce based on these grounds, the
Filipino spouse cannot be accused of invoking foreign law at whim, tantamount to insisting that
he or she should be governed with whatever law he or she chooses. The dissent's comment that
Manalo should be "reminded that all is not lost, for she may still pray for the severance of her
marital ties before the RTC in accordance with the mechanisms now existing under the Family
Code" is anything but comforting. For the guidance of the bench and the bar, it would have been
better if the dissent discussed in detail what these "mechanisms" are and how they specifically
apply in Manalo's case as well as those who are similarly situated. If the dissent refers to a
petition for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage, the reality is that there is no
assurance that our courts will automatically grant the same. Besides, such proceeding is
duplicitous, costly, and protracted. All to the prejudice of our kababayan.

It is argued that the Court's liberal interpretation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 encourages

Filipinos to marry foreigners, opening the floodgate to the indiscriminate practice of Filipinos
marrying foreign nationals or initiating divorce proceedings against their alien spouses.
The supposition is speculative and unfounded.

First, the dissent falls into a hasty generalization as no data whatsoever was shown to support
what he intends to prove. Second, We adhere to the presumption of good faith in this jurisdiction.
Under the rules on evidence, it is disputably presumed (i.e., satisfactory if uncontradicted and
overcome by other evidence) that a person is innocent of crime or wrong,57 that a person intends
the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts,58 that a person takes ordinary care of his
concerns,59 that acquiescence resulted from a belief that the thing acquiesced in was conformable
to the law and fact,60 that a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have
entered into a lawful contract of marriage,61 and that the law has been obeyed.62 It is whimsical
to easily attribute any illegal, irregular or immoral conduct on the part of a Filipino just because
he or she opted to marry a foreigner instead of a fellow Filipino. It is presumed that interracial
unions are entered into out of genuine love and affection, rather than prompted by pure lust or
profit. Third, We take judicial notice of the fact that Filipinos are relatively more forbearing and
conservative in nature and that they are more often the victims or at the losing end of mixed
marriages. And Fourth, it is not for Us to prejudge the motive behind a Filipino's decision to
marry an alien national. In one case, it was said:

Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and cannot
dictate on the kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle
would go into the realm of their right to privacy and would raise serious constitutional questions.
The right to marital privacy allows married couples to structure their marriages in almost any
way they see fit, to live together or live apart, to have children or no children, to love one another
or not, and so on. Thus, marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as
convenience, companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they comply with all the
legal requisites, are equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration in a marriage contract, is
not the only valid cause for marriage. Other considerations, not precluded by law, may validly
support a marriage.63

The 1987 Constitution expresses that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.64 Nevertheless, it was not meant to
be a general prohibition on divorce because Commissioner Jose Luis Martin C. Gascon, in
response to a question by Father Joaquin G. Bernas during the deliberations of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, was categorical about this point.65 Their exchange reveal as follows:

MR. RAMA. Mr. Presiding Officer, may I ask that Commissioner Bernas be recognized.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Colayco). Commissioner Bernas is recognized.

FR. BERNAS. Just one question, and I am not sure if it has been categorically answered. I refer
specifically to the proposal of Commissioner Gascon. Is this to be understood as a prohibition of
a general law on divorce? His intention is to make this a prohibition so that the legislature cannot
pass a divorce law.

MR. GASCON. Mr. Presiding Officer, that was not primarily my intention. My intention was
primarily to encourage the social institution of marriage, but not necessarily discourage divorce.
But now that he mentioned the issue of divorce, my personal opinion is to discourage it, Mr.
Presiding Officer.

FR. BERNAS. No. my question is more categorical. Does this carry the meaning of prohibiting a
divorce law?

MR. GASCON. No. Mr. Presiding Officer.

FR. BERNAS. Thank you.66

Notably, a law on absolute divorce is not new in our country. Effective March 11, 1917,
Philippine courts could grant an absolute divorce on the grounds of adultery on the part of the
wife or concubinage on the part of the husband by virtue of Act No. 2710 of the Philippine
Legislature.67 On March 25, 1943, pursuant to the authority conferred upon him by the
Commander-in-Chief of the Imperial Japanese Forces in the Philippines and with the approval of
the latter, the Chairman of the Philippine Executive Commission promulgated an E.O. No. 141
("New Divorce Law"), which repealed Act No. 2710 and provided eleven grounds for absolute
divorce, such as intentional or unjustified desertion continuously for at least one year prior to the
filing of the action, slander by deed or gross insult by one spouse against the other to such an
extent as to make further living together impracticable, and a spouse's incurable insanity.68 When
the Philippines was liberated and the Commonwealth Government was restored, it ceased to have
force and effect and Act No. 2710 again prevailed.69 From August 30, 1950, upon the effectivity
of Republic Act No. 386 or the New Civil Code, an absolute divorce obtained by Filipino
citizens, whether here or abroad, is no longer recognized.70

