VALMONTE V. GENERAL DE VILLA G.R. No.
discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the
83988 September 29, 1989
FACTS:
Petitioner Valmonte and ULAP Assocation filed
for prohibition with preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order, seeking the declaration of
checkpoints in Valenzuela, Metro Manila or elsewhere,
as unconstitutional and the dismantling and banning of
the same or, in the alternative, to direct the respondents
to formulate guidelines in the implementation of
checkpoints, for the protection of the people.
According to Petitioners, they filed the petition because
they were subjected to searches and seizures without
the benefit of a warrant. The petitioners averred that
there’s a recent incident happened, where a certain
Benjamin Parpoon, was allegedly killed in cold blood by
the members of the NCRDC manning the checkpoint
along McArthur Highway at Malinta, Valenzuela, for
ignoring and/or refusing to submit himself to the
checkpoint and for continuing to speed off inspire of
warning shots fired in the air.
ISSUE:
WON the installations of the checkpoints violated their
constitutional right against illegal search and seizures.
HELD:
NO. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those
which are reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable
search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but
is to be resolved according to the facts of each case.
In the case at bar, the setting up of the questioned
checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably in other areas)
may be considered as a security measure to enable the
NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing an effective
territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for
the benefit of the public. Checkpoints may also be
regarded as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the
government, in the interest of public security. In this
connection, the Court may take judicial notice of the shift
to urban centers and their suburbs of the insurgency
movement, so clearly reflected in the increased killings
in cities of police and military men by NPA "sparrow
units," not to mention the abundance of unlicensed
firearms and the alarming rise in lawlessness and
violence in such urban centers, not all of which are
reported in media, most likely brought about by
deteriorating economic conditions — which all sum up to
what one can rightly consider, at the very least, as
abnormal times. Between the inherent right of the state
to protect its existence and promote public welfare and
an individual's right against a warrantless search which
is however reasonably conducted, the former should
prevail.
True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is
susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform, in the same
manner, that all governmental power is susceptible to
abuse. But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience,
checkpoints during these abnormal times, when
conducted within reasonable limits, are part of the price
we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful community.
Furthermore, the Court stressed that the constitutional
right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a
personal right invocable only by those whose rights have
been infringed, or threatened to be infringed. What
constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search and
seizure in any particular case is purely a judicial
question, determinable from a consideration of the
circumstances involved.
Petitioner Valmonte's general allegation to the effect that
he had been stopped and searched without a search
warrant by the military manning the checkpoints, without
more, i.e., without stating the details of the incidents
which amount to a violation of his right against unlawful
search and seizure, is not sufficient to enable the Court
to determine whether there was a violation of Valmonte's
right against unlawful search and seizure.
VALMONTE V. GENERAL DE VILLA G.R. No.
83988 September 29, 1989
FACTS:
Petitioner Valmonte and ULAP Assocation filed
for prohibition with preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order, seeking the declaration of
checkpoints in Valenzuela, Metro Manila or elsewhere,
as unconstitutional and the dismantling and banning of
the same or, in the alternative, to direct the respondents
to formulate guidelines in the implementation of
checkpoints, for the protection of the people.
According to Petitioners, they filed the petition because
they were subjected to searches and seizures without
the benefit of a warrant. The petitioners averred that
there’s a recent incident happened, where a certain
Benjamin Parpoon, was allegedly killed in cold blood by
the members of the NCRDC manning the checkpoint
along McArthur Highway at Malinta, Valenzuela, for
ignoring and/or refusing to submit himself to the
checkpoint and for continuing to speed off inspire of
warning shots fired in the air.
ISSUE:
WON the installations of the checkpoints violated their
constitutional right against illegal search and seizures.
HELD:
NO. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those
which are reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable
search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but
is to be resolved according to the facts of each case.
In the case at bar, the setting up of the questioned
checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably in other areas)
may be considered as a security measure to enable the
NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing an effective
territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for
the benefit of the public. Checkpoints may also be
regarded as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the
government, in the interest of public security. In this
connection, the Court may take judicial notice of the shift
to urban centers and their suburbs of the insurgency
movement, so clearly reflected in the increased killings
in cities of police and military men by NPA "sparrow
units," not to mention the abundance of unlicensed
firearms and the alarming rise in lawlessness and
violence in such urban centers, not all of which are
reported in media, most likely brought about by
deteriorating economic conditions — which all sum up to
what one can rightly consider, at the very least, as
abnormal times. Between the inherent right of the state
to protect its existence and promote public welfare and
an individual's right against a warrantless search which
is however reasonably conducted, the former should
prevail.
True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is
susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform, in the same
manner, that all governmental power is susceptible to
abuse. But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience,
discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the
checkpoints during these abnormal times, when
conducted within reasonable limits, are part of the price
we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful community.
Furthermore, the Court stressed that the constitutional
right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a
personal right invocable only by those whose rights have
been infringed, or threatened to be infringed. What
constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search and
seizure in any particular case is purely a judicial
question, determinable from a consideration of the
circumstances involved.
Petitioner Valmonte's general allegation to the effect that
he had been stopped and searched without a search
warrant by the military manning the checkpoints, without
more, i.e., without stating the details of the incidents
which amount to a violation of his right against unlawful
search and seizure, is not sufficient to enable the Court
to determine whether there was a violation of Valmonte's
right against unlawful search and seizure.
GUANZON V. DE VILLA
The military and police officers conducted “Areal Target
Zonings” or “saturation drives” in Metro Manila,
specifically on places where the subversives, as
pinpointed by said authorities, were hiding. During these
saturation drives, police and military units cordon an
area of more than one residence and sometimes the
whole barangay or areas of barangays, without any
search warrant or warrant of arrest. Petitioners claimed
that said saturation drives followed a common pattern of
human rights abuses, as such, sought for its stoppage.
Facts:
The petitioners, who are of legal age, bona fide
residents of Metro Manila, and taxpayers and
leaders in their respective communities, sought
to prohibit the military and police officers from
conducting “Areal Target Zonings” or “saturation
drives” in Metro Manila.
Petitioners claim that on various dates from
March 5, 1987 till November 3 of the same year,
various saturation drives were conducted by the
respondents. Added by the petitioners, that
these “saturation drives” are in critical areas
pinpointed by the military and police as places
where the subversives are hiding. The arrests
ranged from 7 persons (July 20, Bankusay,
Tondo) to 1,500 (November 3, Lower
Maricaban, Pasay City) and that same followed
a common pattern of human rights abuses like
police and military units, without any search
warrant or warrant of arrest, cordon an area of
more than one residence and sometimes whole
barangay or areas of barangay in Metro Manila,
from the dead of the night or early morning
hours and residents are herded as cows with
men ordered to strip down to their briefs and
examined for tattoo marks and other imagined
marks.
Ruling:
1. There appears to have been no impediment to
securing search warrants or warrants of arrest
before any houses were searched or individuals
roused from sleep were arrested. There is no
strong showing that the objectives sought to be
attained by the “areal zoning” could not be
achieved as the rights of the squatter and low
income families are fully protected. Where a
violation of human rights specifically guaranteed
by the Constitution is involved, it is the duty of
the court to stop the transgression and state
where even the awesome power of the state
may not encroach upon the rights of the
individual.
2. Where there is large scale mutiny or actual
rebellion, the police or military may go in force to
the combat areas, enter affected residences or
buildings, round up suspected rebels and
otherwise quell the mutiny or rebellion without
having to secure search warrants and without
violating the Bill of Rights.
3. A show of force is sometimes necessary as long
as the rights of the people are protected and not
violated. A blanket prohibition such as that
sought by the petitioners would limit all police
power to one on one confrontation where search
warrants and warrants of arrest against specific
individuals are easily procured.
ALVERO VS. DIZON
Facts:
In February 1945, Aurelio S. Alvero was arrested for
treason. Certain papers were seized from his house.
Alvero demanded the return of the papers seized from
his house because it was in violation of his constitutional
rights.
