AYEH counsel, it is binding on the client.

To follow a contrary rule and allow a party to

Case No. 28 disown his counsel’s conduct would render proceedings indefinite, tentative,
Gomez v Montalban (GR 174414) and subject to reopening by the mere subterfuge of replacing counsel. What the
RULE 38 – Grounds [FME] aggrieved litigant should do is seek administrative sanctions against the erring
counsel and not ask for the reversal of the court’s ruling.
FACTS: Petitioner filed a Complaint with the RTC for a sum of money, damages and
payment of attorney’s fees against respondent. RTC ruled in favor of petitioner.
Respondent filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment alleging that there was no
effective service of summons upon her since there was no personal service of the
same. Respondent failed to attend hearing for her petition, hence it was dismissed.
But it was later granted, upon her filing of an MR saying that that her counsel’s failure
to appear was not intentional, but due to human shortcomings or frailties,
constituting honest mistake or excusable negligence. RTC granted MR in the interest
of justice. Hence, this petition directly filed with the SC.

ISSUE: (1) WON respondent’s relief from judgment is proper during the period for
filing a motion for reconsideration and appeal; (2) WON respondent had cause of
action for relief from judgment.

RULING:

(1) NO. A petition for relief under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court is only available
against a final and executory judgment. Here, the 15-day period to file a motion
for reconsideration or appeal had not yet lapsed. Hence, resort by respondent
to a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court was
premature and inappropriate.
(2) NO. As used in Section 1, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, "mistake" refers to
mistake of fact, not of law, which relates to the case. The word "mistake," which
grants relief from judgment, does not apply and was never intended to apply to
a judicial error which the court might have committed in the trial. Such errors
may be corrected by means of an appeal. This does not exist in the case at bar,
because respondent has in no wise been prevented from interposing an appeal.

"Fraud," on the other hand, must be extrinsic or collateral, that is, the kind which
prevented the aggrieved party from having a trial or presenting his case to the
court or was used to procure the judgment without fair submission of the
controversy. This is not present in the case at hand as respondent was not
prevented from securing a fair trial and was given the opportunity to present her
case.
Negligence to be excusable must be one which ordinary diligence and prudence
could not have guarded against. Under Section 1, the "negligence" must be
excusable and generally imputable to the party because if it is imputable to the