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REDHORSE NOTES AQUINO PART 1

Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests

Professor: Atty. Rodolfo Aquino

Compiled by Raphael Andrada

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC vs. HON. DRILON G.R. No. 81958, June 30, 1988,
SARMIENTO, J.

Facts:

The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI, for short), a firm "engaged
principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female, for overseas placement," challenges
the Constitutional validity of Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, of the Department of Labor and
Employment, in the character of "GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF
DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD WORKERS," in this petition for certiorari and
prohibition. Specifically, the measure is assailed for "discrimination against males or females;" that it
"does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills;" and
that it is violative of the right to travel. It is held likewise to be an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power,
police power being legislative, and not executive, in character. In this petition for certiorari and
prohibition, PASEI, challenges the validity of Department Order No. 1 (deployment ban) of the DOLE on
the following grounds: 1) it is discriminatory as it only applies to female workers; 2) it is an invalid exercise
of the lawmaking power. The respondents invoke the police power of the Philippine State.

Issue: Whether or not the enactment of DO No. 1 is a valid exercise of police power.

Held: Yes, it is a valid exercise of police power. Police power has been defined as the "state authority to
enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general
welfare." It finds no specific Constitutional grant for the plain reason that it does not owe its origin to the
Charter. It is a fundamental attribute of government that has enabled it to perform the most vital
functions of governance. It constitutes an implied limitation on the Bill of Rights. However, police power
is not without its own limitations. It may not be exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably. It is admitted that
Department Order No. 1 is in the nature of a police power measure. The only question is whether or not
it is valid under the Constitution. The concept of police power is wellestablished in this jurisdiction. It has
been defined as the "state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or
property in order to promote the general welfare." As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition of restraint
upon liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the common good. It is not capable of an exact definition
but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all-comprehensive embrace. "Its scope,
ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done,
provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring
the greatest benefits." It finds no specific Constitutional grant for the plain reason that it does not owe its
origin to the Charter. Along with the taxing power and eminent domain, it is inborn in the very fact of
statehood and sovereignty. It is a fundamental attribute of government that has enabled it to perform the
most vital functions of governance. Marshall, to whom the expression has been credited, refers to it
succinctly as the plenary power of the State "to govern its citizens." "The police power of the State . . . is
a power coextensive with self-protection, and it is not inaptly termed the 'law of overwhelming necessity.'
It may be said to be that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things
hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society." It constitutes an implied limitation on the Bill of
Rights. According to Fernando, it is "rooted in the conception that men in organizing the state and
imposing upon its government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to
enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary
measures calculated to ensure communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare." Significantly, the Bill
of Rights itself does not purport to be an absolute guaranty of individual rights and liberties "Even liberty
itself, the greatest of all rights, is not unrestricted license to act according to one's will." It is subject to the
far more overriding demands and requirements of the greater number. Notwithstanding its extensive
sweep, police power is not without its own limitations. For all its awesome consequences, it may not be
exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably. Otherwise, and in that event, it defeats the purpose for which it is
exercised, that is, to advance the public good. Thus, when the power is used to further private interests
at the expense of the citizenry, there is a clear misuse of the power. DO No. 1 applies only to "female
contract workers," but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination between the sexes. ―Equality
before the law" admits of classifications, provided that (1) such classifications rest on substantial
distinctions; (2) they are germane to the purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined to existing
conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all members of the same class. It is the avowed objective of DO
No. 1 to "enhance the protection for Filipino female overseas workers. Discrimination in this case is
justified. Police power is the domain of the legislature, but it does not mean that such an authority may
not be lawfully delegated. The Labor Code itself vests the DOLE with rulemaking powers in the
enforcement whereof. Hence it is a valid exercise of police power.

ICHONG VS. HERNANDEZ 101 PHIL. 1155

FACTS:

Republic Act 1180 or commonly known as ―An Act to Regulate the Retail Business‖ was passed. The said
law provides for a prohibition against foreigners as well as corporations owned by foreigners from
engaging from retail trade in our country. Petitioner filed a suit to invalidate the Retail Trade
Nationalization Law, on the premise that it violated several treaties which under the rule of pacta sunt
servanda, a generally accepted principle of international law, should be observed by the Court in good
faith.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Retail Trade Nationalization Law is unconstitutional for it is in conflict with
treaties which are generally accepted principles of international law.

HELD:

The Supreme Court said it saw no conflict. The reason given by the Court was that the Retail Trade National
Law was passed in the exercise of the police power which cannot be bargained away through the medium
of a treaty or a contract. The law in question was enacted to remedy a real actual threat and danger to
national economy posed by alien dominance and control of the retail business and free the citizens and
country from such dominance and control; that the enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police
power of the State, thru which and by which it protects its own personality and insures its security and
future. Resuming what we have set forth above we hold that the disputed law was enacted to remedy a
real actual threat and danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and control of the retail
business and free citizens and country from such dominance and control; that the enactment clearly falls
within the scope of the police power of the state, through which and by which it protects its own
personality and insures its security and future; that the law does not violate the equal protection clause
of the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for the distinction between alien and citizen in the
exercise of occupation regulated, nor the due process of the law clause; because the law is prospective in
operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already engaged in the occupation and reasonably
protects their privilege; that the wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its objectives appear to us to
be plainly evident - as a matter of fact it seems not only appropriate but actually necessary - and that in
any case such matter falls within the prerogative of the legislature, with whose power and discretion the
judicial department of the Government may not interfere; that the provisions of the law are clearly
embraced in the title, and this suffers from no duplicity and has not misled the legislature of the segment
of the population affected; and that it cannot be said to be void for supposed conflict with treaty
obligations because no treaty has actually been entered into on the subject and the police power may not
be curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any other conventional agreement.

WALTER LUTZ, et. al vs. ANTONIO ARANETA, G.R. No. L-7859, December 22, 1955

REYES, J.B L., J.

Facts:

Plaintiffs seek to recover tax from the respondent alleging that such is unconstitutional and void, being
levied for the aid and support of the sugar industry exclusively, which in plaintiff's opinion is not a public
purpose for which a tax may be constitutionally levied. The action having been dismissed by the Court of
First Instance, the plaintiffs appealed the case directly to the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether or not the imposition of tax under the CA No. 567 is a valid exercise of police power.

Held:

Yes. The tax is levied with a regulatory purpose, to provide means for the rehabilitation and stabilization
of the threatened sugar industry. In other words, the act is primarily an exercise of the police power. The
protection of a large industry constituting one of the great sources of the state's wealth and therefore
directly or indirectly affecting the welfare of so great a portion of the population of the State is affected
to such an extent by public interests as to be within the police power of the sovereign.The decision
appealed from is affirmed.
FLORENTINA A. LOZANO vs. HONORABLE ANTONIO M. MARTINEZ, et.al G.R. No. L-63419 December 18,
1986

YAP, J.

Facts:

Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22 for short), popularly known as the Bouncing Check Law punishes a
person "who makes or draws and issues any check on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue
that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of said check in
full upon presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of
funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid
reason, ordered the bank to stop payment." Those who question the constitutionality of BP 22 insist that
it offends the constitutional provision forbidding imprisonment for debt and it contravenes the equal
protection clause.

Issue: Whether or not the enactment of BP 22 is a valid exercise of police power.

Held:

Yes. The enactment of BP 22 is a valid exercise of the police power and is not repugnant to the
constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt. It may be constitutionally impermissible for the
legislature to penalize a person for nonpayment of a debt ex contractu. But certainly it is within the
prerogative of the lawmaking body to proscribe certain acts deemed pernicious and inimical to public
welfare. Acts mala in se are not the only acts which the law can punish. An act may not be considered by
society as inherently wrong, hence, not malum in se but because of the harm that it inflicts on the
community, it can be outlawed and criminally punished as malum prohibitum. The state can do this in the
exercise of its police power. There is no substance in the claim that the statute in question denies equal
protection of the laws or is discriminatory, since it penalizes the drawer of the check, but not the payee.
Wherefore, the decision rendered by the respondent judge is hereby set aside. Recent statistics of the
Central Bank show that one-third of the entire money supply of the country, roughly totalling P32.3 billion,
consists of peso demand deposits; the remaining two-thirds consists of currency in circulation. These
demand deposits in the banks constitute the funds against which, among others, commercial papers like
checks, are drawn. The magnitude of the amount involved amply justifies the legitimate concern of the
state in preserving the integrity of the banking system. Flooding the system with worthless checks is like
pouring garbage into the bloodstream of the nation's economy. The effects of the issuance of a worthless
check transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the
interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but
also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation,
multiplied a thousandfold, can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking
system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. In sum, we find the enactment
of BP 22 a valid exercise of the police power and is not repugnant to the constitutional inhibition against
imprisonment for debt.
DECS v San Diego 180 SCRA 233

Cruz, J.

Facts: The petitioner disqualified the private respondent who had actually taken and failed four times the
National Medical Admission Test from taking it again under its regulation. But the private respondent
contends that he is still entitled and hence, applied to take a fifth examination based on constitutional
grounds: right to academic freedom and quality education, due process and equal protection. He filed a
petition for mandamus. The respondent judge declared the said rule invalid and granted the petition.

Issue: Whether or not the three flunk rule is a valid exercise of police power.