Through the years, there has been constant clamor from various sectors of the Philippine society
to re-institute absolute divorce. As a matter of fact, in the current 17th Congress, House Bill
(H.B.) Nos. 116,71 1062,72 238073 and 602774 were filed in the House of Representatives. In
substitution of these bills, H.B. No. 7303 entitled "An Act Instituting Absolute Divorce and
Dissolution of Marriage in the Philippines" or the Absolute Divorce Act of 2018 was submitted
by the House Committee on Population and Family Relations on February 28, 2018. It was
approved on March 19, 2018 on Third Reading - with 134 in favor, 57 against, and 2 abstentions.
Under the bill, the grounds for a judicial decree of absolute divorce are as follows:

1. The grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code, modified or
amended, as follows:

a. Physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a common child,
or a child of the petitioner;
b. Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to change religious or political
affiliation;
c. Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the
petitioner, to engage in prostitution, or connivance in such corruption or inducement;
d. Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more than six (6) years, even if
pardoned;
e. Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism or chronic gambling of the respondent;
f. Homosexuality of the respondent;
g. Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage, whether in the Philippines
or abroad;
h. Marital infidelity or perversion or having a child with another person other than one's spouse
during the marriage, except when upon the mutual agreement of the spouses, a child is born to
them by in vitro or a similar procedure or when the wife bears a child after being a victim of
rape;
i. Attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner, a common child or a child of the
petitioner; and
j. Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one (1) year.

When the spouses are legally separated by judicial decree for more than two (2) years, either or
both spouses can petition the proper court for an absolute divorce based on said judicial decree of
legal separation.

1. Grounds for annulment of marriage under Article 45 of the Family Code, restated as follows:

a. The party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was eighteen
(18) years of age or over but below twenty-one (21), and the marriage was
solemnized without the consent of the parents, guardian or person having
substitute parental authority over the party, in that order, unless after attaining the
age of twenty-one (21), such party freely cohabited with the other and both lived
together as husband or wife;
b. either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to reason, freely
cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
c. The consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards
with full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the
other as husband and wife;
d. The consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue
influence, unless the same having disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter
freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
e. Either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the
other and such incapacity continues or appears to be incurable; and
f. Either party was afflicted with a sexually transmissible infection found to be
serious or appears to be incurable.

Provided, That the grounds mentioned in b, e and f existed either at the time of the marriage or
supervening after the marriage.

1. When the spouses have been separated in fact for at least five (5) years at the time
the petition for absolute divorce is filed, and reconciliation is highly improbable;
2. Psychological incapacity of either spouse as provided for in Article 36 of the
Family Code, whether or not the incapacity was present at the time of the
celebration of the marriage or later;
 3. When one of the spouses undergoes a gender reassignment surgery or transitions
from one sex to another, the other spouse is entitled to petition for absolute
divorce with the transgender or transsexual as respondent, or vice-versa;
4. Irreconcilable marital differences and conflicts which have resulted in the total
breakdown of the marriage beyond repair, despite earnest and repeated efforts at
reconciliation.

To be sure, a good number of the Filipinos led by the Roman Catholic Church react adversely to
any attempt to enact a law on absolute divorce, viewing it as contrary to our customs, morals,
and traditions that has looked upon marriage and family as an institution and their nature of
permanence, inviolability, and solidarity. However, none of our laws should be based on any
religious law, doctrine, or teaching; otherwise, the separation of Church and State will be
violated.75

In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government can do with
religion, it also limits what religious sects can or cannot do. They can neither cause the
government to adopt their particular doctrines as policy for everyone, nor can they cause the
government to restrict other groups. To do so, in simple terms, would cause the State to adhere to
a particular religion and, thus, establish a state religion.76

The Roman Catholic Church can neither impose its beliefs and convictions on the State and the
rest of the citizenry nor can it demand that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it sincerely
believes that they are good for the country.77 While marriage is considered a sacrament, it has
civil and legal consequences which are governed by the Family Code.78 It is in this aspect, bereft
of any ecclesiastical overtone, that the State has a legitimate right and interest to regulate.

The declared State policy that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of
the family and shall be protected by the State, should not be read in total isolation but must be
harmonized with other constitutional provisions. Aside from strengthening the solidarity of the
Filipino family, the State is equally mandated to actively promote its total development.79 It is
also obligated to defend, among others, the right of children to special protection from all forms
of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development.80
To Our mind, the State cannot effectively enforce these obligations if We limit the application of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 only to those foreign divorce initiated by the alien spouse. It is not
amiss to point that the women and children are almost always the helpless victims of all forms of
domestic abuse and violence. In fact, among the notable legislation passed in order to minimize,
if not eradicate, the menace are R.A. No. 6955 (prohibiting mail order bride and similar
practices), R.A. No. 9262 ("Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004"),
R.A. No. 9710 ("The Magna Carta of Women"), R.A. No. 10354 ("The Responsible Parenthood
and Reproductive Health Act of 2012"), and R.A. No. 9208 ("Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of
2003"), as amended by R.A. No. 10364 ("Expanded Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2012").
Moreover, in protecting and strengthening the Filipino family as a basic autonomous social
institution, the Court must not lose sight of the constitutional mandate to value the dignity of
every human person, guarantee full respect for human rights, and ensure the fundamental
equality before the law of women and men.81
A prohibitive view of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 would do more harm than good. If We disallow
a Filipino citizen who initiated and obtained a foreign divorce from the coverage of Paragraph 2
of Article 26 and still require him or her to first avail of the existing "mechanisms" under the
Family Code, any subsequent relationship that he or she would enter in the meantime shall be
considered as illicit in the eyes of the Philippine law. Worse, any child born out of such "extra-
marital" affair has to suffer the stigma of being branded as illegitimate. Surely, these are just but
a few of the adverse consequences, not only to the parent but also to the child, if We are to hold a
restrictive interpretation of the subject provision. The irony is that the principle of inviolability of
marriage under Section 2, Article XV of the Constitution is meant to be tilted in favor of
marriage and against unions not formalized by marriage, but without denying State protection
and assistance to live-in arrangements or to families formed according to indigenous customs.82

