SINGAPORE'IS

DEFENGE
INDUSTRTES

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Bilveer Singh

pers on
Defence
 CANBERRA PAPERS ON
STRATEGY AND DEFENCE NO. 70
 SINGAPORE'S
DEFENCE INDUSTRIES

Bilveer Singh

Strategic and Defence Studies Centre

Research School of Pacific Studies
Australian National University
Canberra
1990
Itinted and Published in Australia
at the AusEalian National University 190
@ BilveerSingh 1990

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Sin gapore's defence indus tsies.

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 ABSTRACT
This study analyses the state of Singapore defence industry. It
traces the origins and evolution of the industry, examines the various
motivating factors and analyses the impact of the industry on the
countryand beyond. From the study, it is clear that Singapore has one
of the most developed defence industries in Southeast Asia and this
has been achieved within a relatively short span of time. The
monograph analyses the factors for this achievement, examines the
decision-making process as far as the defence industry is concerned
and examines problems that have been faced and might be faced by
the defence industry in Singapore. Finally, the future directions of the
defence industry are analysed.
Dr Bilveer Singh undertook his undergraduate work at the National
University of Singapore. In 1983 and 1987 respectively, he received his
Master of Arts in International Affairs and PhD from the Department
of International Relations, Australian National University. Dr Singh is
presently a Lecturer at the Department of Political Science, National
University of Singapore. Dr Singh has published extensively in
regional and international journals on security-related matters of
Southeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific. He is the author of Souiet-ASEAN
Relatians, 1.957-'1.989, (Singapore University Press, '1,989); The Swiet
Union in Singapore's Foreign Policy: An Analysis, (Institute of Strategic
and International Studies, Malaysia and Keegan Paul, 1990); and the
co-editor of The Swiet Union in the ,Ask-Pacific Region, (Heinemann
Asia, 1989). Presently, Dr Singh is also the Director of the Singapore
Institute of International Affairs.
Canbena Papus on Shategy and Ddence are a series of monograph
publications which arise out of the work of the Shategic and Defence
Studies Centre, Research fthool of Pacific Studies, The Australian
National University. Previous Canberra Pryas have covered topics
such as the relationship of the supelpowers, arrns control at both the
superpower and South-east Asian regional level, regional strategic
relationships and maior aspects of Australian defence policy. For a list
of those still available refer to the last pages of this volume.
Unless otherwise stated, publications of the Centre are
presented without endorsement as contributions to the public record
and debate. Authors are responsible for their own analysis and
condusions.
 CONTENTS

Tables and Figures

Preface

CHAPTER ONE: DETiENCE INDUSTRIALISATION IN

THE THIRD WORLD 1

CHAPTER TWO: STRUCruRE, ORGANISATION AND

DIMENSIONS OF THE SINGAPORE
DEFENCE INDUSTRIES 11

CHAPTER THREE: IMPERATIVES AND INCENTIVES

FOR THE SINGAPORE DEFENCE
INDUSTRIES 38

CHAPTER FOUR: DECISION MAKING IN THE SINGAPORE

DEFENCE INDUSTRIES 50

GHAPTER FIVE: srNGApoRE DEFENCE

Itr3tsfr_?5rlHE 56

CHAPTER SIX: LIMITS CONFRONTING THE SINGAPORE

DEFENCE INDUSTRIES 60

CHAPTERSEVEN: FUTURE PROSPECTS 65

Shategic and Defence Studies Centre 68

Publications 69
 TABLE AND FIGURES

Table:

1 Arms production in the Third World, 1982-1.987 1.2

Figures:

I Organisational Structure of the

Singapore Defence Industries, 1982-April 1989 16

2 Singapore Technology Corporation 17

3 Products of Singapore Technology Corporation 21.,22

4 Activities of Singapore Aircraft Industries 23

5 Services of Singapore Aircraft Industries 26

6 Activities of Singapore
Shipbuilding and Engineering Limited 29

7 Products of Singapore Shipbuilding and

Engineering Company 30

8 Structure of the SDI since April 1989 31

9 Industries of Singapore Technologies Industrial

Corporation Pte Ltd (STIC) 34

l0 Decision Making in the SDI v

 PREFACE
In line with the general pattern of military behaviour in other
Third World regions, Southeast Asian countries have been spending a
large proportion of their budgets on defence. An important
component of the defence outlay is the increasing emphasis paid to
domestic arms production, especially in the ASEAN (Association of
Southeast Asian Nations) countries consisting of Indonesia, Malaysi4
Thailand, Philippines, Singapore and Brunei. Among the ASEAN
countries, Singapore's experience is worth studying as it testifies how
a competitive defence industrial complex can be developed in the
Third World.
While Singapore was not the first in the region to invest in a
domestic defence industry, its arms industry has grown rapidly over
the last twenty-five years, making the Republic the leading and most
advanced arms producer in the region. Developing sporadically at
first, the defence industries have grown into a massive integrated
complex, organised along four lines : ordnance, aerosPace, marine and
indultrial. As in the other industrial sectors, the role of the political
leadership in directing the development of the defence industries is an
important one. While the sword-plowshares debate can be easily
aroused, it is obvious in the singapore case that the singapore Defence
Industries play an important political, military, economic and
psychologicil role, and it is the combination of these contributions and
inientivei which have generated the continued growth of the defence
indushies in a highly organised, efficient, rational and profit-oriented
direction. Increasingly, the defence industries have also become an
integral element of the country's defence strategy, becoming a critical
element of its deterrence strategy, showing clearly how the defence
industries can be successfully linked to the countrl/s defence strategy
without the state suffering loss in having to shoulder and support a
burdensome defence industrial infrashucture.
While the term Singapore Defence Industries is used
generically in this book to refer to the whole SrouP of companies
organised-under the Ministry of Defence to undertake activities which
are directly and indirectly military-related, increasingly there has been
a concerted effort to play down the military role of these industries
and take the label 'militaq/ away from them, focusing more on their
'non-offensive' industrial role. Hence, the new generic label Singapore
Technologies was officially inaugurated in April 1989. While this
change in focus, with an industrial emphasis, is in part aimed at
reflecting the new and long-term importance of the industrial sector of
the industries, the fact that these industries are an integral part of the
Ministry of Defence and form part of its infrastructure permits the
generic term Singapore Defence Industries to be used legitimately to
describe the group of industries so organised to undertake defence
production in the country.
 CHAPTER ONE
DEFENCE INDUSTRIALISATION IN THE
THIRD WORLD
In addition to political stability, economic development and
military strength, defence industrialization has become an integral part
of any counffs strategic and defence capability. It is no longer
merely part of the strategic thinking of the advanced industrial world
to link weapons production to the political, economic and military
strength of a particular country. Increasingly, more and more states in
the Third World have, for various reasons but primarily due to
multi-faceted security considerations, undertaken defence
industrialization to acquire sophisticated, advanced weapons and
service technologies to meet their shategic and military needs and
possibly to have positive spillover effects on the countr5/s civilian
economy.
In this regard, Singapore has not behaved any differently from
many other Third World states as far as defence industrialization is
concerned. Over the years a highly advanced and integrated defence
industrial complex has emerged to make the Republic a leading arms
producer in the Third World. This book details the major activities of
the Singapore Defence Industries (SDI). It commences with a brief
examination of the emergence of arms industries in the Third World,
with a focus on their incentives for, and probable problems faced in,
defence industrialization. This is followed by an examination of the
structure, organisation and dimensions of the Singapore Defence
Industries. The imperatives and incentives for the Singapore Defence
Industries are analysed nexg then the decision-making process in the
Singapore Defence Industries; the respective impact and limits of the
SDI and, finally, the prospects and possible future directions of the
defence industries are postulated.

Proliferation of Defence Industries in the Third World

Even though gunpowder was invented in China, for a very

long time arms production was a monopoly of the Great Powers, who
were also the economically and technologically advanced and
developed countries of the world. Since the Second World War,
2 Singapore's Defence Industria
however, there has been a steady growth in the number of Third
World states producing arms to meet domestic needs and to compete
in the very lucrative international 'arms bazaar'.7 Beginning with
about four arms producers in the Third World in 1950, today there are
more than forty states in the Third World which are involved in
defence production, with thirty+ix alone from the non-communist
world involved in the production of one or more categories of
conventional weapons.2
In most cases, arrns production in the Third World began
through collaboration with advanced countries, both from the Eastern
and Western blocs. In the main, there are three types of defence
production in the Third World: licensed, joint development and
indigenously designed production.3 In licensed production, initially a
Third World state acquires licenses to assemble the whole weaPon
system or its parts, usually with considerable material and technical
assistance from the licensed supplier. As the country's defence
industry matures and the Third World state is able to develop backup

1 See Anthony Sampson, The Arms Bazaar, New Edition, (London:

Coronet Books, 1988), especially Chapters 9, 10 and 11.
2 Cited in facquelyn Porth, 'Soviet Union World largest Arms
Supplier in 1985 [sicl', Easf AsialPacific Wirelas FiIe,EP2['4M12,12
April 1988, p.20. For more information on the defence industries
in the Third World see Herbert Wulf, 'Arms Production in the
Third World', SIPRI Yearbook 1985, (Stockholm: Stockholm
Intemational Peace Research Institute, 1985), pp.329-3a3; Herbert
Wulf, Developing Countries', in Nicole Ball and Milton Leiteberg
(ds), The Structur e of the D efase Industry. An International Suntey,
(london: Croom Helm, 1983), pp.31h343; Andrew L. Ross,
'Dimensions of Militarization in the Third World', Armed Fmca
anil Society, Vol.13, No.4, Summer 1987, pp.561'-578; Stephanie G.
Neumanry'International Stratification and Third World Military
Industries', lntqnational Organization, Vol.38, No.1, Winter 1984,
pp.l67-197; fames Everett Katz (ed.), The lmplications of Third
World Military lnilustrialization, (Lexington: Lexington Books,
1986); and Michael Brzoska and Thomas Ohlson (eds), Arms
Production in theThird Worlil, ([ondon: Taylor and Francis,l9l%).
See SIPRI Yurbook 1973, (Stockholm: Stockholm International
Peace and Research Institute, 1973), pp.35G3g.
 Defence lndustrialisation in the Thiril World 3
plants, a reasorulble infrastructure and skilled personnel, the
indigenous content of the weapon system and services involved are
increased, if possible, totally through local production. The weapon
system is still, however, produced under license. Once the weapon's
know-how has been mastered, a state is able to reverse engineer and
produce an indigenously designed weapon system or engage in joint
development with a reputable arms producer from the developed
world.
The pattern of development of local defence industries is the
same for most of the Third World states.4 It commences with all
defence materials and know-how being imported from advanced
countries. Then facilities and infrastructure for maintenance and
overhaul of imported arms and other systems are established, usually
with assistance from foreign arms producers. Licences are then
negotiated for the domestic assembly of either the whole weapon
system or its sub'system. A step following this would entail a mutual
understanding between a Third World state and a partner from the
developed world to manufacture simple components which are
politically and strategically unconhoversial locally, while the
sophisticated and sensitive elements continue to be imported. With
experience, the percentage of the system that is produced locally is
increased to a point where the Third World state might be producing
the entire system under license. With growing research and
development capability and breakthroughs, brought about mainly
through the growth of local scientific-technical talent, locally designed
systems are then initiated, at first often using imported components.
Later the whole system may be locally manufactured.
Confirming the generally uniform stepby-step pattern of
domestic production of arms in the Third World, whereby knowledge
and experience gained over time serves as a basis for subsequent
phases of growth, Herbert Wulf has identified five stages which most
Third World states go through:
The first step is usually the import of equipment for
repair, maintenance and overhaul of imported weapon
systems. Foreign suppliers export technological skills
by training personnel in the recipient countries.

See Herbert Wulf, 'Arms Production in the Third World', p.330.

4 Singapore's Det'ence Industia
The next step often involves the assembly of imported
arms. Components, subsystems and unassembled kits
of particular weapon systems are purchased abroad
and assembled domestically.
During the third phase, simple comPonents are
produced locally under licence, while sophisticated
and more expensive parts continue to be delivered
from abroad. Licence'produced and imported
components are then assembled domestically...

In the fourth stage, a maior Portion of the weaPon

system is licence-produced. While the number of
imported parts is reduced so that it can be said that
the weapon is 'produced domestically', rrnny
sophisticated components still have to be imported.
The fifth and final stage is the indigenous design and
production of weapon systems. This stage can only be
initiated - at least for technologically advanced
weapon systems - on the basis of many years of
production experience and when very sophisticated
and diversified R&D facilities are set up. Design and
production often are still dependent on some
know-how and technology input from producers in
the industrialized countries.S

Thfud World's Incentives for Defence Industrialisation

The motivation for Third World states to invest in a defence

Industry are varied. Some have been forced to develop a defence
industry because of the dynamics of regional politics or international
embargoes placed on them,6 while others have taken a conscious
decision not only to increase self-reliance by reducing dependence on
foreign suppliers but also, if possible, to carve out a niche for
themselves in the highly lucrative but competitive arms market.

s tud.
6 See Kapil Kaul, 'Establishment and Growth of Israel's Defence
Industries', S trate gic Analy sis, Vol. 1 1, No.Z October 7987, p.837 .
 Defarce Inilustrinlisation in theThird World 5

The economic incentives are especially important. One of the

principal motivations, especially in the light of reduced availability of
military assistance prograrnmes and hence the need to pay for
expensive arms purchases, is to reduce the defence expenditure outlay.
Through domestic production there is the expectation of cheaper unit
cost of weapons. There is also the saving on scarc€ foreign exchange.
In the light of the big defence budgets of Third World states, it might
even contribute to reducing balance of payment deficits. Additionally,
the domestic defence industry might give an impetus to scientific
research and technological progress in the country. There may be
spin-off benefits to the civilian industry by improving manpower skills
and labour productivity. It might also stimulate general indushial
growttr, especially by supporting local manufacturing industries which
might be associated with the defence industry of the country. This
might also provide valuable iobs, especially for the less skilled. A
defence industry would also provide employment for the highly
skilled and professional population of a Third World state, and would
be a useful mechanism for retaining local skilled manpower. It could
also help to keep a Third World state abreast in modern strategic
technology, which in turn could have civilian spin-offs.
While the potential benefits for Third World states that 'go
defence industries' are many, including employment creation, skill
generation, demand stimulation and foreign exchange savings and
earnings, it is not hue that this is the case all the time. A more
discriminate, case-by-case analysis is needed to verify what appear to
be clear economic benefits for Third World defence industrialization.
While countries such as Israel, Brazil and China appear to have reaped
substantial economic and technological benefits through defence
industrialization, for many other Third World states the benefits are
not so easily recognizable. As Ron Matthews has argued:

For these other states, it can be argued that military-

led industrialisation has contributed less to
employment, due to its capital intensity, than many
other industrial sectors; has encouraged the growth of
research, design and development in a direction
incompatible with the needs of society in the Third
World; has drained the civil economy of skilled
labour; and it has inflated the import-bill, at least in
6 Singapore's Defence Industria

the short to medium term. Futhermore, in terms of

export earnings potential, it is unclear how many
'Brazils' the international market for arms could
support over the longer-term.7
Even though India has emerged as the largest manufacturer of
arms in the Third World, accounting for thirty-one Per cent of all
armaments produced in the Third World, followed by Israel with
twenty-three per cent S the economic rationale for establishing an arrns
industry (as a short cut to industrialisation and to stimulate the civilian
industry) has not been realised. For instance, in the Indian case the
aircraft producer, Hindustan Aeronautics Limited, had as one of its
maiJr goals a programme to produce as many comPonents of the
military aircraft as possible. By the early 1980s, however, the Indian
Defence Ministry was raising questions about the whole rationale of
the indigenisation programme. An Indian Government Report
commented:

The items to be indigenised cover a wide variety of

materials and components which have to go through
very rigid specifications and high standards of quality.
Most of these materials are not used in general
engineering industry and are peculiar to the aircraft
industrY.9
Hence, while the economic rationale is an important one justifying the
establishment of defence industries in the Third World, their actual
economic contributions need to be analysed more deeply to identify
their specific spin-offs for the coun{y's economy.
Equally important, and at times decisive, are the political
motivations. One important incentive is the need to achieve
self-sufficiency in order to reduce dependence on foreign suppliers,
especially those with whom conflicts had broken out in the past or to
preempt potential conllicts. It can also be part of a count4y's strategy
to seek political independence by avoiding political strings which may
be attached to arms imports, especially from a Great Power. In short,

