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This case arose when on May 23, 1988, private respondent Tinig at Lakas ng Manggagawa Applying the principle of vicarious liability, only the officers of the union deserved to be
sa BLTB Co. NAFLU (TLM-BLTB-NAFLU), an affiliate of the National Federation of Labor penalized with the loss of their employment status. The leaders of the union are the
Unions. (NAFLU), filed a Notice of Strike against the Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus moving force in the declaration of the strike and the Rank-in-file employees merely
Company on the grounds of unfair labor practice and violation of the CBA. followed. Likewise, viewed in the light of Article 264, paragraph (e), those who
participated in the commission of illegal acts who stood charged criminally thereof in
The reaction of BLTBCO was to ask the Secretary of Labor to assume jurisdiction over the court must be penalized. BLTBCo will have to agree with Us that while the general
dispute or to certify it to the National Labor Relations Commission for compulsory membership of TLM-NAFLU may have joined the strike at its inception, We are convinced
arbitration. The petitioner also moved to dismiss the notice of strike on August 3, 1988. that they returned to work on September 19, 1988 or, immediately thereafter. And, We
Efforts at amicable settlement having failed, Acting Labor Secretary C. Castro certified the are not swayed that these employees have abandoned their job just because they
dispute to the NLRC on August 29, 1988. 1 reported late or, beyond the period required by the Commission and by BLTBCo. The
circumstances of time and place of employment and the residences of the employees as
A copy of the certification order was served upon the NAFLU on August 29, 1988, and on well as the lack of individual notice to them are reasons enough to justify their failure to
the TLM-BLTBCo-NAFLU on August 30, 1988. However, it was noted in the notice of order beat the deadline.
that union secretary Jerry Soriano refused to receive it. On August 31, 1988, the officers
and members of TLM-BLTBCo-NAFLU went on strike and maintained picket lines blocking True it is, that management of BLTBCo caused the publication of the Resolution of the
the premises of BLTBCo's terminals. Commission of September 5, 1988 in the Manila Bulletin, We cannot reasonably expect
the complainants, who are ordinary workers, to be regular readers of such newspaper.
On September 6, 1988, the NLRC issued an en banc resolution ordering the striking Moreover, the publication of the said resolution was only made once.
employees to lift their picket and to remove all obstructions and barricades. All striking
employees on payroll as of May 23, 1988, were required to return to work. BLTBCo was The contention of the petitioner that the private respondents abandoned their position is
directed to accept them back to work within 5 days under the same terms and conditions also not acceptable. An employee who forthwith takes steps to protest his lay-off cannot
prevailing before the strike. 2 On September 15, 1988, the BLTBCo caused the publication by any logic be said to have abandoned his work. The loss of employment status of
of the resolution and called on all striking workers to return to work not later than striking union members is limited to those "who knowingly participates in the commission
September 18, 1988. It later extended the deadline to September 19, 1988. of illegal acts." (Article 264, Labor Code) Evidence must be presented to substantiate the
commission thereof and not merely an unsubstantiated allegation.
Of the some 1,730 BLTBCo employees who went on strike, only 1,116 reported back for
work. Seventeen others were later re-admitted. Subsequently, about 614 employees, The right to strike is one of the rights recognized and guaranteed by the Constitution as
including those who were allegedly dismissed for causes other than the strike, filed an instrument of labor for its protection against exploitation by management. By virtue
individual complaints for illegal dismissal. Their common ground was that they were of this right, the workers are able to press their demands for better terms of
refused admission when they reported back for work. Among those who failed to comply employment with more energy and persuasiveness, poising the threat to strike as their
with the return-to-work order were the respondent individual union members. reaction to the employer's intransigence. The strike is indeed a powerful weapon of the
working class. But precisely because of this, it must be handled carefully, like a sensitive
The NLRC issued a resolution ordering the reinstatement of the union members. explosive, lest it blow up in the workers' own hands. Thus, it must be declared only after
Issue: the most thoughtful consultation among them, conducted in the only way allowed, that
is, peacefully, and in every case conformably to reasonable regulation. Any violation of
the legal requirements and strictures, such as a defiance of a return-to-work order in
industries affected with public interest, will render the strike illegal, to the detriment of STATUTORY
the very workers it is supposed to protect.
