FAIRLAND KNITCRAFT VS.

PO

FACTS:

In a complaint for unlawful detainer, Fairland alleged that it was the owner of Condominium Unit in Cedar Mansion II on Pasig City. The
said unit was leased by Fairland to Po by verbal agreement for P20,000.00 a month, to be paid by Po at the beginning of each month.
From March 2011, Po had continuously failed to pay rent. For said reason, Fairland opted not to renew the lease agreement anymore.

On January 30, 2012, Fairland sent a formal letter demanding Po to pay the rental arrears, and that he vacate within 15 days from the
receipt of the letter. Despite receipt of the demand letter and the lapse of the said 15-day period to comply, Po neither tendered
payment for the unpaid rent nor vacated the premises. Thus, on December 12, 2012, Fairland was constrained to file the complaint for
unlawful detainer before the MeTC. Po failed to file an answer. Hence, on February 6, 2013, Fairland filed a motion to render judgment.

In its February 21, 2013 Order, the MeTC considered the case submitted for decision.On March 1, 2013, Po's counsel filed his Entry of
Appearance with Motion for Leave of Court to file Comment/Opposition to Motion to Render Judgment. In the attached
Comment/Opposition, Po denied the allegations against him and commented that there was no supporting document that would show
that Fairland owned the property; that there was no lease contract between them; that there were no documents attached to the
complaint which would show that previous demands had been made and received by him; that the alleged unpaid rental was
P220,000.00, but the amount of damages being prayed for was P440,000.00; that the issue in the case was one of ownership; and that
it was the RTC which had jurisdiction over the case.

The MeTC treated the comment/opposition as Po's answer to the complaint. Considering, however, that the case fell under the Rules of
Summary Procedure, the same was deemed filed out of time. Hence, the motion was denied.

The MeTC dismissed the complaint for lack of merit due to Fairland's failure to prove its claim by preponderance of evidence. Fairland
filed its appeal before the RTC which was denied. Fairland filed a petition for review before the CA which was dismissed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the MeTC correctly dismissed the case for lack of preponderance of evidence.

RULING:

NO! Under the Rules of Summary Procedure, the weight of evidence is not considered when a judgment is rendered based on the
complaint. The Court posits that judgment should have been rendered in Fairland’s favor on the basis of the complaint itself and not on
its failure to adduce proof of ownership over the subject property.

The summons, together with the complaint and its annexes, was served upon Po on December 28, 2012. This presupposes that the
MeTC found no ground to dismiss the action for unlawful detainer. Nevertheless, Po failed to file his answer on time and the MeTC had
the option to render judgment motu proprio or on motion of the plaintiff. Sections 5 and 6 of the Rules on Summary Procedure provide:

Sec. 5. Answer. - Within ten (10) days from service of summons, the defendant shall file his answer to the complaint and serve a copy
thereof on the plaintiff. Affirmative and negative defenses not pleaded therein shall be deemed waived, except for lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter. Cross-claims and compulsory counterclaims not asserted in the answer shall be considered barred. The
answer to counterclaims or cross-claims shall be filed and served within ten (10) days from service of the answer in which they are
pleaded.

Sec. 6. Effect of failure to answer. - Should the defendant fail to answer the complaint within the period above provided, the court, motu
proprio or on motion of the plaintiff, shall render judgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint and limited
to what is prayed for therein. The court may in its discretion reduce the amount of damages and attorney's fees claimed for being
excessive or otherwise unconscionable, without prejudice to the applicability of Section 4, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, if there are two
or more defendants.

Section 6 is clear that in case the defendant failed to file his answer, the court shall render judgment, either motu proprio or upon
plaintiffs motion, based solely on the facts alleged in the complaint and limited to what is prayed for. The failure of the defendant
to timely file his answer and to controvert the claim against him constitutes his acquiescence to every allegation stated in the complaint.
Logically, there is nothing to be done in this situation26 except to render judgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the
complaint.27

Similarly, under Section 7, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, which governs the rules for forcible entry and unlawful detainer, if the
defendant fails to answer the complaint within the period provided, the court has no authority to declare the defendant in default.
Instead, the court, motu proprio or on motion of the plaintiff, shall render judgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the
complaint and limited to what is prayed for.

In this case, Po failed to file his answer to the complaint despite proper service of summons. He also failed to provide a sufficient
justification to excuse his lapses. Thus, as no answer was filed, judgment must be rendered by the court as may be warranted by the
facts alleged in the complaint.

Failure to attach annexes is not fatal if the complaint alleges a sufficient cause of action; evidence need not be attached to the
complaint
The lower courts erroneously dismissed the complaint of Fairland simply on the ground that it failed to establish by preponderance of
evidence its ownership over the subject property. As can be gleaned above, the rules do not compel the plaintiff to attach his evidence
to the complaint because, at this inception stage, he only has to file his complaint to establish his cause of action. Here, the court was
only tasked to determine whether the complaint of Fairland alleged a sufficient cause of action and to render judgment thereon.

Also, there was no need to attach proof of ownership in the complaint because the allegations therein constituted a sufficient cause of
action for unlawful detainer. Only when the allegations in the complaint are insufficient to form a cause of action shall the attachment
become material in the determination thereof. Even under Section 4 of the Rules of Summary Procedure, it is not mandatory to attach
annexes to the complaint.

Second, Fairland sufficiently alleged ownership and superior right of possession over the subject property. These allegations were
evidently manifest in the complaint as Fairland claimed to have orally agreed to lease the property to Po. The Court is of the view that
these allegations were clear and unequivocal and did not need supporting attachments to be considered as having sufficiently
established its cause of action. Even the MeTC conceded that the complaint of Fairland stated a valid cause of action for unlawful
detainer. It must be stressed that inquiry into the attached documents in the complaint is for the sufficiency, not the veracity, of the
material allegations in the complaint.

Third, considering that Po failed to file an answer within the prescribed period, he was deemed to have admitted all the allegations in
the complaint including Fairland's claim of ownership. To reiterate, the failure of the defendant to timely file his answer and controvert
the claim against him constituted his acquiescence to every allegation stated in the complaint.

Fourth, it is only at the later stage of the summary procedure when the affidavits of witnesses and other evidence on factual issues shall
be presented before the court. Sections 8 and 9 of the Rules on Summary Procedure state:

Sec. 8. Record of preliminary conference. - Within five (5) days after the termination of the preliminary conference, the court shall issue
an order stating the matters taken up therein, x x x

Sec. 9. Submission of affidavits and position papers. - Within ten (10) days from receipt of the order mentioned in the next preceding
section, the parties shall submit the affidavits of their witnesses and other evidence on the factual issues defined in the order,
together with their position papers setting forth the law and the facts relied upon by them.

Again, it is worth stressing that these provisions are exactly Sections 9 and 10 under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.

Accordingly, it is only at this part of the proceedings that the parties will be required to present and offer their evidence before the court
to establish their causes and defenses. Before the issuance of the record of preliminary conference, the parties are not yet required to
present their respective evidence.

These specific provisions under the Rules of Summary Procedure which are also reflected in Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, serve their
purpose to immediately settle ejectment proceedings. "Forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases are summary proceedings designed
to provide for an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or the right to possession of the property involved. It does not admit
of a delay in the determination thereof. It is a 'time procedure' designed to remedy the situation. 35 Thus, as a consequence of the
defendant's failure to file an answer, the court is simply tasked to render judgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the
complaint and limited to what is prayed for therein.

Unlawful detainer is a summary action for the recovery of possession of real property. This action may be filed by a lessor, vendor,
vendee, or other person from whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of
the right to hold possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied. The possession of the defendant was originally legal, as his
possession was permitted by the plaintiff on account of an express or implied contract between them. The defendant's possession,
however, became illegal when the plaintiff demanded that the defendant vacate the subject property due to the expiration or termination
of the right to possess under the contract, and the defendant refused to heed such demand. A case for unlawful detainer must be
instituted one year from the unlawful withholding of possession.

A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it recites the following: (1) initially, possession of the property
by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff; (2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by the
plaintiff to the defendant of the termination of the latter's right of possession; (3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the
property, and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and (4) within one (1) year from the last demand on defendant to vacate
the property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.

The complaint sufficiently alleged that Fairland was the owner of the subject property being leased to Po by virtue of an oral agreement.
There was a demand by Fairland for Po to pay rent and vacate before the complaint for unlawful detainer was instituted. The complaint
was seasonably filed within the one-year period prescribed by law. With all the elements present, there was clearly a cause of action in
the complaint for unlawful detainer.

MARINA VS. MARC PROPERTIES

FACTS:
On October 23, 2001, MARINA entered into a Contract of Lease with Marc Properties; agreed that the MARINA offices will be
transferred from PPL Building, Manila to MARC Building and Condo Unit 5 of MARC 2000 Tower owned by Marc. The parties fixed the
monthly rental at ₱1,263,607.74 (plus VAT) from January 1, 2002 up to December 31, 2002 and renewable for the same one-year
period.
On December 14, 2001, MARINA requested for rescission of their Contract of Lease for the reason that the MARINA Board denied the
proposed transfer of the MARINA office. Marc expressed disappointment and asserted that if the Board will not reconsider its decision,
MARINA must take responsibility for the cost already incurred as damages and lost rental opportunity.

MARINA replied that it is not liable to pay the penalty considering that the Contract of Lease clearly provides that it is subject to the
approval of the Board and the Office of the President to become binding on the parties. MARINA asserted that it is not liable for penalty
and damages since the Contract of Lease was not perfected; however, MARINA committed "to pay actual expenses incurred for the
works done on the premises based on MARINA’s request."

On July 10, 2002, Marc instituted a case in the RTC-Manila against MARINA. MARINA, through the OSG filed their Answer specifically
denying the foregoing allegations. Marc filed a motion for summary judgment in its favor contending that there is no genuine issue in
this case as to any material fact even as to the amount of damages. Petitioners filed their opposition alleging the existence of genuine
factual issues which can only be resolved in a full-blown trial on the merits.

On March 5, 2003, the RTC granted in part the motion for summary judgment.

Marc then moved to set the case for pre-trial, which was granted. MARINA filed a motion for reconsideration arguing that while
admittedly they had offered to pay the Marc reimbursement for the alterations/renovations made on its, MARINA did not admit that such
alterations/renovations were actually made thereon and that such changes were in fact in accordance with the plans prepared and
provided for by MARINA. MARINA stressed that these factual matters are still to be determined which can only be done through a full-
blown trial.

The trial court denied MARINA’s motion for reconsideration. On the scheduled pre-trial hearing, counsel for MARINA appeared but
without a special power of attorney as directed in the Notice of Pre-Trial. On motion of Marc, the trial court declared MARINA in default
and allowed the respondent to present its evidence ex-parte. On appeal, the CA dismissed MARINA’s petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA was correct in sustaining the trial court’s order granting the motion for partial summary judgment.

RULING:

NO! Sections 1 and 3, Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provide:

SECTION 1. Summary judgment for claimant. – A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a
declaratory relief may, at any time after the pleading in answer thereto has been served, move with supporting affidavits, depositions or
admissions for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof.

SECTION 3. Motion and proceedings thereon.– The motion shall be served at least ten (10) days before the time specified for the
hearing. The adverse party may serve opposing affidavits, depositions or admissions at least three (3) days before the hearing. After
the hearing, the judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, supporting affidavits, depositions, and admissions on file,
show that, except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to anymaterial fact and that the moving party is entitled to
a judgment as a matter of law. (Emphasis supplied.)

Summary judgment is a procedural device resorted to in order to avoid long drawn out litigations and useless delays where the
pleadings on file show that there are no genuine issues of fact to be tried. A "genuine issue" is such issue of fact which require the
presentation of evidence as distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived or false claim. There can be no summary judgment where
questions of fact are in issue or where material allegations of the pleadings are in dispute. A party who moves for summary judgment
has the burden of demonstrating clearly the absence of any genuine issue of fact, or that the issue posed in the complaint is so patently
unsubstantial as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial, and any doubt as to the existence of such an issue is resolved against the
movant.27

The Answer filed by petitioners contained a specific denial of absolute liability for the amount being claimed as actual expenses
for repairs/renovations works done on repondent’s building after the execution of the Contract of Lease.

5. SPECIFICALLY DENY the allegation in paragraph 4 of the complaint that MARINA requested for alterations/renovations in
accordance with the plans prepared by MARINA on the MARC building for the account of and at the expense of MARINA, the truth
being those stated in the Special and Affirmative Defenses hereof. They likewise SPECIFICALLY DENY the rest of the allegations
therein that said request alterations/renovations started on December 5, 2001 and was done by the lowest bidders, JTV Construction
Group, Inc., for civil works/renovations and NCC Communication Networks, for wiring and cable installation, for whcih plaintiff allegedly
advanced/paid the sum of P1,555,170.40 for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof.

xxxx
13. As an act of good faith, Atty. Sevilla, in behalf of MARINA, has offered to shoulder and pay the actual expenses incurred for the
works done on the premises based on MARINA’s request. Moreover, defendants cannot allow plaintiff to collect from them the
additional sum of P2,527,215.48 which is equivalent to two (2) months rental as penalty simply because there is no justification therefor.

xxxx

Likewise, the letter of MARINA simply stated that they have committed themselves to pay the actual expenses incurred by Marc as
based on MARINA’s request. It must be noted, however, that said offer specifically pertains only to alterations/renovations which were
actually made on plaintiff’s properties in accordance with MARINA’s request.

Verily, defendants have yet to actually acquiesce to the veracity of the accomplishment reports, receipt, etc. submitted by plaintiff since
the same are still subject to verification which can only be achieved through a full-blown trial.

The fact that MARINA offered to shoulder actual expenses for works done on the premises based on MARINA’s request does not
necessarily mean that MARINA had waived their right to question the amount being claimed by the respondent. Since the factual basis
of the claim for reimbursement was not admitted by the petitioners, it is clear that the resolution of the question of actual works done
based on MARINA’s request, as well as the correctness of the amount actually spent by respondent for the purpose, required a trial for
the presentation of testimonial and documentary evidence to support such claim. The trial court therefore erred in granting summary
judgment for the respondent. The averments in the answer and opposition clearly pose factual issues and hence rendition of summary
judgment would be improper.

It must be stressed that trial courts have limited authority to render summary judgments and may do so only when there is clearly no
genuine issue as to any material fact. When the facts as pleaded by the parties are disputed or contested, proceedings for summary
judgment cannot take the place of trial. As already stated, the burden of demonstrating clearly the absence of genuine issues of fact
rests upon the movant, in this case the respondent, and not upon petitioners who opposed the motion for summary judgment. Any
doubt as to the propriety of the rendition of a summary judgment must thus be resolved against the respondent. But here, the partial
summary judgment was premised merely on the trial court’s hasty conclusion that respondent is entitled to the reimbursement sought
simply because petitioners failed to point out what particular works were not done or implemented not in accordance with MARINA’s
specifications after demands were made by respondent and the filing of the complaint in court.

The partial summary judgment rendered under the trial court’s Order dated March 5, 2003 being a nullity, the case should be remanded
to said court for the conduct of trial on the issue of the reimbursement of expenses for repair/renovation works being claimed by the
respondent. For this purpose, petitioners shall be afforded fair opportunity to scrutinize the respondent’s evidence, cross-examine its
witnesses and present controverting evidence. It is to be noted that the partial summary judgment was rendered before petitioners were
declared non-suited. Petitioners had promptly challenged the validity of the default order and even sought an injunction against the ex-
parte presentation of evidence by the respondent; however, the CA did not act on the matter until the rendition of the trial court’s
December 1, 2003 Decision. Substantial justice in this instance can best be served if a full opportunity is given to both parties to litigate
their dispute and submit the merits of their respective positions.

PEÑA VS. GSIS

FACTS:

On 13 March 1985, Felisa Peña acquired three lots from Queen’s Row Subdivision, Inc. by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale, with a
right to repurchase within two months, for the sum of P126,000.00 plus interest. However, Peña alleged that Queen’s Row Subdivision,
Inc. failed to repurchase said lots and refused to deliver the corresponding titles of the said subdivision lots because the same were
mortgaged to GSIS, allegedly sometime in 1971 and 1972, without the written approval of the HLURB as required by PD 957

Thus, on 21 January 1994, Pena filed a Complaint for Specific Performance, Annulment of Mortgage, and Damages4 before the
HLURB Regional Office against Queen’s Row and GSIS, asking for the cancellation of the mortgage to GSIS and the consolidation of
ownership to her, alleging that the mortgage of the lots was null and void because it had no written approval of the HLURB.

Queen’s Row did not file any responsive pleading. GSIS, on the other hand, filed its Answer asserting that properties had been
mortgaged, foreclosed, and transferred to its name even before the petitioner purchased the same. HLURB, decided in favor of Peña

On 30 January 1996, GSIS filed a Notice of Appeal, which was denied by the HLURB Arbiter. Pena then claimed that for failure of GSIS
to file the proper mode of appeal within the reglementary period before the HLURB, it became final and executory.

On 25 September 1996, GSIS filed a Motion to Declare Judgment Null and Void Ab Initio before the Board of Commissioners, claiming
that the Regional Office of HLURB had no jurisdiction to resolve the Complaint for it involved title to, possession of, or interest in real
estate, the jurisdiction of which belonged to the RTC, which was also denied. GSIS appealed to the Office of the President which was
granted.

Consequently, on 4 June 1999, Pena filed a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure before the CA
which was denied.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Office of the President can set aside and reverse a judgment of the HLURB Regional Office that has long become
final and executory for failure of the respondent to interpose the proper mode of appeal within the reglementary period as provided for
in the 1994 Rules of Procedure of HLURB.

RULING:

NO! Noteworthy is that the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process, except where it is granted by statute in
which case it should be exercised in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. In other words, appeal is a right of
statutory and not of constitutional origin. The perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by law is not only
mandatory but also jurisdictional and the failure of a party to conform to the rules regarding appeal will render the judgment final and
executory and, hence, unappealable, for it is more important that a case be settled than it be settled right. Furthermore, it is axiomatic
that final and executory judgments can no longer be attacked by any of the parties or be modified, directly or indirectly, even by the
highest court of the land. Just as the losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, so also the winning party
has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of the case.

The rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice and their strict and rigid application which would
result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be avoided28 and they cannot be
blindly adhered to if they would serve no other purpose than to put into oblivion the very lis mota of the controversy under scrutiny.29
However, there are certain procedural rules that must remain inviolable like those setting the periods for perfecting an appeal or filing a
Petition for Review, for it is doctrinally entrenched that the right to appeal is a statutory right and one who seeks to avail of that right
must comply with the statute or rules.

Notice of Appeal filed by GSIS cannot equate to the Petition for Review required by HLURB Rules. There’s a wide difference between
Notice of Appeal and a Petition for Review in terms of substance that the relaxation of the rigid rules of procedure cannot be permitted.

Since the Decision of HLURB Regional Office was already final and executory, no court, not even the highest court of the
land, can revive, review, change or alter the same. It is already well settled in our jurisdiction that the decisions and orders of
administrative agencies rendered pursuant to their quasi-judicial authority, have, upon their finality, the force and binding
effect of a final judgment within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata. The rule of res judicata, which forbids the
reopening of a matter once judicially determined by competent authority, applies as well to the judicial and quasi-judicial acts
of public, executive, or administrative officers and boards acting within their jurisdiction.

In view of the foregoing, the Motion to Declare Judgment Null and Void Ab Initio filed by GSIS on 25 September 1996, or after so many
months from the finality of the Decision it seeks to be declared null and void, can no longer be entertained by the HLURB Board of
Commissioners. The same was just an attempt to reinstate an appeal that had already been lost. Even granting arguendo that the said
Motion was proper, still, the allegation therein of the respondent that the HLURB Regional Office had no jurisdiction over the case
because it involved title to, possession of, or interest in real estate, the jurisdiction of which supposedly belonged to the Regional Trial
Court, was not sufficient to warrant the declaration of the Decision of the HLURB as null and void.

When an administrative agency or body is conferred quasi-judicial functions, all controversies relating to the subject matter pertaining to
its specialization are deemed to be included within the jurisdiction of said administrative agency or body. Split jurisdiction is not
favored.35 Therefore, the Complaint for Specific Performance, Annulment of Mortgage, and Damages filed by petitioner against
respondent, though involving title to, possession of, or interest in real estate, was well within the jurisdiction of the HLURB for it involves
a claim against the subdivision developer, Queen’s Row Subdivision, Inc., as well as respondent.

In sum, the Decision of the HLURB Regional Office dated 20 December 1995 had become final and executory for failure of respondent
to perfect an appeal within the reglementary period in the manner provided for in the HLURB Rules. Hence, the said Decision became
immutable; it can no longer be amended nor altered by the Office of the President. Accordingly, inasmuch as the timely perfection of an
appeal is a jurisdictional requisite, the Office of the President had no more authority to entertain the appeal of the respondent.
Otherwise, any amendment or alteration made which substantially affects the final and executory judgment would be null and void for
lack of jurisdiction.37

This Court had stated before that administrative decisions must end sometime, as fully as public policy demands that finality be written
on judicial controversies. Public interest requires that proceedings already terminated should not be altered at every step, for the rule of
non quieta movere prescribes that what had already been terminated should not be disturbed. A disregard of this principle does not
commend itself to sound public policy.

