BASIC LEGAL ETHICS (CASE DIGESTS) The law is an encroachment on the Court’s primary prerogative to
determine who may be admitted to practice of law and, therefore, in
1. In re: Cunanan
FACTS:
Congress passed Rep. Act No. 972, or what is known as the Bar
Flunkers Act, in 1952. The title of the law was, “An Act to Fix the
Passing Marks for Bar Examinations from 1946 up to and including
1955.”
Section 1 provided the following passing marks:
1946-1951………………70%
1952 …………………….71%
1953……………………..72%
1954……………………..73%
1955……………………..74%
Provided however, that the examinee shall have no grade lower than
50%.
Section 2 of the Act provided that “A bar candidate who obtained a
grade of 75% in any subject shall be deemed to have already passed
that subject and the grade/grades shall be included in the
computation of the general average in subsequent bar
examinations.”
ISSUE:
Whether of not, R.A. No. 972 is constitutional.
RULING:
Section 2 was declared unconstitutional due to the fatal defect of not
being embraced in the title of the Act. As per its title, the Act should
affect only the bar flunkers of 1946 to 1955 Bar examinations.
Section2 establishes a permanent system for an indefinite time. It
was also struck down for allowing partial passing, thus failing to take
account of the fact that laws and jurisprudence are not stationary.
As to Section1, the portion for 1946-1951 was declared
unconstitutional, while that for 1953 to 1955 was declared in force
and effect. The portion that was stricken down was based under the
following reasons:
The law itself admits that the candidates for admission who flunked
the bar from 1946 to 1952 had inadequate preparation due to the
fact that this was very close to the end of World War II;
The law is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of the court
on the petitions of the said candidates;
excess of legislative power to repeal, alter and supplement the Rules
of Court. The rules laid down by Congress under this power are only
minimum norms, not designed to substitute the judgment of the court
on who can practice law; and
The pretended classification is arbitrary and amounts to class
legislation.
As to the portion declared in force and effect, the Court could not
muster enough votes to declare it void. Moreover, the law was
passed in 1952, to take effect in 1953. Hence, it will not revoke
existing Supreme Court resolutions denying admission to the bar of
an petitioner. The same may also rationally fall within the power to
Congress to alter, supplement or modify rules of admission to the
practice of law.
2. In the matter of Haron S. Meling
IN THE MATTER OF THE DISQUALIFICATION OF BAR
EXAMINEE HARON S. MELING IN THE 2002 BAR
EXAMINATIONS AND FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AS MEMBER
OF THE PHILIPPINE SHARI’A BAR,
ATTY. FROILAN R. MELENDREZ, petitioner,
B.M. No. 1154. June 8, 2004
Facts:
On October 14, 2002, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez (Melendrez) filed
with the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) a Petition to disqualify
Haron S. Meling (Meling) from taking the 2002 Bar Examinations and
to impose on him the appropriate disciplinary penalty as a member of
the Philippine Shari’a Bar.
In the Petition, Melendrez alleges that Meling did not disclose in his
Petition to take the 2002 Bar Examinations that he has three (3)
pending criminal cases before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC), Cotabato City, namely: Criminal Cases Noa. 15685 and
15686, both for Grave Oral Defamation, and Criminal Case
No. 15687 for Less Serious Physical Injuries.
The above-mentioned cases arose from an incident which occurred
on May 21, 2001, when Meling allegedly uttered defamatory words
against Melendrez and his wife in front of media practitioners and
other people. Meling also purportedly attacked and hit the face of
Melendrez’ wife causing the injuries to the latter.
Furthermore, Melendrez alleges that Meling has been using the title
“Attorney” in his communications, as Secretary to the Mayor of
Cotabato City, despite the fact that he is not a member of the Bar.
Attached to the Petition is an indorsement letter which shows that
Meling used the appellation and appears on its face to have been
received by the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cotabato City on
November 27, 2001.
Pursuant to this Court’s Resolution dated December 3, 2002, Meling
filed his Answer with the OBC.
In his Answer, Meling explains that he did not disclose the criminal
cases filed against him by Melendrez because retired Judge Corocoy
Moson, their former professor, advised him to settle his
misunderstanding with Melendrez. Believing in good faith that the
case would be settled because the said Judge has moral
ascendancy over them, he being their former professor in the
College of Law, Meling considered the three cases that actually
arose from a single incident and involving the same parties as
“closed and terminated.” Moreover, Meling denies the charges and
adds that the acts complained of do not involve moral turpitude.
As regards the use of the title “Attorney,” Meling admits that some of
his communications really contained the word “Attorney” as they
were, according to him, typed by the office clerk.
In its Report and Recommendation dated December 8, 2003, the
OBC disposed of the charge of non-disclosure against Meling in this
wise:
The reasons of Meling in not disclosing the criminal cases filed
against him in his petition to take the Bar Examinations are
ludicrous. He should have known that only the court of competent
jurisdiction can dismiss cases, not a retired judge nor a law
professor. In fact, the cases filed against Meling are still
pending. Furthermore, granting arguendo that these cases were
already dismissed, he is still required to disclose the same for the
Court to ascertain his good moral character. Petitions to take the Bar
Examinations are made under oath, and should not be taken lightly
by an applicant.
