1.Republic v. Madrona, G.R. 163604, 6 May 2005;
Facts:
In "In the Matter of Declaration of Presumptive Death of Absentee Spouse
Clemente P. Jomoc, Apolinaria Malinao Jomoc, petitioner," the Ormoc City,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 35, by Order of September 29, 1999,[1] granted
the petition on the basis of the Commissioner's Report[2] and accordingly
declared the absentee spouse, who had left his petitioner-wife nine years
earlier, presumptively dead.
In granting the petition, the trial judge, Judge Fortunito L. Madrona, cited
Article 41, par. 2 of the Family Code. Said article provides that for the
purpose of contracting a valid subsequent marriage during the subsistence
of a previous marriage where the prior spouse had been absent for four
consecutive years, the spouse present must institute summary proceedings
for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee spouse, without
prejudice to the effect of the reappearance of the absent spouse.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General, sought to appeal
the trial court's order by filing a Notice of Appeal. The trial court, noting that
no record of appeal was filed and served "as required by and pursuant to
Sec. 2(a), Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the present case
being a special proceeding," disapproved the Notice of Appeal
Issue:
WON a petition for declaration of the presumptive death of a person is in
the nature of a special proceeding.
Ruling:
By the trial court's citation of Article 41 of the Family Code, it is gathered
that the petition of Apolinaria Jomoc to have her absent spouse declared
presumptively dead had for its purpose her desire to contract a valid
subsequent marriage. Ergo, the petition for that purpose is a "summary
proceeding," following above-quoted Art. 41, paragraph 2 of the Family
Code.
Since Title XI of the Family Code, entitled SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDING
IN THE FAMILY LAW, contains the following provision, inter alia:
xxx
Art. 238. Unless modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this
Title shall apply in all cases provided for in this Codes requiring summary
court proceedings. Such cases shall be decided in an expeditious manner
without regard to technical rules. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
x x x,
there is no doubt that the petition of Apolinaria Jomoc required, and is,
therefore, a summary proceeding under the Family Code, not a special
proceeding under the Revised Rules of Court appeal for which calls for the
filing of a Record on Appeal. It being a summary ordinary proceeding, the
filing of a Notice of Appeal from the trial court's order sufficed.
CASE 2:
G.R. NO. 129242 January 16, 2001
Manalo vs. CA
Doctrine:
The requirement in the Family Code involving suits between family members
that there must be a “ verified allegation of earnest efforts to compromise”
only applies to ordinary civil actions and NOT in special proceedings. A
petition for settlement of estate is a special proceeding which does NOT
necessitate the said requirement.
Facts:
Troadio Manalo, a resident of Sampaloc, Manila died intestate on February
14, 1992. He was survived by his wife, Pilar S. Manalo, and his eleven (11)
children, who are all of legal age.1âwphi1.nêt
At the time of his death on February 14, 1992, Troadio Manalo left several
real properties located in Manila and in the province of Tarlac including a
business under the name and style Manalo's Machine Shop with offices.
On November 26, 1992, herein respondents, who are eight (8) of the
surviving children of the late Troadio Manalo, filed a petition 6 with the
respondent Regional Trial Court of Manila 7 of the judicial settlement of the
estate of their late father, Troadio Manalo, and for the appointment of their
brother, Romeo Manalo, as administrator thereof.
On February 11, 1993, the date set for hearing of the petition, the trial court
issued an order 'declaring the whole world in default, except the
government," and set the reception of evidence of the petitioners therein
on March 16, 1993. However, the trial court upon motion of set this order
of general default aside herein petitioners (oppositors therein) namely: Pilar
S. Vda. De Manalo, Antonio, Isabelita and Orlando who were granted then
(10) days within which to file their opposition to the petition.
Several pleadings were subsequently filed by herein petitioners, through
counsel, culminating in the filling of an Omnibus Motion.
Trial court issued an order 1. admiting the so-called Opposition filed by
counsel only for the purpose of considering the merits thereof; 2. denying
the prayer of the oppositors for a preliminary hearing of their affirmative
defenses as ground for the dismissal of this proceeding3 Declaring that this
court has acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the oppositors;4.
Denying the motion of the oppositors for the inhibition of this Presiding
Judge; and 5. Setting the application of Romeo Manalo for appointment as
regular administrator in the intestate estate of the deceased Troadio
Manalo for hearing on September 9, 1993 at 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon.
Herein petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court with the Court of Appeals, stating that in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626; (2)
the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons; (3) the share of
the surviving spouse was included in the intestate proceedings; (4) there
was absence of earnest efforts toward compromise among members of the
same family; and (5) no certification of non-forum shopping was attached to
the petition.
Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari and the motion for
reconsideration of the said resolution was likewise dismissed.
Hence the instant petition.
Issue:
WON the respondent Court of Appeals erred in upholding the questioned
orders of the respondent trial court which denied their motion for the
outright dismissal of the petition for judicial settlement of estate despite the
failure of the petitioners therein to aver that earnest efforts toward a
compromise involving members of the same family have been made prior to
the filling of the petition but that the same have failed.
Herein petitioners claim that the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 is
actually an ordinary civil action involving members of the same family. And
the same should be dismissed under Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the Revised
Rules of Court which provides that a motion to dismiss a complaint may be
filed on the ground that a condition precedent for filling the claim has not
been complied with, that is, that the petitioners therein failed to aver in the
petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626, that earnest efforts toward a
compromise have been made involving members of the same family prior to
the filling of the petition pursuant to Article 222 14 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines.
Ruling:
The instant petition is not impressed with merit.
It is a fundamental rule that in the determination of the nature of an action
or proceeding, the averments15 and the character of the relief sought 16 in
the complaint, or petition, as in the case at bar, shall be controlling. A
careful srutiny of the Petition for Issuance of Letters of Administration,
Settlement and Distribution of Estatein SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 belies
herein petitioners' claim that the same is in the nature of an ordinary civil
action. The said petition contains sufficient jurisdictional facts required in a
petition for the settlement of estate of a deceased person such as the fat of
death of the late Troadio Manalo on February 14, 1992, as well as his
residence in the City of Manila at the time of his said death. The fact of
death of the decedent and of his residence within he country are foundation
facts upon which all the subsequent proceedings in the administration of
the estate rest.17 The petition is SP.PROC No. 92-63626 also contains an
enumeration of the names of his legal heirs including a tentative list of the
properties left by the deceased which are sought to be settled in the
probate proceedings. In addition, the relief's prayed for in the said petition
leave no room for doubt as regard the intention of the petitioners therein
(private respondents herein) to seek judicial settlement of the estate of
their deceased father, Troadio Manalo, to wit;
It is our view that herein petitioners may not be allowed to defeat the
purpose of the essentially valid petition for the settlement of the estate of
the late Troadio Manalo by raising matters that as irrelevant and immaterial
to the said petition. It must be emphasized that the trial court, siting as a
probate court, has limited and special jurisdiction 20 and cannot hear and
dispose of collateral matters and issues which may be properly threshed out
only in an ordinary civil action. In addition, the rule has always been to the
effect that the jurisdiction of a court, as well as the concomitant nature of
an action, is determined by the averments in the complaint and not by the
defenses contained in the answer. If it were otherwise, it would not be too
difficult to have a case either thrown out of court or its proceedings unduly
delayed by simple strategem.21 So it should be in the instant petition for
settlement of estate.
Herein petitioners argue that even if the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626
were to be considered as a special proceeding for the settlement of estate
of a deceased person, Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the Rules of Court vis-à-vis
Article 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines would nevertheless apply as a
ground for the dismissal of the same by virtue of ule 1, Section 2 of the
Rules of Court which provides that the 'rules shall be liberally construed in
order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just,
speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and proceedings.'
Petitioners contend that the term "proceeding" is so broad that it must
necessarily include special proceedings.
The argument is misplaced. Herein petitioners may not validly take refuge
under the provisions of Rule 1, Section 2, of the Rules of Court to justify the
invocation of Article 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines for the dismissal
of the petition for settlement of the estate of the deceased Troadio Manalo
inasmuch as the latter provision is clear enough. To wit:
Art. 222. No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same
family unless it should appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise
have been made, but that the same have failed, subject to the limitations in
Article 2035(underscoring supplied).22
The above-quoted provision of the law is applicable only to ordinary civil
actions. This is clear from the term 'suit' that it refers to an action by one
person or persons against another or other in a court of justice in which the
plaintiff pursues the remedy which the law affords him for the redress of an
injury or the enforcement of a right, whether at law or in equity. 23 A civil
action is thus an action filed in a court of justice, whereby a party sues
another for the enforcement of a right, or the prevention or redress of a
wrong.24 Besides, an excerpt form the Report of the Code Commission
unmistakably reveals the intention of the Code Commission to make that
legal provision applicable only to civil actions which are essentially
adversarial and involve members of the same family,
It must be emphasized that the oppositors (herein petitioners) are not being
sued in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 for any cause of action as in fact no
defendant was imploded therein. The Petition for issuance of letters of
Administration, Settlement and Distribution of Estate in SP. PROC. No. 92-
63626 is a special proceeding and, as such, it is a remedy whereby the
petitioners therein seek to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. 26
the petitioners therein (private respondents herein) merely seek to
establish the fat of death of their father and subsequently to be duly
recognized as among the heirs of the said deceased so that they can validly
exercise their right to participate in the settlement and liquidation of the
estate of the decedent consistent with the limited and special jurisdiction of
the probate court.1âwphi1.nêt
WHEREFORE, the petition in the above-entitled case, is DENIED for lack of
merit, Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
3.Ting v. Heirs of Lirio, 14 March 2007;
“action (Sec. 6, Rule 39.) This provision of the Rules refers to civil actions and
is not applicable to special proceedings, such as a land registration case. This
is so because a party in a civil action must immediately enforce a judgment
that is secured as against the adverse party, and his failure to act to enforce
the same within a reasonable time as provided in the Rules makes the
decision unenforceable against the losing party. In special proceedings the
purpose is to establish a status, condition or fact; in land registration
proceedings, the ownership by a person of a parcel of land is sought to be
established. After the ownership has been proved and confirmed by judicial
declaration, no further proceeding to enforce said ownership is necessary,
except when the adverse or losing party had been in possession of the land
and the winning party desires to oust him therefrom.”