The rule on finality of decisions, orders or resolutions of a judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative body is "not a question of technicality
but of substance and merit," the underlying consideration therefore, being the protection of the substantive rights of the winning
party.39 Nothing is more settled in law than that a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and may no
longer be modified in any respect even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be
made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land.40

The reason for this is that litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an effective and efficient
administration of justice that once a judgment has become final, the winning party be not deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Court must
guard against any scheme calculated to bring about that result and must frown upon any attempt to prolong the controversies. The only
exceptions to the general rule are the correction of clerical errors, the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any
party, void judgments, and whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and
inequitable.41
The orderly administration of justice requires that the judgments/resolutions of a court or quasi-judicial body must reach a point of
finality set by the law, rules, and regulations. The noble purpose is to write finis to dispute once and for all. This is a fundamental
principle in our justice system, without which there would be no end to litigations. Utmost respect and adherence to this principle must
always be maintained by those who exercise the power of adjudication. Any act, which violates such principle, must immediately be
struck down.42 Indeed, the principle of conclusiveness of prior adjudications is not confined in its operation to the judgments of what
are ordinarily known as courts, but it extends to all bodies upon which judicial powers had been conferred.43

As a final point. Having said that the Decision of the HLURB Regional Office dated 20 December 1995 had become final and executory,
it was, therefore, a reversible error on the part of the Court of Appeals to affirm the Decision of the Office of the President reversing the
HLURB Regional Office, because such Decision was rendered by the Office of the President without jurisdiction. Hence, when the
Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision of the Office of the President, it likewise acted without jurisdiction. Well-settled is the rule that
once a judgment has become final and executory, no court, not even this Court, has the power to revive, review, change or alter the
same.

PANLILIO VS. SALONGA

FACTS:

Michael Panlilio, born July 7, 1990, is a natural child of Jose Marcel E. Panlilio and Fe V. Federis while Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio
are the natural grandparents of the minor, being the parents of Jose Marcel. Owing to alleged cruelty, moral depravity and gross
neglect of Fe, the grandparents felt obliged to exercise substitute parental authority over the minor. Thus, on December 14, 1993, they
filed a special proceedings for their appointment as guardians ad litem which was granted by the RTC-Makati Judge Josefina Salonga.

On December 22, 1993, Fe filed a petition for habeas corpus in RTC-Makati which was eventually granted.

The grandparents moved to dismiss the habeas corpus petition on the basis of litis pendentia as well as lack of cause of action. When
grandparent's motion to dismiss was submitted on January 7, 1994, the Makati judge hearing the habeas corpus case supposedly
made a verbal order to produce the body of the minor child on January 10, 1994. The Court issued a TRO to restrain the
implementation of the verbal orders of Judge.

Petitioners are of the fundamental impression that their appointment as guardians ad litem by the Cavite court was rendered illusory by
Fe’s expedient act of filing in Makati a petition for, and issuance of the writ of, habeas corpus. Suggestion is made that private
respondent's maneuver is tantamount to the abhorred practice of shopping for a friendly forum.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC-Makati may interfere with the regular orders of Cavite court.

RULING:

NO! The doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference in the regular orders or judgments of a co-equal court, as an accepted axiom in
adjective law, serves as an insurmountable barrier to the competencia of the Makati court to entertain the habeas corpus case on
account of the previous assumption of jurisdiction by the Cavite court, and the designation of petitioners as guardians ad litem of the
ward.

The doctrine of non-interference has been regarded as an elementary principle of higher importance in the administration of justice that
the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction may not be opened, modified, or vacated by any court of concurrent jurisdiction. A
Judge of a branch of one should not annul the order of a judge of another branch of the same court. Any branch even if it be in the
same judicial district that attempts to annul a judgment of a branch of the CFI either exceeds its jurisdiction or acts with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Thus, the various branches of the Court of First Instance being co-equal cannot interfere
with the respective cases of each branch, much less a branch's order or judgment.

Consequently, even as the appointment of grandparents is still subject to the outcome of the case lodged before the Cavite court, not to
mention the possible courses of action which Fe may pursue in said case to vindicate custody of her child, it cannot be gainsaid that the
immediate assumption of authority by the Makati court, although possibly motivated by a noble goal, is tantamount to defeating the very
essence of the order emanating from the Cavite court. While habeas corpus is the proper remedy to regain custody of minor children,
yet this principle is understood to presuppose that there is no other previous case whose issue is necessarily interwoven with the nature
of a habeas corpus proceeding. Verily, the existence of an anterior suit, such as the termination of private respondent's parental
authority in the Cavite court, coupled with the order appointing principal petitioners as guardians ad litem of the ward, is sufficient to
momentarily stave off private respondent's short-cut and subtle attempt to regain custody of her son at another forum, by reason of the
corollary principle that initial acquisition of jurisdiction by a court of concurrent jurisdiction divests another of its own jurisdiction.

It has been held that "even in cases of concurrent jurisdiction, it is, also, axiomatic that the court first acquiring jurisdiction excludes the
other courts". In addition, it is a familiar principle that when a court of competent jurisdiction acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter
of a case, its authority continues, subject only to the appellate authority, until the matter is finally and completely disposed of, and that
no court of co-ordinate authority is at liberty to interfere with its action. This doctrine is applicable to civil cases, to criminal prosecutions,
and to courts-martial. The principle is essential to the proper and orderly administration of the laws; and while its observance might be
required on the grounds of judicial comity and courtesy, it does not rest upon such considerations exclusively, but is enforced to prevent
unseemly, expensive, and dangerous conflicts of jurisdiction and of the process.
 GONZALES VS. SOLID CEMENT CORP.

FACTS:

The current petition arose from the execution of the final and executory judgment in the parties’ illegal dismissal dispute (referred to as
"original case," docketed in this Court as G.R. No. 165330 and entitled Solid Cement Corporation, et al. v. Leo Gonzales). The Labor
Arbiter (LA) resolved the case at his level on December 12, 2000. Since the LA found that an illegal dismissal took place, the company
reinstated petitioner Gonzales in the payroll on January 22, 2001.2

In the meanwhile, the parties continued to pursue the original case on the merits. The case was appealed to the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) and from there to the Court of Appeals (CA) on a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. The LA’s ruling of illegal dismissal was largely left undisturbed in these subsequent recourses. The original case eventually came
to this Court. In our Resolutions of March 9, 20053 and June 8, 2005,4 we denied the petition of respondent Solid Cement Corporation
(Solid Cement) for lack of merit. Our ruling became final and entry of judgment took place on July 12, 2005.

Soon after its finality, the original case was remanded to the LA for execution. The LA decision dated December 12, 2000 declared the
respondents guilty of illegal dismissal and ordered the reinstatement of Gonzales to his former position "with full backwages and without
loss of seniority rights and other benefits."5 Under this ruling, as modified by the NLRC ruling on appeal, Gonzales was awarded the
following:

When Gonzales moved for the issuance of an alias writ of execution on August 4, 2008, he included several items as components in
computing the amount of his backwages. Acting on the motion, the LA added P57,900.00 as rice allowance and P14,675.00 as medical
reimbursement (with the company’s apparent conformity), and excluded the rest of the items prayed for in the motion, either because
these items have been paid or that, based on the records of the case, Gonzales was not entitled thereto. Under the LA’s execution
order dated August 18, 2009, Gonzales was entitled to a total of P965,014.15.7

The NLRC, in its decision8 dated February 19, 2010 and resolution dated May 18, 2010, modified the LA’s execution order by including
the following amounts as part of the judgment award:

On a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the CA set aside the NLRC’s decision and reinstated the LA’s order,
prompting Gonzales to come to the Court via a petition for review on certiorari (docketed as G.R. No. 198423) under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court. In our Minute Resolutions, we denied Gonzales’ Rule 45 petition. At this point came the two motions now under
consideration.

For easier tracking and understanding, the developments in the original case and in the current petition are chronologically arranged in
the table below:

October 5, 1999 Solid Cement terminated Gonzales’ employment;

December 12, 2000 The LA declared that Gonzales was illegally dismissed and ordered his reinstatement;

January 5, 2001 Gonzales filed a Motion for Execution of reinstatement aspect;

January 22, 2001 Solid Cement reinstated Gonzales in the payroll;

March 26, 2002 The NLRC modified the LA decision by reducing amount of damages awarded by the LA but otherwise affirmed the
judgment;

June 28, 2004 The CA dismissed Solid Cement’s certiorari petition;

March 9, 2005 The Court ultimately denied Solid Cement’s petition for review;

July 12, 2005 The judgment became final and an entry of judgment was recorded;

July 15, 2008 Gonzales was actually reinstated;

August 4, 2008 Gonzales filed with the LA a motion for the issuance of an alias writ of execution (with computation of monetary benefits
as of August 28, 2008 – the day before his termination anew, allegedly due to redundancy, shall take effect);

August 18, 2009 The LA issued an Order directing the issuance of a writ of execution;

February 19, 2010 The NLRC rendered a decision affirming with modification the LA’s Order by including certain monetary benefits in
favor of Gonzales;

May 31, 2011 The CA reversed the NLRC and reinstated the LA’s Order;

November 16, 2011 The Court denied Gonzales’ petition for review, questioning the reinstatement of the LA’s Order;

February 27, 2012 The Court denied Gonzales’ 1st motion for reconsideration;
April 12, 2012 Gonzales again moved for reconsideration and asked that his case be referred to the En Banc.

Our Ruling

As a rule, a second motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading under the Rules of Court,10 and this reason alone is sufficient
basis for us to dismiss the present second motion for reconsideration. The ruling in the original case, as affirmed by the Court, has been
expressly declared final. A definitive final judgment, however erroneous, is no longer subject to change or revision.

A decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable. This quality of immutability precludes the modification of a
final judgment, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law. And this postulate holds true whether
the modification is made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court in the land. The orderly administration of justice requires
that, at the risk of occasional errors, the judgments/resolutions of a court must reach a point of finality set by the law. The noble purpose
is to write finis to dispute once and for all. This is a fundamental principle in our justice system, without which there would be no end to
litigations. Utmost respect and adherence to this principle must always be maintained by those who exercise the power of adjudication.
Any act, which violates such principle, must immediately be struck down. Indeed, the principle of conclusiveness of prior adjudications
is not confined in its operation to the judgments of what are ordinarily known as courts, but extends to all bodies upon which judicial
powers had been conferred.11 (emphases ours, citations omitted)

After due consideration and further analysis of the case, however, we believe and so hold that the CA did not only legally err but even
acted outside its jurisdiction when it issued its May 31, 2011 decision. Specifically, by deleting the awards properly granted by the
NLRC and by reverting back to the LA’s execution order, the CA effectively varied the final and executory judgment in the original case,
as modified on appeal and ultimately affirmed by the Court, and thereby acted outside its jurisdiction. The CA likewise, in the course of
its rulings and as discussed below, acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by using wrong
considerations, thereby acting outside the contemplation of law.

The CA’s actions outside its jurisdiction cannot produce legal effects and cannot likewise be perpetuated by a simple reference to the
principle of immutability of final judgment; a void decision can never become final. "The only exceptions to the rule on the immutability
of final judgments are (1) the correction of clerical errors, (2) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party,
and (3) void judgments."12 For these reasons, the Court sees it legally appropriate to vacate the assailed Minute Resolutions of
November 16, 2011 and February 27, 2012, and to reconsider its ruling on the current petition.

The fallo or the dispositive portion

The resolution of the court in a given issue – embodied in the fallo or dispositive part of a decision or order – is the controlling factor in
resolving the issues in a case. The fallo embodies the court’s decisive action on the issue/s posed, and is thus the part of the decision
that must be enforced during execution. The other parts of the decision only contain, and are aptly called, the ratio decidendi (or reason
for the decision) and, in this sense, assume a lesser role in carrying into effect the tribunal’s disposition of the case.

When a conflict exists between the dispositive portion and the opinion of the court in the text or body of the decision, the former must
prevail over the latter under the rule that the dispositive portion is the definitive order, while the opinion is merely an explanatory
statement without the effect of a directive. Hence, the execution must conform with what the fallo or dispositive portion of the decision
ordains or decrees.

Significantly, no claim or issue has arisen regarding the fallo of the labor tribunals and the CA’s ruling on the merits of the original case.
We quote below the fallo of these rulings, which this Court ultimately sustained.

LA ruling:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondents are hereby declared guilty of ILLEGAL DISMISSAL and ordered to reinstate
complainant to his former position with full backwages and without loss of seniority rights and other benefits which to date amounts (sic)
to Six Hundred Thirty Six Thousand and Six Hundred Thirty Three Pesos and Thirty Three Centavos (P636,633.33).

Further, respondents are jointly and severally liable to pay the following:

1. P18,080 as reimbursement for food and transportation allowance;

2. Five Hundred Thousand (P500,000.00) Pesos as moral damages;

3. Two Hundred Fifty Thousand (P250,000.00) Pesos as exemplary damages; and

4. 10% of all sums owing to complainant as attorney’s fees.13 (emphasis and underscoring ours)

NLRC Ruling:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision under review is hereby, MODIFIED by REDUCING the amount of moral and
exemplary damages due the complainant to the sum of P100,000.00 an P50,000.00, respectively.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA was legally correct in finding that the NLRC acted outside its jurisdiction when it modified the LA’s execution
order.

RULING:

The components of the backwages

a. Salary and 13th month differential due after dismissal

In the case of BPI Employees Union – Metro Manila and Zenaida Uy v. Bank of the Philippine Islands and Bank of the Philippine
Islands v. BPI Employees Union – Metro Manila and Zenaida Uy,21 the Court ruled that in computing backwages, salary increases from
the time of dismissal until actual reinstatement, and benefits not yet granted at the time of dismissal are excluded. Hence, we cannot
fault the CA for finding that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in awarding the salary differential amounting to P617,517.48
and the 13th month pay differentials amounting to P51,459.48 that accrued subsequent to Gonzales’ dismissal.

b. Legal interest of 12% on total judgment

However, based on the same BPI case, Gonzales is entitled to 12% interest on the total unpaid judgment amount, from the time the
Court’s decision (on the merits in the original case) became final. When the CA reversed the NLRC and reinstated the LA’s ruling
(which did not order payment of interest), the CA overstepped the due bounds of its jurisdiction under a certiorari petition as it acted on
the basis of wrong considerations and outside the contemplation of the law on the legal interests that final orders and rulings on
forbearance of money should bear.

In a certiorari petition, the scope of review is limited to the determination of whether a judicial or quasi-judicial tribunal acted without or
in excess of its jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction; such grave abuse of discretion can exist when
the ruling entity used the wrong considerations and thereby acted outside the contemplation of law. In justifying the return to and
adoption of the LA’s execution order, the CA solely relied on the doctrine of immutability of judgment which it considered to the
exclusion of other attendant and relevant factors. This is a fatal error that amounted to grave abuse of discretion, particularly on the
award of 12% interest. The seminal case of Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals22 cannot be clearer on the rate of interest
that applies:

3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory, the rate of legal interest x x x shall be 12%
per annum from such finality until its satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of
credit.23 (emphasis ours)

In BPI, we even said that "this natural consequence of a final judgment is not defeated notwithstanding the fact that the parties were at
variance in the computation of what is due"24 under the judgment. In the present case, the LA’s failure to include this award in its order
was properly corrected by the NLRC on appeal, only to be unreasonably deleted by the CA. Such deletion, based solely on the
immutability of the judgment in the original case, is a wrong consideration that fatally afflicts and renders the CA’s ruling void.

c. Additional backwages and 13th month pay

We reach the same conclusion on the other deletions the CA made, particularly on the deletion of the 13th month pay for 2000-2001,
amounting to P80,000.00, and the additional backwages for the period of December 13, 2000 to January 21, 2001, amounting to
P50,800.00. We note in this regard that the execution proceedings were conducted before the LA issued an Order requiring the
payment of P965,014.15 in Gonzales’ favor. An appeal of this computation to the NLRC to question the LA’s determination of the
amount due throws the LA’s determination wide open for the NLRC’s review. In granting these monetary reliefs, the NLRC reasoned
that –

Since there is no showing that complainant was paid his salaries from the time when he should have been immediately reinstated until
his payroll reinstatement, he is entitled thereto.25 (emphasis ours)

To be sure, if the NLRC’s findings had been arrived at arbitrarily or in disregard of the evidence on record, the CA would have been
right and could have granted the petition for certiorari on the finding that the NLRC made a factual finding not supported by substantial
evidence.26 The CA, in fact, did not appear to have looked into these matters and did not at all ask whether the NLRC’s findings on the
awarded monetary benefits were supported by substantial evidence. This omission, however, did not render the NLRC’s ruling
defective as Jimenez v. NLRC, et al.27 teaches us that –

On the first issue, we find no reason to disturb the findings of respondent NLRC that the entire amount of commissions was not paid,
this by reason of the evident failure of herein petitioners to present evidence that full payment thereof has been made. It is a basic rule
in evidence that each party must prove his affirmative allegations. Since the burden of evidence lies with the party who asserts an
affirmative allegation, the plaintiff or complainant has to prove his affirmative allegation, in the complaint and the defendant or
respondent has to prove the affirmative allegations in his affirmative defenses and counterclaim. Considering that petitioners herein
assert that the disputed commissions have been paid, they have the bounden duty to prove that fact.

As a general rule, one who pleads payment has the burden of proving it.1âwphi1 Even where the plaintiff must allege non-payment, the
general rule is that the burden rests on the defendant to prove payment, rather than on the plaintiff to prove non-payment. The debtor
has the burden of showing with legal certainty that the obligation has been discharged by payment.
When the existence of a debt is fully established by the evidence contained in the record, the burden of proving that it has been
extinguished by payment devolves upon the debtor who offers such a defense to the claim of the creditor. Where the debtor introduces
some evidence of payment, the burden of going forward with the evidence – as distinct from the general burden of proof – shifts to the
creditor, who is then under a duty of producing some evidence to show non-payment.28 (emphases ours, citations omitted)

Thus, even without proof of nonpayment, the NLRC was right in requiring the payment of the 13th month pay and the salaries due after
the LA’s decision until the illegally dismissed petitioner was reinstated in the payroll, i.e., from December 13, 2000 to January 21, 2001.
It follows that the CA was wrong when it concluded that the NLRC acted outside its jurisdiction by including these monetary awards as
items for execution.

These amounts are not excluded from the concept of backwages as the salaries fell due after Gonzales should have been reinstated,
while the 13th month pay fell due for the same period by legal mandate. These are entitlements that cannot now be glossed over if the
final decision on the merits in this case were to be respected.

The Legal Obstacle: the prohibition

on 2nd motion for reconsideration

The above discussions unavoidably lead to the conclusion that the Court’s Minute Resolutions denying Gonzales’ petition were not
properly issued and are tainted by the nullity of the CA decision these Resolutions effectively approved. We do not aim to defend these
actions, however, by mechanically and blindly applying the principle of immutability of judgment, nor by tolerating the CA’s inappropriate
application of this principle. The immutability principle, rather than being absolute, is subject to well-settled exceptions, among which is
its inapplicability when a decision claimed to be final is not only erroneous, but null and void.

We cannot also be oblivious to the legal reality that the matter before us is no longer the validity of Gonzales’ dismissal and the legal
consequences that follow – matters long laid to rest and which we do not and cannot now disturb. Nor is the matter before us the
additional monetary benefits that Gonzales claims in his petition, since these essentially involve factual matters that are beyond a Rule
45 petition to rule upon and correct.

The matter before us – in the Rule 45 petition questioning the CA’s Rule 65 determination – is the scope of the benefits awarded by the
LA, as modified on appeal and ultimately affirmed by this Court, which ruling has become final and which now must be implemented as
a matter of law.

Given these considerations, to reopen this case on second motion for reconsideration would not actually embroil the Court with
changes in the decision on the merits of the case, but would confine itself solely to the issue of the CA’s actions in the course of
determining lack or excess of jurisdiction or the presence of grave abuse of discretion in reviewing the NLRC’s ruling on the execution
aspect of the case.

Additionally, while continued consideration of a case on second motion for reconsideration very strongly remains an exception, our
action in doing so in this case is not without sound legal justification.29 An order of execution that varies the tenor of a final and
executory judgment is null and void.30 This was what the CA effectively did – it varied the final and executory judgment of the LA, as
modified on appeal and ultimately affirmed by the Court. We would simply be enforcing our own Decision on the merits of the original
case by nullifying what the CA did.

Viewed in these lights, the recognition of, and our corrective action on, the nullity of the CA’s ruling on the current petition is a duty this
Court is under obligation to undertake pursuant to Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution. We undertake this corrective action by
restoring what the CA should have properly recognized to be covered by the Decision on the merits of the original case.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, in lieu of our Minute Resolutions of November 16, 2011 and February 27, 2012 which we hereby
vacate, we hereby PARTIALLY GRANT the petition and DIRECT the payment of the following deficiencies in the payments due
petitioner Leo Gonzales under the Labor Arbiter’s Order of August 18, 2009:

ARMOVIT VS. CA

FACTS:

On August 20, 1965 and November 23, 1971, Bengson Commercial Building, Inc. (BCBI) obtained loans from GSIS in the total amount
of ₱4,250,000.00, secured by real estate and chattel mortgages. When BCBI defaulted in the payment of the amortizations, GSIS
extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgaged properties and sold them at public auction where it emerged as the highest bidder.

With the Armovit Law Firm as its counsel, BCBI filed an action to annul the extrajudicial foreclosure on June 23, 1977 with the then
Court of First Instance (CFI) of La Union, which was granted. GSIS appealed to CA. It appears that the Armovit Law Firm ceased to be
the counsel of BCBI sometime before the appeal of GSIS. The said law firm and BCBI dispute the legality of the replacement, with
BCBI claiming that the Armovit Law Firm had been remiss in its duties as BCBI’s counsel.

On January 19, 1988, the CA affirmed RTC decision with modification, which became final and executory on February 10, 1988 and the
records were remanded to the court a quo on March 14, 1988. The GSIS did not file a Motion for Reconsideration or an appeal
therefrom.8
The subsequent proceedings were summarized by this Court in its Decision in G.R. No. 90983,9 which is now the subject of petitioner’s
Motion for Execution:

It x x x appears that when Atty. Armovit sought execution with the court a quo, he was informed by Romualdo Bengzon, president of the
respondent corporation, that the firm had retained the services of Atty. Pacifico Yadao. He was also informed that the company would
pay him the agreed compensation and that Atty. Yadao's fees were covered by a separate agreement. The private respondent,
however, later ignored his billings and over the phone, directed him allegedly not to take part in the execution proceedings. Forthwith,
he sought the entry of an attorney's lien in the records of the case. The lower court allegedly refused to make the entry and on the
contrary, issued an order ordering the Philippine National Bank to "release to the custody of Mr. Romualdo F. Bengzon and or Atty.
Pacifico Yadao" the sum of ₱2,760,000.00 (ordered by the Court of Appeals as rentals payable by the Government Service Insurance
System).

