Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act No. 4103, as amended by Act No.

4225 and
Republic Act No. 4203)
I. OUTLINE

a. People v. Venus, September 15, 1936, G.R. No. 45141

b. People v. Enguero, February 28, 1957, G.R. Nos. L-8922-24
c. People v. Aquino, January 16, 1998, G.R. No. 125906
d. Flordeliz v. People, March 3, 2010, G.R. No. 186441
e. Legrama v. Sandiganbayan, June 13, 2012, G.R. No. 178626
f. Imbo v. People, April 20, 2015, G.R. No. 197712

II. CASE DIGESTS

a. The People of the Philippines Islands v. Bienvenido Venus | G.R. No. 45141 |
September 15, 1936 | Laurel, J.

FACTS: Prosecuting attorney of the Court of First Instance of Manila filed a case of robbery
against defendant which such crime occurred in an inhabited house. It was alleged that
defendant entered the house then occupied by Zoila de Talaban by breaking the door of said
house which was secured by a padlock. Once inside took and carried away, with the intent of
gain and without the consent of the owner, personal properties belonging to Zoila de Talaban of
the total value of one hundred and eighty-eight and fifty centavos. It was also alleged that the
said accused is a habitual delinquent, having previously been convicted by final judgment
rendered by a competent court, once for the crime of attempted robbery in an inhabited house
and once for theft, the date of his last conviction being November 14, 1934.

The accused pleaded guilty to the information and trial court rendered judgment imposing upon
him an indeterminate prison sentence ranging from four months and one day of arresto mayor
to three years, three months and twenty-one days of prision correccional, with the accessory
penalties provided by law, to indemnify the complaint Zoila de Talaban in the amount of P97.50,
which represents the value of the personal properties not recovered from the accused, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs, The articles recovered from
the accused were ordered returned to the complainant. From this decision, the defendant has
appealed to this court. The trial court, in imposing the prison sentence upon the defendant-
appellant, took into account the aggravating circumstance of recidivism instead of what was
alleged in the information. On the contrary, the Solicitor-General, however, recommends that
the defendant-appellant be also adjudged a habitual delinquent.

ISSUE: Whether the contention of the Solicitor General is correct

RULING: No. The Supreme Court Decided, the defendant and appellant in the case at bar
cannot be considered a habitual delinquent but only a recidivist. As the plea of guilty offsets the
aggravating circumstance of recidivism, the penalty provided for in article 299 of the Revised
Penal Code for the crime of robbery in an inhabited house by means of unlawful entry where the
criminal is not armed and the value of the property stolen does not exceed 250 pesos, should
be imposed in the medium degree in accordance with the provisions of article 64 of the Revised
Penal Code. Applying the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law the principal penalty
imposed by the court a quo was modified and instead the penalty of six months and one day to
two years, eleven months and eleven days of prision correccional, was imposed upon the
defendant-appellant, Bienvenido Venus. With this only modification, the judgment of the lower
court is affirmed, with costs against the appellant in both instances.
 b. People of the Philippines v. Enguero | G.R. Nos. L-8922-24 | February 28, 1957|
Padilla, J.

FACTS: Florentino Enguero, Jose Tariman, Nazario Narvarte and Dionisio Bueno were charged
with the crime of robbery in band in three separate informations and after a joint trial the Court
of First Instance of Camarines Sur found them guilty as charged. They appealed. Jose Tariman
withdrew his appeal. As no question of fact is raised, the only error assigned to have been
committed by the trial court being the conviction and sentence of the defendants for three
robberies in band instead of only one, the Court of Appeals certified the appeal to this Court.

ISSUE: Whether the argument of counsel de oficio that the appellants are guilty of one crime
only is tenable.

RULING: Counsel de oficio argues that the appellants are guilty of one crime only citing in
support of his contention the case of People vs. de Leon, 49 Phil., 437. The contention is
without merit. In the case cited by counsel the defendant entered the yard of a house where he
found two fighting this case, after committing the first crime of robbery in band the appellants
went to another house where they committed the second and after committing it they proceeded
to another house where they committed the third. Obviously, the rule in the case cited cannot be
invoked and applied to the present.