FactS:
Judge Alfredo Marigomen of the then Court of First Instance of Cebu,
Branch 7, granted the application filed by the Spouses Diego Lirio and Flora
Atienza for registration of title to Lot No. 18281. The decision became final
and executory on January 29, 1977. Judge Marigomen thereafter issued an
order of November 10, 1982 directing the Land Registration Commission to
issue the corresponding decree of registration and the certificate of title in
favor of the spouses Lirio.
On February 12, 1997, Rolando Ting (petitioner) filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Cebu an application for registration of title to the same lot.
The herein respondents, heirs of Diego Lirio, who were afforded the
opportunity to file an opposition to petitioner's application by Branch 21 of
the Cebu RTC, filed their Answer[2] calling attention to the December 10,
1976 decision in LRC No. N-983 which had become final and executory on
January 29, 1977 and which, they argued, barred the filing of petitioner's
application on the ground of res judicata. After hearing the respective sides
of the parties, Branch 21 of the Cebu RTC, on motion of respondents,
dismissed petitioner's application on the ground of res judicata
Issue:
WON there is res judicata and WON sec 6 rule 39 of rules of court applies to
special proceedings.
Ruling:
The petition fails.
After judgment has become final and executory, it shall devolve upon the
court to forthwith issue an order in accordance with Section 39 of this
Decree to the Commissioner for the issuance of the decree of registration
and the corresponding certificate of title in favor of the person adjudged
entitled to registration. (Emphasis supplied)
In a registration proceeding instituted for the registration of a private land,
with or without opposition, the judgment of the court confirming the title of
the applicant or oppositor, as the case may be, and ordering its registration
in his name constitutes, when final, res judicata against the whole world.[9]
It becomes final when no appeal within the reglementary period is taken
from a judgment of confirmation and registration.
The land registration proceedings being in rem, the land registration court's
approval in LRC No. N-983 of spouses Diego Lirio and Flora Atienza's
application for registration of the lot settled its ownership, and is binding on
the whole world including petitioner.
As for petitioner's claim that under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court
reading:
SEC. 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. - A final and
executory judgment or order may be executed on motion within five (5)
years from the date of its entry. After the lapse of such time, and before it is
barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action.
The revived judgment may also be enforced by motion within five (5) years
from the date of its entry and thereafter by action before it is barred by the
statute of limitations[,]
the December 10, 1976 decision became "extinct" in light of the failure of
respondents and/or of their predecessors-in-interest to execute the same
within the prescriptive period, the same does not lie.
Sta. Ana v. Menla, et al.[13] enunciates the raison d'etre why Section 6, Rule
39 does not apply in land registration proceedings, viz:
THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THAT THE DECISION
RENDERED IN THIS LAND REGISTRATION CASE ON NOVEMBER 28, 1931 OR
TWENTY SIX YEARS AGO, HAS NOT YET BECOME FINAL AND
UNENFORCEABLE.
We fail to understand the arguments of the appellant in support of the
above assignment, except in so far as it supports his theory that after a
decision in a land registration case has become final, it may not be enforced
after the lapse of a period of 10 years, except by another proceeding to
enforce the judgment or decision. Authority for this theory is the provision
in the Rules of Court to the effect that judgment may be enforced within 5
years by motion, and after five years but within 10 years, by an action (Sec.
6, Rule 39.) This provision of the Rules refers to civil actions and is not
applicable to special proceedings, such as a land registration case. This is
so because a party in a civil action must immediately enforce a judgment
that is secured as against the adverse party, and his failure to act to
enforce the same within a reasonable time as provided in the Rules makes
the decision unenforceable against the losing party. In special proceedings
the purpose is to establish a status, condition or fact; in land registration
proceedings, the ownership by a person of a parcel of land is sought to be
established. After the ownership has been proved and confirmed by
judicial declaration, no further proceeding to enforce said ownership is
necessary, except when the adverse or losing party had been in possession
of the land and the winning party desires to oust him therefrom.
Furthermore, there is no provision in the Land Registration Act similar to
Sec. 6, Rule 39, regarding the execution of a judgment in a civil action,
except the proceedings to place the winner in possession by virtue of a writ
of possession. The decision in a land registration case, unless the adverse or
losing party is in possession, becomes final without any further action, upon
the expiration of the period for perfecting an appeal.
CASE #4
ONG vs. PDIC
Doctrine:
A petition for liquidation of an insolvent corporation is a special proceeding.
An appeal in a special proceeding requires both the filing of a notice of
appeal and the record on appeal within thirty days from receipt of the notice
of judgment or final order.
FACTS:
Sometime in 1982 and 1983, petitioner Jerry Ong made some money
market placements with Omnibus Finance Inc. (OFI), which later on suffered
serious financial difficulties. As petitioner's money market placements
matured, he demanded from OFI the return of the same. However, OFI's
checks issued thereby were dishonored by the drawee bank. It was alleged
that OFI sought the assistance of its sister companies which included the
Rural Bank of Olongapo (RBO). On December 29, 1983, Jose Ma. Carballo,
OFI President, and Cynthia Gonzales, Chairperson of the Board of Directors
of RBO, executed in favor of petitioner a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage3
over two parcels of land located in Tagaytay City covered by Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. T-13769 and T-13770, which are both registered in
RBO's name, as collateral to guarantee the payment of OFI's money market
obligations to petitioner in the amount of ₱863,517.02. The mortgage was
executed by Gonzales by virtue of a Secretary's Certificate4 issued by Atty.
Efren L. Legaspi, RBO's alleged Assistant Corporate Secretary, showing that
Gonzales was authorized by the RBO Board to execute such mortgage. The
deed of mortgage was annotated on TCT Nos. T-13769 and T-13770 of the
Register of Deeds of Tagaytay City on January 13, 1984.
As OFI failed to pay petitioner the obligation secured by the real estate
mortgage, petitioner foreclosed the mortgage on March 18, 1984. A
Certificate of Sale was correspondingly issued which was registered with the
Register of Deeds of Tagaytay City on July 16, 1985. Petitioner alleged that
representatives of the Central Bank of the Philippines (Central Bank) had
approached him and borrowed TCT Nos. T-13769 and T-13770 for the on-
going audit and inventory of the assets of the RBO; however, these titles
were not returned despite petitioner's demand. Petitioner filed with the
RTC of Tagaytay City, Branch 18, a case for the surrender of said titles,
docketed as TC-803. The case was subsequently dismissed for being
premature as the one year redemption period had not yet expired.
On May 22, 1984, RBO's Corporate Secretary and Acting Manager, Atty.
Rodolfo C. Soriano, filed with the RTC of Tagaytay City, an action for the
annulment of real estate mortgage, extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage
proceedings, sheriff's certificate of sale with damages against petitioner,
OFI, Cynthia Gonzales, the Sheriff and the Register of Deeds of Tagaytay
City, raffled off to Branch 18, and was docketed as Civil Case No. TG-805.
However, the case was later suspended due to OFI's pending application for
rehabilitation with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
On May 9, 1985, the Central Bank, as petitioner, which was later substituted
by respondent Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation5 (PDIC) filed with
the RTC of Olongapo City a petition for assistance in the liquidation of RBO,
docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 170-0-85 and was raffled off to Branch 73. Later,
upon respondent's motion, Civil Case No. TG-805, i.e., for annulment of
mortgage, was consolidated with RBO's liquidation proceedings.
On February 5, 1991, petitioner filed with Branch 79 of the RTC of Quezon
City6 a petition for the surrender of the titles of the Tagaytay properties
against RBO, which petition was eventually ordered dismissed by the CA
after finding that the RTC lacked jurisdiction to try the case, but without
prejudice to petitioner's right to file his claim in RBO's liquidation
proceedings pending before Branch 73 of the RTC of Olongapo City.
Consequently, on February 16, 1996, petitioner filed in Sp. Proc. No. 170-0-
85 a Motion to Admit Claim against RBO's assets as a secured creditor and
the winning bidder and/or purchaser of the Tagaytay properties in the
foreclosure sale. Respondent filed its Comment/Opposition to the motion.
Trial, thereafter, ensued on petitioner's claim.
On June 25, 2001, Acting Presiding Judge Philbert I. Iturralde issued an
Order7 declaring petitioner's claim against RBO valid and legitimate
Respondent filed its motion for reconsideration. Judge Renato J. Dilag
reversed the June 25, 2001 Decision.
On June 17, 2003, petitioner, thru counsel, filed a Notice of Appeal12 which
the RTC gave due course in an Order.
Respondent sought reconsideration of the Order giving due course to
petitioner's appeal as the latter failed to file a record on appeal within the
reglementary period; thus, the appeal was not perfected.
RTC issued an Order that the appeal is dismissed for having been taken out
of time.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied
Petitioner then filed with the CA a petition for certiorari with prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction assailing the RTC Orders dated
May 31, 2005 and December 7, 2005 for having been issued with grave
abuse of discretion.
