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Detained Defendants in the Philippines
Article in International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology · October 2017

DOI: 10.1177/0306624X17736041
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DOI: 10.1177/0306624X17736041
https://doi.org/10.1177/0306624X17736041
in the Philippines journals.sagepub.com/home/ijo
Raymund E. Narag1
Abstract
Utilizing a combination of jail official data and qualitative data gathered through Focus
Group Discussions and interviews with inmates, court actors, and jail officers, this
article investigates the factors related to prolonged trial of detained defendants in
the Philippines. Sensitizing concepts derived from Western literature are utilized to
understand individual, court, and jail-level variations to prolonged detention. Results
from official jail data show the magnitude and extent of the problem. The narrative
data suggests the salience of organizational and cultural dynamics that lead to the
delay of cases for detained defendants. Specifically, courts that are loosely coupled
and subscribe to workgroup culture that condones leniency are more likely to be
delayed. Implications to theory and policy are discussed.
Keywords
case delay, pretrial detention, tight/loose coupling, court workgroup culture,
Philippine courts
Introduction
Pretrial detention, or being incarcerated between the time of arrest and case disposi-
tion, is a key issue in many criminal justice systems all over the world (Open Society
Foundations [OSF], 2011, 2014; Walmsley, 2016). Three million people undergo pre-
trial detention on a given day and approximately 10 million people are cumulatively
1Southern Illinois University, Carbondale, IL, USA
Corresponding Author:
Raymund E. Narag, Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice, Southern Illinois University,
4224 Faner Hall, Carbondale, IL 62901, USA.
Email: rnarag@siu.edu
2 International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology 00(0)
detained in a year (OSF & United Nations Development Programme [UNDP], 2011).
The United States holds the most number of pretrial detainees with around 400,000
inmates (Wagner & Sakala, 2014). Diverse countries such as Comoros, Libya, Liberia,
and Bolivia have pretrial detainees that comprise more than 80% of their total prison
populations (Walmsley, 2016). In addition, in countries such as Nigeria, detainees suf-
fer from long period of pretrial detention, where inmates stay in jail for an average of
3.7 years (OSF, 2014). In most jurisdictions, the trial courts will find many of the
pretrial detainees not guilty and some detainees will stay in jail longer than the imposed
penalties (Foote, 1954; OSF, 2011, 2014; Rankin, 1964). Pretrial detention, thus,
serves as an indicator of a country’s commitment to the rule of law and administration
of justice (OSF, 2011).
Scholarly studies in the United States suggest that pretrial detention is associated
with different negative outcomes. First, detained defendants are nonproductive and
deprived of the chance to contribute meaningfully to the economy (Foote, 1954).
Second, detained defendants are uprooted from their social circles, which may lead to
family and community disruptions (Irwin, 2013). Third, detained defendants, com-
pared with released defendants with similar characteristics, have increased risk of con-
viction (Ares, Rankin, & Sturz, 1963; Kellough & Wortley, 2002; Leiber & Fox, 2005;
Rankin, 1964), and if convicted, given longer sentences and prison time instead of
probation (Goldkamp, 1979; Rankin, 1964; Williams, 2003). Pretrial detainees are
also more likely to plead guilty even if innocent just to avail of lesser penalties (Sacks
& Ackerman, 2012) so they can resume normal lives. These negative case outcomes
happen because detained defendants are less likely to contribute on their own legal
defense, less likely to secure their own witnesses, and less likely to pay for the services
of their lawyers (Foote, 1954; OSF & UNDP, 2011). In developing countries, pretrial
detention also increases risks of being tortured and subjected to different forms of
police and jail misconduct (OSF, 2011).
Most of the scholarly studies done in the developed countries have investigated
pretrial detention in terms of a dichotomy (Demuth & Steffensmeier, 2004; Nagel,
1983; Rankin, 1964; Scalia, 1999; Williams, 2003). That is, research usually asked
whether defendants were granted or denied bail, and if granted bail, whether they had
the money to post bail or not (bail vs. no bail). Most of these studies then evaluate the
causes or consequences of pretrial detention. While these studies are helpful, very few
studies investigated the actual length of pretrial detention or the total number of days
that a defendant stays in jail from time of arrest to case disposition (Lowenkamp,
VanNostrand, & Holsinger, 2013). This is a key failing among researchers. There are
reasons to believe that the length of stay under detention while pending the disposition
of a case is a key criminal justice phenomenon that needs to be studied in its own right.
A person in detention for only a week may have a qualitatively different experience
than a person in detention for more than a month or a year (Holsinger, 2016a, 2016b;
Lowenkamp, VanNostrand, & Holsinger, 2013b). Intuitively, longer detention propor-
tionately increases the risks that a defendant loses his or her job, housing, family, and
other social support systems (OSF, 2011). In cases of long periods of pretrial deten-
tion, it leads to jail overcrowding (Hall, 1987), which then exacerbates the mental and
Narag 3
physical health of the inmates (OSF, 2014), increases the risk of jail violence (Tartaro,
2002), and heightens exposure to other criminogenic inmates (OSF, 2014). Arguably,
extremely prolonged detention aggravates feelings of procedural injustice (Tyler,
1994), as the trial process becomes the punishment (Feeley, 1979). This fuels feeling
of legal cynicism (Sampson & Bartusch, 1998) where inmates do not trust the out-
comes of the criminal justice system. Even if acquitted, prolonged detention increases
mental and psychological difficulties on release and creates barriers to successful
reentry (Coffey, Kaplan, Sampson, & Tucci, 2010).
In addition, prolonged pretrial detention may hint of factors related to the delay of
criminal case proceedings. It may hint of police, prosecutorial, court, and jail practices
(Church, Carlson, Lee, & Tan, 1978; Hall, 1987) that contribute directly or indirectly
to lengthy pretrial detention, independent of the individual characteristics of the
inmates and the criminal justice actors. Thus, there are compelling reasons to under-
stand the dynamic of long-term pretrial detention especially in light of the efforts to
improve the rule of law and the administration of justice (OSF, 2011).
This article utilizes a combination of jail official data and qualitative data in an
Asian developing country that is currently grappling with issues of prolonged trial of
detained inmates. Anecdotal accounts of inmates detained in jail for more than 10
years while undergoing trial have been a recurring theme in the Philippines (Conde,
2016; Macaraig, 2016). This article investigates the lived experiences (Van Manen,
2015) of inmates, jail officers, and court actors to shed light on this troubling phe-
nomenon. It utilizes a phenomenological approach (Creswell, 2007) that highlights
the frustrations and expectations of individuals within the Philippine criminal justice
system.
This article reviews the factors associated with pretrial detention (traditionally
measured as a dichotomous variable). However, since the phenomenon of interest is
the length of detention (measured as a continuous variable), this article will also review
theoretical pieces that explain “outcomes” in the criminal justice system (Hagan,
1989, p. 117). Although articulated in Western developed country settings, the theo-
retical concepts derived from these studies are utilized as sensitizing concepts (Bowen,
2006) to analyze the situation in the Philippines. Next, a description of the study set-
ting and methods of data collection and analysis are provided. The findings obtained
from the official data are integrated with the emergent themes derived from the quali-
tative data. Last, implications to criminal justice theory and policy are offered.
Literature Review
Factors Related to Pretrial Detention
While the presumption of innocence is universal, the use of pretrial detention is preva-
lent in many countries (OSF, 2014). This happens as national legislatures mandate
their courts to deny bail to defendants charged with serious offenses (e.g., homicide)
or to impose bail amounts not affordable to the accused. Other jurisdictions offer lim-
ited access to pretrial release programs, such as release on recognizance, pre-arrest
diversion, surety bonds, and supervised release (Goldkamp, 1985; Hall, 1987; OSF,
2014; Reaves, 2013).
In the United States, scholars are primarily interested in understanding the legal
and extra-legal factors (Hagan, 1989) associated with pretrial detention (Landes,
1974; Nagel, 1983; Rankin, 1964). Legal factors related to pretrial detention include
seriousness of offense, history of repeat offending, failure to appear in previous trials,
and flight risk (Demuth & Steffensmeier, 2004; Goldkamp, 1985). Defendants who
possess these characteristics are likely to be denied bail or be given prohibitive
amount of bail. Extra-legal factors include demographic characteristics (gender, race,
and ethnicity; Demuth & Steffensmeier, 2004; Nagel, 1983), employment history,
ties to family and community (Rankin, 1964), and other social attributes that indicate
defendants’ stakes to conformity (Nagel, 1983; Spohn, 2008). After the bail reforms
of 1984, these legal and extra-legal variables were construed to indicate the defen-
dants’ level of dangerousness or the threat posed to the safety of the community
(Goldkamp, 1985). Presumably, dangerous defendants are detained as they may com-
mit crime while out on bail, may harass their crime victims and opposing witnesses,
and may jump bail and escape punishments (Goldkamp, 1985). Other scholars extend
the discussion by probing the differential experiences of young men, poor defendants,
and racial and ethnic minorities on bail outcomes (Demuth, 2003; Demuth &
Steffensmeier, 2004). Specifically, scholars utilized the racial minority threat thesis
to explain the overrepresentation of poor young African Americans among the pre-
trial detainee population (Free, 2004; William & Rosenfeld, 2016). Arguably, the
fearful majority views the minority defendants as potential threat to their safety, and
this fear is manifested in the court actors’ bail decisions. Other scholars shift their
research from the characteristics of the defendants and investigate the judicial and
prosecutorial discretion in the granting and recommending of the amount of bail. For
example, scholars look at bail guidelines and determine whether court actors deviated
from these guidelines (Goldkamp & Gottfredson, 1988). Finally, a number of schol-
ars have investigated community-level characteristics, such as racial heterogeneity
and concentrated disadvantage, and determine their impact on the local courts’ deci-
sion-making processes (William & Rosenfeld, 2016).
As previously mentioned, most of these studies did not investigate and measure the
actual length of detention. This inattention among scholars is understandable given the
relatively speedier disposition of criminal cases in the United States and other Western
developed countries (OSF, 2011) where most of the studies were conducted. In a study
done by Lowenkamp, VanNostrand, and Holsinger (2013) in Kentucky, the mean
length of stay in jail for the 112,030 defendants detained between July 1, 2009 and
June 30, 2010 is 6.28 days, with around 78% detained for less than 4 days. In another
study among firearms offenders detained in St. Louis, Missouri, the average time from
day of filing to case disposition is 130 days (William & Rosenfeld, 2016). A slightly
longer pretrial detention is recorded in Canada with average length of stay of 214 days
but with 53% of the inmates staying for a week or less (Weinrath, 2009). The lengthi-
est detention anecdotally recorded was in Bronx, New York, where an inmate stayed
in jail while undergoing trial for 9 years (Palmer, 2016). For many observers, these
Narag 5
lengthy trial proceedings are indeed rare incidents.1 Specifically, with the United
States, the extensive use of plea-bargaining has provided mechanisms to shorten trial
proceedings (Barbara, Morrison, & Cunningham, 1976; Ross, 2006; Smith, 1986).
Stricter adherence to standards on case disposition, like speedy trial laws (Goerdt,
Lomvardias, Gallas, & Mahoney,1989) and disdain on jail and prison overcrowding
that violates evolving sense of human decency (Chung, 1999; Robbins, 1977), have
pushed court jurisdictions to improve the pace of case litigation and keep the length of
pretrial detention to the minimum.
Due to rare incidents of prolonged trial of detained inmates, this phenomenon is
understudied and under-theorized. Very little is thus known about why some criminal
justice systems falter in the speedy disposition of cases for detained defendants.2
However, some concepts derived from traditional criminal justice theorizing that
explains outcomes such as use of discretion and discrepancy in decision-making may
still be useful to guide initial quest to understand the phenomenon of prolonged pre-
trial detention. These sensitizing concepts (Bowen, 2006) hint to the salience of orga-
nizational and cultural variables that may explain the lengthy criminal trial processes
for detained defendants.
Sensitizing Concepts in Relation to Lengthy Case Proceedings

