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DOMINADOR G. JALOSJOS, JR., v. COMMISSION ON ELECTION and AGAPITO J.

CARDINO
G.R. No. 193237 October 9, 2012
CARPIO, J.

FACTS:
Jalosjos and Cardino were candidates for Mayor of Dapitan City, Zamboanga del
Norte in the May 2010 elections. Jalosjos was running for his third term. Subsequently,
Cardino filed a petition under Sec. 78 of the Omnibus Election Code to cancel and deny
the certificate of candidacy (COC) of Jalosjos.
Cardino claimed that long before Jalosjos filed his certificate of candidacy, Jalosjos
had already been convicted by final judgment for robbery and sentenced to prisión mayor
by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18 (RTC) of Cebu City. Cardino asserted that Jalosjos
has not yet served his sentence. Jalosjos admitted his conviction but stated that he had
already been granted probation. Cardino countered that the RTC revoked Jalosjos’
probation. Jalosjos refuted Cardino and stated that the RTC issued an Order declaring
that Jalosjos had duly complied with the order of probation. Jalosjos further stated that
during the 2004 elections the COMELEC denied a petition for disqualification filed against
him on the same grounds.
The COMELEC granted Cardino’s petition and cancelled Jalosjos’ certificate of
candidacy. Concluded that Jalosjos indeed committed material misrepresentation in his
COC when he declared under oath that he is eligible to be elected when in fact he is not
by reason of a final judgment in a criminal case, the sentence of which he has not yet
served. It also found that Jalosjos’ certificate of compliance of probation was fraudulently
issued; thus, Jalosjos has not yet served his sentence (prision mayor). Further, the
COMELEC En Banc denied Jalosjos’ motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE:
Whether Jalosjos is eligible to be elected

RULING:
The perpetual special disqualification against Jalosjos arising from his criminal
conviction by final judgment is a material fact involving eligibility which is a proper ground
for a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. Jalosjos’ certificate of
candidacy was void from the start since he was not eligible to run for any public office at
the time he filed his certificate of candidacy. Jalosjos was never a candidate at any time,
and all votes for Jalosjos were stray votes. As a result of Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy
being void ab initio, Cardino, as the only qualified candidate, actually garnered the highest
number of votes for the position of Mayor.

A sentence of prisión mayor by final judgment is a ground for disqualification under


Section 40 of the Local Government Code and under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election
Code. It is also a material fact involving the eligibility of a candidate under Sections 74
and 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. Thus, a person can file a petition under Section 40
of the Local Government Code or under either Section 12 or Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code.
Even without a petition under either Section 12 or Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code, or under Section 40 of the Local Government Code, the COMELEC is
under a legal duty to cancel the certificate of candidacy of anyone suffering from the
accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification to run for public office by virtue of
a final judgment of conviction. The final judgment of conviction is notice to the COMELEC
of the disqualification of the convict from running for public office. The law itself bars the
convict from running for public office, and the disqualification is part of the final judgment
of conviction. The final judgment of the court is addressed not only to the Executive
branch, but also to other government agencies tasked to implement the final judgment
under the law.
People v. De Guzman
G.R. No. 77368, October 5, 1993

FACTS:

A robbery was committed in Quezon City in the house of Jose L. Obillos, Sr., where
various pieces of precious jewelry alleged to be worth millions of pesos were taken.
Subsequently, an information, dated 22 October 1985, for violation of Presidential Decree No.
1612, otherwise known as the "Anti-Fencing Law," was also filed with the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City against herein respondent spouses Danilo A. Alcantara and Isabelita Esguerra-
Alcantara, from whose possession the jewelries stolen were recovered in Antipolo, Rizal.
The trial court, acting on the motion to quash filed by De Guzman, issued the
questioned order of 28 February 1986. Among others, the motion alleges, that as per
police investigation, the crime took place in Antipolo, Rizal. For this reason, Violation of
Presidential Decree No. 1612 is an independent crime, separate and distinct from that of
Robbery. The accused claims, likewise, that jurisdiction to try the same is with the Court
within which territorial jurisdiction, the alleged fencing took place.
Since the alleged act of fencing took place in Antipolo, Rizal, outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the trial court, and considering that all criminal prosecutions must be
instituted and tried in the Municipality or Province where the offense took place, the trial
court, necessarily, does not have jurisdiction over the instant case.
The private prosecutor's motion for reconsideration was denied in the court's order
of 21 March 1986. Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the crime of "fencing" is a continuing offense that could allow the
filing of an information therefor in the place where the robbery or theft is committed

RULING:

NO. Robbery is the taking of personal property belonging to another, with intent to
gain, by means of violence against or intimidation of any person, or using force upon
anything.7 "Fencing", upon the other hand, is the act of any person who, with intent to
gain for himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or
dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any other manner deal in any article, item, object
or anything of value which he knows, or should be known to him, to have been derived
from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.

The crimes of robbery and fencing are clearly then two distinct offenses. The law
on fencing does not require the accused to have participated in the criminal design to
commit, or to have been in any wise involved in the commission of, the crime of robbery
or theft. Neither is the crime of robbery or theft made to depend on an act of fencing in
order that it can be consummated. True, the object property in fencing must have been
previously taken by means of either robbery or theft but the place where the robbery or
theft occurs is inconsequential.
The Court is not unaware of a number of instances when the Court would allow a
change of venue in criminal cases "whenever the interest of justice and truth so demand,
and there are serious and weighty reasons to believe that a trial by the court that originally
had jurisdiction over the case would not result in a fair and impartial trial and lead to a
miscarriage of justice." Here, however, we do not see the attendance of such compelling
circumstances, nor are we prepared to state that the lower court gravely abused its
discretion in its questioned orders.

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