CA issued its assailed Decision on July 31, 2006, dismissing the petition.
Hence, the present petition
Issues:
W/N CA GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT DISMISSED THE PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI BASED SOLELY ON TECHNICAL RULES OF PROCEDURE.
W/N COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT DISMISSED
THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI WITHOUT PASSING UPON THE MERIT OF
PETITIONER'S APPEAL.17
Petitioner reiterates his argument raised before the CA that his counsel's
failure to submit a record on appeal on time is an excusable neglect as the
failure was due to the serious complications surrounding the case that led
her to commit an error of judgment; that petitioner's counsel honestly
believed that their claim filed against RBO in the special proceedings and
the civil case filed by RBO against petitioner for the annulment of mortgage
under Civil Case No. TG-805, which was eventually consolidated with the
special proceedings, were ordinary civil actions since they sought the
enforcement or protection of a right or prevention or redress of a wrong;
thus, a mere notice of appeal would be sufficient to perfect petitioner's
appeal.
Ruling:
As to the main issues raised by petitioner, we find the same unmeritorious.
It has been held that a petition for liquidation of an insolvent corporation is
classified as a special proceeding.20 The RTC decision, which petitioner
sought to appeal from, was rendered in the special proceeding for the
liquidation of RBO's assets; thus, applying the above-quoted provisions, an
appeal in a special proceeding requires both the filing of a notice of appeal
and the record on appeal within thirty days from receipt of the notice of
judgment or final order.
In this case, petitioner filed his Notice of Appeal on June 17, 2003, and the
RTC gave due course to the appeal after it found that the notice of appeal
was filed within the reglementary period. However, upon respondent's
motion for reconsideration, where it argued that petitioner failed to file a
record on appeal, considering that the decision was rendered in a petition
for liquidation of RBO which was a special proceeding, the RTC reversed
itself as no record on appeal was filed, and dismissed petitioner's appeal for
having been taken out of time. The RTC did not commit a grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing petitioner's appeal, since it is clearly stated under
the Rules that filing of the notice of appeal must be accompanied by a
record on appeal to perfect one's appeal in a special proceeding. In fact, the
RTC's dismissal of petitioner's appeal was expressly allowed under Section
13 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court which states:
SECTION 13. Dismissal of appeal. – Prior to the transmittal of the original
record or the record on appeal to the appellate court, the trial court may
motu propio or on motion to dismiss the appeal for having been taken out
of time.
Thus, we find no error committed by the CA when it sustained the RTC's
dismissal of petitioner's appeal for failure to comply with the Rules.
Withal, petitioner's ratiocinations that he failed to submit a Record on
Appeal on time could be taken as excusable neglect due to serious
complications surrounding the case leading him to an error of judgment
where "an ordinary human being, courts, not excepted, is susceptible to
commit, is highly unsustainable. Petitioner counsel's honest belief that the
claim of petitioner Ong and the civil case for annulment of mortgage under
TG-085 were ordinary actions and, as such, mere filing of a notice of appeal
would be sufficient, is far from being persuasive. This is not the excusable
neglect as envisioned by the rules in order to sidestep on the strict
compliance with the rules on appeal. Petitioner was fully aware that Sp.
Proc. No. 170-0-85 is a petition for liquidation because they filed their claim
in the case claiming to be a preferred creditor, participated in the trial
thereof in every step of the way, and filed the disputed Notice of Appeal
under the title of the said case. We cannot find any reason to accept
petitioner's feigned ignorance that the case they were appealing is a
liquidation petition. In fine, such miscalculation of the petitioner cannot
justify an exception to the rules, and to apply the liberal construction rule.
An erroneous application of the law or rules is not excusable error."26
Petitioner is bound by the mistake of his counsel.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
5. In re Datukan Malang Salibo, 8 April 2015;
“Habeas corpus is the proper remedy for a person deprived of liberty due to
mistaken identity. In such cases, the person is not under any lawful process
and is continuously being illegally detained..[54]”
Facts:
From November 7, 2009 to December 19, 2009, Datukan Malang
Salibo (Salibo) and other Filipinos were allegedly in Saudi Arabia for the Hajj
Pilgrimage.[4] "While in Saudi Arabia, Salibo visited and prayed in the cities
of Medina, Mecca, Arpa, Mina and Jeddah."[5] He returned to the Philippines
on December 20, 2009.[6]
On August 3, 2010, Salibo learned that police officers of Datu Hofer Police
Station in Maguindanao suspected him to be Butukan S. Malang.[7]
Butukan S. Malang was one of the 197 accused of 57 counts of murder for
allegedly participating in the November 23, 2009 Maguindanao Massacre.
He had a pending warrant of arrest issued by the trial court in People of the
Philippines v. Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr., et al.[8]
Salibo presented himself before the police officers of Datu Hofer Police
Station to clear his name. There, he explained that he was not Butukan S.
Malang and that he could not have participated in the November 23, 2009
Maguindanao Massacre because he was in Saudi Arabia at that time.[9]
To support his allegations, Salibo presented to the police "pertinent
portions of his passport, boarding passes and other documents"[10] tending
to prove that a certain Datukan Malang Salibo was in Saudi Arabia from
November 7 to December 19, 2009.[11]
The police officers initially assured Salibo that they would not arrest him
because he was not Butukan S. Malang.[12]
Afterwards, however, the police officers apprehended Salibo and tore off
page two of his passport that evidenced his departure for Saudi Arabia on
November 7, 2009. They then detained Salibo at the Datu Hofer Police
Station for about three (3) days.[13]
The police officers transferred Salibo to the Criminal Investigation and
Detection Group in Cotabato City, where he was detained for another 10
days. While in Cotabato City, the Criminal Investigation and Detention
Group allegedly made him sign and affix his thumbprint on documents.[14]
On August 20, 2010, Salibo was finally transferred to the Quezon City Jail
Annex, Bureau of Jail Management and Penology Building, Camp Bagong
Diwa, Taguig City, where he is currently detained.[15]
On September 17, 2010, Salibo filed before the Court of Appeals the Urgent
Petition for Habeas Corpus[16] questioning the legality of his detention and
deprivation of his liberty.[17] He maintained that he is not the accused
Butukan S. Malang.[
The Court of Appeals ordered the Warden of the Quezon City Jail Annex to
file a Return of the Writ one day before the scheduled hearing and produce
the person of Salibo at the 10:00 a.m. hearing set on September 27, 2010
The trial court found that Salibo was not "judicially charged"[29] under any
resolution, information, or amended information. The Resolution,
Information, and Amended Information presented in court did not charge
Datukan Malang Salibo as an accused. He was also not validly arrested as
there was no Warrant of Arrest or Alias Warrant of Arrest against Datukan
Malang Salibo. Salibo, the trial court ruled, was not restrained of his liberty
under process issued by a courtTtrial court granted Salibo's Petition for
Habeas Corpus and ordered his immediate release from detention.
Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the trial court's Decision. It
dismissed Salibo's Petition for Habeas Corpus.
Even assuming that Salibo was not the Butukan S. Malang named in the
Alias Warrant of Arrest, the Court of Appeals said that "[t]he orderly course
of trial must be pursued and the usual remedies exhausted before the writ
[of habeas corpus] may be invoked[.]"
Salibo filed a Motion for Reconsideration. As for respondent Warden, he
maintains that petitioner Salibo was duly charged in court. Even assuming
that he is not the Butukan S. Malang named in the Alias Warrant of Arrest,
petitioner Salibo should have pursued the ordinary remedy of a Motion to
Quash Information, not a Petition for Habeas Corpus.
Issue:
First, whether the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 153, Pasig
City on petitioner Salibo's Petition for Habeas Corpus was appealable to the
Court of Appeals; and Second, whether petitioner Salibo's proper remedy is
to file a Petition for Habeas Corpus
Ruling:
We grant the Petition.
1. Contrary to petitioner Salibo's claim, respondent Warden correctly
appealed before the Court of Appeals.
An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be made through a petition
filed before this court or any of its members,[50] the Court of Appeals or any
of its members in instances authorized by law,[51] or the Regional Trial Court
or any of its presiding judges.[52] The court or judge grants the writ and
requires the officer or person having custody of the person allegedly
restrained of liberty to file a return of the writ.[53] A hearing on the return of
the writ is then conducted.[54]
The return of the writ may be heard by a court apart from that which issued
the writ.[55] Should the court issuing the writ designate a lower court to
which the writ is made returnable, the lower court shall proceed to decide
the petition of habeas corpus. By virtue of the designation, the lower court
"acquire[s] the power and authority to determine the merits of the [petition
for habeas corpus.]"[56] Therefore, the decision on the petition is a decision
appealable to the court that has appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the
lower court
In this case, petitioner Salibo filed his Petition for Habeas Corpus before the
Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus,
making it returnable to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 153, Pasig City. The
trial court then heard respondent Warden on his Return and decided the
Petition on the merits.
Applying Saulo and Medina, we rule that the trial court "acquired the power
and authority to determine the merits"[74] of petitioner Salibo's Petition. The
decision on the Petition for Habeas Corpus, therefore, was the decision of
the trial court, not of the Court of Appeals. Since the Court of Appeals is the
court with appellate jurisdiction over decisions of trial courts,[75] respondent
Warden correctly filed the appeal before the Court of Appeals.