The crime committed is robbery in band punished in articles 294, paragraph 5, of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 18, in connection with article 295 of the same
Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 373, with prison correccional in its maximum period to
prison mayor in its medium period. As the robbery was committed in band, the penalty to be
imposed is the maximum period of the proper penalty, which is prison mayor in its medium
period, or from 3 years and 1 day to 10 years. The second paragraph of article 295 of the
Revised Penal Code which impose the penalty next higher in degree upon the leader of the
band has been left out by Republic Act No. 373, amending further article 295 of the Revised
Penal Code.

Pursuant to the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty to be imposed upon each of the
appellants is the next lower to that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the offense, or 4
months and 1 day of arresto mayor, as minimum, and 8 years and 1 day of prison mayor, as
maximum, in each of the three crimes committed, and the accessories of the law.
 c. People of the Philippines v. Aquino | G.R. No. 125906 | January 16, 1998 | Puno, J.

FACTS: Accused Juanito Aquino was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan
City with Murder for allegedly killing Primitivo Lazatin. The accused denied the charged he was
at Imelda Valley Camp in Palayan City, Nueva Ecija, more than thirty (30) kilometers from the
scene of the crime in San Felipe, Llanera, Nueva Ecija. He was then working as an informer of
the 79th Infantry Batallion headed by Col. Juanito Sibayan. The trial court convicted the accused
for murder and imposed on him an indeterminate penalty of 10 years and 1day of prision
mayoras minimum to 18 years and 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporalas maximum and
ordered him to pay the heirs of the victim P50,000.00 as indemnity, funeral and burial expenses
moral damages. Accused appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
judgment of conviction but found the penalty imposed by the trial court to be erroneous. The
Court of Appeals thus modified the decision of the trial court and changed the penalty to
reclusion perpetua, in accordance with Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. The Court of
Appeals elevated the instant case to this Court pursuant to the second paragraph of Section 13
of Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Court.

ISSUE: Whether the penalty imposed by the trial court is correct?

RULING: No. The property penalty to be imposed on the accused-appellant should be reclusion
perpetua. At the time the crime was committed, the imposable penalty for murder was reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to death. Since there was neither aggravating nor mitigating
circumstance attending commission of the crime, the penalty should be imposed in its medium
period,that is reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellant cannot avail of the benefits of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law because Indeterminate Sentence Law does not apply to persons
convicted of offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua.
 d. Salvador Flordeliz y Abenojar v. People of the Philippines | G.R. No. 186441 |
March 3, 2010 | J. Nachura

FACTS: Sometime in March 1995, ABC, the wife of petitioner and the mother of private
complainants AAA and BBB, left for Malaysia as an overseas worker. AAA and BBB were left
under the care and custody of petitioner.In April 1995, while sleeping with BBB and AAA, who
was then eleven (11) years old, petitioner touched AAA’s vagina, then played with it. AAA cried
and told petitioner that it was painful. The latter stopped, but warned AAA not to tell anyone
about it. Petitioner allegedly committed the same acts against AAA repeatedly. Not long after,
petitioner was convicted of homicide and imprisoned in Muntinlupa City. In 2001, petitioner was
released on parole.

Petitioner allegedly started molesting BBB in May 2002. The petitioner inserts his 2 fingers into
BBB’s vagina whenever BBB visits petitioner, New Year’s Day, day before AAA’s birthday, and
All Saints Day. Notwithstanding the repeated incidents of sexual abuse committed against her,
BBB did not reveal her experiences to anybody because of fear for her life and that of her
mother.

AAA and BBB had the chance to reveal the abuse when their mother ABC arrived for a
vacation. AAA immediately told ABC what petitioner did to her. When confronted by ABC, BBB
likewise admitted the repeated abuses committed by petitioner. ABC reported the incidents to
the NBI. After conducting medical examinations on AAA and BBB, the attending physician
remarked that there was a "disclosure of sexual abuse and she noted the presence of hymenal
notch in posterior portion of hymenal rim that may be due to previous blunt force or penetrating
trauma suggestive of abuse."With these findings, petitioner was charged with the crimes of Acts
of Lasciviousness, committed against AAA, and nine (9) counts of Qualified Rape through
Sexual Assault, committed against BBB, before the RTC.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner be charged of Acts of Lasciviousness in relation to R.A. 7610 without
stating in the information.

RULING: Section 32, Article XIII of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 7610
defines lascivious conduct as follows:

The intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast,
inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or mouth of any
person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass,
degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious
exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a person.