Atty. Armovit then moved, apparently for the hearing of his motion to recognize attorney's lien, and thereafter, the trial court issued an
order in the tenor as follows:

When this case was called for hearing on the petition to record attorney's charging lien, Attys. Armovit and Aglipay appeared for the
petitioners.

Atty. Armovit informed the Court that they are withdrawing the petition considering that they are in the process of amicably settling their
differences with the plaintiff, which manifestation was confirmed by Atty. Yadao as well as the plaintiffs, Romualdo Bengson and Brenda
Bengson, who are present today.

In view of this development, the petition to record attorney’s charging lien, the same being in order and not contrary to law, morals and
public policy, as prayed for by Attys. Armovit and Aglipay, it is hereby withdrawn. The parties, therefore are hereby directed to comply
faithfully with their respective obligations.

SO ORDERED.

However, upon the turnover of the money to the private respondent, Mrs. Brenda Bengson (wife of Romualdo Bengson) delivered to
Atty. Armovit the sum of ₱300,000.00 only. Atty. Armovit protested and demanded the amount of ₱552,000.00 (twenty percent of
₱2,760,000.00), for which Mrs. Bengson made assurances that he will be paid the balance.

On November 4, 1988, however, Atty. Armovit received an order emanating from the trial court in the tenor as follows:

During the hearing on the petition to record attorney's charging lien on October 11, 1988, Attys. Armovit and Aglipay withdrew their
petition to record attorney's charging lien, which was duly approved by the Court, after which the Court directed the parties to comply
faithfully with their respective obligations.

In compliance with the Order of this Court, the plaintiff submitted a pleading denominated as compliance alleging that petitioner (Atty.
Armovit) has already received from the plaintiff the sum of ₱300,000.00, Philippine Currency, as and by way of attorney’s fees. With the
receipt by the petitioner from the plaintiff of this amount, the latter has faithfully complied with its obligation.

WHEREFORE, the Order of this Court dated October 11, 1988 approving the withdrawal of the petition to record attorney’s charging
lien, on motion of the petitioner, is now final.

SO ORDERED.

Reconsideration having been denied, Atty. Armovit went to the Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari and prohibition.

On August 25, 1989, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment dismissing the petition. Reconsideration having been likewise denied by
the Appellate Court, Atty. Armovit instituted the instant appeal.10

This Court rendered its Decision in the foregoing case on September 27, 1991. The relevant portions of the Decision, including the fallo
thereof, are quoted hereunder:

The disposition of the Court of Appeals was that since the receipt evidencing payment to Atty. Armovit of the sum of ₱300,000.00 "was
without any qualification as 'advance' or 'partial' or 'incomplete'," the intention of the parties was that it was full payment. The Appellate
Court also noted Atty. Armovit's withdrawal of his motion to record attorney's lien and figured that Atty. Armovit was satisfied with the
payment of ₱300,000.00.

There is no question that the parties had agreed on a compensation as follows:

a) ₱15,000.00 by way of acceptance and study fee, payable within five (5) days from date;

b) 20% contingent fee computed on the value to be recovered by favorable judgment in the cases; and

c.) the execution and signing of a final retainer agreement complete with all necessary details.
(While the parties' agreement speaks of "a final retainer agreement" to be executed later, it does not appear that the partie s did enter
into a "final" agreement thereafter.)

The private respondent's version however is that while it may be true that the agreed compensation was twenty percent of all
recoveries, the parties later agreed on a compromise sum approved allegedly by the trial court, per its Order of October 11, 1988.

xxxx

Contingent fees are valid in this jurisdiction. It is true that attorney's fees must at all times be reasonable; however, we do not find Atty.
Armovit's claim for "twenty percent of all recoveries" to be unreasonable. In the case of Aro v. Nañawa, decided in 1969, this Court
awarded the agreed fees amid the efforts of the client to deny him fees by terminating his services. In parallel vein, we are upholding
Atty. Armovit's claim for ₱252,000.00 more — pursuant to the contingent fee agreement — amid the private respondent's own
endeavours to evade its obligations.

xxxx

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The private respondent is ORDERED to pay the petitioner the sum of
₱252,000.00. Costs against the private respondent. 11

Neither party filed a Motion for Reconsideration from the Decision of this Court. Thus, the Decision became final and executory on
December 17, 1991.12

On October 29, 1992, the Armovit Law Firm filed in Civil Case No. 2794 an Omnibus Motion praying, among other things, that a final
assessment of its attorney’s fees be computed at 20% on the value of all the properties recovered by BCBI, deducting the amount
already paid which is 20% of the money judgment for ₱1,900,00.00; and that a writ of execution for the full payment of the balance of its
attorney’s fees be issued.13

On February 24, 1993, the RTC issued the first assailed Order denying the Armovit Law Firm’s Omnibus Motion. The RTC held that the
issue regarding attorney’s fees had already been resolved by this Court in G.R. No. 90983, whereby this Court ordered BCBI to pay the
Armovit Law Firm the sum of ₱252,000.00, in addition to the ₱300,000.00 already paid. The RTC noted that the Decision of this Court
had long become final and executory and in fact, was already executed upon the payment of the sum of ₱252,000.00. The RTC also
stressed that the Armovit Law Firm had no more participation in the prosecution of the case before the appellate court, as BCBI was, by
then, already represented by another counsel. Thus, according to the RTC, it would constitute unjust enrichment to grant the Armovit
Law Firm attorney’s fees despite having no more participation in the case.14

The Armovit Law Firm filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the RTC on June 7, 1993.15

The Armovit Law Firm appealed the Orders of the RTC to the Court of Appeals. The appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 43099.

When the Court of Appeals became repeatedly unsuccessful in securing the original records of Civil Case No. 2794 due to the progress
of the execution of the same in the trial court, the appellate court, in the first assailed Resolution dated November 28, 1996, directed
Atty. Raymundo Armovit to submit a certified copy of the complete original records at his expense.16 Atty. Armovit filed a Motion for
Reconsideration praying that BCBI be ordered to defray the costs of the copying of the pertinent records, as he has no responsibility
whatsoever for the delay. Atty. Armovit added that the photocopying of the records would be futile as there was still the need to await
the termination of the proceedings before the trial court.17 On April 24, 2001, the Court of Appeals received a letter from the Officer-in-
Charge of the RTC informing the appellate court of the pendency before this Court of G.R. No. 137448 and G.R. No. 141454, which
were both connected with the execution of the Decision in Civil Case No. 2794. Due to all of the foregoing circumstances, the Court of
Appeals issued on August 27, 2001 the second assailed Resolution ordering that CA-G.R. CV No. 43099 be archived temporarily
pending receipt of the original records of Civil Case No. 2794.18 The Armovit Law Firm’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied in the
third assailed Resolution dated June 11, 2002.19

On September 9, 2002, the Armovit Law Firm filed the present action captioned "Petition and/or Motion for Execution," a joint Petition
for Certiorari and Motion for Execution, with the following prayer:

WHEREFORE, petitioner respectfully prays that the instant petition for certiorari be given due course and, after due proceedings,
judgment be rendered setting aside as null and void ab initio the respondent courts Orders dated February 24 and June 7, 1993
(Annexes A and B) and Resolutions dated November 28, 1996, August 27, 2001 and June 11, 2002 (Annexes C, D and E); and
ordering respondent trial court as follows:

1. To immediately issue a writ of execution of the final and executory Decision of September 29, 1991, of the Supreme Court in Law
Firm of Raymundo A. Armovit vs. Court of Appeals, et al. (G.R. No. 90983) on the twenty percent of all recoveries on the following:

a. All the mortgaged properties recovered by private respondent from the GSIS by annotating petitioner’s charging lien at the back of
their corresponding titles.

b. The ₱29,982,824.19 received by private respondent on September 26, 1994, as per Sheriff’s Return dated October 3, 1994 (Annex
EE), plus the legal rate of interest from such date until fully paid.
2. To assess the value of the real properties recovered by private respondent from the GSIS and apply petitioner’s charging l ien by
deducting therefrom the sum of ₱552,000.00 priorly applied to the accumulated rentals recovered from GSIS by private respondent.
After the assessment and determination of the value of petitioner’s twenty percent of all recoveries to cause the execution thereof.20

According to the Armovit Law Firm, the RTC and the Court of Appeals committed the following legal errors:

I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN VARYING THE FINAL AND EXECUTORY SUPREME COURT D E C I S I O N BY LIMITING THE
EXECUTION OF PETITIONER’S ATTORNEY’S FEES OF "TWENTY PERCENT OF ALL RECOVERIES" ONLY TO THE RENTALS
AND EXCLUDING THE REST OF THE RECOVERIES MADE BY THE BENGSONS.

II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SENDING PETITIONER’S APPEAL TO THE ARCHIVES.

III.

THE APPELLATE AND TRIAL COURTS ERRED IN DEFYING THE SUPREME COURT IN ITS FINAL AND EXECUTORY D E C I S I
O N AWARDING PETITIONER A CONTINGENT FEE OF "TWENTY PERCENT OF ALL RECOVERIES."21

RULING:

YES! It is basic that when there is a conflict between the dispositive portion or fallo of a Decision and the opinion of the court contained
in the text or body of the judgment, the former prevails over the latter. An order of execution is based on the disposition, not on the
body, of the Decision.1avvphi1 This rule rests on the theory that the fallo is the final order while the opinion in the body is merely a
statement ordering nothing.

Indeed, the foregoing rule is not without an exception. We have held that where the inevitable conclusion from the body of the decision
is so clear as to show that there was a mistake in the dispositive portion, the body of the decision will prevail.

Applying this ruling to the case at bar, it is clear that the statement in the body of our 1991 Decision (that "we do not find Atty. Armovit’s
claim for ‘twenty percent of all recoveries’ to be unreasonable"30) is not an order which can be the subject of execution. Neither can we
ascertain from the body of the Decision an inevitable conclusion clearly showing a mistake in the dispositive portion. On the contrary,
the context in which the statement was used shows that it is premised on the interpretation that Atty. Armovit’s valid claim is only for an
additional ₱252,000.00 in attorney’s fees:

Contingent fees are valid in this jurisdiction. It is true that attorney's fees must at all times be reasonable; however, we do not find Atty.
Armovit's claim for "twenty percent of all recoveries" to be unreasonable. In the case of Aro v. Nañawa, decided in 1969, this Court
awarded the agreed fees amid the efforts of the client to deny him fees by terminating his services. In parallel vein, we are upholding
Atty. Armovit's claim for ₱252,000.00 more — pursuant to the contingent fee agreement — amid the private respondent's own
endeavours to evade its obligations.31 (Emphases supplied.)

The confusion created in the case at bar shows yet another reason why mere pronouncements in bodies of Decisions may not be the
subject of execution: random statements can easily be taken out of context and are susceptible to different interpretations. When not
enshrined in a clear and definite order, random statements in bodies of Decisions can still be the subject of another legal debate, which
is inappropriate and should not be allowed in the execution stage of litigation.

Consequently, the trial court cannot be considered to have committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the execution of the
statement in the body of our 1991 Decision that "we do not find Atty. Armovit’s claim for ‘twenty percent of all recoveries’ to be
unreasonable."

FRANCISCO VS. PUNO

FACTS:

On August 29, 1979, Puno filed with Judge Josefina Lugar a complaint for reconveyance of a parcel of land and damages alleging inter
alia that Puno's father caused the land in question titled in his name alone as "widower", after her mother's death, in spite of the
property being conjugal, and then sold it to the predecessor in interest of Francisco from whom they bought the same.

After the defendants, herein petitioners had filed their answer, wherein they alleged lack of personality of plaintiff to sue, prescription
and that they are buyers in good faith, the case was set for pre-trial, but petitioners failed to appear thereat. Taking advantage of such
absence, private respondent's counsel move that they be declared in default and that private respondent, with the assistance of her
counsel, Atty. Pacifico M. Monje, be allowed to present their evidence. The motion was granted and after presenting her evidence,
counsel rested her case. On the same date, respondent judge rendered judgment finding the evidence insufficient to sustain the cause
of action alleged and therefore dismissing the complaint. That was on January 8, 1980. On February 15, 1980, respondent's counsel
was served with copy of the decision. (See Annex G of the petition.) chanrobles virtual law library
On February 16, 1980, private respondent filed, thru a new counsel, Atty. Bienvenido A. Mapaye, a motion for new trial and/or
reconsideration alleging that the insufficiency of her evidence was due to the fault of her counsel who presented the same without her
being fully prepared. In other words, she claimed, she had newly discovered evidence that could prove her cause of action. It is relevant
to note that said motion was signed and sworn to by private respondent herself together with her counsel.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library

Acting on the said motion for new trial and/or reconsideration, on April 28, 1980, respondent judge denied the same for having been
filed out of time. Indeed, from January 15, 1980, when respondent's counsel was served with the decision, to February 16, 1980, when
the motion was filed, more than 30 days had already elapsed (32 days to be exact).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library

Persisting in her effort to pursue her claim, under date of May 7, 1980, private respondent filed, thru another new counsel, Atty. Ricardo
Rosales, Jr., a petition for relief, purportedly under Rule 38, claiming: chanrobles virtual law library

1. She filed civil case 8480 for Reconveyance and Damages against defendants Luis Francisco, et al., on August 29,
1979.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

2. The main trust in petitioner's action against defendant was her unlawful deprivation of one-half of the property covered by TCT No.
2720 and denominated as Lot 4864 of the cadastral survey of Lucena, as said parcel belongs to the conjugal partnership of Dionisio
Lagar and Gaudencia Daelo, plaintiff-petitioner's immediate predecessor-in-interest.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library

3. Gaudencia Daelo having predeceased her husband, petitioner contends that one-half of the property belongs to her mother and
therefore should rightfully by inherited by her after her mother's death, but failed however, to inherit any part thereof, because her father
sold the entire parcel to the defendant Luis Francisco.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

4. On January 8, 1980, a pre-trial hearing was scheduled, where defendants were declared as if in default thereafter an order of default
was issued and plaintiff adduced evidence ex-parte.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

5. On the same date, January 8, 1980, a decision was rendered dismissing the case after plaintiff took the witness stand, who through
excusable neglect was not able to expound on very vital points and inadvertently failed to introduce in support of her
theory.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

6. Because plaintiff-petitioner was under the belief that the scheduled hearing was one where no testimony is yet to be taken, coupled
by the fact that she was not prepared to testify, and that it was her first time to take the witness stand, she did not fully comprehend the
questions propounded to her.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

7. Plaintiff-petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or new trial but was denied in its order dated April 28, 1980, which petitioner
received on May 5,1980.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

8. If plaintiff-petitioner will be allowed to introduce evidence in her possession, which by excusable neglect and/or mistake were not
introduced, the same will necessarily alter and, or change the decision in her favor, attached is her affidavit of
merits.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

9. Evidence in support of her claim that it is a conjugal property consist of a deed of sale executed by Manual Zaballero and Germana
Ona in favor of the conjugal partnership of Dionisio Lagar and Gaudencia Daello (Doc. No. 412; Page No. 55; Book No. 11; Series of
1948 of Notary Public Francisco Mendioro xerox copy thereof is attached herewith as Annex "A".chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library

10. The deed of sale ratified by Notary Public Ramon Ingente (Doc. No. 68; Page No. 7; Book No. VI; Series of 1955 executed by
Dionisio Lagar should refer only to one-half (1/2) and therefore is annulable in so far as the other half of the property is
Concerned.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

11. That the petition wherein Dionisio Lagar sought [4) change his civil status was not known personally to the plaintiff-petitioner and/or
not understood by her, otherwise she could have made reservations in that petition eventually protecting her right insofar as one-half
(1/2) of the property is concerned.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

12. Plaintiff-petitioner has a valid substantial cause of action consisting of evidence enumerated above, which by excusable negligence
or error was not presented otherwise, the decision will be in favor of the plaintiff herein petitioner. (Petition for Relief of Judgment, pp.
50-52, Record

Answering the petition for relief, petitioners maintained that aside from the fact that no excusable negligence has been alleged, for, on
the contrary, there was an evident effort oil respondent's part to take advantage of the absence and default of petitioners when
respondent presented her evidence, the petition for relief was filed out of time in the light of Section 3 of Rule 38, which provides that
such a petition should be " filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, order or proceeding to be set aside,
and not more than six (6) months after such judgment or order was entered or such proceeding was taken." chanrobles virtual law
library

In his resolution of October 8, 1980 now under question, respondent judge ruled that: chanrobles virtual law library
Defendants' claim that plaintiff is presumed to have learned of the judgment of January 8, 1980, either on January 15, 1980 when Atty.
Monje received a copy thereof or on February 15, 1980, when plaintiff signed the Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial prepared
by Atty. Mapaye, in either case, the petition for relief of May 8, 1980 by Atty. Rosales was resorted to beyond the 60-day period
prescribed under Section 3, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court; from January 15 to May 8 is a period of 114 days and from February 15 to
May 8 is a period of 84 days; in either case, the filing of the petition for relief is beyond 60 days from the time plaintiff is presumed to
have learned of said decision of January 8, although, in either or both events, the filing thereof is admittedly within 6 months from the
issuance of said decision; on the other hand, the plaintiff stated that she did not actually learn of the decision of January 8, until she
received a copy thereof on March 17, 1980 (p. 67 of Record or Exh. "G") and that she was not informed of the contents of the motion
for new trial and/or reconsideration on February 15, 1980 when she was made to sign it.

In the light of the circumstances obtaining in this case, it is the opinion of the Court that it is the date when plaintiff actually learned of
the decision from which she seeks relief that should be considered in computing the period of 60 days prescribed under Sec. 3, Rule 38
of the Rules of Court for purposes of determining the timeliness of the said petition for relief; this opinion finds support in Cayetano vs.
Ceguerra et al., No. L-18831, 13 SCRA, where the Supreme Court, in effect, held that the date of 'actual knowledge' (and not the
presumed date of receipt or knowledge) of the decision, order or judgment from which relief is sought shall be the date which should be
considered in determining the timeliness of the filing of a petition for relief; in that case, the Supreme Court said:

It is conceded that defendants received a first registry notice on January 13, 1961, but they did not claim the letter, thereby giving rise to
the presumption that five (5) days after receipt of the first notice, the defendants were deemed to have received the letter. This Court,
however, cannot justly attribute upon defendants actual knowledge of the decision, because there is no showing that the registry notice
itself contained any indication that the registered letter was a copy of the decision, or that the registry notice referred to the case being
ventilated. We cannot exact a strict accounting of the rules from ordinary mortals, like the defendants. (Resolution, pp. 67-68, Record.)

We cannot agree, for two reasons. First, according to Chief Justice Moran: chanrobles virtual law library

The relief provided for by this rule is not regarded with favor and the judgment would not be avoided where the party complaining "has,
or by exercising proper diligence would have had, an adequate remedy at law, or by proceedings in the original action, by motion,
petition, or the like to open, vacate, modify or otherwise obtain relief against, the judgment." (Fajardo v. Judge Bayona, etc., et al., 52
O.G. 1937; See Alquesa v. Cavoda L-16735, Oct. 31, 1961, citing 49 C.J.S. 695.) The remedy allowed by this rule is an act of grace, as
it were, designed to give the aggrieved party another and last chance. Being in the position of one who begs, such party's privilege is
not to impose conditions, haggle or dilly-dally, but to grab what is offered him. (Palomares, et al. v. Jimenez, et al., L-4513, Jan. 31,
1952.) (Page 226, Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 2, 1979 Edition.)

In other words, where, as in this case, another remedy is available, as, in fact, private respondent had filed a motion for new trial and/or
reconsideration alleging practically the same main ground of the petition for relief under discussion, which was denied, what respondent
should have done was to take to a higher court such denial. A party who has filed a timely motion for new trial cannot file a petition for
relief after his motion has been denied. These two remedies are exclusive of each other. It is only in appropriate cases where a party
aggrieved by a judgment has not been able to file a motion for new trial that a petition for relief can be filed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library

Second, it is beyond doubt that the petition for relief of private respondent was filed out of time. We cannot sanction respondent court's
view that the period should be computed only from March 17, 1980 when she claims self-servingly that she first knew of the judgment
because, as stated above, she signed and even swore to the truth of the allegations in her motion for new trial filed by Atty. Mapaye on
February 16, 1980 or a month earlier. To give way to her accusations of incompetence against the lawyer who handled her case at the
pre-trial, which resulted in a decision adverse to her despite the absence of petitioners, and charge again later that her new counsel did
not inform her properly of the import of her motion for new trial and/or reconsideration is to strain the quality of mercy beyond the
breaking point and could be an unwarranted slur on the members of the bar. That, however, Atty. Mapaye cud not pursue the proper
course after his motion for new trial was denied is, of course, unfortunate, but We are unaware of the circumstances of such failure and
how much of it could be attributed to respondent herself, hence We cannot say definitely Chat it was counsel's fault, chanrobles virtual
law library

In any event, We hold that notice to counsel of the decision is notice to the party for purposes of Section 3 of Rule 38. The principle that
notice to the party, when he is represented by a counsel of record, is not valid is applicable here in the reverse for the very same
reason that it is the lawyer who is supposed Lo know the next procedural steps or what ought to be done in law henceforth for the
protection of the rights of the client, and not the latter.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Under the circumstances, We hold that respondent judge acted beyond his jurisdiction in taking cognizance of private respondent's
petition for relief and, therefore, all his actuations in connection therewith are null and void, with the result that his decision of January 8,
1980 should be allowed to stand, the same having become final and executory.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered setting aside the resolution of respondent judge of October 8, 1980 and reinstating his
decision of January 8, 1980 in Civil Case No. 8480 of his court, which latter decision may now be executed, the same being already
final and executory. No costs.

ALABAN VS. CA

FACTS:
On 8 November 2000, Francisco Provido filed a petition for the probate of the Last Will and Testament of the late Soledad Provido
Elevencionado who died on 26 October 2000 in Janiuay, Iloilo. Provido alleged that he was the heir of the decedent and the executor of
her will. RTC Dumangas, Iloilo, allowed the probate of the will and directing the issuance of letters testamentary to Provido.

