Futures and Options

Class of 2018/2019

Case Study 2
Goodrich-Rabobank Interest-Rate Swap

This Assignment was performed by:

Davide Manieri | 38405

Diogo Moreira | 33899
Francisca Anselmo | 26008
Maria do Carmo Cruz | 34082

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Table of Contents

0. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .................................................................................................................................3

1. B.F. GOODRICH................................................................................................................................................3
BACKGROUND ....................................................................................................................................................3
FINANCING PROBLEM .........................................................................................................................................3
DEREGULATION IN THE 1980S: A FINANCING OPPORTUNITY ................................................................................3

2. RABOBANK .....................................................................................................................................................4

3. THE SWAP ........................................................................................................................................................4

RABOBANK ........................................................................................................................................................4
MORGAN GUARANTY .........................................................................................................................................5
B.F. GOODRICH ..................................................................................................................................................5
SAVINGS BANKS .................................................................................................................................................5

4. WINNERS AND LOSERS .................................................................................................................................6

SCENARIO 1 ........................................................................................................................................................6
SCENARIO 2 ........................................................................................................................................................6
SCENARIO 3 ........................................................................................................................................................6
SCENARIO 4 ........................................................................................................................................................7

5. MAIN CONCLUSIONS .....................................................................................................................................7

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0. Executive Summary

The following report was developed for the Futures and Options course at Nova SBE. For the purpose of the report, the
B.F. Goodrich-Rabobank Interest Rate Swap case-study, by Harvard Business School, is evaluated and complemented
with further research. Throughout this report, Goodrich-Rabobank Interest Rate Swap arrangement is analysed. The
group performed both a quantitative and qualitative assessment of the contract in order to assess the attractiveness of the
deal for each player.

After careful examination, several scenario analyses are performed. Likewise, distinct conclusions are accomplished,
given the various inter-relations among the terms of the swap deal.

1. B.F. Goodrich

Background
B.F Goodrich was an American manufacturing company focused mostly on producing tires and related rubber products,
thus being specialized in the production of industrial components and systems in chemical and plastic businesses. It was
the fourth-largest US producer of tires and its chemical division brought it to be the largest US producer of polyvinyl
chloride resins and compounds.

Nonetheless, by the 1980s, the company struggled financially following the US national recession underway. In order to
combat rising inflation and residual effects from the energy crisis, the Federal Reserve undertook a contractionary
monetary policy that implied an increase of interest rates. By that time, both the manufacturing and the housing sectors
were strongly affected, in such a way that B.F Goodrich faced significant financial difficulties. Accordingly, by 1982, the
company reported $33m loss, which ultimately resulted in a credit rating downgrade.

Financing Problem
Following Goodrich’s above-mentioned hazards, by 1983 the company was in need of roughly $50m – to fund its
ongoing financial needs. By that time, under such circumstances, the firm could have taken a fairly simple approach:
borrow the required $50m from its committed bank lines1. Nonetheless, the firm was reluctant to pursue that solution,
apprehensive that it could jeopardize its future borrowing flexibility in the short-intermediate-term2. Alternatively,
Goodrich was looking forward to borrowing in the long-term3 at a fixed-rate money. Nevertheless, given the market’s
soaring level of interest rates amidst the firm’s lowered credit rating, from BBB to BBB-, “long-term fixed-rate money
would be quite expensive”.

Deregulation in the 1980s: A Financing Opportunity

Following the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, signed by President Jimmy
Carter, several adjustments were incorporated into both commercial banks and thrift institutions. As US banks deposit
insurance was raised from $40k to $100k and checkable deposits became approved, deposit institutions started to offer
additional products, such as MMDAs4 and Super Now Accounts5. Given the financial nature of this products –
aggressively pricing deposits’ accounts –, humongous flows from the money market were recaptured. Therefore,
commercial banks and thrift institutions were looking forward to further invest these amounts into alternative
investments6 – bearing fewer risk when compared to the traditional 30-year fixed-rate on residential mortgages
investment.

Following this outlook, Salomon Brothers7 argued the possibility of depository institutions and commercial banks being
interested in buying floating-rate notes with a yield tied to LIBOR. Likewise, such circumstances presented an

1 Borrowing costs would be slightly above the prime rate (10.63%), plus compensating balances.
2 About 2-5 years range.
3 About 8-10 years range.
4 Money Market Deposit Account (MMDA) is a high-yield savings account that allows depository financial institutions to be more competitive with

money market mutual funds.