Based on the foregoing definition, petitioners act of touching AAA’s vagina and playing with it
obviously amounted to lascivious conduct. Considering that the act was committed on a child
less than twelve years old and through intimidation, it is beyond cavil that petitioner is guilty
under the aforesaid laws.

The Court is aware that the Information specifically charged petitioner with Acts of
Lasciviousness under the RPC, without stating therein that it was in relation to R.A. No. 7610.
However, the failure to designate the offense by statute or to mention the specific provision
penalizing the act, or an erroneous specification of the law violated, does not vitiate the
information if the facts alleged therein clearly recite the facts constituting the crime charged. The
character of the crime is not determined by the caption or preamble of the information or by the
specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, but by the recital of the
ultimate facts and circumstances in the complaint or information.

In the instant case, the body of the Information contains an averment of the acts alleged to have
been committed by petitioner and unmistakably describes acts punishable under Section 5(b),
Article III of R.A. No. 7610.
It is also undisputed that petitioner is the father of AAA. The RTC did not appreciate the
alternative circumstance of relationship, because it was not alleged in the Information. We do
not agree.

The resolution of the investigating prosecutor, which formed the basis of the Information, a copy
of which is attached thereto, stated that petitioner is the victim’s biological father. There was,
therefore, substantial compliance with the mandate that an accused be informed of the nature of
the charge against him.
 e. Cecilia Legrama v. Sandiganbayan and People of the Philippines | G.R. No. 178626
| June 13, 2012 | J. Peralta

FACTS: Office of the Provincial Auditor of the Commission on Audit (COA), Zambales directed
an Audit Team to conduct an examination of the cash and account of petitioner Cecilia
Legrama, the Municipal Treasurer of the Municipality of San Antonio, Zambales.

The COA prepared a Special Cash Examination Report on the Cash and Accounts of petitioner
which contained the findings that petitioners cash accountability has a shortage in the amount
of P1,152,900.75. From the total amount of the shortage, petitioner was able to restitute the
initial amount of P60,000.00.

Consequently, petitioner and Romeo D. Lonzanida (Lonzanida), the Municipal Mayor were
charged in an Informationwith the crime of Malversation of Public Funds. Both petitioner and
Lonzanida voluntarily surrendered and posted their respective cash bonds.

Sandiganbayan rendered a Decision acquitting Lonzanida (lack of proof that is conspired with
petitioner). However, the tribunal concluded that petitioner malversed the total amount
of P1,131,595.05 and found her guilty of the crime of Malversation of Public Funds.

The amount involved in the instant case is more than

Php22,000.00. Hence, pursuant to the provisions of Article 217 of the Revised
Penal Code, the penalty to be imposed is reclusion temporal in its maximum
period to reclusion perpetua.

Considering the absence of any aggravating circumstance and the

presence of two mitigating circumstances, viz., accused Legramas voluntary
surrender and partial restitution of the amount involved in the instant case, and
being entitled to the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, she is hereby
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of 4 years, 2 months and 1 day
of prision correccional, as minimum, to 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as
maximum.

Further, she is ordered to pay the amount of Php299,204.65, representing

the balance of her incurred shortage after deducting therein the restituted amount
of Php832,390.40 and the Php200.00 covered by an Official Receipt
dated August 18, 1996 issued in the name of the Municipality of San
Antonio (Exhibit 22). She is also ordered to pay a fine equal to the amount
malversed which is Php1,131,595.05 and likewise suffer the penalty of perpetual
special disqualification and to pay costs.

ISSUE: Whether the petitioner is guilty of Malversation of Public funds and is entitled of
2 mitigating circumstances.

RULING: Yes. Undoubtedly, all the elements of the crime are present in the case at bar. First, it
is undisputed that petitioner was the municipal treasurer at the time material to this case.
Second, it is the inherent function of petitioner, being the municipal treasurer, to take custody of
and exercise proper management of the local governments funds. Third, the parties have
stipulated during the pre-trial of the case that petitioner received the subject amount as public
funds and that petitioner is accountable for the same. Fourth, petitioner failed to rebut the prima
facie presumption that she has put such missing funds to her personal use.

Verily, in the crime of malversation of public funds, all that is necessary for conviction is proof
that the accountable officer had received the public funds and that he failed to account for the
said funds upon demand without offering sufficient explanation why there was a shortage. In
fine, petitioners failure to present competent and credible evidence that would exculpate her and
rebut the prima facie presumption of malversation clearly warranted a verdict of conviction.