More than four (4) months later, or on 4 October 2001, herein petitioners filed a motion for the reopening of the probate proceedings. [7]
Likewise, they filed an opposition to the allowance of the will of the decedent, as well as the issuance of letters testamentary to
respondent, [8] claiming that they are the intestate heirs of the decedent. Petitioners claimed that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction
over the petition due to non-payment of the correct docket fees, defective publication, and lack of notice to the other heirs. Moreover,
they alleged that the will could not have been probated because: (1) the signature of the decedent was forged; (2) the will was not
executed in accordance with law, that is, the witnesses failed to sign below the attestation clause; (3) the decedent lacked testamentary
capacity to execute and publish a will; (4) the will was executed by force and under duress and improper pressure; (5) the decedent had
no intention to make a will at the time of affixing of her signature; and (6) she did not know the properties to be disposed of, having
included in the will properties which no longer belonged to her. Petitioners prayed that the letters testamentary issued to respondent be
withdrawn and the estate of the decedent disposed of under intestate succession. [9]

On 11 January 2002, the RTC issued an Order [10] denying petitioners' motion for being unmeritorious. Resolving the issue of
jurisdiction, the RTC held that petitioners were deemed notified of the hearing by publication and that the deficiency in the payment of
docket fees is not a ground for the outright dismissal of the petition. It merely required respondent to pay the deficiency. [11] Moreover,
the RTC's Decision was already final and executory even before petitioners' filing of the motion to reopen. [12]

Petitioners thereafter filed a petition [13] with an application for preliminary injunction with the CA, seeking the annulment of the RTC's
Decision dated 30 May 2001 and Order dated 11 January 2002. They claimed that after the death of the decedent, petitioners, together
with respondent, held several conferences to discuss the matter of dividing the estate of the decedent, with respondent agreeing to a
one-sixth (1/6) portion as his share. Petitioners allegedly drafted a compromise agreement to implement the division of the estate.
Despite receipt of the agreement, respondent refused to sign and return the same. Petitioners opined that respondent feigned interest
in participating in the compromise agreement so that they would not suspect his intention to secure the probate of the will. [14] They
claimed that they learnt of the probate proceedings only in July of 2001, as a result of which they filed their motion to reopen the
proceedings and admit their opposition to the probate of the will only on 4 October 2001. They argued that the RTC Decision s hould be
annulled and set aside on the ground of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC. [15]

In its Resolution [16] promulgated on 28 February 2002, the CA dismissed the petition. It found that there was no showing that
petitioners failed to avail of or resort to the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment, or other appropriate
remedies through no fault of their own. [17] Moreover, the CA declared as baseless petitioners' claim that the proceedings in the RTC
was attended by extrinsic fraud. Neither was there any showing that they availed of this ground in a motion for new trial or petition for
relief from judgment in the RTC, the CA added. [18] Petitioners sought reconsideration of the Resolution, but the same was denied by
the CA for lack of merit.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it dismissed their petition for the
alleged failure to show that they have not availed of or resorted to the remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment or
other remedies through no fault of their own, and held that petitioners were not denied their day in court during the proceedings before
the RTC.

RULING:

NO! Section 37 of the Rules of Court allows an aggrieved party to file a motion for new trial on the ground of fraud, accident, mistake, or
excusable negligence. The same

Rule permits the filing of a motion for reconsideration on the grounds' of excessive award of damages, insufficiency of evidence to
justify the decision or final order, or that the decision or final order is contrary to law. [32] Both motions should be filed within the period
for taking an appeal, or fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order.

Meanwhile, a petition for relief from judgment under Section 3 of Rule 38 is resorted to when a judgment or final order is entered, or any
other proceeding is thereafter taken, against a party in any court through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. Said party
may file a petition in the same court and in the same case to set aside the judgment, order or proceeding. It must be filed within sixty
(60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment and within six (6) months after entry thereof. [33]

A motion for new trial or reconsideration and a petition for relief from judgment are remedies available only to parties' in the
proceedings' where the assailed judgment is rendered. [34] In fact, it has been held that a person who was never a party to the case, or
even summoned to appear therein, cannot avail of a petition for relief from judgment. [35]

However, petitioners in this case are mistaken in asserting that they are not or have not become parties to the probate proceedings.

Under the Rules of Court, any executor, devisee, or legatee named in a will, or any other person interested in the estate may, at any
time after the death of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed. [36] Notice of the time and place for
proving the will must be published for three (3) consecutive weeks, in a newspaper of general circulation in the province, [37] as well as
furnished to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator. [38] Thus, it has been held that a proceeding
for the probate of a will is one in rem, such that with the corresponding publication of the petition the court's jurisdiction extends to all
persons interested in said will or in the settlement of the estate of the decedent. [39]

Publication is notice to the whole world that the proceeding has for its object to bar indefinitely all who might be minded to make an
objection of any sort against the right sought to be established. It is the publication of such notice that brings in the whole world as a
party in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it. [40] Thus, even though petitioners were not mentioned in the
petition for probate, they eventually became parties thereto as a consequence of the publication of the notice of hearing.

As parties to the probate proceedings, petitioners could have validly availed of the remedies of motion for new trial or reconsideration
and petition for relief from judgment. In fact, petitioners filed a motion to reopen, which is essentially a motion for new trial, with
petitioners praying for the reopening of the case and the setting of further proceedings. However, the motion was denied for having
been filed out of time, long after the Decision became final and executory.

Conceding that petitioners became aware of the Decision after it had become final, they could have still filed a petition for relief from
judgment after the denial of their motion to reopen. Petitioners claim that they learned of the Decision only on 4 October 2001, or almost
four (4) months from the time the Decision had attained finality. But they failed to avail of the remedy.

For failure to make use without sufficient justification of the said remedies available to them, petitioners could no longer resort to a
petition for annulment of judgment; otherwise, they would benefit from their own inaction or negligence. [41]

Even casting aside the procedural requisite, the petition for annulment of judgment must still fail for failure to comply with the
substantive requisites, as the appellate court ruled.

An action for annulment of judgment is a remedy in law independent of the case where the judgment sought to be annulled was
rendered. [42] The purpose of such action is to have the final and executory judgment set aside so that there will be a renewal of
litigation. It is resorted to in cases where the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment, or other
appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner, [43] and is based on only two grounds: extrinsic fraud,
and lack of jurisdiction or denial of due process. [44] A person need not be a party to the judgment sought to be annulled, and it is only
essential that he can prove his allegation that the judgment was obtained by the use of fraud and collusion and he would be adversely
affected thereby. [45]

An action to annul a final judgment on the ground of fraud lies only if the fraud is extrinsic or collateral in character. [46] Fraud is
regarded as extrinsic where it prevents a party from having a trial or from presenting his entire case to the court, or where it operates
upon matters pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the manner in which it is procured. The overriding consideration when extrinsic
fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in court.

To sustain their allegation of extrinsic fraud, petitioners assert that as a result of respondent's deliberate omission or concealment of
their names, ages and residences as the other heirs of the decedent in his petition for allowance of the will, they were not notified of the
proceedings, and thus they were denied their day in court. In addition, they claim that respondent's offer of a false compromise even
before the filing of the petition prevented them from appearing and opposing the petition for probate.

The Court is not convinced.

According to the Rules, notice is required to be personally given to known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator. [48] A perusal of
the will shows that respondent was instituted as the sole heir of the decedent. Petitioners, as nephews and nieces of the decedent, are
neither compulsory nor testate heirs [49] who are entitled to be notified of the probate proceedings under the Rules. Respondent had no
legal obligation to mention petitioners in the petition for probate, or to personally notify them of the same.

Besides, assuming arguendo that petitioners are entitled to be so notified, the purported infirmity is cured by the publication of the
notice. After all, personal notice upon the heirs is a matter of procedural convenience and not a jurisdictional requisite. [50]

The non-inclusion of petitioners' names in the petition and the alleged failure to personally notify them of the proceedings do not
constitute extrinsic fraud. Petitioners were not denied their day in court, as they were not prevented from participating in the
proceedings and presenting their case before the probate court.

CRISOLOGO VS. DARAY

FACTS:

In a Complaint1 dated September 1, 2006, complainant Jesus G. Crisologo charged respondent Judge Marivic Trabajo Daray, in her
capacity as Acting Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Digos City, Branch 19, with Gross Misconduct, Undue Delay in
Rendering a Decision or Order and Gross Ignorance of the Law of Procedure relative to the denial of the Motion for Intervention filed by
complainant in Civil Case Nos. 3220 and 3387 respectively entitled "Marina Crisologo, Jr. v. Victor Callao and Rural Bank of Tagum,
Inc." and "Salvador Crisologo v. Marina Crisologo, Jr. and Rural Bank of Tagum, Inc."

As found by the Report of the Investigating Justice of the Court of Appeals (CA), the following circumstances prompted the complainant
to file this administrative complaint:
On May 23, 1995, Marina Crisologo, Jr. filed a complaint to Declare Documents Null and Void and Set Aside Auction Sale and
Attorney's Fees against Victor Callao and the Rural Bank of Tagum, Inc. (RBTI). The case docketed as Civil Case No. 3220 was raffled
to RTC-Branch 19 in Digos City.

Afterward, on September 10, 1996, Salvador Crisologo filed an action for Annulment of Real Estate Mortgage, Documents,
Reconveyance, Damages and Attorney's Fees against Marina, Jr. and RBTI. The case docketed as Civil Case No. 3387 was raffled to
RTC-Branch 19 and consolidated with Civil Case No. 3220.

On January 22, 2004, before trial on the merits can be had in the civil cases, Marina, Jr., Salvador, Victor and RBTI submitted a
Compromise Agreement with RTC-Branch 19, which was then presided over in an acting capacity by respondent Judge. In said
compromise agreement, Marina, Jr. and Salvador ceded full ownership of the subject land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. T-22236, including all improvements found thereon, in favor of RBTI.

On February 13, 2004, soon after being informed of the existence of the compromise agreement, complainant Jesus G. Crisologo and
his sister Carolina C. Abrina, represented by Atty. Rodolfo Ta-asan, moved to intervene in the civil cases alleging among others that: [a]
the property in litigation involves the Crisologo family's ancestral home; [b] they are co-owners of the subject property together with
Marina, Jr. and their other siblings; [c] while the subject property is registered in the name of Marina, Jr., she merely holds said property
in trust for them and their other siblings; and [d] they seek to intervene in the civil cases to protect their proprietary right and legal
interest over the subject property.

Meanwhile, on April 21, 2004, Atty. Ta-asan withdrew his appearance as counsel for complainant and Carolina, and was substituted by
Atty. Jenette Marie Crisologo. Atty. Crisologo's entry of appearance was acknowledged by Respondent Judge in an Order dated May
17, 2004.

In an Order dated August 23, 2004, respondent Judge denied complainant's motion for intervention, thus:

FOR RESOLUTION IS THE Motion for Intervention filed by movants-intervenors Jesus G. Crisologo and Carolina C. Abrina through
counsel, seeking permission from this Court to intervene in the cases above-mentioned, so as to protect their proprietary rights and
legal interest over the subject property.

AFTER A CAREFUL ASSESSMENT of the instant motion vis - Ã -vis the Comment/Opposition thereto, this Court holds and is of the
view that the Motion for Intervention could not be entertained anymore considering that the Compromise Agreement had already been
entered into and to allow the intervention will unduly delay the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, particularly so that the
instant cases began almost a decade ago in 1995. Moreover, whatever claims and rights that Jesus G. Crisologo may have over the
subject property may and should be the subject of a separate case between and among his siblings. (Magat, et al. v. Delizo, et al., G.R.
No. 135199, July 5, 2001)

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Motion for Intervention is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

On September 15, 2004, complainant moved for the reconsideration of the Order dated August 23, 2004, arguing that he is a co-owner
of the properties in litigation, and as such, he is an indispensable party whose participation is essential before a final adjudication can
be had in the civil cases.

On October 1, 2004, RBTI manifested that complainant's motion for reconsideration does not contain a notice of hearing, hence, a
mere scrap of paper.

In an Order dated October 15, 2004, respondent Judge denied complainant's motion for reconsideration for lack of the requisite notice
of hearing. However, a copy of the Order dated October 15, 2004 was sent to Atty. Ta-asan instead of Atty. Crisologo who is
complainant's counsel of record.

Subsequently, on October 27, 2004, Respondent Judge issued a Decision approving the compromise agreement. The dispositive
portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, finding the afore-quoted Compromise Agreement to be not contrary to law, public morals, good customs and public
policy, this Court hereby APPROVES the same. The parties in this case are hereby ordered to strictly comply with all the terms and
conditions set forth in said agreement. By virtue of the approval of the compromise agreement, this case is now deemed
TERMINATED.

SO ORDERED.

Again, a copy of the decision was sent to Atty. Ta-asan instead of complainant's counsel, Atty. Crisologo. Thus, complainant was left
unaware that his motion for reconsideration was denied and that a decision approving the compromise agreement has already been
rendered by respondent Judge in the civil cases.

On November 3, 2004, RBTI moved for the execution of the decision on compromise agreement and prayed, among other things, for
RTC-Branch 19: [a] to order the immediate ejectment of the plaintiffs, including all other persons claming rights under them, from the
subject property; [b] to place RBTI in complete possession, control and enjoyment of the subject property, including all improvements
thereon; and [c] to order the cancellation the notice of lis pendens in the certificate of title of the subject property.

On November 4, 2004, complainant was informed by his brother Ramon Crisologo, who is one of the occupants of the subject property,
about RBTI's motion for execution. Thus, on November 5, 2008, complainant, accompanied by Atty. Crisologo, lost no time and
proceeded to RTC-Branch 19 to inquire about the hearing schedule of RBTI's motion for execution, and was surprised to learn that his
motion for reconsideration of the denial of his motion for intervention has already been denied and that in fact a decision on
compromise agreement has already been rendered by respondent Judge.

Immediately thereafter, on November 8, 2004, complainant filed an Urgent Manifestation and Notice of Appeal decrying the lack of
notice to him of the trial court's [October] 15, 2004 Order and appealing the denial of his motion for intervention to the Court of Appeals.
On the same date, complainant also filed an Urgent Motion for Voluntary Inhibition of respondent Judge in the civil cases on the ground
of lack of impartiality.

On December 7, 2004, when respondent Judge failed to act on his notice of appeal, complainant filed a Petition for Certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the Court of Appeals.

On December 8, 2004, respondent Judge gave due course to complainant's motion for voluntary inhibition and voluntarily inhibited
herself in the civil cases, but refrained from acting on complainant's notice of appeal. It was only on March 15, 2005, that complainant's
notice of appeal was acted upon by Judge Carmelita Sarno - Dav[i]n, the newly appointed presiding judge of RTC Branch-19.

On July 20, 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision finding grave abuse of discretion in the denial of complainant's motion for
intervention to warrant the issuance of writs of certiorari and mandamus in favor of complaint.2

In her Comment3 dated October 31, 2006, respondent denied and refuted the charges in the complaint. She contended that the failure
to furnish complainant, through his counsel of record, Atty. Jenette Marie Crisologo, with a copy of the Order denying his motion for
reconsideration vis-a-vis the denial of his motion for intervention, as well as of the decision on the compromise agreement, was
unintentional and brought about by an honest oversight on the part of her court personnel, who inadvertently sent copies of the court
processes to complainant's previous counsel, Atty. Rodolfo Ta-asan, Jr. Thus, respondent insisted that she could not be made
administratively liable for gross misconduct on account of such omission absent a clear showing of bad faith.

Likewise, respondent denounced the charge of undue delay in passing upon complainant's notice of appeal in light of her voluntary
inhibition from hearing the civil cases. She pointed out that she could no longer be expected to pass upon complainant's notice of
appeal after she had voluntarily inhibited herself.

Lastly, respondent asserted that the denial of complainant's motion for intervention was prompted by the prevailing factual
circumstances of the civil cases. She reasoned out that while the denial of the motion for intervention was made prior to a rendition of
judgment in the civil cases, such denial was proper in view of the Compromise Agreement between the original parties to the case.
Respondent insisted that the civil cases had been pending for almost a decade; thus, when presented with a compromise agreement
between the original parties, she felt it proper, in the interest of justice, to deny complainant's motion for intervention and promulgate a
decision based on said compromise agreement.

Respondent underscored that the administrative case is purely harassment, designed to malign her for denying complainant's motion
for intervention.

On November 12, 2007, this Court referred the complaint to the Executive Justice of the CA, Cagayan de Oro City station, for
investigation, report and recommendation.4

In the Report dated June 12, 2008, the Investigating Justice recommended that respondent be ordered to pay a fine of P10,000.00 for
undue delay in rendering a decision or order, and P20,000.00 for gross ignorance of the law or procedure.

On the failure to furnish the complainant's new counsel of record with copies of the court's processes, the Investigating Justice found
that this omission does not amount to gross misconduct. He then recommended that respondent be absolved from administrative
liability on this ground.

As for the charge of undue delay in resolving complainant's notice of appeal, the Investigating Justice brushed aside respondent's
excuse that she could no longer act on the notice of appeal since she already inhibited herself from the case. The Investigating Justice
noted that the notice of appeal was filed simultaneously with the motion for inhibition and that respondent inhibited herself only after
complainant filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA assailing the denial of his motion for intervention. The Investigating Justice opined
that respondent's inhibition was a mere afterthought to escape liability for her negligence to act on the notice of appeal.

Finally, the Investigating Justice held that respondent displayed gross ignorance of the rule on intervention in denying complainant's
motion for intervention and in ruling that the complainant's interest would be better protected in a separate civil action.

While we concur with the Investigating Justice's finding that respondent is not guilty of gross misconduct, we are not in agreement with
his recommendation that respondent be held administratively liable for undue delay in rendering a decision or order and gross
ignorance of the law or procedure.
It is settled that as a matter of policy, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action . He cannot be
subjected to liability - civil, criminal or administrative - for any of his official acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as he acts in good
faith.5 To hold otherwise would be to render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the
process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment.6

However, the judges' inexcusable failure to observe the basic laws and rules will render them administratively liable. When the law is so
simple and elementary, lack of conversance therewith constitutes gross ignorance of the law.7 In any case, to constitute gross
ignorance of the law, it is not enough that the subject decision, order or actuation of the judge in the performance of his official duties is
contrary to existing law and jurisprudence but, most importantly, such decision, order or act must be attended by bad faith, fraud,
dishonesty, or corruption. Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper considerations, are sufficient defenses in
which a judge charged with ignorance of the law can find refuge.8

The allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. The permissive tenor of the
rules shows the intention to give to the court the full measure of discretion in permitting or disallowing the intervention.9

There is no doubt that respondent was cognizant of the rule on intervention, and she complied with it in good faith. In fact, respondent
has explained that she denied the motion for intervention because it would only delay, to the prejudice of the original parties, the civil
cases which had already been pending for almost a decade. Respondent maintains that she sincerely believed that the rights of the
complainant would be better protected in a separate action. Under the rule on intervention, these are valid considerations in deciding
whether or not to grant a motion to intervene. There is no showing that respondent judge was motivated by any ill-will in denying the
complainant's motion for intervention; hence, she cannot be sanctioned therefor.

The filing of an administrative complaint is not the proper remedy for the correction of actions of a judge perceived to have gone beyond
the norms of propriety, where a sufficient judicial remedy exists.10

Complainant erroneously thought that when respondent failed to act on his notice of appeal, he lost his right to appeal the court's order
denying his motion for intervention and that his only remedy was to file a Petition for Certiorari with the CA which he, in fact, filed. He
failed to consider that a party's appeal by notice of appeal is deemed perfected as to him, upon the filing of the notice of appeal in due
time and upon payment of the docket fees. The notice of appeal does not require the approval of the court. The function of the notice of
appeal is merely to notify the trial court that the appellant was availing of the right to appeal, and not to seek the court's permission that
he be allowed to pose an appeal.11

The trial court's only duty with respect to a timely appeal by notice of appeal is to transmit the original record of the case to the
appellate court. The court is given thirty (30) days from the perfection of the appeal within which to transmit the record.12

We note, however, that complainant also filed a motion for inhibition on the same day that he filed the notice of appeal. On the 30th day
since the notice of appeal was filed, respondent inhibited herself from the case. It goes without saying that from that time on,
respondent could no longer perform any act pertaining to the complainant's appeal. That duty would then devolve upon the judge who
will replace the respondent. Hence, respondent should not be sanctioned for her failure to act on the notice of appeal after she had
inhibited herself from the case.

WHEREFORE, this administrative case against Judge Marivic Trabajo Daray is DISMISSED.

ST. MARTIN FUNERAL HOMES VS. NLRC

FACTS:

The present petition for certiorari stemmed from a complaint for illegal dismissal filed by herein private respondent before the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Regional Arbitration Branch No. III, in San Fernando, Pampanga. Private respondent alleges that
he started working as Operations Manager of petitioner St. Martin Funeral Home on February 6, 1995. However, there was no contract
of employment executed between him and petitioner nor was his name included in the semi-monthly payroll. On January 22, 1996, he
was dismissed from his employment for allegedly misappropriating P38,000.00 which was intended for payment by petitioner of its
value added tax (VAT) to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). 1

Petitioner on the other hand claims that private respondent was not its employee but only the uncle of Amelita Malabed, the owner of
petitioner St. Martin's Funeral Home. Sometime in 1995, private respondent, who was formerly working as an overseas contract worker,
asked for financial assistance from the mother of Amelita. Since then, as an indication of gratitude, private respondent voluntarily
helped the mother of Amelita in overseeing the business.