5 Super Now Account is a demand deposit account that offers higher interest rate when compared to a Now Account.
6 Short-term treasury bills, large CDs of commercial banks or floating-rate notes of major US banks (tied to treasury bill notes).
7 Salomon Brothers was an American investment bank founded in 1910.

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outstanding financing opportunity for Goodrich, which could take advantage from market demand to “borrow in the US
public debt market with a floating-rate debt issue tied to LIBOR and then swap interest-payments with a Euromarket
bank that had raised funds in the fixed-rate Eurobond market”, thus being the first public debt security tied to LIBOR in
the US domestic market.

2. Rabobank

Central Rabobank was one of the largest banking organization in the world. By 1983, it was constituted by more than
1,000 agricultural cooperative banks and 3,100 local offices, in the Netherlands. Operating on the basis of cooperative
principles, Rabobank acted as a savings bank and lender – servicing mostly the agricultural sector with 90% of all loans
to farming and agribusiness. During the last few years, the bank decided to focus on the commercial lending business and
other traditional banking activities, coming to have relations with one-third of all Dutch companies and to hold 40% of
all Dutch savings as deposits. Nevertheless, it was not particularly well known abroad, nor outside the Netherlands, and
it had never borrowed in the Eurobond market before. Accordingly, in 1980, it started to expand its international activities
moving its goal to be an international financial services provider.

When approached by a major US bank, to enter a large fixed rate Eurobond issuance – in order to exchange interest
payments with US corporations –, Rabobank encountered an opportunity to be exposed to dollar financing and expand
its international exposure, particularly towards American investors. Therefore, the proposal to execute financing and
interest rate swaps together with Goodrich, seemed quite appealing in light of the Dutch bank prospects.

3. The Swap

Under the timeframe of analysis of the report, swaps were still “a difficult piece of financial innovation to effect” –
Goodrich would, in fact, issue the first public debt security tied to LIBOR in the US market. Therefore, the attractiveness
of the deal for the involved players was still very much prone to debate and analysis. In fact, the incentives underlying
each player’s willingness to participate in the deal was “critically dependent upon the fluctuating spreads between interest
rate, in particular the relation between domestic US and Euro-rates”.

Nevertheless, in order to assess the terms required for the participation of each player it is of extreme importance to
consider the details and procedures of the aforementioned swap contract. The very first part of the swap agreement
consisted on the underwriting and selling of Goodrich 8-year floating-rate note in the US bond market. As perceived on
Annex 1, the amount issued accounted for $50m, whilst bearing an annual rate equal to the prevailing 3-month LIBOR8
plus 50 basis points. In what regards the second element of the swap deal, it concerned the issuance – performed by
Rabobank-Nederland9 –, of 8-year fixed-rate bonds on the Eurobond market. As portrait in Annex 1 the volume issued
was of $50m at an annual coupon, fixed at 11.00%10. Lastly, Morgan Guaranty agreed to proceed as a swap bank,
therefore acting as a passive conduit for the swap payments between the two principals – Goodrich and Rabobank –,
assuming there would be no default11. A one-time initial fee of $125,000 and an undisclosed annual fee (F) for the next
8 years were the monetary requirements by Morgan, that were entitled to Goodrich. Moreover, Goodrich would have to
pay 11.00%10 fixed annual coupon to Morgan, whilst the latter would give back to Goodrich a floating rate of LIBOR-x.
As for Rabobank, it would have to pay LIBOR-x to Morgan, whilst receiving 11.00%10.

By considering the above described swap agreement whilst glancing at Annex 2, one can easily recognize the exchange
payments correspondent to each player. In what regards Goodrich, it has an inflow of LIBOR-x and outflows of
LIBOR+0.50%, 10.70% and F. Similarly, Rabobank has an inflow of 10.70% and outflows of LIBOR-x and 10.70%.
Consequently, the swap bank receives inflows of 10.70%, LIBOR-x and F and pays outflows of LIBOR-x and 10.70%.
Therefore, the profitability of Morgan Guaranty was solely provided by the fees charged to Goodrich (F).

