European Review of History—Revue européenne d’histoire

Vol. 16, No. 1, February 2009, 33–47

French cultural diplomacy in the kingdom of Serbs, Croats and

Slovenians in the 1920s
Stanislav Sretenovic*

Institute for Contemporary History, Belgrade

( Received December 2007; final version received September 2008 )

This paper analyses French cultural diplomacy in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and
Slovenians, a country created after the First World War as a result of the Franco-
Serbian military alliance during the war. Cultural diplomacy is examined as part of
broader French political and economical action in Eastern Europe to organise the small
newly created countries into the French field of interest and oppose Germany. French
cultural diplomacy in the Kingdom of SCS had two aspects: the symbolical and the
concrete. Its aim was to spread positive feelings towards France in the ex-Austria-
Hungarian regions of the Kingdom, where France was unknown or seen as an enemy,
and to maintain the pro-French attitude of the majority of Serbs. The aim was to
contribute to the ‘internal equalisation and strengthening’ of the new ethnically and
religiously heterogeneous country, by using culture as a ‘soft power’. French cultural
diplomacy in the Kingdom of SCS is analysed in its local, regional and European
context and in a short- and long-term perspective.
Keywords: France; Serbia; Kingdom of Serbs; Croats and Slovenians; South-East
Europe; Balkans; history of international relations; cultural diplomacy; inter-war
period; inter-state relations; identities

Introduction
This work is a study of the cultural aspect of relations between France and the new
Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenians (KSCS) from the end of the First World War to
the end of the 1920s. In 1929, after a decade of internal crisis, the KSCS became
Yugoslavia and changed the nature of its political regime. This year was a turning point,
when the first signs of the great worldwide economic crisis started to modify the climate of
international relations.
Within the complex, asymmetrical relations between France and the KSCS in the
1920s, we have to take the cultural aspect into special consideration because it is firmly
linked to the political, military and economic aspects of these relations. These four aspects
have mutually influenced and transformed one another over history, and we should not
give absolute priority to any of them.
Culture, in its widest sense as the production, distribution and consumption of
symbolic objects within a society, was a factor in French –KSCS relations, because in a
certain way it shaped mentalities, gave an orientation to public sentiment and even
influenced political decisions. It was simultaneously both a stake and a field of
confrontation between different internal and external groups and antagonistic forces.

*Email: stanislav.sretenovic@eui.eu

ISSN 1350-7486 print/ISSN 1469-8293 online

q 2009 Taylor & Francis
DOI: 10.1080/13507480802655352
http://www.informaworld.com
34 S. Sretenovic

Culture was significant in French – KSCS relations because the KSCS was at that time an
immature and fragile state, with an uncertain future. It embraced territories occupied by
Serbs, Croats and Slovenians, nations with different religions, traditions and cultures.
In building national cohesion, the French model could play a useful role.
The victory of France and the Allies in the First World War was not merely a military
victory, but in the eyes of the newly created nations of that time, was also a triumph of
freedom and democracy over ‘German autocracy and violence’. In the eyes of the new
nations of Central Europe and the Balkans, France was the guardian and the model; its
language was a symbol of prestige and opened doors to the ‘civilised world’. Its history
and political values were a reference point and an aim to be achieved. But culture is also a
field of confrontation between different influences, and nowhere more so than in interwar
Central Europe and the Balkans. The long presence of the great historical Empires had left
a deep impact on the behaviour of the people, creating certain reservations towards France.
The French government wanted to reinforce feelings of friendship and sympathy towards
France in the small new Eastern States. Its cultural foreign policy could bolster the
country’s influence, reinforcing its wider political position in Europe on a long-term basis.
If the political, military and economical aspects of French–KSCS relations have been
partially examined in both the French and the Serbian (i.e. Yugoslav) historiographies, there
is no monograph dealing with the cultural aspects of these relations. We therefore used
works dealing with culture in general. In order to study the importance of the ‘idea of France’
in the construction of Yugoslav national identity, we referred especially to The Invention of
Tradition by Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (1983). We found a lot of inspiration and
useful data in the work of Albert Salon (1983) who stresses the role of French governments,
including their means, agencies and representatives, in the management of France’s ‘cultural
policies’ towards the rest of the World. Issues 24 and 25 of the journal Relations
internationales focused on the importance of the cultural dimension in international
relations. We were inspired in this work by the theoretical contributions of Pierre Milza and
Jacques Freymond. Stefano Santoro (2002) analyses the competition between different
powers in the field of culture in interwar Eastern Europe, but without particular attention to
the case of the KSCS/Yugoslavia. Within Serbian historiography, Ljubodrag Dimic’s
three-volume book on the cultural policy of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (1996) is a
particularly important source for the state framework of cultural policy, and also for foreign
influences on 1920s Yugoslav literature and art. We also consulted documents in the
Diplomatic Archives of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (the Quai d’Orsay) in Paris,
in the Army Historical Service Archives in Vincennes and in the Archives of the French
Foreign Works Service (Service des Oeuvres françaises à l’étranger) in Nantes, which was
in charge of French cultural activities abroad.
This work is organised around two groups of questions, respectively concerning the
symbolic and concrete dimensions of relations between France and the KSCS. Regarding
the symbolic dimension, how France presented ideas about and references to past
Franco-Yugoslav relations in the society of the KSCS will be examined. The concrete
dimension deals with the material capacity and the means at the disposal of France for
guiding cultural policy in a foreign country.

1. The symbolic aspect of French – KSCS relations

What is the importance of the idea of France in the development of ‘Yugoslav’ identity?
Who created this identity? What were its symbols? How was France perceived in different
Yugoslav nations?
 European Review of History—Revue européenne d’histoire 35

1.1. Image of Serbia in France during the First World War

During the First World War, the language of French and Serbian intellectuals
represented Serbia’s military support to France, against common enemies, as a ‘natural’
prolongation of French –Serbian relations of friendship well established for centuries.
French historians, geographers and linguists such as Ernest Denis, Victor Berard, Emile
Haummant and Gaston Gravier played a major role in the formulation of these ideas.
In their works published during the war, the great ‘idea of France’ had an important
place. The Serbs were portrayed as ‘younger brothers’, following the French example
in the course of history. In Victor Berard’s work titled ‘Serbia’ published in 1915, a
very typical example of the prevailing discourse, France was presented as the point of
reference for Serbia since the Middle Ages, and especially since the French Revolution.
Referring to the 1804 Serbian uprising, he said that the Serbs were the first nation in
the Balkans to rise against the Turks and thus they had followed the French in the
‘conquest of Human Rights’.1 The present war was represented as the struggle of a
‘brave, independent, parliamentary, tolerant and democratic Serbia for the national
liberation and unification of all the Southern Slavs against feudal, police-ridden and
inquisitorial Austria-Hungary’.2 Absolute parallels between France and Serbia were
impeded by the association of all French symbols with republicanism, and Serbian
symbols with monarchy. To get around this contradiction, the discourse of the French
intellectual elite stressed the native origin of the Karadjordjevic dynasty (unlike the
other Balkan dynasties, which were of German origin), its closeness to the people, the
military gifts of its members, and their courage and heroism. During the war, King
Peter I was represented in a way that was largely accepted in the following years:
‘He used to spend a lot of time with the soldiers; he treated them as a father or
grandfather; he took up the gun once again, as did one of our generals in the Great
Revolution; he set an example to his army, which consisted of “citizens”, just as our
citizen-generals set an example to our nation under arms.’3 In the summer of 1918, the
leaders of the allied powers decided to destroy Austria-Hungary. This decision was
reflected in the discourse of diplomats and politicians. The representation of France as
a generous and humanitarian liberator and as a disseminator of new ideas was
enhanced. This discourse supported the unification project of the Southern Slavs that
was being considered by the Serbian government and Southern Slavic emigrants from
Austria-Hungary. On the occasion of the French National day (14 July), celebrated in
Corfu by the French and Serbian armies, Serbian Prime Minister Nikola Pasic glorified
the French Revolution, and the French Ambassador at the Serbian court, Joseph de
Fontenay, said that France and Serbia were fighting side by side in order to destroy
‘this Bastille (Austria-Hungary) that was still keeping nations in chains’.4
The celebration of 14 July in 1918 was an occasion to make this friendship ‘palpable’
in a symbolic way, by awarding decorations. The French Minister received the Great
Cross with White Two-headed Eagle, the highest decoration that Prince Regent
Alexander could award. By this gesture, he was expressing the intention to establish
relations that would guarantee the ‘eternal alliance’ between the two countries. On this
occasion the Prince Regent gave two lunches and decorated the French commander
Picot, his aide de camp, with a gold medal for courage, in view of this officer’s
outstanding record in the service of Serbia during the war.5 On the other side, the
French Minister for Public Education decorated several Serbian officials with highly
important French decorations such as the Palmes d’officiers de l’Instruction publique
and Palmes d’officiers d’Académie.6
36 S. Sretenovic

1.2. The French model and the construction of ‘Yugoslav’ identity in the post-1918
period
The intellectual elite of the new KSCS and its politicians, led by King Aleksandar
Karadjordjevic, promoted the idea of a Yugoslav nation. Most of them were immersed in
the ideology of integral Yugoslavism,7 which was conceived by the liberal Southern
Slavic ‘intelligentsia’ in the second half of the nineteenth century. This called for the
unity of Serbs, Croats and Slovenians as the tribes of the Yugoslav nation, a nation in
creation at that time, arguing that only the will of the great powers had divided the tribes
and left them without a common state throughout history. Tribal differences regarding
religion, customs and political development were the results of this ‘forced’ division.
While Serbian and Croat intellectuals supported these ideas, they were not widely
accepted by the common people. Many Serbs saw the Croats and Slovenians as
foreigners, and even as wartime enemies. No less than the French Ambassador Fontenay,
a great supporter of the Yugoslav idea, provided evidence of this sentiment in a report to
Paris. When Fontenay visited the Serbian countryside in 1920 accompanied by a
Slovenian, he said to a Serbian peasant: ‘Here is one of your brothers, a Slovenian, and
one of your friends, a Frenchman’. The Serbian peasant responded by protesting:
‘No Frenchman, you are our brother.’8
The creation of the new state, with its new borders and new international position, caused
significant and long-lasting consequences for its residents. The standardisation of the
administration and educational and legal systems was meant to transform the different
nations of Southern Slavs into a ‘Yugoslav’ nation. The development of electoral democracy
in the KSCS involved the voters in the political life of their country. In a large part of the state
(the former territories of Austria-Hungary) the right to vote gave the majority of the
population access to politics for the first time. As this right already existed in Serbia from
1903, the politicians had the problem of working out how to spread the links of existing
political obedience and loyalty to the entire territory.
The political life of the new State was constrained by the absence of a constitution for a
three-year period (1918 –1921). Competing visions of how the Yugoslav state should be
structurally constituted aggravated the national differences. The Serbs supported the
position of the king, who wanted a centralised state on the French model, and they entirely
identified the state with the nation. The Croats and the Slovenians opposed them,
advocating a federative concept inspired by a model of reform inherited from
Austria-Hungary. Serbian political parties were shaped by the French model – the Radical
Party, the Democratic Party, the Agrarian Party, the Republican Party – and wanted to
increase their electoral support in the country as a whole. Croats and Slovenians
meanwhile mostly supported parties with a strong nationalistic orientation – the Croat
Republican Peasants Party and the Slovenian Popular Party, which aimed to establish
themselves on the Croatian or Slovenian level only.
The constitution adopted on 21 June 1921 was supposed to solve all internal problems.
It was adopted by the deputies of the Democratic Party, the Radical Party, the Yugoslav
Muslim Organisation, the Slovenian Popular Party and the League of Peasants. However,
a boycott by the Croat deputies meant that it was adopted by a simple majority rather than
a qualified majority, as had been promised during the war. According to this constitution,
the state of the Southern Slavs was a constitutional, parliamentary and hereditary
monarchy. The constitution was strongly centralising. The king was head of the army and
could choose the Prime Minister. There was a single-chamber parliament, the Skupstina,
and an administration completely under the control of the government.
 European Review of History—Revue européenne d’histoire 37

1.3. France and the ‘invention of tradition’ in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and
Slovenians, 1918 –1929
The major internal policy problem of the KSCS was national cohesion. Before 1918, the
Southern Slavs had no political unity. After 1918, the unification that came as a
consequence of the First World War become the most important event on which the
foundations of the new state were laid. The new state became, from that time on, the great
symbol of the realisation of ‘national unity’, and of the ‘secular aspirations’ of the Southern
Slavs. Under these new circumstances, the new state and its regime had to be made
legitimate and the discourse and symbolism of national unity had to be promoted by an
ideology that would be widely accepted by the citizens. If we refer to Eric Hobsbawm’s9
concept of the ‘Invention of Tradition’, two improvements, which played an important role
in creating the ‘idea of France’, were particularly significant for Yugoslavism: the
invention of public ceremonies and the ‘production’ of public monuments.

1.3.1. The ‘invention’ of public ceremonies

Regular and official celebrations in the KSCS of the French National Day on 14 July, and
the anniversary of the 1918 armistice of Rethondes on 11 November, reflected the role
France had played in the unification of the Southern Slavs, but also showed how much the
new state relied on the ‘prestige’ and ‘greatness of France’ in order to express its own
majesty and power.
The French Embassy and the royal government organised 14 July celebrations every year
in Belgrade and other major towns of the Kingdom. We will analyse as an example the
festivities organised in Subotica, a town which had a Slavic Catholic majority and strong
Hungarian and German minorities. Subotica was the third largest town in the Kingdom, after
Belgrade and Zagreb. The celebration was graced by the presence of the regional general
commanding officer, the regional governor, the Mayor of Subotica and representatives of the
French community. It started with a Te Deum and a solemn service held in the Catholic
church. The entrance was decorated with the French and the Kingdom’s flags, a significant
symbolic detail because the Yugoslav flag consisted of the same colours as the French one:
blue, white and red, but laid horizontally. The Yugoslav anthem and the French anthem,
la Marseillaise, were performed as the people entered and left the church. The town was
illuminated on 13 and 14 July. The speeches made by the regional governor and the French
community representative recalled the assault on the Bastille and referred with affection to
the history of friendly feelings that united the Serbian people with France in the past and
which were the basis of the friendship that the Serbs, Croats and Slovenians felt for France.
This friendship was presented not as something born in diplomatic salons but in the thick of
the battle against a common enemy and for the same democratic values. This speech specially
stressed that King Peter I Karadjordjevic, a student of the Saint-Cyr school, fought on the
French side in the 1870–1871 war and that the Serbian and French armies fought together at
the Thessalonica front. The speech was greeted with applause both inside and outside the
church. After the speech, under the escutcheon of the French Republic in ‘French-Serbian
colours’, two young girls covered the bust of King Peter with rose petals, with the tunes of
la Marseillaise playing in the background.10
The celebrations of the anniversary of 11 November 1918 always took place at the
French military cemetery in Belgrade, where with great solemnity the power of the state
and the strength of French– KSCS relations were glorified. The 1927 anniversary
celebration had a significant symbolic aspect. It was officiated over by representatives of
the French community, headed by Ambassador Emile Dard and the highest political
38 S. Sretenovic

officials of the Kingdom, including the ministers for Foreign Affairs, Public Education and
Religious Affairs, a representative of the War Minister, and the Vice-President of the
Assembly. Among the huge crowd attending were war veterans and delegations of pupils
from high schools. A French priest served mass. In their speeches Serbian representatives
praised the sacrifices made by the French and ‘Yugoslav’ peoples in ‘defending
civilisation and the rule of law’, during the war. Ambassador Dard spoke of the
‘French –Yugoslav’ friendship treaty signed in Paris on that very day, which was seen as a
highly symbolic date. His speech was less emotional: he confirmed the warmth of
‘French –Yugoslav’ relations in the past and their attachment to the ‘ideas of peace and
arbitration’.11 The new tone in this speech reflected changes in the general French policy
during the 1920s. French diplomacy now sought to calm Italian –Yugoslav tensions, which
were then at a critical point,12 by playing up France’s attachment to the Locarno Treaty.
The discourse of French officials therefore changed between the time of Versailles
(‘defence of civilisation and rule of law’) and Locarno (‘devotion to the ideas of peace and
arbitration’).

1.3.2. The ‘production’ of monuments

The assassinations of three Croat deputies in the KSCS Assembly on 20 June 1928 put an
end to parliamentary life in the Kingdom and opened the way for the establishment of
personal rule by King Aleksandar on 6 January 1929. With the deterioration of the internal
situation in the Kingdom, provoked by these assassinations, the symbol of France as a
protector of the unity of the Southern Slavs and of their state was conveyed in artistic
expression. The visible material form was meant to be easily understood by the public and
to ‘make eternal’ the role of France in the KSCS at this moment of instability. It was also
supposed to express symbolically that the Kingdom did not lose French support by
establishing dictatorship.
The luxurious new French legation building in Belgrade, approved by the French
Parliament in 1929, was not only meant for diplomatic practicalities, but also as a
symbolic statement. The new building, of ‘essentially French design’ and conforming to
the ‘most elegant’ époque of French architecture, expressed the will to erect a building
‘worthy of French –Yugoslav relations’.13
The Monument of Gratitude to France in Belgrade, which the government decided in
November 1929 to erect, was first symbolic in the choice of architect and second in the
form of the monument. In a report to French Foreign Minister A. Briand, the French
Ambassador in Belgrade admitted that ‘I personally supported the choice of Mestrovic,
firstly because he is the greatest Yugoslav sculptor, whose talent seeks to invoke strength
and heroism and secondly because he is a Croat who, by birth, symbolises the unity of all
Yugoslavs embraced by France’.14 The monument represented a large female Figure
(Marianne) in a heroic pose, reminding ‘Yugoslavs’ of the sacrifices and feats of their
great protector – France.

2. The application of French cultural policy in the KSCS

What was the Quai d’Orsay’s general policy in matters of culture? What was the
geographical range of its cultural policy and who were its agents? What were the domains,
possibilities and limits of the French cultural policy in the KSCS? In which regions and
circles was French cultural action pursued? By what means? What was the role of the state
and of private associations?
 European Review of History—Revue européenne d’histoire 39

2.1. The general policy of the Quai d’Orsay in the field of culture
The three main elements of the Quai d’Orsay’s general cultural policy following the Great
War were to centralise cultural policy within the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, to reach
agreement between the state and the church on cultural policy abroad, and to make cultural
action follow the general policy of the Quai d’Orsay.
The French government was aware of the importance of its global prestige after
the war. Short-term political propaganda to attract neutral countries into its camp during
the war had shown its weaknesses. Therefore, the government decided to act abroad in the
field of culture to reinforce sympathy, solidarity and intellectual relationships with France
on a long-term basis. This process, already launched before the war, had shown the
increasing importance of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in organising and managing
external ‘cultural policy’, taking over from the private cultural initiatives that had
predominated before. In conformity with the new organisation of its services, the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs followed up its creation in 1910 of the Bureau of French Foreign
Schools and Works, with a 1920 decree setting up the French Foreign Works Service,
which was directed by the diplomat Albert Milhaud. Its mission was to ensure
‘France’s intellectual expansion abroad’ and to ‘maintain or spread the good reputation of
our country beyond our borders’.
The service was organised on a global level, with separate departments for Europe, the
French-controlled Levant (Syria and Lebanon), other territories of the Levant, the Far East
and America. Each department was divided into three budgeting sections, managing loans
for universities and schools, arts and literature, and miscellaneous works respectively.
French embassies and consulates abroad supervised the use of these funds for particular
actions. From its creation, the budget of the service was constantly increased, reaching the
amount of 79 million French francs at the end of the interwar period.
The cultural action of the Quai d’Orsay was primarily aimed at expanding the use of the
French language, which was the preferred means of influence at all levels. The main concern
was to contribute to the education of humanist and technical elites in foreign countries and,
later, to spread French culture to the masses. Methods of achieving this goal included
inviting foreign students to France, sending French professors abroad and establishing
French educational institutions abroad. There was continuous support for French religious
institutions abroad, as 1905 laws separating religious from secular schools did not apply to
foreign policy. Public institutions such as grammar schools, the Institut français and
Alliance française and private religious or lay institutions (the order of Assumption Sisters,
the French Lay Mission, Universal Israeli Alliance) were all encouraged and financed by the
Quai d’Orsay to a greater or lesser extent. The dissemination of French books and artistic
exchanges (theatre, art, music) became increasingly important.
French cultural policy followed general French policy in Europe, which can be divided
into three periods: (1) immediately after the war (1918 – 1920); 2) the period after the Paris
Peace Agreement (1920 – 1924) and (3) ‘the Locarno era’ (1924 –beginning of the 1930s).
The immediate postwar period in Europe was characterised by efforts to establish
peace at the Paris Conference. In Central Europe and in the Balkans, where France
maintained a military presence, political instability was caused by the Polish –Soviet war
and the long absence of established borders. In the context of persistent instability
following the Armistice, one of France’s first cultural actions concerning Eastern and
South-Eastern Europe was carried out on French territory. This began as a private action
but was immediately encouraged by the state. In December 1918, pursuant to a request by
French universities, the government authorised the introduction of free courses in the
40 S. Sretenovic

Polish, Czech and Serbo-Croatian languages and literatures at the National School of
Living Oriental Languages in Paris. Several months later, these courses were transformed
into permanent teaching positions, the required funds were planned into the budget and
lecturers were chosen from among competent French teachers. At the same time, an
Institute of Slavonic Languages was created at Strasbourg University.15
The characteristics of the second period were the strict implementation of the
Versailles treaty and France’s uncompromising attitude to Germany, which culminated in
France’s military intervention in the Ruhr region. In Eastern Europe, France supported the
creation of the Little Entente and reinforced its economic penetration through the firm of
Schneider. The government continued its cultural penetration of the region by sending
French professors on missions abroad with a double role: to spread French influence and
keep Paris informed about the general situation in the countries where they had been sent.
In the 1920s, professors Strowski and Denis of the Sorbonne visited Poland and
Czechoslovakia respectively.16 In 1921, professor Geny of Nancy University went to
Poland17 and French professors were also sent to Romania for the opening of Cluj
University.18 These missions showed clearly the goals of the Quai d’Orsay: to collect
information about the German presence, and to explore ways of adapting French cultural
policy to regional specificities. At the end of their missions, the professors had to submit
reports directly to the Quai d’Orsay. The opening of French-language departments and
grammar schools or French religious institutions followed the professors’ missions.
During the third period, the period of relaxation of the ‘Locarno era’, France made
efforts to increase its investments, its economic presence and its cultural influence in
Central Europe and in the Balkans. The Quai d’Orsay founded several Instituts Français in
Eastern Europe: first in Prague in 1923, then in Warsaw in 1924 and Belgrade in 1927.
Their role was broader than that of exchanging university professors or setting up grammar
schools. They were intended not only to influence the elite, but also to have an impact on
the masses by organising numerous lectures and courses of French civilisation and
literature, opening French libraries and distributing French books.
At the end of the 1920s, the economic policy of France in Eastern Europe showed its
first signs of weakness. The factors of geographic proximity and the compatibility of the
highly industrialised German economy with the agrarian economies of the small Eastern
European countries started to show, and this had its consequences for culture. For
example, the French Ambassador in Warsaw in 1930 had to conclude with regret that if the
Polish aristocracy spoke the French language fluently, this was not at all the case with
other layers of society. He noted that Germany was making big efforts to ensure the spread
of its language in Eastern Europe, and had had great success in commercial circles.19

2.2. Strengthening the KSCS in the long-term perspective

French government cultural policy in the KSCS was conditioned by the specific internal
and external position of the new state.

2.2.1. The complex position of the KSCS

The disappearance of the Austro-Hungarian, German and Russian Empires greatly
transformed the European geopolitical balance of power, especially along the Danube and
in the Balkans. With the support of France at Versailles, a new Yugoslav state was formed
by annexing the Southern Slav territories of the Austro-Hungarian Empire to the initial
nucleus of Serbia. The Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenians was a heterogeneous
 European Review of History—Revue européenne d’histoire 41

state as regards ethnicity and religion. The Serbs and the Croats shared a language, but had
different religions. The population of more than 12 million included approximately 45%
Orthodox Serbs and about 25% Catholic Croats. More than two million people, or 17% of
the population, belonged to non-Serb, Croat or Slovenian minority groups. Many of these,
including the Hungarians, Germans, Albanians and Italians, were in contact with their
national states, and so potentially open to irredentist temptations.
The economy of the KSCS was also markedly heterogeneous. The kingdom inherited
six different customs areas, five currencies, four railway networks and three banking
systems. The war upset demographic harmony and, especially in Serbia, resulted in serious
material destruction.
As for foreign affairs, from its inception the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and
Slovenians faced the aspirations of Italy along the Adriatic coast. Italian policy became
even more threatening when Mussolini came to power in 1922. Fascist Italy wanted to
weaken the KSCS and backed all separatist movements within the Kingdom. It could
count on help from Austria, Hungary, Albania and Bulgaria, countries neighbouring the
Kingdom which were also ‘dissatisfied’ with the Versailles treaty.
Upon his arrival in Belgrade in December 1918, French Ambassador Fontenay
expressed his fears that Germany or Italy could take advantage of the internal situation in
the KSCS and that their geographic proximity and existing cultural relations could
influence Croatia, Slovenia and the Adriatic coast economically and culturally. In this
way, they might ‘demolish the results of Allied victory’. He recommended to his
government immediate economic and cultural action to reinforce the new state.
However, French cultural action was not welcomed everywhere in the KSCS. In the
former Austro-Hungarian provinces, and especially in Croatia, it faced certain widely held
reservations, particularly in the local administration and print media and among the local
clergy.
For example, the French Consul in Zagreb, Jules de Berne-Lagarde, explained that
the local government in Zagreb had refused for political reasons to recognise the opening of
the French consulate there in May 1920, though this had been ordered by the central
administration in Belgrade. Describing the entrenched cultural tradition in the former Austro-
Hungarian regions as ‘Austro-Hungarian arrogance’, he said that ‘in the minds of politicians,
the local authorities and what we usually call the community, we remained, in the same
degree as the Serbs, the “enemy” against which the Croatian people fought during the war’.20
Fontenay blamed underground German schemes, which had found fertile soil in
Croatia, for these acts against the unity of the state. Starting in January 1920, he identified
several German nationals engaged in propaganda activity aimed at encouraging ‘the
Yugoslavs to turn against the Alliance’. This open propaganda campaign significantly
intensified several months before the elections for the KSCS Constituent Assembly, when,
especially in Zagreb newspapers like Jutarnji list (The Morning News) and Agramer
Tagblatt, a noisy press campaign was directed against France and Serbia. Fontenay was
certain that Berlin and Budapest had launched a combined action against the KSCS, and
suspected the existence of more or less hidden support from the Bulgarian and Albanian
committees.21 What is more, he reported that Catholic priests had launched a campaign to
incite Croatian public opinion against Orthodox Serbs and secular France.

2.2.2. How did France deal with these difficulties in the KSCS in the sphere of culture?
French cultural action in the KSCS was organised at two levels: that of the central
administration and the local level. The central administration was seen as the basis of the
42 S. Sretenovic

new state and the means of spreading French culture throughout the country. On the level
of the Yugoslav state, France acted by providing education for the francophone elite, by
taking action within the army and by taking action in relation to the dynasty. Where the
central administration was not accepted because of political problems or because of the
competing influence of other countries, France acted directly at the regional level. This
was especially the case in Croatia, where the central administration was rejected and seen
as predominantly Serbian and where German influence was strong. This was also the case
on the Hungarian border and in Macedonia, where the Belgrade government and its
protector France were practically unknown and where France faced an augmentation of
Italian influence.

(A) On the level of the ‘Yugoslav’ state. French cultural action was primarily designed to
spread the French language, and thus promote French ideas and lifestyle. It was believed
that these could help ease the kingdom’s internal differences.
(a) The education of the francophone elites. The education of the Francophone elites
relied on the prewar tradition of sending Serbian students to France. This tradition was
reinforced during the war when Serbia was under occupation and France provided
education for almost 4000 Serbian secondary school and university students. A large
number of these went on to form the Serbian political and cultural elite. This tradition
was cultivated after the war by the signing of the French –Yugoslav University and
School Convention in March 1920. Its aim was to entice students from the former
Austro-Hungarian regions and to lead the ‘Yugoslav youth away from the influence of
German universities’.22
The convention envisaged the sending of French professors on missions to the KSCS
and the introduction of French courses there. Following a note by the French Foreign
Works Service at the end of 1924, university professors of French were put in charge of
lectures at the universities of Belgrade, Zagreb and Ljubljana. More than 10 secondary
school teachers were also sent from France, French courses were introduced in more than
30 cities of the Kingdom and almost 100 scholarships were granted to Yugoslav young
people to complete their studies in France.23
Besides the education of the elites in the humanities, France contributed to the
education of medical and technical professionals, who were urgently needed in the new
state. These came back to their homeland with technical knowledge, but also with
knowledge of the French language and great respect and admiration for French science and
engineering. They were also keenly aware of the French lifestyle and had established
personal friendships in France.
(b) Action within the army. The army, together with the dynasty, was considered one of
the most solid foundations of the new Kingdom. However, it contained a large number of
Croat and Slovenian officers of the former Austro-Hungarian Army, who were educated in
Austrian military schools. They encountered incomprehension and hate from their Serbian
colleagues, who had been raised on the French model. The Serbian officers generally spoke
French, studied French rules and read French military magazines and other publications.
The former Austro-Hungarian officers mostly spoke German and followed the news
coming from Berlin with great interest.24 The French Military Attaché, Colonel Raymond
Deltel, made a round of the garrisons in order to gather information. He was surprised by
the fact that, among these officers, in spite of their knowledge of French, German had
remained the everyday language more than Serbo-Croat!25 He asked the Foreign Works
Service to send French propaganda books, to be handed out to the military as gifts. A year
 European Review of History—Revue européenne d’histoire 43

later, he asked for some French movies to be sent because these were more welcome than
written texts. Cultural action was followed by the provision of French funds. In 1928, King
Aleksandar attended festivities to mark the inauguration of the Arsenal of Kragujevac in
Central Serbia, built with French money. On this occasion, M. Lavergne, a French
professor at the Professional Municipality School, proposed to the French Foreign Works
Service that General Zivojin Trzibasic, manager of the Arsenal, should be decorated with
the Legion d’honneur. The citation said that ‘this high-ranking officer has offered great
services to the spread of French influence. He decided to replace German language courses
with French language ones in the professional school affiliated to the arsenal.’26
The KSCS army was regarded as a symbol of the victory that brought the war to an end,
a symbolic significance carefully cultivated by French diplomacy. In October 1928, during
a period of great Italian – Yugoslav tension, the French provided the highest-ranking and
most numerous diplomatic delegation attending tenth-anniversary celebrations in Belgrade
of the breakthrough on the Thessalonica front. The French Ambassador in Belgrade, Emile
Dard, was very satisfied with this because the festivities left a profound impression on the
public and the French mission was a clear success. Dard was especially pleased with the
fact that the French mission was more numerous and higher-ranking than the Italian.27
He used the occasion to decide that the new building of the French Embassy in Belgrade
should be designed by French architects in the French style.
(c) Cultural action in relation to the dynasty. French diplomacy had great confidence in
Aleksandar Karadjordjevic, the hereditary Prince of Serbia. He had acted as regent since
1914 in place of his father Peter I, who had shown tremendous energy at the beginning of
the war but was then weakened by illness. When Peter died in August 1921, Aleksandar
ascended the throne as Alexander I. He was a Serbian patriot who relied on his army to
build a strong state and was called ‘King, Knight and Unifier’28 by his followers.
The question of King Alexander’s marriage cropped up very soon. It was an
opportunity to reinforce the French political position in the KSCS, but also to promote its
cultural influence. The issue demonstrated well how French diplomacy functioned at this
time, including its possibilities and limitations.
Commander Picot, aide-de-camp of Regent Aleksandar since 1916, transmitted a
message to the Quai d’Orsay in April 1919 reporting that ‘a rumour was abroad that the
Prince would marry an Italian Princess’.29 This led French diplomats to undertake almost
three years of lobbying at the Yugoslav Court.
In his answer to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Fontenay, the French Ambassador in
Belgrade, gave the opinion ‘that it is of great interest to France to attend to this question
of the Regent’s marriage and to place a French girl close to him to make it possible to
influence developments in the Serbian, Croatian and Slovenian territories’.30 Fontenay
thought that the sovereign’s spouse could influence the court and even national policy,
and that the prince’s character was the best guarantee that the French cause would be
upheld. As proof, Fontenay stressed the strength and quality of the personal relations that
he had established with the Regent. He also stressed the need to give a personal award to
the head of state for the exemplary loyalty he had shown to France during the war, but
also in order to ensure the maintenance of French influence in the KSCS. Fontenay also
discussed this question with the President of the Republic, Raymond Poincaré, during a
visit to Paris.31 This proposition was favourably received in the Quai d’Orsay, which
insisted, however, that this matter should be treated as secret.32
Fontenay did his best to promote an engagement to the Princess of Orleans, daughter of
the Duke de Guise, but this was refused, causing deep regret among French diplomats,33
who nevertheless continued to pursue this idea.
44 S. Sretenovic

After Romanian –KSCS political negotiations in Sinaia in 1922, the Foreign Minister
of Romania, Take Ionesco, and his Yugoslav counterpart, Momcilo Nincic (a personal
friend of the King), presented a plan to establish family relations between the Yugoslav
and Romanian dynasties, as a symbol of friendship between the two states. Princess
Maria of Romania, the daughter of King Ferdinand Hohenzollern, gave her agreement to
be engaged to King Aleksandar. The new French ambassador in Belgrade, Frédéric
Clement-Simon, though he was also inspired by some traditional conceptions,
nevertheless remained realistic: ‘There is no doubt that Hohenzollern and Saxe-Coburg
are not the same as the Bourbons, but from a political point of view, this marriage is a
good one in our eyes, because we are encouraging the bringing together of small powers
in Central Europe, where we intend to preserve a favourable situation forever.’34
The Minister was worried, however, because Princess Maria’s personality was clearly
shaped by an English education. Therefore, he suggested that France ‘should try to save
the situation’ by taking an important place in the marriage ceremonies. He suggested
that the Maréchal Franchet d’Esperey, former supreme commander of allied forces on
the Thessalonica front, should be present at the ceremony, and that two small war
vessels should sail down the Danube and be anchored in front of the Belgrade Fortress,
flying the French flag. Finally, he wanted to bring the refinement of ‘French chic’ to the
new Court, by sending furniture for the palace and cars from Paris, and a French acting
company to play in Belgrade. He also had a larger, more long-term project in mind.
‘I would like them to establish a good habit from the very beginning’, he said,
‘by speaking French in the presence of the sovereign, which could only please him
because he loves our language as he loves our country. But we have to play our part in
this matter very carefully, with discretion certainly, but always having in mind the goal
that we are pursuing: to connect this country and the whole of Central Europe very
profoundly to French influence.’35 The propositions of the ambassador were all
approved and a delegation led by the Maréchal Franchet d’Esperey and Fontenay, the
former ambassador in Belgrade, was sent to attend the ceremony. Clement-Simon
thought that it would be ‘good policy’ to suggest that the royal couple travel to France
as, in this way, the new consort might become open to French ideas and influence by
being accorded respect and attention.36

(B) On the regional level: (a) in Croatia; (b) on the Hungarian border (c) in Macedonia.
On the regional level, the French state relied on French religious institutions to exercise
cultural influence in Catholic circles. This policy was undertaken in the regions where
Italian influence, direct or indirect, was present.
In order to thwart the anti-French and anti-Serbian activity of Catholic clergy in Croatia
in 1920, Fontenay proposed to his government to use the influence of the Apostolic Nuncio
in the KSCS, Monsignor Francesco Cherubini.37 He agreed with Cherubini to establish
French Catholic institutions in Croatia. During the conference of Catholic bishops in the
KSCS, Monsignor Cherubini proposed the project but immediately faced extreme hostility
towards it from Monsignor Antun Bauer, archbishop of Zagreb, and other archbishops.38
The decision was nevertheless made to open French religious institutions in Sarajevo and
Belgrade. Consul Berne-Lagarde concluded: ‘Under these conditions, it seems that we
should wait for better times regarding taking action in Croatia, Slovenia and on the
Dalmatic coast.’ By 1921, the position of Monsignor Bauer had changed and he began
supporting a ‘group of ladies from the best society of Zagreb’, who had submitted a request
to the Consulate to set up a French religious institution in Zagreb.39 The ambassador wanted
 European Review of History—Revue européenne d’histoire 45

to know if the proposed religious order, the Chanoinesses de saint-Augustin, could provide
all guarantees ‘on the educational and national levels’. After receiving a positive answer
from the Quai d’Orsay, Fontenay concluded that ‘this would be a means to expand our
intellectual influence in an environment which otherwise could be completely lost for us and
which has been entirely influenced until now by German-Austrian culture’.40
In Subotica, in the northern part of Serbia, close to the border with Hungary and
inhabited by a significant majority of Catholic Slavs and Hungarians, it was agreed in 1928
to create a French religious school.41 France had a great interest in doing so because the city
was close to Hungary, where Italy wielded substantial political influence. Until then France
was practically unknown in the region and German culture was dominant and unopposed.
Macedonia was very important too. It lay on the main route of Italian penetration
into the Balkans, from Albania into Bulgaria. From the Ottoman period, France had
acted as the guardian of several institutions there. In Bitolj (Monastir), there were two
French religious institutions; a school managed by brothers and sisters of Lazarus and
the graveyard of 6000 French soldiers.42

Conclusion
French– KSCS cultural relations reached their peak in the 1920s. They built on
foundations established by the Franco –Serbian alliance in the Great War and on the
mutual emotional relations woven between large numbers of Serbian emigrants, pupils
and soldiers on one hand and the French and their army on the other. These relations were
carefully cultivated by the French and Serbian politicians of the time, and had both a
symbolic and a material aspect, as France played a dominant role as a model state spreading its
influence abroad. But not all nations of the Southern Slavs perceived France in the same way.
If France was a model to the Serbs, this was not the case for the Croats. The differences
between these two nations had increased and French action to support the ‘development’ of a
‘Yugoslav’ identity and of national cohesion had limited results. French influence over the
Croats faced important constraints and never went beyond the modest results achieved by the
French clergy within a very narrow circle of the community.
Changes in the international balance of power at the beginning of the 1930s, like the
general economic crisis, the weakening of France, and the rising power of fascist Italy and
Hitler’s Germany, marked a turning point. Future researchers should examine the
consequences of these changes for Franco – Yugoslav political, military and economic
relations and also the impact on their cultural relations.

Notes
1. Berard, Victor. La Serbie, 14.
2. Op. cit., 26.
3. Op. cit., 37.
4. AMFA, Z-Europe 1918– 1940, Yugoslavia 1, from Fontenay to Pichon, Corfu, July 15, 1918.
5. Op. cit., Yugoslavia 25, from Fontenay to Pichon, Corfu, July 15, 1918.
6. Op. cit., Yugoslavia 3, Note of the MFA, Paris, July 6, 1918.
7. Djokic, Yugoslavism.
8. CDA, Belgrade Legation 171, Fontenay to MFA, Belgrade, August 2, 1920.
9. Hobsbawm and Ranger, The Invention of Tradition.
10. Op. cit., Yugoslavia 121, Report for MFA, Subotica, July 15, 1921.
11. Le Temps, November 13, 1927.
12. Milza, Pierre. “L’Italie fasciste et les Balkans.” Relations internationales 104 (2000): 397–411.
13. AMFA, Yugoslavia 122, from Dard to Briand, Belgrade, October 10, 1928.
14. Op. cit., Yugoslavia 75, from Dard to Briand, Belgrade, November 26, 1929.
46 S. Sretenovic

15. AMFA, Poland 268, Ministry of Public Education to the MFA, Paris, March 29, 1919.
16. Op. cit., Vice-Consul to MFA, Poznan, November 13, 1920.
17. Op. cit., M. Geny to MFA, Nancy, December 30, 1921.
18. Op. cit., Yugoslavia 119, St. Aulaire to MFA, Bucharest, January 15, 1920.
19. AMFA, Poland 268, Ambassador to the MFA, Warsaw, September 7, 1929.
20. AMFA, Yugoslavia 1, from the Consul to Fontenay, Zagreb, May 27, 1920.
21. Op. cit., Yugoslavia 73, Belgrade, January 11, 1921.
22. Op. cit., Yugoslavia 119, the Convention.
23. Op. cit., Note of the French Foreign Works Service, Paris, October 31, 1924.
24. Op. cit., Yugoslavia 17, the Consul to the MFA, Skoplje, January 21, 1920.
25. Op. cit., from Deltel to the War Minister, Belgrade, February 14, 1920.
26. HSA, 7N3208, French Foreign Works Service, Paris, June 23, 1928.
27. AMFA, Yugoslavia 122, from Dard to Briand, Belgrade, October 10, 1928.
28. Batakovic, Yougoslavie.
29. Op. cit., Yugoslavia 25, MFA note, Paris, September 24, 1919.
30. Op. cit., Yugoslavia 6, Belgrade, April 9, 1920.
31. Op. cit., 2.
32. Op. cit., Yugoslavia 6, MFA to Fontenay, Paris, April 11, 1920.
33. Op. cit., Yugoslavia 6, Belgrade, January 20, 1922.
34. Op. cit., 2.
35. Op. cit., 5.
36. Op. cit., Yugoslavia 6, Belgrade, August 22, 1922.
37. Op. cit., Yugoslavia 43, the Minister to the MFA, Belgrade, February 2, 1920.
38. FDD, tom 1, 1920, document number 415, the Consul to MFA, Zagreb, April 28, 1920.
39. AMFA, Yugoslavia 43, from Clement-Simon to Briand, Belgrade, September 9, 1921.
40. Ibid.
41. Op. cit., Yugoslavia 119, from Dard to Briand, Belgrade, November, 1928.
42. Op. cit., Yugoslavia 1, from Clement-Simon to Briand, September 28, 1921.

Sources
Archives and edited documents
Archives of the Ministry for Foreign Affaires (AMFA), Paris: set Z- Europe 1918– 1940,
Yugoslavia, Poland and Czechoslovakia.
Centre of Diplomatic Archives (CDA), Nantes: set Belgrade Legation 171.
History Service of the Army (HSA), Vincennes: set 7N, Yugoslavia.
French Diplomatic Documents (FDD): years 1920– 1932, vol. 1 (1920), Paris, 1997.

Press
Le temps

Notes on contributor
Dr. Stanislav Sretenovic is the senior research fellow at the Institute of Contemporary History in
Belgrade, Serbia.
He obtained his PhD from the European University Institute in Florence (Italy) in the field of history and
civilizations in 2006. The title of his PhD thesis is: “France and the New Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats
and Slovenians 1918–1929: the Unequal Inter-state Relations”. Dr. Sretenovic holds an MA degree from
the University of Nancy, France (2000) and a BA from the University of Belgrade (1996). He specialized
in European studies at the European University Center, University of Nancy (1999).
He was visiting researcher at several important academic institutions including EHESS, CERI, Paris and
EFR, Rome. He researched in the diplomatic archives of the Quai d’Orsay, Paris, Public Records Office,
London and the diplomatic archives of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Farnesina). Dr. Sretenovic
is the author of a number of publications in the fields of International Relations, Franco-Serbian relations
and history of diplomacy of European states. He regularly takes part in international seminars and
conferences, both as an educator and keynote speaker.
He is fluent in Serbian, French, English and Italian.
 European Review of History—Revue européenne d’histoire 47

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