ASSOCIATION OF INDEPENDENT UNIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES (AIUP), JOEL DENSING,
Even war must be lawfully waged. A labor dispute demands no less observance of the HENEDINO MIRAFUENTES, CHRISTOPHER PATENTES, AND ANDRES TEJANA, petitioner,
rules, for the benefit of all concerned. vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC), CENAPRO CHEMICAL
CORPORATION and/or GO SING CHAN in his capacity as Managing Director,
Petition DISMISSED. respondents.
Facts:
Joel Densing, Henedino Mirafuentes, Christopher Patentes, and Andres Tejana, the
petitioner herein, were casual employees of respondent CENAPRO Chemicals Corporation.
In the said company, the collective bargaining representative of all rank and file
employees was CENAPRO Employees Association (CCEA), with which respondent company
had a collective bargaining agreement (CBA). Their CBA excluded casual employees from
membership in the incumbent union. The casual employees who have rendered at least
one to six years of service sought regularization of their employment. When their demand
was denied, they formed themselves into an organization and affiliated with the
Association of Independent unions in the Philippines (AIUP). Thereafter, AIUP filed a
petition for certification election, which petition was opposed by the respondent
company. The CCEA anchored its opposition on the contract bar rule.
On May 4, and July 3, 1990, the union filed a notice of strike, minutes of strike vote, and
the needed documentation, with the Department of Labor and Employment. The notice of
strike cited as grounds therefor the acts of respondent company constituting unfair labor
practice, more specifically coercion of employees and systematic union busting.
On July 23, 1992, the union proceeded to stage a strike, in the course of which, the union
perpetrated illegal acts. The strikers padlocked the gate of the company. The areas
fronting the gate of the company were barricaded and blocked by union strikers. The
strikers also prevented and coerced other non-striking employees from reporting for
work. Because of such illegal activities, the respondent company filed a petition for
injunction with the NLRC, which granted a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), enjoining
the strikers from doing further acts of violence, coercion, or intimidation and from
blocking free ingress and egress to the company premises.
On October 5, 1993, the respondent company appealed the aforesaid insofar as it ordered b) obstruct the free ingress to or egress from the employers premises for lawful purposes
the reinstatement of some of the strikers. or
On October 7, 1993, the petitioners also appealed the same decision of the Labor Arbiter. c) obstruct public thoroughfares.
Pending resolution of the said appeals, petitioner AUIP filed with the Labor Arbiter a Even if the strike is valid because its objective or purpose is lawful, the strike may still be
Motion for Execution of the Labor Arbiters Decision directing reinstatement of some of its declared invalid where the means employed are illegal. For instance, the strike was
members. The motion was granted in the Order dated October 15, 1993. considered illegal as the strikers formed a human cordon along the side of the Sta. Ana
wharf and blocked all the ways and approaches to the launches and vessels of
In its Decision dated August 15, 1994, the NLRC affirmed in toto the Labor Arbiters Petitioners.[13]
decision, dismissed both the appeal of private respondent and that of petitioners, and
reiterated the Labor Arbiters Order for the reinstatement of the herein petitioners, Joel It follows therefore that the dismissal of the officers of the striking union was justified and
Densing, Henedino Mirafuentes, Christopher Patentes, and Andres Tejana. valid. Their dismissal as a consequence of the illegality of the strike staged by them finds
support in Article 264 (a) of the Labor Code, pertinent portion of which provides: x x Any
Issue: union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any x x union officer who
knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to
WON the AIUP- sponsored Union committed Illegal Strike. YES have lost his employment status. x x
Ratio: Union officers are duty bound to guide their members to respect the law. If instead of
doing so, the officers urge the members to violate the law and defy the duly constituted
From the gamut of evidence on hand, it can be gathered that the strike staged by the authorities, their dismissal from the service is a just penalty or sanction for their unlawful
petitioner union was illegal for the reasons, that: acts. The officers responsibility is greater than that of the members.[14]
1) The strikers committed illegal acts in the course of the strike. They formed human The courts finds merit in the finding by the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC that the
barricades to block the road, prevented the passage of the respondent companys truck, respondent company committed no illegal lockout. Lockout means temporary refusal of
padlocked the companys gate, and prevented co-workers from entering the company the employer to furnish work as a result of an industrial or labor dispute.[15] As observed
premises.[9] by the Labor Arbiter, it was the appellant-workers who voluntarily stopped working
because of their strike. In fact, the appellant workers admitted that non-striking workers
who wanted to return to work were allowed to do so. Their being without work could not
therefore be attributed to the employers refusal to give them work but rather, to the
voluntary withdrawal of their services in order to compel the company to recognize their
union.[16]
LIMITATIONS
The next aspect of the case to consider is the fate of the four petitioners herein. Decisive BISIG NG MANGGAGAWA SA CONCRETE AGGREGATES, INC., (BIMCAI) FSM, AND ITS
on the matter is the pertinent provision of Article 264 (a) of the Labor Code that: x x any UNION OFFICERS & MEMBERS, ETC., petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
worker x x who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may COMMISSION, LABOR ARBITER ERNILO V. PEÑALOSA and CONCRETE AGGREGATES
be declared to have lost his employment status. x x It can be gleaned unerringly from the CORP., respondents.
