In Re-Justice Cornejo, A.M. No.

16-10-05-SB, March 14, 2017

On October 20, 2016, this Court received a letter from Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice Amparo M. Cabotaje-Tang
stating that Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Maria Cristina J. Cornejo (Justice Cornejo) has been on sick leave since
June 13, 2016. According to the attached clinical abstract, Justice Cornejo was diagnosed with acute cerebrovascular
disease in bilateral cerebral and cerebellar hemispheres; controlled hypertension; systemic lupus erythematous;
pancytopenia; colon cancer stage III s/p left hemicolectomy; and acute kidney injury secondary to poor oral intake.

On January 13, 2017, Justice Cornejo wrote Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno to request the approval of her
optional retirement, effective March 1, 2017, due to serious health concerns.
On February 6, 2017, Presiding Justice Amparo M. Cabotaje-Tang recommended the approval of Justice Cornejo's
request.

1. Does the social justice principle apply to those who are forced to cease from service for disabilities
beyond their control?
Yes. In light of Justice Cornejo's actual medical condition, this Court will treat her letter request as one for retirement
due to disability. The social justice principle behind retirement benefits also applies to those who are forced to cease
from service for disabilities beyond their control.

Digital Telecom vs. Ayapana, G.R. No. 195614, Jan. 10, 2018
Digital Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. (petitioner or company) hired respondent as Key Accounts Manager for
its telecommunication products and services.

On 19 January 2007, petitioner issued a Notice of Dismissal finding respondent guilty of "breach by the employee of
the trust and confidence reposed in him by management or by a company representative" under petitioner's
disciplinary rules, which merited dismissal for the first offense.

Aggrieved, respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint, ruling that
substantial evidence exists that respondent was involved in an event that justified petitioner's loss of trust and
confidence in him, and therefore, he was validly dismissed from employment. Respondent then appealed to the
NLRC.

2. Even with a finding that respondent was validly dismissed, may separation pay be granted?
Yes. Even with a finding that respondent was validly dismissed, separation pay may be granted as a measure of social
justice.

By way of exception, the Court has allowed the grant of separation pay based on equity and as a measure of social
justice, as long as the dismissal was for causes other than serious conduct or those manifesting moral depravity.

COURAGE vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 213446, July 3, 2018
On August 6, 2014, petitioners Confederation for Unity, Recognition and Advancement of Government Employees
(COURAGE), et al., organizations/unions of government employees from the Sandiganbayan, Senate of the
Philippines, Court of Appeals, Department of Agrarian Reform, Department of Social Welfare and Development,
Department of Trade and Industry, Metro Manila Development Authority, National Housing Authority and local
government of Quezon City, filed a Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus, imputing grave abuse of discretion on the
part of respondent CIR in issuing RMO No. 23-2014. According to petitioners, RMO No. 23-2014 classified as
taxable compensation, the following allowances, bonuses, compensation for services granted to government
employees, which they alleged to be considered by law as non-taxable fringe and de minimis benefits.

3. Are Sections III, IV and VII or RMO No. 23-2014 valid and constitutional?
Yes. Sections III and IV of the assailed RMO do not charge any new or additional tax. On the contrary, they merely
mirror the relevant provisions of the NIRC of 1997, as amended, and its implementing rules on the withholding tax on
compensation income.

Similar to Sections III and IV, Section VII was issued in accordance with the provisions of the NIRC of 1997, as
amended, and RR No. 2-98. Tested against the provisions of the NIRC of 1997, as amended, Section VII of RMO No.
23-2014 does not define a crime and prescribe a penalty therefor. Section VII simply mirrors the relevant provisions of
the NIRC of 1997, as amended, on the penalties for the failure of the withholding agent to withhold and remit the
correct amount of taxes, as implemented by RR No. 2-98.

4. Can this ruling be applied retroactively?

No. As a measure of equity and compassionate social justice, the Court deems it proper to clarify and declare, pro hac
vice, that its ruling on the validity of Sections III and IV of the assailed RMO is to be given only prospective effect.
Apo Fruits vs. Land Bank, G.R. Nos. 217985-86, March 21, 2018
Apo was the registered owner of a 115.2179 hectare land situated in San Isidro, Tagum City, Davao del Norte covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-113359 (subject property). On October 12, 1995, Apo voluntarily offered
to sell the subject property to the government for purposes of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).

On October 16, 1996, Apo received from the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Provincial Agrarian Reform
Office (PARO) in Davao a Notice of Land Valuation and Acquisition informing Apo that the value of the subject
property was Php 16.5484 per square meter or only for the total amount of Php 165,484.47 per ha. Finding the said
valuation low, Apo rejected the offer.

Meanwhile, the DAR requested LBP to deposit the amount of Php 3,814,053.53 as initial payment for the subject
property, at the rate of Php 3.3102 per sq m.

Not satisfied with the valuation of LBP, Apo filed a complaint for determination of just compensation with the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).

5. Whether or not the CA erred in finding that the amount of PHP103.33 per sq m is the just
compensation for the subject property?
Yes. Php 130.00 per sq m is the reasonable and just amount considering the nature of the property involved.

To guide the RTC-SAC in the exercise of its function to determine just compensation as its judicial function, Section
17 of R.A. No. 6657 enumerates the factors required to be taken into account to correctly determine just
compensation.

Thus, the just compensation for the subject property taking into account the distance of the subject property to
different landmarks in Tagum City, the fact that it is planted with commercial bamboos, the Average of Sales Data
used by the commissioners, the Deeds of Sale of properties found near and adjacent to the subject property, is hereby
fixed at Php 130.00 per sq m.

6. Up to when should the 12% interest on the unpaid just compensation should be reckoned: until May 9,
2008; or until June 30, 2013; or up to the present?
The LBP is liable to pay legal interest of 12% counted from December 9, 1996, the time of the taking until June 30,
2013. Thereafter, or beginning July 1, 2013 until fully paid, the just compensation shall earn 6% legal interest in
accordance with Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Monetary Board Circular No. 799, Series of 2013.

Land Bank vs. Franco, G.R. No. 203242, March 12, 2019
Lucy Grace Franco and Elma Gloria Franco (the Francos) were the registered owners of parcels of agricultural land in
Barangay Maquina, Dumangas, Iloilo. The Francos offered the parcels of land for sale to the Department of Agrarian
Reform under the Voluntary Offer to Sell of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program in 1995.

During the summary proceedings, the parcels of land were valued at P714,713.78 which the Francos did not agree
with. Upon a Petition for Review, the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board raised the amount to
P739,461.43. Still dissatisfied with the amount, the Francos on August 3, 2000 filed before the Regional Trial Court,
sitting as the Special Agrarian Court, a Complaint for the determination of just compensation.

The Special Agrarian Court fixed the just compensation for the 12.5977 hectares of land area actually taken by the
government in the amount of P1,024,115.49. It ordered Land Bank to pay the remaining balance with legal interest at
12% per annum.

Moreover, it held that under Section 19 of Republic Act No. 6657, or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, the
Francos were also entitled to an additional five percent (5%) cash payment by way of incentive for voluntarily
offering their lots for sale.

7. Is the additional five percent (5%) cash incentive to be paid on top of the awarded just compensation
for the property?
No. The five percent (5%) cash incentive under Section 19, in relation to Section 18 of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law, is not in addition to the amount of just compensation awarded by the courts. The incentive only applies
to the cash payment to be awarded.
Section 19 provides: Incentives for Voluntary Offers for Sale. — Landowners, other than banks and other financial
institutions, who voluntarily offer their lands for sale shall be entitled to an additional five percent (5%) cash payment.
The landowner shall receive 35% of the just compensation in cash, while the remaining 65% shall be paid in bonds if
the aggregate area acquired by the Department of Agrarian Reform is below 24 hectares. However, if the landowner
voluntarily offers their land to the Department of Agrarian Reform, as in this case, the landowner shall be entitled to
an additional five percent (5%) only on the cash portion.

Ocampo vs. Enriquez, GR NO. 225973, Nov 8, 2016

Public respondent Secretary of National Defense Delfin N. Lorenzana issued a Memorandum to the public respondent
Chief of Staff of the AFP, General Ricardo R. Visaya, regarding the interment of Marcos at the Libingan Ng Mga
Bayani (LNMB) in reference to the Verbal Order of President Duterte.
Respondent AFP Rear Admiral Ernesto C. Enriquez issued directives to the Philippine Army (PA) Commanding
General for the Funeral Honors and Service to former President Marcos.

8. Will the burial of Marcos at the LNMB violate the human rights of the HRVVs to “full” and “effective”
reparation?

NO. The enforcement of HRVVs right under RA 10306 will surely not be impaired by the internment of Marcos at the
LNMB. Furthermore, the Philippines is more than compliant with its international obligations on human rights.
Contrary to petitioners' postulation, our nation's history will not be instantly revised by a single resolve of President
Duterte, acting through the public respondents, to bury Marcos at the LNMB.

Wilson vs. Ermita, GR NO. 189220 Dec 7, 2016

The present case has its roots in the incarceration and subsequent acquittal of Wilson for the crime of rape. On
September 16, 1996, Wilson, a British national, was accused and charged with the crime of consummated rape by a
12-year-old girl, the daughter of his Filipina live-in partner. The girl was assisted by her biological father in filing the
criminal complaint. Immediately thereafter, Wilson was taken into custody. Wilson was released from detention the
day after the acquittal. He immediately left the Philippines for the United Kingdom (UK). Upon his return in the UK,
Wilson sought compensation from the Board of Claims (BOC) of the Department of Justice (DOJ) pursuant to R.A.
No. 7309 through counsel as one who was unjustly accused, convicted and imprisoned but released by virtue of an
acquittal.
9. WON Wilson has a legal right to enforce the United Nations Human Rights Committee Communication
No. 868/1992 against the Philippines?

NO. What was ratified by Congress were the ICCPR and the Optional Protocol, excluding the View of the Committee
which does not form part of the treaty.

People vs. Bayabos, G.R. No. 171222, Feb. 18, 2015

Fernando C. Balidoy, Jr. (Balidoy) was admitted as a probationary midshipman at the PMMA. In order to reach active
status, all new entrants were required to successfully complete the mandatory “Indoctrination and Orientation Period,”
which was set from 2 May to 1 June 2001. Balidoy died on 3 May 2001.

The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) probed the death of Balidoy. After months of investigation, it forwarded
its findings to the provincial prosecutor of Zambales. Subsequently, the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Zambales
issued a Resolution finding probable cause to charge the principals to the crime of hazing. A criminal case against
Alvarez et al. was then filed with the Regional Trial Court of Iba, Zambales (RTC–Zambales).

The Assistant Provincial Prosecutor also endorsed to the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military the finding of probable
cause to charge the school authorities as accomplices to hazing.

10. What is the extent of liability of schools and school authorities under R.A. No. 8049, aka the “Anti-
Hazing Law”?
The school authorities including faculty members who consent to the hazing or who have actual knowledge thereof,
but failed to take any action to prevent the same from occurring shall be punished as accomplices for the acts of
hazing committed by the perpetrators.

In the case of school authorities and faculty members who have had no direct participation in the act, they may
nonetheless be charged as accomplices if it is shown that (1) hazing, as established by the above elements, occurred;
(2) the accused are school authorities or faculty members; and (3) they consented to or failed to take preventive action
against hazing in spite actual knowledge thereof.
CoTesCUP vs. Sec. of Education, G.R. No. 216930, etc., Oct. 09, 2018
These are consolidated petitions, assailing the constitutionality of Republic Act (RA) No. 10533 (K to 12 Law), RA
No. 10157 (Kindergarten Education Act), and related issuances of the Department of Education (DepEd), Commission
on Higher Education (CHED), Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) and Technical Education and Skills
Development Authority (TESDA) implementing the K to 12 Basic Education Program.

Claiming that the K to 12 Basic Education Program violates various constitutional provisions, petitions were filed
before the Court praying that the Kindergarten Education Act, K to 12 Law, K to 12 IRR, DO No. 31, Joint
Guidelines, and CMO No. 20, be declared unconstitutional.

11. Does the K to 12 law limit access to education (by making kindergarten compulsory) and cause a de
facto privatization of senior high school education (through the voucher system) in violation of the
constitutional mandate of free high school education?
No. Petitioners' argument that the establishment of the voucher system will result in the de facto privatization of senior
high school is without any basis. The voucher system is one of the mechanisms established by the State through RA
No. 6728, otherwise known as the Government Assistance to Students and Teachers in Private Education Act.

Through the law, the State provided "the mechanisms to improve quality in private education by maximizing the use
of existing resources of private education x x x." One of these is the voucher system where underprivileged high
school students become eligible for full or partial scholarship for degree or vocational/technical courses.

12. Did the legislators violate the Constitution when they made kindergarten and senior high school
compulsory under the K to 12 law (R.A. No. 10533)?
No. There is no conflict between the K to 12 Law and related issuances and the Constitution when it made
kindergarten and senior high school compulsory. The Constitution is clear in making elementary education
compulsory; and the K to 12 Law and related issuances did not change this as, in fact, they affirmed it.

La Sallian Foundation vs. CIR, G.R. No. 202792, February 27, 2019
Petitioner La Sallian Educational Innovators Foundation, Inc. (De La Salle University-College of St. Benilde
Foundation)/for brevity) is a non--stock, non-profit domestic corporation duly organized and existing under the laws
of the Philippines. Respondent is the Commissioner of Internal Revenue who has the power to decide, cancel, and
abate tax liabilities pursuant to Section 204(B) of the Tax Code, as amended.

On June 17, 2005, respondent issued two Assessment Notices which have demand letters against petitioner for
deficiency income tax. The alleged deficiency income tax is in the amount of P122,414,521.70, inclusive of interest.
The other Assessment Notice is for a deficiency value-added tax (VAT) in the amount of P2,752,228.54, inclusive of
interest. On the same date, a separate demand letter was also sent by respondent to petitioner for a compromise penalty
in deficiency VAT in the amount of P25,000.00.

Respondent alleged that the petitioner Foundation has already lost its tax-exempt status, malting it liable to deficiency
income tax.

13. Whether or not the petitioner foundation has lost its tax-exempt status under the 1987 constitution.
No. Petitioner Foundation has presented adequate legal and factual basis to prove that it remains as a tax exempt entity
under Article XIV, Section 4, Paragraph 3 of the 1987 Constitution.

Based on jurisprudence and tax rulings, a taxpayer shall be granted with this tax exemption after proving that: (1) it
falls under the classification of non-stock, non-profit educational institution; and (2) the income it seeks to be
exempted from taxation is used actually, directly and exclusively for educational purposes.

Petitioner Foundation has fulfilled both of the abovementioned requirements.

CoTesCUP vs. Sec. of Education, G.R. No. 216930, etc., Oct. 09, 2018
[FACTS ABOVE]

14. Is the implementation of the K to 12 Law (R.A. No. 10533) a limitation on the right of senior high school
students to choose their professions?
No. There is no conflict between the K to 12 Law and its IRR and the right of the senior high school students to
choose their profession or course of study. The senior high school curriculum is designed in such a way that students
have core subjects and thereafter, they may choose among four strands: 1) Accountancy, Business and Management
(ABM) Strand; 2) Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics (STEM) Strand; 3) Humanities and Social
Sciences (HUMSS) Strand; and 4) General Academic (GA) Strand.
 15. Will the faculty from HEI stand to lose their academic freedom when they are transferred to senior
high school level as provided in the K to 12 Law?
No, the Court does not agree with petitioners that their transfer to the secondary level, as provided by the K to 12 Law
and the assailed issuances, constitutes a violation of their academic freedom. While the Court agrees, in principle, that
security of tenure is an important aspect of academic freedom — that the freedom is only meaningful if the faculty
members are assured that they are free to pursue their academic endeavors without fear of reprisals — it is likewise
equally true that convergence of security of tenure and academic freedom does not preclude the termination of a
faculty member for a valid cause.

CoTesCUP vs. Sec. of Education, G.R. No. 216930, etc. Oct. 09, 2018
[FACTS ABOVE]

16. Does the use of the MT or the regional or native language under K to 12 Law (R.A. No. 10533) as
primary medium of instruction for kindergarten and the first three (3) years of elementary education
contravene Section 7, Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution?
No, it was never the intent of the framers of the Constitution to use only Filipino and English as the exclusive media of
instruction. The Congress has the power to enact a law that designates Filipino as the primary medium of instruction
even in the regions but, in the absence of such law, the regional languages may be used as primary media of
instruction. The Congress, however, opted not to enact such law. On the contrary, the Congress, in the exercise of its
wisdom, provided that the regional languages shall be the primary media of instruction in the early stages of
schooling. Verily, this act of Congress was not only Constitutionally permissible, but was likewise an exercise of an
exclusive prerogative to which the Court cannot interfere with.