Statcon Preliminary Cases

EDCEL LAGMAN VS. MEDIALDEA

(VOID FOR VAGUENESS DOCTRINE)
FACTS:
Effective May 23, 2017, and for a period not exceeding 60 days, President Rodrigo Roa
Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216 declaring a state of martial law and suspending the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao.
In accordance with Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the President, on May 25,
2017, submitted to Congress a written Report on the factual basis of Proclamation No.
216.
The Report pointed out that for decades, Mindanao has been plagued with rebellion and
lawless violence which only escalated and worsened with the passing of time.
On May 23, 2017, as the President stated in his Report, the Maute terrorist group took
over a hospital in Marawi City; established several checkpoints within the city; burned
down certain government and private facilities and inflicted casualties on the part of
Government forces; and started flying the flag of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
(ISIS) in several areas, thereby indicating a removal of allegiance from the Philippine
Government and their capability to deprive the duly constituted authorities – the
President, foremost – of their powers and prerogatives.
The Report also highlighted the strategic location of Marawi City; the role it plays in
Mindanao, and the Philippines as a whole; and the possible tragic repercussions once it
falls under the control of the lawless groups.
After the submission of the Report and the briefings, the Senate declared that it found
“no compelling reason to revoke Proclamation 216.
The Lagman Group, the Cullamat Group and the Mohamad Group petitioned the
Supreme Court, questioning the factual basis of President Duterte’s Proclamation of
martial law.

ISSUES:
[1] W/N the petitions are the “appropriate proceeding” covered by paragraph 3, Section
18, Article VII of the Constitution sufficient to invoke the mode of review required by the
Court;
[2] A. Is the President required to be factually correct or only not arbitrary in his
appreciation of facts? B. Is the President required to obtain the favorable
recommendation thereon bf the Secretary of National Defense? C. Is the President is
required to take into account only the situation at the time of the proclamation, even if
subsequent events prove the situation to have not been accurately reported?
[3] Is the power of this Court to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is independent of the actual actions that have been taken by Congress jointly or
separately;
[4] W/N there were sufficient factual [basis] for the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; A. What are the parameters for
review? B. Who has the burden of proof? C. What is the threshold of evidence?
[5] Whether the exercise of the power of judicial review by this Court involves the
calibration of graduated powers granted the President as Commander-in-Chief?
[6] W/N Proclamation No. 216 of 23 May 2017 may be considered, vague and thus null
and void: a. with its inclusion of “other rebel groups;” or b. since it has no guidelines
specifying its actual operational parameters within the entire Mindanao region;
[7] W/N the armed hostilities mentioned in Proclamation No. 216 and in the Report of
the President to Congress are sufficient bases: a. for the existence of actual rebellion; or
b. for a declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus in the entire Mindanao region;
[8] W/N terrorism or acts attributable to terrorism are equivalent to actual rebellion
and the requirements of public safety sufficient to declare martial law or suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and
[9] W/N nullifying Proclamation No. 216 of23 May 2017 will: A. have the effect of
recalling Proclamation No. 55 s. 2016; or B. also nullify the acts of the President in
calling out the armed forces to quell lawless violence in Marawi and other parts of the
Mindanao region.