Ron Matthews, Deforce koduction in lndia, (New Delhi: ABC

Publishing House, 1989), p.8.
8 Cited in TheTribune (Chandigarh),29May 1989.
9 Quoted in Ron Matthews, Defarc Production in lndia,p.l3.
 Defence lnilustrialistion in theThird World 7
it is an exercise in seeking complete independence; this is an important
motivating factor for most Third World states, which may seek 'total
political independence' through autonomy in military technology.
Hence, following the successful Indian test-launch of its intermediate-
range ballistic missile Agni inMay 7989, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi
argued that its aim was to enhance the countq/s freedom and
independence: India lost its independence two cenhrries ago,
according to Rajiv Gandhi, because

we were disunited on the home front and not vigilant

on the external front. We must remember that
technological backwardness also leads to subiugation.
Never again will we allow our freedom to be so
subjugated.lo
For some states, defence industrialisation is forced upon them
by international embargoes. The need to circumvent embargoes or
potential embargoes is often a compelling motivation. It has also been
noted that, for middle or regional Third World powers, a credible
defence industry is, in addition to its prestige consideration, part of an
exercise in seeking regional influence. States in the Third World which
have a fairly comprehensive defence industry have found, just as have
the advanced arms producers, that political leverage and influence can
be gained through arms exports. Direct and indirect political influence
can be exercised on client states to whom sophisticated weapons are
sold. More influence can be wielded if technicians, engineers and
advisers are also dispatched to maintain and operate the weapon
systems. Finally, political leverage can be explicitly exercised when
badly needed spares are sold at exorbitant prices or, even worse,
withheld in time of need. The Indian experience in this regard is
illuminating. India experienced a particular strategic vulnerability
during the Sino-lndian border war in 1962. While the world's major
arms producers in the West were willing to sell weapons to India
before and after the war, during the critical period of the war they
tried to use India's predicament to force her to change her foreign
policy. According to Ron Matthews:
When fighting was taking place, the Western position
was that arms would onlv be made available to India

10 Quoted in The Straits Tima, (Singapore) , 24 May 1989 .

8 Singapore's Defarce lnilustrirs
on condition that it moved closer to Pakistan's policy
stance over the Kashmir dispute, and that
non-alignment was diluted in favour of Western
foreign policy obiectives. Local [meaning Indian]
arms production was thus viewed as being an
essential industrial goal, necessary to .rssuage future
application of linkage by a maior arms supplying
nation.ll
The miliary factor is equally a critical motivating force When
the military is involved in government, there is a general tendenry to
develop local defence industries as part of the military-industrial
complex. Countries which are engaged in military conflicts, or are
under potential threats of aggression, also tend to invest in a local
defence industry to meet the countr5/s defence needs. A defence
industry would not only ensure availability of necesary spares and
supplies in time of crisis, but the defence industry would also ensure a
high state of operational readiness for all levels of the industry, and
hence readiness for the country's defence capability, at least from the
weapons-logistics sector. Additionally, a local defence industry can
meet the unique requirements of a Third World state, tailoring
production to meet the local human and environmental needs. The
fact that 'off-the-shelf' purchases of weapons from the Western or
Eastern bloc countries are tailored for the European theatre and
strategic needs means that very often they are unsuited for the iungle
or desert terrain of the Third World - hence the need to develop locally
oriented armaments.
Finally, while a Third World state may invest in a defence
industry for economic, political or military reasons, many Third World
states have been greatly encouraged to establish defence industries by
the easy availability of weapons production technology.l2 This is
because the developed countries are generally willing to assist the
Third World states to esablish home-grown defence industries. The
developed countries' generosity arises from two main considerations:
political and economic. The export of weapons technology is seen as a
new device to maintain political influence as well as to expand
markets. The rationale is that it is profitable to maintain links with a

11 Ron Matthews, Det'ence Production in lnilia, p.53.

72 Herbert Wulf, 'Developing Countries', pp.311-312.
 Defence Industrialisation in the Third World 9
traditional customer rather than to lose it to a new rival. In the same
way, it is better to ce'produce with a Third World state and reap
benefits rather than to lose it to a competitor. Furthermore, a
developed state stands to gain economically because by producing
weapons systems or their components in the Third World, due to the
cheaper production cost, a weapon system or its component can be
morc economically re€xported to the developed counhy from whom
the licence was originally awarded to the Third World state.
In the light of the above incentives and motivations, different
countries in the Third World are at different levels of arms production.
They can be ranked according to the comprehensiveness of their
defence industries.l3 India, Israel, Brazil, South Africa and South
Korea are among the most advanced anns manufacturers in the Third
World, producing aircraft, armourcd vehicles, warships and missiles.
Next in ranking would be countries such as Argentina, Taiwan,
Philippines, Indonesia, North Korea and Singapore. These countries
produce most of the weapons under licence and their production
ranges from assembling imported components to full-scale production
from locally produced raw materials. Many have even begun
producing indigenously designed weapon systems.
Despite the horizontal (numerical increase of Third World
arms producers) and vertical (increase in the quality of their produce)
proliferation of defence industries in the Third World, few countries
have attempted to acquire self-sufficiency in all aspects of defence
production. This is due mainly to the multifaceted problems Third
World countries face in arms production, the most acute problems
being shortage of financial resources,lack or limited supply of specific
raw materials, the limited nature of defence-related industries and the
severe shortage of highly skilled nnnpower. The generally weak
across-the.board industrial base also imposes a severe technological
handicap if production is to proceed beyond a certain point. In this
regard, Third World arms producers are in a perpetual dilemma, in the
sense that there is little demand for what they can most efficiently
produce but they cannot produce high-technology based weapons
which are in constant demand locallv.

13 lbid.; Stephanie G. Neumann, 'International Stratification...',

p.767.
10 Singapor e' s D efence lnilustries
In the light of this dilemma of whether to produce or purchase,
the basic goal of achieving self-sufficiency in all areas of arms
production in the Third World is largely illusory. At the same time,
ichieving total independence in arms production from the advanced
countries is also almost impossible to achieve. Only the technically
advanced countries can be self-sufficient, and without exception these
are all in the developed world. Furthermorg the vital components and
technologies are still monopolised by a few developed countries. At
the same time, total independence in arms production might not really
be welcomed if it proves to be economically exorbitant. In the main,
however, the achievement of self-sufficiency will be problematic
because the Third World states are generally still dependent on foreign
suppliers for sophisticated weapons, are still dependent on imported
components and even on foreign scientists and engineers. In fact, even
when a Third World state is successful in 'taking off in arms
production, total independence is not achieved; rather, there is iust
inother form of dependence, on a licence, vital component, technology
or technical aid.
 CHAPTER TWO
STRUCTUR4 ORGANISATION AND
DIMENSIONS OF THE SINGAPORE DEFENCE
INDUSTRIES
In more than twenty-two years, the Singapore Defence
Industries have grown from a single small plant established at the
Chartered Industries of Singapore in 1967 into a highly integrated,
high+echnology, diversified industrial complex with a global outlook
(see Table l).1 This growth has indeed been phenomenal by most
Third World standards, prompting the journal Defence Attache in 1983
to describe Singapore as 'a defence producer of more than regional
significance'2 and the magazine Defence Minister and Chief of Staff to
acknowledge in fanuary 1985 that, as far as the defence industry was
concerned, Singapore was 'on the international map as an innovator'.3
It has grown to such an extent that it is able to satisfy most of the
SeeSir l,aurence Hartnett, 'Operation Doberman: The Singapore
Armaments Story', Pactt'ic Det'ence Reportu, April 1982, pp.10-1,2;
Gregory Copley, 'The Lion City-State Begins to Roa/, Defense and
Foreign Affairs, January-February 1983, pp.21,-25; Michael
Richardson,'Singapore's Defence Industry', Pacit'ic Defence
Reporter, May 1983, pp.69-75; H.M.F. Howarth, 'Singapore Armed
Forces and Defence Industrl/, lnternationnl Defence Raniew, No.11,
1983, pp.1570-1572; facquelyn S. Porth, 'Singapore: A Littlc
Dragon in Arms Production', in fames Everett Katz (ed.), The
Implications of Third World Military Industrialization, pp.225-2a0;
Bilveer Singh and Kwa Chong Guan, 'The Singapore Defence
Industries: Motivations, Organization and Impacf, paper read at
a conference on Research Proiect on Defence and Development in
Southeast Asia: Arms Procurement Policies and Their
Implications, 29 September-l October 1988, Marina Mandarin,
Singapore; and S. Bilveer, 'Defence Production in Singapore:
Focus on the Ordnance Industries', Asian Defence lournal,No.7,
fanuary 1989.
Cited in Michael Richardson, 'Singapore's Defence Industry',
P.69.
'Paced Development Holds the Key', Defence Minister and Chief of
Sfaf (Singapore), No.l, 1986, p.11.
12 Singapord s Defarce lnilustfies
TABLEl
ARMS PRODUCTION IN THE THIRD WORLD
r9E2.r9E7

GrurdPmfudpumt AlFrnrndTrcdolMisdle N.vdEquiPmql

Srull UCrt fbvy Udtt ,er Tactol Snrtl L"tgJ

cmtry Amsl Ardllay2 1-* Atmu Atron3 RthF Mtdlc wrrsltiF w.BltlF
Br.dllMfMIIIPLl15
Is.dIMlMltMlPll
tndta LM lM L L L L L I 15

ArtodsIMCMPPl-CLL5
SothKoeLMCMLPLL-lL
TelwmCM|MC-ILLCC
SourhAlrieIMlMI-C-CL
ESyptCMCMI-L-CC
ChileCMMIPP
Indon€i. lM M L - - L
Mexico IM - C L
PnMM-LL
PhiUppn€IM-LL
SingporelMM-l
ThailandlM-Ll
PatbtanLMM-ML
TukeyLMM-LL5
VoeaehM--l
Nigsia LM - L
Malayda M L
Sri tanl<a - I
Hog Kong - I
ban LM
Algerta - L
Blm. CM L
Uby.
SrudlArabh LM
BuldEF@ M
Camm M
Cdmbia M
DodnionR?ublic M
lraq M
M@M
Pareguy M
Sud.n M
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hig'ysophisticated'::i"'::X::X:ffii,Tffi :'f.3#3il:
army, airforce and navy. In listing the 27 Third World's arms
producers in 7973, the Stockholm Intemational Peace and Research
Institute (SIPRI) did not even mention Singapore's growing defence
production capabilities.a Yet in its 1986 publication, Arms Production in
the Third Worlil, Michael Brzoska and Thomas Ohlson 'argued that
Singapore's 'arms industry is the most diversified and capable in
ASEAN'.S At present Singaporq despite its small size and various
limitations (such as limited manpower resources, lack of raw materials
and limited experience in arms production), is respectfully and
competitively viewed as a leading Third World arms producer. This is
best evidenced by the range of defence and non-defence related
equipment and services that is produced and offered by the SDI for the
domestic and international markets.
The defence industries in Singapore are largely government-
owned through a holding compant Sheng-Li Holding ('Sheng-Li'
means 'victory' in Chinese). While the Ministry of Finance is the lcgal
owner of the SDI and oversees its finances, Sheng-Li's operations are
largely supervised by the Ministry of Defence (MINDEF) and the latter
does, to a very large degree, set the main policy guidelines for thc
operations of the different defence companies. At the same time, the
companies do have a great leeway in their day-to-day operations. The
main reason for MINDEF's overseeing role over the defence industries
is to ensure that the defence companies are tailored to meet its military
and strategic requirements as well as to ensure that they do not
undertake activities which could embarrass or compromise the
Singapore government in any way.
Sheng-Li was incorporated in 1974 to coordinate the
mushrooming subsidiaries of the defence industry. Until April 1989, it
had six subsidiaries and 43 indirect subsidiaries and associated
companies which were organised under four main groups: Ordnance,
Aerospace, Naval and General Services. Presently, it employs more
than 11,000 workers. As the defence industries developed and
expanded, restructuring of the industry became necessary in order to
rationalise the organisation, especially in the areas of Ordnance,
4 SIPRI YearbookL973, p.348. See Table 10.1.
5 See Michael Brzoska and Thomas Ohlson, (eds), Arms Production
in the Thir d World, p.67.
74 Singapwe's Defence lnilustria
Aerospace and Technologies. In 1982, two new divisions were
introduced; namely, the Singapore Technology Corporation (STC),
which grouped together the ordnance companies, and the Singapore
Aircrafi IndustrieJ (SAI), which rationalised all the aerosPace-related
companies.
A closer look at the different defence industries indicates that
their growth and origins have been largely prompted by particular,
immediate needs. In short, they emerged in resPonse to certain
developments and requirements. Like little branches growing from
different directions, they have developed into a big oak tree called the
SDI. While the particular needs of the 1960s and 1970s compelled the
growth of individual companies, by the late 1970s the existence of
more than sixteen defence companies forced the government to
undertake a review of the industry. Partly in response to this, a
rationalization progranune was launched in 1982 with the aim of
allowing for synergies; namely, for the industry to mature and grow
by the optimal use of people, resources, capabilities and money' It was
aiso to encourage the export of defence products. The success of the
rationalization programme and the need to project a new image of the
defence indusfrieJ led to another massive reorganization of the
industry in April 1989.
In the main, the SDI evolved through four phases. From 1967
to 1974, defence companies grew uP sporadically and often
opportunistically either to meet specific defence needs of the
buigeoning military units or when the withdrawal of the British forces
co-peuea-the singapore government to take over the operations of
existing defence cohpanies, such as was the case with the Singapore
Shipbuilding and Engineering Company and the Singapore Electronic
and Engineering Company Limited. With the establishment of Sheng-
Liin 1914,a semblance of coordination and a general sense of direction
could be observed in the industry. The next phase, 1982 to mid-1989,
saw a massive reorganisation of the defence industry, showing clearly
that the defence companies in the Republic had reached an advanced
stage. Following this, the defence industry ryent through another
*"Fr reorganisation exercise in April 1989, which marked the next
phase of development for the sDI. A more vivid pictureof the defence
industry and its role will be best obtained by examining in greater
depth the third and fourth phase of the SDI's growth.
 Structure, Organixtion arul Dimensions of the SDI ls

The SDI from 1982 to April1989

Details of the industry in this phase can best be grasped by

:1l^!niry th9 main industries under the Sheng-Li group, namily, th-e
STC, SAI and the Singapore Shipbuilding and Engineeiing Company
(SSE) (see Figure l).

Singapr e T ahnolo gy Corpor ation

This was the largest company among the defence industries

following the reorganisation in 1982. As a parent company, it had six
subsidiaries: the chartered Industries of singapore (cls), ordnance
Developnrent and Engineering (ODE), Singapore Automotive
Engineerilg (SAE), Unicorn International (Ul), Singapore Computer
Systems (SCS) and Singapore Automotive Leasing (Sal) (see Figure
2). The two primary arms of the STC were the CIS and ODE, witli the
former as the star performer of the entire ordnance group.
CIS was incorporated in 1,967 to address the basic defence
needs of newly independent Singapore. It started with producing
srnall-arms ammunition, then branched into production bf mortar
bombs, M-16 rifles as a Colt licencee and then into medium-calibre
ammunition. In the mid-1970s, it began production on a indigenously
designed assault rifle (which is a derivative of the Armalitl AR-lg
developed by Sterling Armament), the SAR-80 and a light machine-
gun, the Ultimax-l00. CIS has not developed in isolatiory as it
managed to establish close links with other arms producers in the
world. Hence, it had licence agreements with many weapons
producers of the world, such as Dynamit Nobel of Sweden, General
Dynamics of the United States, Racal of Britain and Oerlikon-Buhrle of
switzerland. The growth and diversified nature of the CIS was best
testified by the fact that by 1984 it had 'thirteen subsidiary companies
occupying a land area of more than 59 hectares and with a total
workforce of 250U.6

See The Singapore Technology Corporation',The Pointer, Vol.11,

No.l, October-December 1984, p.16.
16 Singapore's Defmu lndustrirs

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 Structure, Organiution and Amensions of the SDl 17
FICI'RE2
SINGAPORE TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION

Chartered Industries of Singapore: Develops and rnanufactures infantry arms and a

broad range of calibre of ammunitions; designs
and produces military connections and electronic
equipnEn$ plans and conskucts industrial
facilities and provides automational
rnanufacturing consultaney as well as industrial
teeting services.