Issue: WON the imposition of appropriate sanctions upon Haron S.
Meling is proper and shall subsequently barred him from taking his
lawyer’s oath and signing on the Roll of Attorneys
Held:
The Petition is GRANTED insofar as it seeks the imposition of
appropriate sanctions upon Haron S. Meling as a member of the
Philippine Shari’a Bar. Accordingly, the membership of Haron S.
Meling in the Philippine Shari’a Bar is hereby SUSPENDED until
further orders from the Court, the suspension to take effect
immediately. Insofar as the Petition seeks to prevent Haron S. Meling
from taking the Lawyer’s Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys as a
member of the Philippine Bar, the same is DISMISSED for having
become moot and academic.
Rationale:
Practice of law, whether under the regular or the Shari’a Court, is not
a matter of right but merely a privilege bestowed upon individuals
who are not only learned in the law but who are also known to
possess good moral character. The requirement of good moral
character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the
practice of law, its continued possession is also essential for
remaining in the practice of law.
The disclosure requirement is imposed by the Court to determine
whether there is satisfactory evidence of good moral character of the
applicant. The nature of whatever cases are pending against the
applicant would aid the Court in determining whether he is endowed
with the moral fitness demanded of a lawyer. By concealing the
existence of such cases, the applicant then flunks the test of fitness
even if the cases are ultimately proven to be unwarranted or
insufficient to impugn or affect the good moral character of the
applicant.
3. Pentecostes vs. Marasigan
ROLLY PENTECOSTES v. ATTY. HERMENEGILDO
529 SCRA 146 (2007)
The clerk of court has the duty to safely keep all records, papers,
files, exhibits and public property.
Atty. Hermenegildo Marasigan, Clerk of Court VI of the Office of the
Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court North Cotabato, was
administratively charged with grave misconduct and conduct
unbecoming a public officer for the loss of a motorcycle-subject
matter of a criminal case which was placed under his care and
custody.
The administrative case against Atty. Hermenegildo stemmed from a
sworn affidavit complaint filed on November 11, 2004 by Rolly
Pentecostes, the owner of a Kawasaki motorcycle, which was
recovered by members of the Philippine National Police of M’lang,
North Cotabato from suspected carnappers.
The release order for the motorcycle was issued but Pentecostes
refused to receive it because it was already ―cannibalized‖ and
unserviceable.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) referred the case to the Executive
Judge of RTC, Kabacan, North Cotabato, for investigation, report
and recommendation. Judge Rabang recommended that the
administrative complaint against Atty. Hermenegildo be dismissed
because there was no proof of Pentecostes’ claim that the vehicle
was ―cannibalized‖ from the time that it was under Atty.
Hermenegildo’s custody until its transfer to Philippine National Police
(PNP) of Kabacan. The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
affirmed the dismissal of the complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Atty. Hermenegildo is guilty of misconduct
HELD: It is the duty of the clerk of court to keep safely all records,
papers, files, exhibits and public property committed to his
charge.[12] Section D (4), Chapter VII of the 1991 Manual For Clerks
of Court (now Section E[2], paragraph 2.2.3, Chapter VI of the 2002
Revised Manual for Clerks of Court) which provides all exhibits used
as evidence and turned over to the court and before the case/s
involving such evidence shall have been terminated shall be under
the custody and safekeeping of the Clerk of Court.
From the above provisions, it is clear that as clerk of court of the
RTC, Kabacan, Atty. Hermenegildo was charged with the custody
and safekeeping of Pentecostes’ motorcycle, and to keep it until the
termination of the case, barring circumstances that would justify its
safekeeping elsewhere, and upon the prior authority of the trial court.
The Court said ―no explanation was offered by Atty. Hermenegildo,
however, for turning over the motorcycle. But whatever the reason
was, Atty. Hermenegildo was mandated to secure prior consultations
with and approval of the trial court.‖
Moreover disconcerting is the fact that the acknowledgment receipt
evidencing the turnover of the motorcycle from the trial court to the
Kabacan police station was lost from the records, with nary a lead as
to who was responsible for it. These circumstance are viewed with
disfavor as it reflects badly on the safekeeping of court records, a
duty entrusted to Atty. Hermenegildo as clerk of court.
The Court has repeatedly emphasized that clerks of court are
essential and ranking officers of our judicial system who perform
delicate functions vital to the prompt and proper administration of
justice. Their duties include the efficient recording, filing and
management of court records and, as previously pointed out, the
safekeeping of exhibits and public property committed to their
charge.
4. Aquino vs. Pascua
FATHER RANHILIO AQUINO et al V ATTY EDWIN PASCUA
A.C. No. 5095, November 28, 2007
FACTS:
Father Ranhilio Aquino, as the Academic head of the Philippine
Judiciary Academy, together with other complainants filed a
letter-complaint against Attorney Edwin Pascua, a Notary Public
for violation of the Notarial Practice Law. In his letter-complaint,
Father Aquino alleged that Atty. Pascua falsified two notarized
documents in which he filed with the Civil Service Commission.