RULING:
1. The Court agrees that the jurisdiction of this Court under the third paragraph of
Section 18, Article VII is sui generis. It is a special and specific jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court different from those enumerated in Sections 1 and 5 of Article VIII. The
phrase “in an appropriate proceeding” appearing on the third paragraph of Section 18,
Article VII refers to any action initiated by a citizen for the purpose of questioning the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise of the Chief Executive’s emergency powers,
as in these cases. It could be denominated as a complaint, a petition, or a matter to be
resolved by the Court.
2. a.) In determining the sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration and/or the
suspension, the Court should look into the full complement or totality of the factual
basis, and not piecemeal or individually. Neither should the Court expect absolute
correctness of the facts stated in the proclamation and in the written Report as the
President could not be expected to verify the accuracy and veracity of all facts reported
to him due to the urgency of the situation. To require him otherwise would impede the
process of his decision-making.
b.) The recommendation of the Defense Secretary is not a condition for the declaration
of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. A plain reading
of Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution shows that the President’s power to declare
martial law is not subject to any condition except for the requirements of actual invasion
or rebellion and that public safety requires it. Besides, it would be contrary to common
sense if the decision of the President is made dependent on the recommendation of his
mere alter ego. Only on the President can exercise of the powers of the Commander-in-
Chief.
c.) As Commander-in-Chief, the President has the sole discretion to declare martial law
and/or to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, subject to the revocation of
Congress and the review of this Court. Since the exercise of these powers is a judgment
call of the President, the determination of this Court as to whether there is sufficient
factual basis for the exercise of such, must be based only on facts or information known
by or available to the President at the time he made the declaration or suspension which
facts or information are found in the proclamation as well as the written Report
submitted by him to Congress. These may be based on the situation existing at the time
the declaration was made or past events. As to how far the past events should be from
the present depends on the President.
3. The power of the Court to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus under Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution is independent of the
actions taken by Congress.
The Court may strike down the presidential proclamation in an appropriate proceeding
filed by any citizen on the ground of lack sufficient factual basis. On the other hand,
Congress may revoke the proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set
aside by the President. The power to review by the Court and the power to revoke by
Congress are not only totally different but likewise independent from each other
although concededly, they have the same trajectory, which is, the nullification of the
presidential proclamation.
4. The parameters for determining the sufficiency of factual basis are as follows: l) actual
rebellion or invasion; 2) public safety requires it; the first two requirements must
concur; and 3) there is probable cause for the President to believe that there is actual
rebellion or invasion.
The President needs only to satisfy probable cause as the standard of proof in
determining the existence of either invasion or rebellion for purposes of declaring
martial law, and that probable cause is the most reasonable, most practical and most
expedient standard by which the President can fully ascertain the existence or non-
existence of rebellion necessary for a declaration of martial law or suspension of the
writ. To require him to satisfy a higher standard of proof would restrict the exercise of
his emergency powers.
5. The judicial power to review the sufficiency of factual basis of the declaration of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not
extend to the calibration of the President’s decision of which among his graduated
powers he will avail of in a given situation. To do so would be tantamount to an
incursion into the exclusive domain of the Executive and an infringement on the
prerogative that solely, at least initially, lies with the President.
6. a.) Inclusion of “other rebel groups ” does not make Proclamation No. 216 vague. The
term “other rebel groups” in Proclamation No. 216 is not at all vague when viewed in the
context of the words that accompany it. Verily, the text of Proclamation No. 216 refers to
“other rebel groups” found in Proclamation No. 55, which it cited by way of reference in
its Whereas clauses.
b.) Lack of guidelines/operational parameters does not make Proclamation No. 216
vague. Operational guidelines will serve only as mere tools for the implementation of the
proclamation.
There is no need for the Court to determine the constitutionality of the implementing
and/or operational guidelines, general orders, arrest orders and other orders issued
after the proclamation for being irrelevant to its review. Any act committed under the
said orders in violation of the Constitution and the laws should be resolved in a separate
proceeding. Finally, there is a risk that if the Court wades into these areas, it would be
deemed as trespassing into the sphere that is reserved exclusively for Congress in the
exercise of its power to revoke.
7. There is sufficient factual basis for the declaration of martial law and the suspension
of the writ of habeas corpus. By a review of the facts available to him that there was an
armed public uprising, the culpable purpose of which was to remove from the allegiance
to the Philippine Government a portion of its territory and to deprive the Chief
Executive of any of his power and prerogatives, leading the President to believe that
there was probable cause that the crime of rebellion was and is being committed and
that public safety requires the imposition of martial law and suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus.
After all, what the President needs to satisfy is only the standard of probable cause for a
valid declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus.
8. Terrorism neither negates nor absorbs rebellion. Rebellion may be subsumed under
the crime of terrorism, which has a broader scope covering a wide range of predicate
crimes. In fact, rebellion is only one of the various means by which terrorism can be
committed.
Meanwhile, public safety requires the declaration of martial law and the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao. For a declaration of
martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus to be valid, there
must be concurrence of 1.) actual rebellion or invasion and 2.) the public safety
requirement.
In his report, the President noted that the acts of violence perpetrated by the ASG and
the Maute Group were directed not only against government forces or establishment but
likewise against civilians and their properties. There were bomb threats, road blockades,
burning of schools and churches, hostages and killings of civilians, forced entry of young
male Muslims to the group, there were hampering of medical services and delivery of
basic services, reinforcement of government troops, among others. These particular
scenarios convinced the President that the atrocities had already escalated to a level that
risked public safety and thus impelled him to declare martial law and suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
9. a.) The calling out power is in a different category from the power to declare martial
law and the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; nullification of
Proclamation No. 216 will not affect Proclamation No. 55.
The President may exercise the power to call out the Armed Forces independently of the
power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and to declare martial law.
Even so, the Court’s review of the President’s declaration of martial law and his calling
out the Armed Forces necessarily entails separate proceedings instituted for that
particular purpose.
b.) Neither would the nullification of Proclamation No. 216 result in the nullification of
the acts of the President done pursuant thereto. Under the operative fact doctrine,” the
unconstitutional statute is recognized as an “operative fact” before it is declared
unconstitutional.
***
Verily, the Court upholds the validity of the declaration of martial law and suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao region. The Court
FINDS sufficient factual bases for the issuance of Proclamation No. 216 and DECLARES
it as CONSTITUTIONAL. Accordingly, the consolidated Petitions are hereby
DISMISSED.
 ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO v. REPUBLIC, GR NO. 174689,
2007-10-19
Facts:
petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first
name and sex in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila
He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels,
thinks and acts as a female" and that he had always identified himself with girls since
childhood.
Feeling trapped in a man's body, he consulted several doctors in... the United States. He
underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation.
His attempts to transform himself to a "woman" culminated on January 27, 2001 when
he underwent sex reassignment surgery[2] in Bangkok, Thailand.
He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto"
to "Mely," and his sex from "male" to "female."
The [c]ourt rules in the affirmative.
the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in
the Court of Appeals.[6] It alleged that there is no law allowing the change of entries in
the birth certificate by reason of sex... alteration.
the Court of Appeals[7] rendered a decision[8] in favor of the Republic.