Held:

Yes. The police power is validly exercised if (a) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from
those of a particular class, require the interference of the State, and (b) the means employed are
reasonably necessary to the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals. Thus, the subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within the ambit
of the police power. It is the right and indeed the responsibility of the State to insure that the medical
profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health.
While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does not have a constitutional right to be a
doctor. The private respondent has failed the NMAT five times and this is sufficed to say that he must
yield to the challenged rule and give way to those better prepared. The Court upheld the constitutionality
of the NMAT as a measure intended to limit the admission to medical schools only to those who have
initially proved their competence and preparation for a medical education. The decision of the respondent
judge is reversed.

Ynot v IAC 148 SCRA 659,

Cruz, J.

Facts:

President Marcos issued E.O. 626-A amending E.O. 626, which prohibits the transport of carabaos or
carabeefs from one province to another for the purpose of preventing indiscriminate slaughter of these
animals. The petitioner had transported six carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo where they were confiscated
for violation of the said order. He sued for recovery and challenges the constitutionality of the said order.
The lower court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos. He appealed the decision to the Intermediate
Appellate Court which upheld the lower court. Hence this petition for review on certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not the purpose of E.O. 626-A is a valid exercise of police power.

Held:

No. We do not see how the prohibition of the interprovincial transport of carabaos can prevent their
indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one
province than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent their
slaughter there, any more than moving them to another province will make it easier to kill them there. As
for the carabeef, the prohibition is made to apply to it as otherwise, so says executive order, it could be
easily circumvented by simply killing the animal. Perhaps so. However, if the movement of the live animals
for the purpose of preventing their slaughter cannot be prohibited, it should follow that there is no reason
either to prohibit their transfer as, not to be flippant, dead meat. Even if a reasonable relation between
the means and the end were to be assumed, we would still have to reckon with the sanction that the
measure applies for violation of the prohibition. The penalty is outright confiscation of the carabao or
carabeef being transported, to be meted out by the executive authorities, usually the police only. In the
Toribio Case, the statute was sustained because the penalty prescribed was fine and imprisonment, to be
imposed by the court after trial and conviction of the accused. Under the challenged measure,
significantly, no such trial is prescribed, and the property being transported is immediately impounded by
the police and declared, by the measure itself, as forfeited to the government. In the instant case, the
carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station commander, were returned to the petitioner
only after he had filed a complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00, which was
ordered confiscated upon his failure to produce the carabaos when ordered by the trial court. The
executive order defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment,
which was carried out forthright. The measure struck at once and pounced upon the petitioner without
giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying him the centuries-old guaranty of elementary fair play. In
the instant case, the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method
employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is
unduly oppressive. Moreover, there was no such pressure of time or action calling for the petitioner's
peremptory treatment. The properties involved were not even inimical per se as to require their instant
destruction. Thus, the Court cannot say with equal certainty that it complies with the second requirement,
that there be a lawful method. The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose
sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing. Executive Order No. 626-A is hereby declared
unconstitutional.

City Gov’t of Quezon City v Ericta 122 SCRA 759,

Gutierrez, Jr., J

Facts:

Respondent Himlayang Pilipino filed a petition seeking to annul Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64,
requiring private cemeteries to reserve 6% of its total area for the burial of paupers, on the ground that it
is contrary to the Constitution. The petitioner contends that the said order was a valid exercise of police
power under the general welfare clause. The respondent court declared the said order null and void.
Hence, this instant petition.

Issue: Whether or not Section 9 of the ordinance in question is a valid exercise of police power.

Held:
No. Section 9 cannot be justified under the power granted to Quezon City to tax, fix the license fee, and
regulate such other business, trades, and occupation as may be established or practice in the City.'
(Subsections 'C', Sec. 12, R.A. 537). The ordinance in question not only confiscates but also prohibits the
operation of a memorial park cemetery. As defined, police power is 'the power of promoting the public
welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property'. In the instant case, Section 9 of
Ordinance No. 6118, Series of 1964 of Quezon City is not a mere police regulation but an outright
confiscation. It deprives a person of his private property without due process of law, nay, even without
compensation. There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the
total area of an private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of
health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a taking
without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of
the municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city
passes the burden to private cemeteries. As a matter of fact, the petitioners rely solely on the general
welfare clause or on implied powers of the municipal corporation, not on any express provision of law as
statutory basis of their exercise of power. The petition for review is hereby dismissed

ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC., et. al vs. HONORABLE SECRETARY OF
AGRARIAN REFORM G.R. No. 78742, July 14, 1989,

CRUZ, J.

Facts:

In these consolidated cases, petitioners primarily assail the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27,
Proc. No. 131, and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 arguing that no private property shall be taken for public use
without just compensation. The respondent invokes the police power of the State.

Issue: Whether or not the taking of property under the said laws is a valid exercise of police power or of
the power of eminent domain.

Held:

It is an exercise of the power of eminent domain. The cases present no knotty complication insofar as the
question of compensable taking is concerned. To the extent that the measures under challenge merely
prescribe retention limits for landowners, there is an exercise of the police power for the regulation of
private property in accordance with the Constitution. But where, to carry out such regulation, it becomes
necessary to deprive such owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum area
allowed, there is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for which payment of just
compensation is imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What
is required is the surrender of the title to and the physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial
rights accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer-beneficiary. This is definitely an exercise not of the
police power but of the power of eminent domain. Wherefore, the Court holds the constitutionality of
R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131, and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229. However, the title to all expropriated
properties shall be transferred to the State only upon full payment of compensation to their respective
owners.

MANILA MEMORIAL PARK, INC v. SECRETARY OF DSWD 711 SCRA 302 G.R. No. 175356December 3, 2013

FACTS:

RA 7432 was passed into law (amended by RA 9257), granting senior citizens 20% discount on certain
establishments.

To implement the tax provisions of RA 9257, the Secretary of Finance and the DSWD issued its own Rules
and Regulations.

Hence, this petition.

Petitioners are not questioning the 20% discount granted to senior citizens but are only assailing the
constitutionality of the tax deduction scheme prescribed under RA 9257 and the implementing rules and
regulations issued by the DSWD and the DOF.

Petitioners posit that the tax deduction scheme contravenes Article III, Section 9 of the Constitution, which
provides that: "private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation."

Respondents maintain that the tax deduction scheme is a legitimate exercise of the State’s police power.

ISSUE: Whether the legally mandated 20% senior citizen discount is an exercise of police power or
eminent domain.

RULING:

The 20% senior citizen discount is an exercise of police power.

It may not always be easy to determine whether a challenged governmental act is an exercise of police
power or eminent domain. The judicious approach, therefore, is to look at the nature and effects of the
challenged governmental act and decide on the basis thereof.

The 20% discount is intended to improve the welfare of senior citizens who, at their age, are less likely to
be gainfully employed, more prone to illnesses and other disabilities, and, thus, in need of subsidy in
purchasing basic commodities. It serves to honor senior citizens who presumably spent their lives on
contributing to the development and progress of the nation.

In turn, the subject regulation affects the pricing, and, hence, the profitability of a private establishment.

The subject regulation may be said to be similar to, but with substantial distinctions from, price control or
rate of return on investment control laws which are traditionally regarded as police power measures.
The subject regulation differs there from in that (1) the discount does not prevent the establishments
from adjusting the level of prices of their goods and services, and (2) the discount does not apply to all
customers of a given establishment but only to the class of senior citizens. Nonetheless, to the degree
material to the resolution of this case, the 20% discount may be properly viewed as belonging to the
category of price regulatory measures which affect the profitability of establishments subjected thereto.
On its face, therefore, the subject regulation is a police power measure.

Pascual vs. Secretary of Public Works and Communications G.R. No. L10405, 29 December 1960

Facts:

On August 31, 1954, petitioner Wenceslao Pascual, as Provincial Governor of Rizal, instituted this action
for declaratory relief, with injunction, upon the ground that Republic Act No. 920, entitled "An Act
Appropriating Funds for Public Works", approved on June 20, 1953, contained, in section 1-C (a) thereof,
an item (43[h]) of P85,000.00 "for the construction, reconstruction, repair, extension and improvement"
of Pasig feeder road terminals, that, at the time of the passage and approval of said Act, the said feeder
roads were "nothing but projected and planned subdivision roads within the Antonio Subdivision situated
at Pasig, Rizal" near Shaw Boulevard, not far away from the intersection between the latter and EDSA,
which projected feeder roads "do not connect any government property or any important premises to
the main highway"; that the aforementioned Antonio Subdivision (as well as the lands on which said
feeder roads were to be construed) were private properties of respondent Jose C. Zulueta, who, at the
time of the passage and approval of said Act, was a member of the Senate of the Philippines; that on May,
1953, respondent Zulueta, addressed a letter to the Municipal Council of Pasig, Rizal, offering to donate
said projected feeder roads to the municipality of Pasig, Rizal; that, on June 13, 1953, the offer was
accepted by the council, subject to the condition "that the donor would submit a plan of the said roads
and agree to change the names of two of them"; that no deed of donation in favor of the municipality of
Pasig was, however, executed; that on July 10, 1953, respondent Zulueta wrote another letter to said
council, calling attention to the approval of Republic Act. No. 920, and the sum of P85,000.00 appropriated
therein for the construction of the projected feeder roads in question; that the municipal council of Pasig
endorsed said letter of respondent Zulueta to the District Engineer of Rizal, who, up to the present "has
not made any endorsement thereon" that inasmuch as the projected feeder roads in question were
private property at the time of the passage and approval of Republic Act No. 920, the appropriation of
P85,000.00 therein made, for the construction, reconstruction, repair, extension and improvement of said
projected feeder roads, was illegal and, therefore, void ab initio"; that said appropriation of P85,000.00
was made by Congress because its members were made to believe that the projected feeder roads in
question were "public roads and not private streets of a private subdivision"'; that, "in order to give a
semblance of legality, when there is absolutely none, to the aforementioned appropriation", respondents
Zulueta executed on December 12, 1953, while he was a member of the Senate of the Philippines, an
alleged deed of donation of the four (4) parcels of land constituting said projected feeder roads, in favor
of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines; that said alleged deed of donation was, on the same
date, accepted by the then Executive Secretary; that being subject to an onerous condition, said donation
partook of the nature of a contract; that, such, said donation violated the provision of our fundamental
law prohibiting members of Congress from being directly or indirectly financially interested in any contract
with the Government, and, hence, is unconstitutional, as well as null and voidab initio, for the construction
of the projected feeder roads in question with public funds would greatly enhance or increase the value
of the aforementioned subdivision of respondent Zulueta,

Issue: Whether the contested item of Republic Act No. 920 unconstitutional and, therefor, illegal?