Rabobank
In order to analyze how large the discount (x) – subtracted to the prevailing 3-month LIBOR rate –, must be, in order to
make the swap arrangement attractive for Rabobank, it is of major importance to consider both the swap agreement on
Annex 2 and the rates Rabobank could obtain in the Eurobond market12, as in Annex 3.

8 LIBOR 3-months amounts for 8.75%.

9 Rabobank-Nederland credit rating was of AAA.
10 An 11.00% Eurobond corresponds to 10.70% equivalent semiannual YTM in US terms, as in the Eurobond market bonds usually pay interest annually, not

semiannually as in the US bond market.

11 In the event of default by one party Morgan would continue the agreement with the other party.
12 Opportunity cost rates, that Rabobank could obtain in the Eurobond market.

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Rabobank has payment outflows to the market (10.70%) and to Morgan Guaranty (LIBOR-x), whilst having a payment
inflow of 10.70% – as previously described. Meantime, the Dutch bank could borrow, in the Eurobond market, at a
floating-rate of LIBOR+0.25%13 or of LIBOR+0.375%14, thus being this rates equivalent to Rabobank’s borrowing
opportunity cost. Therefore, once computing the net borrowing position of the bank, in both case scenarios, and
comparing to the respective floating-rates, the discount (x) should be larger than 0.25%15 or 0.375%16, in order to be
attractive to Rabobank – meaning that the obtained profit would be greater than zero.

Morgan Guaranty
In order to recognise how large should the undisclosed annual fee (F) be – such that the swap arrangement is an attractive
deal for Morgan Guaranty –, it is relevant to revise the bank’s role in the swap contract. As previously stated in the report,
Morgan bank performed a swap bank position. Thus, given its exchange payment inflows17 being equal to its exchange
payment outflows18, the only relevant variable that motivated this player to enter the swap contract was the level of
charged fees – addressed to B.F. Goodrich. The fee charged to Goodrich consisted of two components: a one-time fee of
$125,000 and an undisclosed annual fee (F).

Even though Morgan was “merely agreeing to serve as a passive conduit for the swap payments between the two
principals, assuming there would be no default”, the bank should be compensated, for entering the swap, by the amount
corresponding to Goodrich’s default risk – which represented Morgan exposure to credit risk by assuming the swap bank
role. Likewise, the first step for determining the required annual fee was to compute Goodrich’s default likelihood in
dollar terms, thus pricing the swap based upon the spread methodology19. The difference between Goodrich’s fixed rate
in the US market (12.50%)20 and floating rate (9.25%)21, of 3.25%, represented how the market was pricing the likelihood
of the company defaulting, in the upcoming 8 years. Therefore, this spread times the nominal value of the bond ($50m)
resulted into Goodrich’s default likelihood in dollar terms ($1,625,000), thus corresponding to the total minimum value
of the fee Morgan would charge in order to participate in the agreement. Nonetheless, Morgan could opt for introducing
a premium on top of the total fee, thus charging for its considerable good reputation in the market, meaning that an annual
fee of 0.375%22 would represent the best possible scenario for Goodrich. Therefore, the annual fee (F) should be at least
as large as $1,625,000 – in order to be an attractive deal for Morgan bank.

Hence, following the above-mentioned reasoning, in order to accurately compute the total outflow from Goodrich to
Morgan bank, the one-time fee of $125,000 was taken into consideration. In order to perceive the impact of this fee on
Goodrich’s payoff, a cash-flow table was built, as shown in Annex 4, considering the remaining debt payable. Following
the presented calculations, a semi-annual yield of 10.76% was the one correspondent to the discount factor in such
circumstance. Accordingly, Goodrich was paying a total fee of F+0.06%.

B.F. Goodrich
In order to get the smallest combination of F and x – such that the swap strategy is an attractive deal for B.F Goodrich –
it is relevant to glance at swap agreement on Annex 5. As previously stated in the report, B.F. Goodrich would be the first
company issuing a public debt security tied to LIBOR in the US market. Thus, given its payment inflows of LIBOR-x
and its payment outflows to Morgan and the market23, the only way to motivate this player to take the agreement would
be that the difference between the payoff of payments inflows and payment outflows with the market (12.50%) is positive.