In January 1996, the mother of Amelita passed away, so the latter then took over the management of the business. She then
discovered that there were arrears in the payment of taxes and other government fees, although the records purported to show that the
same were already paid. Amelita then made some changes in the business operation and private respondent and his wife were no
longer allowed to participate in the management thereof. As a consequence, the latter filed a complaint charging that petitioner had
illegally terminated his employment.2

Based on the position papers of the parties, the labor arbiter rendered a decision in favor of petitioner on October 25, 1996 declaring
that no employer-employee relationship existed between the parties and, therefore, his office had no jurisdiction over the case. 3
Not satisfied with the said decision, private respondent appealed to the NLRC contending that the labor arbiter erred (1) in not giving
credence to the evidence submitted by him; (2) in holding that he worked as a "volunteer" and not as an employee of St. Martin Funeral
Home from February 6, 1995 to January 23, 1996, or a period of about one year; and (3) in ruling that there was no employer-employee
relationship between him and petitioner.4

On June 13, 1997, the NLRC rendered a resolution setting aside the questioned decision and remanding the case to the labor arbiter
for immediate appropriate proceedings.5 Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the NLRC in its
resolution dated August 18, 1997 for lack of merit,6 hence the present petition alleging that the NLRC committed grave abuse of
discretion.7

Before proceeding further into the merits of the case at bar, the Court feels that it is now exigent and opportune to reexamine the
functional validity and systemic practicability of the mode of judicial review it has long adopted and still follows with respect to decisions
of the NLRC. The increasing number of labor disputes that find their way to this Court and the legislative changes introduced over the
years into the provisions of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 442 (The Labor Code of the Philippines and Batas Pambansa Blg. (B.P. No.)
129 (The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980) now stridently call for and warrant a reassessment of that procedural aspect.

We prefatorily delve into the legal history of the NLRC. It was first established in the Department of Labor by P.D. No. 21 on October
14, 1972, and its decisions were expressly declared to be appealable to the Secretary of Labor and, ultimately, to the President of the
Philippines.

On May 1, 1974, P.D. No. 442 enacted the Labor Code of the Philippines, the same to take effect six months after its promulgation. 8
Created and regulated therein is the present NLRC which was attached to the Department of Labor and Employment for program and
policy coordination only.9 Initially, Article 302 (now, Article 223) thereof also granted an aggrieved party the remedy of appeal from the
decision of the NLRC to the Secretary of Labor, but P.D. No. 1391 subsequently amended said provision and abolished such appeals.
No appellate review has since then been provided for.

Thus, to repeat, under the present state of the law, there is no provision for appeals from the decision of the NLRC. 10 The present
Section 223, as last amended by Section 12 of R.A. No. 6715, instead merely provides that the Commission shall decide all cases
within twenty days from receipt of the answer of the appellee, and that such decision shall be final and executory after ten calendar
days from receipt thereof by the parties.

When the issue was raised in an early case on the argument that this Court has no jurisdiction to review the decisions of the NLRC, and
formerly of the Secretary of Labor, since there is no legal provision for appellate review thereof, the Court nevertheless rejected that
thesis. It held that there is an underlying power of the courts to scrutinize the acts of such agencies on questions of law and jurisdiction
even though no right of review is given by statute; that the purpose of judicial review is to keep the administrative agency within its
jurisdiction and protect the substantial rights of the parties; and that it is that part of the checks and balances which restricts the
separation of powers and forestalls arbitrary and unjust adjudications. 11

Pursuant to such ruling, and as sanctioned by subsequent decisions of this Court, the remedy of the aggrieved party is to timely file a
motion for reconsideration as a precondition for any further or subsequent remedy, 12 and then seasonably avail of the special civil
action of certiorari under Rule 65, 13 for which said Rule has now fixed the reglementary period of sixty days from notice of the
decision. Curiously, although the 10-day period for finality of the decision of the NLRC may already have lapsed as contemplated in
Section 223 of the Labor Code, it has been held that this Court may still take cognizance of the petition for certiorari on jurisdictional
and due process considerations if filed within the reglementary period under Rule 65. 14

Turning now to the matter of judicial review of NLRC decisions, B.P. No. 129 originally provided as follows:

Sec. 9. Jurisdiction. — The Intermediate Appellate Court shall exercise:

(1) Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or
processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction;

(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of Regional Trial Courts; and

(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders, or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-
judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards, or commissions, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
in accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of
the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.

The Intermediate Appellate Court shall have the power to try cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all
acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant
and conduct new trials or further proceedings.

These provisions shall not apply to decisions and interlocutory orders issued under the Labor Code of the Philippines and by the
Central Board of Assessment Appeals. 15

Subsequently, and as it presently reads, this provision was amended by R.A. No. 7902 effective March 18, 1995, to wit:

Sec. 9. Jurisdiction. — The Court of Appeals shall exercise:

(1) Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or
processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction;

(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of Regional Trial Courts; and

(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-
judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, including the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Social Security
Commission, the Employees Compensation Commission and the Civil Service Commission, except those falling within the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No.
442, as amended, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth
paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.

The Court of Appeals shall have the power to try cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary
to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct
new trials or further proceedings. Trials or hearings in the Court of Appeals must be continuous and must be completed within, three (3)
months, unless extended by the Chief Justice.

It will readily be observed that, aside from the change in the name of the lower appellate court, 16 the following amendments of the
original provisions of Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 were effected by R.A. No. 7902, viz.:

1. The last paragraph which excluded its application to the Labor Code of the Philippines and the Central Board of Assessment Appeals
was deleted and replaced by a new paragraph granting the Court of Appeals limited powers to conduct trials and hearings in cases
within its jurisdiction.

2. The reference to the Labor Code in that last paragraph was transposed to paragraph (3) of the section, such that the original
exclusionary clause therein now provides "except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with
the Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of this Act, and of
subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948."
(Emphasis supplied).

3. Contrarily, however, specifically added to and included among the quasi-judicial agencies over which the Court of Appeals shall have
exclusive appellate jurisdiction are the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Social Security Commission, the Employees
Compensation Commission and the Civil Service Commission.

This, then, brings us to a somewhat perplexing impassè, both in point of purpose and terminology. As earlier explained, our mode of
judicial review over decisions of the NLRC has for some time now been understood to be by a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court. This is, of course, a special original action limited to the resolution of jurisdictional issues, that is, lack or excess of
jurisdiction and, in almost all cases that have been brought to us, grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

It will, however, be noted that paragraph (3), Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 now grants exclusive appellate jurisdiction to the Court of
Appeals over all final adjudications of the Regional Trial Courts and the quasi-judicial agencies generally or specifically referred to
therein except, among others, "those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with . . . the Labor
Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, . . . ." This would necessarily contradict what has been ruled
and said all along that appeal does not lie from decisions of the NLRC. 17 Yet, under such excepting clause literally construed, the
appeal from the NLRC cannot be brought to the Court of Appeals, but to this Court by necessary implication.

The same exceptive clause further confuses the situation by declaring that the Court of Appeals has no appellate jurisdiction over
decisions falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of B.P. No.
129, and those specified cases in Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. These cases can, of course, be properly excluded from the
exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. However, because of the aforementioned amendment by transposition, also
supposedly excluded are cases falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Labor Code. This is
illogical and impracticable, and Congress could not have intended that procedural gaffe, since there are no cases in the Labor Code the
decisions, resolutions, orders or awards wherein are within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court or of any other court for that
matter.

A review of the legislative records on the antecedents of R.A. No. 7902 persuades us that there may have been an oversight in the
course of the deliberations on the said Act or an imprecision in the terminology used therein. In fine, Congress did intend to provide for
judicial review of the adjudications of the NLRC in labor cases by the Supreme Court, but there was an inaccuracy in the term used for
the intended mode of review. This conclusion which we have reluctantly but prudently arrived at has been drawn from the
considerations extant in the records of Congress, more particularly on Senate Bill No. 1495 and the Reference Committee Report on S.
No. 1495/H. No. 10452. 18

In sponsoring Senate Bill No. 1495, Senator Raul S. Roco delivered his sponsorship speech 19 from which we reproduce the following
excerpts:

The Judiciary Reorganization Act, Mr. President, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, reorganized the Court of Appeals and at the same time
expanded its jurisdiction and powers. Among others, its appellate jurisdiction was expanded to cover not only final judgment of Regional
Trial Courts, but also all final judgment(s), decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards
and commissions, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the
provisions of BP Blg. 129 and of subparagraph 1 of the third paragraph and subparagraph 4 of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.

Mr. President, the purpose of the law is to ease the workload of the Supreme Court by the transfer of some of its burden of review of
factual issues to the Court of Appeals. However, whatever benefits that can be derived from the expansion of the appellate jurisdiction
of the Court of Appeals was cut short by the last paragraph of Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 which excludes from its coverage
the "decisions and interlocutory orders issued under the Labor Code of the Philippines and by the Central Board of Assessment
Appeals.

Among the highest number of cases that are brought up to the Supreme Court are labor cases. Hence, Senate Bill No. 1495 seeks to
eliminate the exceptions enumerated in Section 9 and, additionally, extends the coverage of appellate review of the Court of Appeals in
the decision(s) of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Social Security Commission, and the Employees Compensation
Commission to reduce the number of cases elevated to the Supreme Court. (Emphases and corrections ours)

xxx xxx xxx

Senate Bill No. 1495 authored by our distinguished Colleague from Laguna provides the ideal situation of drastically reducing the
workload of the Supreme Court without depriving the litigants of the privilege of review by an appellate tribunal.

In closing, allow me to quote the observations of former Chief Justice Teehankee in 1986 in the Annual Report of the Supreme Court:

. . . Amendatory legislation is suggested so as to relieve the Supreme Court of the burden of reviewing these cases which present no
important issues involved beyond the particular fact and the parties involved, so that the Supreme Court may wholly devote its time to
cases of public interest in the discharge of its mandated task as the guardian of the Constitution and the guarantor of the people's basic
rights and additional task expressly vested on it now "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

We used to have 500,000 cases pending all over the land, Mr. President. It has been cut down to 300,000 cases some five years ago. I
understand we are now back to 400,000 cases. Unless we distribute the work of the appellate courts, we shall continue to mount and
add to the number of cases pending.

In view of the foregoing, Mr. President, and by virtue of all the reasons we have submitted, the Committee on Justice and Human
Rights requests the support and collegial approval of our Chamber.

xxx xxx xxx

Surprisingly, however, in a subsequent session, the following Committee Amendment was introduced by the said sponsor and the
following proceedings transpired: 20

Senator Roco. On page 2, line 5, after the line "Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution," add the phrase "THE LABOR
CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES UNDER P.D. 442, AS AMENDED." So that it becomes clear, Mr. President, that issues arising from the
Labor Code will still be appealable to the Supreme Court.

The President. Is there any objection? (Silence) Hearing none, the amendment is approved.

Senator Roco. On the same page, we move that lines 25 to 30 be deleted. This was also discussed with our Colleagues in the House of
Representatives and as we understand it, as approved in the House, this was also deleted, Mr. President.

The President. Is there any objection? (Silence) Hearing none, the amendment is approved.

Senator Roco. There are no further Committee amendments, Mr. President.

Senator Romulo. Mr. President, I move that we close the period of Committee amendments.

The President. Is there any objection? (Silence) Hearing none, the amendment is approved. (Emphasis supplied).

xxx xxx xxx

Thereafter, since there were no individual amendments, Senate Bill No. 1495 was passed on second reading and being a certified bill,
its unanimous approval on third reading followed. 21 The Conference Committee Report on Senate Bill No. 1495 and House Bill No.
10452, having theretofore been approved by the House of Representatives, the same was likewise approved by the Senate on
February 20, 1995, 22 inclusive of the dubious formulation on appeals to the Supreme Court earlier discussed.

The Court is, therefore, of the considered opinion that ever since appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court were eliminated, the
legislative intendment was that the special civil action of certiorari was and still is the proper vehicle for judicial review of decisions of
the NLRC. The use of the word "appeal" in relation thereto and in the instances we have noted could have been a lapsus plumae
because appeals by certiorari and the original action for certiorari are both modes of judicial review addressed to the appellate courts.
The important distinction between them, however, and with which the Court is particularly concerned here is that the special civil action
of certiorari is within the concurrent original jurisdiction of this Court and the Court of Appeals; 23 whereas to indulge in the assumption
that appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court are allowed would not subserve, but would subvert, the intention of Congress as
expressed in the sponsorship speech on Senate Bill No. 1495.

Incidentally, it was noted by the sponsor therein that some quarters were of the opinion that recourse from the NLRC to the Court of
Appeals as an initial step in the process of judicial review would be circuitous and would prolong the proceedings. On the contrary, as
he commendably and realistically emphasized, that procedure would be advantageous to the aggrieved party on this reasoning:

On the other hand, Mr. President, to allow these cases to be appealed to the Court of Appeals would give litigants the advantage to
have all the evidence on record be reexamined and reweighed after which the findings of facts and conclusions of said bodies are
correspondingly affirmed, modified or reversed.

Under such guarantee, the Supreme Court can then apply strictly the axiom that factual findings of the Court of Appeals are final and
may not be reversed on appeal to the Supreme Court. A perusal of the records will reveal appeals which are factual in nature and may,
therefore, be dismissed outright by minute resolutions. 24

While we do not wish to intrude into the Congressional sphere on the matter of the wisdom of a law, on this score we add the further
observations that there is a growing number of labor cases being elevated to this Court which, not being a trier of fact, has at times
been constrained to remand the case to the NLRC for resolution of unclear or ambiguous factual findings; that the Court of Appeals is
procedurally equipped for that purpose, aside from the increased number of its component divisions; and that there is undeniably an
imperative need for expeditious action on labor cases as a major aspect of constitutional protection to labor.

Therefore, all references in the amended Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 to supposed appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court are
interpreted and hereby declared to mean and refer to petitions for certiorari under Rule 65. Consequently, all such petitions should
hence forth be initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as the appropriate
forum for the relief desired.

Apropos to this directive that resort to the higher courts should be made in accordance with their hierarchical order, this pronouncement
in Santiago vs. Vasquez, et al. 25 should be taken into account:

One final observation. We discern in the proceedings in this case a propensity on the part of petitioner, and, for that matter, the same
may be said of a number of litigants who initiate recourses before us, to disregard the hierarchy of courts in our judicial system by
seeking relief directly from this Court despite the fact that the same is available in the lower courts in the exercise of their original or
concurrent jurisdiction, or is even mandated by law to be sought therein. This practice must be stopped, not only because of the
imposition upon the precious time of this Court but also because of the inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the
adjudication of the case which often has to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper forum under the rules of
procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues since this Court is not a trier of facts. We, therefore, reiterate the judicial policy
that this Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where
exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of our primary jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, under the foregoing premises, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby REMANDED, and all pertinent records thereof
ordered to be FORWARDED, to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action and disposition consistent with the views and ruling herein
set forth, without pronouncement as to costs.

RELAMPAGOS VS. COMELEC

FACTS:

This special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court revives the issue of whether or not the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) has jurisdiction over petitions for, certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus in election cases where it has exclusive
appellate jurisdiction In the split decision of 4 March 1992 in the consolidated cases of Garcia vs. De Jesus and Uy vs. Commission on
Elections,1 this Court ruled in the negative because of the absence of any specific conferment upon the COMELEC, either by the
constitution or by legislative fiat, of jurisdiction to issue such extraordinary writs. It held that jurisdiction or the legal power to hear and
determine a cause or causes of action, must exist as a matter of law, whether the jurisdiction is original or appellate, and since these
two classes of jursdiction are exclusive of each other, each must expressly conferred by law. One does not flow, nor is inferred, from
the other. This Court proceeded to state that in the Philippine setting, the authority to issue the aforesaid writs involves the exercise of
original jurisdiction which has always been expressly conferred either by Constitution or by law. It is never derived by implication.
Although the Constitution grants the COMELEC appellate jurisdiction, it does not grant it any power to exercise original jurisdiction over
petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus unlike the case of this Court which is specifically conferred with such authority in
Section 5(1) of Article VIII. It also pointed out that the doctrines laid down in Pimentel vs. COMELEC2 — that neither the Constitution
nor any law has conferred jurisdiction on the COMELEC to issue such writs — still finds application under the 1987 Constitution.

In the decision of 29 July 1992 in Veloria vs. Commission on Elections, 3 this Court reiterated the Garcia and Uy doctrine.

In the challenged resolution at bench, the respondent COMELEC adhered to the affirmative view of the issue, citing as authority
therefore its own decision of 29 July 1993 in Dictado vs. Cosico and the last paragraph of Section 50 of B. P. Blg. 697, which reads:

Sec. 50. Definition. —

xxx xxx xxx

The Commission is hereby vested with exclusive authority to hear and decide petitions for certiorari prohibition, and mandamus
involving election cases.

The petitioner herein pleads that this resolution be set aside and nullified for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. He contends that while the COMELEC's position is inherently compelling, it deserves scant
consideration in view of Garcia and Uy and Veloria and the nature and purpose of B. P. Blg. 697 which was to govern solely the
Batasang Pambansa election of 14 May 1984; hence, it was a temporary statute which self-destructed after such election.

The antecedent facts that led to the filing of this action are uncomplicated and undisputed.

In the synchronized elections of 11 May 1992, the petitioner and private respondent Rosita Cumba were candidates for the position of
Mayor in the municipality of Magallanes, Agusan del Norte. The latter was proclaimed the winning candidate, with a margin of only
twenty-two votes over the former.

Unwilling to accept defeat, the petitioner filed an election protest with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Agusan del Norte, which was
assigned to Branch 2 thereof in Butuan City.

On 29 June 1994, the trial court, per Judge Rosario F. Dabalos, found the petitioner to have won with a margin of six votes over the
private respondent and rendered judgement in favor of the petitioner as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing results, the court hereby declares the protestant as having won the mayoralty election and as
duly elected Mayor of the Municipality of Magallanes, Agusan del Norte in the local election held on May 11, 1992, the protestant
having obtained six (6) votes more than that of the protestee's votes.

Copies of the decision were sent to and received by the petitioner and the private respondent on 1 July 1994.

On 4 July 1994, the private respondent appealed the decision to the COMELEC by filing her notice of appeal and paying the appellate
docket fees.

On 8 July 1994, the trial court gave due course to the appeal.

On 12 July 1994, the petitioner filed with the trial court a motion for execution pending appeal, which the private respondent opposed on
22 July 1994.

On 3 August 1994, the trial court granted the petitioner's motion for execution pending appeal. The corresponding writ of execution was
forthwith issued. Thereafter, the private respondent filed a motion for a reconsideration of the order of execution and the sheriff held in
abeyance the implementation of the writ. This motion was denied on 5 August 1994.

The private respondent then filed with the respondent COMELEC a petition for certiorari to annul the aforesaid other of the trial court
granting the motion for execution pending appeal and the writ of execution. The petition was docketed as SPR No. 1-94.

On 9 February 1995, the COMELEC promulgated its resolution granting the petition.4 The dispositive portion thereof reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVES that is [sic] has exclusive authority to hear and decide petitions for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus in election cases as authorized by law, and therefore, assumes jurisdiction of the instant petition
for certiorari which is hereby GRANTED. The Order of the court a quo of August 3, 1994 is hereby declared NULL and VOID and the
Writ of Execution issued on August 4, 1994 LIFTED.

Accordingly, petitioner Rosita Cumba is ordered restored to her position .as Municipality Mayor of Magallanes, Agusan del Norte,
pending resolution of the appeal before this Commission in the case of Relampagos vs. Cumba in EAC No. 108-94.

In upholding its jurisdiction in certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus cases, the respondent COMELEC maintains that there is a special
law granting it such jurisdiction, viz., Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697, which remains in full force as it was not expressly repealed by the
Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881),and that it is not exactly correct that this law self-destructed after the May 1984 election. It
further reasoned out that in the performance of its judicial functions, the COMELEC, is the most logical body to issue the extraordinary
writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus in election cases where it has appellate jurisdiction. It ratiocinated as follows:

It is therefore clear that if there is a law which specifically confers jurisdiction to issue the prerogative Writs, then the Commission has
jurisdiction.

Such a law exists. Section 50, B.P. Blg. 697 is that law.

B.P. Blg. 697, approved on March 14, 1984, is entitled "AN ACT TO GOVERN THE ELECTION OF MEMBERS OF THE BATASANG
PAMBANSA ON MAY 14, 1984 AND THE SELECTION OF SECTORAL REPRESENTATIVES THEREAFTER, APPROPRIATING
FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. Section 50 provides:
Sec. 50. Definition.— Pre-proclamation controversy refers to any question pertaining to or affecting the proceedings of the Board of
Canvassers which may be raised by any candidate, political party or coalition of political parties before the board or directly with the
Commission.

The Commission Elections shall be the sole judge and shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all pre-proclamation controversies.

The Commission is hereby vested with exclusive authority to hear and decide petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
involving election cases.(Emphasis supplied).

We have debated among ourselves whether Section 50, B.P. Blg. 697, has been repealed. We have come to the conclusion that it has
not been repealed. The repealing provision in the Omnibus Election Code (BP Blg. 881, December 3, 1985), provides:

Sec. 282. Repealing Clause. — Presidential Decree No. 1296 otherwise known as the The 1978 Election Code, as amended, is hereby
repealed. All other election Laws, decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations or parts thereof, inconsistent with the provisions of
this Code is hereby repealed, except Presidential Decree No. 1618 and Batas Pambansa Blg. 20 governing the election of the
members of the Sangguniang Pampook of Regions IX and XII. (Emphasis supplied).

B.P. Blg. 697 has not been expressly repealed, and Section 50 thereof is not inconsistent with the provisions of the Omnibus Election
Code. Besides, in the cited Garcia/Uy cases, as reiterated in the Veloria case, the Supreme Court itself said, reiterating previous cases,
that implied repeal of statutes is frowned upon, thus:

Just as implied repeal of statutes frowned upon, so also should the grant of original jurisdiction by mere implication to a quasi-judicial
body be tabooed. (Garcia/Uy/Veloria Cases: Emphasis supplied).

xxx xxx xxx

It is equally clear that Executive Order No. 90 . . . did not modify or repeal, whether expressly or impliedly, Section 23 of P.D. No. 1752.
It is common place Learning that implied repeal are not favored in Law and are not casually to be assumed. The first effort of a court
must always be to reconcile or adjust the provisions of one statute with those of another so as to give sensible effect to both provisions
(Jalandoni vs. Andaya, 55 SCRA 261 (1974); Villegas vs. Subido, 41 SCRA 190, 196-197 (1971); National Power Corporation vs.
ARCA, 25 SCRA 931 (1968); U.S. vs. Palacios, 33 Phil. 208 (1916); and Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association, Inc. vs. Feliciano,
13 SCRA 377·(1965). Only when there is clear inconsistency and conflict between the provisions of two (2) statutes, may a court hold
that the provisions later in point of time have impliedly repealed the earlier ones" that (Philippine American Management Co., Inc., vs.
Philippine American Management Employees Association, 49 SCRA 194 (1973); and Villegas vs. Subido, 41 SCRA 190 (1971) (Larga
vs. Ranada, Jr., No. L-7976, August 3, 1984, 164 SCRA 25).