2. It is undisputed that petitioner Salibo presented himself before the Datu
Hofer Police Station to clear his name and to prove that he is not the
accused Butukan S. Malang. When petitioner Salibo was in the presence of
the police officers of Datu Hofer Police Station, he was neither committing
nor attempting to commit an offense. The police officers had no personal
knowledge of any offense that he might have committed. Petitioner Salibo
was also not an escapee prisoner.
The police officers, therefore, had no probable cause to arrest petitioner
Salibo without a warrant. They deprived him of his right to liberty without
due process of law, for which a petition for habeas corpus may be issued.
Petitioner Salibo's proper remedy is not a Motion to Quash Information
and/or Warrant of Arrest. None of the grounds for filing a Motion to Quash
Information apply to him. Even if petitioner Salibo filed a Motion to Quash,
the defect he alleged could not have been cured by mere amendment of the
Information and/or Warrant of Arrest. Changing the name of the accused
appearing in the Information and/or Warrant of Arrest from "Butukan S.
Malang" to "Datukan Malang Salibo" will not cure the lack of preliminary
investigation in this case.

CASE #6
VILLAVICENCIO, vs.LUKBAN
Facts:
The Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, for the best of all reasons, to
exterminate vice, ordered the segregated district for women of ill repute,
which had been permitted for a number of years in the city of Manila,
closed. Between October 16 and October 25, 1918, the women were kept
confined to their houses in the district by the police. Presumably, during this
period, the city authorities quietly perfected arrangements with the Bureau
of Labor for sending the women to Davao, Mindanao, as laborers; with
some government office for the use of the coastguard cutters Corregidor
and Negros, and with the Constabulary for a guard of soldiers. At any rate,
about midnight of October 25, the police, acting pursuant to orders from
the chief of police, Anton Hohmann and the Mayor of the city of Manila,
Justo Lukban, descended upon the houses, hustled some 170 inmates into
patrol wagons, and placed them aboard the steamers that awaited their
arrival. The women were given no opportunity to collect their belongings,
and apparently were under the impression that they were being taken to a
police station for an investigation. They had no knowledge that they were
destined for a life in Mindanao. They had not been asked if they wished to
depart from that region and had neither directly nor indirectly given their
consent to the deportation. The involuntary guests were received on board
the steamers by a representative of the Bureau of Labor and a detachment
of Constabulary soldiers. The two steamers with their unwilling passengers
sailed for Davao during the night of October 25.
The vessels reached their destination at Davao on October 29. The women
were landed and receipted for as laborers by Francisco Sales, provincial
governor of Davao, and by Feliciano Yñigo and Rafael Castillo. The governor
and the hacendero Yñigo, who appear as parties in the case, had no
previous notification that the women were prostitutes who had been
expelled from the city of Manila.
To turn back in our narrative, just about the time the Corregidor and the
Negros were putting in to Davao, the attorney for the relatives and friends
of a considerable number of the deportees presented an application for
habeas corpus to a member of the Supreme Court. And alleged that the
women were illegally restrained of their liberty by Justo Lukban, Mayor of
the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, and
by certain unknown parties. The writ was made returnable before the full
court. The city fiscal appeared for the respondents, Lukban and Hohmann,
admitted certain facts relative to sequestration and deportation, and prayed
that the writ should not be granted because the petitioners were not proper
parties, because the action should have been begun in the Court of First
Instance for Davao, Department of Mindanao and Sulu, because the
respondents did not have any of the women under their custody or control,
and because their jurisdiction did not extend beyond the boundaries of the
city of Manila. In open court, the fiscal admitted, in answer to question of a
member of the court, that these women had been sent out of Manila
without their consent.
The court awarded the writ, in an order of November 4, that directed Justo
Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the
city of Manila, Francisco Sales, governor of the province of Davao, and
Feliciano Yñigo, an hacendero of Davao, to bring before the court the
persons therein named, alleged to be deprived of their liberty, on December
2, 1918.
The court, after due deliberation, on December 10, 1918, promulgated a
second order, which related that the respondents had not complied with
the original order to the satisfaction of the court nor explained their failure
to do so, and therefore directed that those of the women not in Manila be
brought before the court by respondents Lukban, Hohmann, Sales, and
Yñigo on January 13, 1919, unless the women should, in written statements
voluntarily made before the judge of first instance of Davao or the clerk of
that court, renounce the right, or unless the respondents should
demonstrate some other legal motives that made compliance impossible.
On January 13, 1919, the respondents technically presented before the
Court the women who had returned to the city through their own efforts
and eight others who had been brought to Manila by the respondents.
Attorneys for the respondents, by their returns, once again recounted the
facts and further endeavored to account for all of the persons involved in
the habeas corpus. In substance, it was stated that the respondents,
through their representatives and agents, had succeeded in bringing from
Davao with their consent eight women; that eighty-one women were found
in Davao who, on notice that if they desired they could return to Manila,
transportation fee, renounced the right through sworn statements; that
fifty-nine had already returned to Manila by other means, and that despite
all efforts to find them twenty-six could not be located. Both counsel for
petitioners and the city fiscal were permitted to submit memoranda. The
first formally asked the court to find Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of
Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, Jose Rodriguez
and Fernando Ordax, members of the police force of the city of Manila,
Feliciano Yñigo, an hacendero of Davao, Modesto Joaquin, the attorney for
the Bureau of Labor, and Anacleto Diaz, fiscal of the city of Manila, in
contempt of court. The city fiscal requested that the replica al
memorandum de los recurridos, (reply to respondents' memorandum) dated
January 25, 1919, be struck from the record.
In the second order, the court promised to give the reasons for granting the
writ of habeas corpus in the final decision. We will now proceed to do so.
Granted that habeas corpus is the proper remedy, respondents have raised
three specific objections to its issuance in this instance. The fiscal has
argued (l) that there is a defect in parties petitioners, (2) that the Supreme
Court should not a assume jurisdiction, and (3) that the person in question
are not restrained of their liberty by respondents. It was finally suggested
that the jurisdiction of the Mayor and the chief of police of the city of
Manila only extends to the city limits and that perforce they could not bring
the women from Davao.
The first defense was not presented with any vigor by counsel. The
petitioners were relatives and friends of the deportees. The way the
expulsion was conducted by the city officials made it impossible for the
women to sign a petition for habeas corpus. It was consequently proper for
the writ to be submitted by persons in their behalf. (Code of Criminal
Procedure, sec. 78; Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 527.) The law, in its zealous
regard for personal liberty, even makes it the duty of a court or judge to
grant a writ of habeas corpus if there is evidence that within the court's
jurisdiction a person is unjustly imprisoned or restrained of his liberty,
though no application be made therefor. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec.
93.) Petitioners had standing in court.
The fiscal next contended that the writ should have been asked for in the
Court of First Instance of Davao or should have been made returnable
before that court. It is a general rule of good practice that, to avoid
unnecessary expense and inconvenience, petitions for habeas corpus should
be presented to the nearest judge of the court of first instance. But this is
not a hard and fast rule. The writ of habeas corpus may be granted by the
Supreme Court or any judge thereof enforcible anywhere in the Philippine
Islands. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 79; Code of Civil Procedure, sec.
526.) Whether the writ shall be made returnable before the Supreme Court
or before an inferior court rests in the discretion of the Supreme Court and
is dependent on the particular circumstances. In this instance it was not
shown that the Court of First Instance of Davao was in session, or that the
women had any means by which to advance their plea before that court. On
the other hand, it was shown that the petitioners with their attorneys, and
the two original respondents with their attorney, were in Manila; it was
shown that the case involved parties situated in different parts of the
Islands; it was shown that the women might still be imprisoned or
restrained of their liberty; and it was shown that if the writ was to
accomplish its purpose, it must be taken cognizance of and decided
immediately by the appellate court. The failure of the superior court to
consider the application and then to grant the writ would have amounted to
a denial of the benefits of the writ.
The last argument of the fiscal is more plausible and more difficult to meet.
When the writ was prayed for, says counsel, the parties in whose behalf it
was asked were under no restraint; the women, it is claimed, were free in
Davao, and the jurisdiction of the mayor and the chief of police did not
extend beyond the city limits. At first blush, this is a tenable position. On
closer examination, acceptance of such dictum is found to be pervasive of
the first principles of the writ of habeas corpus.
A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is
restraint of liberty. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas
corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished
from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal.
Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient. The forcible
taking of these women from Manila by officials of that city, who handed
them over to other parties, who deposited them in a distant region,
deprived these women of freedom of locomotion just as effectively as if
they had been imprisoned. Placed in Davao without either money or
personal belongings, they were prevented from exercising the liberty of
going when and where they pleased. The restraint of liberty which began in
Manila continued until the aggrieved parties were returned to Manila and
released or until they freely and truly waived his right.
A question came before the Supreme Court of the State of Michigan at an
early date as to whether or not a writ of habeas corpus would issue from
the Supreme Court to a person within the jurisdiction of the State to bring
into the State a minor child under guardianship in the State, who has been
and continues to be detained in another State. The membership of the
Michigan Supreme Court at this time was notable. It was composed of
Martin, chief justice, and Cooley, Campbell, and Christiancy, justices. On the
question presented the court was equally divided. Campbell, J., with whom
concurred Martin, C. J., held that the writ should be quashed. Cooley, J., one
of the most distinguished American judges and law-writers, with whom
concurred Christiancy, J., held that the writ should issue.
The opinion of Judge Cooley has since been accepted as authoritative by
other courts. (Rivers vs. Mitchell [1881], 57 Iowa, 193; Breene vs. People
[1911], Colo., 117 Pac. Rep., 1000; Ex parte Young [1892], 50 Fed., 526.)
The English courts have given careful consideration to the subject. Thus, a
child had been taken out of English by the respondent. A writ of habeas
corpus was issued by the Queen's Bench Division upon the application of the
mother and her husband directing the defendant to produce the child. The
judge at chambers gave defendant until a certain date to produce the child,
but he did not do so. His return stated that the child before the issuance of
the writ had been handed over by him to another; that it was no longer in
his custody or control, and that it was impossible for him to obey the writ.
He was found in contempt of court.
A decision coming from the Federal Courts is also of interest. A habeas
corpus was directed to the defendant to have before the circuit court of the
District of Columbia three colored persons, with the cause of their
detention. Davis, in his return to the writ, stated on oath that he had
purchased the negroes as slaves in the city of Washington; that, as he
believed, they were removed beyond the District of Columbia before the
service of the writ of habeas corpus, and that they were then beyond his
control and out of his custody. The evidence tended to show that Davis had
removed the negroes because he suspected they would apply for a writ of
habeas corpus. The court held the return to be evasive and insufficient, and
that Davis was bound to produce the negroes, and Davis being present in
court, and refusing to produce them, ordered that he be committed to the
custody of the marshall until he should produce the negroes, or be
otherwise discharged in due course of law. The court afterwards ordered
that Davis be released upon the production of two of the negroes, for one
of the negroes had run away and been lodged in jail in Maryland. Davis
produced the two negroes on the last day of the term. (United States vs.
Davis [1839], 5 Cranch C.C., 622, Fed. Cas. No. 14926. See also Robb vs.
Connolly [1883], 111 U.S., 624; Church on Habeas, 2nd ed., p. 170.)
We find, therefore, both on reason and authority, that no one of the
defense offered by the respondents constituted a legitimate bar to the
granting of the writ of habeas corpus.
For the respondents to have fulfilled the court's order, three optional
courses were open: (1) They could have produced the bodies of the persons
according to the command of the writ; or (2) they could have shown by
affidavit that on account of sickness or infirmity those persons could not
safely be brought before the court; or (3) they could have presented
affidavits to show that the parties in question or their attorney waived the
right to be present. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 87.) They did not
produce the bodies of the persons in whose behalf the writ was granted;
they did not show impossibility of performance; and they did not present
writings that waived the right to be present by those interested. Instead a
few stereotyped affidavits purporting to show that the women were
contended with their life in Davao, some of which have since been
repudiated by the signers, were appended to the return. That through
ordinary diligence a considerable number of the women, at least sixty, could
have been brought back to Manila is demonstrated to be found in the
municipality of Davao, and that about this number either returned at their
own expense or were produced at the second hearing by the respondents.
The court, at the time the return to its first order was made, would have
been warranted summarily in finding the respondents guilty of contempt of
court, and in sending them to jail until they obeyed the order. Their excuses
for the non-production of the persons were far from sufficient. The,
authorities cited herein pertaining to somewhat similar facts all tend to
indicate with what exactitude a habeas corpus writ must be fulfilled.
In response to the second order of the court, the respondents appear to
have become more zealous and to have shown a better spirit. Agents were
dispatched to Mindanao, placards were posted, the constabulary and the
municipal police joined in rounding up the women, and a steamer with free
transportation to Manila was provided. While charges and counter-charges
in such a bitterly contested case are to be expected, and while a critical
reading of the record might reveal a failure of literal fulfillment with our
mandate, we come to conclude that there is a substantial compliance with
it. Our finding to this effect may be influenced somewhat by our sincere
desire to see this unhappy incident finally closed. If any wrong is now being
perpetrated in Davao, it should receive an executive investigation. If any
particular individual is still restrained of her liberty, it can be made the
object of separate habeas corpus proceedings.
Since the writ has already been granted, and since we find a substantial
compliance with it, nothing further in this connection remains to be done.
With all the facts and circumstances in mind, and with judicial regard for
human imperfections, we cannot say that any of the respondents, with the
possible exception of the first named, has flatly disobeyed the court by
acting in opposition to its authority. Respondents Hohmann, Rodriguez,
Ordax, and Joaquin only followed the orders of their chiefs, and while,
under the law of public officers, this does not exonerate them entirely, it is
nevertheless a powerful mitigating circumstance. The hacendero Yñigo
appears to have been drawn into the case through a misconstruction by
counsel of telegraphic communications. The city fiscal, Anacleto Diaz, would
seem to have done no more than to fulfill his duty as the legal
representative of the city government. Finding him innocent of any
disrespect to the court, his counter-motion to strike from the record the
memorandum of attorney for the petitioners, which brings him into this
undesirable position, must be granted. When all is said and done, as far as
this record discloses, the official who was primarily responsible for the
unlawful deportation, who ordered the police to accomplish the same, who
made arrangements for the steamers and the constabulary, who conducted
the negotiations with the Bureau of Labor, and who later, as the head of the
city government, had it within his power to facilitate the return of the
unfortunate women to Manila, was Justo Lukban, the Mayor of the city of
Manila. His intention to suppress the social evil was commendable. His
methods were unlawful. His regard for the writ of habeas corpus issued by
the court was only tardily and reluctantly acknowledged.
In resume — as before stated, no further action on the writ of habeas
corpus is necessary. The respondents Hohmann, Rodriguez, Ordax, Joaquin,
Yñigo, and Diaz are found not to be in contempt of court. Respondent
Lukban is found in contempt of court and shall pay into the office of the
clerk of the Supreme Court within five days the sum of one hundred pesos
(P100). The motion of the fiscal of the city of Manila to strike from the
record the Replica al Memorandum de los Recurridos of January 25, 1919, is
granted. Costs shall be taxed against respondents. So ordered.
7. Fletcher v. Director of BuCor, UDK14071, 17 July 2009
If it appears that the person to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of
an officer under process issued by a court or judge; or by virtue of a
judgment or order of a court of record, and that court or judge had
jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the
writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is
allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or
defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be
held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an
offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under
lawful judgment
Facts:
Petitioner Martin Gibbs Fletcher seeks his release from prison in this
petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus. He claims that his
prison sentence of 12 to 17 years was commuted by then President Fidel V.
Ramos to nine to 12 years. Since he had already served 14 years, three
months and 12 days, including his good conduct allowance, his continued
imprisonment is illegal.[1]
In its return to the writ, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) posited
that the petition should be denied for failure to comply with Section 3, Rule
102 of the Rules of Court. In particular, the petition was neither signed nor
verified by petitioner or a person on his behalf or by his purported counsel.
Moreover, it was not accompanied by a copy of the cause of petitioner's
detention or commitment order.

The OSG further opposed the issuance of the writ on the following grounds:
petitioner's prison sentence was never commuted by then President Ramos;
he had not been granted the status of a colonist; there were other pending
cases against him warranting his continued detention[2] and he was put
under custody by virtue of a judicial process or a valid judgment.
Issues:
Should the petition for habeas curpos dimissed?
Ruling:
We disagree with the OSG insofar as it argues that the petition should be
dismissed for failure to comply with Section 3, Rule 102 of the Rules of
Court. Strict compliance with the technical requirements for a habeas
corpus petition as provided in the Rules of Court may be dispensed with
where the allegations in the application are sufficient to make out a case for
habeas corpus. In Angeles v. Director of New Bilibid Prison,[3] we held that
the formalities required for petitions for habeas corpus shall be construed
liberally. The petition for the writ is required to be verified but the defect in
form is not fatal.[4] Indeed, in the landmark case of Villavicencio v. Lukban,[5]
this Court declared that it is the duty of a court to issue the writ if there is
evidence that a person is unjustly restrained of his liberty within its
jurisdiction even if there is no application therefor. So long as this Court sits,
technicality cannot trump liberty. Therefore, a petition which is deficient in
form, such as petitioner's petition-letter in this case, may be entertained so
long as its allegations sufficiently make out a case for habeas corpus.
Nonetheless, we agree with the OSG that petitioner is not entitled to the
issuance of the writ.
The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or
detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty.[10] However,
Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. - If it appears that
the person to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer
under process issued by a court or judge; or by virtue of a judgment or
order of a court of record, and that court or judge had jurisdiction to issue
the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be
allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person
shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process,
judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the
discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the
Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.
(emphasis supplied)
Plainly stated, the writ obtains immediate relief for those who have been
illegally confined or imprisoned without sufficient cause. The writ, however,
should not be issued when the custody over the person is by virtue of a
judicial process or a valid judgment.[11]
It is undisputed that petitioner was convicted of estafa in Criminal Case No.
95-995.[12] On June 24, 1996, he was sentenced to imprisonment of 12 years
of prision mayor as minimum to 17 years and four months of reclusion
temporal as maximum, with payment of actual damages of P102,235.56
Case #8
Aquino vs. Esperon
Doctrine:
-A regular officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines shall be under the
Articles of War.
- Only after a thorough and impartial investigation thereof have been made,
that a charge be referred to a general court-martial for trial.
- This Court has declared that habeas corpus is not the proper mode to
question conditions of confinement but the writ of habeas corpus will only lie
if what is challenged is the fact or duration of confinement
Facts:
On 3 February 2006, Major Aquino, along with several military men,
allegedly met at the resthouse of Captain Aldomovar near Camp Tecson,
San Miguel, Bulacan to plot a breach of the Camp Defense Plan of Camp
General Emilio Aguinaldo and to take over Camp Aquinaldo, as well as the
Headquarters of the Philippine Army. On 26 February 2006, in the wake of
the group’s alleged withdrawal of support from the Armed Forces of the
Philippines chain of command and the current administration of President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Major Aquino was ordered arrested and confined
at the Intelligence Service Group of the Philippine Army in Fort Bonifacio,
Taguig, upon the order of Lt. Gen. Hermogenes C. Esperon, (Lt. Gen.