Held:

No. The P85,000.00 appropriation for the projected feeder roads in question, the legality thereof
depended upon whether said roads were public or private property when the bill, which, latter on,
became Republic Act 920, was passed by Congress, or, when said bill was approved by the President and
the disbursement of said sum became effective, or on June 20, 1953 (see section 13 of said Act). Inasmuch
as the land on which the projected feeder roads were to be constructed belonged then to respondent
Zulueta, the result is that said appropriation sought a private purpose, and hence, was null and void. The
donation to the Government, over five (5) months after the approval and effectivity of said Act, made,
according to the petition, for the purpose of giving a "semblance of legality", or legalizing, the
appropriation in question, did not cure its aforementioned basic defect. Consequently, a judicial
nullification of said donation need not precede the declaration of unconstitutionality of said
appropriation. Again, it is well-stated that the validity of a statute may be contested only by one who will
sustain a direct injury in consequence of its enforcement. Yet, there are many decisions nullifying, at the
instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the disbursement of public funds, upon the theory that "the
expenditure of public funds by an officer of the State for the purpose of administering an unconstitutional
act constitutes a misapplication of such funds," which may be enjoined at the request of a taxpayer.
Republic Act No. 920 is unconstitutional, since the legislature is without power to appropriate public
revenue for anything but a public purpose and the project feeder roads are at the time private properties.
The right of the legislature to appropriate funds is correlative with its right to tax, and, under constitutional
provisions against taxation except for public purposes and prohibiting the collection of a tax for one
purpose and the devotion thereof to another purpose, no appropriation of state funds can be made for
other than for a public purpose.

Punsalan vs. Municipal Board of the City of Manila G.R. No. L-4817, 26 May 1954

Facts:

An ordinance was approved by the Municipal Board of the City of Manila which imposes a municipal
occupation tax on persons exercising various professions in the city and penalizes non-payment of the tax
by a fine of not more than two hundred pesos or by imprisonment of not more than six months or by both
such fine and imprisonment in the discretion of the court. The ordinance was in pursuance to paragraph
(1) Section 18 of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila which empowers the Municipal Board of said
city to impose a municipal occupation tax, not to exceed P50 per annum, on persons engaged in the
various professions above referred to the plaintiffs, after having paid their occupation tax, now being
required to pay the additional tax prescribed in the ordinance. The plaintiffs paid the said tax under
protest. The lower court declared the validity of the law authorizing the enactment of the ordinance, but
declared the latter illegal and void since its penalty provided for the nonpayment of tax was not legally
authorized.

Issue: Is this ordinance and the law authorizing it constitute class legislation, are unjust and oppressive,
and authorize what amounts to double taxation?

Held:

NO. To begin with defendants' appeal, we find that the lower court was in error in saying that the
imposition of the penalty provided for in the ordinance was without the authority of law. The last
paragraph (kk) of the very section that authorizes the enactment of this tax ordinance (section 18 of the
Manila Charter) in express terms also empowers the Municipal Board "to fix penalties for the violation of
ordinances which shall not exceed to(sic) two hundred pesos fine or six months" imprisonment, or both
such fine and imprisonment, for a single offense." Hence, the pronouncement below that the ordinance
in question is illegal and void because it imposes a penalty not authorized by law is clearly without basis.
Secondly, In raising the hue and cry of "class legislation", the burden of plaintiffs' complaint is not that the
professions to which they respectively belong have been singled out for the imposition of this municipal
occupation tax; and in any event, the Legislature may, in its discretion, select what occupations shall be
taxed, and in the exercise of that discretion it may tax all, or it may select for taxation certain classes and
leave the others untaxed. (Cooley on Taxation, Vol. 4, 4th ed., pp. 3393- 3395.) Plaintiffs' complaint is that
while the law has authorized the City of Manila to impose the said tax, it has withheld that authority from
other chartered cities, not to mention municipalities. We do not think it is for the courts to judge what
particular cities or municipalities should be empowered to impose occupation taxes in addition to those
imposed by the National Government. That matter is peculiarly within the domain of the political
departments and the courts would do well not to encroach upon it. Moreover, as the seat of the National
Government and with a population and volume of trade many times that of any other Philippine city or
municipality, Manila, no doubt, offers a more lucrative field for the practice of the professions, so that it
is but fair that the professionals in Manila be made to pay a higher occupation tax than their brethren in
the provinces. Thirdly, Plaintiffs brand the ordinance unjust and oppressive because they say that it
creates discrimination within a class in that while professionals with offices in Manila have to pay the tax,
outsiders who have no offices in the city but practice their profession therein are not subject to the tax.
Plaintiffs make a distinction that is not found in the ordinance. The ordinance imposes the tax upon every
person "exercising" or "pursuing" — in the City of Manila naturally — any one of the occupations named,
but does not say that such person must have his office in Manila. What constitutes exercise or pursuit of
a profession in the city is a matter of judicial determination. The argument against double taxation may
not be invoked where one tax is imposed by the state and the other is imposed by the city (1 Cooley on
Taxation, 4th ed., p. 492), it being widely recognized that there is nothing inherently obnoxious in the
requirement that license fees or taxes be exacted with respect to the same occupation, calling or activity
by both the state and the political subdivisions thereof.
Lladoc v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue GR L-19201, 16 June 1965

Facts:

In 1957, the MB Estate Inc., of Bacolod City, donated P10,000.00 in cash to Fr. Crispin Ruiz then parish
priest of Victorias, Negros Occidental, and predecessor of Fr. Casimiro Lladoc, for the construction of a
new Catholic Church in the locality. The total samount was actually spent for the purpose intended. On 3
March 1958, MB Estate filed the donor‘s gift tax return. Under date of 29 April 1960, the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue issued as assessment for donee‘s gift tax against the Catholic Parish of Victorias,
Negros Occidental, of which petitioner was the priest. The tax amounted to P1,370.00 including
surcharges, interest of 1% monthly from 15 May 1958 to 15 June 1960, and the compromise for the late
filing of the return. Petitioner lodged a protest to the assessment and requested the withdrawal thereof.
The protest and the motion for reconsideration presented to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue were
denied. The petitioner appealed to the CTA on 2 November 1960. After hearing, the CTA affirmed the
decision of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue except the imposition of compromise penalty of P20.
Fr. Lladoc appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether a donee‘s gift tax may be assessed against the Catholic Church.

Held: Yes. The phrase ―exempt from taxation,‖ as employed in the Constitution should not be interpreted
to mean exemption from all kinds of taxes. Section 22(3), Art. VI of the Constitution of the Philippines,
exempts from taxation cemeteries, churches and personages or convents, appurtenant thereto, and all
lands, buildings, and improvements used exclusively for religious purposes. The exemption is only from
the payment of taxes assessed on such properties enumerated, as property taxes, as contra-distinguished
from excise taxes. A donee‘s gift tax is not a property tax but an excise tax imposed on the transfer of
property by way of gift inter vivos. Its assessment was not on the property themeselves. It does not rest
upon general ownership, but an excise upon the use made of the properties, upon the exercise of the
privilege of receiving the properties. The imposition of such excise tax on property used for religious
purposes does not constitute an impairment of the Constitution.

Abra Valley College vs. Aquino GR L-39086, 15 June 1988

Facts:

Petitioner Abra Valley College is an educational corporation and institution of higher learning duly
incorporated with the SEC in 1948. On 6 July 1972, the Municipal and Provincial treasurers (Gaspar Bosque
and Armin Cariaga, respectively) and issued a Notice of Seizure upon the petitioner for the college lot and
building (OCT Q-83) for the satisfaction of said taxes thereon. The treasurers served upon the petitioner
a Notice of Sale on 8 July 1972, the sale being held on the same day. Dr. Paterno Millare, then municipal
mayor of Bangued, Abra, offered the highest bid of P 6,000 on public auction involving the sale of the
college lot and building. The certificate of sale was correspondingly issued to him. The petitioner filed a
complaint on 10 July 1972 in the court a quo to annul and declare void the ―Notice of Seizure‖ and the
―Notice of Sale‖ of its lot and building located at Bangued, Abra, for non-payment of real estate taxes
and penalties amounting to P5,140.31. On 12 April 1973, the parties entered into a stipulation of facts
adopted and embodied by the trial court in its questioned decision. The trial court ruled for the
government, holding that the second floor of the building is being used by the director for residential
purposes and that the ground floor used and rented by Northern Marketing Corporation, a commercial
establishment, and thus the property is not being used ―exclusively‖ for educational purposes. Instead
of perfecting an appeal, petitioner availed of the instant petition for review on certiorari with prayer for
preliminary injunction before the Supreme Court, by filing said petition on 17 August 1974.