Atty. Pascua admitted having notarized the two documents, but
they were not entered in his Notarial Register due to the
oversight of his legal secretary. The case was referred to the
Office of the Bar Confidant for investigation, report and
recommendation. The Office of the Bar Confidant found that Fr.
Ranhilio and the other complainants are, therefore, correct in
maintaining that Atty. Pascua falsely assigned fictitious numbers
to the questioned affidavit-complaints, a clear dishonesty on his
part not only as a Notary Public, but also as a member of the
Bar.
5. RODOLFO M. BERNARDO v ATTY. ISMAEL F. MEJIA Adm.
ISSUE:
WON Atty. Pascua is guilty of Misconduct in the performance of
his duties for failing to register in his Notarial Register the
affidavit-complaints.
HELD:
Yes. After a close review of the records of this case, the court
resolved to adopt the findings of facts and conclusion of law by
the Office of the Bar Confidant. They found that Atty. Pascua
guilty of misconduct in the performance of his duties for failing to
register in his Notarial Register the affidavit-complaints of Joseph
B. Acorda and Remigio B. Domingo. Misconduct generally
means wrongful, improper or unlawful conduct motivated by a
premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose. Atty. Pascua
claims that the omission was not intentional but due to oversight
of his staff. Whichever is the case, Atty. Pascua cannot escape
liability. His failure to enter into his notarial register the
documents that he admittedly notarized is a dereliction of duty on
his part as a notary public and he is bound by the acts of his
staff. Under the notarial law, the notary public shall enter in such
register, in chronological order, the nature of each instrument
executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before him, the person
executing, swearing to, or acknowledging the instrument. Failure
of the notary to make the proper entry or entries in his notarial
register touching his notarial acts in the manner required by law
is a ground for revocation of his commission. In the present
case, considering that this is Atty. Pascua’s first offense, court
believed that the imposition of a three-month suspension from
the practice of law upon him is in order. Likewise, since his
offense is a ground for revocation of notarial commission, the
same should also be imposed upon him.
DECISION:
WHEREFORE, Atty. Edwin Pascua is declared GUILTY of
misconduct and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
three (3) months with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of
the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely. His
notarial commission, if still existing, is ordered REVOKED.
Case No. 2984. August 31, 2007
FACTS:
Rodolfo M. Bernardo, Jr. accused his retained attorney, Ismael
F. Mejia of several administrative offenses such as
misappropriating and converting to his personal use the money
entrusted to him for payment of real estate taxes on Bernardo’s
property; falsification of documents such as the Special Power of
Attorney, Deed of Sale and Deed of Assignment and lastly,
issuing a check knowing that he was without funds in the bank,
in payment of a loan obtained from the former in the amount of
P50,000.00, and thereafter, replacing said check with others
known also to be insufficiently funded. The Supreme Court En
Banc rendered a Decision Per Curiam which found the
respondent Atty. Mejia guilty of all the charges against him and
imposed on him the penalty of Disbarment. Respondent files a
Petition praying that he be allowed to reengage in the practice of
 law however, the Supreme Court En Banc denied his petition for
reinstatement. The respondent filed again this present petition
for review of his Administrative case with a plea for reinstatement
in the practice of law. In the petition, Mejia acknowledged his
indiscretions in the law profession. At the age of seventy-one, he
is begging for forgiveness and pleading for reinstatement.
According to him, he has long repented and he has suffered
enough. Through his reinstatement, he wants to leave a legacy
to his children and redeem the indignity that they have suffered
due to his disbarment.
ISSUE:
WON the respondent shall be reinstated.
HELD:
The Court granted the respondent’s petition. Fifteen years has
passed since he was punished with the severe penalty of
disbarment. Although the Court does not lightly take the bases
for Mejias disbarment, it also cannot close its eyes to the fact
that Mejia is already of advanced years. Since his disbarment in
1992, no other transgression has been attributed to him, and he
has shown remorse. Thus, while the Court is ever mindful of its
duty to discipline its erring officers, it also knows how to show
compassion when the penalty imposed has already served its
purpose. After all, penalties, such as disbarment, are imposed
not to punish but to correct offenders. However, the petitioner is
reminded that practice of law is a privilege burdened with
conditions. Adherence to the rigid standards of mental fitness,
maintenance of the highest degree of morality and faithful
compliance with the rules of the legal profession are the
continuing requirements for enjoying the privilege to practice law.
DECISION:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for
reinstatement in the Roll of Attorneys by Ismael F. Mejia is
hereby GRANTED.
Bernardo, Jr. vs. Mejia, 211 SCRA 852 , July 29, 1992
Attorneys; An attorney who appropriated money entrusted by his
client, and who falsely gave assurances that he used the money for
the purposes intended, and who issued bad checks to re-pay them is
ordered debarred.—A thoroughgoing review of the affidavits,
pleadings and other papers filed by the parties convinces this Court
of the correctness of the foregoing conclusions of the IBP Board of
Governors. They are consequently hereby adopted and approved.