aforecited provision of law in point, however, that an ordinary striking employee can not
be terminated for mere participation in an illegal strike. There must be proof that he Facts:
committed illegal acts during the strike[17] and the striker who participated in the The labor conflict between the parties broke out in the open when the petitioner union
commission of illegal act must be identified. But proof beyond reasonable doubt is not struck on April 6, 1992 protesting issues ranging from unfair labor practices and union
required. Substantial evidence available under the attendant circumstances, which may busting allegedly committed by the private respondent. The union picketed the premises
justify the imposition of the penalty of dismissal, may suffice. In the landmark case of Ang of the private respondent in Quezon City, Rizal, Pampanga and Laguna. On April 8, 1992,
Tibay vs. CIR,[18] the court ruled Not only must there be some evidence to support a private respondent filed with the NLRC a petition for injunction to stop the strike which it
finding or conclusion, but the evidence must be substantial. Substantial evidence is more denounced as illegal. The petition was set for hearing but the union claimed that it was
than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might not furnished a copy of the petition. Allegedly, the company misrepresented its address to
accept as sufficient to support a conclusion. be at Rm. 205-6 Herald Bldg. Muralla St., Intramuros, Manila. On April 13, 1992, the NLRC
heard the evidence of the company alone. Before the day was over, the respondent NLRC
The unmeritorious appeal interposed by the respondent company, let alone the failure to issued a temporary restraining order against the union. No copy of this Order was
execute with dispatch the award of reinstatement delayed the payroll reinstatement of furnished the union. The union learned of the Order only when it was posted on April 15,
petitioner. But their long waiting is not completely in vain, for the court holds that their 1992 at the premises of the company. On April 24, 1992, the union also filed its own
(petitioners) salaries and backwages must be computed from October 15, 1993 until full Petition for Injunction to enjoin the company "from asking the aid of the police and the
payment of their separation pay, without any deduction. This is in consonance with the military officer in escorting scabs to enter the struck establishment." The records show
ruling in the case of Bustamante vs. NLRC,[24] where payment of full backwages without that the case was heard on April 24 and 30, May 4 and 5, 1992 by respondent Labor
deduction was ordered. The four petitioners herein are entitled to reinstatement absent Arbiter Enrilo Peñalosa. On April 30, 1992, the company filed a Motion for the Immediate
any just ground for their dismissal. Considering, however, that more than eight (8) years Issuance of Preliminary Injunction, which the union opposed. On May 5, 1992, however,
have passed since subject strike was staged, an award of separation pay equivalent to one the respondent NLRC issued its disputed Order granting the company's motion for
(1) month pay for every year of service, in lieu of reinstatement, is deemed more practical preliminary injunction.
and appropriate to all the parties concerned.
Issue:
WON Order of the NLRC infringes petitioners' right to strike and must be struck down. YES
Ratio:
In the case at bar, the records will show that the respondent NLRC failed to comply with
the letter and spirit of Article 218 (e), (4) and (5) of the Labor Code in issuing its Order of
May 5, 1992. Article 218 (e) of the Labor Code provides both the procedural and
substantive requirements which must strictly be complied with before a temporary or
permanent injunction can issue in a labor dispute.