Issue: Whether the College is exempt from taxes.

Held:

Yes. While the Court allows a more liberal and non-restrictive interpretation of the phrase ―exclusively
used for educational purposes,‖ reasonable emphasis has always been made that exemption extends to
facilities which are incidental to and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the main purposes.
While the second floor‘s use, as residence of the director, is incidental to education; the lease of the first
floor cannot by any stretch of imagination be considered incidental to the purposes of education. The test
of exemption from taxation is the use of the property for purposes mentioned in the Constititution. Adonis
Notes: The SC stated that if only the judge had read the 1973 Constitution, he should have known the
difference between the 1935 and the 1973 Constitution and he could not have summarily dismissed the
case. There is a substantial distinction between the 1935 and the 1973 Constitution. In the 1935
Constitution the requirement for exemption for real property taxes is “exclusively” , while the 1973
Constitution requires “actually, directly & exclusively”. The SC remanded to the Court of Origin for further
hearing. (excerpts from Sababan Notes)

Sison vs Ancheta GR No. L-59431, 25 July 1984

Facts: Section 1 of BP Blg 135 amended the Tax Code and petitioner Antero M. Sison, as taxpayer, alleges
that "he would be unduly discriminated against by the imposition of higher rates of tax upon his income
arising from the exercise of his profession vis-a-vis those which are imposed upon fixed income or salaried
individual taxpayers. He characterizes said provision as arbitrary amounting to class legislation, oppressive
and capricious in character. It therefore violates both the equal protection and due process clauses of the
Constitution as well asof the rule requiring uniformity in taxation.

Issue: Whether or not the assailed provision violates the equal protection and due process clauses of the
Constitution while also violating the rule that taxes must be uniform and equitable.

Held:
The petition is without merit.
On due process - it is undoubted that it may be invoked where a taxing statute is so arbitrary that it finds
no support in the Constitution. An obvious example is where it can be shown to amount to the confiscation
of property from abuse of power. Petitioner alleges arbitrariness but his mere allegation does not suffice
and there must be a factual foundation of such unconsitutional taint.
On equal protection - it suffices that the laws operate equally and uniformly on all persons under similar
circumstances, both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed.
On the matter that the rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable - this requirement is met when the
tax operates with the same force and effect in every place where the subject may be found." Also, :the
rule of uniformity does not call for perfect uniformity or perfect equality, because this is hardly
unattainable." When the problem of classification became of issue, the Court said: "Equality and
uniformity in taxation means that all taxable articles or kinds of property of the same class shall be taxed
the same rate. The taxing power has the authority to make reasonable and natural classifications for
purposes of taxation..." As provided by this Court, where "the differentation" complained of "conforms to
the practical dictates of justice and equity" it "is not discriminatory within the meaning of this clause and
is therefore uniform."

Arturo Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance and Commissioner of Internal Revenue G.R. No. 115455;
October 30, 1995
Mendoza, J.:

FACTS:

The present case involves motions seeking reconsideration of the Court’s decision dismissing the petitions
for the declaration of unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added
Tax Law. The motions, of which there are 10 in all, have been filed by the several petitioners.

The Philippine Press Institute, Inc. (PPI) contends that by removing the exemption of the press from the
VAT while maintaining those granted to others, the law discriminates against the press. At any rate, it is
averred, “even nondiscriminatory taxation of constitutionally guaranteed freedom is unconstitutional”,
citing in support of the case of Murdock v. Pennsylvania.

Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations, Invc., (CREBA), on the other hand, asserts that R.A. No.
7716 (1) impairs the obligations of contracts, (2) classifies transactions as covered or exempt without
reasonable basis and (3) violates the rule that taxes should be uniform and equitable and that Congress
shall “evolve a progressive system of taxation”.

Further, the Cooperative Union of the Philippines (CUP), argues that legislature was to adopt a definite
policy of granting tax exemption to cooperatives that the present Constitution embodies provisions on
cooperatives. To subject cooperatives to the VAT would, therefore, be to infringe a constitutional policy.

ISSUE:
Whether or not, based on the aforementioned grounds of the petitioners, the Expanded Value-Added Tax
Law should be declared unconstitutional.

RULING:

No. With respect to the first contention, it would suffice to say that since the law granted the press a
privilege, the law could take back the privilege anytime without offense to the Constitution. The reason is
simple: by granting exemptions, the State does not forever waive the exercise of its sovereign prerogative.
Indeed, in withdrawing the exemption, the law merely subjects the press to the same tax burden to which
other businesses have long ago been subject. The PPI asserts that it does not really matter that the law
does not discriminate against the press because “even nondiscriminatory taxation on constitutionally
guaranteed freedom is unconstitutional.” The Court was speaking in that case (Murdock v.
Pennsylvania) of a license tax, which, unlike an ordinary tax, is mainly for regulation. Its imposition on the
press is unconstitutional because it lays a prior restraint on the exercise of its right. The VAT is, however,
different. It is not a license tax. It is not a tax on the exercise of a privilege, much less a constitutional right.
It is imposed on the sale, barter, lease or exchange of goods or properties or the sale or exchange of
services and the lease of properties purely for revenue purposes. To subject the press to its payment is
not to burden the exercise of its right any more than to make the press pay income tax or subject it to
general regulation is not to violate its freedom under the Constitution.

Anent the first contention of CREBA, it has been held in an early case that even though such taxation may
affect particular contracts, as it may increase the debt of one person and lessen the security of another,
or may impose additional burdens upon one class and release the burdens of another, still the tax must
be paid unless prohibited by the Constitution, nor can it be said that it impairs the obligation of any
existing contract in its true legal sense. It is next pointed out that while Section 4 of R.A. No. 7716 exempts
such transactions as the sale of agricultural products, food items, petroleum, and medical and veterinary
services, it grants no exemption on the sale of real property which is equally essential. The sale of food
items, petroleum, medical and veterinary services, etc., which are essential goods and services was
already exempt under Section 103, pars. (b) (d) (1) of the NIRC before the enactment of R.A. No. 7716.
Petitioner is in error in claiming that R.A. No. 7716 granted exemption to these transactions while
subjecting those of petitioner to the payment of the VAT. Finally, it is contended that R.A. No. 7716 also
violates Art. VI, Section 28(1) which provides that “The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable.
The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation”. Nevertheless, equality and uniformity of
taxation mean that all taxable articles or kinds of property of the same class be taxed at the same rate.
The taxing power has the authority to make reasonable and natural classifications for purposes of
taxation. To satisfy this requirement it is enough that the statute or ordinance applies equally to all
persons, firms, and corporations placed in similar situation. Furthermore, the Constitution does not really
prohibit the imposition of indirect taxes which, like the VAT, are regressive. What it simply provides is that
Congress shall “evolve a progressive system of taxation.” The constitutional provision has been
interpreted to mean simply that “direct taxes are . . . to be preferred [and] as much as possible, indirect
taxes should be minimized.” The mandate to Congress is not to prescribe, but to evolve, a progressive tax
system.
As regards the contention of CUP, it is worth noting that its theory amounts to saying that under the
Constitution cooperatives are exempt from taxation. Such theory is contrary to the Constitution under
which only the following are exempt from taxation: charitable institutions, churches, and parsonages, by
reason of Art. VI, §28 (3), and non-stock, non-profit educational institutions by reason of Art. XIV, §4 (3).
With all the foregoing ratiocinations, it is clear that the subject law bears no constitutional infirmities and
is thus upheld.

PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYEES ORGANIZATION v. PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO. INC.
G.R. No. L-31195, June 5, 1973,

Makasiar, J.

Facts: Sometime in 1969, petitioner decided to stage a mass demonstration in Malacañang in protest
against alleged abuses of the Pasig Police. Respondent Company, however requested petitioner that the
first-shift workers should not participate in the strike for it will unduly prejudice the normal operation of
the company. Despite the warning, all the workers including those who were in first-shift still participated
in the rally. Prior to that, respondent company informed that workers who belong in the first-shift, who
were without previous leave of absence approved by the company, who shall participate in the rally shall
be dismissed for it is a clear violation of the existing CBA and is tantamount to an illegal strike. Respondent
company then filed a charge against petitioners and later dismissed some of its employees.

Issues: Whether or not the constitutional freedoms of speech and expression of the petitioner were
violated by the respondent company in preventing some of its employees to participate in the rally and
later dismissed some of them.

Held:

No. There is need of briefly restating basic concepts and principles which underlie the issues posed by the
case at bar.

(1) In a democracy, the preservation and enhancement of the dignity and worth of the human personality
is the central core as well as the cardinal article of faith of our civilization. The inviolable character of man
as an individual must be "protected to the largest possible extent in his thoughts and in his beliefs as the
citadel of his person.

(2) The Bill of Rights is designed to preserve the ideals of liberty, equality and security "against the assaults
of opportunism, the expediency of the passing hour, the erosion of small encroachments, and the scorn
and derision of those who have no patience with general principles.‖

In the pithy language of Mr. Justice Robert Jackson, the purpose of the Bill of Rights is to withdraw "certain
subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and
officials, and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's rights to life, liberty
and property, to free speech, or free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental
rights may not be submitted to a vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections." Laski proclaimed
that "the happiness of the individual, not the well-being of the State, was the criterion by which its
behaviour was to be judged. His interests, not its power, set the limits to the authority it was entitled to
exercise.