WHEREFORE, the Court DECLARES the respondent, Atty. Ismael
F. Mejia, guilty of all the charges against him and hereby imposes on
him the penalty of DISBARMENT. Pending finality of this judgment,
and effective immediately, Atty. Ismael F. Mejia is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law. Let a copy of this Decision be
spread in his record in the Bar Confidant’s Office, and notice thereof
furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, as well as the Court
Administrator who is DIRECTED to inform all the Courts concerned
of this Decision
6. Velez vs. De Vera
VELEZ V ATTY DE VERA
A.C. No. 6697, July 25, 2006
FACTS:
This case involves three consolidated cases revolving around
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Governor and Executive Vice-
President (EVP) Atty. Leonard de Vera. The first pertains to a
disbarment case questioning Atty. de Veras moral fitness to remain
as a member of the Philippine Bar, the second refers to Atty. de
Veras letter-request to schedule his oath taking as IBP National
President, and the third case concerns the validity of his removal as
Governor and EVP of the IBP by the IBP Board. The complainant
Zoilo Antonio Velez moved for the suspension and/or disbarment of
respondent Atty. Leonard de Vera based on the following grounds: 1)
respondents alleged misrepresentation in concealing the suspension
order rendered against him by the State Bar of California; and 2)
respondents alleged violation of the so-called rotation rule with the
purpose of becoming the next IBP National President Complainant
averred that the respondent, in appropriating for his own benefit
funds due his client, was found to have performed an act constituting
moral turpitude by the State Bar of California. He also alleged that
the respondent was then forced to resign or surrender his license to
practice law in the said state in order to evade the recommended
three (3) year suspension. Complainant asserted that the respondent
lacks the moral competence necessary to lead the country’s most
noble profession. Complainant prayed that the respondent be
enjoined from assuming office as IBP National President.
Respondent, in his comment, stated that the issues raised in
Complaint were the very issues raised in an earlier administrative
case filed by the same complainant against him. In fact, according to
him, the said issues were already extensively discussed and
categorically ruled upon by this Court. Respondent prayed that the
instant administrative complaint be dismissed following the principle
of res judicata. On the other hand, complainant added that the
principle of res judicata would not apply in the case at bar. He
asserted that the first administrative case filed against the
respondent was one for his disqualification. During the 20th Regular
Meeting of the Board the IBP Board, by 2/3 vote, resolved to remove
Atty. de Vera as member of the IBP Board of Governors and as IBP
Executive Vice President for having committed acts which were
inimical to the IBP Board and the IBP. On the other hand, Atty. de
Vera aired his sentiments to this Court by writing the then Hon. Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. a letter. In the said letter, he strongly
and categorically denied having committed acts inimical to the IBP
and its Board. He alleged that on the basis of an unverified letter
complaint filed by IBP Governor Rivera, the IBP Board voted to expel
him posthaste, without just cause and in complete disregard of even
the minimum standards of due process. On their response, the IBP
Board explained to the Court that their decision to remove Atty. de
Vera was based on valid grounds and was intended to protect itself
from a recalcitrant member. Atty. de Vera maintained that there was
absolutely no factual or legal basis to sustain the motion to remove
him from the IBP Board because he violated no law. He argued that
if the basis for his removal as EVP was based on the same grounds
as his removal from the IBP Board, then his removal as EVP was
likewise executed without due notice and without the least
compliance with the minimum standards of due process of law.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not respondent Attorney Leonard S. Devera commited
malpractice which amounted to moral turpitude in the State Bar of
California and in the Philippines, in the course of his practice of law.
2. Whether or not the oath of office as lawyer is attached to the
person of Attorney Leonard S. Devera wherever he may go and not
necessarily bound by the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines. 3.
Whether or not there is substantial evidence to prove the moral
turpitude, as basis for disbarment of respondent in an administrative
proceeding. 4. Whether or not res judicata applies in this case.
HELD:
1. The recommendation of the hearing officer of the State Bar of
California, standing alone, is not proof of malpractice. There’s no
final judgment for suspension or disbarment was meted against Atty.
de Vera despite a recommendation of suspension of three years as
he surrendered his license to practice law before his case could be
taken up by the Supreme Court of California. Judgment of
suspension against a Filipino lawyer may transmute into a similar
judgment of suspension in the Philippines only if the basis of the
foreign courts action includes any of the grounds for disbarment or
suspension in this jurisdiction. In herein case, considering that there
is technically no foreign judgment to speak of, the recommendation
by the hearing officer of the State Bar of California does not
constitute prima facie evidence of unethical behavior by Atty. de
Vera. Complainant must prove by substantial evidence the facts
upon which the recommendation by the hearing officer was based. If
he is successful in this, he must then prove that these acts are
likewise unethical under Philippine law. 2. Petitioners contend that
respondent de Vera is disqualified for the post because he is not
really from Eastern Mindanao. His place of residence is in
Paranaque and he was originally a member of the PPLM IBP
Chapter. He only changed his IBP Chapter membership to pave the
way for his ultimate goal of attaining the highest IBP post, which is
the national presidency. Petitioners aver that in changing his IBP
membership, respondent De Vera violated the domicile rule. The
contention has no merit. Under the last paragraph of Section 19,
Article II, a lawyer included in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme
Court can register with the particular IBP Chapter of his preference
or choice. 3. The distinctions between the two cases are far from
trivial. The previous case was resolved on the basis of the parties
rights and obligations under the IBP By-laws. We held therein that
Atty. de Vera cannot be disqualified from running as Regional
Governor as there is nothing in the present IBP By-laws that
sanctions the disqualification of candidates for IBP governors.