As for the appropriate penalty, since the amount involved is more than P22,000.00, pursuant to
the provisions of Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty to be imposed is reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua.

However, as aptly concluded by the Sandiganbayan, petitioner enjoys the mitigating

circumstances of voluntary surrender and restitution. Although restitution is akin to voluntary
surrender, as provided for in paragraph 7 of Article 13, in relation to paragraph 10 of the same
Article of the Revised Penal Code, restitution should be treated as a separate mitigating
circumstance in favor of the accused when the two circumstances are present in a case, which
is similar to instances where voluntary surrender and plea of guilty are both present even
though the two mitigating circumstances are treated in the same paragraph 7, Article 13 of the
Revised Penal Code. Considering that restitution is also tantamount to an admission of guilt on
the part of the accused, it was proper for the Sandiganbayan to have considered it as a
separate mitigating circumstance in favor of petitioner.

Taking into consideration the absence of any aggravating circumstance and the presence of two
mitigating circumstance, i.e., petitioners voluntary surrender and partial restitution of the amount
malversed, the prescribed penalty is reduced to prision mayor in its maximum period
to reclusion temporal in its medium period, which has a range of ten (10) years and one (1) day
to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months. In accordance with paragraph 1, Article 64 of the
Revised Penal Code.] and considering that there are no other mitigating circumstance present,
the maximum term should now be the medium period of prision mayor maximum to reclusion
temporal medium, which is reclusion temporal minimum and applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the minimum term should be anywhere within the period of prision
correccional maximum to prision mayor medium. Hence, the penalty imposed needs
modification. Accordingly, petitioner is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4)
years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to twelve (12) years,
five (5) months and eleven (11) days of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
 f. Nonito Imbo Y Gamores v. People of the Philippines | G.R. No. 197712 | April 20,
2015 | J. Perez

FACTS: Imbo was charged with crime of acts of lasciviousness upon his own daughter, 11
years old, a minor, by then and there forcing her to remove her shorts, mashing her breasts and
private parts and kissing her, thereby subjecting him to sexual abuse, with lewd design and
against her will, which act debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth of dignity of his
daughter as a human being, to the damage and prejudice of the said offended party.

Imbo claimed that his wife CCC, AAA's mother merely fabricated such a story that he had raped
his daughter. Ultimately, Imbo claimed that on the night in question, within the period from 14
October 2003 to 25 January 2004, no crime occurred, his days ending as did his workday which
were from 8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.

The RTC convicted Imbo of the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness and was sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate sentence of FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS OF RECLUSION
TEMPORAL AS MINIMUM TO SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS OF
RECLUSION TEMPORAL AS MAXIMUM in accordance with Section 5 of Republic Act No.
7610, otherwise known as the Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation
and Discrimination.

ISSUE: Whether Imbo is liable for the Crime of Acts of Lasciviousness and is subject to the
Penalty Imposed under Section 5 of RA 7610 despite the fact that the information failed to
indicate its applicability.

RULING: Yes. Imbo has undoubtedly committed the Acts of Lasciviousness as all the elements
of the crime was sufficiently proven through the lone testimony of AAA which the court has held
in more than one occasion as more than sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused.

Yes, Imbo is Liable since under Sec 5 of RA 7610 such as in this When AAA a child was
coerced by her Father to indulge in acts of lasciviousness as sufficiently proven in the
information .

With regard to the Penalty the court found that the RTC's decision should be modified by
applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law. According to the Courts The Indeterminate Sentence
Law is applicable to prison sentence both for an offense punished by the RPC and an offense
punished "by any other law." The correct application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law has
long been clarified in People v. Simon which ruled that the underscored portion of Section 1 of
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, i.e. the "offense is punished by any other law," indubitably
refers to an offense under a special law where the penalty imposed was not taken from and is
without reference to the RPC.

The minimum term should be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the
RPC, i.e. reclusion temporal in its minimum period of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to
fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months.

As for the maximum term of the imposable penalty on petitioner, the lower courts while correct,
should have mentioned Section 31(c), Article XII of R.A. No. 7610. The provision takes into
consideration the relationship between the parties, petitioner being AAA’s father
With the aggravating circumstance of relationship and applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, the penalty imposed by the lower courts of seventeen (17) years, four (4) months of
reclusion temporal correctly does not exceed the maximum of the penalty range of reclusion
temporal in its medium period (14 years, 4 months and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months).