(3) The freedoms of expression and of assembly as well as the right to petition are included among the
immunities reserved by the sovereign people, in the rhetorical aphorism of Justice Holmes, to protect the
ideas that we abhor or hate more than the ideas we cherish; or as Socrates insinuated, not only to protect
the minority who want to talk, but also to benefit the majority who refuse to listen. And as Justice Douglas
cogently stresses it, the liberties of one are the liberties of all; and the liberties of one are not safe unless
the liberties of all are protected.

(4) The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are not only civil rights but also political rights
essential to man's enjoyment of his life, to his happiness and to his full and complete fulfillment. Thru
these freedoms the citizens can participate not merely in the periodic establishment of the government
through their suffrage but also in the administration of public affairs as well as in the discipline of abusive
public officers. The citizen is accorded these rights so that he can appeal to the appropriate governmental
officers or agencies for redress and protection as well as for the imposition of the lawful sanctions on
erring public officers and employees.

(5) While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights over property rights
is recognized. Because these freedoms are "delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our
society" and the "threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual application
of sanctions," they "need breathing space to survive," permitting government regulation only "with
narrow specificity."

Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible. If human
rights are extinguished by the passage of time, then the Bill of Rights is a useless attempt to limit the
power of government and ceases to be an efficacious shield against the tyranny of officials, of majorities,
of the influential and powerful, and of oligarchs - political, economic or otherwise.

In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly occupy a preferred position
as they are essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions; and such priority
"gives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not permitting dubious intrusions." The superiority of
these freedoms over property rights is underscored by the fact that a mere reasonable or rational relation
between the means employed by the law and its object or purpose that the law is neither arbitrary nor
discriminatory nor oppressive would suffice to validate a law which restricts or impairs property rights.
On the other hand, a constitutional or valid infringement of human rights requires a more stringent
criterion, namely existence of a grave and immediate danger of a substantive evil which the State has the
right to prevent.

So it has been stressed that the (1)―FREEDOMS OF SPEECH‖ and (2)―OF THE PRESS‖ as well as (3)―OF
PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND OF PETITION FOR REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES‖ are absolute when directed
against public officials or "when exercised in relation to our right to choose the men and women by whom
we shall be governed," even relying on the balancing-of-interests test.

The respondent Court of Industrial Relations, after opining that the mass demonstration was not a
declaration of strike, concluded that by their "concerted act and the occurrence of a temporary stoppage
of work," herein petitioners are guilty of bargaining in bad faith and hence violated the collective
bargaining agreement with private respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc. Set against and tested
by the foregoing principles governing a democratic society, such a conclusion cannot be sustained. The
demonstration held by petitioners was against alleged abuses of some Pasig policemen, NOT against their
employer, herein private respondent firm, said demonstration was purely and completely an exercise of
their freedom of expression in general and of their right of assembly and of petition for redress of
grievances in particular before the appropriate governmental agency, the Chief Executive, against the
police officers of the municipality of Pasig. They exercised their civil and political rights for their mutual
aid and protection from what they believe were police excesses. As a matter of fact, it was the duty of
herein private respondent firm to protect herein petitioner Union and its members from the harassment
of local police officers. It was to the interest of herein private respondent firm to rally to the defense of,
and to take up the cudgels for, its employees, so that they can report to work free from harassment,
vexation or peril and as a consequence perform more efficiently their respective tasks to enhance its
productivity as well as profits. Herein respondent employer did not even offer to intercede for its
employees with the local police. Was it securing peace for itself at the expense of its workers? Was it also
intimidated by the local police or did it encourage the local police to terrorize or vex its workers? Its failure
to defend its own employees all the more weakened the position of its laborers vis-a-vis the alleged
oppressive police, who might have been all the more emboldened thereby to subject its lowly employees
to further indignities.

In seeking sanctuary behind their freedom of expression as well as their right of assembly and of petition
against alleged persecution of local officialdom, the employees and laborers of herein private respondent
firm were fighting for their very survival, utilizing only the weapons afforded them by the Constitution he
untrammelled enjoyment of their basic human rights. The pretension of their employer that it would
suffer loss or damage by reason of the absence of its employees, is a plea for the preservation merely of
their property rights. Such apprehended loss or damage would not spell the difference between the life
and death of the firm or its owners or its management. The employees' pathetic situation was a stark
reality abused, harassed and persecuted as they believed they were by the peace officers of the
municipality. As above intimated, the condition in which the employees found themselves vis-a-vis the
local police of Pasig, was a matter that vitally affected their right to individual existence as well as that of
their families. Material loss can be repaired or adequately compensated. The debasement of the human
being broken in morale and brutalized in spirit can never be fully evaluated in monetary terms. The
wounds fester and the scars remain to humiliate him to his dying day, even as he cries in anguish for
retribution, denial of which is like rubbing salt on bruised tissues.

As heretofore stated, THE PRIMACY OF HUMAN RIGHTS, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, OF PEACEFUL


ASSEMBLY AND OF PETITION FOR REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES over PROPERTY RIGHTS has been sustained.
Emphatic reiteration of this basic tenet as a coveted boon at once the shield and armor of the dignity and
worth of the human personality, the all-consuming ideal of our enlightened civilization becomes Our duty,
if freedom and social justice have any meaning at all for him who toils so that capital can produce
economic goods that can generate happiness for all. To regard the demonstration against police officers,
not against the employer, as evidence of bad faith in collective bargaining and hence a violation of the
collective bargaining agreement and a cause for the dismissal from employment of the demonstrating
employees, stretches unduly the compass of the collective bargaining agreement, is "a potent means of
inhibiting speech" and therefore inflicts a moral as well as mortal wound on the constitutional guarantees
of free expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition.

The collective bargaining agreement which fixes the working shifts of the employees, according to the
respondent Court of Industrial Relations, in effect imposes on the workers the "duty . . . to observe regular
working hours." The strained construction of the Court of Industrial Relations that such stipulated working
shifts deny the workers the right to stage a mass demonstration against police abuses during working
hours, constitutes a virtual tyranny over the mind and life of the workers and deserves severe
condemnation. Renunciation of the freedom should not be predicated on such a slender ground.

The mass demonstration staged by the employees on March 4, 1969 could not have been legally enjoined
by any court, for such an injunction would be trenching upon the freedom of expression of the workers,
even if it legally appears to be an illegal picketing or strike. The respondent Court of Industrial Relations
in the case at bar concedes that the mass demonstration was not a declaration of a strike "as the same is
not rooted in any industrial dispute although there is a concerted act and the occurrence of a temporary
stoppage of work."

The respondent firm claims that there was no need for all its employees to participate in the
demonstration and that they suggested to the Union that only the first and regular shift from 6 A.M. to 2
P.M. should report for work in order that loss or damage to the firm will be averted. This stand failed to
appreciate the sine qua non of an effective demonstration especially by a labor union, namely the
complete unity of the Union members as well as their total presence at the demonstration site in order
to generate the maximum sympathy for the validity of their cause but also immediate action on the part
of the corresponding government agencies with jurisdiction over the issues they raised against the local
police. Circulation is one of the aspects of freedom of expression. If demonstrators are reduced by one-
third, then by that much the circulation of the issues raised by the demonstration is diminished. The more
the participants, the more persons can be apprised of the purpose of the rally. Moreover, the absence of
one-third of their members will be regarded as a substantial indication of disunity in their ranks which will
enervate their position and abet continued alleged police persecution. At any rate, the Union notified the
company two days in advance of their projected demonstration and the company could have made
arrangements to counteract or prevent whatever losses it might sustain by reason of the absence of its
workers for one day, especially in this case when the Union requested it to excuse only the day-shift
employees who will join the demonstration on March 4, 1969 which request the Union reiterated in their
telegram received by the company at 9:50 in the morning of March 4, 1969, the day of the mass
demonstration (pp. 42-43, rec.). There was a lack of human understanding or compassion on the part of
the firm in rejecting the request of the Union for excuse from work for the day shifts in order to carry out
its mass demonstration. And to regard as a ground for dismissal the mass demonstration held against the
Pasig police, not against the company, is gross vindictiveness on the part of the employer, which is as
unchristian as it is unconstitutional.

III

The respondent company is the one guilty of unfair labor practice. Because the refusal on the part of the
respondent firm to permit all its employees and workers to join the mass demonstration against alleged
police abuses and the subsequent separation of the eight (8) petitioners from the service constituted an
unconstitutional restraint on their freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and freedom to petition
for redress of grievances, the respondent firm committed an unfair labor practice defined in Section 4(a-
1) in relation to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 875, otherwise known as the Industrial Peace Act. Section 3
of Republic Act No. 875 guarantees to the employees the right "to engage in concerted activities for . . .
mutual aid or protection"; while Section 4(a-1) regards as an unfair labor practice for an employer "to
interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed in Section Three."