Moreover, the records reveal the continuing misuse of unfair strategies to secure ex parte
temporary restraining orders against striking employees. Petitioner union did not receive
any copy of private respondent's petition for injunction in Case No. 000249-92 filed on
April 8, 1992. Its address as alleged by the private respondent turned out to be
"erroneous". 15 Consequently, the petitioner was denied the right to attend the hearing prisons. The spectre of incarceration did not spur its leaders to sloth; on the contrary it
held on April 13, 1992 while the private respondent enjoyed a field day presenting its spiked labor to work for its legitimization. This effort was enhanced by the flowering of
evidence ex parte. On the basis of uncontested evidence, the public respondent, on the liberal ideas in the United States which inevitably crossed our shores. It was enormously
same day April 13, 1992, temporarily enjoined the petitioner from committing certain boosted by the American occupation of our country. Hence, on June 17, 1953, Congress
alleged illegal acts. Again, a copy of the Order was sent to the wrong address of the gave statutory recognition to the right to strike when it enacted RA 875, otherwise known
petitioner. Knowledge of the Order came to the petitioner only when its striking members as the Industrial Peace Act. For nearly two (2) decades, labor enjoyed the right to strike
read it after it was posted at the struck areas of the private respondent. until it was prohibited on September 12, 1972 upon the declaration of martial law in the
country. The 14-year battle to end martial rule produced many martyrs and foremost
To be sure, the issuance of an ex parte temporary restraining order in a labor dispute is
among them were the radicals of the labor movement. It was not a mere happenstance,
not per se prohibited. Its issuance, however, should be characterized by care and caution
therefore, that after the final battle against martial rule was fought at EDSA in 1986, the
for the law requires that it be clearly justified by considerations of extreme necessity, i.e.,
new government treated labor with a favored eye. Among those chosen by then President
when the commission of unlawful acts is causing substantial and irreparable injury to
Corazon C. Aquino to draft the 1987 Constitution were recognized labor leaders like
company properties and the company is, for the moment, bereft of an adequate remedy
Eulogio Lerum, Jose D. Calderon, Blas D. Ople and Jaime S.L. Tadeo. These delegates
at law. This is as it ought to be, for imprudently issued temporary restraining orders can
helped craft into the 1987 Constitution its Article XIII entitled Social Justice and Human
break the back of employees engaged in a legal strike. Often times, they unduly tilt the
Rights. For the first time in our constitutional history, the fundamental law of our land
balance of a labor warfare in favor of capital. When that happens, the deleterious effects
mandated the State to ". . . guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization,
of a wrongfully issued, ex parte temporary restraining order on the rights of striking
collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the
employees can no longer be repaired for they defy simple monetization. Moreover,
right to strike in accordance with law." 12 This constitutional imprimatur given to the right
experience shows that ex parte applications for restraining orders are often based on
to strike constitutes signal victory for labor. Our Constitutions of 1935 and 1973 did not
fabricated facts and concealed truths. A more becoming sense of fairness, therefore,
accord constitutional status to the right to strike. Even the liberal US Federal Constitution
demands that such ex parte applications should be more minutely examined by hearing
did not elevate the right to strike to a constitutional level. With a constitutional matrix,
officers, lest, our constitutional policy of protecting labor becomes nothing but a synthetic
enactment of a law implementing the right to strike was an inevitability. RA 6715 came
shibboleth. The immediate need to hear and resolve these ex parte applications does not
into being on March 21, 1989, an intentional replication of RA 875. 13 In light of the
provide any excuse to lower our vigilance in protecting labor against the issuance of
genesis of the right to strike, it ought to be obvious that the right should be read with a
indiscriminate injunctions. Stated otherwise, it behooves hearing officers receiving
libertarian latitude in favor of labor. In the wise words of Father Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., a
evidence in support of ex parte injunctions against employees in strike to take a more
distinguished commissioner of the 1987 Constitutional Commission " . . . the
active stance in seeing to it that their right to social justice is in no way violated despite
constitutional recognition of the right to strike does serve as a reminder that injunctions,
their absence. This equalizing stance was not taken in the case at bar by the public
should be reduced to the barest minimum". 14
respondents.