This Court should not turn a blind eye to the realities of the present time. With the advancement
of communication and information technology, as well as the improvement of the transportation
system that almost instantly connect people from all over the world, mixed marriages have
become not too uncommon. Likewise, it is recognized that not all marriages are made in heaven
and that imperfect humans more often than not create imperfect unions.83 Living in a flawed
world, the unfortunate reality for some is that the attainment of the individual's full human
potential and self-fulfillment is not found and achieved in the context of a marriage. Thus, it is
hypocritical to safeguard the quantity of existing marriages and, at the same time, brush aside the
truth that some of them are of rotten quality.

Going back, We hold that marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment between two parties,
cannot possibly be productive of any good to the society where one is considered released from
the marital bond while the other remains bound to it.84 In reiterating that the Filipino spouse
should not be discriminated against in his or her own country if the ends of justice are to be
served, San Luis v. San Luis85 quoted:

x x x In Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, the Court stated:

But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and likewise, we may add, by its
purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the
judge should be to discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law
should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this is never within the
legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives
of the legislature, is to render justice.

Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice. Law
and justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that,
while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case because of its
peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we are not bound, because only of our nature and
functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish obedience to their language. What we do
instead is find a balance between the word and the will, that justice may be done even as the law
is obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law as it is
worded, yielding like robots to the literal command without regard to its cause and consequence.
"Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of a law," so we are warned, by Justice
Holmes again, "where these words import a policy that goes beyond them."

xxxx

More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and perpetual wish to
render every one his due." That wish continues to motivate this Court when it assesses the facts
and the law in every case brought to it for decision. Justice is always an essential ingredient of its
decisions. Thus when the facts warrant, we interpret the law in a way that will render justice,
presuming that it was the intention of the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed with
justice.86

Indeed, where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead
to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed
according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law.87 A statute
may, therefore, be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they
come within its spirit or intent.88

The foregoing notwithstanding, We cannot yet write finis to this controversy by granting
Manalo's petition to recognize and enforce the divorce decree rendered by the Japanese court and
to cancel the entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila.

Jurisprudence has set guidelines before Philippine courts recognize a foreign judgment relating
to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Presentation
solely of the divorce decree will not suffice.89 The fact of divorce must still first be proven.90
Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove
the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.91

x x x Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first
be presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce
decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself. The decree purports
to be a written act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign country.

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven
as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a
copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not
kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.92

In granting Manalo's petition, the CA noted:

In this case, Petitioner was able to submit before the court a quo the 1) Decision of the Japanese
Court allowing the divorce; 2) the Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippine Consulate
General in Osaka, Japan of the Decree of Divorce; and 3) Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce
by Petitioner and the Japanese national. Under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule
39, Section 48 (b) of the Rules of Court, these documents sufficiently prove the subject Divorce
Decree as a fact. Thus, We are constrained to recognize the Japanese Court's judgment decreeing
the divorce.93

If the opposing party fails to properly object, as in this case, the divorce decree is rendered
admissible as a written act of the foreign court.94 As it appears, the existence of the divorce
decree was not denied by the OSG; neither was the jurisdiction of the divorce court impeached
nor the validity of its proceedings challenged on the ground of collusion, fraud, or clear mistake
of fact or law, albeit an opportunity to do so.95

Nonetheless, the Japanese law on divorce must still be proved.

x x x The burden of proof lies with the "party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing
necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action." In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of
proving the material allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the answer; and
defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in their answer when they
introduce new matters. x x x

It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws.
Like any other facts, they must be alleged and proved. x x x The power of judicial notice must be
exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the
negative.96

Since the divorce was raised by Manalo, the burden of proving the pertinent Japanese law
validating it, as well as her former husband's capacity to remarry, fall squarely upon her.
Japanese laws on persons and family relations are not among those matters that Filipino judges
are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The September 18, 2014
Decision and October 12, 2015 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 100076,
are AFFIRMED IN PART. The case is REMANDED to the court of origin for further
proceedings and reception of evidence as to the relevant Japanese law on divorce.

SO ORDERED.