We repeat that the obvious purpose of the mass demonstration staged by the workers of the respondent
firm on March 4, 1969, was for their mutual aid and protection against alleged police abuses, denial of
which was interference with or restraint on the right of the employees to engage in such a common action
to better shield themselves against such alleged police indignities. The insistence on the part of the
respondent firm that the workers for the morning and regular shifts should not participate in the mass
demonstration, under pain of dismissal, was as heretofore stated, "a potent means of inhibiting speech."
Such a concerted action for their mutual help and protection, deserves at least equal protection as the
concerted action of employees in giving publicity to a letter complaint charging a bank president with
immorality, nepotism, favoritism and discrimination in the appointment and promotion of bank
employees. We further ruled in the Republic Savings Bank case, supra, that for the employees to come
within the protective mantle of Section 3 in relation to Section 4(a-1) of Republic Act No. 875, "it is not
necessary that union activity be involved or that collective bargaining be contemplated," as long as the
concerted activity is for the furtherance of their interests.

As stated clearly in the stipulation of facts embodied in the questioned order of respondent Court dated
September 15, 1969, the company, "while expressly acknowledging, that the demonstration is an
inalienable right of the Union guaranteed by the Constitution," nonetheless emphasized that "any
demonstration for that matter should not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the company" and
"warned the PBMEO representatives that workers who belong to the first and regular shifts, who without
previous leave of absence approved by the Company, particularly the officers present who are the
organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to report for work the following morning (March 4, 1969)
shall be dismissed, because such failure is a violation of the existing CBA and, therefore, would be
amounting to an illegal strike (;)" (p. III, petitioner's brief). Such threat of dismissal tended to coerce the
employees from joining the mass demonstration. However, the issues that the employees raised against
the local police, were more important to them because they had the courage to proceed with the
demonstration, despite such threat of dismissal. The most that could happen to them was to lose a day's
wage by reason of their absence from work on the day of the demonstration. One day's pay means much
to a laborer, more especially if he has a family to support. Yet, they were willing to forego their one-day
salary hoping that their demonstration would bring about the desired relief from police abuses. But
management was adamant in refusing to recognize the superior legitimacy of their right of free speech,
free assembly and the right to petition for redress.

Because the respondent company ostensibly did not find it necessary to demand from the workers proof
of the truth of the alleged abuses inflicted on them by the local police, it thereby concedes that the
evidence of such abuses should properly be submitted to the corresponding authorities having jurisdiction
over their complaint and to whom such complaint may be referred by the President of the Philippines for
proper investigation and action with a view to disciplining the local police officers involved.

On the other hand, while the respondent Court of Industrial Relations found that the demonstration
"paralyzed to a large extent the operations of the complainant company," the respondent Court of
Industrial Relations did not make any finding as to the fact of loss actually sustained by the firm. This
significant circumstance can only mean that the firm did not sustain any loss or damage. It did not present
evidence as to whether it lost expected profits for failure to comply with purchase orders on that day; or
that penalties were exacted from it by customers whose orders could not be filled that day of the
demonstration; or that purchase orders were cancelled by the customers by reason of its failure to deliver
the materials ordered; or that its own equipment or materials or products were damaged due to absence
of its workers on March 4, 1969. On the contrary, the company saved a sizable amount in the form of
wages for its hundreds of workers, cost of fuel, water and electric consumption that day. Such savings
could have amply compensated for unrealized profits or damages it might have sustained by reason of
the absence of its workers for only one day.

IV

Apart from violating the constitutional guarantees of free speech and assembly as well as the right to
petition for redress of grievances of the employees, the dismissal of the eight (8) leaders of the workers
for proceeding with the demonstration and consequently being absent from work, constitutes a denial of
social justice likewise assured by the fundamental law to these lowly employees. Section 5 of Article II of
the Constitution imposes upon the State "the promotion of social justice to insure the wellbeing and
economic security of all of the people," which guarantee is emphasized by the other directive in Section
6 of Article XIV of the Constitution that "the State shall afford protection to labor . . ." Respondent Court
of Industrial Relations as an agency of the State is under obligation at all times to give meaning and
substance to these constitutional guarantees in favor of the working man; for otherwise these
constitutional safeguards would be merely a lot of "meaningless constitutional patter." Under the
Industrial Peace Act, the Court of Industrial Relations is enjoined to effect the policy of the law "to
eliminate the causes of industrial unrest by encouraging and protecting the exercise by employees of their
right to self-organization for the purpose of collective bargaining and for the promotion of their moral,
social and economic well-being." It is most unfortunate in the case at bar that respondent Court of
Industrial Relations, the very governmental agency designed therefor, failed to implement this policy and
failed to keep faith with its avowed mission its raison d'etre as ordained and directed
. It has been likewise established that a violation of a constitutional right divests the court of jurisdiction;
and as a consequence its judgment is null and void and confers no rights. Relief from a criminal conviction
secured at the sacrifice of constitutional liberties, may be obtained through habeas corpus proceedings
even long after the finality of the judgment. Thus, habeas corpus is the remedy to obtain the release of
an individual, who is convicted by final judgment through a forced confession, which violated his
constitutional right against selfincrimination; or who is denied the right to present evidence in his defense
as a deprivation of his liberty without due process of law, even after the accused has already served
sentence for twenty-two years.

Both the respondents Court of Industrial Relations and private firm trenched upon these constitutional
immunities of petitioners. Both failed to accord preference to such rights and aggravated the inhumanity
to which the aggrieved workers claimed they had been subjected by the municipal police. Having violated
these basic human rights of the laborers, the Court of Industrial Relations ousted itself of jurisdiction and
the questioned orders it issued in the instant case are a nullity. Recognition and protection of such
freedoms are imperative on all public offices including the courts as well as private citizens and
corporations, the exercise and enjoyment of which must not be nullified by mere procedural rule
promulgated by the Court Industrial Relations exercising a purely delegate legislative power, when even
a law enacted by Congress must yield to the untrammelled enjoyment of these human rights. There is no
time limit to the exercise of the freedoms. The right to enjoy them is not exhausted by the delivery of one
speech, the printing of one article or the staging of one demonstration. It is a continuing immunity to be
invoked and exercised when exigent and expedient whenever there are errors to be rectified, abuses to
be denounced, inhumanities to be condemned. Otherwise these guarantees in the Bill of Rights would be
vitiated by rule on procedure prescribing the period for appeal. The battle then would be reduced to a
race for time. And in such a contest between an employer and its laborer, the latter eventually loses
because he cannot employ the best an dedicated counsel who can defend his interest with the required
diligence and zeal, bereft as he is of the financial resources with which to pay for competent legal services.

VI.

Does the mere fact that the motion for reconsideration was filed two (2) days late defeat the rights of
the petitioning employees? Or more directly and concretely, does the inadvertent omission to comply
with a mere Court of Industrial Relations procedural rule governing the period for filing a motion for
reconsideration or appeal in labor cases, promulgated pursuant to a legislative delegation, prevail over
constitutional rights? The answer should be obvious in the light of the aforecited cases. To accord
supremacy to the foregoing rules of the Court of Industrial Relations over basic human rights sheltered by
the Constitution, is not only incompatible with the basic tenet of constitutional government that the
Constitution is superior to any statute or subordinate rules and regulations, but also does violence to
natural reason and logic. The dominance and superiority of the constitutional right over the aforesaid
Court of Industrial Relations procedural rule of necessity should be affirmed. Such a Court of Industrial
Relations rule as applied in this case does not implement or reinforce or strengthen the constitutional
rights affected,' but instead constrict the same to the point of nullifying the enjoyment thereof by the
petitioning employees. Said Court of Industrial Relations rule, promulgated as it was pursuant to a mere
legislative delegation, is unreasonable and therefore is beyond the authority granted by the Constitution
and the law. A period of five (5) days within which to file a motion for reconsideration is too short,
especially for the aggrieved workers, who usually do not have the ready funds to meet the necessary
expenses therefor. In case of the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, a period of fifteen (15) days
has been fixed for the filing of the motion for re hearing or reconsideration (See. 10, Rule 51; Sec. 1, Rule
52; Sec. 1, Rule 56, Revised Rules of Court). The delay in the filing of the motion for reconsideration could
have been only one day if September 28, 1969 was not a Sunday. This fact accentuates the
unreasonableness of the Court of Industrial are concerned.

It is a procedural rule that generally all causes of action and defenses presently available must be
specifically raised in the complaint or answer; so that any cause of action or defense not raised in such
pleadings, is deemed waived. However, a constitutional issue can be raised any time, even for the first
time on appeal, if it appears that the determination of the constitutional issue is necessary to a decision
of the case, the very lis mota of the case without the resolution of which no final and complete
determination of the dispute can be made. It is thus seen that a procedural rule of Congress or of the
Supreme Court gives way to a constitutional right. In the instant case, the procedural rule of the Court of
Industrial Relations, a creature of Congress, must likewise yield to the constitutional rights invoked by
herein petitioners even before the institution of the unfair labor practice charged against them and in
their defense to the said charge.

Simon vs CHR GR No. 100150, Jan. 5, 1994

Facts:

A “Demolition notice”, dated 9 July 1990, signed by Carlos Quimpo (one of the petitioners) in his capacity
as an Executive Officer of the Quezon City Integrated Hawkers Management Council under the Office of
the City Mayor, was sent to, and received by, the private respondents (being the officers and members
of the North EDSA Vendors Association, Incorporated). In said notice, the respondents were given a grace
period of three days within which to vacate the questioned premises of North EDSA. Prior to their receipt
of the demolition notice, the private respondents were informed by petitioner Quimpo that their stalls
should be removed to give way to the “People’s Park”. On 12 July 1990, the group, led by their President
Roque Fermo, filed a letter-complaint with the CHR against the petitioners, asking the late CHR Chairman
Mary Concepcion Bautista for a letter to be addressed to the then Mayor Brigido Simon, Jr., of Quezon
City to stop the demolition of the private respondents’ stalls, sari-sari stores, and carinderia along North
EDSA. The complaint was docketed as CHR Case no 90-1580. On 23 July 1990, the CHR cited the petitioners
in contempt for carrying out the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia despite the “order
to desist”, and it imposed a fne of P500.00 on each of them.