Consequently, we stressed that the petition had no firm ground to
stand on. The Courts statement, therefore, that Atty. De Vera cannot
be disqualified on the ground that he was not morally fit was mere
obiter dictum. Precisely, the IBP By-laws do not allow for pre-election
disqualification proceedings; hence, Atty. de Vera cannot be
disqualified on the basis of the administrative findings of a hearing
officer of the State Bar of California suspending him from the practice
of law for three years. There is nothing in the By-Laws which
explicitly provides that one must be morally fit before he can run for
IBP governorship. For one, this is so because the determination of
moral fitness of a candidate lies in the individual judgment of the
members of the House of Delegates. Indeed, based on each
member's standard of morality, he is free to nominate and elect any
member, so long as the latter possesses the basic requirements
under the law. For another, basically the disqualification of a
candidate involving lack of moral fitness should emanate from his
disbarment or suspension from the practice of law by this Court, or
conviction by final judgment of an offense which involves moral
turpitude. 4. In the instant administrative case, it is clear that the
issues raised by the complainant had already been resolved by this
Court in an earlier administrative case. The complainant’s contention
that the principle of res judicata would not apply in the case at bar as
the first administrative case was one for disqualification while the
instant administrative complaint is one for suspension and/or
disbarment should be given least credence. It is worthy to note that
while the instant administrative complaint is denominated as one for
suspension and/or disbarment, it prayed neither the suspension nor
the disbarment of the respondent but instead merely sought to enjoin
the respondent from assuming office as IBP National President.
Although the parties in the present administrative case and in Adm.
Case No. 6052 are identical, their capacities in these cases and the
issues presented therein are not the same, thereby barring the
application of res judicata. In order that the principle of res judicata
may be made to apply, four essential conditions must concur,
namely: (1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final;
(2) the decision must have been rendered by a court having
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the disposition
of the case must be a judgment or order on the merits, and (4) there
must be between the first and second action identity of parties,
identity of subject matter, and identity of causes of action. In the
absence of any one of these elements, Atty. de Vera cannot argue
res judicata in his favor. Finally, the two administrative cases do not
seek the same relief. In the first case, the complainants sought to
prevent Atty. de Vera from assuming his post as IBP Governor for
Eastern Mindanao. In the present case, as clarified by complainant in
his Memorandum, what is being principally sought is Atty. De Vera’s
suspension or disbarment.
DECISION:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we rule as follows: 1.
SUSPEND Atty. Leonard de Vera in A.C. No. 6697 from the practice
of law for TWO (2) YEARS, effective from the finality of this
Resolution. Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to the personal
record of Atty. Leonard de Vera and copies furnished the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for
dissemination to all courts; 2. DISMISS the letter-complaint of Atty.
Leonard de Vera, dated 18 May 2005, in A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC,
praying for the disapproval of the Resolution, dated 13 May 2005, of
the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
removing him from his posts as Governor and Executive Vice
President of the Integrated Bar of thePhilippines, the said Resolution
having been rendered without grave abuse of discretion; 3. AFFIRM
the election by the Board of Governors of Atty. Jose Vicente B.
Salazar as Executive Vice President of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for the remainder of the term 2003-2005, such having
been conducted in accordance with its By-Laws and absent any
showing of grave abuse of discretion; and 4. DIRECT Atty. Jose
Vicente B. Salazar to immediately take his oath of office and assume
the Presidency of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for the term
2005-2007 in accordance with the automatic succession rule in
Article VII, Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws, upon receipt of this
Resolution.
7. DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE v EDWIN L. RANA
Bar Matter No. 1036. June 10, 2003
FACTS
Respondent Edwin L. Rana was among those who passed the 2000
Bar Examinations. One day before the scheduled mass oath-taking
of successful bar examinees as members of the Philippine Bar,
complainant Donna Marie Aguirre filed against the respondent.
Complainant charged respondent with unauthorized practice of law,
grave misconduct, violation of law, and grave misrepresentation. The
Court allowed respondent to take his oath as a member of the Bar.
However, the Court ruled that respondent could not sign the Roll of
Attorneys pending the resolution of the charge against him. Thus,
respondent took the lawyer’s oath on the scheduled date but has not
signed the Roll of Attorneys up to now. Complainant alleges that
respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for a
candidate in the May 2001 elections before the Municipal Board of
Election Canvassers (“MBEC”) of Mandaon, Masbate. Complainant
further alleges that respondent filed with the MBEC a pleading
wherein the respondent represented himself as counsel for and in be
Vice Mayoralty Candidate and signed the pleading as counsel for
him. Complainant claims that respondent filed the pleading as a ploy
to prevent the proclamation of the winning vice mayoralty candidate.