Issues:
The sole issue here is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the relief asked for.

Ruling:
Petitioner's basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment.
He intended to make his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed
himself into through surgery.
RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment.
Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or
reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such change.[19] In addition, he
must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name.[20] In this
case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of
using his true and official name.
In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of petitioner's
first name was not within that court's primary jurisdiction as the petition should have
been filed with the local civil registrar concerned, assuming it could be legally done. It
was an... improper remedy because the proper remedy was administrative, that is, that
provided under RA 9048. It was also filed in the wrong venue as the proper venue was
in the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila where his birth certificate is kept. More
importantly, it had no merit... since the use of his true and official name does not
prejudice him at all. For all these reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed
petitioner's petition in so far as the change of his first name was concerned.
The birth certificate of petitioner... contained no error. All entries therein, including
those corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct. No correction is
necessary.
Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of certain acts... and
judicial decrees
These acts, events and judicial decrees produce... legal consequences that touch upon
the legal capacity, status and nationality of a person. Their effects are expressly
sanctioned by the laws. In contrast, sex reassignment is not among those acts or events
mentioned in Article 407. Neither is it recognized nor even mentioned by... any law,
expressly or impliedly.
Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they
existed at the time of birth.[29] Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually
done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by... examining the genitals of
the infant. Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the
determination of a person's sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by
error,[30] is immutable.
For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and
appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of
entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his
petition for the... correction or change of the entries in his birth certificate.