Issue: W/N the CHR has jurisdiction:

1. To investigate the alleged violations of the “business rights” of the private respondents whose
stalls were demolished by the petitioners at the instance and authority given by the Mayor of
Quezon City;
2. To impose the fine of P 500.00 each on the petitioners for contempt;
Held:

1. The recalling of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, aforequoted, it is readily


apparent that the delegated envisioned a Commission on Human Rights that would focus its
attention to the more severe cases of human rights violations. Delegate Garcia, for instance,
mentioned such areas as the “1. Protection of rights of political detainees, 2. Treatment of
prisoners and the prevention of tortures, 3. Fair and public trials, 3. Cases of disappearances,
5. Salvaging and hamletting, and 6. Other crimes committed against the religious.” While the
enumeration has not likely been meant to have any preclusive effect, more than just
expressing a statement of priority, it is, nonetheless, significant for the tone it has set. In any
event, the delegates did not apparently take comfort in peremptorily makinga conclusive
delineation of the CHR’s scope of investigatorial jurisdiction. They have thus seen it fit to
resolve, instead, that “Congress may provide for other cases of violations of human rights that
should fall within the authority of the Commission, taking into account its recommendation.”
In the particular case at hand, there is no cavil that what are sought to be demolished are the
stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia, as well as temporary shanties, erected by private
respondents on a land which is planted to be developed into a “People’s Park”. More than
that, the land adjoins the North EDSA of Quezon City which, this Court can take judicial notice
of, is a busy national highway. The consequent danger to life and limb is not thus to be likewise
simply ignored. It is indeed paradoxical that a right which is claimed to have been violated is
one that cannot, in the first place, even be invoked, if it is, in fact, extant. Be that as it may,
looking at the standards hereinabove discoursed vis-à-vis the circumstances obtaining that
the order for the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia of the private
respondents can fall within the compartment of “human rights violations involving civil and
political rights” intended by the constitution.
2. No, on its contempt powers, the CHR is constitutionally authorized to “adopt its operational
guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance
with the Rules of Court.” Accordingly, the CHR acted within its authority in providing in its
revised rules, its power “to cite or hold any person in direct or indirect contempt, and to
impose the appropriate penalties in accordance with the procedure and sanctions provided
for in the Rules of Court.” That power to cite for contempt, however, should be understood
to apply only to violations of its adopted operational guidelines and rules of procedure
essential to carry out its investigatorial powers, to exemplify, the power to cite for contempt
could be exercised against persons who refuse to cooperate with the said body, or who unduly
withhold relevant information, or who decline to honor summons, and the like, in pursuing
its investigative work. The “order to desist” (semantic interplay for a restraining order) in the
instance before us, however, is not investigatorial in character but prescinds from an
adjudicative power that it does not possess.

Banco Espanol-Filipino vs. Palanca


on 6:41 AM in Case Digests, Civil Law, Political Law, Remedial Law 0

G.R. No. L-11390, March 26, 1918

JURISDICTION, HOW ACQUIRED: Jurisdiction over the property which is the subject of the litigation may
result either from a seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into the actual
custody of the law, or it may result from the institution of legal proceedings wherein, under special
provisions of law, the power of the court over the property is recognized and made effective.

The action to foreclose a mortgage is said to be a proceeding quasi in rem, by which is expressed the idea
that while it is not strictly speaking an action in rem yet it partakes of that nature and is substantially such.

DUE PROCESS IN FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS: Property is always assumed to be in the possession of its
owner, in person or by agent; and he may be safely held, under certain conditions, to be affected with
knowledge that proceedings have been instituted for its condemnation and sale.

FACTS:

Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y Limquingco mortgaged various parcels of real property in Manila to El
Banco Espanol-Filipino. Afterwards, Engracio returned to China and there he died on January 29, 1810
without returning again to the Philippines. The mortgagor then instituted foreclosure proceeding but
since defendant is a non-resident, it was necessary to give notice by publication. The Clerk of Court was
also directed to send copy of the summons to the defendant’s last known address, which is in Amoy,
China. It is not shown whether the Clerk complied with this requirement. Nevertheless, after publication
in a newspaper of the City of Manila, the cause proceeded and judgment by default was rendered. The
decision was likewise published and afterwards sale by public auction was held with the bank as the
highest bidder. On August 7, 1908, this sale was confirmed by the court. However, about seven years after
the confirmation of this sale, a motion was made by Vicente Palanca, as administrator of the estate of the
original defendant, wherein the applicant requested the court to set aside the order of default and the
judgment, and to vacate all the proceedings subsequent thereto. The basis of this application was that
the order of default and the judgment rendered thereon were void because the court had never acquired
jurisdiction over the defendant or over the subject of the action.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the defendant and the subject matter of the
action

Whether or not due process of law was observed

RULING:

On Jurisdiction
The word “jurisdiction” is used in several different, though related, senses since it may have reference (1)
to the authority of the court to entertain a particular kind of action or to administer a particular kind of
relief, or it may refer to the power of the court over the parties, or (2) over the property which is the
subject to the litigation.

The sovereign authority which organizes a court determines the nature and extent of its powers in general
and thus fixes its competency or jurisdiction with reference to the actions which it may entertain and the
relief it may grant.

How Jurisdiction is Acquired

Jurisdiction over the person is acquired by the voluntary appearance of a party in court and his submission
to its authority, or it is acquired by the coercive power of legal process exerted over the person.

Jurisdiction over the property which is the subject of the litigation may result either from a seizure of the
property under legal process, whereby it is brought into the actual custody of the law, or it may result
from the institution of legal proceedings wherein, under special provisions of law, the power of the court
over the property is recognized and made effective. In the latter case the property, though at all times
within the potential power of the court, may never be taken into actual custody at all. An illustration of
the jurisdiction acquired by actual seizure is found in attachment proceedings, where the property is
seized at the beginning of the action, or some subsequent stage of its progress, and held to abide the final
event of the litigation. An illustration of what we term potential jurisdiction over the res, is found in the
proceeding to register the title of land under our system for the registration of land. Here the court,
without taking actual physical control over the property assumes, at the instance of some person claiming
to be owner, to exercise a jurisdiction in rem over the property and to adjudicate the title in favor of the
petitioner against all the world.

In the terminology of American law the action to foreclose a mortgage is said to be a proceeding quasi in
rem, by which is expressed the idea that while it is not strictly speaking an action in rem yet it partakes of
that nature and is substantially such. The expression "action in rem" is, in its narrow application, used only
with reference to certain proceedings in courts of admiralty wherein the property alone is treated as
responsible for the claim or obligation upon which the proceedings are based. The action quasi rem differs
from the true action in rem in the circumstance that in the former an individual is named as defendant,
and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interest therein to the obligation or lien burdening the
property. All proceedings having for their sole object the sale or other disposition of the property of the
defendant, whether by attachment, foreclosure, or other form of remedy, are in a general way thus
designated. The judgment entered in these proceedings is conclusive only between the parties.

xxx

It is true that in proceedings of this character, if the defendant for whom publication is made appears, the
action becomes as to him a personal action and is conducted as such. This, however, does not affect the
proposition that where the defendant fails to appear the action is quasi in rem; and it should therefore
be considered with reference to the principles governing actions in rem.
On Due Process

xxx As applied to a judicial proceeding, however, it may be laid down with certainty that the requirement
of due process is satisfied if the following conditions are present, namely; (1) There must be a court or
tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it; (2) jurisdiction must be
lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the property which is the subject of the
proceeding; (3) the defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard; and (4) judgment must be
rendered upon lawful hearing.

Passing at once to the requisite that the defendant shall have an opportunity to be heard, we observe
that in a foreclosure case some notification of the proceedings to the nonresident owner, prescribing the
time within which appearance must be made, is everywhere recognized as essential. To answer this
necessity the statutes generally provide for publication, and usually in addition thereto, for the mailing of
notice to the defendant, if his residence is known. Though commonly called constructive, or substituted
service of process in any true sense. It is merely a means provided by law whereby the owner may be
admonished that his property is the subject of judicial proceedings and that it is incumbent upon him to
take such steps as he sees fit to protect it.

It will be observed that this mode of notification does not involve any absolute assurance that the absent
owner shall thereby receive actual notice. The periodical containing the publication may never in fact
come to his hands, and the chances that he should discover the notice may often be very slight. Even
where notice is sent by mail the probability of his receiving it, though much increased, is dependent upon
the correctness of the address to which it is forwarded as well as upon the regularity and security of the
mail service. It will be noted, furthermore, that the provision of our law relative to the mailing of notice
does not absolutely require the mailing of notice unconditionally and in every event, but only in the case
where the defendant's residence is known. In the light of all these facts, it is evident that actual notice to
the defendant in cases of this kind is not, under the law, to be considered absolutely necessary.