Accordingly, considering Goodrich’s above described circumstance in the swap agreement, the firm had a net borrowing
position of x-LIBOR+LIBOR+0,50%+10.70%+F+0.06%. Thus, by considering x+F+11.26% – which must be better
than opportunity cost of borrowing at the market (12.50%) –, one can conclude that F + x must be lower than 1.24.

Savings Banks

13 Best floating-rate case scenario given the provided range: LIBOR+(0.25% to 0.375%).
14 Worst floating-rate case scenario given the provided range: LIBOR+(0.25% to 0.375%).
15 Best floating-rate case scenario given the provided range: LIBOR+(0.25% to 0.375%).
16 Worst floating-rate case scenario given the provided range: LIBOR+(0.25% to 0.375%).
17 Morgan bank inflows: 10.70% + LIBOR-x.
18 Morgan bank outflows: 10.70% + LIBOR-x.
19 Value the swap based upon the difference between a fixed rate bond and a floating rate bond.
20 7-10-year fixed rate for BBB industrials ranged between 12.00% and 12.50%. Given the downgrading of Goodrich to BBB-, 12.50% was the value taken into

consideration.
21 Goodrich floating rate equals the prevailing 3-month LIBOR (8.75%) plus 50 basis points, thus being equal to 9.25%.
22 A 0.375% fee corresponds to an annual fee of $187,500, in nominal terms. This percentage was obtained by computing $187,500/$50m, in order to determine the fees

weight given the bonds’ face value.

23 B.F. Goodrich outflows: LIBOR + 0.50% + 10.70% + F + 0.06%.

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As previously detailed in the report, following the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of
1980, both commercial banks and thrift institutions were looking forward to reinvesting the humongous flows being
recaptured from the money market. Likewise, it is not surprising that the bulk of buyers of Goodrich’s bond issuance
were mutual savings banks. By the time, given the higher reinvestment needs, savings banks wanted to avoid the dangers
of their traditional investments, such as 30-year fixed rate residential mortgages. Therefore, the following alternatives
were being considered: short-term treasury bills, large CDs of commercial banks and floating-rate notes of major US
banks (tied to treasury bill notes).

Accordingly, the swap deal attractiveness for savings banks depended on the relative attractiveness of Goodrich’s bonds
in comparison to the above-mentioned investment alternatives. By glimpsing at Annex 6, one can perceive Goodrich’s
bonds as the ones providing the highest return (9.25%). Nonetheless, when compared to the remaining investment
alternatives, excluding the traditional 30-year fixed rate residential mortgages, besides providing the highest return it also
provides the highest risk. In fact, Goodrich displays a credit rating of BBB-, whilst both short-term T-bills and floating
rate notes are rated as AAA. Hence, once evaluating the attractiveness of this alternative under an investor perspective it
is not as appealing as it looked like – due to having a lower info sharpe24. As by 1983 swaps were still “a difficult piece
of financial innovation to effect”, savings banks might have perceived the deal as attractive. Nonetheless, given both
credit risk and interest rate risk, in the transaction, savings banks were not winning as much as they were perceiving, at
the time, as Goodrich’s bonds entailed higher risk and were not proportionally rewarding investors in terms of returns.

4. Winners and Losers

In order to assess both winners and losers, under the swap agreement circumstance, four scenarios were taken into
consideration. Nonetheless, it is relevant to highlight that under the intervals previously established – for both x and F –,
every player is a winner, when assuming there is no default. For this reason, the majority of the analysed scenarios aim
at performing the impact of potential defaults.

Scenario 1
On scenario 1, there are two main assumptions holding: there is no default, thus no credit risk, and x= - 0.05%. Moreover,
upon analysing the attractiveness for each party, the undisclosed rate and annual fee interval are the ones presented in
Annex 7.

For instance, if x= - 0.05% and F=0.69%, Goodrich, Rabobank and Morgan would benefit from the swap agreement by
0.60%, 0.20% and 0.75%, respectively, Annex 8. Therefore, whenever the undisclosed rate (x) and the annual fee (F)
prevail between the interval, all players would benefit from the swap agreement. Nonetheless, as previously explained in
the report, saving banks would be the only party not fully benefiting from the deal. In essence, savings banks agree to
receive LIBOR+0.50% from Goodrich when they could earn 8.07% from a short-term T-bill – meaning saving banks
carry more risk for roughly the same return, when assuming LIBOR is equal to 8.75%.