Strike has been considered the most effective weapon of labor in protecting the rights of
employees to improve the terms and conditions of their employment. It may be that in
highly developed countries, the significance of strike as a coercive weapon has shrunk in
view of the preference for more peaceful modes of settling labor disputes. In
underdeveloped countries, however, where the economic crunch continues to enfeeble
the already marginalized working class, the importance of the right to strike remains
undiminished as indeed it has proved many a time as the only coercive weapon that can
correct abuses against labor. It remains as the great equalizer.
In the Philippine milieu where social justice remains more as a rhetoric than a reality,
labor has vigilantly fought to safeguard the sanctity of the right to strike. Its struggle to
gain the right to strike has not been easy and effortless. Labor's early exercise of the right
to strike collided with the laws on rebellion and sedition and sent its leaders languishing in
GREPALIFE submitted before the Labor Arbiter several affidavits of its employees which de
la Rosa did not refute. Of these documents, two (2) specifically described the incidents
Limitations
that transpired during the strike on 4 and 5 November 1993 as deposed by Security guard
GREAT PACIFIC LIFE EMPLOYEES UNION and RODEL P. DE LA ROSA, petitioners, vs. Rodrigo S. Butalid.
GREAT PACIFIC LIFE ASSURANCE CORPORATION, LABOR ARBITER JOVENCIO LL. MAYOR
Petitioner de la Rosa assails the inherent weakness of the sworn statements of these
JR. and NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (THIRD DIVISION), respondents.
security guards. But while it is true that affidavits may be regarded as infirm evidence[16]
G.R. No. 126717. February 11, 1999 before the regular courts unless the affiants are presented on the stand, such affidavits by
themselves are acceptable in proceedings before the Labor Arbiter. Under Sec. 7, Rule V,
Facts:
of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, these proceedings, save for the constitutional
Prior to the expiration of the CBA, the Parties submitted their respective proposals for its requirements of due process, are not to be strictly governed by the technicalities of law
projected renewal. However, it ended to a deadlock. Thus, the Union proceeded to stage and procedural rules. Section 3, par. 2, of the same Rule, provides that verified position
a strike employing some violence and blocking all points of ingress and egress of the papers are to be accompanied by all supporting documents including the affidavits of the
Company’s premises. parties' respective witnesses in lieu of direct testimony. It is therefore a clear mandate
In view thereof, the GREPALIFE directed the Union to explain why no disciplinary action, that the Labor Arbiter may employ all reasonable means to ascertain the facts of the
including possible dismissal from employment, should be taken against them for controversy before him.
committing illegal acts against the company in the course of the strike. In response, the Since de la Rosa did not present countervailing evidence, the NLRC correctly appreciated
Union asserted that they were just exercising their right to strike, while the other striking the affidavits of the two (2) security guards as having adequately established the charges
employees ignored the same. leveled against de la Rosa thus justifying his dismissal from employment.
The GREPALIFE found Union’s explanations unacceptable, thus terminating its officers and As to the claim of Dela Rosa that he was forced to resign and that respondent company
employees. unreasonably singled out the top officers of the UNION, including himself as unfit for
Eventually, the Parties entered into a MOA, where GREPALIFE requested, among others, reinstatement, the SC ruled in this wise:
for the voluntary resignation of President and Vice-President of the Union, Mr. Domingo While an act or decision of an employer may be unfair, certainly not every unfair act or
and Mr. Dela Rosa, respectively, in exchange for the reinstatement of all other strikers. decision constitutes unfair labor practice (ULP) as defined and enumerated under Art. 248
Thus, prompting Mr. Dela Rosa to file a complaint against GREPALIFE for illegal dismissal of the Labor Code.[18]
and ULP. The Labor Arbiter sided for the Union’s Officers, while the NLRC reversed the
There should be no dispute that all the prohibited acts constituting unfair labor practice in
former’s decision, contending that a just cause for dismissal had been sufficiently
essence relate to the workers' right to self-organization. Thus, an employer may be held
established. However, it agreed that GREPALIFE failed to comply strictly with the
liable under this provision if his conduct affects in whatever manner the right of an
requirements of due process prior to termination, thus awarding the Union‘s Officers its
employee to self-organize. The decision of respondent GREPALIFE to consider the top
monetary benefits. Hence, Mr. Dela Rosa’s Petition.