The lower court denied.
The documents were presented as evidence by the
prosecution.
Issue:
Whether the seizure of the documents taken from
Alvero’s house was legal and can be used as evidence
against him.
Held:
The right of officers and men of the United States Army
to arrest Alvero, and to seize his personal papers,
without any search warrant, in the zone of military
operations, is unquestionable, under the provisions the
Regulations relative to the Laws and Customs of War on
Land of the Hague Conventions of 1907, authorizing the
seizure of military papers in the possession of prisoners
of war;
The consitution does not prohibit the Government from
taking advantage of unlawful searches under authority of
state law.
The use and presentation of documents, as evidence for
the prosecution against Alvero cannot now be legally
attacked, on the ground of unlawful or unreasonable
searches and seizures.
What constitutes a reasonable or even an unreasonable
search in any particular case is purely a judicial
question, determinable from a consideration of the
circumstances involved.
AURELIO S. ALVERO vs ARSENIO P. DIZON, et al.,
FACTS:
The petitioner has been accused of treason; that at the
hearing on his petition for bail, the prosecution
presented, as part of its evidence, certain documents
which had been allegedly seized by soldiers of the
United States Army, accompanied by Filipino Guerrillas
in the petitioner’s house. The Petitioner further contends
that the seized documents should be returned as it
obtained by means of force and intimidation or through
coercion, those are not his personal papers but part of
the files of the New Leader’s Association, which was
proven to be an organization created for the purpose of
collaborating with the enemy. Lastly, the presentation of
the seized documents in the trial is tantamount to
compelling him to testify against himself, in violation of
his constitutional rights.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the “seized” documents are
legal?
2. Whether or not the documents seized should be
admitted as evidence in the trial court?
HELD.
No. The petition for Certiorari with Injunction is
absolutely no merit.
RATIONALE:
The right of the officer and men of the United States
Army to arrest the petitioner as a collaborationist
suspect, and to seize his personal papers is
unquestionable. Also, proclamation of General Douglas
McArthur, as Commander in Chief of the United States
of Army, declaring his purpose to remove certain citizens
of the Philippines, who had voluntarily given aid and
comfort to the enemy, in violation of the allegiance.
EXCEPTION:
Important exception to the necessity for a Search
Warrant is the right of search and seizure as an incident
to a lawful arrest. A lawful arrest may be made either
while a crime is being committed or after its commission.
The right to search includes in both instances that of
searching the person of him who is arrested, in order to
find and seize things arrested with the crime as its fruits
as the means by which it was committed.
The Petitioner consented to the presentation of the
seized documents, as part of the evidence for the
prosecution, at the hearing in his petition for bail and at
the trial of the case on the merits, without having insisted
that the question of the alleged illegality of the search
and seizure of said papers and documents should first
have been directly litigated and established by a motion.
COMPULSORY SELF-INCRIMINATION
Not violated by the use of evidence of articles obtained
by an unconstitutional search and seizure. Thus, the
petitioner is estopped from questioning their admission.
PURPOSE: (Adam vs New York)
The purpose of the constitutional provisions against
unlawful searched and seizures is to prevent violations
of private security in person and property, and unlawful
invasions of the sanctity of the home, by officers of the
law acting under legislative and judicial sanction, and to
give remedy against such usurpations when
attempted.
BACHE & CO. INC. ET AL VS BIR COMMISSIONER
VIVENCIO RUIZ ET AL
Search and Seizure – Personal Examination of the
Judge
On 24 Feb 1970, Commissioner Vera of Internal
Revenue, wrote a letter addressed to J Ruiz requesting
the issuance of a search warrant against petitioners for
violation of Sec 46(a) of the NIRC, in relation to all other
pertinent provisions thereof, particularly Sects 53, 72,
73, 208 and 209, and authorizing Revenue Examiner de
Leon make and file the application for search warrant
which was attached to the letter. The next day, de Leon
and his witnesses went to CFI Rizal to obtain the search
warrant. At that time J Ruiz was hearing a certain case;
so, by means of a note, he instructed his Deputy Clerk of
Court to take the depositions of De Leon and Logronio.
After the session had adjourned, J Ruiz was informed
that the depositions had already been taken. The
stenographer read to him her stenographic notes; and
thereafter, J Ruiz asked respondent Logronio to take the
oath and warned him that if his deposition was found to
 be false and without legal basis, he could be charged for
perjury. J Ruiz signed de Leon’s application for search
warrant and Logronio’s deposition. The search was
subsequently conducted.
ISSUE: Whether or not there had been a valid search
warrant.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Bache on three grounds.
1. J Ruiz failed to personally examine the complainant
and his witness.
Personal examination by the judge of the complainant
and his witnesses is necessary to enable him to
determine the existence or non-existence of a probable
cause.
2. The search warrant was issued for more than one
specific offense.
The search warrant in question was issued for at least
four distinct offenses under the Tax Code. As ruled in
Stonehill “Such is the seriousness of the irregularities
committed in connection with the disputed search
warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to amend Section
3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court that ‘a search
warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in
connection with one specific offense.’ Not satisfied with
this qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph,
directing that ‘no search warrant shall issue for more
than one specific offense.
3. The search warrant does not particularly describe the
things to be seized.
The documents, papers and effects sought to be seized
are described in the Search Warrant
“Unregistered and private books of accounts (ledgers,
journals, columnars, receipts and disbursements books,
customers ledgers); receipts for payments received;
certificates of stocks and securities; contracts,
promissory notes and deeds of sale; telex and coded
messages; business communications, accounting and
business records; checks and check stubs; records of
bank deposits and withdrawals; and records of foreign
remittances, covering the years 1966 to 1970.”
The description does not meet the requirement in Art III,
Sec. 1, of the Constitution, and of Sec. 3, Rule 126 of
the Revised Rules of Court, that the warrant should
particularly describe the things to be seized.
A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the
things to be seized when the description therein is as
specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow or
when the description expresses a conclusion of fact not
of law by which the warrant officer may be guided in
making the search and seizure or when the things
described are limited to those which bear direct relation
to the offense for which the warrant is being issued.
ALVAREZ V. CFI G.R. No. L-45358 January 29,
1937
FACTS:
l Petitioner Alvarez asks that the warrant issued by Judge
Gutierrez ordering the search and seizure of certain
accounting documents at any time of day and night as
well as the order authorizing the agents of the Anti-Usury
Board to retain the articles seized be declared illegal and
set aside and the items be returned to him.
l Petitioner contends that Agent Almeda has no personal
knowledge of the facts which was served as the basis for
the issuance of the warrant. That he got it only from a
reliable source. Thus, the search warrant issued is
illegal.
l The articles had not been brought immediately to the judge
who issued the search warrant.
l The Anti-Usury Board insinuates in its answer that the
petitioner cannot now question the validity of the search
warrant or the proceedings had subsequent to the
issuance thereof, because he has waived his
constitutional rights in proposing a compromise whereby
he agreed to pay a fine of P200 for the purpose of
evading the criminal proceeding or proceedings.
ISSUE:
WON the requirements to find probable cause was
sufficiently made by the judge
WON the search and seizure warrant is valid.
HELD:
1.
l NO. Section 98 of General Orders, No. 58
provides that the judge or justice must, before issuing
the warrant, examine under oath the complainant and
any witnesses he may produce and take their
depositions in writing. It is the practice in this jurisdiction
to attach the affidavit of at least the applicant or
complainant to the application.
l It is admitted that the judge who issued the search
warrant, in this case, relied exclusively upon the affidavit
made by agent Mariano G. Almeda and that he did not
require nor take the deposition of any other witness. The
affidavit of the agent, in this case, was insufficient
because his knowledge of the facts was not personal but
merely hearsay.
l When the affidavit of the applicant of the complaint
contains sufficient facts within his personal and direct
knowledge, it is sufficient the judge is satisfied that there
existed probable cause;
l when the applicant's knowledge of the facts is
mere hearsay, the affidavit of one or more witnesses
having a personal knowledge of the fact is necessary.
l We conclude, therefore, that the warrant issued is
likewise illegal because it was based only on the affidavit
of the agent who had no personal knowledge of the
facts.