Complainant questioned his appearance on two grounds: (1)
respondent had not taken his oath as a lawyer; and (2) he was an
employee of the government. In his Comment, respondent admits
that Bunan sought his “specific assistance” to represent him before
the MBEC. Respondent claims that “he decided to assist and advice
Bunan, not as a lawyer but as a person who knows the law.”
Respondent admits signing the pleading that objected to the
inclusion of certain votes in the canvassing. He explains, however,
that he did not sign the pleading as a lawyer or represented himself
as an “attorney” in the pleading. Respondent prays that the complaint
be dismissed for lack of merit and that he be allowed to sign the Roll
of Attorneys.
ISSUE
WON respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and
thus does not deserve admission to the Philippine Bar.
HELD
The records show that respondent appeared as counsel for Bunan
and has also retained by a mayoralty candidate as her counsel. All
these happened even before respondent took the lawyer’s oath.
Clearly, respondent engaged in the practice of law without being a
member of the Philippine Bar. In Cayetano v. Monsod, the Court held
that “practice of law” means any activity, in or out of court, which
requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training
and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform acts
which are usually performed by members of the legal profession.
Generally, to practice law is to render any kind of service which
requires the use of legal knowledge or skill. Verily, respondent was
engaged in the practice of law when he appeared in the proceedings
before the MBEC and filed various pleadings, without license to do
so. Evidence clearly supports the charge of unauthorized practice of
law. Respondent called himself “counsel” knowing fully well that he
was not a member of the Bar. Having held himself out as “counsel”
knowing that he had no authority to practice law, respondent has
shown moral unfitness to be a member of the Philippine Bar. A bar
candidate does not acquire the right to practice law simply by
passing the bar examinations. The practice of law is a privilege that
can be withheld even from one who has passed the bar
examinations, if the person seeking admission had practiced law
without a license. Passing the bar is not the only qualification to
become an attorney-at-law.8 Respondent should know that two
essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed,
namely: his lawyer’s oath to be administered by this Court and his
signature in the Roll of Attorneys On the charge of grave misconduct
and misrepresentation, evidence shows that Bunan indeed
authorized respondent to represent him as his counsel before the
MBEC and similar bodies. While there was no misrepresentation,
respondent nonetheless had no authority to practice law.
DECISION
WHEREFORE, respondent Edwin L. Rana is DENIED admission to
the Philippine Bar.
8. Petition for Leave to Resume Practice of Law, Benjamin
Dacanay 540 SCRA 424
FACTS: Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960.
He practiced law until he migrated to Canada in December 1998 to
seek medical attention for his ailments. He subsequently applied for
Canadian citizenship to avail of Canada’s free medical aid program.
His application was approved and he became a Canadian citizen in
May 2004.
In July 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship
Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003), petitioner reacquired his
Philippine citizenship. On that day, he took his oath of allegiance as
a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto,
Canada. Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and now intends
to resume his law practice.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner may still resume practice?
RULING: Section 2, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides an
applicant for admission to the bar be a citizen of the Philippines, at
least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character and a
resident of the Philippines.5 He must also produce before this Court
satisfactory evidence of good moral character and that no charges
against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending
in any court in the Philippines.
Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar,
loss thereof terminates membership in the Philippine bar and,
consequently, the privilege to engage in the practice of law. In other
words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure terminates the
privilege to practice law in the Philippines. The practice of law is a
privilege denied to foreigners.
The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of
naturalization as a citizen of another country but subsequently
reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because “all Philippine
citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not
to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of [RA
9225].” Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another
country is deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if he
reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225.
Before he can can resume his law practice, he must first secure from
this Court the authority to do so, conditioned on:
 the updating and payment of of IBP membership dues;
 the payment of professional tax;
 the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory
continuing legal education; this is specially significant to
refresh the applicant/petitioner’s knowledge of Philippine
laws and update him of legal developments and
 the retaking of the lawyer’s oath.
9. Cayetano vs. Monsod
RENATO L. CAYETANO v. CHRISTIAN MONSOD, GR No. 100113,
1991-09-03
Facts:
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:
"There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman
and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the
Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five
years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been...
candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding
elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall
be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years."
Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to
the position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the
Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991.
Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does...
not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having
passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86.55%. He
has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying
his... professional license fees as a lawyer for more than ten years.
(p. 124, Rollo)
After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled
the bar, Atty. Monsod worked in the law office of his father. During
his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as
an operations officer for about two years in Costa Rica and
Panama, which involved getting acquainted with the laws of member-
countries, negotiating loans and coordinating legal, economic, and
project work of the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in 1970,
he worked with the Meralco Group, served as chief executive officer
of... an investment bank and subsequently of a business
conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered services to various
companies as a legal and economic consultant or chief executive
officer. As former Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman
(1987) of NAMFREL, Monsod's,... work involved being
knowledgeable in election law. He appeared for NAMFREL in its
accredition hearings before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy,
Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former Co-Chairman of the
Bishops Businessmen's Conference for Human
Development, has worked with the under privileged sectors, such as
the farmer and urban poor groups, in initiating, lobbying for and
engaging in affirmative action for the agrarian reform law and lately
the urban land reform bill. Monsod also made use of his legal...
knowledge as a member of the Davide Commission, a guasi-judicial
body, which conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a member
of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its
Committee on Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was
cited by the
President of the Commission, Justice Cecilia-Munoz-Palma for
"innumerable amendments to reconcile government functions with
individual freedoms and public accountability and the party-list
system for the House of Representative.