officers of petitioner UNION as unfit for reinstatement is not essentially discriminatory
Issue: and constitutive of an unlawful labor practice of employers under the above-cited
Whether the NLRC erred in its decision. NO provision. Discriminating in the context of the Code involves either encouraging
membership in any labor organization or is made on account of the employee's having
Ratio: given or being about to give testimony under the Labor Code. These have not been
We hold that the NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion. The right to strike, while proved in the case at bar.
constitutionally recognized, is not without legal constrictions.[14] The Labor Code is To elucidate further, there can be no discrimination where the employees concerned are
emphatic against the use of violence, coercion and intimidation during a strike and to not similarly situated.[19] A union officer has larger and heavier responsibilities than a
this end prohibits the obstruction of free passage to and from the employer's premises union member. Union officers are duty bound to respect the law and to exhort and guide
for lawful purposes. The sanction provided in par. (a) of Art. 264 thereof is so severe their members to do the same; their position mandates them to lead by example. By
that "any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of committing prohibited activities during the strike, de la Rosa as Vice President of
illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status."[15] petitioner UNION demonstrated a high degree of imprudence and irresponsibility. Verily,
this justifies his dismissal from employment. Since the objective of the Labor Code is to
ensure a stable but dynamic and just industrial peace, the dismissal of undesirable labor
leaders should be upheld.[20]
Strike Activity: Definition
It bears emphasis that the employer is free to regulate all aspects of employment
according to his own discretion and judgment. This prerogative flows from the established
INTERPHIL LABORATORIES EMPLOYEES UNION-FFW, ENRICO GONZALES and MA.
rule that labor laws do not authorize substitution of judgment of the employer in the
THERESA MONTEJO, petitioners, v s. I NTERPHIL LABORATORIES, INC., AND HONORABLE
conduct of his business. Recall of workers clearly falls within the ambit of management
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING, SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, respondents.
prerogative.[21] The employer can exercise this prerogative without fear of liability so
long as it is done in good faith for the advancement of his interest and not for the purpose
of defeating or circumventing the rights of the employees under special laws or valid Facts:
agreements. It is valid as long as it is not performed in a malicious, harsh, oppressive,
vindictive or wanton manner or out of malice or spite. Petitioner is the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of
Respondent. They had a CBA.
That respondent company opted to reinstate all the strikers except Domingo and de la
Rosa is an option taken in good faith for the just and lawful protection and advancement Prior to the expiration of the CBA, respondent company was approached by the
of its interest. Readmitting the union members to the exclusion of Domingo and de la petitioner, through its officers. The Union inquired about the stand of the company
Rosa was nothing less than a sound exercise of managment prerogative, an act of regarding the duration of the CBA which was set to expire in a few months. Salazar told
self-preservation in fact, designed to insure the maintenance of peace and order in the the union officers that the matter could be best discussed during the formal negotiations
company premises.[22] The dismissal of de la Rosa who had shown his capacity for which would start soon.
unmitigated mischief was intended to avoid a recurrence of the violence that attended
the fateful strike in November. All the rank-and-file employees of the company refused to follow their regular two-shift
work schedule. The employees stopped working and left their workplace without sealing
the containers and securing the raw materials they were working on.
To minimize the damage the overtime boycott was causing the company, Salazar
immediately asked for a meeting with the union officers. In the meeting, Enrico Gonzales,
a union director, told Salazar that the employees would only return to their normal work
schedule if the company would agree to their demands as to the effectivity and duration
of the new CBA. Salazar again told the union officers that the matter could be better
discussed during the formal renegotiations of the CBA. Since the union was apparently
unsatisfied with the answer of the company, the
overtime boycott continued. In addition, the employees started to engage in a work
slowdown campaign during the time they were working, thus substantially delaying the
production of the company.
Respondent company filed with the National NLRC a petition to declare illegal petitioner
union’s “overtime boycott” and “work slowdown” which, according to respondent
company, amounted to illegal strike. It also filed with Office Secretary of Labor a petition
for assumption
of jurisdiction. Secretary of Labor Nieves Confesor issued an assumption order over the
labor dispute.
Labor Arbiter Caday submitted his recommendation to the then Secretary of Labor Code, taken conjointly and rationally construed to subserve the objective of the
Leonardo A. Quisumbing. Then Secretary Quisumbing approved and adopted the report in jurisdiction vested in the Secretary.
his Order, finding illegal strike on the part of petitioner Union.
As to the Definition:
Issue:
More importantly, the overtime boycott or work slowdown by the employees constituted
WON the Labor Secretary has jurisdiction to rule over an illegal strike. YES a violation of their CBA, which prohibits the union or employee, during the existence of
the CBA, to stage a strike or engage in slowdown or interruption of work.[22] In Ilaw at
Ratio: Buklod ng Manggagawa vs. NLRC,[23] this Court ruled:
On the matter of the authority and jurisdiction of the Secretary of Labor and Employment x x x (T)he concerted activity in question would still be illicit because contrary to the
to rule on the illegal strike committed by petitioner union, it cannot be denied that the workers explicit contractual commitment that there shall be no strikes, walkouts,
issues of “overtime boycott” and “work slowdown” amounting to illegal strike before stoppage or slowdown of work, boycotts, secondary boycotts, refusal to handle any
Labor Arbiter merchandise, picketing, sit-down strikes of any kind, sympathetic or general strikes, or
Caday are intertwined with the labor dispute before the Labor Secretary. any other interference with any of the operations of the COMPANY during the term of xxx
(their collective bargaining) agreement.
The appellate court also correctly held that the question of the Secretary of Labor and
Employment’s jurisdiction over labor-related disputes was already settled in International What has just been said makes unnecessary resolution of SMCs argument that the
Pharmaceutical, Inc. vs. Hon. Secretary of Labor and Associated Labor Union (ALU) where workers concerted refusal to adhere to the work schedule in force for the last several
the Court declared: years, is a slowdown, an inherently illegal activity essentially illegal even in the absence of
a no-strike clause in a collective bargaining contract, or statute or rule. The Court is in
In the present case, the Secretary was explicitly granted by Article 263(g) of the Labor substantial agreement with the petitioners concept of a slowdown as a strike on the
Code the authority to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a installment plan; as a willful reduction in the rate of work by concerted action of
strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest, and decide the same workers for the purpose of restricting the output of the employer, in relation to a labor
accordingly. Necessarily, this authority to assume jurisdiction over the said labor dispute dispute; as an activity by which workers, without a complete stoppage of work, retard
must include and extend to all questions and controversies arising therefrom, including production or their performance of duties and functions to compel management to
cases over which the labor arbiter has exclusive jurisdiction. grant their demands. The Court also agrees that such a slowdown is generally condemned
as inherently illicit and unjustifiable, because while the employees continue to work and
Moreover, Article 217 of the Labor Code is not without, but contemplates, exceptions remain at their positions and accept the wages paid to them, they at the same time select
thereto. This is evident from the opening proviso therein reading ‘(e)xcept as otherwise what part of their allotted tasks they care to perform of their own volition or refuse
provided under this Code x x x.’ Plainly, Article 263(g) of the Labor Code was meant to openly or secretly, to the employers damage, to do other work; in other words, they work
make both the Secretary (or the various regional directors) and the labor arbiters share on their own terms. x x x.[24]
jurisdiction,
subject to certain conditions. Otherwise, the Secretary would not be able to effectively
and efficiently dispose of the primary dispute. To hold the contrary may even lead to the
absurd and undesirable result wherein the Secretary and the labor arbiter concerned may
have diametrically
opposed rulings. As we have said, ‘it is fundamental that a statute is to be read in a
manner that would breathe life into it, rather than defeat it.
In fine, the issuance of the assailed orders is within the province of the Secretary as
authorized by Article 263(g) of the Labor Code and Article 217(a) and (5) of the same