The idea upon which the law proceeds in recognizing the efficacy of a means of notification which may
fall short of actual notice is apparently this: Property is always assumed to be in the possession of its
owner, in person or by agent; and he may be safely held, under certain conditions, to be affected with
knowledge that proceedings have been instituted for its condemnation and sale.

Did the failure of the clerk to send notice to defendant’s last known address constitute denial of due
process?

The observations which have just been made lead to the conclusion that the failure of the clerk to mail
the notice, if in fact he did so fail in his duty, is not such an irregularity, as amounts to a denial of due
process of law; and hence in our opinion that irregularity, if proved, would not avoid the judgment in this
case. Notice was given by publication in a newspaper and this is the only form of notice which the law
unconditionally requires. This in our opinion is all that was absolutely necessary to sustain the
proceedings.
It will be observed that in considering the effect of this irregularity, it makes a difference whether it be
viewed as a question involving jurisdiction or as a question involving due process of law. In the matter of
jurisdiction there can be no distinction between the much and the little. The court either has jurisdiction
or it has not; and if the requirement as to the mailing of notice should be considered as a step antecedent
to the acquiring of jurisdiction, there could be no escape from the conclusion that the failure to take that
step was fatal to the validity of the judgment. In the application of the idea of due process of law, on the
other hand, it is clearly unnecessary to be so rigorous. The jurisdiction being once established, all that due
process of law thereafter requires is an opportunity for the defendant to be heard; and as publication was
duly made in the newspaper, it would seem highly unreasonable to hold that failure to mail the notice
was fatal. We think that in applying the requirement of due process of law, it is permissible to reflect upon
the purposes of the provision which is supposed to have been violated and the principle underlying the
exercise of judicial power in these proceedings. Judge in the light of these conceptions, we think that the
provision of Act of Congress declaring that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process
of law has not been infringed

G.R. No. 114046 October 24, 1994

HONORATO GALVEZ and GODOFREDO DIEGO, petitioners,

vs.

COURT OF APPEALS (17TH DIVISION), First Asst. Provincial Prosecutor. DENNIS M. VILLA-IGNACIO of
Pasig, Rizal; THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES; and PNP P/SR. SUPT. RICARDO F. DE LEON, Camp
Commander and Head of the PNP Custodial Group, Camp Crame, Cubao, Quezon City, respondents.

FACTS:

On November 12, 1993, petitioners Honorato Galvez and Godofredo Diego were charged in three separate
information’s with homicide and two counts of frustrated homicide. The said petitioners posted their bail
bonds and in effect, were released from detention. On November 15, 1993, in order for him to review the
evidence on record, Bulacan Provincial Prosecutor Liberator L. Reyes filed a Motion to Defer Arraignment.
Pursuant to a DOJ Department Order, respondent Prosecutor Dennis Villa-Ignacio was designated Acting
Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan with the instructions to conduct a re-investigation of the aforementioned
criminal cases. Thereafter, the proceedings were again suspended by Judge Villajuan until after the
prosecution’s request for change of venue shall have been resolved by the Supreme Court and the
termination of the preliminary investigation .On December 15, 1993 before petitioners could be arrainged
for the respective cases, respondent prosecutor filed an Ex parte Motion to Withdraw Informations, which
was granted by Judge Villajuan. On the same day, the prosecutor filed four new information’s agains
therein petitioners for murder, two counts of frustrated murder, and for illegal possession of firearms,
which were raffled to Judge Victoria Pornillos. No bail having been recommended by the said Judge, the
arraignment of the accused was issued for December 27, 1993.On December 27, 1993, the arraignment
was reset due to the absence of the respondent prosecutor. On the same date, petitioners filed a Motion
for Reconsideration of the order granting the withdrawal of the srcinal information’s. In addition, a Motion
to Quash the new information’s for lack of jurisdiction was filed by petitioners. Judge Pornillos thereafter
denied said motion and directed that a plea of not guilty be entered for petitioners when the latter refused
to enter their plea. In the meantime, on January 20, 1994, Judge Villajuan granted the motion for
reconsideration by petitioners and thus reinstating the previous criminal cases. However, the
corresponding arraignment was suspended and, in the meanwhile, petitioners filed a petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with respondent Court of Appeals which denied petitioners’s
motion to quash. Respondent court dismissed this petition, hence the case at hand.

ISSUE:

Whether the ex parte motion to withdraw the srcinal information’s is null and void on the ground that (a)
there was no notice and hearing as required by Sections 4, 5, and 6,Rule 15 of Rule of Courts; and (b) the
appropriate remedy which should have been adopted by the prosecution was to amend the information
by charging the proper offenses pursuant to Section 14 of Rule 110

HELD:

No. Petitioner’s assert that the failure of the prosecution to serve them a copy of the motion to withdraw
the srcinal information’s and to set said motion for hearing constitutes a violation of their right to be
informed of the proceedings against them. Furthermore, the ex parte motion should be considered null
and void because Judge Villajuan had no authority to act on it. The Court stresses that once a complaint
or information is filed in court, any disposition of the case, whether as to its dismissal or the conviction or
the acquittal of the accused, rests in the sound discretion of the court. As explained in Crespo vs. Mogul,

“A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to
grant or deny the same.” It cannot therefore be claimed that the prosecutor exceeded his authority in
withdrawing those information’s because the same bore the imprimatur of the court.

As regards the correctness of the court’s decision in dismissing the srcinalinformation’s rather than
ordering the amendment thereof, the Court asserts that there has been no grave abuse of discretion
considering that the motion to withdraw was filed and granted before the petitioners were arraigned.
Hence, the risk of double jeopardy is non-existent. Even if a substitution was made at such stage,
petitioners cannot claim double jeopardy, which is precisely the evil sought to be prevented under the
rule on substitution, for the simple reason that no first jeopardy has as yet attached. Petitioner’s right to
speedy trialwas never violated since the new informations were filed immediately after the motion to
withdraw the srcinal information’s was granted. Thus, the petitions for certiorari, mandamus and habeas
corpus are denied.

State Prosecutors vs Muro, 236 SCRA 505 (19 September 1994)

“the doctrine of judicial notice rests on the wisdom and discretion of the courts. The power to take judicial
notice is to be exercised by the courts with caution; care must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists;
and reasonable doubt on the subject should be resolved in the negative”

Facts:

The state prosecutors who are members of the DOJ Panel of Prosecution filed a complaint against
respondent Judge Muro on the ground of ignorance of the law, grave misconduct and violation of the
provisions in the Code of Judicial Conduct. The case at bar involves the prosecution of the 11 charges
against Imelda Marcos in violation of the Central Bank Foreign Exchange Restriction in the Central Bank
Circular 960. The respondent judge dismissed all 11 cases solely on the basis of the report published from
the 2 newspapers, which the judge believes to be reputable and of national circulation, that the Pres. of
the Philippines lifted all foreign exchange restrictions. The respondent’s decision was founded on his belief
that the reported announcement of the Executive Department in the newspaper in effect repealed the
CB 960 and thereby divested the court of its jurisdiction to further hear the pending case thus motu propio
dismissed the case. He further contends that the announcement of the President as published in the
newspaper has made such fact a public knowledge that is sufficient for the judge to take judicial notice
which is discretionary on his part.

The complainants contend that the respondent judge erred in taking judicial notice on matters he
purported to be a public knowledge based merely on the account of the newspaper publication that the
Pres. has lifted the foreign exchange restriction. It was also an act of inexcusable ignorant of the law not
to accord due process to the prosecutors who were already at the stage of presenting evidence thereby
depriving the government the right to be heard. The judge also exercised grave abuse of discretion by
taking judicial notice on the published statement of the Pres. In the newspaper which is a matter that has
not yet been officially in force and effect of the law.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in taking judicial notice
on the statement of the president lifting the foreign exchange restriction published in the newspaper as
basis for dismissing the case?

Ruling:

The Supreme Court held the respondent judge guilty for gross ignorance of the law. It cannot comprehend
his assertion that there is no need to wait for the publication of the circular no. 1353 which is the basis of
the President’s announcement in the newspaper, believing that the public announcement is absolute and
without qualification and is immediately effective and such matter becomes a public knowledge which he
can take a judicial notice upon in his discretion. It is a mandatory requirement that a new law should be
published for 15 days in a newspaper of general circulation before its effectivity. When the President’s
statement was published in the newspaper, the respondent admitted of not having seen the official text
of CB circular 1353 thus it was premature for him to take judicial notice on this matter which is merely
based on his personal knowledge and is not based on the public knowledge that the law requires for the
court to take judicial notice of.

For the court to take judicial notice, three material requisites should be present:

(1) the matter must be one of common and general knowledge;

(2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain;

(3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court.

The fact that should be assumed as judicially known must be on such notoriety that such fact cannot be
disputed. Judicial notice is not judicial knowledge where the personal knowledge of the judge does not
amount to the judicial notice of the court. The common knowledge contemplated by the law where the
court can take judicial notice must come from the knowledge of men generally in the course of ordinary
experiences that are accepted as true and one that involves unquestioned demonstration. The court ruled
that the information he obtained from the newspaper is one of hearsay evidence. The judge erred in
taking cognizant of a law that was not yet in force and ordered the dismissal of the case without giving
the prosecution the right to be heard and of due process. The court ordered for the dismissal of the judge
from service for gross ignorance of the law and grave abuse of discretion for dismissing the case motu
proprio and for erring in exercising his discretion to take judicial notice on matters that are hearsay and
groundless with a reminder the power to take judicial notice is to be exercised by the courts with caution
at all times.

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