Ordnance Developrnent and Ergineedng Specialises in the overhaul, development and

Company: manufactur€ of medium to large calibre weapons.

Singapore Automative Engineering: Specialises in the designing, modifying,

manufacturing, rebuilding, upgrading and
tBting of vehicular mechanical systems for both
military and comnErcial vehides.

Unicpm International: Marketing arm of the Singapore Defenc€

IrdusEies.

Singaporc Computer Systems: Provides inforrnation technology to the STC.

Provides total system solution of every phase of a
computerigation proiect; and consultancy services
for t€quir€merit planning, specification,
developflient, implementation and operation of
inforrnation sysEms to supplying clients with the
right combination of hardware and software
products.

SAL Leasing: As the leasing arm of the STC, it leases vehicles as

well as a variety of construction and industrial
equipment and through its subsidiary, Robot
Ieasing Consultancy, is spearheading the
robotics and autromation movement in the
country.

Source: Complled by the author.

78 Singapore's Defence lnilustia
ODE was incoqporated in 1973 as a sister comPany of the CIS
to produce small amounts of weaPons for the Singapore Armed Forces
(SAF). In the words of Sir l.aurence Hartnett, the first adviser to CIS,

quite early Dr Goh [Keng Swee, the then Defence

Ministerl, who always was looking towards expansion
to meet growing domestic demands and establish new
export markets, saw the need for a second comPany to
concentrate on smaller volume production of weapons
not needed in great numbers, like field guns. As a
result ODE came into being.T
Since then, ODE has expanded its operations to include the production
of the 7.62mm infantry and coaxial machine gun, the M203 40mm
grenade launcher, mortars of 60 mm, 81 mm and 120 mm range and,
most impressive of all, the domestically designed FH-88 155 mm
howitzer. After ten years' experience in operating and maintaining the
155 mm guns, the Ministry of Defence decided to develop an
improved version of the weaPon and in 1983 the task was assigned to
the ODE. In November 1988 (that is, within five years) the FH-88 was
publicly unveiled by the Minister for Trade and Industry and the
Second Minister for Defence (Services), Brigadier-General Lee Hsien
Loong, with a glowing compliment in the following words:

The FH-88 has undergone rigorous field trials under

realistic conditions, to verify and improve the design.
It has exceeded the expectations we had when we
embarked on this project.s
SAE was initiated in 1977 with the task of modifying and
upgrading armoured personnel carriers (APC) and tanks for the SAF'
In addition to upkeeping armoured vehicles for combat readiness, the
SAE has the capability to redesign and modify existing equipment; for
example, vehicle retrofit including the installation of surfaceto-air
missile system on V200 APC and surveillance radars on 10 ton trucks.
In this regard, SAE has undertaken a mairr Programme to rebuild
AMX13 light tanks as well as retrofit RBS 70 surface-to'air missiles on

7 Sir laurence Hartneft ,'Operation Doberman', p.1.2.

8 Cited in The StraitsTima,24 November 1988.
 Structure, Organisation and Dimensions of the SDl79

Cadillac Gage V200 4x4 armoured vehicles, transforming these

essentially from a ground to air defence role.
UI was incorporated in 1978 to serve SDI's needs to market its
products in the highly fluid and competitive arms market. Its primary
function is to handle exports and sales of defence materials and
supporting services provided by Sheng-Li's six main companies, viz.
the CIS, ODE, SSE, SEEL, SAE and SAMCO. In addition to its sales
function, UI also assists MINDEF to source for equipment required by
the different services of the SAF as well as to bring together foreign
customers and capabilities of foreign manufacturers. UI pursues an
'aggressive marketing policy for the STC'and 'over the years, inroads
have been made to every continent through exhibitions and
demonstrations'.9
SCS was formed in 1981 from two existing computer centres in
CIS and SAE. Today, it is the largest software developing house in
Singapore,leading the high-technology movement in the country.
SAL was started as a subsidiary of SAE in 1982. Originally, its
main function was to lease commercial and passenger vehicles. Since
then, it has grown to include office equipment, robots, computers and
office machinery.
ln addition to the six subsidiaries of the STC which were
involved with ordnance-related products, the AIIied Ordnance
Company of Singapore (AOS), which was established in 1973 with
forty per cent equity participation by Bofors of Sweden, was also
involved in the production and marketing of a wide variety of
weapons and ammunition, including naval and field guns, anti-tank,
anti-aircraft and anti-missile systems. The company was directly
under the Sheng-U group. AOS manufactured the Bofors 40 mm L)70
anti-aircraft ammunition such as HE-T (High Explosive with Tracer),
Practice Tracer and PFHE-T (Proximity Fuzed High Explosive with
Tracer). As far as weapon systems are concerned, the AOS
manufactures the 40 mm BOFI-R anti-aircraft gun, the new-generation
57 mm L/70 MK2 naval Bun, illumination and electronic
counterrneasure chaff and flare rockets, FH77B 155 mm field howitzer

'Unicorn International (Pte) Limited', The Pointu, Vol.ll, No.1,

October-December 1984, pp.28-30.
20 Singapore' s Det'orce lndustia
and the Bofors SR375 anti-submarine weapon.lO An AOS
wholly-owned subsidiary, the Allied Engineering of Singapore,
specialises in the maintenance and assembly of ordnance systems,
eipeciatty the anti-aircraft guns. In mid-1988, Sheng-Li bought the
forty per cent Bofors' share to make it a 100 per cent government-
owned company, following the embarrassing revelations that Bofors
had given the AOS General Manager (Mr Tan Kok Cheng) kickbacks to
the value of 5$600,000 between March 1984 and February 1'987-11
On the whole, STC's principal ordnance companies, namely,
CIS, ODE, SAE and to some extent AOS, produce a large range of
products from small-arrns weaPon systems, medium<alibre weapon
iystems, large-calibre ammunitions, mortar systems, vehicle systems,
aircraft accessories, military radios, explosives and pyrotechnics, to
make Singapore a major ordnance manufacturer in the Southeast
Asian region (see Figure 3).

Singryor e Air cr aft ln il us tri c

SAI was the aviation wing of the SDI involved in depot-level

maintenance, manufacture of aircraft parts and assemblies, systems
design and integration. SAI was formed in February 1982 by the
amalgamation of two government-owned companies, the Singapore
Aeroipace Maintenance Company (SAMCO) and Singapore
Engineering and Electronic (SEEL). The formation of SAI was
primarily intended to make available in Singapore and Southeast Asia
i comprehensive and integrated range of capabilities and services in
aircraft and aeroengine maintenance, overhaul and manufacturing,
which would be able to meet the anticipated growth of the aerospace
industries in the 1980s. In mid-1983, SAI had five operating
subsidiaries and two associate companies. Other than SAMCO and
SEEL, these are Singapore Aero{omponents Overhaul (SACO),
Singapore Aerospace Manufacturing (SAM), Singapore Aerospace
Warehousing and Supplies (SAWS), Singapore Aero-Engine Overhaul
(SAEOL) and SAMERO Company. The six operating companies (see

10 'Allied Ordnance of Singapore (Pte) Limited and its Subsidiar;/,

The Pointq, Vol.l1, No.2, fanuary-March 7985,pp.71'-72.
fu The Straits Times, 27 September 1988.
 Structure, Organivtion anil Dimensions ot' the SDl21.

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 22 Singapore's Det'ence lndustries

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 Structure, Organiution and Dimensions of the SDI23
FIGI,'RE 4
ACTIVT$ES OI SINCAPORE NRCRAFT INDUSTRIES

Singapore Aeroopace Matntalnlng Company: Undertakes the mainEnance, structural work,

assernbly, avionics reFofit, systems integration
and mairr modification of civil and military
aircraft.

Singapore AereComponenb Ovethaul: Overhauls and repain different types of civil and
military aircraft components and accessories.

Singapore Aeroopace Manufacturing: Specialises in engineering and manufachrring of

quality aircraft and aero-engine comPonents such
as btades and vanes, fuel tanks, bomb-racks and
sPar$,

Singapore Aero-Engine Overhaul: Specialises in overhauling and repairing civil and

military aircraft engines and industrial gas
turbines.

Source: Compiled by the author.

24 Singapore' s D efmce lnilustrire
Figure 4), excluding SAMERO, undertake mostly military-related
tasks, especially for the Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF). SAI
accounts for half the aerospace workforce. SAI's expansion has
coincided with the growth of the aerosPace industry in Singapore
which, according to one account, is taking off at an incredible sPeed.l2
The Singapore Government has identified the aerospace sector area of
economic growth, as well as aiming to make the Republic the regional
aircraft servicing centre. The SAI's mapr customers have included the
Singapore Ministry of Defence, RSAR the United States Navy and the
Marine Corps.
The expansion of the aircraft industries in Singapore up to
April 1989 is best understood by discussing the activities of the
different companies under SAI.
SAMCO was the leading subsidiary of SAI, with the bulk of its
workforce and turnover. It began operations in April 1976 and has
been the principal contractor of the RSAF. It has been described as the
largest commercial aircraft maintenance facility in Southeast Asia. As
the core of the then SAI, it could refurbish, modify and maintain both
civilian and military aircraft including the C-130 Hercules transport
planes. Its main programme over the last few years had been to
iefurbish and modify the US Skyhawks to A-491 planes for the RSAF'
For example, in February 1982, the first batch of refurbished Skyhawks
was handed over to the RSAF. Since then, SAMCO has played a
leading role in upgrading the Skyhawks into the new F40/, dubbed
the Super Skyhawk. As of March 1989, SAMCO had re-engined 21
such planes, with two more squadrons (each with twenty aircraft)
scheduled for similar upgrading. It has also converted A45 to TA45
Trainers. Over and above its duties for MINDEF, it has undertaken
projects for overseas clients such as depot-level maintenance for the US
Navy and Marine Corps'C-130s based in the Western Pacific.
SEEL, the oldest subsidiary of SAI, was incorporated in 1969,
in the wake of the British withdrawal. Its primary function was to

12 Michael Richardson, 'Singapore's Aviation Industries Set for

Take.off', Pacific Defence Rqorter, August 1983, pp.22-25;
'singapore's High Fllng Aircraft Industrly', The Pointer, Vol.11,
No.2, fanuary-March 7985, pp.59'70.
 Structure, Organisation anil Dimensions of the SDl25
market products in the fields of telecommunicatrons, defence
electronics, avionics and electronic inshumentation.
SACO was founded in 1982 to service, maintain, overhaul and
repair different types of civilian and military aircraft components and
equipment.
SAM was formed in 1983 to manufacture high-performance
aviation components such as engine compressors, turbine blades,
vanes, external fuel tanks and bomb racks. It also produced and stored
spare parts for the A4S-1 Skyhawks.
SAWS was started in 1983 to purchase, store and supply a
comprehensive range of airframe, engine and general spares and raw
materials to support SAI's maintenance and overhaul activities and for
sales.

SAEOL was the product of a partnership between SAI and

Singapore Airlines. As a company, it started in 7974 to undertake
overhaul and repair work on civilian and military aircraft engines. All
RSAF engines are repaired by SAEOL. The company has also
refurbished engines for the Royal Malaysian Air Force.
On the whole, until its reorganisation in April 1989, SAI had a
fairly massive, complex and integrated aircraft industry which
undertook a wide range of activities including aircraft maintenance
and overhaul services, aircraft component repair and overhaul
services, aircraft engine repair and overhaul services, aircraft sPares
and accessories and electronic system services (see Figure 5), to make
Singapore one of the leading centres of aircraft maintenance in the
Asia-Pacific region.

Singapore Shipbuilding and Engineaing (SSE)

The company was incorporated in May 196f, in the wake of

the British withdrawal, to take over the British dockyards as well as to
meet the needs of the burgeoning navy. In 1968, MINDEF brought
together a group of local businessmen and, with the government as a
minority shareholder, started the SSE. With the navy assessing its
immediate requirements to be fast patrol craft, the SSE, to acquire
missile gunboat technology, signed a Technical Cooperation
26 Singapore's Defence lndustria

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 Structure, Oryaniution and Dimensions of the SDl27
Agreement with a German shipbuilding company - Luerssen Werft - to
establish local capability in the construction of naval patrol craft. In
1969, the Singapore Navy awarded SSE-Luerssen Werft a contract to
build six missile gunboats. The first two vessels were built at Luerssen
Werft shipyards at Vegesack, West Germany in1972 and the other four
at the SSE yards at Benoi Basin in furong, Singapore in1974.
While the SSE acquired the relevant technologies, the Republic
of Singapore Navy (RSN) did not develop or expand in the same
manner as did the SAF or the RSAF, and this had a mapr dampening
effect on the expansion of the SSE. After the successful buildup of the
missile gunboats, SSE built three 45 m Coast Guard Patrol Vessels for
Thailand betrreen 1974 and 7976. However, between 1974 and 1979,
the RSN did not place any new orders with the SSE and, to survive, the
company had to commercialise its activities, moving into tug-boat
construction, building of barges, sophisticated vessels,
Liquid-Petrolzum€as tankers and container ships.
SSE has also moved into designing its own ships, including the
14.5 m Fast Patrol Boats and the 62 m Corvettes. ln 1979, 12 units of
22.7 m Fast Patrol Boats were built for the RSN. The SSE built eleven
14.5 m Fast Patrol Boats for the Singapore Marine Police in the period
1983-1985, seven units for the Brunei Marine Police between 1985 and
1987, and eight more units for the Singapore Marine Police in 1988. In
1986, the SSE also delivered two 45 m Coast Guard Patrol Vessels to
India. In ]une 1988, Luerssen Werft launched the first of the six 52 m
Missile Corvettes in Germany and, on its arrival in Singapore in
December 1988, the First Deputy Prime Minister, Mr Goh Chok Tong,
announced at the launching aeremony that a strong navy was vital to
keep the lifelines of the Republic open. For this, the government
would be investing in an effective naval capability.ta While the first
Missile Corvette was built in West Germany, the remaining five would
be built locally by SSE by 1989. With stateof-the-art sonar and
torpedoes, the Missile Corvettes would have an upto-date
anti-submarine warfare capability and, armed with U$made Halpoon
surface-to-surface missiles and the ltalian-made 76 mm Oto Melara
Rapid-Firing Guns, they would also have the feahrres of a fast attack
naval craft. More importantly, the orders from the RSN for five
Missile Corvettes would keep SSE busy throughout 1989.

13 See The SundayTimr,ll December 1988.

28 Singapore's D$ence lndustia
Together with the acquisition of higher technologies and
diversification into civilian and other defence-related areas, such as
bridging systems, Ramp Powered Lighters and Hovercraft, over the
years - especially when the SSE was not performing well financially
and with Sheng-Li's capital inpction - the SSE has become largely
government-owned, with the governrrlent controlling 87 per cent of its
equity. After more than twenty years of existence, SSE has acquired
the expertise to perform maior sophisticated maintenance (see Figure
6) for the RSN and, to that degree, the SSE has been able to undertake
maintenance work on naval and commercial vessels as well as
maintain engineering equipment (see Figure 7). In many ways, SSE
has become the leading shipyard in the Southeast Asian region.
Presently, it employs 800 people directly and another 400-500
indirectly.
Compared to the STC and SAI, the SSE has been a far smaller
component of the SDI. It suffered from many handicaps, the most
important being: the lack of demand from the RSN and the generally
limited demand for naval and commerical vessels in the country; the
very fierce international and regional competition, especially when the
shipping market was very depressed; political reasons, when
neighbouring countries preferred to develop their own commercial
and military shipping industry even though it would have been
cheaper to build in Singapore; and finall/, the countr/s maritime
security and defence needs being able to be more economically met by
the use of aircraft and helicopters.
One of the lower profile companies, but an important
component of the countrly's defence, is that organising the logistics of
food supply to the SAF. The Singapore Food Industry (SFD is part of
the Sheng-Li Holding Company, cteated to cater for this need. SFI is
capable of supplying a complete range from fresh food to specialised
military specifications combat rations to MINDEF. It also supplies to
hospitals and prisons in the country.

The SDI Since April1989

On 19 April 1989, the group of companies under Sheng-Li

Holding came to be officially known as Singapore Technologies (ST)
(see Figure 8). Under the new name, all the defence and
 Structure, Organintion and Amensions of the SDl29
FIGUREs
ACTIVITIES OT SINGAPORE SHIPBI,'ILDING AND
ENGINEERING LIMITED

Shipbuilding: Ability to build coast guard vessels, naval patrol

craft, missile gunboats and mini-corvettes.