2
l NO. In view of the foregoing and under the above-cited
authorities, it appears that the affidavit, which served as
the exclusive basis of the search warrant, is insufficient
and fatally defective by reason of the manner in which
the oath was made, and therefore, it is hereby held that
the search warrant in question and the subsequent
seizure of the books, documents, and other papers are
illegal and do not in any way warrant the deprivation to
which the petitioner was subjected.
Moreover, Section 101 of General Orders, No. 58
authorizes that the search is made at night when it is
positively asserted in the affidavits that the property is on
the person or in the place ordered to be searched.
However, as declared, the affidavits are insufficient and
the warrant issued exclusively upon it is illegal,
Therefore, the search could not legally be made at night.
ALVAREZ V CFI 64 PHIL 33 (1937) the attorney for the petitioner filed a petition alleging that
the search warrant issued was illegal and that it had not
Facts: yet been returned to date together with the proceedings
taken in connection therewith, and praying that said
On 3 June 1936, the chief of the secret service of the
warrant be cancelled, that an order be issued directing
Anti-Usury Board, of the Department of Justice,
the return of all the articles seized to Alvarez, that the
presented to Judge Eduardo Gutierrez David then
agent who seized them be declared guilty of contempt of
presiding over the Court of First Instance of Tayabas, an
court, and that charges be filed against him for abuse of
affidavit alleging that according to reliable information,
authority. On September 10, the court issued an order
Narciso Alvarez kept in his house in Infanta, Tayabas,
holding: that the search warrant was obtained and
books, documents, receipts, lists, chits and other papers
issued in accordance with the law, that it had been duly
used by him in connection with his activities as a
complied with and, consequently, should not be
moneylender, charging usurious rates of interest in
cancelled, and that agent Siongco did not commit any
violation of the law. In his oath at the end of the affidavit,
contempt of court and must, therefore, be exonerated,
the chief of the secret service stated that his answers to
and ordering the chief of the Anti-Usury Board in Manila
the questions were correct to the best of his knowledge
to show cause, if any, within the unextendible period of 2
and belief. He did not swear to the truth of his
days from the date of notice of said order, why all the
statements upon his own knowledge of the facts but
articles seized appearing in the inventory should not be
upon the information received by him from a reliable
returned to Alvarez. The assistant chief of the Anti-Usury
person. Upon the affidavit the judge, on said date,
Board of the Department of Justice filed a motion
issued the warrant which is the subject matter of the
praying, for the reasons stated therein, that the articles
petition, ordering the search of the Alvarez’s house at
seized be ordered retained for the purpose of conducting
any time of the day or night, the seizure of the books and
an investigation of the violation of the Anti-Usury Law
documents and the immediate delivery thereof to him to
committed by Alvarez. On October 10, said official again
be disposed of in accordance with the law. With said
filed another motion alleging that he needed 60 days to
warrant, several agents of the Anti-Usury Board entered
examine the documents and papers seized, which are
Alvarez’s store and residence at 7:00 p.m. of 4 June
designated on pages 1 to 4 of the inventory by Nos. 5,
1936, and seized and took possession of the following
10, 16, 23, 25-27, 30-31 , 34, 36-43 and 45, and praying
articles: internal revenue licenses for the years 1933 to
that he be granted said period of 60 days. In an order of
1936, 1 ledger, 2 journals, 2 cashbooks, 9 order books,
October 16, the court granted him the period of 60 days
4 notebooks, 4 check stubs, 2 memorandums, 3
to investigate said 19 documents. Alvarez, herein, asks
bankbooks, 2 contracts, 4 stubs, 48 stubs of purchases
that the search warrant as well as the order authorizing
of copra, 2 inventories, 2 bundles of bills of lading, 1
the agents of the Anti-Usury Board to retain the articles
bundle of credit receipts, 1 bundle of stubs of purchases
seized, be declared illegal and set aside, and prays that
of copra, 2 packages of correspondence, 1 receipt book
all the articles in question be returned to him.
belonging to Luis Fernandez, 14 bundles of invoices and
other papers, many documents and loan contracts with Issue:
security and promissory notes, 504 chits, promissory
notes and stubs of used checks of the Hongkong & Whether the search warrant issued by the court is illegal
Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC). The search for because it has been based upon the affidavit of agent
and seizure of said articles were made with the Almeda in whose oath he declared that he had no
opposition of Alvarez who stated his protest below the personal knowledge of the facts which were to serve as
inventories on the ground that the agents seized even a basis for the issuance of the warrant but that he had
the originals of the documents. As the articles had not knowledge thereof through mere information secured
been brought immediately to the judge who issued the from a person whom he considered reliable, and that it is
search warrant, Alvarez, through his attorney, filed a illegal as it was not supported by other affidavits aside
motion on 8 June 1936, praying that the agent Emilio L. from that made by the applicant.
Siongco, or any other agent, be ordered immediately to
deposit all the seized articles in the office of the clerk of Held:
court and that said agent be declared guilty of contempt
Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution
for having disobeyed the order of the court. On said date
and Section 97 of General Orders 58 require that there
the court issued an order directing Siongco to deposit all
be not only probable cause before the issuance of a
the articles seized within 24 hours from the receipt of
search warrant but that the search warrant must be
notice thereof and giving him a period of 5 days within
based upon an application supported by oath of the
which to show cause why he should not be punished for
applicant and the witnesses he may produce. In its
contempt of court. On 10 June, Attorney Arsenio
broadest sense, an oath includes any form of attestation
Rodriguez, representing the Anti-Usury Board, filed a
by which a party signifies that he is bound in conscience
motion praying that the order of the 8th of said month be
to perform an act faithfully and truthfully; and it is
set aside and that the Anti-Usury Board be authorized to
sometimes defined as an outward pledge given by the
retain the articles seized for a period of 30 days for the
person taking it that his attestation or promise is made
necessary investigation. On June 25, the court issued an
under an immediate sense of his responsibility to God.
order requiring agent Siongco forthwith to file the search
The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts
warrant and the affidavit in the court, together with the
within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his
proceedings taken by him, and to present an inventory
witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince
duly verified by oath of all the articles seized. On July 2,
the committing magistrate, not the individual making the
affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the
existence of probable cause. The true test of sufficiency
of an affidavit to warrant issuance of a search warrant is
whether it has been drawn in such a manner that perjury
could be charged thereon and affiant be held liable for
damages caused. The affidavit, which served as the
exclusive basis of the search warrant, is insufficient and
fatally defective by reason of the manner in which the
oath was made, and therefore, the search warrant and
the subsequent seizure of the books, documents and
other papers are illegal. Further, it is the practice in this
jurisdiction to attach the affidavit of at least the applicant
or complainant to the application. It is admitted that the
judge who issued the search warrant in this case, relied
exclusively upon the affidavit made by agent Almeda
and that he did not require nor take the deposition of any
other witness. Neither the Constitution nor General
Orders 58 provides that it is of imperative necessity to
take the depositions of the witnesses to be presented by
the applicant or complainant in addition to the affidavit of
the latter. The purpose of both in requiring the
presentation of depositions is nothing more than to
satisfy the committing magistrate of the existence of
probable cause. Therefore, if the affidavit of the
applicant or complainant is sufficient, the judge may
dispense with that of other witnesses. Inasmuch as the
affidavit of the agent was insufficient because his
knowledge of the facts was not personal but merely
hearsay, it is the duty of the judge to require the affidavit
of one or more witnesses for the purpose of determining
the existence of probable cause to warrant the issuance
of the search warrant. When the affidavit of the applicant
or complainant contains sufficient facts within his
personal and direct knowledge, it is sufficient if the judge
is satisfied that there exists probable cause; when the
applicant’s knowledge of the facts is mere hearsay, the
affidavit of one or more witnesses having a personal
knowledge of the facts is necessary. Thus the warrant
issued is likewise illegal because it was based only on
the affidavit of the agent who had no personal
knowledge of the facts.
urgos vs. Chief of Staff
G.R. No. L-64261, December 26, 1984, 133 SCRA 800
FACTS:
On December 7, 1982, respondent judge issued two [2]
search warrants to "Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum"
newspapers.
During the search, the office and printing machines,
equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other
articles used in the printing, publication and distribution
of the said newspapers, as well as numerous papers,
documents, books and other written literature alleged to
be in the possession and control of petitioner Jose
Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the "We Forum"
newspaper, were seized.
Petitioners pray to nullify the search warrants in
question.
Respondent:
1. Respondents contend that petitioners should
have filed a motion to quash said warrants in
the court that issued them before impugning the
validity of the same before this Court.
2. Respondents also assail the petition on the
ground of laches (failure or negligence for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time to
do that which, by exercising due diligence, could
or should have been done earlier. It is
negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting a presumption that
the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it.)
3. Respondents also submit the theory that since
petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. had used and marked
as evidence some of the seized documents, he
is now estopped from challenging the validity of
the search warrants.
4. Respondents also invoked Section 8
of Presidential Decree No. 885 to justify the
continued sealing of the printing machines, "the
sequestration of the property of any person,
natural or artificial, engaged in subversive
activities against the government and its duly
constituted authorities ... in accordance with
implementing rules and regulations as may be
issued by the Secretary of National Defense."
Petitioners:
1. Petitioners alleged that respondent Judge failed
to conduct an examination under oath or
affirmation of the applicant and his witnesses, as
mandated by the above-quoted constitutional
provision as wen as Sec. 4, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court.
2. The two search warrants pinpointed only one
place where petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was
allegedly keeping and concealing the articles
listed therein.
3. Articles belonging to his co-petitioners - Jose
Burgos, Sr., Bayani Soriano and the J. Burgos
Media Services, Inc. were also seized although
the warrants were directed against Jose Burgos,
Jr. alone.
4. Real properties were seized.
5. The documents and Joint Affidavit presented to
respondent Judge prior to the filing of the search
warrants could not have provided sufficient basis
for the finding of a probable cause upon which a
warrant may validly issue in accordance with
Section 3, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution
which provides,
SEC. 3. ... and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined by the judge, or such other responsible
officer as may be authorized by law, after
examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and
the persons or things to be seized.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the two search warrants were valid.
Read: People vs. Gerente
HELD:
No.

Quashal of Warrants - The Court takes cognizance of
this petition in view of the seriousness and urgency of
the constitutional Issue raised, not to mention the public
interest generated by the search of the "We Forum"
offices which was televised in Channel 7 and widely
publicized in all metropolitan dailies.
The existence of this special circumstance justifies this
Court to exercise its inherent power to suspend its rules.
With the contention pertaining to laches, the petitioners
gave an explanation evidencing that they have
exhausted other extra-judicial efforts to remedy the
situation, negating the presumption that they have
abandoned their right to the possession of the seized
property.
PD 885 - It is doubtful however, if sequestration could
validly be effected in view of the absence of any
implementing rules and regulations promulgated by the
Minister of National Defense.
Besides, President Marcos himself denied the request of
the military authorities to sequester the property seized
from petitioners.
Ruling regarding the enumerated reasons by the
petitioners:
1. This objection may properly be considered moot
and academic, as petitioners themselves
conceded during the hearing on August 9, 1983,
that an examination had indeed been conducted
by respondent judge of Col. Abadilla and his
witnesses.
2. The defect pointed out is obviously a
typographical error. Precisely, two search
warrants were applied for and issued because
the purpose and intent were to search two
distinct premises. It would be quite absurd and
illogical for respondent judge to have issued two
warrants intended for one and the same place.
3. Section 2, Rule 126, of the Rules of Court, does
not require that the property to be seized should
be owned by the person against whom the
search warrant is directed. It may or may not be
owned by him.
4. Petitioners do not claim to be the owners of the
land and/or building on which the machineries
were placed.
5. This being the case, the machineries in
question, while in fact bolted to the ground,
remain movable property susceptible to seizure
under a search warrant. The broad statements
in the application and joint affidavit are mere
conclusions of law and does not satisfy the
requirements of probable cause. Deficient of
such particulars as would justify a finding of the
existence of probable cause, said allegation
cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a
search warrant and it was a grave error for
respondent judge to have done so. In Alvarez v.
Court of First Instance, this Court ruled that "the
oath required must refer to the truth of the facts
within the personal knowledge of the petitioner
or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is
to convince the committing magistrate, not the
individual making the affidavit and seeking the
issuance of the warrant, of the existence of
probable cause." Another factor which makes
the search warrants under consideration
constitutionally objectionable is that they are in
the nature of general warrants. The description
of the articles sought to be seized under the
search warrants in question are too general.
Read: Alvarez vs Court of First Instance
Therefore, the two search warrants issued by
respondent Judge on are hereby declared null and void.
The prayer for a writ of mandatory injunction for the
return of the seized articles is hereby granted and all
articles seized are hereby ordered released to
petitioners.
No cost
JOSE BURGOS VS. CHIEF OF STAFF
G.R. NO L-64261
DECEMBER 26, 1984
FACTS:
Two warrants were issued against petitioners for the
search on the premises of “Metropolitan Mail” and “We
Forum” newspapers and the seizure of items alleged to
have been used in subversive activities. Petitioners
prayed that a writ of preliminary mandatory and
prohibitory injunction be issued for the return of the
seized articles, and that respondents be enjoined from
using the articles thus seized as evidence against
petitioner.
Petitioners questioned the warrants for the lack of
probable cause and that the two warrants issued
indicated only one and the same address. In addition,
the items seized subject to the warrant were real
properties.
Issue: Whether or not the two warrants were valid to
justify seizure of the items.
Held:
The defect in the indication of the same address in the
two warrants was held by the court as a typographical
error and immaterial in view of the correct determination
of the place sought to be searched set forth in the
application. The purpose and intent to search two
distinct premises was evident in the issuance of the two
warrant.
As to the issue that the items seized were real
properties, the court applied the principle in the case
of Davao Sawmill Co. v. Castillo, ruling “that machinery
which is movable by nature becomes immobilized when
placed by the owner of the tenement, property or plant,
but not so when placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any
other person having only a temporary right, unless such
person acted as the agent of the owner.” In the case at
bar, petitioners did not claim to be the owners of the land
and/or building on which the machineries were placed.
This being the case, the machineries in question, while
in fact bolted to the ground remain movable property
susceptible to seizure under a search warrant.
However, the Court declared the two warrants null and
void.
Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts
and circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has
been committed and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place sought to be
searched.
The Court ruled that the affidavits submitted for the
application of the warrant did not satisfy the requirement
of probable cause, the statements of the witnesses
having been mere generalizations.
Furthermore, jurisprudence tells of the prohibition on the
issuance of general warrants. (Stanford vs. State of
Texas). The description and enumeration in the warrant
of the items to be searched and seized did not indicate
with specification the subversive nature of the said
items.
JOSE BURGOS VS. CHIEF OF STAFF
G.R. NO L-64261
DECEMBER 26, 1984
Facts:
Two warrants were issued against petitioners for the
search on the premises of “Metropolitan Mail” and “We
Forum” newspapers and the seizure of items alleged to
have been used in subversive activities. Petitioners
prayed that a writ of preliminary mandatory and
prohibitory injunction be issued for the return of the
seized articles, and that respondents be enjoined from
using the articles thus seized as evidence against
petitioner.
Petitioners questioned the warrants for the lack of
probable cause and that the two warrants issued
indicated only one and the same address. In addition,
the items seized subject to the warrant were real
properties.
Issue: Whether or not the two warrants were valid to
justify seizure of the items.
Held:
The defect in the indication of the same address in the
two warrants was held by the court as a typographical
error and immaterial in view of the correct determination
of the place sought to be searched set forth in the
application. The purpose and intent to search two
distinct premises was evident in the issuance of the two
warrant.
As to the issue that the items seized were real
properties, the court applied the principle in the case
of Davao Sawmill Co. v. Castillo, ruling “that machinery
which is movable by nature becomes immobilized when
placed by the owner of the tenement, property or plant,
but not so when placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any
other person having only a temporary right, unless such
person acted as the agent of the owner.” In the case at
bar, petitioners did not claim to be the owners of the land
and/or building on which the machineries were placed.
This being the case, the machineries in question, while
in fact bolted to the ground remain movable property
susceptible to seizure under a search warrant.
However, the Court declared the two warrants null and
void.
Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts
and circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has
been committed and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place sought to be
searched.
The Court ruled that the affidavits submitted for the
application of the warrant did not satisfy the requirement
of probable cause, the statements of the witnesses
having been mere generalizations.
Furthermore, jurisprudence tells of the prohibition on the
issuance of general warrants. (Stanford vs. State of
Texas). The description and enumeration in the warrant
of the items to be searched and seized did not indicate
with specification the subversive nature of the said
items.
JOSE BURGOS VS. CHIEF OF STAFF
Facts:
Respondent Judge Ernani Cruz-Pano issued 2 search
warrants to search the premises of of the “Metropolitan
Mail” and “We Forum”. Various equipment,
paraphernalia and written documents were searched.
Written literature alleged to be in the possession and
control of petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr., publisher-editor of
“We Forum” newspaper were seized.
The validity of these warrants were questioned through a
petition for certiorari and so that the articles and
equipment may be returned to the petitioners.
Issue:
Whether or not the warrant of arrest is valid to justify the
seizure of the items.
Supreme Court Ruling:
The law provides that “…no search warrant or warrant
of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined by the judge, or such other responsible
officer as may be authorized by law, after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized.”
Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts
and circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has
been committed and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place sought to be
searched. In the case, the reason for the seizure must
be well stated, as well as the specifications and the
particularities of the alleged subversive material that the
petitioner has published or is intending to publish. Mere
generalization will not suffice. Thus, the broad statement
in Col. Abadilla’s application is a mere conclusion of law
and does not satisfy the requirements of probable cause.
The warrant is constitutionally objectionable because
they are in the nature of general warrants.
The search warrants were declared null and void.
PAUL G. ROBERTS, ET AL. V. COURT OF
APPEALS, ET AL., G.R. NO. 113930, MARCH 5, 1996
I. THE FACTS
Petitioners, who are corporate officers and
members of the Board of Pepsi Cola Products Phils.,
Inc. were prosecuted in connection with the Pepsi
“Number Fever” promotion by handlers of the
supposedly winning “349” Pepsi crowns. Of the four
cases filed against the petitioners, probable cause was
found by the investigating prosecutor only for the crime
of estafa, but not for the other alleged offenses.
On 12 April 1993, the information was filed with
the trial court without anything accompanying it. A copy
of the investigating prosecutor’s Joint Resolution was
forwarded to and received by the trial court only on 22
April 1993. However, no affidavits of the witnesses,
transcripts of stenographic notes of the proceedings
during the preliminary investigation, or other documents
submitted in the course thereof were found in the
records of the case as of 19 May 1993.
On 15 April 1993, petitioners Roberts, et al. filed
a petition for review to the Department of Justice seeking
the reversal of the finding of probable cause by the
investigating prosecutor. They also moved for the
suspension of the proceedings and the holding in
abeyance of the issuance of warrants of arrest against
them. Meanwhile, the public prosecutor also moved to
defer the arraignment of the accused-appellants pending
the final disposition of the appeal to the Department of
Justice.
On 17 May 1993, respondent Judge Asuncion
issued the challenged order (1) denying, on the basis
of Crespovs. Mogul, the foregoing motions respectively
filed by the petitioners and the public prosecutor, and
directing the issuance of the warrants of arrest “after
June 1993” and setting the arraignment on 28 June
1993. In part, respondent judge stated in his order that
since the case is already pending in this Court for trial,
following whatever opinion the Secretary of Justice may
have on the matter would undermine the independence
and integrity his court. To justify his order, he quoted the
ruling of the Supreme Court in Crespo, which stated:
In order therefor to avoid such a situation
whereby the opinion of the Secretary of Justice who
reviewed the action of the fiscal may be disregarded by
the trial court, the Secretary of Justice should, as far as
practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review
or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the
complaint or information has already been filed in Court.
The matter should be left entirely for the determination of
the Court.
Petitioners went to the Court of Appeals (CA),
arguing that the respondent judge had not the slightest
basis at all for determining probable cause when he
ordered the issuance of warrants of arrest. After finding
that a copy of the public prosecutor’s Joint Resolution
had in fact been forwarded to, and received by, the trial
court on 22 April 1993, the CA denied petitioners’
application for writ of preliminary injunction. The CA
ruled that the Joint Resolution “was sufficient in itself to
have been relied upon by respondent Judge in
convincing himself that probable cause indeed exists for
the purpose of issuing the corresponding warrants of
arrest” and that the “mere silence of the records or the
absence of any express declaration” in the questioned
order as to the basis of such finding does not give rise to
an adverse inference, for the respondent Judge enjoys
in his favor the presumption of regularity in the
performance of his official duty. Roberts, et al. sought
reconsideration, but meanwhile, the DOJ affirmed the
finding of probable cause by the investigating
prosecutor. The CA therefore dismissed the petition for
mootness.
II. THE ISSUES
1. Did Judge Asuncion commit grave abuse of
discretion in denying, on the basis of Crespo vs.
Mogul, the motions to suspend proceedings and hold in
abeyance the issuance of warrants of arrest and to defer
arraignment until after the petition for review filed with
the DOJ shall have been resolved?
2. Did Judge Asuncion commit grave abuse of
discretion in ordering the issuance of warrants of arrest
without examining the records of the preliminary
investigation?
3. May the Supreme Court determine in
this [sic] proceedings the existence of probable cause
either for the issuance of warrants of arrest against the
petitioners or for their prosecution for the crime of
estafa?
III. THE RULING
[The Court, in a 7-5-2 vote, GRANTED the
petition. It SET ASIDE the decision and resolution of the
CA, the resolutions of the DOJ 349 Committee, and the
order of respondent judge.]
1. YES, Judge Asuncion committed grave
abuse of discretion in denying, on the basis
of Crespo vs. Mogul, the motions to suspend
proceedings and hold in abeyance the issuance of
warrants of arrest and to defer arraignment until
after the petition for review filed with the DOJ shall
have been resolved.
There is nothing in Crespo vs. Mogul which bars
the DOJ from taking cognizance of an appeal, by way of
a petition for review, by an accused in a criminal case
from an unfavorable ruling of the investigating
prosecutor. It merely advised the DOJ to, “as far as
practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review
or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the
complaint or information has already been filed in
Court.”
Whether the DOJ would affirm or reverse the
challenged Joint Resolution is still a matter of
guesswork. Accordingly, it was premature for respondent
Judge Asuncion to deny the motions to suspend
proceedings and to defer arraignment on the following
grounds:
This case is already pending in this Court for
trial. To follow whatever opinion the Secretary of Justice
may have on the matter would undermine the
independence and integrity of this Court. This Court is
still capable of administering justice.
The real and ultimate test of the independence
and integrity of this court is not the filing of the
aforementioned motions [to suspend proceedings and
issuance of warrants of arrest and to defer arraignment]
at that stage but the filing of a motion to dismiss or to
withdraw the information on the basis of a resolution of
the petition for review reversing the Joint Resolution of
the investigating prosecutor. However, once a motion to
dismiss or withdraw the information is filed the trial judge
may grant or deny it, not out of subservience to the
Secretary of Justice, but in faithful exercise of judicial
prerogative.
 2. YES, Judge Asuncion committed grave
abuse of discretion in ordering the issuance of
warrants of arrest without examining the records of
the preliminary investigation.
The teachings then
of Soliven, Inting, Lim, Allado, and Webb reject the
proposition that the investigating prosecutor’s
certification in an information or his resolution which is
made the basis for the filing of the information, or both,
would suffice in the judicial determination of probable
cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. In Webb,
this Court assumed that since the respondent Judges
had before them not only the 26-page resolution of the
investigating panel but also the affidavits of the
prosecution witnesses and even the counter-affidavits of
the respondents, they (judges) made personal
evaluation of the evidence attached to the records of the
case.
In this case, nothing accompanied the
information upon its filing on 12 April 1993 with the trial
court. A copy of the Joint Resolution was forwarded to,
and received by, the trial court only on 22 April 1993.
And as revealed by the certification of respondent
judge’s clerk of court, no affidavits of the witnesses,
transcripts of stenographic notes of the proceedings
during the preliminary investigation, or other documents
submitted in the course thereof were found in the
records of this case as of 19 May 1993. Clearly, when
respondent Judge Asuncion issued the assailed order of
17 May 1993 directing, among other things, the issuance
of warrants of arrest, he had only the information,
amended information, and Joint Resolution as bases
thereof. He did not have the records or evidence
supporting the prosecutor's finding of probable
cause. And strangely enough, he made no specific
finding of probable cause; he merely directed the
issuance of warrants of arrest “after June 21, 1993.” It
may, however, be argued that the directive presupposes
a finding of probable cause. But then compliance with a
constitutional requirement for the protection of individual
liberty cannot be left to presupposition, conjecture, or
even convincing logic.
3. NO, the Supreme Court MAY NOT
determine in this [sic] proceedings the existence of
probable cause either for the issuance of warrants of
arrest against the petitioners or for their prosecution
for the crime of estafa.
Ordinarily, the determination of probable cause
is not lodged with this Court. Its duty in an appropriate
case is confined to the issue of whether the executive or
judicial determination, as the case may be, of probable
cause was done without or in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to want of
jurisdiction. This is consistent with the general rule that
criminal prosecutions may not be restrained or stayed by
injunction, preliminary or final.
There are, however, exceptions to the foregoing
rule. But the Court refused to reevaluate the evidence to
determine if indeed there is probable cause for the
issuance of warrants of arrest in this case. For the
respondent judge did not, in fact, find that probable
cause exists, and if he did he did not have the basis
therefor. Moreover, the records of the preliminary
investigation in this case are not with the Court. They
were forwarded by the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Quezon City to the DOJ in compliance with the latter's
1st Indorsement of 21 April 1993. The trial court and the
DOJ must be required to perform their duty.
ROBERTS V CA, JUDGE ASUNCION, ET. AL. G.R.
NO. 113930 (1996)
Pepsi Cola Products Phils., Inc. had a Number
Fever Promotion where “all holders of crowns and/or
caps of Pepsi products bearing the winning 3-digit
number will win the prize printed on the crown/cap. On
May 25, 1992, it was announced that the winning
number for the next day was “349”. Several thousand
holders of “349” went then to Pepsi to redeem but Pepsi
refused to pay. These holders filed complaints for estafa
against the officers of Pepsi.
After several procedural maneuvers by
petitioners’ counsel (including a petition for review with
the Secretary of Justice on the finding of PC by the
prosecutor), respondent Judge denied the Motion to
Suspend Proceedings and to Hold in Abeyance
Issuance of Warrants of Arrest and the Motion to Defer
arraignment, and directed the issuance of the warrants
of arrest and setting the arraignment.
Petitioners filed a certiorari with CA with
application for TRO against Judge Asuncion alleging
GAD. CA granted TRO. However, with the issuance of
the decision of the Secretary of Justice dismissing the
petition for review, the CA dismissed the case as moot.
MR denied.
Petitioners filed instant petition – resp Judge
Asuncion committed GAD in ordering the issuance
of warrants of arrest without examining the records
of the preliminary investigation
WON respondent judge acted with GAD in issuing
the warrants of arrest without examination of
preliminary investigation records. YES
WARRANT OF ARREST: TWO TYPES, PERSONAL
EXAMINATION OF JUDGE NOT REQUIRED IN
SECOND TYPE BUT…
Under existing laws, warrants of arrest may be issued
(1) by the Metropolitan Trial Courts (MeTCs) except
those in NCR, Municipal Trial Courts (MTCs), and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (MCTCs) in cases falling
within their exclusive original jurisdiction; in cases
covered by the rule on summary procedure where the
accused fails to appear when required; and in cases filed
with them which are cognizable by the Regional Trial
Courts (RTCs); and
(2) by the Metropolitan Trial Courts in NCR(MeTCs-
NCR) and the RTCs in cases filed with them after
appropriate preliminary investigations conducted by
officers authorized to do so other than judges of MeTCs,
MTCs and MCTCs.
As to the first, a warrant can issue only if the
judge is satisfied after an examination in writing and
under oath of the complainant and the witnesses, in
the form of searching questions and answers, that a
probable cause exists and that there is a necessity of
placing the respondent under immediate custody in
order not to frustrate the ends of justice.
As to the second, this Court held in Soliven vs.
Makasiar that the judge is not required to personally
examine the complainant and the witnesses, but “he
shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and
supporting documents submitted by the fiscal
regarding the existence of probable cause and, on
the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if
on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he
may disregard the fiscal’s report and require the
submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to
aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the
existence of probable cause.”
Xxx “otherwise judges would be unduly laden with
the preliminary examination and investigation of criminal
complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and
deciding cases filed before their courts.” It must be
emphasized that judges must not rely solely on the
report or resolution of the fiscal (now prosecutor); they
must evaluate the report and the supporting documents.
XXX in People vs. Inting “the affidavits, the transcripts of
stenographic notes (if any), and all other supporting
documents behind the Prosecutor’s certification which
are material in assisting the Judge to
make his determination of probable cause.
WHY THE JUDGE EVALUATE THE
REPORT/CERTIFICATION OF THE FISCAL
First, the determination of probable cause is a
function of the Judge. It is not for the Provincial Fiscal
or Prosecutor nor the Election Supervisor to
ascertain. Only the Judge and the Judge alone makes
this determination.
Second, the preliminary inquiry made by a
Prosecutor does not bind the Judge. It merely assists
him to make the determination of probable cause. The
Judge does not have to follow what the Prosecutor
presents to him. By itself, the Prosecutor’s certification of
probable cause is ineffectual. It is the report, the
affidavits, the transcripts of stenographic notes (if any),
and all other supporting documents behind the
Prosecutor’s certification which are material in assisting
the Judge to make his determination.
Soliven vs. Makasiar: Judge does not have to
personally examine the complainant and his witnesses
xxx. However, there should be a report and necessary
documents supporting the Fiscal’s bare certification. All
of these should be before the Judge.
Allado vs. Diokno: before issuing a warrant of arrest,
the judge must satisfy himself that based on the
evidence submitted there is sufficient proof that a crime
has been committed and that the person to be arrested
is probably guilty thereof
Webb vs. De Leon: before issuing warrants of arrest,
judges merely determine personally the probability, not
the certainty of the guilt of an accused. In doing so,
judges do not conduct a de novo hearing to determine
the existence of probable cause. They just personally
review the initial determination of the prosecutor finding
a probable cause to see if it is supported by substantial
evidence.
The teachings then of Soliven, Inting, Lim,
Allado, and Webb reject the proposition that the
investigating prosecutor’s certification in an information
or his resolution which is made the basis for the filing of
the information, or both, would suffice in the judicial
determination of probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest.