Esperon) who was then the Commanding General of the Philippine Army.
On the same day, Lt. Gen. Esperon ordered the Army Inspector General to
conduct an investigation. During the investigation, Major Aquino denied the
accusations hurled against him. He intimated, inter alia, that he had no plan
nor did he make any pronouncement of withdrawing support from the chain
of command, and that he pledged to continue to support the same and the
duly constituted authorities.7
On 4 March 2006, the panel of investigators submitted its Investigation
Report to the Commanding General of the Philippine Army. In its report, the
panel of investigators found that the troop movement8 by some military
personnel from their respective stations to Manila was illegal, implicating
Major Aquino.
The panel of investigators recommended that: 1) all implicated officers
therein mentioned be immediately relieved from their respective posts; and
2) appropriate charges be filed before the General Court Martial against
Major Aquino, among other military officers/personnel, for violations of
Article 6710 (Attempting to Begin or Create Mutiny); and Article 97.
Further, the panel’s Investigation Report was referred by Lt. Gen. Esperon to
the Judge Advocate General’s Office (JAGO) of the Philippine Army for
review. On 17 March 2006, the JAGO found the existence of probable cause
against Major Aquino, among other military officers, for violations of Article
9613 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman), Article 97
(Disorders and Neglects Prejudicial to Good Order and Military Discipline),
and Article 67 (Attempting to Begin or Create Mutiny) of the Articles of War.
Per said Supplemental Affidavit, it was revealed that subj Officers met at the
resthouse of CPT ALDOMOVAR near the so-called tower area in Camp
Tecson, San Miguel, Bulacan, on the evening of 03 Feb 2006, discuss and
plot their plan to breach the Camp Defense Plan of Camp General Emilio
Aguinaldo and hatch a plan to take over Camp Aguinaldo and [the]
Headquarters [of the] Philippine Army. x x x.14
On the basis of JAGO’s recommendations, Col. Jose R. Recuenco (Col.
Recuenco), then Army Provost Marshal, signed under oath a charge sheet15
against Major Aquino, charging the latter with violations of Article 67
(Attempting to Begin or Create Mutiny)16 and Article 9617 (Conduct
Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman) of the Articles of War, which was
indorsed to the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP).
On 12 July 2006, Lt. Gen. Esperon issued an Order18 to the Commanding
Officer, 191st, MP Bn to exercise custodial responsibility of Major Aquino,
together with the other implicated military personnel who withdrew their
support from the chain of command in February 2006, and to place them in
confinement at the Philippine Army Detention Center, Camp Capinpin,
Tanay, Rizal. The same Order also designated the aforementioned
Commanding Officer to exercise direct supervision and control over the
concerned detainees.19
On 20 July 2006, the charge sheet against Major Aquino was amended to set
forth more detailed specifications of the charges.20 It, however, retained the
charges against Major Aquino as stated in the original charge sheet—i.e.
violation of Article 67 (Attempting to Begin or Create a Mutiny) and Article
96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman) of the Articles of War.
On 20 July 2006, the Judge Advocate General of the AFP General
Headquarters of the AFP issued Office Order Number 14-06, creating a Pre-
trial Investigation Panel21 for the case of Major Aquino, et al.
On 21 July 2006, petitioner filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus22 with the
Court of Appeals, praying that the AFP Chief of Staff and the Commanding
General of the Philippine Army, or whoever are acting in their place and
stead, be directed to immediately produce the body of Major Aquino and
explain forthwith why he should not be set at liberty without delay. The
case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 95341.
In the meantime, the Pre-trial Investigation Panel of the AFP issued a
Subpoena/Notice of Pre-trial Investigation23 to Major Aquino, summoning
him to appear in person before the panel and to submit his counter-
affidavits and affidavits of witnesses.
After hearing,25 the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision26 dated 31 August
2006, denying the Petition for Habeas Corpus.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the 31 August 2006
Decision, but, the Court of Appeals denied the same and found no reason to
disturb its judgment.
Hence, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Issues:
1.WHETHER OR NOT THE [COURT OF APPEALS] ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
PREFERMENT OF THE CHARGE SHEET AGAINST ARMY MAJOR AQUINO IS
EQUIVALENT TO FORMALLY CHARGING THE LATTER AS CONTEMPLATED IN
ARTICLE 70 OF THE ARTICLES OF WAR.
2.WHETHER OR NOT THE [COURT OF APPEALS] ERRED IN RULING THAT
THERE IS LEGAL BASIS IN PLACING ARMY MAJOR AQUINO IN SOLITARY
CONFINEMENT IN A MAXIMUM SECURITY DETENTION FACILITY.
3.WHETHER OR NOT THE [COURT OF APPEALS] ERRED IN RULING THAT
ARMY MAJOR AQUINO’S SOLITARY CONFINEMENT IN A MAXIMUM
SECURITY DETENTION FACILITY IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS
OF ARTICLE 70 OF THE ARTICLES OF WAR.32
Ruling:
Anent the first issue, petitioner assails the legality of Major Aquino’s
confinement on the ground that the latter had not been formally charged. It
is petitioner’s theory that charges can only be deemed formally filed after a
thorough and impartial investigation shall have been made.33 Thus,
petitioner suggests that the word "charge" as used in Article 7034 of the
Articles of War means that a person is formally charged only after the
conduct of a mandatory pre-trial investigationThus, according to petitioner,
the filing of a formal charge can only be done after the conclusion of the
pre-trial investigation, when the case is referred to the general court-
martial, akin to the conduct of a preliminary investigation in civilian courts.35
We are not persuaded.
First, it is established that Major Aquino is governed by military law. Article
2 of the Articles of War36 circumscribes the jurisdiction of military law only
over persons subject thereto. Major Aquino, G3 of the First Scout Ranger
Regiment (FSRR) of the Special Operation Command of the Philippine Army,
is subject to military law.
As a regular officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Major Aquino
falls squarely under Article 2 of the Articles of War. Consequently, he is
subject to the applicable provisions of the Articles of War and Executive
Order No. 178;37 or the Manual for Courts-Martial, Philippine Army.
Second, a scrutiny of the confinement of Major Aquino proves that the
same is valid.
Article 70 of the Articles of War governs the cases of arrest or confinement,
viz.:
Evidently, Article 70 of the Articles of War empowers the commanding
officer to place, in confinement or in arrest, any person subject to military
law charged with a crime or with a serious offense under the Articles of
War. Article 70 is the authority for enabling the proper military personnel to
put an instant end to criminal or unmilitary conduct, and to impose such
restraint as may be necessary upon the person of a military offender, with a
view of his trial by court-martial
We juxtapose Article 70 with Article 71 of the Articles of War. Under military
law, the conduct of investigations is governed by Article 71 of the Articles of
War
No charge will be referred to a general court-martial for trial until after a
thorough and impartial investigation thereof shall have been made. This
investigation will include inquiries as to the truth of the matter set forth in
said charges, form of charges, and what disposition of the case should be
made in the interest of justice and discipline. At such investigation[,] full
opportunity shall be given to the accused to cross-examine witnesses
against him if they are available and to present anything he may desire in
his own behalf, either in defense or mitigation, and the investigating officer
shall examine available witnesses requested by the accused. If the charges
are forwarded after such investigation, they shall be accompanied by a
statement of the substance of the testimony taken on both sides.
Before directing the trial of any charge by general court-martial[,] the
appointing authority will refer it to his Staff Judge Advocate for
consideration and advice.
When any person subject to military law is placed in arrest or confinement
immediate steps will be taken to try the person accused or to dismiss the
charge and release him. Any officer who is responsible for unnecessary
delay in investigating or carrying the case to a final conclusion shall be
punished as a court-martial may direct. When a person is held for a trial by
general court-martial, the commanding officer, within eight days after the
accused is arrested or confined, if practicable, forward the charges to the
officer exercising general court-martial jurisdiction and furnish the accused
a copy of such charges. If the same be not practicable, he will report to
superior authority the reasons for delay. The trial judge advocate will cause
to be served upon the accused a copy of the charges upon which trial is to
be had, and a failure so to serve such charges will be ground for a
continuance unless the trial be had on the charges furnished the accused as
hereinbefore provided. In time of peace[,] no person shall, against his
objection, be brought to trial before a general court-martial within a period
of five days subsequent to the service of charges upon him. (As amended by
RA 242). (Emphasis supplied.)
The formal written accusation in court-martial practice consists of two
parts, the technical charge and the specification.40 The charge, where the
offense alleged is a violation of the articles, merely indicates the article the
accused is alleged to have violated while the specifications sets forth the
specific facts and circumstances relied upon as constituting the violation.41
Each specification, together with the charge under which it is placed,
constitutes a separate accusation.42 The term "charges" or "charges and
specifications" is applied to the formal written accusation or accusations
against an accused.43
The first part of Article 71 of the Articles of War categorically provides that
charges and specifications must be signed by a person subject to military
law, who under oath states that he either has personal knowledge of, or has
investigated, the matters set forth therein and that the same are true in
fact, to the best of his knowledge and belief. Further, the second paragraph
of Article 71 explicitly provides that no charge will be referred to a general
court-martial for trial until after a thorough and impartial investigation
thereof shall have been made. A charge is made followed by a thorough and
impartial investigation and if the result of the investigation so warrants, the
charge is referred to the general court martial. Contrary to petitioner’s
contention, Article 71 makes no qualification that there can be a "charge"
against a person subject to military law only if a pre-trial has been
completed and the case has been referred to a court martial. What Article
71 instructs is that no charges, i.e. charges and specifications signed by a
person subject to military law under oath, may be referred to a general
court-martial for trial until after a thorough and impartial investigation
thereof shall have been made. Article 71 does not make the thorough and
impartial investigation a prerequisite before charges may be filed against a
person subject to military law. Clearly, the thorough and impartial
investigation is a prerequisite not to making a charge against a person
subject to military law, but to the referral of the charge to the general court
martial. It is the charge which comes prior to the investigation, and which
sets into motion the investigation.