Scenario 2
On scenario 2, there are two main assumptions holding: Goodrich defaults and x= - 0.05%.

As highlighted on the case-study, in the event of a default, Morgan would have to continue with the agreement with the
other party – whilst keeping in mind that only a two-way deal would prevail. For this reason, when considering a scenario
where Goodrich defaults, Morgan Bank would have to keep on pursuing the swap arrangement with Rabobank. In such
case, as Rabobank inflows would remain the same, Morgan Guaranty would incur in an annual loss of 1.84%.

As portrait in Annex 9, the sooner Goodrich defaults, the higher the total loss for the swap bank would be. Furthermore,
the more the undisclosed rate (x) increases, the less Morgan Guaranty would be receiving from Rabobank, contributing
to a larger loss for the bank. Nonetheless, it would be an improbable circumstance, given that the probability of Goodrich
defaulting being, roughly, 1.43%25.

Scenario 3
On scenario 3, there are two main assumptions holding: Morgan Bank defaults and x= - 0.05%.

Another possible scenario, although unlikely given Morgan Bank’s AAA rating, is that the swap bank defaults during the

24 Info Sharpe equal to the return of a given asset dividing by the correspondent standard deviation.
25 The probability was calculated by taking the probability of a BBB entering into default in t+1. Meantime, to compute each year’s default likelihood the probability of

not defaulting, until that year, is multiplied by the probability of defaulting in that year.

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swap agreement. Upon such situation, assuming x= - 0,05%, Goodrich would incur in a higher loss26 than Rabobank.
The reason underlying this relationship, on Annex 10, is related with each player’s breakeven point, in regards to x. As
Rabobank’s breakeven point is at x= - 0.25% and Goodrich’s breakeven point is at x=0.87%, when the discount equals
0.05% Rabobank’s takes a greater benefit out of the swap agreement, thus losses less.

Scenario 4
On scenario 4, there are two main assumptions holding: Rabobank defaults and x= - 0.05%.

Lastly, the fourth scenario, although equally unlikely, would be Rabobank to default during the contract. Since Morgan
would have to continue the agreement with Goodrich, the latter would not suffer from such event. Meantime, quite
surprisingly, a default from Rabobank would actually benefit the swap bank by an annual 2.34%, Annex 11. This situation
is explained by the fact that either the LIBOR was too low or the undisclosed rate too high. In fact, the higher the LIBOR
or the lower the undisclosed rate, the less Morgan would benefit from Rabobank defaulting. Accordingly, such
movements would imply a higher payment to Goodrich.

5. Main Conclusions

Following the scenario analysis and computations performed throughout the report, the group concluded that as long as
the discount is within the predefined intervals, the swap agreement is profitable for both Goodrich and Rabobank27 –
regardless of Rabobank’s floating-rate. Nevertheless, each player should keep in mind that prevailing as a winner implies
no defaulting assumptions. Therefore, the group considers that by the time of Goodrich-Rabobank interest rate swap
players underestimated default probabilities. Namely, savings banks disregarded the risk from this operation, especially
given Goodrich's BBB- credit rating.

26 In this case, as both players would continue to profit from the market, their losses would represent the opportunity cost of the benefit they could have had on a non-default

circumstance.
27 Annex 11.

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6. Annexes

Annex 1 – B.F. Goodrich-Rabobank Issuance Details

Issuer B.F. Goodrich Rabobank

Credit Rating BBB- AAA
Amount $50m $50m
Maturity 8-year 8-year
Coupon LIBOR+0.50% 11.00%

Source: B.F. Goodrich-Rabobank Interest-Rate Swap, Harvard Business School Case Study, 1996

Annex 2 – Swap Model 1

Morgan Bank

10,7%+F 10,70%

Libor -x Libor -x
Libor + 0,5% 10,70%
Goodrich Rabobank

Annex 3 – US and Eurobond Market Rates

Floating Fixed
Goodrich (US Bond
Libor + 0,5% 12,50%
Market)
Rabobank (Eurobond
Libor + 1/4 - 3/8% 10,70%
Market)