Issues:
petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the
consequent appointment of Monsod... as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections be declared null and void.
Ruling:
The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted during the
public hearings on Monsod's confirmation, implicitly determined that
he possessed the necessary qualifications as required by law. The
judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an
acknowledged... power is beyond judicial interference except only
upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus,
only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the
Court... interfere with the Commission's judgment. In the instant
case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's corrective
power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that
would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the
issuance... of the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.
Principles:
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term "practice
of law", particularly the modern concept of law practice, and taking
into consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers of
the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a...
lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of
industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of
both the rich and the poor - verily more than satisfy the constitutional
requirement - that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at
least... ten years.
Finally, one significant legal maxim is:
"We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that
giveth life."
Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the
procurator of Judea asked Delilah (who was Samson's beloved) for
help in capturing Samson. Delilah agreed on condition that
"No blade shall touch his skin; No blood shall flow from his veins."
When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the
procurator placed an iron rod burning white-hot two or three inches
away from in front of Samson's eyes. This blinded the man. Upon
hearing of what had happened to her beloved, Delilah was beside
herself... with anger, and fuming with righteous fury, accused the
procurator of reneging on his word. The procurator calmly
replied: "Did any blade touch his skin? Did any blood flow from his
veins?" The procurator was clearly relying on the letter, not the spirit
of the... agreement.
10. Cruz vs. Cabrera
Facts:
Complainant alleges that he is a fourth year law student; since the
latter part of 2001, he instituted several actions against his
neighbors; he appeared for and in his behalf in his own cases; he
met respondent who acted as the counsel of his neighbors; during a
hearing on January 14, 2002, in one case before the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 112, Pasay City, presided by Judge Caridad Cuerdo.
Respondent’s imputations were uncalled for and the latter’s act of
compelling the court to ask complainant whether he is a lawyer or not
was intended to malign him before the public, inasmuch as
respondent knew that complainant is not a lawyer, having appeared
for and in his behalf as a party litigant in prior cases; respondent’s
imputations of complainant’s misrepresentation as a lawyer was
patently with malice to discredit his honor, with the intention to
threaten him not to appear anymore in cases respondent was
handling; the manner, substance, tone of voice and how the words
“appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka muna!” were uttered were totally
with the intention to annoy, vex and humiliate, malign, ridicule,
incriminate and discredit complainant before the public.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent violated Rule 8.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility
Whether or not complainant is not precluded from litigating
personally his cases
Whether or not complainant is engaged in the practice of law
Ruling:
1. We hold that respondent’s outburst of “appear ka ng appear,
pumasa ka muna” does not amount to a violation of Rule 8.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Such single outburst, though
uncalled for, is not of such magnitude as to warrant respondent’s
suspension or reproof. It is but a product of impulsiveness or the heat
of the moment in the course of an argument between them. It has
been said that lawyers should not be held to too strict an account for
words said in the heat of the moment, because of chagrin at losing
cases, and that the big way is for the court to condone even
contemptuous language.
2. Nonetheless, we remind respondent that complainant is not
precluded from litigating personally his cases. A party’s right to
conduct litigation personally is recognized by Section 34 of Rule 138
of the Rules of Court: SEC. 34. By whom litigation conducted. — In
the court of a justice of the peace a party may conduct his litigation in
person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that
purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party
may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his
appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member
of the bar.
3. The practice of law, though impossible to define exactly, involves
the exercise of a profession or vocation usually for gain, mainly as
attorney by acting in a representative capacity and as counsel by
rendering legal advise to others. Private practice has been defined
by this Court as follows:
x x x. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in
frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind.
In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise. Practice of law to fall
within the prohibition of statute [referring to the prohibition for judges
and other officials or employees of the superior courts or of the Office
of the Solicitor General from engaging in private practice] has been
interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one’s self out to the
public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services. x x x.
Clearly, in appearing for herself, complainant was not customarily or
habitually holding herself out to the public as a lawyer. Neither was
she demanding payment for such services. Hence, she cannot be
said to be in the practice of law.
On the other hand, all lawyers should take heed that lawyers are
licensed officers of the courts who are empowered to appear,
prosecute and defend; and upon whom peculiar duties,
responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as a consequence.
Membership in the bar imposes upon them certain obligations.
Mandated to maintain the dignity of the legal profession, they must
conduct themselves honorably and fairly. Though a lawyer’s
language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified
and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The use of
intemperate language and unkind ascriptions has no place in the
dignity of judicial forum.
11. Lim-Santiago vs. Sagucio
EN BANC[ A.C. No. 6705, March 31, 2006 ]
RUTHIE LIM-SANTIAGO, COMPLAINANT,
VS.