Rural Bank of San Miguel vs. Monetary Board

(Judicial Legislation)

Facts:
Monetary Board (MB), the governing board of respondent Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas
(BSP), issued Resolution No. 105 prohibiting RBSM from doing business in the
Philippines, placing it under receivership and designating respondent Philippine
Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC) as receiver on the basis of the comptrollership
reports of the banks supervising head. To assist its impaired liquidity and operations,
the RBSM was granted emergency loans on different occasions in the aggregate amount
of P375. As early as November 18, 1998, Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) advised
RBSM that it will terminate the clearing of RBSM’s checks in view of the latter’s
frequent clearing losses and continuing failure to replenish its Special Clearing Demand
Deposit with LBP. The BSP interceded with LBP not to terminate the clearing
arrangement of RBSM to protect the interests of RBSM’s depositors and creditors. On
the basis of reports prepared by PDIC stating that RBSM could not resume business
with sufficient assurance of protecting the interest of its depositors, creditors and the
general public, the MB passed Resolution No. 966 directing PDIC to proceed with the
liquidation of RBSM under Section 30 of RA 7653.
Issue: Whether or not the Monetary Board can unilaterally close a bank without prior
hearing
Held: No. It is well-settled that the closure of a bank may be considered as an exercise of
police power. The action of the MB on this matter is final and executory. Such exercise
may nonetheless be subject to judicial inquiry and can be set aside if found to be in
excess of jurisdiction or with such grave abuse of discretion as to amount to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
This case essentially boils down to one core issue: whether Section 30 of RA 7653 (also
known as the New Central Bank Act) and applicable jurisprudence require a current and
complete examination of the bank before it can be closed and placed under receivership.
The actions of the Monetary Board taken under this section or under Section 29 of this
Act shall be final and executory, and may not be restrained or set aside by the court
except on petition for certiorari on the ground that the action taken was in excess of
jurisdiction or with such grave abuse of discretion as to amount to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. The petition for certiorari may only be filed by the stockholders of record
representing the majority of the capital stock within ten (10) days from receipt by the
board of directors of the institution of the order directing receivership, liquidation or
conservatorship.

Reyes vs. Lim

(Judicial Legislation)
Facts:
Petitioner David Reyes filed a complaint for annulment of contract and damages against
respondents. The complaint alleged that Reyes as seller and Lim as buyer entered into a
contract to sell a parcel of land located along F.B. Harrison Street, Pasay City with a
monthly rental of P35,000.
The complaint claimed that Reyes had informed Harrison Lumber to vacate the
Property before the end of January 1995. Reyes also informed Keng and Harrison
Lumber that if they failed to vacate by 8 March 1995, he would hold them liable for the
penalty of P400,000 a month as provided in the Contract to Sell. It was also alleged
that Lim connived with Harrison Lumber not to vacate the Property until the P400,000
monthly penalty would have accumulated and equaled the unpaid purchase price of
P18,000,000.
Keng and Harrison Lumber denied that they connived with Lim to defraud Reyes, and
that Reyes approved their request for an extension of time to vacate the Property due to
their difficulty in finding a new location for their business. Harrison Lumber claimed
that it had already started transferring some of its merchandise to its new business
location in Malabon.
Lim filed his Answer stating that he was ready and willing to pay the balance of the
purchase price. Lim requested a meeting with Reyes through the latter’s daughter on the
signing of the Deed of Absolute Sale and the payment of the balance but Reyes kept
postponing their meeting. Reyes offered to return the P10 million down payment to Lim
because Reyes was having problems in removing the lessee from the Property. Lim
rejected Reyes’ offer and proceeded to verify the status of Reyes’ title to the Property.
Lim learned that Reyes had already sold the Property to Line One Foods Corporation
Lim denied conniving with Keng and Harrison Lumber to defraud Reyes.Reyes filed a
Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint due to supervening facts. These included
the filing by Lim of a complaint for estafa against Reyes as well as an action for specific
performance and nullification of sale and title plus damages before another trial court.
The trial court granted the motion.
In his Amended Answer Lim prayed for the cancellation of the Contract to Sell and for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against Reyes. The trial court denied
the prayer for a writ of preliminary attachment.
Lim requested in open court that Reyes be ordered to deposit the P10 million down
payment with the cashier of the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque. The trial court
granted this motion.
Reyes filed a Motion to Set Aside the Order on the ground the Order practically granted
the reliefs Lim prayed for in his Amended Answer. The trial court denied Reyes’ motion.
The trial court denied Reyes’ Motion for Reconsideration. In the same order, the trial
court directed Reyes to deposit the P10 million down payment with the Clerk of Court.
Reyes filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals and prayed that the orders
of the trial court be set aside for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. But the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for
lack of merit.
Hence, this petition for review.

Issue: Whether or not the equity jurisdiction is an applicable law on the matter?

Held:
The instant case, the Supreme Court held that if this was a case where there is hiatus in
the law and in the Rules of Court. If this case was left alone, the hiatus will result in
unjust enrichment to Reyes at the expense of Lim. Here the court excercised equity
jurisdiction.The purpose of the exercise of equity jurisdiction in this case is to prevent
unjust enrichment and to ensure restitution so that substantial justice may be attained
in cases where the prescribed or customary forms of ordinary law are inadequate.
The Supreme Court also state that rescission is possible only when the person
demanding rescission can return whatever he may be obliged to restore. A court of
equity will not rescind a contract unless there is restitution, that is, the parties are
restored to the status quo ante.
In this case, it was just, equitable and proper for the trial court to order the deposit of
the P10 million down payment. The decision of the Court of Appeals.was affirmed.

Floresca vs. Philmex Mining Corp.

(Judicial Legislation)
FACTS:
Several miners, who, while working at the copper mines underground operations at
Tuba, Benguet on June 28, 1967, died as a result of the cave-in that buried them in the
tunnels of the mine. The heirs of the deceased claimed their benefits pursuant to the
Workmen’s Compensation Act before the Workmen’s Compensation Commission. They
also petitioned before the regular courts and sue Philex for additional damages, pointing
out in the complaint 'gross and brazen negligence on the part of Philex in failing to take
necessary security for the protection of the lives of its employees working underground'.
Philex invoked that they can no longer be sued because the petitioners have already
claimed benefits under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, which, Philex insists, holds
jurisdiction over provisions for remedies.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the heirs of the deceased have a right of selection between availing
themselves of the worker’s right under the Workmen’s Compensation Act and suing in
the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages (actual, moral and
exemplary) from the employers by virtue of that negligence or fault of the employers or
whether they may avail themselves cumulatively of both actions.
RULING:
The court held that although the other petitioners had received the benefits under the
Workmen’s Compensation Act, such may not preclude them from bringing an action
before the regular court because they became cognizant of the fact that Philex has been
remiss in its contractual obligations with the deceased miners only after receiving
compensation under the Act. Had petitioners been aware of said violation of
government rules and regulations by Philex, and of its negligence, they would not have
sought redress under the Workmen’s Compensation Commission which awarded a
lesser amount for compensation. The choice of the first remedy was based on ignorance
or a mistake of fact, which nullifies the choice as it was not an intelligent choice. The
case should therefore be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings. However,
should the petitioners be successful in their bid before the lower court, the payments
made under the Workmen’s Compensation Act should be deducted from the damages
that may be decreed in their favor.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III

G.R. No.154881, October 5, 2005

Facts:

On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United
Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed
with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V.
Orbecido.

In 1986, Cipriano’s wife left for the United States bringing along their son, Kristoffer. A
few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American
citizen.

Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained
a divorce decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. The respondent thereafter
filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article
26 of the Family Code.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent can remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code.

Ruling:

The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were
a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be
to sanction absurdity and injustice.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of
the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.

The Court ruled that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code should be interpreted
to allow a Filipino citizen who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired
foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry. However, considering that in the
present petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted and on record, the Court is
unable to declare, based on respondent’s bare allegations that his wife, who was
naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried an
American, that respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only be
made properly upon respondent’s submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor.

TING VS VELEZ-TING

Facts:
Benjamin Ting and Carmen Velez-Ting first met in 1972 while they were classmates in
medical school. They fell in love, and they were wed on July 26, 1975 in Cebu City when
respondent was already pregnant with their first child. On October 21, 1993, after being
married for more than 18 years to petitioner and while their youngest child was only two
years old, Carmen filed a verified petition before the RTC of Cebu City praying for the
declaration of nullity of their marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code. She
claimed that Benjamin suffered from psychological incapacity even at the time of the
celebration of their marriage, which, however, only became manifest thereafter.
Carmens allegations of Benjamins psychological incapacity consisted of the following
manifestations:
1. Benjamins alcoholism, which adversely affected his family relationship and his
profession;
2. Benjamins violent nature brought about by his excessive and regular drinking;
3. His compulsive gambling habit, as a result of which Benjamin found it necessary to sell
the family car twice and the property he inherited from his father in order to pay off his
debts, because he no longer had money to pay the same; and
4. Benjamins irresponsibility and immaturity as shown by his failure and refusal to give
regular financial support to his family.

In his answer, Benjamin denied being psychologically incapacitated. He maintained that

he is a respectable person, as his peers would confirm. He also pointed out that it was he
who often comforted and took care of their children, while Carmen played mahjong with
her friends twice a week. Both presented expert witnesses (psychiatrist) to refute each
others claim. RTC ruled in favor of the respondent declaring the marriage null and void.

Petitioner appealed to the CA. CA reversed RTC’s decision. Respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration, arguing that the Molina guidelines should not be applied to this case

Issues:
1. Whether the CA violated the rule on stare decisis when it refused to follow the
guidelines set forth under the Santos and Molina cases,

2. Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that the requirement of proof of psychological
incapacity for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of the
Family Code has been liberalized,
3. Whether the CAs decision declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent
null and void is in accordance with law and jurisprudence.

Held:
1. No. respondent’s argument that the doctrinal guidelines prescribed in Santos and
Molina should not be applied retroactively for being contrary to the principle of stare
decisis is no longer new.

2. The Case involving the application of Article 36 must be treated distinctly and judged
not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to
its own attendant facts. Courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis,
guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines,
and by decisions of church tribunals.

3. There is no evidence that adduced by respondent insufficient to prove that petitioner is

psychologically unfit to discharge the duties expected of him as a husband, and more
particularly, that he suffered from such psychological incapacity as of the date of the
marriage eighteen (18) years ago.

CARPIO MORALES VS CA

FACTS:
A complaint/affidavit was filed before the Office of the Ombudsman against Binay, Jr.
and other public officers and employees of the City Government of Makati (Binay, Jr., et
al), accusing them of Plunder and violation of RA 3019, otherwise known as “The Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,” in connection with the five phases of the procurement
and construction of the Makati City Hall Parking Building.
Before Binay, Jr., et al.’s filing of their counter-affidavits, the Ombudsman issued the
order placing Binay, Jr., et al. under preventive suspension for not more than six months
without pay, during the pendency of the OMB Cases.
The Ombudsman ruled that the requisites for the preventive suspension of a public officer
are present, and that their continued stay in office may prejudice the investigation relative
to the OMB Cases filed against them.
Binay, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari before the CA seeking the nullification of the
preventive suspension order, and praying for the issuance of a TRO and/or WPI to enjoin
its implementation.
Primarily, Binay, Jr. argued that he could not be held administratively liable for any
anomalous activity attending any of the five phases of the Makati Parking Building project
since: (a) Phases I and II were undertaken before he was elected Mayor of Makati in 2010;
and (b) Phases III to V transpired during his first term and that his re-election as City
Mayor of Makati for a second term effectively condoned his administrative liability
therefor, if any, thus rendering the administrative cases against him moot and academic.
Prior to the hearing of the oral arguments before the CA, the Ombudsman filed the
present petition before this Court, assailing the CA’s Resolution, which granted Binay,
Jr.’s prayer for TRO.
The Ombudsman claims that the CA had no jurisdiction to grant Binay, Jr.’s prayer for a
TRO.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the doctrine of condonation should apply in Binay’s case.

RULING:
The petition is partly meritorious.
This Court simply finds no legal authority to sustain the condonation doctrine in this
jurisdiction. It was a doctrine adopted from one class of US rulings way back in 1959 and
thus, out of touch from – and now rendered obsolete by – the current legal regime. In
consequence, it is high time for this Court to abandon the condonation doctrine that
originated from Pascual, and affirmed in the cases following the same, such as Aguinaldo,
Salalima, Mayor Garcia, and Governor Garcia, Jr. which were all relied upon by the CA.
It should, however, be clarified that this Court’s abandonment of the condonation
doctrine should be prospective in application for the reason that judicial decisions
applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution, until reversed, shall form part of the
legal system of the Philippines.
The condonation doctrine was first enunciated in Pascual v. Hon. Provincial Board of
Nueva Ecija, There is no truth in Pascual’s postulation that the courts would be depriving
the electorate of their right to elect their officers if condonation were not to be sanctioned.
In political law, election pertains to the process by which a particular constituency
chooses an individual to hold a public office.
In this jurisdiction, there is, again, no legal basis to conclude that election automatically
implies condonation. Neither is there any legal basis to say that every democratic and
republican state has an inherent regime of condonation. If condonation of an elective
official’s administrative liability would perhaps, be allowed in this jurisdiction, then the
same should have been provided by law under our governing legal mechanisms. May it be
at the time of Pascual or at present, by no means has it been shown that such a law,
whether in a constitutional or statutory provision, exists.
Therefore, inferring from this manifest absence, it cannot be said that the electorate’s will
has been abdicated.

ARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and

PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL – ARROYO
G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010
FACTS:
The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010 occurs just
days after the coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010.
These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming
compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven days after the
presidential election. Under Section 4(1), in relation to Section 9, Article VIII, that
“vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof” from a “list of at
least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy.” Also
considering that Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department) of the Constitution
prohibits the President or Acting President from making appointments within two
months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term,
except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies
therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously agreed to start the
process of filling up the position of Chief Justice.
Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC “automatically considered” for the
position of Chief Justice the five most senior of the Associate Justices of the Court,
namely: Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio; Associate Justice Renato C. Corona;
Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales; Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.;
and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura. However, the last two declined their
nomination through letters dated January 18, 2010 and January 25, 2010, respectively.
The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief Justice,
because the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution does not apply
to appointments in the Supreme Court. It argues that any vacancy in the Supreme Court
must be filled within 90 days from its occurrence, pursuant to Section 4(1), Article VIII
of the Constitution; that had the framers intended the prohibition to apply to Supreme
Court appointments, they could have easily expressly stated so in the Constitution,
which explains why the prohibition found in Article VII (Executive Department) was not
written in Article VIII (Judicial Department); and that the framers also incorporated in
Article VIII ample restrictions or limitations on the President’s power to appoint
members of the Supreme Court to ensure its independence from “political vicissitudes”
and its “insulation from political pressures,” such as stringent qualifications for the
positions, the establishment of the JBC, the specified period within which the President
shall appoint a Supreme Court Justice.
A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court is whether the JBC properly initiated
the process, there being an insistence from some of the oppositors-intervenors that the
JBC could only do so once the vacancy has occurred (that is, after May 17, 2010).
Another part is, of course, whether the JBC may resume its process until the short list is
prepared, in view of the provision of Section 4(1), Article VIII, which unqualifiedly
requires the President to appoint one from the short list to fill the vacancy in the
Supreme Court (be it the Chief Justice or an Associate Justice) within 90 days from the
occurrence of the vacancy.

ISSUE:
Whether the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon
his retirement.

HELD:
Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy
in the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary.
Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.
The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides: Section 15. Two
months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term,
a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary
appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice
public service or endanger public safety.
The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states: Section 4. (1). The
Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It
may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any
vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII
to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done
so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would
have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as
being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article
VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done
only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President making
appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and up to the
end of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not refer to the Members of the
Supreme Court.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII
to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done
so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would
have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as
being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article
VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done
only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President making
appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and up to the
end of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not refer to the Members of the
Supreme Court.
Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in that they
affect the power of the President to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer
only to appointments within the Executive Department renders conclusive that Section
15 also applies only to the Executive Department. This conclusion is consistent with the
rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e.
that every part must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient
to the general intent of the whole enactment. It is absurd to assume that the framers
deliberately situated Section 15 between Section 14 and Section 16, if they intended
Section 15 to cover all kinds of presidential appointments. If that was their intention in
respect of appointments to the Judiciary, the framers, if only to be clear, would have
easily and surely inserted a similar prohibition in Article VIII, most likely within Section
4 (1) thereof.

PHILIPPINE GUARDIANS BROTHERHOOD, INC. (PGBI) represented by its

Secretary General George “FGBF George” Duldulao, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
[G.R. No. 190529. April 29, 2010]
FACTS:
Respondent delisted petitioner, a party list organization, from the roster of registered
national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions under the party-list
system through its resolution, denying also the latter’s motion for reconsideration, in
accordance with Section 6(8) of Republic Act No. 7941 (RA 7941), otherwise known as
the Party-List System Act, which provides:
Section 6. Removal and/or Cancellation of Registration. – The COMELEC may motu
proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel, after due
notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party,
organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:
x x x x
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least
two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2)
preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered.[Emphasis supplied.]
Petitioner was delisted because it failed to get 2% of the votes cast in 2004 and it did not
participate in the 2007 elections. Petitioner filed its opposition to the resolution citing
among others the misapplication in the ruling of MINERO v. COMELEC, but was denied
for lack of merit. Petitioner elevated the matter to SC showing the excerpts from the
records of Senate Bill No. 1913 before it became the law in question.

ISSUES:
Political Law
(1) Whether or not there is legal basis in the delisting of PGBI.
(2) Whether or not PGBI’s right to due process was violated.
Civil Law (Statutory Construction)
(1) Whether or not the doctrine of judicial precedent applies in this case.

RULINGS:
Political Law
(1) No. The MINERO ruling is an erroneous application of Section 6(8) of RA 7941;
hence, it cannot sustain PGBI’s delisting from the roster of registered national, regional
or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions under the party-list system. First, the law
is in the plain, clear and unmistakable language of the law which provides for two (2)
separate reasons for delisting. Second, MINERO is diametrically opposed to the
legislative intent of Section 6(8) of RA 7941, as PGBI’s cited congressional deliberations
clearly show. MINERO therefore simply cannot stand.
(2) No. On the due process issue, petitioner’s right to due process was not violated for
[it] was given an opportunity to seek, as it did seek, a reconsideration of [COMELEC
resolution]. The essence of due process, consistently held, is simply the opportunity to
be heard; as applied to administrative proceedings, due process is the opportunity to
explain one’s side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances
essential. The requirement is satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and
reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand. What is frowned
upon is absolute lack of notice and hearing x x x. [It is] obvious [that] under the
attendant circumstances that PGBI was not denied due process.
Civil Law (Statutory Construction)
(1) No. This case is an exception to the application of the principle of stare decisis. The
doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere (to adhere to precedents and not to
unsettle things which are established) is embodied in Article 8 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines which provides, thus:
ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall
form a part of the legal system of the Philippines.
The doctrine enjoins adherence to judicial precedents. It requires courts in a country to
follow the rule established in a decision of its Supreme Court. That decision becomes a
judicial precedent to be followed in subsequent cases by all courts in the land. The
doctrine of stare decisis is based on the principle that once a question of law has been
examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument.
The doctrine though is not cast in stone for upon a showing that circumstances
attendant in a particular case override the great benefits derived by [SC’s] judicial
system from the doctrine of stare decisis, the Court is justified in setting it
aside. MINERO did unnecessary violence to the language of the law, the intent of the
legislature, and to the rule of law in general. Clearly, [SC] cannot allow PGBI to be
prejudiced by the continuing validity of an erroneous ruling. Thus, [SC] now
abandons MINERO and strike it out from [the] ruling case law.