Annex 4 – Annual Fee Calculations

Time 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Cash Flow 49 875 000 -5 500 000 -5 500 000 -5 500 000 -5 500 000 -5 500 000 -5 500 000 -5 500 000 -55 500 000
Discount Factor 1,11048665 1,23318059 1,36943058 1,52073437 1,68875521 1,87534011 2,08254015 2,31263302
FCF -4952783,6 -4460011,8 -4016267,8 -3616673,7 -3256836,7 -2932801,3 -2641005,5 -23998620

Inputs
Loan 50000000
One time fee 125000
Rate 11%
Annual Yield 11,049%
Semmi Annual Yield 10,76%
Semi Annual Yield without fee 10,70%
Cost of Initial Fee 0,06%

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Annex 5 – Swap Model 2

Morgan Bank

10,7% + F + 0,06% 10,70%

Libor -x Libor -x
Libor + 0,5% 10,70%
Goodrich Rabobank

Annex 6 – US Mutual Savings Banks Investment Alternatives

Alternatives
30 y Fixed Rates Residencial Mortages 12,05% - 13% / 13% - 13,05%
Short Term T - Bill 8,07%
Large CDS 8,40%
Floating rate notes, major US banks ( tied to Tbill Notes) AAA 8,07% + 1% = 9,07%
Goodrich BBB- 8,75% + 0,50% = 9,25%

Annex 7 – Established Intervals for Scenario Analysis

Annex 8 – Scenario Analysis 1

Assuming no default
Scenario 1
f= 0,690%
x= -0,050%
Goodrich 0,60%
Rabobank 0,20%
Morgan 0,75%

Annex 9 – Scenario Analysis 2

Total amount loss by Morgan in case Goodrich defaults
Assuming x=-0,05%%
Time 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Nominal amount 50000000
Annual % loss -1,840% -1,840% -1,840% -1,840% -1,840% -1,840% -1,840% -1,840%
Probability of default 0,1800% 0,1797% 0,1794% 0,1790% 0,1787% 0,1784% 0,1781% 0,1777%
Annual loss -920000 -920000 -920000 -920000 -920000 -920000 -920000
Total loss -6440000 -5520000 -4600000 -3680000 -2760000 -1840000 -920000

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Annex 10 – Scenario Analysis 3
Total amount loss by Rabobank and Goodrich in case Morgan defaults
Rabobank
Opportunity cost by endind the swap agreement
Assuming x=-0,05%
Time 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Nominal amount 50000000
Annual % loss 0,20% 0,20% 0,20% 0,20% 0,20% 0,20% 0,20% 0,20%
Probability of default 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00%
Annual loss (100 000,00) € (100 000,00) € (100 000,00) € (100 000,00) € (100 000,00) € (100 000,00) € (100 000,00) € (100 000,00) €
Total loss (800 000,00) € (700 000,00) € (600 000,00) € (500 000,00) € (400 000,00) € (300 000,00) € (200 000,00) € (100 000,00) €

Goodrich
Opportunity cost by endind the swap agreement
Assuming x=-0,05%
Time 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Annual % loss 0,60% 0,60% 0,60% 0,60% 0,60% 0,60% 0,60% 0,60%
Nominal amount 50000000
Annual loss (300 000,00) € (300 000,00) € (300 000,00) € (300 000,00) € (300 000,00) € (300 000,00) € (300 000,00) € (300 000,00) €
Total loss (2 400 000,00) € (2 100 000,00) € (1 800 000,00) € (1 500 000,00) € (1 200 000,00) € (900 000,00) € (600 000,00) € (300 000,00) €

Annex 11 – Scenario Analysis 4

Total amount gain by Morgan in case Rabobank defaults

Assuming f= 0,375%
Assuming x= -0,001%
Time 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Nominal amount 50000000
Annual % gain 2,385% 2,385% 2,385% 2,385% 2,385% 2,385% 2,385%
Probability of default 0,0000% 0,0000% 0,0000% 0,0000% 0,0000% 0,0000% 0,0000% 0,0000%
Annual gain 1 192 250,00 € 1 192 250,00 € 1 192 250,00 € 1 192 250,00 € 1 192 250,00 € 1 192 250,00 € 1 192 250,00 €
Total gain 1 192 250,00 € 2 384 500,00 € 3 576 750,00 € 4 769 000,00 € 5 961 250,00 € 7 153 500,00 € 8 345 750,00 €

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