ATTY. CARLOS B. SAGUCIO, RESPONDENT
Facts:
Complainant charges respondent with the following violations:
1. Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
Complainant contends that respondent is guilty of representing
conflicting interests. Respondent, being the former Personnel
Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat, knew the operations of
Taggat very well. Respondent should have inhibited himself from
hearing, investigating and deciding the case filed by Taggat
employees. Furthermore, complainant claims that respondent
instigated the filing of the cases and even harassed and threatened
Taggat employees to accede and sign an affidavit to support the
complaint.
2. Engaging in the private practice of law while working as a
government prosecutor
Complainant also contends that respondent is guilty of engaging in
the private practice of law while working as a government prosecutor.
Complainant presented evidence to prove that respondent received
P10,000 as retainer’s fee for the months of January and February
1995, another P10,000 for the months of April and May 1995, and
P5,000 for the month of April 1996.
Issue:
whether or not being a former lawyer of Taggat conflicts with
respondent’s role as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
Whether or not respondent is engaged in the practice of law
Ruling:
1. The Court exonerates respondent from the charge of violation of
Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (“Code”).
However, the Court finds respondent liable for violation of Rule 1.01,
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility against unlawful
conduct. Respondent committed unlawful conduct when he violated
Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees or Republic Act No. 6713 (“RA
6713”).
Canon 6 provides that the Code “shall apply to lawyers in
government service in the discharge of their official duties.” A
government lawyer is thus bound by the prohibition “not [to]
represent conflicting interests.” However, this rule is subject to
certain limitations. The prohibition to represent conflicting interests
does not apply when no conflict of interest exists, when a written
consent of all concerned is given after a full disclosure of the facts or
when no true attorney-client relationship exists. Moreover,
considering the serious consequence of the disbarment or
suspension of a member of the Bar, clear preponderant evidence is
necessary to justify the imposition of the administrative penalty.
Respondent is also mandated under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 not to
engage in “unlawful x x x conduct.” Unlawful conduct includes
violation of the statutory prohibition on a government employee to
“engage in the private practice of [his] profession unless authorized
by the Constitution or law, provided, that such practice will not
conflict or tend to conflict with [his] official functions.”
2. “Private practice of law” contemplates a succession of acts of the
same nature habitually or customarily holding one’s self to the public
as a lawyer.
Respondent argues that he only rendered consultancy services to
Taggat intermittently and he was not a retained counsel of Taggat
from 1995 to 1996 as alleged. This argument is without merit
because the law does not distinguish between consultancy services
and retainer agreement. For as long as respondent performed acts
that are usually rendered by lawyers with the use of their legal
knowledge, the same falls within the ambit of the term “practice of
law.”
12. In Re: Al C. Argosino 246 SCRA 14 (1995)
FACTS:
On February 4, 1992 ,Argosino, together with 13 others, was
charged with the crime of homicide in connection with the death of
one Raul Camaligan. The death of Camaligan stemmed from the
affliction of severe physical injuries uponhim in course of "hazing"
conducted as part of the university fraternity initiation rites. On
February 11, 1993, the accused were consequently sentenced to
suffer imprisonment for a period ranging from two (2) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day to four (4) years.Eleven (11) days later, Mr.
Argosino and his colleagues filed an application for probation with
the lower court. The application was granted on June 18 1993. The
period of probation was set at two (2) years, counted from the
probationer's initial report to the probation officer assigned to
supervise him. Less than a month later, Argosino filed a petition to
take the bar exam. He was allowed and he passed the exam, but
was not allowed to take the lawyer's oath of office.On April 15, 1994,
Argosino filed a petition to allow him to take the attorney's oath and
be admitted to the practice of law. He averred that his probation
period had been terminated. It is noted that his probation period did
not last for more than 10 months.
NOTES:
 The practice of law is a high personal privilege limited to citizens of
goodmoral character, with special education qualifications, duly
ascertained and certified.
 Requirement of good moral character is of greater importance so
far as the general public and proper administration of justice is
concerned.
 All aspects of moral character and behavior may be inquired into in
respect of those seeking admission to the Bar.
 Requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by those who
wouldseek admission to the bar must be a necessity more stringent
than the norm of conduct expected from members of the general
public.
 Participation in the prolonged mindless physical beatings inflicted
upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident rejection of that moral duty
and was totally irresponsible behavior, which makes impossible a
finding that the participant was possessed of good moral character.
 Good moral character is a requirement possession of which must
be demonstrated at the time of the application for permission to take
the barexaminations and more importantly at the time of application
for admission to the bar and to take the attorney's oath of office.

ISSUE:
Whether Argosino should be allowed to take the oath of attorney and
be admitted to the practice of law

HELD:
Mr. Argosino must submit to this Court evidence that he may now be
regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral character
imposed upon those who are seeking admission to the bar. He
should show to the Court how he has tried to make up for the
senseless killing of a helpless student to the family of the deceased
student and to the community at large. In short, he mustshow
evidence that he is a different person now, that he has become
morally fitfor admission to the profession of law.
He is already directed to inform the Court, by appropriate written
manifestation, of the names of the parents or brothers and sisters of
Camaligan from notice.