Ship repairing: Provides broad range of ship-repair capabilities,

backed by facilities like a versatile syncrolift
docking system, covered workshops for naval
and commercial repairs, diesel workshops to
overhaul enginec up to 6000 bhp, systems for
integration of weapons into naval craft and
comprehensive range of support services.

Military fabrication: Ability to produce aluminium and steel bridging

and ferry systems.

Technical Managernent 9ervices: Transfer technology and other sources to other

counFies through the supply of design data,
production drawings, material packagcs and the
complete shipbuilding support package.

Source: Compiled by the author.

3O Singapore's Defence lnilustria

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 Structure, Organimtion and Dimensions of the SD/ 31

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32 Singapore' s Defance lnilustria
defence-related companies are grouped under four sectors: Industrial,
ordnance, Aerospace and Marine. According to the official brochure
titl€d Singapore Technologies, the need for a new identity was brought
about by the changing nature of SDI's business: trlo longer are we
involved solely in defence work'. Also, 'from the inception of our first
company in 1968, we have continued to grow in size and have
expanded into areas that include industrial products and services'.l4
In addition to reflecting the changing nature of the defence industries,
which have gone beyond their original defence-oriented tasks, an
important goal of the new establishment is to 'elPa]rd 3nd glow into a
mapr international group. A group thafs at the leading edge of the
industries we are involved in'.15 Under the reorganisation, the most
fundamental restructuring has taken place in the companies which
were previously under the STC, with the industrial sector now
commanding the largest number of establishments. In the main, the
industrial division is now organised under the parent comPany called
Singapore Technologies Industrial Corporation (STIC), the ordnance
aivision under the parent company called chartered Industries of
Singapore (ClS), the aerosPace division under the parent comPany
called Singapore Aerospace (sA), and the marine division remains
unchanged under the ssE. No substantial change has taken place with
regards to the aircraft and shipbuilding industries, excePt for the
former's change in name. However, a maior revamP was instituted for
the ordnance division, as well as the constitution of a new industrial
division.
While the ordnance division under the previous Parent
company STC had six main comPanies (see Figure 1), under the new
CIS lrrangements there are sixteen companies (see Figure 8) involved
in ordnance production, as follows: Allied Ordnance of Singapore,
Chartered Chemical Industries, Chartered Composite Technology,
Chartered Firearms Industries, Chartered Materials and Services,
Chartered Metal Industries, Chartered Pyrotechnic Industries,
Ordnance Development and Engineering, SAE Inspection Services,
SAE Supplies, Singapore Assay Office, Singapore Automotive

Singapore Technologia, (Singapore: Singapore Technologies, n.d)

n.P.
15 Cited Your Guide to the Neut Corpotnte ldntity, (Singapore:
in
Singapore Technologies, n.d.), n.p.
 Structure, Organisation and Dimensions of the SDl 33

Engineering, Singapore Commuter, Singapore Ordnance Engineering,

Singapore Test Services and Unicorn International. In the brief
write'up in SingaporeTechnologia, it was argued that:
The Ordnance-based companies of Chartered
Industries of Singapore have become synonymous
with our pre-eminence in the field of sophisticated
arrns, arununition, weapon systems engineering and
manufacturing.
Through the incorporation of the latest in electronics
and advanced technology, efforts are continually
directed towards upgrading the sophistication and
range of the group's products.
Included within this range are small, medium and
large calibre weapons and ammunition, mechanical
and electronic fuzes, explosives and pyrotechnics,
military electronics, mortars, anti-tank weapons,
artillery guns and howitzers.
It has also capability for the design, refurbishment,
modification, rebuilding and upgrading of military
vehides and vehicular mechanical systems including
tanks, trucks and weapon slstems.l5
By far the largest group of companies under the new structure
is that under the STIC, covering twentyone companies. It is the
industrial arm of the SDI, and its stated goal 'is to develop into a
quality technology based engineering and service organisation
headquartered in Singapore'.l7 Within the STIC, primary activities
have been organised under four main fields: electronics, engineering,
support services and start-ups (see Figure 9). Under electronics, there
are five companies: Chartered Electronics Industries Pte Ltd,
Chartered Telmos Design Pte Ltd, Computer Engineering Systems Pte
Ltd, Singapore Computer Systems Pty Ltd and Singapore Electronics
and Engineering Pte Ltd. Under support services there are five
companies: CDC - Construction and Development Pte Ltd, Reliance

76 Cited in SingaporeTechnologies,n.p.
77 Cited in Singapore Technologies lnilustrial, (Singapore: Singapore
Technologies, n.d.), n.p.
34 Singapore's Defence lndustic
FIGI.'RE9
INDUSTRIES OF
SINGAPORE TECHNOLOGIES INDUSTRIAL CORPORATTON PTE LTD (STIC)

Electronica
Chartered Electronics lndustries Pte Ltd
Chartered Telnros Design Pte Ltd
Computer Engineering Systerns Pte Ltd
Singapore C-omputer Systems Pte Ltd
Singaport Electronics and Engineering Pte Ltd

Services
CDC - Construction and Developnrent Pte Ltd
Reliance Contractors Pte Ltd
SAFE Travel and Enterprises Pte Ltd
SAL Industrial Leasing Pte Ltd
Singapore Food Industries Pte Ltd

Precision Engtneering
Aero-Engine Manufacturing of Singapore Pte Ltd
Chartered Machine Tools Pte Ltd
Singapore Mint Pte Ltd

Start-up Companlec
Chartered Microwave Pte Ltd
Chartered Precision Foundry Pte Ltd
Chartered Semiconductor PE Ltd
Metheus Corporation (USA)
Metheus Singapore Pte Ltd
Origen Intemational Pte Ltd
Vertex Investments Pte Ltd
Vertex Management Pte Ltd

Source: Sing4pore Tehnologb lnilusfnal (Singapore: Singapore Technologies, n.d').

 Structure, Organisation anil Dimensions of the SDI35
Contractors Pte Ltd, SAFE Travel and Enterprises Pte Ltd, SAL
Industrial Leasing Pte Ltd and Singapore Food Industries Pte Ltd.
Under precision engineering, there are three main companies: Aero-
Engine Manufacturing of Singapore Pte Ltd, Chartered Machine Tools
Pte Ltd and Singapore Mint Pte Ltd. Finally, under the start-up
companies, covering venture capital start-ups and ioint ventures, there
are eight companies: Chartered Microwave Pte Ltd, Chartered
Precision Foundry Pte Ltd, Chartered Semiconductor Pte Ltd, Metheus
Corporation (USA), Metheus Singapore Pte Ltd, Origen International
Pte Ltd, Vertex Investrnent Pte Ltd and Vertex Management Pte Ltd.
Together, STIC capabilities include electronics, computer
technology, precision engineering, metal fabrication, automotive
engineering, construction and development, marine engineering,
robotics and automation, leasing services, chemical finishing, heat
treatrnent and test services.lS
With the reorganisation, it is hoped that 'the synergy of these
individual business units [would] form the base for a coordinated
thrust into new areas of advanced automation and new age
technologies'.19

The Research Dimension of the SDI

The quality of a countr;/s defence industry is very much

dependent on the quality of its research and development. In the
Singapore case, while the SDI is a complex organisation, the research
content is very much centralised in the hush-hush organisation called
the Defence Science Organisation (DSO). While very little is known
about this organisation (although recently some publicity was given at
the opening of its $S12 million complex), on the whole,the DSO is the
research and development wing of the SDI. This is so even though
organisationally it does not come under direct control of the Singapore
Technologies group. Rather, direct control is exercise by the Ministry
of Defence.

18 Stated in SingaporeTechnologia lndustrial,n.p.

19 Cited in SingaporeTechnologia,n.p.
36 Singapore's Defance lnilustria
The origins of the DSO go back to 1972, when Dr Goh Keng
Swee established the ETC (believed to stand for Electronics Testing
Center) under the direction of Dr Tay Eng Soon. In 1977 , the DSO was
formally established with a small core of hand-picked engineers. This
has gradually grown into an organisation with more than 300
engineers and scientists, including the best scientific brains in the
countr5r', believed to be the largest research and development team in
Singapore. According to Brigadier4eneral l,ee Hsien Loong, the role
of the DSO, the Ministry of Defence's research and development
organisation, is 'to ensure that the SAF keeps up technologically with
the demands of the modern battlefield':20 According to Brigadier-
General [ee, the DSO has to add 'value to our purchases, and make
every defence dollar spent on hardware count. This is what defence
technology is about'. It is also the arcane and secret asPect of defence
technology:

It involves understanding the scientific principles

underlying weapon systems, doing research and
development on them, and using the knowledge
acquired to improve them, or even to produce new
and secret weapons.2l
Among others, the DSO is said to have helped in the following:

a. Developing special software for the air force's tyes in

the sky' planes, the E-2C Hawkeye.
b. Developing electronic equipment aimed at minimising
electromagnetic interference for the navy's new
missile corvettes.22
In this context, the DSO must be regarded as the invisible Partner of
the SDI, and the defence industry's success must to some extent be
attributed to the research and development undertakings of the DSO.
Together with the independent research work undertaken by the
different agencies of the SDI, Singapore has build uP over time quite a
formidable expertise in defence science and technology, and tNs -

20 SeeThe Straits Times,28 October 1989.

21 Cited in ibrd.
22 tud.
 Structure, Organisation and Dimensions of the SDl37
more than anything else - will see the industry through the next phase
of development.
 CHAPTER THREE
IMPERATIVES AND INCENTIVES FOR THE
SINGAPORE DEFENCE INDUSTRIES
From Chapter Two it is clear that Singapore has developed a
relatively sophisticated and mature defence industry, with a good
standing in the Third World (see Table l). Beginning with a modest
infrastructure in 196f., the SDI has undergone two major
reorganisations, the first in 1982 and the second in April 1989, to reach
where it is today. Different countries have converging and conflicting
reasons for undertaking defence industrialization. According to
Gregory Copley, the Editor-in{hief of Defense and Foreign Affairs,
countries industrialise in the defence sectors for the following reasonsl
to ensure operational readiness; to meet unique requirements; to
ensure foreign exchange savings; to make foreign exchange earnings;
to assist domestic employmen! to benefit from technological spin-off;
to create national pride; to adapt imported systems to local needs and
conditions; to undertake upgrading instead of buying from abroad; to
utilise existing civil-sector capacity; and finally, to co-produce with
other states to achieve political and technological goals.l
Surveying the development and Progress of the SDI, it can be
posited that the combination of three factors was principally
instrumental in motivating the establishment of defence industries in
the Republic; namely, political, military and economic considerations.

Political

Defence industries are in many ways the political industries of

a country. They reflect both the politicalthinking of a country and its
leadership as well as the particular problems a state may be
confronting. Defence industries are also established to satisfy the
various politically related goals of a country. An important goal is to
attempt self-sufficienry with the object of reducing dependenry on
foreign suppliers. This goal is all the more critical if conflicts have

Cited in Gregory Copley, 'The Road to Self-Sufficiency', Defense

and Foreign Affairs, December 7987, p.24.
 lmperatioa and lncentias for tln Singryore Defence lndustria 39
arisen in the past with such suppliers. It also enhances political
independence by rcducing or negating political strings that may be
attached to arms imports. Another goal could be to enable bargaining
for more liberal terms for advanced countries' arms technology or
licensing schemes. For countries which are subiect to international or
unilateral arms embargoes, a local defence industry is more often than
not inevitable in order to circumvent embargoes or potential
embargoes. For countries interested in projecting their power, arms
industries - and especially the large-scale export of weapons - are
important instruments for exerting political pressure on client states. In
the Singapore case, a number of political factors played a key role in
early defence industrialization.
In many ways, the political factors which led to the
establishment of a national defence capability were also crucial in the
founding of a defence industry in the country. The suddenness of
independence, brought about by the country's eviction from Malaysia
after only 23 months of acrimonious marriage between Singapore and
the Federation of Malaysia, which also saw the explosion of two racial
riots in Singapore, created a 'survival crisis' for the Chinese-dominated
People's Action Party (PAP) leadership, the governing party of
Singapore since 1959.2
One of the many responses of the PAP in overcoming the
'survival crisis' was to establish a viable defence capability,3 and with
that was implanted the seeds of a local defence industry. The 'shock' of
independence,4 6tu,nur with the ongoing hostilities with Indonesia

See Chan Heng Chee, Singapore: The Politics of Suroiaal, L965-1.967,

(London: Oxford University Press, 1 971 ), ppJ -28.
See Bernard Chen, The Singapore Armed Forces: A Total
Perspective', in The Singapore Armed Forcts, (Singapore: Public
Affairs Deparhnent, Ministry of Defence, Singapore, n.d.), pp.10-
1,4.
It was a 'shocK because prior to this the PAP leadership had
argued that an independent Singapore could not survive. For
instance, in March 7957, Le Kuan Yew, then a leading member of
the opposition in the Legislative Assembly, argued that the idea
of an independent Singapore was 'a political, economic and
gmgraphical absurdity'. Quoted in Colony of Singapore, l-cgislatioe
Assanbly D ebat a, Y o1.2, 5 March 1957, Col.l 47 1.
40 Singapore's Defence lndustries
(which began in 1964, caused by Sukarno's 'konfrontasi'), prompted
the Republic's leadership to build a defence force to safeguard the
newly gained political independence. The British decision to withdraw
their forces from the Republic at short notice, first given officially in
1965, merely accentuated the 'survival crisis', adding an impetus to fill
the military vacuum being left by the departing British trooPs. In
other words, the withdrawal of external security guarantees played an
important role in influencing the Singapore government to invest in a
local defence industry. It is these'political environmental' factors that
are stressed by Sir laurence Hartnett, the consultant to the Singapore
government for the establishment of the first two locally owned
defence industries. The 'political urgency' was made imperative
because'the Republic was standing alone, having withdrawn from the
Malaysian union not long previously'. Also, 'the departing British had
left behind little more than a couple of thousand outdated small arms
and some engineering equipment... To make matters worse, Singapore
was still facing the hostility of Indonesia'.S
The generally unstable political environment of Southeast
Asia, often called a 'political and military cockpit', also influenced the
leadership to develop a viable defence capability in the quickest
possible time. That this fact of constant and total vulnerability has not
changed was clearly alluded to by Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew in his
1988 National Day Rally speech, when he warned: 'Remember, this is
Southeast Asia and storm clouds can gather quickly' So, please have
an umbrella ready'.5 The rivalries, interference and intervention of
Great Powers (then involved in the Indochina War in Southeast Asia)
warned and reminded the Singapore leadership that a weak city-state,
especially in a hostile 'Malay Sea', could be easily manipulated and
destabilised by Great Powers, especially if it had no defence capability
of its own. Singapore, being strategically located astride sea lanes of
the region, was exceptionally sensitive to the need to avoid Great
Powers' interference. However, the phenomenal cost of maintaining a
full-time standing army and the manpower shortage of the Republic -
labour was also required for the civilian economy - forced the
leadership to opt for a National Conscript Citizens' Army; through it,
the Republic hoped to achieve its goal of political survival through the

5 Cited in Sir laurence Harnett, 'Operation Doberman', p.10.

6 See The StraitsTimes,l5 August 1988.
 Impuatioa and lncentioa for tle Singapore Defence lndustries 47

strategy of deterrence.T In this regard, the defence industries were

seen as necessary to support the countr5/s defence effort. The facts
that the conscript army had to be serviced and that defence weapons
and services are sensitive and closely guarded national secrets made it
only natural to develop government-owned defence establishments.
The non-aligned orientation of the PAP leadership after
independence in 1965 was also instrumental in the decision to develop
a rudimentary defence capability, at least, to sustain the basic needs of
the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF). As in most Third World states, the
political leadership was sensitive to and jealously guarded its newly
gained political independence and did not want to be dictated to, or be
seen to be dictated to, by Western or Eastern bloc arms suppliers. In
other words, it was partly to safeguard its political independence and
avoid political strings which might be attached to weapon purchases
that a local arms industry was initiated. It was aimed at minimising
interference in the internal affairs of the Republic by foreign big
business, either defence companies or other high-technology-based
corporations. At the same time, the leadership did not want to be
beholden to any one supplier, especially from among the Great
Powers, or get its newly recognised non-aligned status tarnished by
dependence on a single Western or Eastern supplier. Sir laurence
Hartnett alluded to this when he argued that

from the start the Singapore leaders were determined

to avoid political alignment with foreign nations, and
this was particularly true in the matter of arms supply
from abroad which might have political strings
attached. Implicit in this approach was the heavy
emphasis placed on self-reliance, a policy which has
paid enormous dividends.
That Singapore is a small city-state also played a part in the
establishment of a defence industrial infrastructure. It has been argued
that, for small countries, the development of an integrated and credible
defence industrial base is part of an attempt to be accepted as an equal,
especially by larger neighbours. In this context, the SDI can be seen as
a strategy adopted by the Singapore governnent to equalise its power

7 See Bernard Chen, The Singapore Armed Forces'.

8 Sir l-aurence Harnett, 'Operation Doberman', p.l1.
42 Singapore's Defance Inilustria
and overcome its 'midget psychosis'with regards to its difficult Malay
neighbours. At the same time, how a coun$s political leadership
views the role of the defence industries is critical for the establishment
of such industries. They can be viewed as political industries, to
buttress the power and image of the political regime. That it requires
strong political will to see through the development of defence
industries makes this political factor all the more determinant.
Finally, the political leadership must also have calculated that
it would reap long-term political benefits by having a homegrown
defence industry as this would not only enhance its independence but,
more importantly, could augment its national Power and, in times of
crisis, might strengthen its bargaining Power. In short, it would
symbolise real political independence as well as the confidence of the
leadership and people, even though Singapore was only a small and
vulnerable island-city state.