~NO DOCUMENTARY BASES FOR FINDING OF PC
(IN FACT NO FINDING OF PC) => WARRANTS OF
ARREST INVALID
Unfortunately, in Criminal Case No. Q-93-43198,
nothing accompanied the information upon its filing
on 12 April 1993 with the trial court. As found by the
Court of Appeals in its resolution of 1 July 1993, a copy
of the Joint Resolution was forwarded to, and received
by, the trial court only on 22 April 1993. And as revealed
by the certification of Branch Clerk of Court Gibson
Araula, Jr., no affidavits of the witnesses, transcripts
of stenographic notes of the proceedings during the
preliminary investigation, or other documents
submitted in the course thereof were found in the
records of Criminal Case No. Q-93-43198 as of 19 May
1993. Clearly, when respondent Judge Asuncion
issued the assailed order of 17 May 1993 directing,
among other things, the issuance of warrants of arrest,
he had only the information, amended information,
and Joint Resolution as bases thereof. He did not
have the records or evidence supporting the
prosecutor’s finding of probable cause. And
strangely enough, he made no specific finding of
probable cause; he merely directed the issuance of
warrants of arrest “after June 21, 1993.” It may,
however, be argued that the directive presupposes a
finding of probable cause. But then compliance with a
constitutional requirement for the protection of individual
liberty cannot be left to presupposition, conjecture, or
even convincing logic.
WON the SC may determine in a petition for certiorari
the existence of probable cause either for the issuance
of warrants of arrest against the petitioners or for their
prosecution for estafa. NO
DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE NOT
LODGED WITH SC; EXCEPTIONS
In criminal prosecutions, the determination of probable
cause may either be an executive or a judicial
prerogative. XXX preliminary investigation should be
distinguished as to whether it is an investigation for the
determination of a sufficient ground for the filing of the
information or it is an investigation for the determination
of a probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest. The first kind is executive in nature. It is part of
the prosecution’s job. The second kind which is more
properly called preliminary examination is judicial in
nature and is lodged with the judge
Ordinarily, the determination of probable cause is
not lodged with this Court. Its duty in an appropriate
case is confined to the issue of whether the
executive or judicial determination, as the case may
be, of probable cause was done without or in excess
of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to want of jurisdiction. This is consistent
with the general rule that criminal prosecutions may not
be restrained or stayed by injunction, preliminary or final.
In exceptional cases, this Court may ultimately resolve
the existence or non-existence of probable cause by
examining the records of the preliminary investigation
Exceptions are enumerated in Brocka vs. Enrile as
follows:
a. To afford adequate protection to the
constitutional rights of the accused
b. When necessary for the orderly administration of
justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of
actions
c. When there is a pre-judicial question which
is sub judice
d. When the acts of the officer are without or in
excess of authority
e. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law,
ordinance or regulation
f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent
g. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the
offense
h. Where it is a case of persecution rather than
prosecution
i. Where the charges are manifestly false and
motivated by the lust for vengeance
j. When there is clearly no prima facie case
against the accused and a motion to quash on that
ground has been denied
k. Preliminary injunction has been issued by the
Supreme Court to prevent the threatened unlawful
arrest of petitioners

~ CASE FALLS UNDER EXCEPTION => COURT MAY
MAKE FINDING OF PC BUT SC REFUSED TO MAKE
FINDING
There can be no doubt that, in light of the several
thousand private complainants in Criminal Case No. Q-
93-43198 and several thousands more in different parts
of the country who are similarly situated as the former for
being holders of “349” Pepsi crowns, any affirmative
holding of probable cause in the said case may
cause or provoke, as justly feared by the petitioners,
the filing of several thousand cases in various
courts throughout the country. Inevitably, the
petitioners would be exposed to the harassments of
warrants of arrest issued by such courts and to huge
expenditures for premiums on bailbonds and for travels
from one court to another throughout the length and
breadth of the archipelago for their arraignments and
trials in such cases. Worse, the filing of these staggering
number of cases would necessarily affect the trial
calendar of our overburdened judges and take much of
their attention, time, and energy, which they could
devote to other equally, if not more, important cases.
Such a frightful scenario would seriously affect the
orderly administration of justice, or cause
oppression or multiplicity of actions - a situation
already long conceded by this Court to be an exception
to the general rule that criminal prosecutions may not be
restrained or stayed by injunction.
We shall not, however, reevaluate the evidence to
determine if indeed there is probable cause for the
issuance of warrants of arrest in Criminal Case No. Q-
93-43298. For, as earlier stated, the respondent Judge
did not, in fact, find that probable cause exists, and
if he did he did not have the basis therefor as
mandated by Soliven, Inting, Lim, Allado, and
even Webb. Moreover, the records of the preliminary
investigation in Criminal Case No. Q-93-43198 are
not with this Court. They were forwarded by the Office
of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to the DOJ in
compliance with the latter’s 1st Indorsement of 21 April
1993. The trial court and the DOJ must be required to
perform their duty.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-
APPELLEE,
VS.
CHUA HO SAN @ TSAY HO SAN, ACCUSED-
APPELLANT.
FACTS OF THE CASE:
In response to reports of rampant smuggling of firearms
and other contraband, Chief of Police Jim Lagasca Cid
of Bacnotan Police Station, La Union began patrolling
the Bacnotan coastline with his officers. While
monitoring the coastal area of Barangay Bulala, he
intercepted a radio call at around 12:45 p.m. from
Barangay Captain Juan Almoite of Barangay
Tammocalao requesting for police assistance regarding
an unfamiliar speedboat the latter had spotted.
According to Almoite, the vessel looked different from
the boats ordinarily used by fisherfolk of the area and
was poised to dock at Tammocalao shores. Cid and six
of his men led by SPO1 Reynoso Badua, proceeded
immediately to Tammocalao beach and there conferred
with Almoite. Cid then observed that the speedboat
ferried a lone male passenger, who was later identified
as Chua Ho San. When the speed boat landed, the male
passenger alighted, carrying a multicolored strawbag,
and walked towards the road. Upon seeing the police
officers, the man changed direction. Badua held Chua’s
right arm to prevent him from fleeing. They then
introduced themselves as police officers; however, Chua
did not understand what they’re saying. And by resorting
of “sign language”, Cid motioned with his hands for the
man to open his bag. The man acceded to the request.
The said bag was found to contain several transparent
plastics containing yellowish crystalline substances,
which was later identified to be methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu. Chua was then brought to
Bacnotan Police Station, where he was provided with an
interpreter to inform him of his constitutional rights.
ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless arrest, search
and seizure conducted by the Police Officers constitute a
valid exemption from the warrant requirement.
RULING: The Court held in the negative.
The Court explains that the Constitution bars State
intrusions to a person's body, personal effects or
residence except if conducted by virtue of a valid of a
valid search warrant issued in accordance with the
Rules. However, warrantless searches may be permitted
in the following cases, to wit:
(1) search of moving vehicles,
(2) seizure in plain view,
(3) customs searches,
(4) waiver or consent searches,
(5) stop and frisk situations (Terry search), and
(6) search incidental to a lawful arrest.
It is required in cases of in flagrante delicto that the
arresting officer must have personal knowledge of
such facts or circumstances convincingly indicative
or constitutive of probable cause. Probable cause
means a reasonable ground of suspicion supported
by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to
warrant a cautious man's belief that the person
accused is guilty of the offense with which he is
charged. In the case at bar, there are no facts on
record reasonably suggestive or demonstrative of
CHUA's participation in on going criminal enterprise
that could have spurred police officers from
conducting the obtrusive search. CHUA was not
identified as a drug courier by a police informer or
agent. The fact that the vessel that ferried him to
shore bore no resemblance to the fishing boats of
the area did not automatically mark him as in the
process of perpetrating an offense. With these, the
Court held that there was no probable cause to
justify a search incidental to a lawful arrest.
The Court likewise did not appreciate the contention
of the Prosecution that there was a waiver or
consented search. If CHUA could not understand
what was orally articulated to him, how could he
understand the police's "sign language?" More
importantly, it cannot logically be inferred from his
alleged cognizance of the "sign language" that he
deliberately, intelligently, and consciously waived his
right against such an intrusive search.
Finally, being a forbidden fruit, the subject regulated
substance was held to be inadmissible in evidence.
Hence, the accused was acquitted as the evidence
was not sufficient to establish guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
PEOPLE VS MOLINA
19 February 2001 | Ponente: Ynares-Santiago
Overview: SPO1 Paguidopon received a tip about
drug pushers. He previously caught a glimpse of one of
them, Mula, so he was able to point to him and his
companion, Molina, to arresting officers when they were
aboard a trisikad. Upon accosting them, the police were
able to find marijuana in a bag carried by Molina, leading
to their arrest. The court however held that they were
illegally arrested because their case don’t fall under the
exception of an in flagrante delicto arrest, there being no
outward indication that could justify their arrest.
Statement of the Case: This is for review of the
decision of the RTC finding Nasario Molina alias
"Bobong" and Gregorio Mula alias "Boboy" guilty
of violation of Sec. 8 of RA 6245, or the Dangerous
Drugs Act, by possessing 946.9 grants of dried
marijuana.-Molina and Mula pleaded guilty upon
arraignment.
Statement of Facts: On June 1996, SPO1 Marino
Paguidopon received information about a marijuana
pusher in Davao. Paguidopon first saw the pusher in
person on July of the same year, when his informer
identified Mula as the driver of a motorcycle who just
passed by them. Molina, on the other hand, was never
identified prior arrest. In the morning of August 8, 1996,
Paguidopon received information that the drug pushers
will pass by at NHA, Ma-a, Davao City that morning, so
he called for assistance from the PNP. A team
composed of SPO4 Cloribel, SPO2 Paguidopon
(brother of Marino), and SPO1 Pamplona were
dispatched to proceed to Marino's house where they'll
wait for the drug pushers will pass by. Two hours later,
a "trisikad" identified by Paguidopon as carrying Molina
and Mula passed by. So, the team boarded their vehicle,
overtook the trisikad and accosted the two.-At that point,
Mula was holding a black bag. He handed the same to
Molina. Pamplona, introducing himself as a police
officer, asked Molina to open the bag, to which Molina
replied "Boss, if possible, we will settle this."-Pamplona
insisted on opening the bag, which revealed dried
marijuana leaves inside. Thereafter, Mula and Molina
were handcuffed. Mula and Molina filed a Demurrer to
Evidence, saying that the marijuna was illegally seized
from them, therefore it is inadmissible. The trial court
denied this. The two waived presentation of evidence,
and opted to file a joint memorandum. Later, the trial
court still found them guilty, and sentenced them
to suffer the death penalty. Pursuant to Art. 47 of the
RPC and Rule 122, Sec. 10 of the ROC, the case is
elevated to the SC on automatic review. The SolGen
moved for the acquittal of the two.
Issue and Held: Was the arrest of Mula and Molina fall
under the exception of in flagrante delicto in warrantless
arrests?
NO. Applicable Laws: Article III, Sec. 2Article III, Sec. 3
Rationale: The law mandates that searches be carried
out with a search warrant upon the existence of probable
cause. Likewise, the law protects against unreasonable
searches and seizures and holds evidence taken from
such incidents as inadmissible as evidence. There are
exceptions to this, the first being seizure conducted
incidental to a lawful arrest
For this, there should be a lawful arrest first, before a
search can be made. It doesn't work the other
way around. Likewise, as a rule, an arrest is legitimate
if it's with a valid warrant of arrest. However, a police
officer may conduct warrantless arrests:
(a)In flagrante delicto - When, in his presence, the
person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense
(b) Arrest effected in hot pursuit - - when an offense has
just been committed and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it.
(c) Arrest of escaped prisoners - when the person to be
arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from penal
establishment or a place where he is serving final
judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is
pending, or has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another. In this case, the trial court
found that the warrantless arrest and seizure were valid
apparently because they were caught in flagrante delicto
in possession of the prohibited drugs. But the question
is: does the present case aptly fall within the exceptions
to the warrant requirement?
In flagrante delicto arrests, it is settled that "reliable
information" alone is not sufficient to constitute probable
cause that would justify in flagrante delicto arrests
O People vs Chua Ho San: The arresting officer must
have personal knowledge that the person he is arresting
has committed, is committing or is about to commit the
offense.
O People vs Aminudin: The accused was just
disembarking the vessel. He only became suspect when
the informer pointed him to the officials.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MOLINA
FACTS: Sometime in June 1996, SPO1
Paguidopon received an information regarding
the presence of an alleged marijuana pusher in Davao
City. His informer pointed to the motorcycle driver,
accused-appellant Mula, as the pusher. As to accused-
appellant Molina, SPO1 Paguidopon had no occasion
to see him before the arrest. Moreover, the names and
addresses of the accused-appellants came to the
knowledge of SPO1 Paguidopon only after they were
arrested. In the morning of August 8,1996, SPO1
Paguidopon received an information that the alleged
pusher will be passing at NHA, Ma-a, Davao City.
He called for assistance at the PNP proceed to the
house of SPO1 Marino Paguidopon where they would
wait for the alleged pusher to pass by. At around 9:30
in the morning of August 8, 1996, a “trisikad” carrying the
accused-appellants passed by. At that instance,
SPO1Paguidopon pointed to the accused-appellants as
the pushers. The police officers then ordered the
“trisikad” to stop. SPO1Pamplona introduced himself as
a police officer and asked accused-appellant Molina to
open the bag. Molina replied, “ Boss, if possible we will
settle this.” SPO1 Pamplona insisted on opening
the bag, which revealed dried
marijuana leaves inside. Thereafter, accused-appellants
Mula and Molina were handcuffed by the police officers.
Accused-appellants contended that the marijuana
allegedly seized from them is inadmissible as evidence
for having been obtained in violation of their
constitutional right against unreasonable searches and
seizures.
ISSUE: W/N the marijuana is inadmissible in evidence caught a glimpse of him. With respect to accused-
for having been seized in violation of appellants’ appellant Molina, SPO1 Paguidopon admitted that he
constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and had never seen him before the arrest. The Court holds
seizures that the arrest of accused-appellants does not fall under
the exceptions allowed by the rules. Hence, the search
HELD: The fundamental law of the land mandates that conducted on their person was likewise
searches and seizures be carried out in a reasonable illegal. Consequently, the marijuana seized by the peace
fashion. The Constitution provides: officers could not be admitted as evidence.
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against WHEREFORE accused are ACQUITTED.
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.

Search and seizure may be made without a warrant and

the evidence obtained therefrom may be admissible in
the following instances: (1) search incident to a lawful
arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search
in violation of customs laws; (4) seizure of evidence
in plain view; (5) when the accused himself waives his
right against unreasonable searches and seizures; and
(6) stop and frisk situations. As a rule, an arrest
is considered legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of
arrest. The Rules of Court, however, recognizes
permissible warrantless arrests. Thus, a peace officer or
a private person may, without warrant, arrest a person:
(a) when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense(arrest in flagrante delicto ); (b) when
an offense has just been committed and he has probable
cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts
or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it (arrest effected in hot pursuit);and (c) when
the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped
from a penal establishment or a place where he
is servingfinal judgment or is temporarily confined while
his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferr
ed from oneconfinement to another (arrest of escaped
prisoners). In the case at bar, accused-appellants
manifested no outward indication that would justify their
arrest. In holding a bag on board a trisikad, accused-
appellants could not be said to be committing,
attempting to commit or have committed a crime. The
response of Molina that “Boss, if possible we will settle
this” is an equivocal statement which standing alone will
not constitute probable cause to effect an in flagrante
delicto arrest. Note that were it not for SPO1 Marino
Paguidopon (who did not participate in the arrest but
merely pointed accused-appellants to the arresting
officers), accused-appellants could not be the subject of
any suspicion, reasonable or otherwise. SPO1
Paguidopon only learned Mula’s name and address after
the arrest. It is doubtful if SPO1 Paguidopon indeed
recognized accused-appellant Mula. It is worthy to note
that, before the arrest, he was able to see Mula in
person only once, pinpointed to him by his informer while
they were on the side of the road. These circumstances
could not have afforded SPO1 Paguidopon a closer look
at accused-appellant Mula, considering that the latter
was then driving a motorcycle when SPO1 Paguidopon