It was even suggested that Batas Pambansa Blg. 697 self-destructed after the Batasang Pambansa elections of 1984; because of the
provisions of Section 1 (Title and Applicability) which provides: "This act shall be known and cited as "The Law on the 1984 Batasang
Pambansa Election." It shall govern the election for the regular Batasang Pambansa which shall be held on May 14, 1984, and the
selection of sectoral representatives thereafter as provided by the Constitution.

While that may be true with most of its provisions which were applicable only for the particular election (like election and campaign
periods, voting constituency, etc.) most if not all of the remaining provisions could be applicable to future elections. It is not lost to the
Commission that B.P. Blg. 697 was passed also "for other purposes."

But the important consideration is that the authority granted to the Commission under B.P. Blg. 697 is not inconsistent with our election
laws. It should be mentioned that the provisions of Republic Act No. 6638 which governed the local elections of January 18, 1988, as to
the number of councilors in specified cities (Sec. 3) and the number of Sangguniang members in different provinces and cities (Sec. 4)
are still applicable up to this day. In fact, it became one of the important controlling provision which governed the May 11, 1992
elections. If provisions of Republic Act No. 6636 which are not inconsistent with the present election laws did not self-destruct, why
should Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697?

Another provision which did not self-destruct is that which provides that "any city or municipal judge, who includes or excludes any voter
without any legal basis in inclusion and exclusion proceedings, shall be guilty of an election offense," although this provision is found in
Section 10 of Executive Order No. 134 supposedly with limited application as the enabling act for the elections for Members of
Congress on May 11, 1987 and for other purposes.

Clearly the intent of the law, was to give certiorari, jurisdiction to the Commission on Elections because the Pimentel case said there
was none, to fill a void in the law, and avoid an incongruous situation.

A statute's clauses and phrases must not be taken separately but in its relation to the statute's totality. Each statute must, in fact, be
construed as to "harmonized it with the pre-existing body of laws." Unless clearly repugnant, provisions of statutes must be reconciled. .
. . (Commissioner of Customs vs. ESSO Standard Eastern, Inc. L-28329, August 7, 1975, 66 SCRA 113).

xxx xxx xxx

The statutory construction rule is: "When the Legislature enacts provision, it is understood that it is aware of previous statutes relating to
the same subject matter and that in the absence of any express repeal or amendment therein, the new provision should be deemed
enacted pursuant to the legislative policy embodied in the prior statutes." (Legaspi vs. Executive Secretary, L-36153, November 28,
1975, 68 SCRA 253).

The Commission is the most logical body whenever it performs judicial functions to take jurisdiction of petitions for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus because it has appellate jurisdiction in election cases granted by the Constitution itself. The Court of Appeals has no
more appellate jurisdiction over such cases And in the case of the Supreme Court, Justice de Castro in the Pimentel case pointed out,
in his dissenting opinion that under the Constitution the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in election cases should properly be
limited to decisions, orders or rulings of the Commission on Elections, not from lower courts.

It was of course different under the Election Code of 1971 (R.A. No. 6388, September 2, 1971) because the Supreme Court and the
Court of Appeals then had appellate jurisdiction in election case decided by the lower courts.

In the Veloria case, it now appears that only the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals have certiorari jurisdiction over election cases
from the lower courts because after reiterating the ruling in the Garcia and Uy cases, the Supreme Court said:

In view of this pronouncement, an original civil action of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus against a regional trial court in an election
contest may be filed only in the Court of Appeals or in this Court being the only courts given such original jurisdiction under the
Constitution and the Law. (Emphasis supplied).

While these two appellate Courts do have the jurisdiction under the Constitution and the law, it is most logical for the Commission
whenever it performs judicial functions to have the authority to issue these prerogative writs. . . .

...

In traversing the first issue, we are citing our decision laid down in the case of Antonio Dictado vs. Hon. Rodrigo N. Cosico and Emilio
Tiongco promulgated on July 29, 1993. In this case, the Commission en banc had occasion to rule on the question of whether or not the
Commission has the authority to hear and decide petitions for certiorari in election cases.

The Commission En Banc, speaking through Hon. Commissioner Regalado E. Maambong, ruled that there is [a] law which grants the
Commission, the exclusive authority to issue special writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus in election cases, and there are also
Supreme Court decisions, recent in fact, which declare that the Commission has no such authority precisely because; according to the
decisions, there is no law granting such authority, and without any hint whatsoever of the existence of Sec. 50 of Batas vs. Pambansa
Blg. 697.

As gleaned from the case of Dictado, respondents were arguing that Sec. 50 of BP Blg. 697 was repealed by the Omnibus Election
Code (BP Blg. 881, December 3, 1985). Furthermore, in their answer, respondents cited Supreme Court decisions where it was
declared that, indeed, the Commission has no jurisdiction to issue special writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction.

It is still the position of this Commission that Sec. 50, BP Blg. 697 has not been repealed.

As defined in the Constitution, "Judicial power" includes the duty of the Courts of Justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess, of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government (Sec. 1, par. 2, Art. VII).

Since the COMELEC, in discharging its appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Sec. 2 (2), Art. IX-C, acts as a court of justice performing
judicial power and said power includes the determination of whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction, it necessarily follows that the Comelec, by constitutional mandate, is vested with jurisdiction to issue writs of
certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. 5

It set aside, for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion, the trial court's order of execution pending appeal and the writ of
execution because

[a]t the time the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal was filed on July 12, 1994 the court a quo had already lost jurisdiction over the
case for as early as July 8, 1994, it had already acknowledged through its order issued on that date, the perfection of the appeal of
petitioner as in fact it ordered the elevation of the records of the case to this Honorable Commission. 6

Aggrieved by the resolution, the petitioner filed the instant special civil action.

In the resolution of 21 February 1985, the Court required the respondents to comment on the petition and issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining the respondent COMELEC to cease and desist from enforcing is challenged resolution.

As naturally expected, the private respondent, in her Comment, opposed the petition by invoking the very arguments adduced by the
respondent COMELEC in its challenged the resolution and the dissenting opinion in the Garcia and Uy cases.

In its comment filed by the Office of the Solicitor General, the respondent COMELEC postulates that it issued the said resolution after it
had taken cognizance of the appeal interposed by the private respondent from the RTC decision, unlike in the Garcia and Uy cases,
and therefore, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, thus:
it cannot be gainsaid that [it] possesses inherent powers to employ means necessary to carry into effect the powers conferred upon it
by law (Sec. 6, Rule 135 of the Revised Rules of Court) and verily, there was no need for any statutory grant for that purpose. Indeed,
in annulling the Order of Execution of the Regional Trial Court, public respondent did not exceed its jurisdiction since its action in this
regard was necessary to preserve the subject of the appeal and to maintain the status quo of the parties pending the final outcome of
its review of the correctness of the appealed decision. 7

It tried to show that in Pimentel and Garcia, the trial courts still had jurisdiction over the cases unlike in the instant case where the trial
court had already given due course to the appeal and elevated the records of the case to the COMELEC which had taken cognizance
of the appeal.

This Court resolved to give due course to this petition and to decide it on its merits.

The contention of the respondent COMELEC as advanced by the Office of the Solicitor General is unacceptable. It goes against its
theory in the assailed resolution and is not supported by the facts. The challenged resolution involves a case which the COMELEC
docketed as a special relief case (SPR. No. 1-94). Under Rule 28 of its Rules of Procedure, the special relief cases are petitions for
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, and contempt proceedings. The ordinary appeal from the RTC decision was, as disclosed in the
challenged resolution; docketed as EAC No. 108-94.8 Clearly then, the COMELEC had recognized and taken cognizance of two cases:
one, the ordinary appeal from the RTC decision (EAC No. 108-94), and two, the special civil action for certiorari docketed as SPR No.
1-94. The two cases were not consolidated. The dissimilarities between them need no further elaboration. Since it issued the
challenged resolution under the latter case, it cannot now be heard to state that it issued it as an incident in the former, the ordinary
appeal. This erroneous contention of the Office of the of the Solicitor General notwithstanding, the position taken by the COMELEC in
its resolution now in question paves the way for a re-examination of this Court's pronouncement in the Garcia and Uy cases.

As earlier stated, in Garcia and Uy, 9 and later, in Veloria, 10 this Court ruled that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction over the
extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus because there is no specific constitutional or statutory conferment to it of
such jurisdiction.

The respondent COMELEC, however, points out that Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697 expressly granted it such jurisdiction. Indeed, it did.
Nevertheless, considering that the said law was, per Section 1 thereof, "to govern the election for the regular Batasang Pambansa
which shall be held on May 14, 1984, and the selection of sectoral representatives thereafter as provided by the Constitution," and in
view of the passage of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881) by the regular Batasang Pambansa, 11 this Court is then confronted
with the twin issues of whether said B.P. Blg. 697 became functus officio after the 14 May 1984 election of members of the regular
Batasang Pambansa or the selection thereafter of the sectoral representatives at the latest, and whether it was repealed by the
Omnibus Election Code.

The Court agrees with the respondent COMELEC that there are provisions in B.P. Blg. 697 whose lifetime go beyond the 14 May 1984
election or the subsequent selection of sectoral representatives. In fact, by the very wording of the last paragraph of its Section 50, to:
wit:

Sec. 50. Definition. —

xxx xxx xxx

The Commission is hereby vested with the exclusive authority to hear and decide petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
involving election cases. (Emphasis supplied).

it is quite clear that the exercise of the power was not restricted within a specific period of time. Taken in the context of the conspicuous
absence of such jurisdiction as ruled in Pimentel vs. Commission on Elections, 12 it seems quite obvious that the grant was intended as
a remedial legislation to eliminate the seeming incongruity or irrationality resulting in a splitting of jurisdiction pointed out in the
dissenting opinion of Justice De Castro in the said case.

But did not the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881) repeal B.P. Blg. 697? The repealing clause of the latter reads as follows:

Sec. 282. Repealing clause. — Presidential decree No. 1296, otherwise known as The 1978 Election Code, as amended, is hereby
repealed. All other election laws, decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations, or parts thereof, inconsistent with the provisions of
this Code are hereby repealed, except Presidential Decree No. 1618 .and Batas Pambansa Blg. 20 governing the election of the
members of the Sangguniang Pampook of Regions IX and XII.

The second sentence is in the nature of a general repealing clause. It has been said:

An express general repealing clause to the effect that. all inconsistent enactments are repealed; is in legal contemplation a nullity.
Repeals must either be expressed or result by implication. Although it has in some instances been held to be an express recognition
that there are acts in conflict with the act in which it is included and as indicative of the legislative intent to repeal such acts, a general
repealing clause cannot be deemed an express repeal because it fails to identify or designate any act to be repealed. It cannot be
determinative of an implied repeal for if does not declare any inconsistency but conversely, merely predicates a repeal upon the
condition that a substantial conflict is found under application of the rules of implied repeals. If its inclusion is more than mere
mechahical verbiage, it is more often a detriment than an aid to the establishment of a repeal, for such clause is construed as an
express limitation of the repeal to inconsistent acts.13
This Court is not unaware of the equally settled rule in statutory construction that in the revision or codification of laws, all parts and
provisions of the old laws that are omitted in the revised statute or code are deemed repealed, unless the statute or code provides
otherwise expressly or impliedly. 14

By the tenor of its aforequoted Repealing Clause, it does not evidently appear that the Batasang Pambansa had intended to codify all
prior election statutes and to replace them with the new Code. It made, in fact, by the second sentence, a reservation that all prior
election statutes or parts thereof not inconsistent with any provisions of the Code shall remain in force. That sentence

predicates the intended repeal upon the condition that a substantial conflict must be found on existing and prior acts of the same
subject matter. Such being the case, the presumption against implied repeals and the rule on strict construction regarding implied
repeals apply ex proprio vigore. For the legislature is presumed to know the existing laws so that, if repeal of particular or specific law or
laws is intended, the proper step is to express it. The failure to add a specific repealing clause particularly mentioning the statute to be
repealed indicates that the intent was not to repeal any existing law on the matter, unless an irreconcilable inconsistency a nd
repugnancy exist in the terms of the new and the old laws.15

This being the case, the Court painstakingly examined the aforesaid last paragraph of Section 50 of the Omnibus Election Code to
determine if the former is inconsistent with any of the provisions of the latter, It found none.

In the face of the foregoing disquisitions, the Court must, as it now does, abandon the ruling in the Garcia and Uy and Veloria cases,
We now hold that the last paragraph of Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697 providing as follows:

The Commission is hereby vested with exclusive authority to hear and decide petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
involving election cases.

remains in full force and effect but only in such cases where, under paragraph (2), Section 1, Article IX-C of the Constitution, it has
exclusive appellate jurisdiction. Simply put, the COMELEC has the authority to issue the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition,
and mandamus only in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.

The jurisdiction of the COMELEC having been settled, we now proceed to review the substance of the challenged resolution.

That the trial court acted with palpable and whimsical abuse of discretion in granting the petitioner's motion for execution pending
appeal and in issuing the writ of execution is all too obvious. Since both the petitioner and the private respondent received copies of the
decision on 1 July 1994, an appeal therefrom may be filed within five days 16 from 1 July 1994, or on or before 6 July 1994. Any motion
for execution pending appeal must be filed before the period for the perfection of the appeal. Pursuant to Section 23 of the Interim
Rules Implementing B.P. Blg. 129, which is deemed to have supplementary effect to the COMELEC Rules of Procedures pursuant to
Rule 43 of the latter, an appeal would be deemed perfected on the last day for any of the parties to appeal,17 or on 6 July 1994. On 4
July 1994, the private respondent filed her notice of appeal and paid the appeal fee. On 8 July 1994, the trial court gave due course to
the appeal and ordered the elevation of the records of the case to the COMELEC. Upon the perfection of the appeal, the trial court was
divested of its jurisdiction over the case. 18 Since the motion for execution pending appeal was filed only on 12 July 1994, or after the
perfection of the appeal, the trial court could no longer validly act thereon. It could have been otherwise if the motion was filed before
the perfection of the appeal. 19 Accordingly, since the respondent COMELEC has the jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writs of
certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, then it correctly set aside the challenged order granting the motion for execution pending appeal
and writ of execution issued by the trial court.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the challenged resolution of 9 February 1995 of the Commission on Elections in SPR
No. 1-94 entitled "Rosita Cumba vs. Manuel M. Relampagos, et al. " is AFFIRMED.

The temporary restraining order issued on 21 February 1995 is hereby LIFTED.

NEYPES VS. CA

FACTS:

Petitioners Domingo Neypes, Luz Faustino, Rogelio Faustino, Lolito Victoriano, Jacob Obania and Domingo Cabacungan filed an
action for annulment of judgment and titles of land and/or reconveyance and/or reversion with preliminary injunction before the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 43, of Roxas, Oriental Mindoro, against the Bureau of Forest Development, Bureau of Lands, Land Bank of the
Philippines and the heirs of Bernardo del Mundo, namely, Fe, Corazon, Josefa, Salvador and Carmen.

In the course of the proceedings, the parties (both petitioners and respondents) filed various motions with the trial court. Among these
were: (1) the motion filed by petitioners to declare the respondent heirs, the Bureau of Lands and the Bureau of Forest Development in
default and (2) the motions to dismiss filed by the respondent heirs and the Land Bank of the Philippines, respectively.

In an order dated May 16, 1997, the trial court, presided by public respondent Judge Antonio N. Rosales, resolved the foregoing
motions as follows: (1) the petitioners' motion to declare respondents Bureau of Lands and Bureau of Forest Development in default
was granted for their failure to file an answer, but denied as against the respondent heirs of del Mundo because the substituted service
of summons on them was improper; (2) the Land Bank's motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action was denied because there were
hypothetical admissions and matters that could be determined only after trial, and (3) the motion to dismiss filed by respondent heirs of
del Mundo, based on prescription, was also denied because there were factual matters that could be determined only after trial. [1]
The respondent heirs filed a motion for reconsideration of the order denying their motion to dismiss on the ground that the trial court
could very well resolve the issue of prescription from the bare allegations of the complaint itself without waiting for the trial proper.

In an order [2] dated February 12, 1998, the trial court dismissed petitioners' complaint on the ground that the action had already
prescribed. Petitioners allegedly received a copy of the order of dismissal on March 3, 1998 and, on the 15th day thereafter or on March
18, 1998, filed a motion for reconsideration. On July 1, 1998, the trial court issued another order dismissing the motion for
reconsideration [3] which petitioners received on July 22, 1998. Five days later, on July 27, 1998, petitioners filed a notice of appeal [4]
and paid the appeal fees on August 3, 1998.

On August 4, 1998, the court a quo denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was filed eight days late. [5] This was recei ved by
petitioners on July 31, 1998. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but this too was denied in an order dated September 3, 1998.
[6]

Via a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, petitioners assailed the dismissal of the
notice of appeal before the Court of Appeals.

In the appellate court, petitioners claimed that they had seasonably filed their notice of appeal. They argued that the 15-day
reglementary period to appeal started to run only on July 22, 1998 since this' was' the day they received the final order of the trial court
denying their motion for reconsideration. When they filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998, only five days had elapsed and they
were well within the reglementary period for appeal. [7]

On September 16, 1999, the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the petition. It ruled that the 15-day period to appeal should have been
reckoned from March 3, 1998 or the day they received the February 12, 1998 order dismissing their complaint. According to the
appellate court, the order was the 'final order appealable under the Rules. It held further:

Perforce the petitioners' tardy appeal was correctly dismissed for the (P)erfection of an appeal within the reglementary period and in the
manner prescribed by law is jurisdictional and non-compliance with such legal requirement is fatal and effectively renders the judgment
final and executory. [8]

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforementioned decision. This was denied by the Court of Appeals on January 6,
2000.

In this present petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules, petitioners ascribe the following errors allegedly committed by the
appellate court:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITIONERS' PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND
MANDAMUS AND IN AFFIRMING THE ORDER OF THE HON. JUDGE ANTONIO N. ROSALES WHICH DISMISSED THE
PETITIONERS' APPEAL IN CIVIL CASE NO. C-36 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 43, ROXAS, ORIENTAL
MINDORO, EVEN AFTER THE PETITIONERS HAD PAID THE APPEAL DOCKET FEES.

II

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS LIKEWISE ERRED IN RULING AND AFFIRMING THE DECISION OR ORDER OF THE
RESPONDENT HON. ANTONIO M. ROSALES THAT PETITIONERS' APPEAL WAS FILED OUT OF TIME WHEN PETITIONERS
RECEIVED THE LAST OR FINAL ORDER OF THE COURT ON JULY 22, 1998 AND FILED THEIR NOTICE OF APPEAL ON JULY
27, 1998 AND PAID THE APPEAL DOCKET FEE ON AUGUST 3, 1998.

III

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FURTHER ERRED IN RULING THAT THE WORDS 'FINAL ORDER IN SECTION 3, RULE
41, OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE WILL REFER TO THE [FIRST] ORDER OF RESPONDENT JUDGE HON.
ANTONIO M. MORALES DATED FEBRUARY 12, 1998 INSTEAD OF THE LAST AND FINAL ORDER DATED JULY 1, 1998 COPY
OF WHICH WAS RECEIVED BY PETITIONERS THROUGH COUNSEL ON JULY 22, 1998.

IV.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FINALLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE DECISION IN THE CASE OF DENSO, INC. V.
IAC, 148 SCRA 280, IS APPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT CASE THEREBY IGNORING THE PECULIAR FACTS AND
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE AND THE FACT THAT THE SAID DECISION WAS RENDERED PRIOR TO THE ENACTMENT
OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. [9]

The foregoing issues essentially revolve around the period within which petitioners should have filed their notice of appeal.

First and foremost, the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process. It is merely a statutory privilege and may be
exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. Thus, one who seeks to avail of the right to appeal must
comply with the requirements of the Rules. Failure to do so often leads to the loss of the right to appeal. [10] The period to appeal is
fixed by both statute and procedural rules. BP 129, [11] as amended, provides:
Sec. 39. Appeals. ' The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any court in all these cases
shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from. Provided,
however, that in habeas corpus cases, the period for appeal shall be (48) forty-eight hours from the notice of judgment appealed from. x
xx

Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:

SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. ― The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from the notice of the judgment or final order
appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30)
days from the notice of judgment or final order.

The period to appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a
motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed. (emphasis supplied)

Based on the foregoing, an appeal should be taken within 15 days from the notice of judgment or final order appealed from. A final
judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more for the court to do with respect to it. It is an adjudication
on the merits which, considering the evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties
are; or it may be an order or judgment that dismisses an action. [12]

As already mentioned, petitioners argue that the order of July 1, 1998 denying their motion for reconsideration should be construed as
the 'final order, not the February 12, 1998 order which dismissed their complaint. Since they received their copy of the denial of their
motion for reconsideration only on July 22, 1998, the 15-day reglementary period to appeal had not yet lapsed when they filed their
notice of appeal on July 27, 1998.

What therefore should be deemed as the 'final order, receipt of which triggers the start of the 15-day reglementary period to appeal ' the
February 12, 1998 order dismissing the complaint or the July 1, 1998 order dismissing the MR?