Military
The need to satisfy military-related requirements of the
Republic can be posited as one of the more important motivating
factors for the establishment of the local defence industry. Even
though the Ministry of Finance owns the SDI, MINDEF provides the
policy inputs for the defence industries. This is mainly because the
obiect of the SDI is to enhance the defence capability of the country
and make it credible by meeting its operational needs in peacetime and
in crisis.9 SDI is to acquire the relevant technologies for the defence
forces; to respond to specific defence needs of the Republic; to achieve
local maintenance capability for all the arms of the countr5/s defence;
to tailor to local needs (for instance, the development of the Singapore
Fragmentation Grenade I, which could fit with a smaller Asian frame);
to be in a position to provide all or most of the essential war materials;
to develop and improve on weaPon systems to enhance the national
defence capability: here, an important function is to extend the life-
span of military equipment, which could not only save cost but
upgrade the performance of the weapon system at the same time; to

See Lim Hock Gin, 'The Defence Industries', The Pointu, Vol.ll,
No.1, October-December 1984, p.4.
 Imperatioes and Incentioc for the Singapore Defence lndustries 43
achieve self-sufficienry in basic defence needs in order to avoid
dependence for critical combat and service needs on foreign sources; to
adapt the military hardware to changing threat scenarios. In the long
run, it is to create a capability to support the SAF in time of hostilities
and to eruiure continuous supply of critical materials. In addition to
maintaining a constant state of operational preparedness for all the
armed services, it would also, during peacetime, provide the necessary
skills for upgrading and modernising existing equipment to meet
potential threats. According to a staff member from the Defence
Materiels Organisation, MINDEF, Lim Hock Gin, a local defence
industry would also perform three additional military roles:
l. form part of the SAF supply system in time of
hostility;
2. enable a minimum stock of ammunition to be kept
during peacetime and reduce the maintenance effort
and cost required for such a stockpilei and
3. provide the 'warning period' to meet the anticipated
threat.lo
The military significance of the SDI can therefore not be
underestimated. This is all the more so when one realises that the
concept of deterrence lies at the heart of Singapore's strategic thinking.
The state being small and vulnerable, with a dominant ethnic Chinese
composition in a'Malay Sea', Singapore's deterrent poliry is calculated
at inducing adversaries to refrain from undertaking actions which
Singapore regards as undesirable by threatening penalties for
non-compliance. In this regard, Singapore adopted the Israeli model
of detenence: this was partly influenced by the belief that Singapore
and Israel share certain broad similarities. Both are surrounded by
proportionately large Islamic neighbours, both are small in terms of
land area and population, and both are confronted with the problem of
political, military and economic survival. It was in this regard that
Singapore undertook a massive progranune of defence build-up in
order to become a'poisonous shrimp'; namely, to be in a position to
punish an adversary and therefore make an attack on Singapore costly
and unattractive. This led to adoption of an Israeli-style conscript
army backed with well+rained reservists; focus on combined-arms

r0 lud.
M Singapore's Defence Inilustria
training doctrine; investment in early-warning and intelligence-
gathering structures to gather and process information quickly;
emphasis on forward strategy and mobility; emphasis on air and
armoured power; development of a unified central command system
with a single Chief-of-Staff commanding all the military units;
continued outlay on defence; emphasis on Total Defence and, finally,
investrnent in friendly alliances. Israel has also developed military
industries with the aim of maximising self-reliance and self-sufficiency
in basic weaponry and ammunitions. In the same vein, the
establishment of Singapore should be seen as Part of the countrJ/s
defence shategy and an important Part of its miliary defence.A well-
developed defence industrialised shucture would make its deterrent
posture all the more credible and nny Prove to be critical, especially if
embargoes are envisaged.

Economic

In view of the political-military exigencies which confronted

the Republic after independence in 1965, it is obvious that economic
viability and profit orientation were not uppermost in the minds of the
political leadership in establishing the defence industries.ll Dr Goh
Keng Swee, the Defence Minister, who was principally instrumental in
establishing the defence industries in Singapore and can therefore be
regarded as the 'father of SDI', first raised the idea of a domestic arms
industry in 1966.12 Despite serious climatic problems caused by
humidity and lightning, as well as the lack of an appropriate
supporting industrial base, Dr Goh, against the advice of Sir Laurence
Hartnett, the consultant employed to advice the government on SDI
matters, determinedly pushed for the local defence indushy in order to
supply the internal needs of the SAF;13 the rationale being, 'it was
strategically and militarily a necessity'.I4 Initially, Dr Goh was not
keen on the industry being export-oriented, fearing this might
antagonise Singapore's neighbours, who might accuse the Republic of

11 This was confirmed by the write/s interview with a senior official

from the SDI.
12 Ibid. fu also Sir laurence Hartnett,'Operation Doberman'.
13 Interview with a senior official from the SDI.
14 tud.
 lmpratioa and lnceiliaa for the Singrpore Det'ence lndustrire 45
following the footsteps of Israel. Equally important was the general
lack of confidence on the part of the leadership in Singapore's ability to
produce defence products and services that could meet the high
intemational standards.
Over time, however, the huge expenditure that was initially
incured to establish a viable defence capability for land, air and naval
forces was a heavy drain on the countr;/s limited resources. For
instance, between 1968 and 1989, defence expenditure has varied
between a quarter to a third of government expenditure.lS For the
fiscal year 7989-7990, the defence budget of Singapore amounted to
3$2,975.7 million, forming twenty-three per cent of total government
spending for the year.l5 As defence capability improved, it was
painfully clear that the import of high-value-added weapons and
ammunitions was a heavy burden on the foreign exchange of the
country and ways had to be found to reduce or halt the hard currency
oufflow. This goal was partly achieved by the expansion and
diversification of the SDI. With the establishment of a sophisticated
defence industry there was always the hope that it could assist in the
industrialisation and economic growth of the country through the
application of advanced technology. ln other words, defence
industrialisation could have spill-over effects on the civilian economy.
In this regard, the rationalisation of the SDI in 1982 and 1989 was
mainly aimed, through the pooling of its research and development
resources, at spearheading the high-technology movement in the
counEy. In the words of the promotion brochure Singapore
Technologia, the rationale behind the globalisation exercise is obvious:
'as a clearly defined corporate identity becomes an essential element in
the establishment of a firm position in the international market
place'.l7 In the words of the then Minister of State (Defence), presently
the Second Defence Minister, Dr Yeo Ning Hong,

lSSee C'hin Kin Wah, 'Singapore: Threat Perception and Defence

Spending in a City-State', in Chin Kin Wah (ed.),Defence Spending
in Southeast Asra, (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies,
1987),pp.203-272.
15 Cited in The StraitsTima,16 March 1989.
17 Cites in SingaporeTechnologia, n.p.
46 Singapore's Defence lndustries

MINDEF's role in Singapore is obvious to all

Singaporeans - to look after the interests of Singapore,
to ensure peace and security and hence contribute to
the prosperity of our island Republic and to enable a
high standard of living and a better quality of life for
all citizens.l8
The latter obiectives can be achieved in part through a technological
revolution, hopefully with spin-offs from the defence industries.
At the same time, the small market in the Republic could not
justify the huge investments and production of defence materials, and
it was in the late 1970s that a serious decision was taken to enter the
international arms market with profit as an important motive and goal.
This was principally because the basic needs of the armed forces in the
country had been met and the excess capacity had to be put to better
use. For example, M-16 rifles produced at the CIS were not allowed to
be sold to third parties by the United States-owned Colt Industries. By
the late 1970s, the Republic's defence industries, especially the unit at
CI$ succeeded in acquiring enough relevant technological skills to
produce a new assault rifle and a light machine-gun which were both
cheaper and more reliable. The result of this success was the
production of the SAR-80 and the Ultimax-lO0, which placed
Singapore on the world's arms market and led to the high-profile
posture of the SDI.
The establishment of Unicorn International in 1978 as the
marketing arm of the SDI manifested the Singaporean interest in
ioining the ranks of arms suppliers. This is not to say that Singapore
had not been exporting its defence products earlier; rather, what is
meant here is that large scale production for export only commenced
in the early 1980s. In other words, an arlns export policy had been
synchronised by this time. According to Sir laurence Hartnett, within
a short space of time 'Singapore was producing far more 5.56 mm high
velocity ammunition than it needed, leaving considerable volume for
export to approved countries'.l9 According to a senior defence
industry official from the CIS, the first export of ammunition took

18 Singapore Monitor, (Singapore), 15 fune 1983.

19 Sir lawrence Hartnett, 'Operation Doberman', p.12.
 lmpnatioa anil lncentias for the Singapore Defarce lnilustia 47
place between 1969 and 1970.20 In his article on the SDI, Sir laurence
Hartnett has also quoted an Australian Major4eneral who higNy
praised the quality of the Singapore-produced ammunition in the
following terms:
God bless Singapore. If it hadn't been for the five
million rounds of 5.56 rrun anununition supplied by
Singapore to the Australian troops in Vietnam, they
would have been in a very bad way. Moreover, the
ammunition was of excellent quality and was almost
the envy of the Americans. Not a single faulty round
was ever revealed.2l
For a small country like Singapore, and one which had iust began
defence production a few years earlier, this was indeed a great
compliment and recognition of its defence industry.
While the govemment has so far been reticent about its
export policies ( namely, about its customers and the export value and
volume), the reorganisation of the defence industry in 1982 and 1989
was a clear indication of the profit motive becoming an important
factor for the SDI. The heavy investment in the SDI and the fact of its
having met the rnaior SAF needs led to a clear orientation towards
exports. Belatedly, too, the SDI was gradually diversifying into
civilian industry. This was best manifested in the aerospace industry,
as well as in the establishment of Singapore Technologies Industrial in
1989. This, however, is not in the least to say that the principal
political-strategic motivations have been lost. Only that, having
achieved a respectable domestic capability to meet national needs, it is
only logical that excess production should be exported to earn foreign
exchange.
There were also other motivations to keep the production lines
running in peacetime. With production continuing at the present rate,
defence materials will be at hand as and when needed. It also means
retaining highly skilled manpower and permits the SDI to keep in
touch with suppliers of raw materials, as well as keep up with new
technologies. This means the continuous upgrading and build-up of

20 Interview with a senior official from the SDI.

2l Sir laurence Hartnett, 'Operation Doberman', p.11.
48 Singapwe's Defance Industria
the national defence production capability (and, in case of emergency
or crisis, the capability and skills can be put to good use) rather than
depending on foreign sources which may not be made available when
needed.
As far as weapons exports are concerned, the need to break
into the competitive international arms market has called for the
production of cheaper and better weaPons. This could be seen in the
introduction of the SAR-80 assault rifle the Ultimax-10O light machine
gun, high-perforrnance General Purpose Machine Gun, a 60 mm
commando mortar, a pod containing two machine guns developed for
the air force and the FH-88 155 mm howitzer. In an interview in
February-March 1983, Mr Lai Chun Loong, the General Manager of
CIS, said that'the only restriction we have is that all orders go through
the Ministry of Defence (which must approve buyers)...we only sell
our arn$ and guns to friendly countries. We do not deal with
communist countries, for example'.22 SingaPore also does not sell to
countries which are under United Nations embargo. In 1983, Mr Lai
maintained that the sales position of the SDI was 60 per cent for local
needs of MINDEF and 40 per cent for non-MINDEF needs and exports.
The final goal was to produce a 5G50 per cent split.2e
It is therefore clear that, over the years, the continuation of
political, military and economic obiectives have shaped the directions
and philosophy of the SDI. The corporate ideology of the SDI, as
explained to the author by a senior defence industry official, clearly
laid down the philosophy of the government with regard to the
defence industries supporting the defence of the country as its primary
and foremost goal, with MINDEF determining the direction of the
defence industries. Most importantly of all, the SDI has come to be
seen as 'an essential element in the Total Defence of Singapore.'24
Hence, while commercialisation is to be encouraged, mainly to
maintain the SDI's efficiency and also to profit from the massive
infrastructure and investment, the bottom line is that the defence
industries must be in a position to meet the needs of the country's
defence as and when required. In other words, in addition to the SAE

Cited in Gregory Cople/s interview with Lai Chun Loong,

Defence and F oreign Affairs, f anuary-February 1983, p.25'
23 tbid.
24 Interview with a senior official from the SDI.
 lmpaatfua anil lncentioa for the Singrpore Defence lndustrie 49
RSAF, RSN and Civil Defence, the SDI can be seen as the fifth arm of
total defence. The other four arms'performance and morale would be
affected by the ability and capacity of the SDI. ln a nutshell, over the
years the role and function of the SDI have become critical for the
countr5/s defence capability.
 CHAPTER FOUR
DECISION MAKING IN THE SINGAPORE
DEFENCE INDUSTRIES
Reaching definitive conclusions about how decisions ate made
in the defence industry of any country is a difficult and hazardous
exercise. To a large degree, it depends on the system of government
and nature of policy making in a particular country. This is very much
true in the case of Singapore.
Here, iust as in most aspects of public life it is clear that the
apex of power provides the central direction for the defence ministry.
In Singapore, this apex has been held by Prime Minister I.ee Kuan Yew
and shared with a few other individuals in some areas. As long as Dr
Goh Keng Swee was the Defence Minister, the fate of the defence
ministry and the defence industries was in his hands. He was closely
and keenly involved with starting the defence industries and took a
personal interest in testing and 'dirtying his hands' with the products
of the SDI. At the same time, he was able to convince the Cabinet of its
necessity and, being a strong-willed personality, usually had his way
on matters related to the countq/s defence. It is less clear how
decisions pertaining to the defence industries are made since the
departure of Dr Goh, but one can conclude with a fair degree of
confidence that it is still largely a topdown process. This was clearly
alluded to by Mr Lai Chun Loong in an interview in 1985. He
described the CIS's relations with MINDEF in the following terms:

The Company [STCI is under the supervision of the

Ministry of Defence. The Ministry appoints a Board of
Directors to establish the policy and guidelines for the
Company. In this way, the Government does not
interfere with the day-to-day affairs of the Company.l
In the present reorganised structure of the SDI, this means that
the Ministry of Finance is formally in control of Sheng-Li Holding
Company, but in reality it is the Ministry of Defence which guides the
actual direction and operations of the SDI. This has been officially

Cited in 'Supply the Forces: Singapore Technology Corporation',

Military Technology, No.4, 1985, p.4.
 Decision Making in the Singapore Defence lndustris 51,

acknowledged in the Ministry of Communications and Information

publication Singapore: Facts and Pictura '1.987, where it was clearly
stated that the 'Ministry of Defence is responsible for... the
management of Government-owned defence companies.'2 While SDI
is directly under the Minister for Defence, Mr Goh Chok Tong, the
actual person responsible for the policies of the SDI appears to be the
Second Minister for Defence (Services), Brigadier€eneral Lee Hsien
loong. Brigadier-General [ce's involvement and prominence in the
defence industries is clearly manifested publicly in his role as the key
spokesperson on matters relating to the SDI. Hence, as a Guest-of-
Honour at the Defence Technology Training Award Presentation
Ceremony on 2 April198g Brigadier4eneral Lee made known the
government's rationale for the establishment of the defence industries:

If the SAF is to fulfil its mission, it cannot only buy

expensive equipment. It must put together weapon
systems well adapted to SAF use, suited to our
soldiers, and to our operating environment. We need
defence engineers to understand our operational
requirements, to work out solutions. The best solution
is sometimes to develop a new weapon ourselves - e.g.
the FH{8. Often, we do better by adapting and
customising off+he-shelf hardware - e.g. F-16s; or
upgrading an old equipment to fulfil a new role, e.g.
4451./F4M. Choosing which path to take is a maior
decision. Whether we develop, buy or modify, we still
need a strong technological team to manage the
project and make sure that we get value for money.
Furthermore, the SAF cannot look at individual
purchases in isolation. It has to combine different
weapon systems into one integratd whole... Then
only will we get full value out of the aircraft or
computers which we buy. This system integration can
only be done by MINDEF itself, and cannot be bought
off the shelf. That means our Defence Technology

Se Singapore Facts anil Pictura 7987, (Singapore: Ministry of

Communications and Information, 7987\, p.22.
52 Singapore's Defence Inilustria
Group (DTG) engineers, working together with the
SAF.3

Brigadier4eneral Lee also commissioned the FFI-88 155 mm gun, on

23 November 1988 at the 23rd Battalion of the Singapore Artillery,
where he was once the Commanding Officer. Here, he once again
stressed the need to build up a local arms industry wherever it was
necessary and possible:

Because the SAF is so small, it is out of the question

for us to develop all our armaments ourselves. We
must buy most of our weaPons'from others, and we
must buyT intelligently, so that we get what we need
for our purPoses and not just what is most expensive
and eye-catching.
At the same time the Second Minister for Defence made it clear that it
was not an easy matter to make decisions on arrns production locally,
with specific reference to the FH-88:
The decision to develoP our own 155 mm gun was a
bold one and not without risk ... MINDEF weighed the
odds, decided to accept the risks and went ahead. The
result is a weaPon we can all be proud of.a
In the same manner, Brigadier-General Lee made a key policy
speech supporting the upgrading programme of the RSAF when he
inaugurated the 143rd ?hoenix Squadron', the first to receive
twen-ty-one of the re-engined A4s, dubbed the Super Skyhawks, on
1 March 1989. In his speech he again made it clear that the decision to
upgrade was made by MINDEF, and here the defence planners had
two options: either phase out the Skyhawks or modernise them and
use th-em for another 15 years. According to Brigadier-General Lee,
'the RSAF could not wish away the A4 fleet. Buying a whole new
fleet of aircraft overnight was out of question. It was not only
exorbitantly expensive, but also politically insensitive'. IVIINDEF
decided on upgiading even though it was not by any means cheap.

Cited in Defence Narc Supplement, (Singapore: Ministry of

Defence, 1988), Issue No'6/88, 070488'
The StraitsTims,24 November 1988'
 Decision Making in the Singapore Det'ence lndustrire 53

Within a year of this decision, we had a spate of

accidents involving the older A4s. The difficulties we
experienced tracking down the faults confirmed the
correchress of our decision to upgrade the engine.
Although we eventually overcame the problems, it
became quite clear that the remedies we had taken to
solve the difficulties were temporary fixes. The long
term solution was the new F-404 engine, which would
be more reliable and easier to maintain.
The upgraded Super Skyhawks are not only more fuel
efficient, more powerful and can carry heavier payloads, but are
lighter, have a 30 per cent increase in thrust and a better rate of climb.S
Confirming the belief that Brigadier€eneral Lee is the key personality
behind the SDI, he also opened the D6O building on 27 October 1989
and for the first time publicly showered praise on the role of the
'invisible hand' behind the success of the SDI, making a 'significant
contribution to the SAF's operational capabilities'.5
It is therefore amply clear that key policy inputs as far as the
SDI is concerned emanate from MINDEF, with Brigadier-General Lee
playrng a pivotal role since 1987. The role of the SDI is to support the
Ministry of Defence, its policies and its strategies. On any key
decision, the flow of policy inputs is from the top downwards. While
key decisions are made in MINDER for efficiency and economy the
day-today operations of the SDI are left to the individual companies,
which must strive economically and technologically to survive. While
effective control is exercised from MINDEF on key policies, at the
same time there is much leeway on how a particular company
aftempts to achieve the goals that are set for it. Here, the role of
individual personalities comes into play. The more esablished
companies, such as CIS and ODE under the previous structure of STC,
tended to exercise this leeway to a greater degree than any other
defence companies. This was well reflected by the fact that the CIS,
after failing to convince MINDEF of the economies of the SAR-80
Assault Rifle, was able to produce it successfully and it was only much
later that MINDEF adopted the weapon, though not on a large scale.
This was the main reason whythe Ultimax-100, a MlNDEF-initiated

5 lhiil.,2 March 1989.

5 Cited in The StraitsTims,2S October 1989.
54 Singapore's Defence lndustire

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 Decision Making in the Singapore Defence lndustria 55
project, was viewed as a much more successful indigenously produced
weapon than the SAR-80.
Irrespective of this aberration, in the main the dominant policy
inputs come from MINDEF to Sheng-Li Holding, and are then
transmitted to the appropriate defence companies for implementation
(see Figure l0). At the same time, there are secondary policy inputs
which usually come from the different defence companies, and these
are usually sent up for approval and then implemented on the basis of
the decision from MINDEF. What Figure 10 demonstrates is that the
SDI is, relatively speaking, a tightly controlled and organised
bureaucratic structure which is able to respond to the needs of
MINDEF as and when required. This also means that while MINDEF
can claim credit for many of the successful policies, it must ultimately
also reap the blame for any major failures. That the SDI is largely a
'closed company' makes ass€ssment of its successes and failures
difficult.
 CHAPTER FIVE
IMPACT OF THE SINGAPORE DEFENCE
INDUSTRIES
After more than twenty years, the SDI has attained a
respectable level of capability to meet the Republic's defence- needs.
The combined capacityof the STIC, CIs and SSE is able to prod,uce the
basic weapons and ammunition needs of the SAF, RSAF and RSN' In a
way, the Republic has attained a certain level of self-sufficienry,
in meeting its peacetime needs. It should, however, be
-that
"rpe"iutty
stressed completi self-sufficiency is not an immediate or medium-
term goal because of its grossly uneconomic nature. For instance, the
Defence Minister and First Deputy Prime Minister, Mr Goh Chok
Tong, answered an inquiry about the Republic attaining self-
sufficiency in arms production as follows:

... we can,but we have to be very practical about the

whole matter. We cannot be producing missiles and
airplanes and so on. Where is our capability? Where
are our manPower resources? Even though we can do
this because of our technical ability, is the cost worth
it? There is a cost of producing for the service, and a
very srnall market. So the cost of production will be
very high and you have to weigh that cost against the
possibility of not being able to Procure the equipment
when you need it. Singapore is not Israel anyway' I
think we have a more oPen policy and we have more
friends around the world.l
Arguing along the same lines, in November 1988 Brigadier-General
Lee maintained that 'because the SAF is so small, it is out of the
question for us to develop all our armaments ourselves''2
To date, the SDI has performed a valuable role in meeting the
SAF,s immediate needs and in case of crisis, when supplies can be cut
off or delayed - especially if a state is dependent on foreign suppliers -
the Republic,s deience forces can rest assured of a basic supply of

1 Quoted inThe Pointer, Vol.l1, No.1, October-December 1984, p'10'

2 The StraitsTima,24 November 1988'
 Impact of the Singapore Defence Industries 57
small and medium weapons and ammunitions. Its net result has been
to build up the country's defence capability and confidence, and it
therefore forms an important component of the Republic's concept of
total defence, especially in sustaining the military component of total
defence. The efficiently managed defence industry is also able to meet
MINDEF's short and long-term needs, and change and adjust its
production lines according to changing threat scenarios and
environment, perceptions and evaluations.
While the economic goal was not immediate or primary in
establishing the defence industries in Singapore, economic
implications have been paramount. First, SDI has provided direct
employment to more than 11,000 people, and its multiplier effect in
this arena should not be underestimated. That the employment is for
highly skilled, specialised and professional workers makes this
contribution all the more significant. kond, the defence indushies
form the backbone of Singapore based and owned technology-oriented
industries. While there are many other high-technology-based
industries, the maprity of them are owned by multinational
corporations or foreign-owned. At the same time, while there are
many locally owned industries, most of them can be classified as
manufacturing and electronics in character. Only the SDI group of
industries can be identified as high-technology based and oriented
industries, and that they are government-owned means that they can
be activated to perform tasks or operations in accordance with national
needs. In this connection, the defence industries perform the very
critical role of grooming engineering and technological skills for the
country, which in itself is an important national resource and asset,
especially for a small city-state devoid of natural resources.
Also, SDI's spin-off effects are considerable. First, is the
import of high technologies into the Republic. The great success of
STIC, CIS and SSE in undertaking high-level maintenance work on
sophisticated weapon systems is an important yardstick by which to
measure this success. Next, the industry's ability to bring out
indigenously designed production which is highly competitive
internationally shows the high level of achievement in this area. Here,
the Republic is not iust an importer of technology but has become an
innovator. This is clearly shown by SA s quality control approval by
the RSAF, United States Nary, CAA Singapore, GAC Indonesia,
Malaysia DCA, Brunei DCA and the Philippines BAT. At the same
58 Singapore' s Defmce lnilustries

tirne, the spin-off of the arms technology into the civilian area is
important. That there was a need to establish the Singapore
Technologies Industrial wing under the new rationalised structure of
the SDI is an indication of this. While Singapore is an important
industrial cenhe in Southeast Asia, its growing ascendancy in the high-
technology area has been given a great boost and is often spearheaded
by the STIC, CIS and SSE, which are primary utilisers, either as
importers or exporters, of modern high-technology-based products.
Also, their impact on the civilian economy is important. Their role can
be seen directly in the defence industry's production of high-
technology-basd non-military products, either by its own subsidiaries
or sub-contracted out. In other words, the SDI has acted as a catalyst
for the growth of the civilian sector.
In addition to providing employment and being the base of
high-technology-based industries in Singapore, the defence industries
have saved the country valuable foreign exchange by their ability to
meet a large proportion of its basic defence needs. While the defence
budget is still very high, it would have been very much higher had it
not been for the SDI, which has helped to meet some of the basic needs
of MINDEF more economically. Not only that. Its growing role as an
exporter of defence materials and services has earned the country
valuable foreign exchange. In fact, the rapid expansion and growth of
the various defence companies is largely due to the success of the
various defence companies in becoming self-financing: exPansion has
taken place with profits from the initial capital being ploughed back
into the industry. As a rule, the defence companies which started with
initial capital from the government do not depend on government
subsidy for survival and expansion. In this way, the defence
industries have been able to conhibute economically to the country
and yet have the capability and capacity to perform their main role;
that is, to militarily back up the country's defence capability as and
when called upon. This contrasts sharply with many defence
industries in the Third World, which survive mainly on government
subsidy and protection.
While the political cost-benefits are difficult to quantify, that
they are there cannot be denied. First, politically, it must be satisfying
for the leadership to know that the country has developed a highly
successful locally based defence industry without harming other
sectors of the economy. That the defence industry is highly successful
 lmpact of the Singapore Det'ence lndustries 59

can be gleaned from what the international press - specialised or

general - say about the SDI. People have come to know about the SDI
and its higNy competitive and reliable products. That the United
States Navy elite commando force, the Seals, have opted to use the
Ultimax Light Machine Gun produced in Singapore speaks well of the
achievements in the area of arms production.3 As a small supplier,
Singapore is a worthy competitor, and for this to be achieved within
twenty years is indeed a remarkable achievement. Also notable is the
fact that the defence industries have developed without unduly
complicating relations with the country's touchy neighbour.
Politically, it is also comforting and satisfying to know that in the area
of basic armaments, especially small- and medium<alibre weapons
and ammunitions, Singapore has achieved a basic degree of
self-sufficiency. Not only does this reduce dependency, but in time of
crisis the government will be confident of the availability of the
necessary equipments. It is also part of the national asset and hence
provides bargaining power with regard to foreign countries,
especially in times of hostilities. This must also have enhanced the
counhy's prestige and can be regarded as one of its many laudable
achievements. While Singapore is certainly not in the big league of
arms producers, it is apparent that it has fast joined the second
division of the world arrns m.rnufacturers. For a small, vulnerable,
resourceless city+tate, this is no mean feat. In the words of Sir
Laurence Hartneft:

... the Republic of Singapore has done an amazingly

good irb in developing the capacity to make a full and
adequate supply of small arms, anti-aircraft and other
artillery ammunition, and a considerable range of
weapons,largely within its own control. The Republic
is not obligated to foreign countries, it has benefited
financially, and in the case of war, knows that it has its
own production capacity for essential arms and
ammunition.4
Hence, one can detect many favourable consequences for the small
Republic brought about by the establishment of defence industries.

3 Reported in Tfte StraitsTimes,25 October 1989.

a Sir laurence F{artnett,'Operation Doberman', p.32.
 CHAPTER SIX
LIMITS CONFRONTING THE SINGAPORE
DEFENCE INDUSTRIES
To date, Singapore's emphasis on the production of weapons
and ammunitions domestically has not been disastrous or produced
negative consequences, either in the economic or political arenas.
There have been no major setbacks or political problems with
neighbours or third parties, except for the Swedish govemment's
decision to place an embargo on the sale of arms to Singapore in April
1987 following the discovery of arms diversion to the Middle East of
weapons destined for Singapore. This, however, had nothing to do
with the SDI or the Singapore goverrunent's arms exPort policies per se
except that the culprit, the then General Manager of AOS, was
involved in comrpt dealings and that the AOS was 60 per cent owned
by Sheng-Li Holding. A major reason for the relative absence of
controversy as far as the SDI is concerned is MINDEF's policies: just as
in Swedery Singapore's weapons production has been guided by what
Ingemar Dorfer calls 'suboptimization'; that is, using known
technologies and design principles and refusing to make a product in
advance of anyone else.l This, more than anything else, has so far
prevented the production of 'failure products'. At the same time, it
also means that the SDI is less adventurous and ambitious. The
relatively tight control exercised by MINDEF over the defence
industries has given them a sense of direction and a degree of
flexibility in line with what the MINDEF planners would consider to
be the new directions in the international arms trade.

For a small country with limited and scarce resources, the

main concern in the long run is to make the defence industry viable.
The SDI has to grapple with many problems and limitations. In the
first place, MINDEF and the SAF are not obliged to purchase
exclusively from the local defence industries but, rather, the SDI has to
competitively tender for MINDEF contracts on Par with other
commercial arms producers. For example, the SAR-80 was principally
a CIS initiative in anticipation of MINDEF operational requirements.

Ingemar Dorfer, System 37 Viggau (Oslo: Universitetforlaget,

1973),p.18.
 Limits Confronting the Singapore Defence Industies 61
The fact that the SAF has not adopted the weapon on a large scale
makes it difficult to sell the rifle in the international market. This is
because the main question a potential customer would ask is, why has
not the Singapore government or MINDEF adopted the weapon? No
matter what the explanation, the fact that the weapon is not adopted
locally will make it very difficult to sell as there would always be
lingering doubts about its reliability in combat situations. For a local
defence industry to be successful and relevant it must work closely
with MINDEF; that to a large degree ensures its usefulness and
importance in the country's defence strategy. In the Singapore context,
theSDI has no choice but to work with MINDEF: if MINDEF were to
fail in any way, that would sound the deathknell of the SDI.
From a longer term perspective, the SDI can be said to have
iust passed the first phase of defence industrialisation and be quickly
moving into the next intermediate stage. While the initiation phase is
easy to undertake and iustify, either in terms of security, autonomy,
protection against embargoes, foreign exchange generation,
technological spin-offs and even psychological-prestige considerations,
difficulties will ultimately arise leading to questioning of the entire
rationale of defence industrialisation at the middle phase. More often
than not, it is the economics of the entire defence industrialisation, and
its negative consequences for the other sectors of the economy or
country, that causes the need for a countr5/s domestic arms production
to be called into question.
If defence industries hide behind the emblem of national
security, being regarded as 'sacred cows' even if badly managed, the
macrmonomy of a country might become undermined. This can
lead to waste and inefficiencies, with the economy being artificially
overheated. If a country attempts to achieve self-sufficiency in arms
production at all costs, the country might increase its dependence on
foreign credits or, worse still, even increase it foreign debt. If
disashously managed, the correlation between defence
indushialisation and economic growth might result in negative
consequences, with the emphasis on 'guns' taking precedence over
'bufter/. A lesson worth bearing in mind is that once a Third World
country, such as Singapore, achieves self-sufficiency in conventional
wealrcns and ammunitions, there is usually the problem of capacity
utilisation. How to utilise and sustain the excess capacity without
harming the dornestic economy and arms industry and without
62 Singapord s Deforce Inilustia
complicating relations with the suppliers of technology becomes the
principal concem and, if this is undiplomatically managed, new types
of problems that could undermine a countg/s arms industry might
result.
This is principally because it is easier to initiate a defence
industry than to sustain it. While it is easy to receive external suPPort
to undertake defence industrialisation for self-sufficiency and domestic
use, it is altogether another proposition to seek assistance in order to
export and ultimately compete with the supplier of arms technology in
what is already a very crowded intemational arms market' This is
mainly due to the new kind of dependence that results from defence
industrialisation by small countries such as Singapore. While
Singapore can acquire the relevant know-how to produce weaPons
and ammunitions, as far as technologies and components are
concerned Singapore is still very much dependent on foreign
suppliers. In short, there is a new kind of dependency, one based on
technology and spare parts, and this is often the new 'colonialism'by
which the advanced countries attempt to influence countries such as
Singapore in the Third World. For instance, the United States, with
which Singapore has close defence relations and many licensing
agreements, has two Acts, the United States Arms Exports Control Act
and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations, which have placed
brakes on the sales of weapons and ammunitions that are produced
with American assistance. It was by the application of these Acts to
the Singapore case that in the 1970s the Republic was forbidden to
export its excess M-16s, produced by the CIS under licence from Colt
Industries.
In view of the new types of problems which usually emerge
with the successful crossing of the first bridge in defence
indushialisation, the question which a Third World country such as
Singapore must ultimately ask is, for what PurPose is arms production
being undertaken? Is it solely to satisfy domestic needs or is it for the
international market? If it is for the extra-national market, then
problems relating to third-country sales must be taken into account
and ways of succeeding in encounters with suppliers of technologies
and components given topmost priority. If this is not done, defence
industrialisation and the countr/s exPorts might entangle a country
like Singapore in new types of foreign Poliry problems with the
advanced countries - countries which are also the close economic
 Limits Confronting the Singapore Defence lndustries 63
partners of Singapore and its close political friends. Being a small state
with limited resources and being only a very marginal arms producer
in the world, there is indeed a very low margin for error. At the same
time, the arms export business is a high-risk undertaking which, in the
words of Aaron Klieman, operates on the principles of 'high
competition and low ethics'.2 In view of this, and at a time when
protectionism and fair (rather than free) trade are the dominant winds
blowing from the United Sates and the European Economic
Community, it would be extremely difficult and hazardous for
Singapore (which has received American assistance especially) to
export its defence products in competition with American arms
companies. The alternative would be to produce the weapons and
related products indigenously, but the limited research and
development commitment, even in a high-technology country like
Singapore, makes this possibility more apparent than real. To these
problems can be added the perennial dilemmas of apportioning the
use of scarce resourcesi the conflict between 'technology at all costs'
and cost factors; the need to continue importing raw materials and
skills to keep the defence industries functioning; and the possibility of
changing national priorities. All could pose new threats to the national
defence industries.
While Singapore has not so far been compromised by any
adverse publicity about its arrns exports and it is a business where
morality is never a primary consideration, a country's arms exports
policies can affect its reputation and ultimately its destiny. In a game
where astute salesmanship and discretion is critical, the SDI has been
fortunate in that the local or international media have not found it
wanting. If anything, the SDI has come up stronger and with a
positive image. There is, however, always the factor of uncertainty
which clouds the future of any country's arms industry; more so, if it is
a small and vulnerable country. The steep competition, the fluctuating
market, the unreliability of customers and the sensitive nature of the
trade means that a country must always guard against unexpected bad
times. Ultimately, the decision to engage in the arms trade is a
political act which will have wide-ranging political, economic and
military implications. How a country rnanages its arms diplomacy is

Aaron S. Klieman, Israel's Global Ruch: Arms Sala '4s Diplomacy,

(Washington: Pergamon Press, 1985), p.198.
& Singapore's Defence lndustia
therefore critical for the survival of that country's defence industries.
Being small and only a marginal actor in the arms trade more often
than not, the SDI (just as the Republic) is at the mercy of changing
demands and technologies, and its survival will to a large degree be
determined by its ability to keep up with change. The limits
confronting the SDI can in part be overcome if the newly reorganised
defence industry is able to live up to its stated goal: "To expand and
grow into a maior international group ... [Bel at the leading edge of the
industries we are involved in'.3

Cited in Your Guide to theNett Corpwate lilatity,n.p.

 CHAPTER SEVEN
FUTURE PROSPECTS

Answering the question of what its future direction would be,

S in gapor e T echnolo gies s tated :

At Singapore Technologies, we believe the perceptive

management of new and evolving technologies is our
best opportunity to enhance our competitive edge. An
advantage based on the skills of our people, the
resources of our business sectors and a shared
commitment to meet thechallenges of tomorrow.l
Ambiguous as it is, this does not point to future directions
except possibly the need to adopt and adapt to new technologies. For
an industry based on modern technology, this may have answered the
question far more deeply than might appear at first glance. This is
because, for a small country like Singapore, the strides it has made in
defence industrialisation have been very impressive by all counts.
Having succeeded inbuilding the infrastructure and then'taken off in
the ordnance, aerospace and marine industries, and having build up
the technological base to absorb high technologies for defence and
strategic needs, where does it go from here? One of its primary
directions would be to continue the progress it has made in all sections
of the defence industry. Not only must it sustain the present levels of
defence production but, more critically, it must upgrade to keep
abreast of new technologies. This would keep the production lines
open, keep the industry in contact with the suppliers of strategic raw
materials and, at the same time, maintain the skills of the specialised
labour force, especially of the Defence Technology Group, needed to
produce highquality defence products and services.
As the SDI matures, it will need to move up-market, especially
in terms of technologies. As more and more Third World countries
with ready access to strategic raw materials and a cheap pool of skilled
labour undertake defence industrialisation, Singapore's competitive
edge in the production of simple and basic weaponry and services

1 Cited in SingrporeTahnologies,n.p.
66 Singapore's Defence lnilustis
could be lost. To avoid sDI being overtaken and rendered redundant,
new areas of development would need to be looked into.
Equally relevant, for the SDI to be self-supporting, it must not
only produce weapons and services cost-effectively and efficiently but,
more importantly, they must be professionally marketed - an area
where ttr-e su has not made great strides, partly because it is under
strict MINDEF direction. Many of the most lucrative arms deals are
made'under-the-table', and how the SDI is able to compete effectively
with experienced and world-class 'arms salesmen' remains to be seen.
From whatever angle once reflects on the future of an arms
industry, particularly one from the Third world, it is difficult to
ascertain its future. There are many problems, dilemmas and
uncertainties confronting it. At the end of the day, it is obvious that a
small country cannot go on producing small arms: if the domestic
market is big, then it hls a greater leeway in sustaining a reasonable
defence industry. But once ihe basic needs were met, the problem of
what and how much to produce would affect the future of the defence
industry. As exports are not a natural outlet due to the highly
competitive international market, the high standards demanded and
the aifficulties of approval from licensors, the stark alternative would
be to scale down prbduction or to divert resources to new products,
particularly nondefence-related products.
An alternative which many Third World states such as
singapore can contemplate is to develop 'double-barrel industries';
thal ii, industries which can produce defence products and services
and at the same time be an integral element of the civilian economy,
producing non-miliary goods and services. In short, the thin line
Let*een mititary and non-military products might need to be
extinguished. while this is more easily said than done, this option
could be taken into consideration during the reorganisation and
modernisation phase of the country's defence industries. lt is quite
apparent that ttie April 1989 reorganisation of the SDI had this goal in
mina, even though it remained unstated. As it is highly unlikely that
Singapore's defence industries would be in a position to produce
cutting-edge goods, the alternative would be to concentrate on small,
high-scale and low-technology products in demand locally and, more
importantly, to be in a position to sustain the local defence industries.
Failure to come to terms with this would mean a country would have
 FutureProspects 67
two options: run the defence industry at a loss and over-produce
products that are not in demand, or simply scale down - and possibly
close down - the defence industry. In other words, the future of any
defence industry, especially that in Singapore, would be determined
by astute planning and anticipation of the 'sunset' and 'sunrise'
products and services.
 STRATEGIC AND DEFENCE STUDIES CENTRE

The aim of the strategic and Defence studies Centre, which was set up in
the Research fthool of Pacific Studies in The Australian National
University, is to advance the study of strategic problems, Particularly
those relating to the general region of the Indian and Pacific Oceans and
Southeast Asia. Participation in the Centre's activities is not limited to
members of the University, but includes other interested professional and
Parliamentary groups. Research includes not only military,-but political,
economic, scientific and technological aspects. Strategy, for the pu{Pose of
the Centre, is defined in the broadest sense of embracing not only the
control and application of military force, but also the Peaceful settlement
could cause violence.
- Thiswhich
of disputes
is the only academic body in Australia which specialises in
these studies. Centre memhrs give frequent lectures and serninars for
other departments within the ANU and other universities. fegular
seminars and conferences on toPics of current importance to the Centre's
research are held, and the maior defence training institutions, the Joint
services staff college and the Navy, Army and RAAF Staff Colleges, are
heavily dependent upon sDSC assistance with the strategic studies
sections of their courses.
since its inception in 1966, the centre has supported a number of
Visiting and Research Fellows, who have undertaken a wide variety of
investigations. Recently the emphasis of the centre's work has been on
problems posed for the peace and stability of Australia's neighbourhood;
lhe defetrCe of Australiai arrns proliferation and arms control; decision
making processes of the higher levels of the Australian Defence
Departmenu nunagement studies and the role of the Minister in
Auitralia's defence policy making; and the strategic implications of
developments in south-east Asia, the Indian ocean and the south west
Pacific Area.
The Centre contributes to the work of the Department of
Intemational Relations through its graduate studies Programme; and the
Deparrnent reciprocates by assisting the centre in its research. A
comprehensive collection of reference materials on strategic issues,
particularly from the Press, learned iournals and government publications,
is maintained by the Centre. The Centre also conducts seminars and
conferences which have led to several volumes of published proceedings.
 STRATEGIC AND DEFENCE STUDIES CENTRE
PUBLICATIONS
as at 1 December 1990

All series distributed by:

Publications Officer
Strategic and Defence Studies Centre
Research School of Pacific Studieg
The Australian National University
GPO Box 4 Canbera ACT 2601 Australia

CANBERRA PAPERS ON STRATEGY AND DEFENCE:

NO. TITLE SAUS
CRll Japanese Defmce Policy Since 1976: l.atest Trends
bv K.V. Kesavan 7.n
Ct32 LimitedWorldWar?
by Neville Brown 9.00
CPll The Strategic Inplications for Australia of the New Law of the Sea
by D.B. Nichols 9.00
CP34 low l"evel Conllict C-ontingencies andAushalian Defence Policy
by Tony Godfrey-Smith 10.00
CI35 The Terrorist Threat to Dplomacy:
An Aushalian Perspective
by Andrew Selth 10.50
CRb Problems in Australian Defence Planning
by Ray Sunderland 10.00
CY37 Nuclear Preemption and Crisis
Stability 1985-190
bv Robert D. Glasser 10.m
CP38 TheRegionalConcentration of DefenceSpending:
Issues, Implications and Policies Concerning Defence
Infrastructure Development in Austsalia
bv Michael Ward 10.00
Cf€9 The Role of fapan in United States Strategic Policy
for Northeast Asia
by Russell Solomon 10.50
CP40 Australian Higher C.ommand in the Vietnam War
by D.M. Horner 10.00
CP4l Command Structure of the Australian Defence Force
by F.W. Speed 10.00
CP42 The Afghanistan Conflict: Gorbachev's Options
by Amin Saikal 10,00
CP43 Ausbalia's Secret Space Programs
by Deemond Ball 10.m
CP44 High Personnel Turnover: The ADF is not a
Limited Liabili ty C-ompany
by Cathy Downes 10.00
CP,ts Should Australia Plan to Defend Christnras
and Coos Islands?
by Ross Babbage 10.00
CP46 US Bases in the Philippines: Issues and Implications
by Desmond Ball (ed.) 10.00
70 Singapore's Defance lndustries
CPO Soviet Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)
by Degmond Ball 15.00
CP48 The Vieham People-s Army: Regularization of Command 79n-7988
by D,M. FltzGerald 10.00
CP49 AusqaIa and the Global Stsategic Balance
by Decmond Ball 10.00
CP50 (tganising an Army: the Australian Experience 1957-1965
byf.C. Elaxlnnd 15.00
CP51 The Evolving World Economy: Some AlternaHve Security Question
for Ausbata
by Richard A. Higgott 10.00
CP52 Defending the Northern Gateway
by Peter Donovan 15.00
CP53 Soviet Signals Intelligence (SIGINT):
Intercepting Satellite C-ommunications
by Deamond Ball t5.m
CP54 Breaking the American Alliance:
An lndependent National Sectrrity Policy for Australia
by Gary Brown 15.00
CP55 Senior Officer Professional Development in the
Australian Defence Force: Constant Study to Prepare
by CathyDownes 15.00
CP55 Ccdie77Z. Australia and the US Defense Satellite
Communications 9ystem (DSCS)
bv Degmond Ball 77.50
CP57 China's Crisis: The International Implications
by Gary Klintworth (ed.) 12.00
CP58 Index to Parliamentary Questions on Defence
by Gary Brown 15.00
CP59 Controlling Gvil Maritime Activities in a Defence Contingmcy
by W.A.G.-Dovers _ 12.00
CP60 The Security of Oceania in the 1990s. Vol.l, Views from the Region
by David liegarty and Peter Polomka (eds) 10.00
CP61 The Shategic Significance of Torres Strait
by Roee Babbage _ 25.00
CP62 The Leading Edge: Air Power in Australia's Unique Environment
"17.50
by Pf. CrisJand D.;. Schubert
CP63 The Northern Territory in the Defence of Australia:
Geography, History, tronomy, Infrastructure, and Defence Presence
by Deairond Ball ind f.O. f:ngtry (eds) 19.50
CP64 Vietnam's Withdrawal From Cambodia: Regional Issues and Realignments
by Gary Klintworth (ed.) 12.00
CP65 ltospects for Crisis Prediction: A South Pacific Case Study
by Ken Roso 15.00
CP66 Bougainville: Perspectives on a Crisis
by Peter Polomka (ed.) 15.00
CP67 The Amateur Managers: A Study of the Management of Weapons
System Projects
by F.N. Eennett 17.50
CP68 The Security of Oceania in the 1990s. Vol.2, Managing Change
by Peter Polomka (ed.) 10.00
CP69 Australia and the World: Prologue and hospecb
by Deemond B.ll (ed.) 20.m
CWO Singapore's Defmce Industries
by Bilveer Singh 9.00
 Strategic arul Defarce Studics Centre publications 7t
CWI RAAFAiT Power Doctrins A C-ollecdon of Contenporary Essays
by Gary Watera (ed.) 10.00
Plus packaging and postage
WORKING PAPERS:
Prlce: All at the one prlce of 0A3.fl) plue peckegtng md postage, except wp57.
Some earlier numberc evailable on requeot.