We find that there was compliance with the requirements of the Articles of
War. As shown by the evidence on record, the amended charge sheets44
against Major Aquino, containing the charges and the specifications for
violations of Article 67 (Attempting to Begin or Create Mutiny) and Article
96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman) of the Articles of War,
were personally signed under oath by Capt. Armando P. Paredes, a person
subject to military law. The amended charge sheets were sworn to by the
accuser, Capt. Armando P. Paredes in the manner provided under Article
71.45 As it is, Major Aquino stands charged in court martial proceedings for
alleged violations of the Articles of War.
Perforce, we do not find that the Court of Appeals erred in denying
petitioner’s Petition for Habeas Corpus for the person of Major Aquino. A
writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or
detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the
rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled to it.50 As
a general rule, the writ of habeas corpus will not issue where the person
alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under a
process issued by the court which has jurisdiction to do so.51 Its essential
object and purpose is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint and
to relieve a person from it if such restraint is illegal.52 In the case at bar,
Major Aquino stands charged in court martial proceedings for alleged
violations of Article 67 (Attempting to Begin or Create Mutiny) and Article
96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman) of the Articles of War.
The legality of Major Aquino’s restraint having been settled, the privilege of
the writ is unavailing.
We proceed to discuss jointly the second and third issues raised by the
petitioner before this Court.
Petitioner contends that in his confinement, Major Aquino was not
restricted to his barracks, quarters or tent as mandated by Article 70 of the
Articles of War; rather, he was placed in solitary confinement in a maximum
security detention cell. When petitioner proceeded to the detention cell,
she alleged that she was restricted from visiting her husband.53 Petitioner
asserts that these are extreme punishments akin to treating Major Aquino
as a convicted criminal.54
We are not impressed.
At this juncture, it must be stressed that respondents deny the solitary
confinement of Major Aquino.55 According to respondents, Major Aquino is
confined in a U-shaped building without any division/partition.56 The place is
described as a long hall with 50 double-deck beds.57 Respondents also
asseverate that Major Aquino is confined along with 16 other military
personnel who were similarly charged in the 23-24 February 2006
incident.58
While it is true that the extraordinary writ of habeas corpus is the
appropriate remedy to inquire into questions of violations of constitutional
right,59 this Court, however, does not find the conditions of Major Aquino’s
confinement to be a proper subject of inquiry in the instant Petition.
This Court has declared that habeas corpus is not the proper mode to
question conditions of confinement.
Furthermore, the following guidelines were given by the Court to determine
if an action constitutes punishment, to wit: (1) that action causes the inmate
to suffer some harm or "disability," and (2) the purpose of the action is to
punish the inmate.63 It is also an additional requisite that the harm or
disability be significantly greater than, or be independent of, the inherent
discomforts of confinement.64 We do not see the attendance of the
foregoing factors in the instant case. There are no specific facts that are
brought to the attention of this Court to indicate the punitive character of
the confinement. The confinement is not herein imposed as a punishment.
We do not see that the confinement of Major Aquino causes him to suffer
some harm or disability.1avvphi1 There is no punitive hardship that exists in
the case at bar. In fact, petitioner does not even allege a single act which
would show such harm or such "disability" as to prove that the same is
significantly greater than, or independent of, the inherent discomforts of
confinement.1avvphi1
To be sure, the first part of Article 70 of the Articles of War grants discretion
to military authorities over the imposition of arrest or confinement of
persons subject to military law charged with crime or with serious offense.
Major Aquino is charged with violations of Article 67, for attempting to
begin or create mutiny, and Article 97, for Conduct Unbecoming an Officer
and Gentleman. According to Article 67, any person subject to military law
who attempts to create or who begins, excites, causes or joins in any mutiny
shall suffer death or such other punishment as a court-martial may direct. It
cannot be gainsaid that in determining the "circumstances" of arrest and
confinement in Article 70 of persons charged with crime or with serious
offense, such circumstances as the gravity of the offense charged may be
considered.
Anent petitioner’s allegation that she was restricted from visiting Major
Aquino, the Court had in the past underscored the "hands-off doctrine"—a
deference given by courts to military custodians over prison matters,
especially on blanket restrictions on contact visit.
As a rule, therefore, the writ of habeas corpus does not extend into
questions of conditions of confinement; but only to the fact and duration of
confinement. The high prerogative writ of habeas corpus was devised and
exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful
restraint.66 Its object is to inquire into the legality of one’s detention, and if
found illegal, to order the release of the detainee.67 It is not a means for the
redress of grievances or to seek injunctive relief or damages.
The ruling in this case, however, does not foreclose the right of detainees
and convicted prisoners from petitioning the courts for the redress of
grievances. Regulations and conditions in detention and prison facilities that
violate the Constitutional rights of the detainees and prisoners will be
reviewed by the courts on a case-by-case basis. The courts could afford
injunctive relief or damages to the detainees and prisoners subjected to
arbitrary and inhumane conditions. However, habeas corpus is not the
proper mode to question conditions of confinement. The writ of habeas
corpus will only lie if what is challenged is the fact or duration of
confinement.68 (Emphasis supplied.)
In sum, we find the present Petition to be devoid of merit.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. No costs. SO ORDERED.
9. Ampatuan v. Macaraig, 29 June 2010
“The objective of the writ is to determine whether the confinement or
detention is valid or lawful. If it is, the writ cannot be issued. What is to be
inquired into is the legality of a person's detention as of, at the earliest, the
filing of the application for the writ of habeas corpus, for even if the
detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of some supervening
events, such as the instances mentioned in Section 4 of Rule 102, be no
longer illegal at the time of the filing of the application.[16]
Plainly stated, the writ obtains immediate relief for those who have been
illegally confined or imprisoned without sufficient cause. The writ, however,
should not be issued when the custody over the person is by virtue of a
judicial process or a valid judgment”
“a petition for habeas corpus will be given due course only if it shows that
petitioner is being detained or restrained of his liberty unlawfully, but a
restrictive custody and monitoring of movements or whereabouts of police
officers under investigation by their superiors is not a form of illegal
detention or restraint of liberty”
“While habeas corpus is a writ of right, it will not issue as a matter of course
or as a mere perfunctory operation on the filing of the petition. Judicial
discretion is called for in its issuance and it must be clear to the judge to
whom the petition is presented that, prima facie, the petitioner is entitled to
the writ. It is only if the court is satisfied that a person is being unlawfully
restrained of his liberty will the petition for habeas corpus be granted. If the
respondents are not detaining or restraining the applicant or the person in
whose behalf the petition is filed, the petition should be dismissed”
Facts:
Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head of the COMELEC Legal Department, was killed
at the corner of M. H. Del Pilar and Pedro Gil Streets, Ermita, Manila.
Investigation conducted by the Manila Police District Homicide Section
yielded the identity of the male perpetrator as PO1 Ampatuan.
Consequently, PO1 Ampatuan was commanded to the MPD District Director
for proper disposition. Likewise, inquest proceedings were conducted by the
Manila Prosecutor’s Office.
On 18 April 2008, Police Senior Superintendent Guinto, rendered his Pre-
Charge Evaluation Report against PO1 Ampatuan, finding probable cause to
charge PO1 Ampatuan with Grave Misconduct (Murder) and recommending
that said PO1 Ampatuan be subjected to summary hearing.
Meanwhile, on 21 April 2008, the City Prosecutor of Manila recommended
that the case against PO1 Ampatuan be set for further investigation and
that the latter be released from custody unless he is being held for other
charges/legal grounds.
Armed with the 21 April 2008 recommendation of the Manila City’s
Prosecution Office, petitioner, who is the wife of PO1 Ampatuan, filed a
Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus before the RTC of
Manila on 22 April 2008.
On 24 April 2008, RTC ordered the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus
commanding therein respondents to produce the body of PO1 Ampatuan
and directing said respondents to show cause why they are withholding or
restraining the liberty of PO1 Ampatuan.
Seeking the reversal of RTC, the respondents averred that the filing of the
administrative case against PO1 Ampatuan is a process done by the PNP and
this Court has no authority to order the release of the subject police officer.
The petitioner countered that the letter resignation of PO1 Ampatuan has
rendered the administrative case moot and academic. Respondent however
stressed that the resignation has not been acted by the appropriate police
officials of the PNP, and that the administrative case was filed while PO1
Ampatuan is still in the active status of the PNP. The RTC reversed and
dismissed the petition.
Issues:
WON the arrest is illegal and won the writ is applicable
Ruling:
In this case, PO1 Ampatuan has been placed under Restrictive Custody.
Republic Act No. 6975 (also known as the Department of Interior and Local
Government Act of 1990), as amended by Republic Act No. 8551 (also
known as the Philippine National Police Reform and Reorganization Act of
1998), clearly provides that members of the police force are subject to the
administrative disciplinary machinery of the PNP. Section 41(b) of the said
law enumerates the disciplinary actions, including restrictive custody that
may be imposed by duly designated supervisors and equivalent officers of
the PNP as a matter of internal discipline
Given that PO1 Ampatuan has been placed under restrictive custody, such
constitutes a valid argument for his continued detention. This Court has
held that a restrictive custody and monitoring of movements or
whereabouts of police officers under investigation by their superiors is not a
form of illegal detention or restraint of liberty.[26]
Restrictive custody is, at best, nominal restraint which is beyond the ambit
of habeas corpus. It is neither actual nor effective restraint that would call
for the grant of the remedy prayed for. It is a permissible precautionary
measure to assure the PNP authorities that the police officers concerned are
always accounted for.[27]
Since the basis of PO1 Ampatuan's restrictive custody is the administrative
case filed against him, his remedy is within such administrative process.
We likewise note that PO1 Ampatuan has been under restrictive custody
since 19 April 2008. To date, the administrative case against him should
have already been resolved and the issue of his restrictive custody should
have been rendered moot and academic
Having conceded that there is no grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the trial court, we have to dismiss the petition.
In sum, petitioner is unable to discharge the burden of showing that she is
entitled to the issuance of the writ prayed for in behalf of her husband, PO1
Ampatuan. The petition fails to show on its face that the latter is unlawfully
deprived of his liberty guaranteed and enshrined in the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DISMISSED for
lack of merit

Case #10
Harden vs. Director of Prisons
Doctrine: The property moved into foreign jurisdiction is still covered by
Philippine jurisdiction. “While a court cannot give its receiver authority to act
in another state without the assistance of the courts thereof, yet it may act
directly upon the parties before it with respect to the property beyond the
limits of its territorial jurisdiction, and hold them in contempt if they resist
the court’s orders with reference to its custody or disposition.”
Facts:
The proceedings for contempt arose in a civil case between Mrs. Harden as
plaintiff and the petitioner and another person as defendants, commenced
on July 12, 1941, and involving the administration of a conjugal partnership,
payment of alimony, and accounting. In that case, a receiver was appointed
and a preliminary injunction was issued restraining Fred M. Harden and his
codefendant, Jose Salumbides, from transferring or alienating, except for a
valuable consideration and with the consent of the court first had and
obtained, moneys, shares of stock, and other properties and assets, real or
personal, belonging to the aforesaid partnership, and which might be found
in the names of said defendants or either of them.
Fred M. Harden transferred to the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking
Corporation and the Chartered Bank of India, Australia & China, both in
Hongkong, over P1,000,000 in drafts or cash; to Virginia Recreation Center,
Long Beach, California, P20,196.80, and to an unknown person, P50,000.
Mrs. Harden moved the court to order Harden to return all these amounts
and to redeposit them with the Manila branch of the Chartered Bank of
India, Australia & China. Judge Peña granted the motion .
After a petition for certiorari was instituted by Harden in the Supreme Court
and decided, and after various motions were filed and heard, Judge Peña,
on March 27, 1948, entered an order, which was a modification of that of
October 7, 1947, directing Harden "to deposit with the Manila Branch of the
Chartered Bank of India, Australia & China within five days from receipt of a
copy of this order the money and drafts that he has actually in Hongkong,
without prejudice to passing upon later on the different amounts that the
defendant has spent according to his attorney, after he has submitted to the
court an itemized account of those expenses.
The receiver appointed in the main case prayed that the certificates of stock
of the conjugal partnership be ordered turned over to him (receiver) so that
he might have them registered in pursuance of the provisions of Republic
Act No. 62. On June 7, 1947, the court "authorized" Harden "to register not
later than June 30, 1947 the stock certificates in his possession, notifying
the court afterwards of such action.
On July 28, 1947, Mrs. Harden complained that her husband failed to
comply with the above order and prayed that he be ordered to show cause
why he should not be declared in contempt. In his "compliance" dated
August 7, 1947, Harden stated that he had been granted an extension until
December 31, 1947, within which to register the Balatoc Mining Co. shares
under Republic Act No. 62.
In a motion dated January 7, 1948, the receiver informed the court that,
notwithstanding the expiration on December 31, 1947, of Harden's
extended time to comply with Republic Act No. 62, the records of the
Balatoc Mining Co. showed that the certificate had not been registered as of
January 7, 1948; and upon his request, an order dated January 17, 1948,
was issued giving Harden "an extension until March 31, 1948 within which
to comply with the Order dated June 7, 1947."
In a motion dated March 15, 1948, Mrs. Harden prayed for the reasons
therein stated, that defendant Harden "be ordered to deliver the
certificates covering the 368,553 Balatoc Mining Co. shares either to the
Clerk of this Court or to the Receiver herein for safekeeping, immediately
after registering them pursuant to Republic Act No. 62." On March 24, 1948,
Harden filed a motion stating that the registration of shares of stock under
Republic Act No. 62 had been extended until June 30, 1948, and prayed that
he "be allowed to register the stock certificates in question within such
period as by law or regulations is or may be provided."
It was at this stage of the case that the present petitioner was committed to
jail.
Broadly speaking, the grounds for relief by habeas corpus are only (1)
deprivation of any fundamental or constitutional rights, (2) lack of
jurisdiction of the court to impose the sentence, or (3) excessive penalty.
(Santiago vs. Director of Prisons, 1 L-1083, Jan. 30, 1947, 44 Off. Gaz., 1231.)
Issues:
WON the property moved into foreign jurisdiction is still covered by
Philippine jurisdiction.
Ruling:
The fact that the property is in a foreign country is said to deprive the court
of jurisdiction, the remedy in such case being, it is contended, ancillary
receivership. We can not agree with this view.
While a court can not give its receiver authority to act in another state
without the assistance of the courts thereof (53 C. J., 390-391), yet it may
act directly upon the parties before it with respect to property beyond the
territorial limits of its jurisdiction, and hold them in contempt if they resist
the court's orders with reference to its custody or disposition (Id. 118)
Whether the property was removed before or after the appointment of the
receiver is likewise immaterial.
In Sercomb vs. Catlin, 21 N. E., 606-608, the Supreme Court of Illinois said:
It is true that the property attached is beyond the jurisdiction of the
courts of this state, but the appellant, who caused it to be attached,
is in this state, and within the jurisdiction of its courts. If the
superior court had no power to reach the goods in Newton's hands,
it had the power to reach appellant, who sought to prevent its
receiver from getting possession of the goods. It makes no
difference that the property was in a foreign jurisdiction.
The punishment meted out to the petitioner is not excessive. It is suitable
and adapted to its objective; and it accords with section 7, Rule 64, of the
Rules of Court which provides that "when the contempt consists in the
omission to do an act which is yet in the power of the accused to perform,
he may be imprisoned by order of a superior court until he performs it.
The latter decision cites Stanley vs. South Jersey Realty Co., 83 N.J. Eq. 300,
90 A., 1042, 1043, in which the theory is expressed in this language:
In a "civil contempt" the proceeding is remedial, it is a step in the
case the object of which is to coerce one party for the benefit of the
other party to do or to refrain from doing some act specified in the
order of the court. Hence, if imprisonment be ordered, it is remedial
in purpose and coercive in character, and to that end must relate to
something to be done by the defendant by the doing of which he
many discharge himself. As quaintly expressed, the imprisoned man
"carries the keys to his prison in his own pocket."
The failure of the order of commitment to state that the acts which the
contemner fails to do are still in his power to perform, does not void the
order of imprisonment. Section 7 of Rule 64 does not require such finding to
appear in the order, unlike section 1219 of the Code of Civil Procedure of
California on which the petitioner's contention is rested. Petitioner is in
error in saying that section 237 of the former Philippine Code of Civil
Procedure, from which section 7 of Rule 64, supra, has been copied, was of
California origin. Former Justice Fisher is authority for the statement that
section 237 of Act No. 190 was borrowed from section 1456 of the Ohio
Code of Civil Procedure. (Fisher's Code of Civil Procedure, 3rd ed., p. 136.)
The exact similarity in substance though not in language between the two
provisions is a confirmation of this statement.
At any rate, the order of commitment contains the alleged missing element
if it is taken, as it should be taken, in connection with the orders of October
7, 1947, and March 27, 1948, and with the charges for contempt. It
expressly gives non-compliance with the two last mentioned orders as the
grounds for the warrant of commitment, and thus by reference makes them
part of it. The orders of October 7, 1947, and March 27, 1948, in turn clearly
specify the acts with the petitioner was commanded to fulfill. It is equally
clear from these orders that in the opinion of the court the petitioner is in a
position to bring back to the Philippines from Hongkong part of the cash and
the Balatoc shares he had remitted to that colony.
Whether or not in truth the court's findings are supported by sufficient
evidence is a different matter; it is a matter of fact which can not be
reviewed by habeas corpus.

In a long line of decisions, this Court has steadfastly held that habeas corpus
does not lie to correct errors of fact or law. When a court has jurisdiction of
the offense charged and of the party who is so charged, its judgment, order
or decree is not subject to collateral attack by habeas corpus. the writ of
habeas corpus can not be made to perform the function of a writ of error;
and this holds true even if the judgment, orders or decree was erroneous,
provided it is within the jurisdiction of the court which rendered such
judgment or issued such an order or decree. (Slade Perkins vs. Director of
Prisons, supra; Santiago vs. Director of Prisons, supra.) So whether the act
charged has been committed or can still be performed is conclusively
determined by the order or judgment of the trial court in the proceeding
wherein the petitioner for habeas corpus is adjudged in contempt. (Ex-parte
Fisher, 206 S.W. 2d. 1000.).

The petition is denied with costs.