FACTS: Rebecca C. Young was similarly rejected by the trial court on the The Defendant Philippine Holding, Inc. following grounds: (1) that she was is the former owner of a piece of land located at Soler St., Sta. Cruz, Manila, not a party in the Civil Case No. and a two storey building erected 123883, wherein subject compromise thereon, consisting of six units. agreement was submitted and approved by the trial court apart from The owner Philippine Holding, Inc. the fact that she did not even affix her secured an order from the City signature to the said compromise Engineer of Manila to demolish the agreement; (2) that Rebecca Young building. Antonio Young, then a tenant of said Unit 1352, filed an action to had failed to present any evidence to annul the City Engineer's demolition show that she had demanded from the As an incident in said case, the parties defendants-owners, observance of her submitted a Compromise Agreement right of first refusal before the said to the Court. owners sold units 1356, 1358 and Paragraph 3 of said agreement 1360; (3) that even assuming that her provides that plaintiff (Antonio S. Young) and Rebecca Young and all supposed right of first refusal is a persons claiming rights under them stipulation for the benefit of a third bind themselves to voluntarily and person, she did not inform the obligor peacefully vacate the premises which of her acceptance as required by the they were occupying as lessees which second paragraph of Article 1311 of are the subject of the condemnation the Civil Code. and demolition order and to surrender possession. Chui Wan and Felisa Tan Yu and Rebecca C. Young, assisted by her A case was filed to the RTC and Young husband, appealed to the Court of contended that even assuming that her supposed right of first refusal is a Appeals which dismissed the same on stipulation for the benefit of a third August 7, 1987, for lack of merit. person, she did not inform the obligor of her acceptance as required by the second paragraph of Article 1311 of the Civil Code. ISSUE: Whether or not Rebecca they be allowed to exercise her right Young can enforce the stipulation in of first refusal to purchase subject her favor in the compromise property (Rollo, p. 50). agreement as she is not a party therein? The lower court decided in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiffs, thus dismissing the complaint together RULING: The stipulation that young printed name, nor on the left margin gave may be a stipulation pour autrui of each and every page thereof. but it is unrebutted that she did not communicate her acceptance whether The requisites of a stipulation pour expressly or impliedly. autrui or a stipulation in favor of a third person are the following: (1) This issue has already been squarely there mus tbe a stipulation in favor of settled by this Court in the negative a third person (2) the stipulation must in J.M. Tuason& Co., Inc. v. be a part, not the whole of the Cadampog (7 SCRA 808 [1963])where contract (3) the contracting parties must have clearly and deliberately it was ruled that appellant is not conferred a favor upon a third person, entitled to enforce a compromise not a mere incidental benefit or agreement to which he was not a interest (4) the third person must party and that as to its effect and have communicated his acceptance to scope, it has been determined in the the obligor before its revocation. (5) sense that its effectivity if at all, is neither of the contracting parties bears the legal representation or limited to the parties thereto and authorization of the third party. those mentioned in the exhibits (J.M. Tuason& Co., Inc. v. Aguirre, 7 SCRA The argument is pointless, considering 112 [1963]). It was reiterated later that the sale of subject property to that a compromise agreement cannot some other person or entity bind persons who are not parties constitutes in effect a revocation of thereto. the grant of the right of first refusal to Rebecca C. Young.155. Associated From the terms of this agreement, the Bank vs CA (GR 123793 June 29, conditions are very clear, such as: (1) 1998). that Rebecca C. Young shall be impleaded in the action and (2) that she shall signify her written conformity thereto.
For unknown reasons, the above
conditions were not complied with. The parties did not make any move to implead Rebecca as necessary party in the case. Neither did her written conformity appear in said agreement. While there is the printed name of Rebecca C. Young appearing at the end of the joint motion for approval of the Compromise Agreement, she did not affix her signature above her