Hagan (1989) introduced the notion of loose coupling versus tight coupling to explain
variations in the decision-making of criminal justice actors. He described criminal
justice systems as loosely coupled when the different subcomponents, such as the
police, prosecutions, courts, pretrial services, and corrections, are independent and
autonomous from each other. On the other hand, he described criminal justice systems
as tightly coupled when the different components are linked and coordinated. For
example, if prosecutors clearly manifest their goals and intentions with the police
department as to what crimes they prioritize to prosecute, then police officers will be
guided in their arrest decisions. With the prosecutors and the police being tightly cou-
pled, it is expected that arrest disparities will be reduced (Hagan, 1989, p. 18). In the
context of this study, Hagan’s (1989) treatise therefore hints to the importance of orga-
nizational variables like coordination, sharing of information, regular communication,
and other mechanisms to tightly couple the different criminal justice organizations. It
is reasonable to expect that tightly coupled systems will have speedier disposition of
criminal cases (Hall, 1987).
The classic treatise by Packer (1964) on crime control versus due process also hints
of the importance of organizational and cultural variables. Although originally con-
ceptualized to explain values in the practice of criminal law, Packer’s (1964) notions
of crime control and due process are instructive. Accordingly, crime control values
emphasize speed and finality, where actors work similar to an assembly line and quan-
tity of convictions is valued. On the other hand, due process values emphasize quality
and legitimacy, where actors work similar to an obstacle course and quality control is
valued. Court actors then utilize these orienting values as “narratives” or “cognitive
toolkits” (Swidler, 1986) to justify case processing behaviors. In the context of this
study, actors’ subscription to either of these values may be utilized as “pretext”

(Slobogin, 1997, p. 782) to speed up or to delay the case proceedings. Court actors
may “code-switch” (Anderson, 1999) from “due process” to “crime control” narra-
tives to rationalize specific course of action.
Eisenstein, Flemming, and Nardulli (1988) also investigated the courtroom work-
group dynamics and suggested that judges, prosecutors, lawyers, and other court
actors develop informal exchange agreements to facilitate the disposition of cases. In
addition, Church and colleagues (Church, 1982; Church et al., 1978) also uncovered
the influence of local legal culture on the shared expectations on the pace of case liti-
gation. These scholars uncovered the existence of a give-and-take relationship
(Flemming, 1990) or “professional courtesy” (Church et al., 1978, p. 42) that norma-
tively prescribes appropriate behavior and practices (Eisenstein et al., 1988). For
example, exchanges in previous cases may set a pattern of a “going rate” (Harris &
Jesilow, 2000, p. 197) that may influence the amount of bail imposed to a current
defendant. The salience of this courtroom culture therefore affects case outcomes. In
the context of this study, courtroom culture where actors are either lenient or strict in
the postponements of hearings may impinge on the length of the trial proceedings
(Church et al., 1978), which translates to prolonged detention.
These ideas from Hagan (1989), Packer (1964), Eisenstein et al. (1988), and Church
et al., (1978)3 may be combined to develop a plausible explanation to the lengthy trial
proceedings for detained defendants, which can be called the organizational-cultural
perspective. Organizationally, judges may develop tighter coordination and sharing of
information with the prosecutors, pretrial services, and defense lawyers. Judges may
establish firm managerial control over calendar of hearings and continuances and set
the tone for speedy case disposition. These organizational practices become regular-
ized and translate to shared expectations among the actors. Culturally, the court and
other criminal justice actors may develop courtroom narratives that emphasize tight
coupling and crime control values and which are then utilized to justify behaviors that
speed up case proceedings. This eventually cultivates a court culture that emphasizes
the speedy disposition of cases.
These sensitizing concepts (Bowen, 2006) derived from the Western literature are
used as guide in analyzing the official and narrative data culled from a field research
in the Philippines. These sensitizing concepts are utilized to determine whether there
are individual, court, and jail-level variations in the experiences of inmates and the
criminal justice actors. These sensitizing concepts also informed the flow of the pre-
sentation of the emergent findings.
Research Setting
To contextualize this research, a brief description of the characteristics and processes of
the criminal procedures in the Philippines is provided. One of the main features of the
Philippine criminal procedure is the mandate given to trial court judges to automatically
deny bail to defendants who are accused of capital offenses such as murder and rape (as
provided for by the Philippine Constitution) and drug trade and distribution (as
Narag 7
provided for by Republic Act 9165), if the evidence against the accused is strong. Thus,
inmates charged with “non-bailable” offenses must first file a petition for bail to be
released, which must be heard and debated on merits in the open court similar to a full-
blown trial. In addition, the Philippines is heavily reliant on a financial bail system such
that majority of the “bailable” defendants cannot produce the amount of bail (Caparas
& Feliciano, 1987). While “bailable” defendants can also file a petition for surety bond,
reduction of the amount of bail, and release on recognizance, such petitions must also
be heard and debated in the open court and entail a number of requirements. These
characteristics and processes translate to high prevalence of defendants being detained
and lengthy detention time while undergoing trial. To address these issues, plea bar-
gaining is authorized under Section 2, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, and must be entered during the pretrial stage of the criminal proceedings.
Unfortunately, the Philippine government does not systemically collect and publish
data on the number of detained inmates while undergoing trial and the number of those
who plea bargained. In addition, a Speedy Trial Law (Republic Act 8943) was intro-
duced in 1998 specifying time limits for the different stages of adjudication. However,
the law provides multiple exclusions in computing the length of time, which the court
actors can liberally draw from to justify delay in case proceedings.
Data and Method

The official data and qualitative data were collected as part of a collaborative pro-
gram among criminal justice agencies in Metro Manila, Philippines, which aims to
speed up the disposition of criminal cases and to reduce jail overcrowding. Pushed by
persistent anecdotal concerns on case delays of detained defendants, a Task Force
was created in August 2015 to address the issue. Six jails from the Bureau of Jail
Management and Penology (BJMP), a national government agency in charge of pro-
viding custody to pretrial detainees, and court jurisdictions from five cities,4 partici-
pated in this program. The jails varied in size of inmate population and level of
crowding. Four jails cater to male inmates and two jails cater to female inmates. A list
of inmates from the six jails was made available to the researcher who served as the
program’s secretariat and facilitator. This list contains limited but helpful demo-
graphic and legal information, such as inmates’ date of commitment to jail, nature of
offense, bail status (bailable or nonbailable), and the court handling the case. The
official jail data was utilized to determine the length of stay for each inmate (expressed
in number of days). It was also used to determine whether an inmate’s stay in jail
exceeds the standards set by the Task Force, which, in turn, was based from the
Speedy Trial Law of 1998. For example, inmates with less serious cases (with penal-
ties of not more than 6 years) and tried in the Metropolitan Trial Courts (MTC) should
not exceed 6 months in detention, while inmates charged with more serious cases
(with penalties of more than 6 years) and tried in the Regional Trial Courts (RTC)
should not exceed 3 years in detention. Inmates whose cases are still undergoing trial
but had stayed longer than the baseline standards are considered “overstaying”
inmates. This definition is utilized in this study.
The official data is complemented by qualitative data. Four Focus Group Discussions
(FGDs) among jail officials, judges, prosecutors, public defense lawyers, and court
staff were conducted to help the Task Force understand causes of delay of trial pro-
ceedings for detained defendants and to design interventions to overcome the prob-
lems. These FGDs were conducted monthly (September 2015 to January 2016) during
interagency meetings facilitated by the researcher. The participating judges, prosecu-
tors, public defense lawyers, and court staff (mostly clerk of courts and stenographers)
were divided into five small homogeneous subgroups (i.e., judges only, prosecutors
only, etc.) with four to seven members. Some participants were present in all the four
FGDs, but other participants were added in succeeding FGDs as the attendance in the
meetings were voluntary. In the FGDs, participants were provided with idea cards
where they answered probing questions such as the following: What are the causes of
case delay? What are the manifestations of case delay? What are the consequences of
case delay? and What can be done to reduce case delay? The participants then shared
their answers to the small group, which was recorded in a manila paper by a chosen
group leader. The leader then reported the small group output to the big group for
comparison and validation of answers. The idea cards, manila paper, and oral reports
were recorded and became narratives analyzed in this article. The judges, prosecutors,
and public lawyers are between the ages of 40 to 65 and have held higher administra-
tive positions in their respective offices.
In addition, the researcher independently conducted open-ended interviews using
purposive sampling techniques. Guided by the results on the analyses of the length of
stay, “overstaying” inmates (more than 3 years in jail), actors from “speedy” or “chal-
lenged” jails and courts (below or above the mean of length of stay) were sought.
Interviewees were asked about their experiences during court hearings, their views on
the causes and consequences of delay, and their suggestions on how to improve the
current situations. Interviews lasted from 45 min to 2 hr. This yielded rich narratives
from 20 overstaying inmates, seven jail officers from “speedy” jails, six jail officers
from “challenged jails,” 10 court staff from “speedy” courts and seven court staff from
“challenged” courts that shed light on their direct experiences on case processing. By
probing and comparing the atypical experiences of overstaying inmates and actors in
the “speedy” and “challenged” jails and courts, deeper insights on case delay were
generated. However, this procedure may limit the capability of the sample to reflect
the population of inmates and court/jail personnel more generally.
All FGD and interview data were transcribed and open-coded using the NVIVO8
software to develop emerging themes. A phenomenological approach (Creswell, 2007)
was employed to highlight the lived experiences, frustrations, and expectations of the
research participants (Van Manen, 2015). A phenomenological approach entails
describing what participants have in common as they experience a phenomenon
(Creswell, 2007), in this case, the phenomenon of case delay leading to lengthy deten-
tion. The description consists of “what” they experienced and “how” they experienced
it (Moustakas, 1994). It holds the view that the participant’s experience is a conscious
experience (Van Manen, 2015) that needs to be privileged. It also requires bracketing
out one’s personal knowledge, beliefs, feelings, and experiences to be more open or
Narag 9
faithful to the phenomenon (Creswell, 2007). It is an attempt to approach a lived expe-

rience with sense of “newness” to elicit rich and descriptive data (Anderson & Spencer,
2002). It is an inductive process allowing for themes to emerge. Phenomenological
analysis necessitates reducing the textual narratives to significant statements, which is
done in three iterative steps. These include textural description (what the participants
experienced), structural description (how they experienced in terms of the conditions,
situations, or context), and overall essence (combining the textural and the structural
descriptions; Creswell, 2007). The emergent themes from the phenomenological anal-
yses were compared with the sensitizing concepts (Bowen, 2006) derived from the
literature. Thus, while the key findings were developed inductively, the presentation of
the findings followed a deductive approach.
Procedures on the ethical conduct of research among vulnerable populations were
strictly followed. All information identifying the inmates and court actors were de-
identified. Participants were promised confidentiality of information. Pseudonyms
were used in the report.
Findings
Factors Related to Length of Pretrial Detention
On October 30, 2015, there were 8,915 pretrial detainees in the six jails under study
(see Figure 1). The median stay for all these pretrial detainees is 268 days, suggesting
that 50% (4,457) of the inmates had already stayed in jail for more than 9 months
while still undergoing trial. The “length of stay” is calculated by subtracting the “date
of commitment to jail” (when the inmates arrived in the jail) from the “cut-off date”
(when the data were submitted to the Task Force).5 The mean, another measure of
central tendency, is 529 days. The mean is twice the median as the data is highly
skewed to the right (SD = 664 days). This suggests that some inmates are extremely
delayed and they push up the average length of stay for all the inmates. The top 25th
percentile of the population (2,229 inmates) had stayed in jail for 2 years or more. In
terms of extreme circumstances, there are 52 inmates who had stayed in jail for more
than 10 years, and the longest staying inmate had been detained for 15 years and 17
days. In terms of the program-defined “overstaying” inmates, Table 1 indicates that
20.3% (1,806) of the inmates are considered “overstaying.” Breaking this by Court
Type, 36.1% (435 inmates) of the 1,205 inmates tried in MTC courts have stayed lon-
ger than 6 months, which meant that these inmates could have served the minimum
imposable penalties of their offenses (see Table 1). Another 17.6% (1,336 inmates) of
the 7,578 inmates tried in RTC courts have exceeded the threshold of 3 years of stay
in jail. A third category of inmates includes inmates with multiple case assignments
where they are assigned to both MTC and RTC courts. Twenty percent (35 inmates) of
the 130 inmates with multiple court assignments have exceeded 3 years of detention.
All these “overstaying” inmates are candidates for instant release as their right to
speedy trial had been violated. These figures capture the extent and magnitude of the
problem of prolonged detention of inmates undergoing trial in the Philippines.6 This
Figure 1. Frequency distribution of length of stay in jail while undergoing trial.
Note. N = 8,915; median = 268 days, dotted line; mean = 529 days, broken line.
Table 1. Frequency distribution by Court Type and Overstaying Inmates.
Overstaying inmates
Court type No Yes Total

MTC 770 435a 1,205
63.9% 36.1%
RTC 6,242 1,336b 7,578
82.4% 17.6%
Multiple 95 35c 130
73.1% 26.9%
Total 7,107 1,806 8,913d
79.7% 20.3% 100.0%
Note. MTC = Metropolitan Trial Courts; RTC = Regional Trial Courts.

aExceeding 6 months of stay in jail.
bExceeding 3 years of stay in jail.
cExceeding 3 years of stay in jail.
dTwo inmates currently had no assigned courts.
huge variation in the length of stay in jail also supports the strategy of measuring this
phenomenon as a continuous rather than a dichotomous variable.
Narag 11
Table 2. Mean Comparison of Length of Stay on Key Variables.
M (number M difference Percentage

Variable Na of days) T test (in days) overstaying
Gender 8,915 9.13***
Female 781 736 226 27.30
Male 8,134 509 19.60
Drug offense 8,177 4.69***
No 4,468 500 70 21.50
Yes 3,709 570 19.40
Violent offense 8,177 9.60***
No 5,851 487 157 19.90
Yes 2,326 645 21.90
Bail status 4,297b 13.92***
Nonbailable 1.925 723 282 25.80
Bailable 2,372 441 18.50
aVariation in sample size is due to missing information in some of the jails.
bTwo of the participating jails did not provide data on Bail Status of inmates.
***p < .05 Significance level.
Individual-level variations. Given the wide variation in the length of stay, it is interesting
to explore whether individual-level characteristics of the inmates are correlated to
their length of pretrial detention. Guided by the literature reviewed above, gender,
drug offending, violent offending, and bail status were utilized as bivariate correlates
of length of detention.7 As Table 2 suggests, compared with their counterparts, female
inmates, inmates charged with drug or violent offenses, and those who have no bail
recommended are more likely to stay longer in jail while undergoing trial. Specifi-
cally, female inmates stay significantly longer by an average of 226 days than male
inmates (T test = 9.13***). In addition, female inmates are significantly more likely to
overstay in jail (27.3%) compared with males (19.6%). Inmates charged with drug
offenses stay an average of 70 days longer than nondrug offenders (T test = 4.69***).
Inmates charged with violent offenses, on the other had, stayed 157 days longer than
non-violent offenders (T test = 9.60***). Inmates with non-bailable offenses are more
likely to stay longer in jail than inmates with bailable offenses but cannot afford bail
by an average of 282 days (T test = 13.92***).8
Informed by the initial findings from the official data, 20 inmates who had been
held in jail for at least 3 years were purposefully interviewed to understand why indi-
vidual-level variations exist. These narratives describe the lived experiences of the
inmates as they navigate the period of lengthy detention. Here is a common narrative
that captures the overall essence (Creswell, 2007) of lengthy detention:
You need to be on top of your case. You just cannot rely on the system. You need to check
with the records section whether they received the court subpoena about your scheduled
hearing; you make sure that they type in your name in court calendar hearing; you must
inform the jail officers to bring you to court when you have a hearing. There must be
someone who will call your lawyer; remind your witnesses to come. Without those
reminders, if one of those players is absent, your hearing will be postponed. Your next
hearing will be 6 months after. That usually happens to me. (Janice,9 female, 8 years in jail)
These statements are echoed repeatedly by all 20 inmates. For these inmates, fail-
ure to coordinate their own hearings meant delays and lengthy detention. A similar
theme is echoed in this statement:
I haven’t spoken to my lawyer. I saw him in court only during trials, which are always
postponed. He doesn’t even know me. I don’t have the resources to contact him; I am
hoping that he interviews my witnesses, so we can prepare my defense. I cannot bring my
witnesses to him; I can’t afford the transportation costs. That is why, it takes me longer
here. (Junior, male, 4 years in jail)
These narratives capture the frustrations of the inmates with the fact that they can-
not do anything to fast-track their own cases. Sensitized by key concepts from the lit-
erature, these narratives indicate the importance of tight coupling (Hagan, 1989) where
inmates should try their best to coordinate their own hearings. Inmates should be able
to bring the acts of the different agencies together so their hearings will push through.
Inmates without the capacity to do these are more likely to stay in jail longer. Using
structural description (Creswell, 2007), the experiences of male and female detainees
were compared. It appears that this emergent theme is more prominent among female
inmates where, due to their limited number compared with male inmates, services are
not as readily available to them. The female jails are located in more distant places,
and there are fewer personnel assigned to attend to them. Thus, it is harder for female
inmates to coordinate with lawyers, court staff, and witnesses, which may explain their
longer stay in jail compared with their male counterparts.
Other structural descriptions differentiate between the testimonies of inmates based
on nature of their offenses. Inmates with drug or violent offenses provide unique expla-
nations as to why they stayed in jail longer. These inmates speak of the mind-set of
court actors about their offenses. One inmate charged with drug law violations laments,
If you are charged with drugs, then you have no bail. That is almost automatic. Then they
will make you rot longer. But then, you are acquitted. Most of the cases are eventually
acquitted or dismissed. They will let you suffer first, then, let you out. That is the name
of the game. (Juan, male, 4 years in jail)
Even if your case is simple, such as snatching, you will rot in jail. That is the procedure
before they dismiss the case. There should be three hearings where the complainant will
not show up, then, the judge will dismiss the case. Majority of the complainant don’t
show up. You just need to endure the three postponements. You have a hearing once every
8 months. (Roger, male, 3.5 years in jail)
From the perspectives of the inmates, the major essence of prolonged trial detention
is the notion that the process has become the punishment (Feeley, 1979). Nationwide,
Narag 13
Figure 2. Length of stay in jail per court.

Note. (N = 262 courts; average for all courts is 355 days, dotted line).
only around 18% of the pretrial detainees are eventually convicted and 82% of the
inmates are either acquitted or dismissed (Narag, 2005). However, majority of the
inmates had already served time equivalent to their imposable penalties, even if acquit-
ted. As one inmate mentioned, “it is not a question of whether you are guilty or not, it
is question of how much punishment you get from the process of determining your
guilt” (Roderick, male, 10 years in jail). Thus, inmates believe that court actors may
conveniently utilize the tenets of “due process” (Packer, 1964) as a “pretext” (Slobogin,
1997) to delay their cases.10 They believe that drug cases and violent offenses are cur-
rently on the top of the political agenda on “war against drugs and criminality,” and the
slow process is utilized as the mechanism for their indirect punishment.
Court-level variations. The next step in the analysis is to group inmates by court assign-
ment and to determine whether there is a variation in the average length of stay per
court11 (see Figure 2 and Table 3). In this study, there are 262 courts that had jurisdic-
tion over the 8,915 inmates. This ranges from courts with only one inmate under
detention to a court with 460 inmates under detention. Forty-three courts have 50 or
more clients who are detained while undergoing trial. For all 262 courts, the average
stay is 355 days, suggesting that 50% of the courts in this study have inmates who had
stayed in jail for an average of a little less than year. The Task Force labeled the courts
Table 3. Percentage Overstaying and Length of Stay of Inmates Among Courts With More
Than 50 Inmates Under Trial.
Percentage of Number of Average
Court code Number of detainees detainees length of stay Average length of stay in
number inmates in jail overstaying overstaying (days) year, months, and days
245 460 0.32 147 821 2 years 2 months 30 days

113 156 0.58 90 1,134 3 years 1 months 7 days
below the average as “speedy courts” and courts above the average as “challenged”
courts.12
There is a wide variation in terms of mean length of stay and percentage overstay-
ing among the courts, confirming the notion that some courts are more expeditious
Narag 15
than others (see Table 3). Limiting the analysis to courts with at least 50 detained cli-
ents, the most “speedy” court (Court code number 205) has an average length of stay
of 127 days for its 58 clients while the most “challenged” court (Court code number
227) has an average length of stay of 1,648 days for its 51 clients. Note that these two
courts have almost the same number of detained inmates (workload). Similarly, in
comparing two courts on the percentage of inmates who are overstaying, Court code
number 241 has 74% of its 61 clients who had stayed beyond the baseline standard,
whereas Court code number 242 has 8% of its 407 clients who had stayed beyond the
baseline standard. Indeed, sorting the courts by the number of detained inmates (from
the most burdened to the least burdened) and comparing the courts’ performance on
the two outcome measures (percentage of detainee overstaying and average length of
stay) suggest that caseload is not predictive. This echoes the findings by Church and
colleagues (1978) who found that structural variables (court structure, size, workload,
and backlog) are not necessarily related to case delay. This further suggests that there
could be court-level organizational and cultural practices related to the length of the
disposition of cases.
To understand the variations in the court performance, participants from “speedy”
and “challenged” courts were interviewed. Using structural description (Creswell,
2007), the narratives of participants from the “speedy” courts were contrasted with the
narratives of participants from the “challenged” courts. The following narratives are
indicative of certain beliefs and practices adhered to in “speedy” courts:
I have my own list of detainees and the dates of their hearings. Days before the hearings,
my court staff send text messages to all the parties, reminding them of the hearings. We
remind the prosecutors, the lawyers, the jail guards, and the police witnesses. We make
sure that everyone is present during the hearing so we can proceed smoothly. I penalize
prosecutors and lawyers if they don’t show up. If I know in advance that they are not
coming, I let my staff inform the jail warden so the jail escort officers won’t waste time
sending their inmates in the court. We can also use the vacated time for inmates whose
hearings pushed through. (Judge 1 from a “speedy” court)
I do not let the bailable offenses clog my dockets. I let them go as soon as possible.
Anyway, those inmates should have been released if only they had money. If they stayed
in jail more than 6 months, they should be released outright. I use summary procedures
for that. I just let them promise to attend the next hearing. I proceed to the next case, as
soon as possible. The more cases you dispose, the better for everyone—the police can
spend time preventing crimes in the streets rather than stay in court. (Judge 10 from a
“speedy” court)
For these court actors, the essence of speedy disposition cases and shorter detention
time is taking proactive steps. Referring back to the sensitizing concepts, these narra-
tives from the “speedy” judges reflects the importance of coordination and sharing of
information (Hagan, 1989) among the courts, prosecutors, defense lawyers, police
witnesses, and the jail officers. They make sure that everyone is on the same page so
the daily proceedings progress smoothly. They also utilize crime control (Packer,
1964) narratives to justify speedy disposition of cases. They exercise their discretion
in dismissing cases if the inmates had already served the imposable penalties.
Now, contrast these with the narratives of court actors in the “challenged” courts:
I don’t have a list of detainees. I don’t know how many of the defendants I am prosecuting
are in jail. I don’t have any idea of how long they had been staying in jail, either. I am not
concerned because I am a prosecutor. That’s the work of the PAO (Public Attorney
Office). I just see these inmate-defendants when we have court hearings. (Prosecutor 2 in
a “challenged” court)
I also would not know how long our defendants stay in jail. We rely also on the court to
inform us on the schedule of the next hearing. That’s when we talk to our clients, only
during the court hearings. There are many of them; we hear 30 cases in a day. It gets
postponed because there is not enough time. (PAO lawyer 2 in a “challenged” court)
These narratives indicate the lack of coordination and cooperation among the court
actors. Most judges, prosecutors, and defense lawyers in the “challenged” courts are
not aware that their clients had been overstaying in jail. Prosecutors pass the responsi-
bility to the PAO defense lawyers whom they believed “should be the one fighting for
their clients” (Prosecutor 4). The PAO lawyers, on the other hand, pass the responsibil-
ity to the Judges whom they believed “should monitor the length of case proceedings”
(PAO lawyer 5).
The lack of coordination is compounded by the justifications peddled by the court
actors in the delay of the cases. These justifications are informally shared among the
court actors. Taken together, these justifications hint of a prevailing court culture
(Church et al., 1978; Eisenstein et al., 1988). Here are some instructive narratives that
capture the essence of their experiences:
Sometimes, I ask for postponements, I purposely delay the case a bit. It is better that way.
Inmates can serve their time in jail. When they are convicted early, they are transferred to
Bilibid [National Prison], which is farther away. It is harder for their families and visitors
to go see them. So, I let the process grind slowly… Sometimes, if it has taken that long,
the judge will act favorably in our case. The judges realize that the inmates had already
languished in jail and then it is easier to plead guilty and be given a lesser penalty. (PAO
lawyer 10 in a “challenged” court)
You cannot just dismiss non-bailable offenses. Even if the inmates had stayed in jail for
long, you let the prosecutors present first. It is a process; we need to decide cases based
on evidence. What is 10 years of stay if they are convicted of murder with a life sentence
anyway? (Judge 2 in a “challenged” court)
From these narratives, one can discern the court actors’ shared belief in how cases
are to be disposed (Church et al., 1978). The courts develop a workgroup culture
(Eisenstein et al., 1988) that utilizes concepts such as “due process” as a pretext to
delay the case proceedings. The delay of cases is deliberate to “generate leverage
when they bargain for a lesser offense,” “to evade serving time in the national prison
Narag 17
Table 4. Length of Stay and Other Relevant Information by Jail.
Number Percentage Percentage Average

Number Ideal jail of inmates congestion of detainees length of stay
of Jail Type of jail capacity in jail rate overstaying (days)
1 Male only 263 607 130.8 10 417.1
2 Male only 1,150 3,481 202.7 19 463.1
3 Male only 41 557 1,259.0 16 447.4
4 Female only 22 174 690.9 23 683.0
5 Female only 27 607 2,148.0 29 750.8
6 Male only 261 3,489 1,237.0 23 581.7
Total 1,764 8,915 405.0 20 529.0
and serve the sentence in the jail instead,” and “to buy time so complainants will lose
interest, won’t show up, and the case can be dismissed” (FGD among PAO lawyers).
Accordingly, “speedy trial means speedy conviction” (PAO lawyer 8), and it should be
avoided as much as possible. In addition, some research participants believe that
judges delay their cases to avoid being assigned new cases, as the “reward for a good
work is more work” (Court Staff 1). Finally, private lawyers, who are paid per court
appearance, “continually ask for postponements as this provides them steady income”
(Private lawyer 1). These narratives are prominent among actors in the “challenged”
courts where judges are known to be lenient in granting postponements and accepting
guilty pleas after the inmates had served their sentences. While majority of the court
actors abhor these practices, they admit, “these informal practices tarnish the image of
the law profession and go unabated” (FGD among prosecutors).
Jail-level variations. The third step in the analysis is to group inmates according to jail
assignment and to determine whether there is a variation in the average length of stay
of inmates per jail (See Table 4). The number of inmates and the level of congestion
vary among the six jails. Two jails (Jail 2 and Jail 6) have an inmate population of
more than 3,000 inmates, and the rest have less than a thousand inmates. All six jails
are full to the brim, however, Jail 5 stood out as the most congested with a rate of
2,148% over-congestion.
In terms of length of stay, the most “speedy” jail is Jail 1, which recorded an aver-
age length of stay of 417 days, and only 10% of its inmates deemed overstaying. The
most challenged jail is Jail 5, which recorded an average of 751 days and 29% of its
inmates deemed overstaying. Note that both Jails 1 and 5 have 607 inmates. These
suggest that there could be jail-level organizational and cultural practices that may be
related to the stay of inmates in jail.
To probe this finding, jail officers from the “speedy” and “challenged” jails were
interviewed. Similar to the analyses done with the court actors, experiences of the jail
officers were compared and contrasted. Here are some interesting remarks that capture
the essence of a “speedy” jail:
In this jail, we identify inmates who had been overstaying, and we let the judges,
prosecutors, and PAO lawyers know that their cases had been ‘sleeping.’ Sometimes, they
get mad at us; we make them look inefficient. But that is what our data says. We give
them notices every month, prodding them to take action. Eventually, they give priority to
the delayed cases. (Jail personnel 1 in a “speedy” jail)
The relationship with the Executive Judge, Chief Prosecutor, and Chief PAO is good. We
conduct regular interagency meetings where we discuss the cases of overstaying inmates. We
monitor the inmates’ length of stay. The courts prioritize their hearings. We identify the
backlog and the choke points. We continually ask for feedback. (Jail Warden in “speedy” jail)
For these jail officers, the essence of speedy case disposition for detained inmates
is active involvement, that is, jail officials should actively involve in the workings of
the criminal justice system. Referring back to the sensitizing concepts, these narratives
hint to the importance of tight coupling in the disposition of cases. In jails where there
is constant communication between the warden and the court actors, lengthy detainees
(3 years or more) are identified, their cases are reviewed, and are instantly acted upon.
They designed a mechanism were information is shared and transferred from office to
office. They view their work similar to a factory (Packer, 1964) where “the more cases
disposed, the better” (Jail officer 3).
In comparison, here are some narratives from the “challenged” jails:
The judges in this city are hard to approach. They look at jail guards as if we are inmates.
They are intimidating. They don’t pay attention to our requests. We had been requesting
a meeting with them; we continually request them to visit the jail so they will know the
situation. They won’t. (Jail personnel 5 in a “challenged” jail)
The judges in this city are independent. They consider their courts as their own fiefdoms.
You cannot barge in and say “you the need to work fast.” That is the same thing with
prosecutors and the PAO. We try our best to inform them that our inmates had languished
in jail for so long but they say that “they have their own procedures to follow.” They
instead tell us, “do not rush us. Or else, the clients will be convicted.” (Jail Warden in a
“challenged” jail)
These narratives capture the “dismal relationship between the jail officers and the
court actors” (Jail warden in a “challenged” jail). They felt that court actors have a
condescending view of the jail guards, which serve as barrier in their efforts to coordi-
nate case processing. As one jail officer lamented, “due to perceptions that we are
poorly trained, court actors do not entertain our suggestions.” Officers from jails who
report these kinds of sentiments have difficulty prioritizing their delayed cases, which
translates to lengthy detention of inmates in their jails.
Summary and Discussion

This research explores the factors related to prolonged trial of detained defendants, a
key phenomenon faced in many countries all over the world. The Philippines is one of
Narag 19
the countries facing this challenge, as 50% of the inmates in this study had stayed in
jail longer than 9 months while undergoing trial. In addition, 25% of the inmates in
this study had stayed in jail for more than 2 years, indicating a serious flaw in the
Philippine administration of justice. Guided by this initial finding, this research inves-
tigated whether there are individual, court, and jail-level factors that contribute to the
delay of cases for detained inmates.
At the individual level, the results echo some of the findings in the literature.
Inmates charged with serious offenses, such as violent and drug offenses, stay longer
in jail compared with nonviolent and nondrug offenders. This suggests that court
actors may view these inmates as the more dangerous (Goldkamp, 1985), thus signify-
ing the need to lock them up while undergoing trial. Indeed, inmates charged with drug
or violent offenses are more likely to be denied bail (or with bail amounts that they
cannot produce), and majority of them reported that they are “punished without even
being found guilty.” They felt court actors are utilizing the process as a pretext to lock
them up. Court actors echo these inmate sentiments and they suggest that an “informal
punishment” had developed where they can punish offenders through pretrial deten-
tion (FGD among Prosecutors). This happens as they are frustrated with the ineffi-
ciency of the police in building up cases and where they dismiss majority of the cases,
even if they believe that offenders are factually guilty (Packer, 1964). A judge admit-
ted that “we let these types of inmates (drug and violent offenders) suffer first, then we
let them go eventually” (Judge 3). These findings echo some of the more recent
research findings in the United States that document the punitive use of the criminal
justice process.13 Vîlcică (2012) documented court practices in Philadelphia where
prosecutors continue to prosecute cases in court despite high chance of dismissal to
generate leverage. In another study, Vîlcică (2016) documented parole board practices
in Pennsylvania of denying parole to eligible inmates in their initial applications order
to prolong their stay in prison. This informal punishment practices translate to their
prolonged detention.
At the court level, judges who develop strong coordination between prosecutors,
lawyers, police officers, and jail wardens are more likely to have speedy disposition of
cases. Judges who articulate their goals of speedy disposition, who remind court actors
on the provisions of the Speedy Trial Law, who use their leadership positions to prod
prosecutors and PAO lawyers to action and avoid leniency, and who practice their
discretion in dismissing cases that are long overdue, are more likely to be efficient.
These judges also control and regularized their process for setting early and firm trial
dates (Church et al., 1978). They subscribe to the orienting value of crime control
(Packer, 1964), where they give primacy to the speed and finality of case dispositions.
These judges develop a workgroup culture (Eisenstein et al., 1988) that emphasizes
efficiency, sharing of information, and regular communication. As one judge said, “it
all depends on the judges, if you let these people run around, they will run around. You
will not accomplish anything. But not in my court, they will need to be a team player;
they need to pay attention to our collective effort.”
On the other hand, judges who defer to the “independence” and “autonomy” of
prosecutors and PAO lawyers are more likely to have courts with delayed disposition
of cases and prolonged detention. Judges who allow prosecutors and PAO lawyers to
continually ask for postponements and continuances of hearings, on the pretext that
“they are developing their cases,” are likely to be delayed. This does not mean that
judges should not recognize the independence and autonomy of these co-equal institu-
tions. However, in the Philippine cultural context, “independence” and “autonomy”
had become the basis of some organizations to shield themselves from accountability.
Judges who condone these practices have inmates who have suffered 10 years of
imprisonment yet are still unconvicted. Even if confronted with the information that a
case had been delayed and have violated the provisions of the Speedy Trial Law, they
felt powerless over the other court actors. They simply allow prosecutors and lawyers
to liberally draw from the exclusions allowed by the Speedy Trial Law.14 As one judge
lamented, “we cannot do anything. We are not the one in charged with the appointment
and promotion of these prosecutors and PAO lawyers. We work with whoever is
assigned to our courts. We just hope that they come as professional workers and be
dedicated. Otherwise, they are independent and we cannot correct them” (Judge 5).
Similar themes emerged in the jail-level analysis. Jail wardens who reported to have
access to the judges, prosecutors, and PAO lawyers are more likely to have speedy
disposition of cases for their inmates. Jail wardens who actively prepare a list of over-
staying inmates, and whose lists are acted on, are more likely to have inmates whose
cases are processed swiftly and judiciously. This, in turn, translates to the early release
of inmates and the reduction of jail crowding. As one jail officer summarized, “If the
criminal justice system works as a team, no inmate will be delayed. We just need to
communicate, meet regularly, and state the same goals. We hold a key information
which they do not have (the length of stay of inmates), they should listen to us.”
Taking the views of inmates, court actors, and jail officers together, an overall
essence of the phenomenon (Creswell, 2007) emerges, which correspond to an organi-
zational-cultural perspective in understanding the causes of prolonged trial of detained
defendants in the Philippines. In essence, judges play a central role in developing the
organizational capacity and culture of the actors in their courts. At the organizational
level, if judges learn how to articulate their goals, coordinate the actions of the differ-
ent players, set the rules and reprimand the violators, and other mechanisms to tightly
couple the system, then they can develop a firm hand in the case processing (Church
et al., 1978). Prosecutors and lawyers take a cue from the pronouncements and actions
of judges and they will be socialized accordingly. For example, if judges will not toler-
ate postponement of hearings on flimsy grounds, or if they do not allow prosecutors
and defense lawyers to abuse “due process” as pretext to delay the case, then these
court actors will come to the hearings prepared. These organizational initiatives will
shape the cultural narratives in the courtroom workgroup. At the cultural level, the
court actors will develop a shared workgroup culture that emphasizes efficiency, speed
and finality in the disposition of cases. They will also draw from the helpful provisions
of the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 to hold each other accountable. They will utilize
“crime control” narratives that justify fast-tracking of the pace of litigation.
On the flipside, judges who do not possess these coordinative skills, who fail to
articulate their goals, who do not set rules, and who let the actors be “independent” and
Narag 21
“autonomous” in their actions, are likely to lose the handle in case proceedings.
Prosecutors and lawyers take advantage of the organizational inefficiency and may be
emboldened to utilize different “justifications” (Swidler, 1986) to further delay the
cases. As shown from the narratives, they may utilize legal tenets such as “due pro-
cess” to purposefully delay the case. They can also hide on their organizational inde-
pendence and autonomy from the courts when judges try to audit their performance. In
the guise of “professional courtesy” (Church et al., 1978, p. 42), they utilize exclusions
allowed in the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 to justify postponement of hearings, similar to
the conclusions drawn by Feeley (1983) on how U.S. court actors circumvent the U.S.
Speedy Trial Law. Although the initial justifications utilized by judges, prosecutors,
and lawyers to delay the case may seem to contradict each other, in the long run, these
court actors develop a shared workgroup culture that tolerates leniency, nonaccount-
ability, and passing of responsibility.
Limitations and Theoretical and Policy Implications

This study has a number of limitations. First, it is based on a cross-sectional data of
inmates currently under detention. As such, the length of stay of the inmates is a con-
servative estimate as inmates are likely to stay longer until their cases are terminated.
Ideally, inmates should be monitored from the date of arrest until date of case disposi-
tion to determine the actual length of stay of the inmates. These data are currently
collected and will be utilized in succeeding research. Second, some variables of inter-
est such as socioeconomic status, membership in minority groups, and prior convic-
tions or arrests, which are significant correlates of pretrial detention, as documented in
the literature, are not available in the dataset. These pieces of information are also
being collected and will be utilized in succeeding analyses. Third, the purposive selec-
tion of atypical cases (overstaying inmates, and actors from “speedy” and “challenged”
courts and jails) limits the cross-sample generalizability of the findings. Fourth, the
findings from this study may not be generalizable to other courts and jails in the
Philippines. The six jails in this study all emanated from highly urbanized cities and
were chosen due to their considerable problems of overcrowding. Thus, there could be
individual, court, and jail-level practices that are unique to these overcrowded jails
located in the urban centers. This research needs to be replicated to other regional
areas of the Philippines and determine whether rural location, jail population size, and
level of crowding is related to length of stay of inmates. Further studies must also test
the emerging findings from this research using random sample of inmates, jail officers,
and court actors.
In the context of these limitations, this research provides meaningful insights. It
provides empirical evidence using a large data set on the magnitude and extent of the
prolonged trial of detained inmates in the Philippines. Using a phenomenological per-
spective, this research complements the emotive reports on prolonged detention as
documented by journalists and activists (Conde, 2016; Macaraig, 2016). In addition,
this research provides exploratory insights on the individual, court, and jail-level fac-
tors that led to the delay of cases of detained defendants, which had been neglected in
most studies. It suggests that Western criminal justice theorizing that explain tradi-
tional outcomes (Hagan, 1989) can be utilized as sensitizing concepts (Bowen, 2006)
to explain case delay in the Philippines. Specifically, there are organizational and cul-
tural dynamics that impinge on the behaviors of the court actors and jail officers that
translate to prolonged trial of detained defendants.
Based on these findings, this article suggests the following theory-based recom-
mendations to speed up the dispositions of cases. First, court actors must learn skills
on how to tightly couple the systems. Judges must undergo training on case flow man-
agement so they can be apprised of the efficient scheduling of the calendar of hearings.
The practices of the “speedy” courts (such as sending of text messages prior to a hear-
ing) and “speedy” jails (preparing a list of overstaying inmates) may be documented
and shared as “best practices” to other actors. In addition, an inter-agency body com-
posed of the judges, prosecutors, PAO lawyers, and jail officers must be established in
each city jurisdiction where they can monitor, evaluate, and take instant actions on
cases that are in excess of the thresholds set in the Speedy Trial Law of 1998. The court
actors may also utilize the current jail population and crowding data as basis to release
inmates, set continuous trials, and other mechanisms of relief.
Second, court actors must overcome the ingrained culture of purposeful delay
of cases. Majority of the research participants admit that delay of cases is a toolkit
(Swidler, 1986) to negotiate a plea bargain, to generate income, to informally
punish, to evade sentence in the national prison, and a host of other extra-legal
purposes. Worse, they use pretext such as “due process,” “independence” and
“autonomy” as cognitive justifications of their behavior. This ingrained culture
can be remedied through repeated exposure (Akers, 2011) in ethical trainings that
highlights the substantive meaning of due process, which can be integrated with
the annual Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) required by the
Philippine Supreme Court to all practicing lawyers. It must be emphasized that
reducing case delay for detained inmates does not imply railroading the procedure
and sacrificing the substantive due process rights of the accused. Court actors can
still observe due process while disposing cases expeditiously. This research sim-
ply highlights the abhorrent practice among court actors of utilizing “due process”
narratives as justifications for case delay.
In addition, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), which has administrative
supervision of all the courts in the Philippines, should monitor the compliance of the
courts on the speedy disposition of cases. Newly installed judges who inherited case
backlogs must be provided with additional court staff so they can immediately address
the backlogs. However, veteran judges who continually fail to act on aging cases, as
manifested by the prevalence of overstaying inmates, must be made to explain the
causes of delay. The OCA may also utilize length of stay of inmates in jail as one of
the indicators in the evaluation of their performance and tie this with the merit-based
promotion system. In cases where inmates had already languished in jail for 6 years or
more (twice the length of the baseline standard set in the Speedy Trial Law) but are
still ongoing trial, the OCA may consider imposing disciplinary sanctions against
these courts as these are clear manifestations of neglect.
Narag 23
Finally, these efforts should be implemented with urgency. As currently depicted in

the popular media, the lengthy trial process of detained inmates is seen as one of the
manifestations of a broken justice system. This has led to feelings of procedural injus-
tice (Tyler, 1994) where inmates felt they are punished by the trial process. Coupled
with low conviction rates, the Filipino people have become legally cynical (Sampson
& Bartusch, 1998) and have developed a deep-seated disdain to the administration of
justice and the rule of law (Taub, 2016). This has led to popular notions that citizens
must take matters in their own hands as demonstrated by the public support to Extra
Judicial Killings (Iyengar, 2016). Efficient, professionalized, and tightly coupled
agencies of the criminal justice system may overturn this tide.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship,
and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of
this article.
Notes
1. This impression came from a panel of researchers presenting their papers on Pretrial Processing
and the Right to Bail in the annual conference of the American Society of Criminology (Panel
Discussion 1085) in New Orleans, Louisiana, USA, on November 18, 2016.
2. As pointed out by the reviewers, one line of inquiry pertains to the pace of litigation in
trial courts. One study has examined court delays in felony cases (Goerdt et al., 1989). The
study finds that majority of the court jurisdictions terminate their felony cases within 1 year
after arrest. Church and colleagues (1978) also found variations in the pace of litigation in
civil and criminal courts in 21 jurisdictions. Indeed, there is an overlap between case delay
and pretrial detention. However, since these studies utilized court data, the information
presented pertains to the length of trial for all defendants (who were either on bail or in
detention). The length of stay in jail of defendants who were denied bail and/or cannot post
bail while undergoing trial cannot be ascertained from these studies. This present research
focuses on case delay for accused who are detained.
3. Admittedly, these articles are much more nuanced than the manner in which they are
presented here. This article selectively borrowed concepts that were most helpful in the
analyses.
4. Two of the jails were located in the same city jurisdiction.
5. This is a conservative estimate for two reasons: First, inmates stay in police precincts after
arrest for a couple of weeks before being transferred to the jails. Second, inmates can still
stay in jail even after the cut-off date as their cases are still undergoing. Ideally, the date of
arrest and date of case disposition are the information needed in determining length of stay.
However, these pieces of information will need a longitudinal data. Succeeding research
will incorporate this information when they are collected. Still, there is a wide variation in
the length of stay up until the cut-off date among the inmates that warranted this current
investigation.
6. As correctly pointed by the reviewers, “pretrial detention time” and “adjudication/case dis-
position time” are two different concepts but are used interchangeably in this article. Since
this is a jail data, all the study subjects are detained. These subjects are either denied bail
or were not able to post bail. They stay in jail until such time they are convicted, acquitted,
dismissed, or posted bail. Preliminary analysis shows that only a few defendants (12%) are
eventually able to post bail after staying in jail. In addition, inmates who eventually posted
bail had stayed in jail for an average period of 170 days.
7. A multivariate analysis was also conducted where the variables serve as statistical controls
for the other variables. The results are the same. However, some of the jails did not report
all the variables in the analysis reducing the N to 3,754 cases.
8. However, considering that inmates with bailable offenses should not have been in jail if
only they had the money to post bail or if alternatives to pretrial detention were available,
this is a key finding in itself. In the four jails that provided data, there are 2,372 inmates
whose cases are bailable but were not able to post bail. These inmates had stayed in jail for
an average of 441 days, (1 year and 2 months), which cost the Philippine government at
least PhP172 million. This computation is based on the BJMP budget of PhP60 thousand
(US$1,200.00) per year per inmate.
9. All names are fictitious.
10. The reviewers pointed out that this may be a complaint against the adversarial “process”
and not on “due process,” which is a very valid point. The author checked and re-read the
narratives. It appears that the participants were referring to the due process rights (right to
trial and be heard), which, ironically, translates to more court hearings and more time in
detention.
11. In the Philippines, Trial Courts (RTC and MTC) try both criminal and civil cases. Some
courts may be assigned heavily with criminal cases and others with civil cases. As such,
courts with few criminal cases may be assigned with more civil cases. To account for this
disparity in case assignment, additional analyses were conducted only to courts with more
than 50 clients under detention, as they are the criminal-case-heavy assigned courts.
12. This is a temporary label and was utilized for a lack of a better term. In addition, the term
challenged courts does not automatically mean that the judges in those courts are inefficient.
Some judges may have recently assumed judgeship over the courts. The “challenged” court
is also utilized to indicate that these courts may need assistance or supervision, depending
on the cause of their delay.
13. The author would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for directing them toward this
area of inquiry.
14. One of the commonly utilized exclusion is set forth in Sec 10 (3) delay resulting from
interlocutory appeals.
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Article in International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology · October 2017

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1Southern Illinois University, Carbondale, IL, USA

Sensitizing Concepts in Relation to Lengthy Case Proceedings

study, actors’ subscription to either of these values may be utilized as “pretext”

Data and Method

faithful to the phenomenon (Creswell, 2007). It is an attempt to approach a lived expe-

Table 1. Frequency distribution by Court Type and Overstaying Inmates.

Court type No Yes Total

Note. MTC = Metropolitan Trial Courts; RTC = Regional Trial Courts.

Table 2. Mean Comparison of Length of Stay on Key Variables.

M (number M difference Percentage

Figure 2. Length of stay in jail per court.

245 460 0.32 147 821 2 years 2 months 30 days

Table 4. Length of Stay and Other Relevant Information by Jail.

Number Percentage Percentage Average

Summary and Discussion

Limitations and Theoretical and Policy Implications

Finally, these efforts should be implemented with urgency. As currently depicted in

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

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