NO. TITLE
wPs0
IhluruTr-q+ \,lilitar_y Region: Defme and Security in China,s West
by Donald H. McMillen
wPs1 China's Political Battlefronh Deng Xiaoping and the Military
by Donald H. McMillen
wP52 TectrnologicalIorecasting in the Australian Military Environment
by Decmond O'Connor
wP53 Qptions and Constraints for US Far Eastern policy: FIve Issue Areas
by Een Higgino
wP54 The Development of Moscow-Hanoi Relations Slnce the Vietnam War:
The View from Sinsapore
by Bilveer Singh - '
wPs5 Kenya's Role ln the Somali-Ethiopian Gonflict
by Semuel Maklndt
wPs5 Aushalia, the U9 and the Strategic Balance
by H.G. Gelber
wP57 A New Aircraft Carrier for the Royal Aushalhn Naw?
by Gary Brown and Derek Woobier
($S.(Xl pluc packaging and postage.)
wPs8 Issues in stratiegic Nudear Targetlng: Target selection and Rates of Fire
by Deemond Ball
wP59 The Need for an Australian Aircraft Carrier Capability
by Alan Robertcon
WP60 The State of the Western Alliance
byT.B. Millar
WP61 Contr_olling the Spread of Nuclear Weapons
by T.B. Miller
WP62 Managing Nudear Polarity
byJohn l. Welhnan
WP63 Aspects_of Leadership ln a Modern Arrry
-WP64 byI.O. hngtry
Indian Ocean: A Zone of Peace or power plav?
by Iqbal Singh
WP55 World Politicll and Strategic Trends over the Next 20 years _
Their Relevance to Australia
by Plul Dibb
WP65 The C.oncept of Force Multipliers and the Development of
the Australian Defence For&
byt.O. kngtry and Desmond B.ll
WP67 Indochina andlnsurgmcy in the ASEAN States, l9Z5_19g1
bv Tim Huxlev
wP6s lioblerrs and i'rospects in Managing servicemen's careers: A Review
by Warwick f. Gnco
WP69 PerformanceBased Training: An Explanation and Reappraisal
by Warwick t. Gnco
72 Singapor e' s D efance ln ilustries
WYTO The Civil Infrastructure in the Defence of Australia: A Regional Approach
byf.O. hngtrY
Wnl The Case of Officer Education, 1955-1980
dvit-t'tititaiy hetations in Awhalia:
by VJ. Kronenberg and Hugh Smith
WP72 China in Asian International Relations
bv Donald H. McMillen
WP73 Tire Reolution of C-onflict and the Study of Peace
bv T.B. Millar
Wm4 The Australian Army of Today and Tomorrow
by Maior General KJ. TaYlor
WnS dNuciear-free Zone?or the Southwest Pacific Prospects and Significance
by Greg Fry
WW6 War an-d Cbnflict Shrdies in Malaysia: The State of the Art
by Zakaria Haii Ahmad
WW7 Rrnding Australia's Defence
bv Derek Woolner
Wt78 dustralia's Changing Threat Perceptions
by Ray Sunderland
WV79 Humin Resources and Aushalia's Defence
bv I.F. Andrew
WP80 ,{usualia's Emerging Regional Defence Strategy
bv Rav Sunderland
WP81 Ti." S5"i.t Union as a Pacific Military Power
by Paul Dibb
WPE2 Soviet Policy in the Red Sea Region
bv Samuel M. Makinda
WP83 Tire Political Economy of Global Dedine: America in the 1980s
bv Andrew Mack
Wp84 dustralia and the Republic of Korea: Still Allies or Just Good Friends?
bv Andrew Selth
WPE5 iommand in Operations of the Australian Defence Force
by f.W. Speed
WP86 Australian Defence Force Functional C-ommands
by F.W. Speed
WP87 Mr Reagair's'Star Wars': Towards a New Shategic Era?
by Harry Gelber
WP88 the eSEeN States'Defence Policies, 797*87:
Military ResPonse to Indochina?
by Tim HuxleY
WP89 Tire Civil Defence of the USSR: This Everybody Must Know and
Understand. A Handbook for the Population
translated bY GeoffreY lukes
WI90 Soviet Strat6gy Towaids Australia, New Zealand and Oceania
bv Paul Dibb
WP91 Terrorist Studie and the Threat to Dplomacy
bv Andrew Selth
Wt92 Awtralia and the Terrorist Threat to Diplomacy
bv Andrew Selth
WI93 Ci.rili"n Defence: A Useful Component of Australia's Defence Structure?
bv Peter I. Murphy
WIr4 dustraliis Defrinc'e Forces - Ready or Not?
bv Rav Sunderland
Wt95 S"t*ting long-Term Force Structure Objectives
by Ray Sunderland
 Strategic and Defence Stuilies Centre Publications 73
WP95 Aspects of Defence: Why Defence?
by W.H. Talberg
WW7 Operational Command by the Chief of the Defence Force
by F.W. Speed
WI'98 Deterrence, Strategic Defence and Arms Control
by Ron Huisken
WP99 Strategic Defenses: Concepts and Programs
by Desmond Ball
WP10O Local Development of Defence Hardware in Australia
by Stanley S. Schaetzel
WP101 Air Operations in Northern Aushalia
by Air Marshal S.D. Evans, AC, DSO, AFC
WP102 International Temorism and Aushalian Foreign Policy: A Survey
by Andrew Selth
WP103 Internal Aspects of Security in Asia and the Pacific: an Australian Perspective
by An&ew Madntyre
WP104 Rethinking Deterrence and Arms Control
bv B.C. Brett
WP105 L6w-level Military lncursions: Lessons of the Indonesia-Malaysia
'Confrontation' Episode, 7%34
byl.A.C. Maclie
WP106 Japan's Role in United States Strategy in the Pacific
by Paul Keal
WP1,07 Detection of Nudear Weapons and the US Non-disdosure Policy
by Gary Brown
WP108 Managing Australia's Contingency Spectrum for Defence Planning
by Rose Babbage
WP109 Australia's Approadl to the United States Sbategic Defense Initiative (SDI)
by Rose Babbage
WPl10 Looking Beyond the Dibb Report
by Roaa Babbage
WP11l Mr Gorbadrey's China Diplomacy
by Gary Klintworth
WP112 The C-omprehensive Test Ban Treaty: Verification ltoblems
by Samina Yagmeen.
WP113 The Future of the Australian-New Zealand Defence Relationship
by Ross Babbage
WP114 Kim Il Sung's North Korea: at the crossroads
by GarY Klintworth
WP115 The Aushalian Defence Force in Industrial Action Sihrations:
Joint Service Plan 'CABRIOLE'
by Gary Brown
wPl,15 Conscientious Objection to Particular Wars: The Australian Approadr
by Hugh Smith
wP7r7 Vietnam's With&awal from Cambodia,
bv Gary Klintworth
wPl18 triucleai erms Conhol After Reyklrvik
by Harry G' Gelber
WP119 A Programme for the Development of Senior Officers of
the AusEalian Defence Force
by Harry G. Gelber
WP120 The Northern Territory Economy: Growth and Structure 196t1985
by Ciaran O'Faircheallaigh
WPl2l Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders in the Seond World War
by Robert A. Hall
74 Singapre's Defance lndustries
WP122 the ASEAN States Intemal Security Expenditure,
by Tlm Huxley
WP123 The Status of Ausbalian Mobillzatlon Planning ln 7987
byl.O. frngtry
WP724 China's India War: A Question of Confidene
by Gary Kllntworth
WP125 India and Pakistan: Why the Latest Exerdse in Brinkmanship?
by Semtna Yacmeen
WP126 Small State Security in the South Pacific
by Drvid Hegarty
WP127 Libya and the South Pacific
by Devid HetArty
WP12E The Dilenrmas of Papua New Guinea (PNG) Contingencies
in Aushalian Defence Planning
by Rocc Babbage
WP129 Guishras and the C-ocos Islands: Defence Liabilitie or Assets?
by Rose Babbage
WP130 The Gulf War and'Irangate': American Dilemmas
by Amitav Adrarya
WPl3l The Defence Para-military Manpower Dilernma: Militia or Constabulary?
byI.O. Lrngry
WPl32 'Garrisoning' the Northern Territory: The Arm/s Role
by J.O.Iangtry
WP133 The Case for a Joint Force Regional Command Headquarters in Darwin
byf.O. Langtry
WP134 The Use of the Soviet Embassy in Canberra for Signals
lntelligence (SICINT) Gollection
by Decmond Ball
WP135 Army Manoeuvre and Exercise Areas in the Top End
by Desrnond Ballandf.O. hngtry
WP136 kgal Aspects of Defence Operations on Aboriginal Land in the
Northern Territory
by Graemc Neate
WP737 The ANZUS Alliance - The Case Against
by Gary Brown
WP138 C-ontrolling Theater Nuclear War
by Decmond Ball
WP139 The Northern Territory in the Defencc of Australia: Geostrategic Imperatives
byf.O. kngtry
WPl40 The Ambient Environment of the Northem Territorv:
Implications for the Conduct of Military Operationi
by|.O. I:ngky
WP141 Is the Non-aligned Movement Really Non-aligned?
by Samina Yasmeen
WPl42 The Australian Submarine Project: An Inhoduction to Some General Issues
by A.D. Garriaaon
WPl43 The Northern Territory in the Defence of Australia: Naval Considerations
by Commender Stephen Youll RANEM
WP144 The Northern Territory in the Defence of Australia: A Potential
Advercary's Perceptions
by j.O. f:ngtry
WPl45 The INF Treaty and Soviet Arms Control
by Samuel Makinda
WP146 Infrasbuchrre Development in the North: Gvil-Military Interaction
by I.O. L.ngtry
 Strategb anil Defarce Studies Cmtre Publications 75
WP147 South Pacific Security Issues: An Aushdlan Ponpective
by David Hetatty
WP148 The Potendal Role of Net Assessment ln Australtan Defence Planning
by Brlce Pecey
WP149 Polltical Reforrr and the l3th Congrese of the Commurlst Party of China
by Ian Wibon
WP150 Australia'sDefenceRevolution
by Andrew Mack
WP15t The Intelligene Analyst's Notebook
by R.H. Mathame
WP152 Asseseing the 1987 Aushalian Defence White Paper in the Llght of Domestic
Polidcal and Allied Influerrces on the Objective of Defence Self-rellance
by Thomee-Durrell Young
WP153 The Shategic Defense Inidative (SDI); The North Padflc Dlmension
by Clive Williams
WP154 Ausbalia's Maritime Acdvtttes and Vulnerabilitles
byW.A.G. Doverr
WPf 55 Coastal Surveillanc€ rnd Protection:
Current Problems and Qptions for the Future
by Rocc Babbage
WP156 Military Competetrae: An lndividual Perspective
by Warwickf. Gnco
WP157 Defmce Forces and Capabilities in the Northem Territory
by Desmond Ball
WP158 The Future of United States Maritime Srategy in the Pacific
by Rosr Babbage
WP159 lnadvertent Nudear War: The US Marithre Strategy
and the 'Cult of the Offensive'
by David Hodgkinson
WP160 Could the Military Govern the Philippines?
bv Vibe*o Sclochan
WP151 frfmce in Papua New Guinea: lntroduc'tory Issues
bv Tae Mtketu
WPl62 The Northern Territory in the Defence of Australia:
Settlement Hlstory, Adminishadon and Infrastructure
by Deboreh Wade-Marshall
WP153 The Diplomatic and Security lmplications of ANZUS Naval
Relations, 1951-1985
by Thomao-Durrell Young
WP164 How Valid was the Criticism of Paul Dibb's 'Review of
Australia's Defence Capabilities ?
by Matthew Gubb
WPl65 ASEAN: Security Issues of the 1990s
by Leczek Buczyneki
WP166 Brunei's Defene Policy and Military Expenditure
by Tim Huxley
WP167 Manpower Considerations in Mobilizing the Australian Army for
Operadonal Service
by Warwick f. Graco
WP158 The @graphic Context for Defence of the Northern Territory
by fohn Chappell
WP159 Social" Eonomic and Political Influences Upon the Aushalian
Army of the 199G
by CathyDownes
76 Singapore's Defence Industries
wP170 Activities of the soviet Fishing Fleet: Implications for Australia
by Robert AYson
Wpl71, Tire AusUalian Military Response to the Fii Coup: an Asse$sment
bv Matthew Gubb
WP172 6rbachev and the Soviet Military
bv Malcolm Mackintosh
WPl73 iorbavhev's First Three Years
bv Malcolm Mackintosh
WP774 S6uth Pacific Culture and Politics: Notes on Current Issues
by fin SandaY
WP775 !&hy Australii Should Not Ratify the New Law of War
bv Brieadier P.I. Greville (RL)
WPl76 ii.,oN8ttt f"rritory and the Defence of Australia: Historical Overview
"rn
bv Peter Donovan
WP177 P'apua New Guinea: At the Political Crossroads?
by David Hutarty
WP178 China's Indochina Policy
bY GarY Klintworth
WPl7g Piacek&ping in Cambodia: An Australian Role?
bv Garv Klintworth and Ross Babbage
Wp180 i6w"iis 2Of O' Security in the Asia-Pacific, an Australan Regional Strategy
by David W. Beveridge
WP181 The Vietnamese Achievement in Kampuchea
bY GarY Klintworth
WPf 82 Tire C5nept of Political Regulation in Soviet Foreign Policy:
The Case of the KamPuchean Issue
by Leszek BuszYnski
lr,iajor power lniluences on the Southeast Asian Region: An Australian
View
Wp1B3
bv A.C. Kevin
WP184 Tire ANZAC ShiPs
bv Denia Mcleah and Desmond Ball
WP185 Slability and Turbulence in South Pacific Politics
bY David HegartY
Wpl 86 Niuclear War iermination: Concepts, Controversies and Conclusions
bY StePhen |. Cimbala
WP187 E'xerciie Goiden Fleece and the New Zealand Military:
l.essons and Limita tions
bv Peter lennings
WPl88 Sir"i"t Silnats In*telligence (SIGINT): Listening to ASEAN
bv Desmond Ball
WP189 ANZUS: Requiescat in Pace?
by Thomas-flurrell Young
WPl90 drina's New Economic and Strategic Uncertainties;
and the SecuritY ProsPects
by HarrY G. Gelber
WPl91 6fending the Torres Strait: The Likely Reactions of Papua
New Guiiea and Indonesia to Australia's Initiatives
bY David HegartY and Martin O'Hare
WPf 92 Maritime Lesion5 from the 1971 Indo-Pakistan War
bv Commodore H'J. Donohue RAN
WPl93 Tire Changing Maritime Equation in the Northwest Pacific
bv Ross Babbace
WP194 More Troops foi our Taxes? Examining Defence Personnel
Options for Australia
bY Ross Babbage
 Strategic anil Defence Stuilies Centte Publications 77
WP195 kadership Politics in the Chinee Party-Atzty State:
The Fall of ZhaoZiyang
by You tt end Ian Wilson
WP195 The Neither Confirning Nor Denying Gontroversy
byfan hnwitz
WP197 The Death of an Aircraft: The A-10 Debade
by Stanley S. Schaetzel
WP198 Fourteen Stepe to Decision - or, the Qperations of the Defence Deparhnent
by Stanley S. Schaetzel
WPl99 The Coastal Exposure of Australia
by Stenley S. Schaetzel
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WU2g2 The Itospects for a Third Military Coup in Fiji
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by |ohn C. Dorrance
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WP206 Australia and the C-oncept of National Security
by Alan Dupont
WUIM The Soviet Union and the Pacific lslands:
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by lohn C. Dorance
WP208 Security Perceptions in the South Pacific Quesdonnaire Results
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5
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78 Singapr e' s D efarce lnilustries
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WH22O The Northern Territory in the Defence of
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WP222 Li Seardr of Blue Waters Power: The PLA Navy's
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ili Contsolling Awtralia's Threat Environment: A methodology for
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M5 tfu.na e*tt.lia's Security: The Future Fuel Requirements of the
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by I.M. SpeedY 9'm
M7 Sirvivat Water in Australia's Arid lands
10.00
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NO. TITLE OAUS
MSl Defmce Resources of South East Asla and the
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by Ron Hullken 8.m
MS3 TestimonY
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MS4 TireA-N?USTriangle
18'm
by Alan Burnett
Plus packaging and Postage
 This study analyses the state of Singapore defence industry. It
traces the origins and evolution of the industry, examines the various
motivating factors and analyses the impact of the industry on the
countr5r and beyond. From the study, it is clear that Singapore has one
of the most developed defence industries in Southeast Asia and this
has been achieved within a relatively short span of time. The
monograph analyses the factors for this achievement, examines the
decision-making process as far as the defence industry is concerned
and examines problems that have been faced and might be faced by
the defence industry in Singapore. Finally, the future directions of the
defence industry are analysed.