In the recent case of Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc., [13] the trial court declared petitioner Quelnan non-suited and accordingly
dismissed his complaint. Upon receipt of the order of dismissal, he filed an omnibus motion to set it aside. When the omnibus motion
was filed, 12 days of the 15-day period to appeal the order had lapsed. He later on received another order, this time dismissing his
omnibus motion. He then filed his notice of appeal. But this was likewise dismissed ― for having been filed out of time.

The court a quo ruled that petitioner should have appealed within 15 days after the dismissal of his complaint since this was the final
order that was appealable under the Rules. We reversed the trial court and declared that it was the denial of the motion for
reconsideration of an order of dismissal of a complaint which constituted the final order as it was what ended the issues raised there.

This pronouncement was reiterated in the more recent case of Apuyan v. Haldeman et al. [14] where we again considered the order
denying petitioner Apuyan's motion for reconsideration as the final order which finally disposed of the issues involved in the case.

Based on the aforementioned cases, we sustain petitioners' view that the order dated July 1, 1998 denying their motion for
reconsideration was the final order contemplated in the Rules.

We now come to the next question: if July 1, 1998 was the start of the 15-day reglementary period to appeal, did petitioners in fact file
their notice of appeal on time?

Under Rule 41, Section 3, petitioners had 15 days from notice of judgment or final order to appeal the decision of the trial court. On the
15th day of the original appeal period (March 18, 1998), petitioners did not file a notice of appeal but instead opted to file a motion for
reconsideration. According to the trial court, the MR only interrupted the running of the 15-day appeal period. [15] It ruled that
petitioners, having filed their MR on the last day of the 15-day reglementary period to appeal, had only one (1) day left to file the notice
of appeal upon receipt of the notice of denial of their MR. Petitioners, however, argue that they were entitled under the Rules to a fresh
period of 15 days from receipt of the 'final order or the order dismissing their motion for reconsideration.

In Quelnan and Apuyan, both petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the trial court. We ruled there that they only
had the remaining time of the 15-day appeal period to file the notice of appeal. We consistently applied this rule in similar cases, [16]
premised on the long-settled doctrine that the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period permitted by law is not only
mandatory but also jurisdictional. [17] The rule is also founded on deep-seated considerations of public policy and sound practice that,
at risk of occasional error, the judgments and awards of courts must become final at some definite time fixed by law. [18]

Prior to the passage of BP 129, Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court read:

Sec. 3. How appeal is taken. ' Appeal maybe taken by serving upon the adverse party and filing with the trial court within thirty (30)
days from notice of order or judgment, a notice of appeal, an appeal bond, and a record on appeal. The time during which a motion to
set aside the judgment or order or for new trial has been pending shall be deducted, unless such motion fails to satisfy the requirements
of Rule 37.

But where such motion has been filed during office hours of the last day of the period herein provided, the appeal must be perfected
within the day following that in which the party appealing received notice of the denial of said motion. [19] (emphasis supplied)
According to the foregoing provision, the appeal period previously consisted of 30 days. BP 129, however, reduced this appeal period
to 15 days. In the deliberations of the Committee on Judicial Reorganization [20] that drafted BP 129, the raison d etre behind the
amendment was to shorten the period of appeal [21] and enhance the efficiency and dispensation of justice. We have since required
strict observance of this reglementary period of appeal. Seldom have we condoned late filing of notices of appeal, [22] and only in very
exceptional instances to better serve the ends of justice.

In National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority and Authority v. Municipality of Libmanan, [23] however, we declared that appeal is an
essential part of our judicial system and the rules of procedure should not be applied rigidly. This Court has on occasion advised the
lower courts to be cautious about not depriving a party of the right to appeal and that every party litigant should be afforded the amplest
opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause, free from the constraint of technicalities.

In de la Rosa v. Court of Appeals, [24] we stated that, as a rule, periods which require litigants to do certain acts must be followed
unless, under exceptional circumstances, a delay in the filing of an appeal may be excused on grounds of substantial justice. There, we
condoned the delay incurred by the appealing party due to strong considerations of fairness and justice.

In setting aside technical infirmities and thereby giving due course to tardy appeals, we have not been oblivious to or unmindful of the
extraordinary situations that merit liberal application of the Rules. In those situations where technicalities were dispensed with, our
decisions were not meant to undermine the force and effectivity of the periods set by law. But we hasten to add that in those rare cases
where procedural rules were not stringently applied, there always existed a clear need to prevent the commission of a grave injustice.
Our judicial system and the courts have always tried to maintain a healthy balance between the strict enforcement of procedural laws
and the guarantee that every litigant be given the full opportunity for the just and proper disposition of his cause. [25]

The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules in all courts. [26] It has the sole prerogative to amend, repeal or even establish
new rules for a more simplified and inexpensive process, and the speedy disposition of cases. In the rules governing appeals to it and
to the Court of Appeals, particularly Rules 42, [27] 43 [28] and 45, [29] the Court allows extensions of time, based on justifiable and
compelling reasons, for parties to file their appeals. These extensions may consist of 15 days or more.

To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it
practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of
the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration. [30]

Henceforth, this 'fresh period rule shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial
Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial
agencies [31] to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. [32] The new rule aims to
regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for
reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution.

We thus hold that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal within the fresh period of 15 days, counted from July 22, 1998 (the
date of receipt of notice denying their motion for reconsideration). This pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the
Rules which states that the appeal shall be taken within 15 days from notice of judgment or final order appealed from. The use of the
disjunctive word 'or signifies disassociation and independence of one thing from another. It should, as a rule, be construed in the sense
in which it ordinarily implies. [33] Hence, the use of 'or in the above provision supposes that the notice of appeal may be filed within 15
days from the notice of judgment or within 15 days from notice of the 'final order, which we already determined to refer to the July 1,
1998 order denying the motion for a new trial or reconsideration.

Neither does this new rule run counter to the spirit of Section 39 of BP 129 which shortened the appeal period from 30 days to 15 days
to hasten the disposition of cases. The original period of appeal (in this case March 3-18, 1998) remains and the requirement for strict
compliance still applies. The fresh period of 15 days becomes significant only when a party opts to file a motion for new trial or motion
for reconsideration. In this manner, the trial court which rendered the assailed decision is given another opportunity to review the case
and, in the process, minimize and/or rectify any error of judgment. While we aim to resolve cases with dispatch and to have judgments
of courts become final at some definite time, we likewise aspire to deliver justice fairly.

In this case, the new period of 15 days eradicates the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period should be counted ' from receipt
of notice of judgment (March 3, 1998) or from receipt of notice of 'final order appealed from (July 22, 1998).

To recapitulate, a party litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt of the Regional Trial Court's decision or
file it within 15 days from receipt of the order (the 'final order') denying his motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. Obviously,
the new 15-day period may be availed of only if either motion is filed; otherwise, the decision becomes final and executory after the
lapse of the original appeal period provided in Rule 41, Section 3.

Petitioners here filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998 or five days from receipt of the order denying their motion for
reconsideration on July 22, 1998. Hence, the notice of appeal was well within the fresh appeal period of 15 days, as already discussed.
[34]

We deem it unnecessary to discuss the applicability of Denso (Philippines), Inc. v. IAC [35] since the Court of Appeals never even
referred to it in its assailed decision.

WHEREFORE , the petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
 IMANI VS. METROBANK

FACTS:

On appeal is the July 3, 2008 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 93061, setting aside the November 22, 2005
Order2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 64, as well as its subsequent Resolution dated March 3, 2009,3
denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

On August 28, 1981, Evangeline D. Imani (petitioner) signed a Continuing Suretyship Agreement in favor of respondent Metropolitan
Bank & Trust Company (Metrobank), with Cesar P. Dazo, Nieves Dazo, Benedicto C. Dazo, Cynthia C. Dazo, Doroteo Fundales, Jr.,
and Nicolas Ponce as her co-sureties. As sureties, they bound themselves to pay Metrobank whatever indebtedness C.P. Dazo
Tannery, Inc. (CPDTI) incurs, but not exceeding Six Million Pesos (₱6,000,000.00).

Later, CPDTI obtained loans of ₱100,000.00 and ₱63,825.45, respectively. The loans were evidenced by promissory notes signed by
Cesar and Nieves Dazo. CPDTI defaulted in the payment of its loans. Metrobank made several demands for payment upon CPDTI, but
to no avail. This prompted Metrobank to file a collection suit against CPDTI and its sureties, including herein petitioner. The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. 15717.

After due proceedings, the RTC rendered a decision4 in favor of Metrobank. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court renders a judgment in favor of [Metrobank] ordering defendants, C.P. Dazo Tannery,
Inc., Cesar P. Dazo, Nieves Dazo, Benedicto C. Dazo, Evangelina D. Imani, Cynthia C. Dazo, Doroteo Fundales, Jr., and Nicolas
Ponce to pay [respondent] Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company:

1. Under the First Cause of Action, the sum of ₱175,451.48 plus the stipulated interest, penalty charges and bank charges from March
1, 1984 and until the whole amount is fully paid;

2. Under the Second Cause of Action, the sum of ₱92,158.85 plus the stipulated interest, penalty charges and bank charges from
February 24, 1985, and until the whole amount is fully paid;

3. The sum equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the total amount due under the First and Second Cause of Action; and

4. Ordering the defendants to pay the costs of suit and expenses of litigation.

SO ORDERED.5

Therein defendants appealed to the CA. On September 29, 1997, the CA issued a Resolution dismissing the appeal.6 Consequently,
on October 22, 1997, the CA issued an Entry of Judgment.7

Metrobank then filed with the RTC a motion for execution,8 which was granted on December 7, 1999.9 A writ of execution10 was
issued against CPDTI and its co-defendants. The sheriff levied on a property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-27957
P(M) and registered in the name of petitioner. A public auction was conducted and the property was awarded to Metrobank, as the
highest bidder.

Metrobank undertook to consolidate the title covering the subject property in its name, and filed a Manifestation and Motion,11 praying
that spouses Sina and Evangline Imani be directed to surrender the owner’s copy of TCT No. T-27957 P(M) for cancellation. Petitioner
opposed the motion and filed her Comment with Urgent Motion to Cancel and Nullify the Levy on Execution, the Auction Sale and
Certificate of Sale Over TCT No. T-27957 P(M).12 She argued that the subject property belongs to the conjugal partnership; as such, it
cannot be held answerable for the liabilities incurred by CPDTI to Metrobank. Neither can it be subject of levy on execution or public
auction. Hence, petitioner prayed for the nullification of the levy on execution and the auction sale, as well as the certificate of sale in
favor of Metrobank.

On June 20, 2005, the RTC issued an Order13 denying Metrobank’s motion, explaining that:

[Petitioner] Evangelina D. Imani incurred the obligation to [Metrobank] by the mere fact that she executed the Continuing Suretyship
Agreement in favor of [Metrobank]. The loan proceeds were not intended for [petitioner] Evangelina D. Imani. It cannot therefore be
presumed that the loan proceeds had redounded to the benefit of her family. It is also worth stressing that the records of this case is
bereft of any showing that at the time of the signing of the Suretyship Agreement and even at the time of execution and sale at public
auction of the subject property, [petitioner] Evangelina D. Imani has the authority to dispose of or encumber their conjugal partnership
properties. Neither was she conferred the power of administration over the said properties. Hence, when she executed the Suretyship
Agreement, she had placed the Conjugal Partnership in danger of being dissipated. The law could have not allowed this in keeping with
the mandate of protecting and safeguarding the conjugal partnership. This is also the reason why the husband or the wife cannot
dispose of the conjugal partnership properties even onerously, if without the consent of the other, or gratuitously, as by way of
donation.14

The RTC decreed that:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, [Metrobank’s] motion for issuance of an Order directing Spouses Sina Imani and Evangeline
Dazo-Imani to surrender the owner’s copy of TCT No. T-27957 P(M) to the Register of Deeds of Meycauayan, Bulacan for cancellation,
is DENIED.

On the other hand, [petitioner’s] Motion to Cancel and Nullify the Levy on Execution, the Auction Sale and Certificate of Sale with
respect to the real property covered by TCT No. T-27957 P(M) is GRANTED.

The Levy on Execution and the Sale by Public Auction of the property covered by TCT No. T-27957 P(M) are nullified and the
Certificate of Sale over the same property is hereby Cancelled.

SO ORDERED.15

Metrobank filed a motion for reconsideration. Petitioner opposed the motion, asserting that the property belongs to the conjugal
partnership.16 Attached to her opposition were an Affidavit17executed by Crisanto Origen, the former owner of the property, attesting
that spouses Sina and Evangeline Imani were the vendees of the subject property; and the photocopies of the checks18 allegedly
issued by Sina Imani as payment for the subject property.

However, despite petitioner’s opposition, the RTC issued an Order dated August 15, 2005, setting aside its June 20, 2005 Order. Thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED. The Order dated June 20, 2005 is set aside.
Evangelina Dazo-Imani is hereby ordered to surrender TCT No. T-27957 P(M) to the Register of Deeds of Meycauayan, Bulacan for
cancellation.

The effectivity of the Levy on Execution, the Auction Sale and the Certificate of Sale with respect to the real property covered by TCT
No. T-27957 P(M) is reinstated.

SO ORDERED.19

But on petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, the RTC issued an Order dated November 22, 2005,20 reinstating its June 20, 2005
Order. In so ruling, the RTC relied on the affidavit of Crisanto Origen, and declared the property levied upon as conjugal, which cannot
be held answerable for petitioner’s personal liability.

Metrobank assailed the November 22, 2005 Order via a petition for certiorari in the CA, ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the RTC for annulling the levy on execution and the auction sale, and for canceling the certificate of sale.

On July 3, 2008, the CA rendered the now challenged Decision reversing the RTC, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. ACCORDINGLY, the Order dated November 22, 2005 of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City, Branch 64, is hereby REVERSED and new one is entered declaring the Levy on Execution, Sale by Public Auction
of the property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title T-27957 [P](M) and the Certificate of Sale over said property as valid and legal.

SO ORDERED.21

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied it on March 3, 2009.22

Hence, this recourse by petitioner, arguing that:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRS (sic) IN REVERSING THE FINDING OF FACT OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE
PROPERTY IS CONJUGAL IN NATURE BASED ON MERE SPECULATIONS AND CONJECTURES.23

II

THE UNSUPPORTED TEMPORARY RULING THAT THE PROPERTY IS NOT CONJUGAL AND THE SUGGESTION TO VINDICATE
THE RIGHTS OF SINA IMANI AND THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP IN A SEPARATE ACTION UNDER SEC. 16, RULE 39
ENCOURAGE MULTIPLICITY OF SUITS AND VIOLATE THE POLICY OF THE RULES FOR EXPEDIENT AND INEXPENSIVE
DISPOSITION OF ACTIONS.

III

THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION, B[EI]NG A ROAD RIGHT OF WAY, IS NOT SUBJECT TO EXECUTION UNDER SEC. 50, 2ND
PARAGRAPH, OF PD [NO.] 1529.24

First, the procedural issue on the propriety of the course of action taken by petitioner in the RTC in vindication of her claim over the
subject property.

Petitioner takes exception to the CA ruling that she committed a procedural gaffe in seeking the annulment of the writ of execution, the
auction sale, and the certificate of sale. The issue on the conjugal nature of the property, she insists, can be adjudicated by the
executing court; thus, the RTC correctly gave due course to her motion. She asserts that it was error for the CA to propose the filing of
a separate case to vindicate her claim.

We agree with petitioner.

The CA explained the faux pas committed by petitioner in this wise:

Under [Section 16, Rule 39], a third-party claimant or a stranger to the foreclosure suit, can opt to file a remedy known as terceria
against the sheriff or officer effecting the writ by serving on him an affidavit of his title and a copy thereof upon the judgment creditor. By
the terceria, the officer shall not be bound to keep the property and could be answerable for damages. A third-party claimant may also
resort to an independent "separate action," the object of which is the recovery of ownership or possession of the property seized by the
sheriff, as well as damages arising from wrongful seizure and detention of the property despite the third-party claim. If a "separate
action" is the recourse, the third-party claimant must institute in a forum of competent jurisdiction an action, distinct and separate from
the action in which the judgment is being enforced, even before or without need of filing a claim in the court that issued the writ. Both
remedies are cumulative and may be availed of independently of or separately from the other. Availment of the terceria is not a
condition sine qua non to the institution of a "separate action."

It is worthy of note that Sina Imani should have availed of the remedy of "terceria" authorized under Section 16 of Rule 39 which is the
proper remedy considering that he is not a party to the case against [petitioner]. Instead, the trial court allowed [petitioner] to file an
urgent motion to cancel and nullify the levy of execution the auction sale and certificate of sale over TCT No. T27957 [P](M). [Petitioner]
then argue[s] that it is the ministerial duty of the levying officer to release the property the moment a third-party claim is filed.

It is true that once a third-party files an affidavit of his title or right to the possession of the property levied upon, the sheriff is bound to
release the property of the third-party claimant unless the judgment creditor files a bond approved by the court. Admittedly, [petitioner’s]
motion was already pending in court at the time that they filed the Affidavit of Crisanto Origen, the former owner, dated July 27, 2005.

In the instant case, the one who availed of the remedy of terceria is the [petitioner], the party to the main case and not the third party
contemplated by Section 16, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.

Moreover, the one who made the affidavit is not the third-party referred to in said Rule but Crisanto Origen who was the former owner of
the land in question.25

Apparently, the CA lost sight of our ruling in Ong v. Tating,26 elucidating on the applicability of Section 16 of Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court, thus:

When the sheriff thus seizes property of a third person in which the judgment debtor holds no right or interest, and so incurs in error, the
supervisory power of the Court which has authorized execution may be invoked by the third person. Upon due application by the third
person, and after summary hearing, the Court may command that the property be released from the mistaken levy and restored to the
rightful owner or possessor. What the Court can do in these instances however is limited to a determination of whether the sheriff has
acted rightly or wrongly in the performance of his duties in the execution of the judgment, more specifically, if he has indeed taken hold
of property not belonging to the judgment debtor. The Court does not and cannot pass upon the question of title to the property, with
any character of finality. It can treat the matter only in so far as may be necessary to decide if the Sheriff has acted correctly or not. x x
x.

xxxx

Upon the other hand, if the claim of impropriety on the part of the sheriff in the execution proceedings is made by a party to the action,
not a stranger thereto, any relief therefrom may only be applied with, and obtained from, only the executing court; and this is true even if
a new party has been impleaded in the suit.27

The filing of the motion by petitioner to annul the execution, the auction sale, and the certificate of sale was, therefore, a proper remedy.
As further held by this Court:

Certain it is that the Trial Court has plenary jurisdiction over the proceedings for the enforcement of its judgments. It has undeniable
competence to act on motions for execution (whether execution be a matter of right or discretionary upon the Court), issue and quash
writs, determine if property is exempt from execution, or fix the value of property claimed by third persons so that a bond equal to such
value may be posted by a judgment creditor to indemnify the sheriff against liability for damages, resolve questions involving
redemption, examine the judgment debtor and his debtors, and otherwise perform such other acts as may be necessary or incidental to
the carrying out of its decisions. It may and should exercise control and supervision over the sheriff and other court officers and
employees taking part in the execution proceedings, and correct them in the event that they should err in the discharge of their
functions.28

Contrary to the CA’s advice, the remedy of terceria or a separate action under Section 16, Rule 39 is no longer available to Sina Imani
because he is not deemed a stranger to the case filed against petitioner:

[T]he husband of the judgment debtor cannot be deemed a "stranger" to the case prosecuted and adjudged against his wife.29

Thus, it would have been inappropriate for him to institute a separate case for annulment of writ of execution.
In Spouses Ching v. Court of Appeals,30 we explained:

Is a spouse, who was not a party to the suit but whose conjugal property is being executed on account of the other spouse being the
judgment obligor, considered a "stranger?" In Mariano v. Court of Appeals, we answered this question in the negative. In that case, the
CFI of Caloocan City declared the wife to be the judgment obligor and, consequently, a writ of execution was issued against her.
Thereupon, the sheriff proceeded to levy upon the conjugal properties of the wife and her husband. The wife initially filed a petition for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals praying for the annulment of the writ of execution. However, the petition was adjudged to be without
merit and was accordingly dismissed. The husband then filed a complaint with the CFI of Quezon City for the annulment of the writ of
execution, alleging therein that the conjugal properties cannot be made to answer for obligations exclusively contracted by the wife. The
executing party moved to dismiss the annulment case, but the motion was denied. On appeal, the Court of Appeals, in Mariano, ruled
that the CFI of Quezon City, in continuing to hear the annulment case, had not interfered with the executing court. We reversed the
Court of Appeals' ruling and held that there was interference by the CFI of Quezon City with the execution of the CFI of Caloocan City.
We ruled that the husband of the judgment debtor cannot be deemed a "stranger" to the case prosecuted and adjudged against his
wife, which would allow the filing of a separate and independent action.

The facts of the Mariano case are similar to this case. Clearly, it was inappropriate for petitioners to institute a separate case for
annulment when they could have easily questioned the execution of their conjugal property in the collection case. We note in fact that
the trial court in the Rizal annulment case specifically informed petitioners that Encarnacion Ching's rights could be ventilated in the
Manila collection case by the mere expedient of intervening therein. Apparently, petitioners ignored the trial court's advice, as
Encarnacion Ching did not intervene therein and petitioners instituted another annulment case after their conjugal property was levied
upon and sold on execution.

There have been instances where we ruled that a spouse may file a separate case against a wrongful execution. However, in those
cases, we allowed the institution of a separate and independent action because what were executed upon were the paraphernal or
exclusive property of a spouse who was not a party to the case. In those instances, said spouse can truly be deemed a "stranger." In
the present case, the levy and sale on execution was made upon the conjugal property.

Ineluctably, the RTC cannot be considered whimsical for ruling on petitioner’s motion. The CA, therefore, erred for declaring otherwise.

Now, on the merits of the case.

Petitioner asserts that the subject property belongs to the conjugal partnership. As such, it cannot be made to answer for her obligation
with Metrobank. She faults the CA for sustaining the writ of execution, the public auction, and the certificate of sale.

We sustain the CA ruling on this point.

Indeed, all property of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal. However, for this presumption to apply, the party who invokes it must
first prove that the property was acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the coverture is a condition sine qua non to
the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership.31 Thus, the time when the property was acquired is material.32

Francisco v. CA33 is instructive, viz.:

Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that "all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it
be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife." However, the party who invokes this presumption must first prove
that the property in controversy was acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the coverture is a condition sine qua non
for the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership. The party who asserts this presumption must first prove said
time element. Needless to say, the presumption refers only to the property acquired during the marriage and does not operate when
there is no showing as to when property alleged to be conjugal was acquired.34

To support her assertion that the property belongs to the conjugal partnership, petitioner submitted the Affidavit35 of Crisanto Origen,
attesting that petitioner and her husband were the vendees of the subject property, and the photocopies of the checks36 allegedly
issued by Sina Imani as payment for the subject property.

Unfortunately for petitioner, the said Affidavit can hardly be considered sufficient evidence to prove her claim that the property is
conjugal. As correctly pointed out by Metrobank, the said Affidavit has no evidentiary weight because Crisanto Origen was not
presented in the RTC to affirm the veracity of his Affidavit:

The basic rule of evidence is that unless the affiants themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify on their affidavits, such
affidavits must be rejected for being hearsay. Stated differently, the declarants of written statements pertaining to disputed facts must
be presented at the trial for cross-examination. 37

In the same vein, the photocopies of the checks cannot be given any probative value. In Concepcion v. Atty. Fandiño, Jr.38 and
Intestate Estate of the Late Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban v. Court of Appeals,39 we held that a photocopy of a document has no
probative value and is inadmissible in evidence. Thus, the CA was correct in disregarding the said pieces of evidence.

Similarly, the certificate of title could not support petitioner’s assertion. As aptly ruled by the CA, the fact that the land was registered in
the name of Evangelina Dazo-Imani married to Sina Imani is no proof that the property was acquired during the spouses’ coverture.
Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two different acts. It is well settled that registration does not confer title but merely
confirms one already existing.40
Indubitably, petitioner utterly failed to substantiate her claim that the property belongs to the conjugal partnership. Thus, it cannot be
rightfully said that the CA reversed the RTC ruling without valid basis.

As a last ditch effort, petitioner asserts that the property is a road right of way; thus, it cannot be subject of a writ of execution.

The argument must be rejected because it was raised for the first time in this petition.lawphil.net In the trial court and the CA,
petitioner’s arguments zeroed in on the alleged conjugal nature of the property. It is well settled that issues raised for the first time on
appeal and not raised in the proceedings in the lower court are barred by estoppel. Points of law, theories, issues, and arguments not
brought to the attention of the trial court ought not to be considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal. To consider the alleged facts and arguments raised belatedly would amount to trampling on the basic principles of fair play,
justice, and due process.41

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and the Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 93061 sustaining
the validity of the writ of execution, the auction sale, and the certificate of sale are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
AKANG VS. MUNICIPALITY OF ISULAN

FACTS:

Ali Akang (petitioner) is a member of the national and cultural community belonging to the Maguindanaon tribe of Isulan, Province of
Sultan Kudarat and the registered owner of Lot 5-B-2-B-14-F (LRC) Psd 1100183 located at Kalawag III, Isulan, Sultan Kudarat,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-3653,5 with an area of 20,030 square meters.6

Sometime in 1962, a two-hectare portion of the property was sold by the petitioner to the Municipality of Isulan, Province of Sultan
Kudarat (respondent) through then Isulan Mayor Datu Ampatuan under a Deed of Sale executed on July 18, 1962, which
states:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
“That for and in consideration of the sum of THREE THOUSAND PESOS ([P]3,000.00), Philippine Currency, value to be paid and
deliver to me, and of which receipt of which shall be acknowledged by me to my full satisfaction by the MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT OF
ISULAN, represented by the Municipal Mayor, Datu Sama Ampatuan, hereinafter referred to as the VENDEE, I hereby sell, transfer,
cede, convey and assign as by these presents do have sold, transferred, ceded, conveyed and assigned, an area of TWO (2) hectares,
more or less, to and in favor of the MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT OF ISULAN, her (sic) heirs, assigns and administrators to have and to
hold forevery (sic) and definitely, which portion shall be utilized purposely and exclusively as a GOVERNMENT CENTER SITE x x x[.]”7
The respondent immediately took possession of the property and began construction of the municipal building.8

Thirty-nine (39) years later or on October 26, 2001, the petitioner, together with his wife, Patao Talipasan, filed a civil action for
Recovery of Possession of Subject Property and/or Quieting of Title thereon and Damages against the respondent, represented by its
Municipal Mayor, et al.9 In his complaint, the petitioner alleged, among others, that the agreement was one to sell, which was not
consummated as the purchase price was not paid.10

In its answer, the respondent denied the petitioner’s allegations, claiming, among others: that the petitioner’s cause of action was
already barred by laches; that the Deed of Sale was valid; and that it has been in open, continuous and exclusive possession of the
property for forty (40) years.11

After trial, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner. The RTC construed the Deed of Sale as a contract to sell, based on
the wording of the contract, which allegedly showed that the consideration was still to be paid and delivered on some future date – a
characteristic of a contract to sell.12 In addition, the RTC observed that the Deed of Sale was not determinate as to its object since it
merely indicated two (2) hectares of the 97,163 sq m lot, which is an undivided portion of the entire property owned by the petitioner.
The RTC found that segregation must first be made to identify the parcel of land indicated in the Deed of Sale and it is only then that
the petitioner could execute a final deed of absolute sale in favor of the respondent.13

As regards the payment of the purchase price, the RTC found the same to have not been made by the respondent. According to the
RTC, the Municipal Voucher is not a competent documentary proof of payment but is merely evidence of admission by the respondent
that on the date of the execution of the Deed of Sale, the consideration stipulated therein had not yet been paid. The RTC also ruled
that the Municipal Voucher’s validity and evidentiary value is in question as it suffers infirmities, that is, it was neither duly recorded,
numbered, signed by the Municipal Treasurer nor was it pre-audited.14

The RTC also ruled that the Deed of Sale was not approved pursuant to Section 145 of the Administrative Code for Mindanao and Sulu
or Section 120 of the Public Land Act (PLA), as amended. Resolution No. 70,15 which was issued by the respondent, appropriating the
amount of P3,000.00 as payment for the property, and Resolution No. 644 of the Provincial Board of Cotabato, which approved
Resolution No. 70, cannot be considered proof of the sale as said Deed of Sale was not presented for examination and approval of the
Provincial Board.16 Further, since the respondent’s possession of the property was not in the concept of an owner, laches cannot be a
valid defense for claiming ownership of the property, which has been registered in the petitioner’s name under the Torrens System.17

The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision18 dated January 14, 2004 reads:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

WHEREFORE, upon all the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

Declaring the contract entered into between the plaintiffs and the defendant, Municipal Government of Isulan, Cotabato (now S ultan
Kudarat), represented by its former Mayor, Datu Suma Ampatuan, dated July 18, 1962, as a contract to sell, without its stipulated
consideration having been paid; and for having been entered into between plaintiff Ali Akang, an illiterate non-Christian, and the
defendant, Municipal Government of Isulan, in violation of Section 120 of C.A. No. 141, said contract/agreement is hereby declared null
and void;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Declaring the Deed of Sale (Exh. “1”-“E”) dated July 18, 1962, null and void [ab] initio, for having been executed in violation of Section
145 of the Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu, and of Section 120 of the Public Land Law, as amended by R.A. No.
3872;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Ordering the defendants to pay plaintiffs, the value of the lot in question, Lot No. 5-B-2-B-14-F (LRC) Psd 110183, containing an area of
20,030 Square Meters, at the prevailing market value, as may [be] reflected in its Tax Declaration, or in the alternative, to agree on the
payment of monthly back rentals, retroactive to 1996, until defendants should decide to buy and pay the value of said lot as aforestated,
with legal interest in both cases;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Ordering the defendant, Municipal Government of Isulan, Sultan Kudarat, to pay plaintiffs, by way of attorney’s fee, the equivalent of
30% of the value that defendants would pay the plaintiffs for the lot in question; and to pay plaintiffs the further sum of [P]100,000.00, by
way of moral and exemplary damages;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Ordering the defendants, members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Isulan, Sultan Kudarat, to pass a resolution/ordinance for the
appropriation of funds for the payment of the value of plaintiffs’ Lot 5-B-2-B-14-F (LRC) Psd-110183, and of the damages herein
awarded to the plaintiffs; and

Ordering the defendants to pay the costs of suit.

For lack of merit, the counterclaims of the defendants should be, as it is hereby, dismissed.

IT IS SO ORDERED.19

By virtue of said RTC decision, proceedings for the Cancellation of Certificate of Title No. T-49349 registered under the name of the
respondent was instituted by the petitioner under Miscellaneous Case No. 866 and as a result, the respondent’s title over the property
was cancelled and a new one issued in the name of the petitioner.

The respondent appealed the RTC Decision dated January 14, 2004 and in the Decision20 dated April 25, 2008, the CA reversed the
ruling of the RTC and upheld the validity of the sale. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision provides:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated January 14, 2004 is hereby REVERSED and a new one entered, upholding the contract of
sale executed on July 18, 1962 between the parties.

SO ORDERED.21
The CA sustained the respondent’s arguments and ruled that the petitioner is not entitled to recover ownership and possession of the
property as the Deed of Sale already transferred ownership thereof to the respondent. The CA held that the doctrines of estoppel and
laches must apply against the petitioner for the reasons that: (1) the petitioner adopted inconsistent positions when, on one hand, he
invoked the interpretation of the Deed of Sale as a contract to sell but still demanded payment, and called for the application of Sections
145 and 146 of the Administrative Code for Mindanao and Sulu, on the other; and (2) the petitioner did not raise at the earliest
opportunity the nullity of the sale and remained passive for 39 years, as it was raised only in 2001.22

The CA also ruled that the Deed of Sale is not a mere contract to sell but a perfected contract of sale. There was no express
reservation of ownership of title by the petitioner and the fact that there was yet no payment at the time of the sale does not affect the
validity or prevent the perfection of the sale.23

As regards the issue of whether payment of the price was made, the CA ruled that there was actual payment, as evidenced by the
Municipal Voucher, which the petitioner himself prepared and signed despite the lack of approval of the Municipal Treasurer. Even if he
was not paid the consideration, it does not affect the validity of the contract of sale for it is not the fact of payment of the price that
determines its validity.24

In addition, the CA noted that there was an erroneous cancellation of the certificate of title in the name of the respondent and the
registration of the same property in the name of the petitioner in Miscellaneous Case No. 866. According to the CA, this does not affect
in any way the ownership of the respondent over the subject property because registration or issuance of a certificate of title is not one
of the modes of acquiring ownership.25

The petitioner sought reconsideration of the CA Decision, which was denied by the CA in its Resolution26 dated October 29, 2008.

Hence, this petition.

Issue
WHETHER THE PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER OWNERSHIP AND POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY IN DISPUTE.
Resolution of the above follows determination of these questions: (1) whether the Deed of Sale dated July 18, 1962 is a valid and
perfected contract of sale; (2) whether there was payment of consideration by the respondent; and (3) whether the petitioner’s claim is
barred by laches.
The petitioner claims that the acquisition of the respondent was null and void because: (1) he is an illiterate non -Christian who only
knows how to sign his name in Arabic and knows how to read the Quran but can neither read nor write in both Arabic and English; (2)
the respondent has not paid the price for the property; (3) the Municipal Voucher is not admissible in evidence as proof of payment; (4)
the Deed of Sale was not duly approved in accordance with Sections 145 and 146 of the Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu,
and Section 120 of the PLA, as amended; and (4) the property is a registered land covered by a TCT and cannot be acquired by
prescription or adverse possession.27 The petitioner also explained that the delayed filing of the civil action with the RTC was due to
Martial Law and the Ilaga-Blackshirt Troubles in the then Province of Cotabato.28

The respondent, however, counters that: (1) the petitioner is not an illiterate non-Christian and he, in fact, was able to execute, sign in
Arabic, and understand the terms and conditions of the Special Power of Attorney dated July 23, 1996 issued in favor of Baikong Akang
(Baikong); (2) the Deed of Sale is valid as its terms and conditions were reviewed by the Municipal Council of Isulan and the Provincial
Board of Cotabato; and (3) the Deed of Sale is a contract of sale and not a contract to sell.29

Ruling of the Court

The Court finds the petition devoid of merit.

Issue Raised for the First Time on Appeal is Barred by Estoppel

The petitioner asserts that the Deed of Sale was notarized by Atty. Gualberto B. Baclig who was not authorized to administer the same,
hence, null and void. This argument must be rejected as it is being raised for the first time only in this petition. In his arguments before
the RTC and the CA, the petitioner focused mainly on the validity and the nature of the Deed of Sale, and whether there was payment
of the purchase price. The rule is settled that issues raised for the first time on appeal and not raised in the proceedings in the lower
court are barred by estoppel. To consider the alleged facts and arguments raised belatedly would amount to trampling on the basic
principles of fair play, justice, and due process.30 Accordingly, the petitioner’s attack on the validity of the Deed of Sale vis-à-vis its
compliance with the 2004 New Notarial Law must be disregarded.31

The Deed of Sale is a Valid Contract of Sale

The petitioner alleges that the Deed of Sale is merely an agreement to sell, which was not perfected due to non-payment of the
stipulated consideration.32 The respondent, meanwhile, claims that the Deed of Sale is a valid and perfected contract of abs olute
sale.33

A contract of sale is defined under Article 1458 of the Civil Code:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

By the contract of sale, one of the contracting parties obligates himself to transfer the ownership of and to deliver a determinate thing,
and the other to pay therefore a price certain in money or its equivalent.
The elements of a contract of sale are: (a) consent or meeting of the minds, that is, consent to transfer ownership in exchange for the
price; (b) determinate subject matter; and (c) price certain in money or its equivalent.34

A contract to sell, on the other hand, is defined by Article 1479 of the Civil Code:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
[A] bilateral contract whereby the prospective seller, while expressly reserving the ownership of the subject property despite delivery
thereof to the prospective buyer, binds himself to sell the said property exclusively to the prospective buyer upon fulfillment of the
condition agreed upon, that is, full payment of the purchase price.
In a contract of sale, the title to the property passes to the buyer upon the delivery of the thing sold, whereas in a contract to sell, the
ownership is, by agreement, retained by the seller and is not to pass to the vendee until full payment of the purchase price.35

The Deed of Sale executed by the petitioner and the respondent is a perfected contract of sale, all its elements being present. There
was mutual agreement between them to enter into the sale, as shown by their free and voluntary signing of the contract. There was
also an absolute transfer of ownership of the property by the petitioner to the respondent as shown in the stipulation: “x x x I [petitioner]
hereby sell, transfer, cede, convey and assign as by these presents do have sold, transferred, ceded, conveyed and assigned, x x x.”36
There was also a determinate subject matter, that is, the two-hectare parcel of land as described in the Deed of Sale. Lastly, the price
or consideration is at Three Thousand Pesos (P3,000.00), which was to be paid after the execution of the contract. The fact that no
express reservation of ownership or title to the property can be found in the Deed of Sale bolsters the absence of such intent, and the
contract, therefore, could not be one to sell. Had the intention of the petitioner been otherwise, he could have: (1) immediately sought
judicial recourse to prevent further construction of the municipal building; or (2) taken legal action to contest the agreement.37 The
petitioner did not opt to undertake any of such recourses.

Payment of consideration or purchase price

The petitioner’s allegation of non-payment is of no consequence taking into account the Municipal Voucher presented before the RTC,
which proves payment by the respondent of Three Thousand Pesos (P3,000.00). The petitioner, notwithstanding the lack of the
Municipal Treasurer’s approval, admitted that the signature appearing on the Municipal Voucher was his and he is now estopped from
disclaiming payment.

Even assuming, arguendo, that the petitioner was not paid, such non payment is immaterial and has no effect on the validity of the
contract of sale. A contract of sale is a consensual contract and what is required is the meeting of the minds on the object and the price
for its perfection and validity.38 In this case, the contract was perfected the moment the petitioner and the respondent agreed on the
object of the sale – the two-hectare parcel of land, and the price – Three Thousand Pesos (P3,000.00). Non-payment of the purchase
price merely gave rise to a right in favor of the petitioner to either demand specific performance or rescission of the contract of sale.39
Sections 145 and 146 of the Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu, and Section 120 of the PLA, as amended, are not applicable

The petitioner relies on the foregoing laws in assailing the validity of the Deed of Sale, claiming that the contract lacks executive
approval and that he is an illiterate non-Christian to whom the benefits of Sections 145 and 146 of the Administrative Code of Mindanao
and Sulu should apply.

Section 145 of the Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu essentially provides for the requisites of the contracts entered into by a
person with any Moro or other non-Christian inhabitants.40 Section 146,41 meanwhile, provides that contracts entered into in violation
of Section 145 are void. These provisions aim to safeguard the patrimony of the less developed ethnic groups in the Philippines by
shielding them against imposition and fraud when they enter into agreements dealing with realty.42

Section 120 of the PLA (Commonwealth Act No. 141) affords the same protection.43 R.A. No. No. 387244 likewise provides that
conveyances and encumbrances made by illiterate non-Christian or literate non-Christians where the instrument of conveyance or
encumbrance is in a language not understood by said literate non-Christians shall not be valid unless duly approved by the Chairman of
the Commission on National Integration.

In Jandoc-Gatdula v. Dimalanta,45 however, the Court categorically stated that while the purpose of Sections 145 and 146 of the
Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu in requiring executive approval of contracts entered into by cultural minorities is indeed to
protect them, the Court cannot blindly apply that law without considering how the parties exercised their rights and obligations. In this
case, Municipality Resolution No. 70, which approved the appropriation of P3,000.00, was, in fact, accepted by the Provincial Board of
Cotabato. In approving the appropriation of P3,000.00, the Municipal Council of Isulan and the Provincial Board of Cotabato,
necessarily, scrutinized the Deed of Sale containing the terms and conditions of the sale. Moreover, there is nothing on record that
proves that the petitioner was duped into signing the contract, that he was taken advantage of by the respondent and that his rights
were not protected.
The court’s duty to protect the native vendor, however, should not be carried out to such an extent as to deny justice to the vendee
when truth and justice happen to be on the latter’s side. The law cannot be used to shield the enrichment of one at the expense of
another. More important, the law will not be applied so stringently as to render ineffective a contract that is otherwise valid, except for
want of approval by the CNI. This principle holds, especially when the evils sought to be avoided are not obtaining.46
The Court must also reject the petitioner’s claim that he did not understand the import of the agreement. He alleged that he signed in
Arabic the Deed of Sale, the Joint Affidavit and the Municipal Voucher, which were all in English, and that he was not able to
comprehend its contents. Records show the contrary. The petitioner, in fact, was able to execute in favor of Baikong a Special Power
of Attorney (SPA) dated July 23, 1996, which was written in English albeit signed by the petitioner in Arabic. Said SPA authorized
Baikong, the petitioner’s sister, to follow-up the payment of the purchase price. This raises doubt on the veracity of the petitioner’s
allegation that he does not understand the language as he would not have been able to execute the SPA or he would have preven ted
its enforcement.

The Petitioner’s Claim for Recovery of Possession and Ownership is Barred by Laches

Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising
due diligence could or should have been done earlier.47 It should be stressed that laches is not concerned only with the mer e lapse of
time.48

As a general rule, an action to recover registered land covered by the Torrens System may not be barred by laches.49 Neither can
laches be set up to resist the enforcement of an imprescriptible legal right.50 In exceptional cases, however, the Court allowed laches
as a bar to recover a titled property. Thus, in Romero v. Natividad,51 the Court ruled that laches will bar recovery of the property even
if the mode of transfer was invalid. Likewise, in Vda. de Cabrera v. CA,52 the Court ruled:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
In our jurisdiction, it is an enshrined rule that even a registered owners of property may be barred from recovering possession of
property by virtue of laches. Under the Land Registration Act (now the Property Registration Decree), no title to registered land in
derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. The same is not true with regard to
laches. x x x.53 (Citation omitted and emphasis supplied)
More particularly, laches will bar recovery of a property, even if the mode of transfer used by an alleged member of a cultural minority
lacks executive approval.54 Thus, in Heirs of Dicman v. Cariño,55 the Court upheld the Deed of Conveyance of Part Rights and
Interests in Agricultural Land executed by Ting-el Dicman in favor of Sioco Cariño despite lack of executive approval. The Court stated
that “despite the judicial pronouncement that the sale of real property by illiterate ethnic minorities is null and void for lack of approval of
competent authorities, the right to recover possession has nonetheless been barred through the operation of the equitable doctrine of
laches.”56 Similarly in this case, while the respondent may not be considered as having acquired ownership by virtue of its long and
continued possession, nevertheless, the petitioner’s right to recover has been converted into a stale demand due to the respondent’s
long period of possession and by the petitioner’s own inaction and neglect.57 The Court cannot accept the petitioner’s explanation that
his delayed filing and assertion of rights was due to Martial Law and the Cotabato Ilaga-Black Shirt Troubles. The Martial Law regime
was from 1972 to 1986, while the Ilaga-Black Shirt Troubles were from the 1970s to the 1980s. The petitioner could have sought
judicial relief, or at the very least made his demands to the respondent, as early as the third quarter of 1962 after the execution of the
Deed of Sale and before the advent of these events. Moreover, even if, as the petitioner claims, access to courts were restricted during
these times, he could have immediately filed his claim after Martial Law and after the Cotabato conflict has ended. The petitioner’s
reliance on the Court’s treatment of Martial Law as force majeure that suspended the running of prescription in Development Bank of
the Philippines v. Pundogar58 is inapplicable because the Court’s ruling therein pertained to prescription and not laches.
Consequently, the petitioner’s lengthy inaction sufficiently warrants the conclusion that he acquiesced or conformed to the sale.
Vigilantibus sed non dormientibus jura subverniunt. The law aids the vigilant, not those who sleep on their rights. This le gal percept
finds application in the petitioner’s case.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED.