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STATEMENT OF CAPABILITY

SAFETY ASSESSMENTS
FOR
OFFSHORE FACILITIES

OFFSHORE DEPARTMENT,
RISK AND RELIABILITY SERVICES

FEBRUARY 1998
Det Norske Veritas Statement of Capability
Offshore i February 1998

Table of Contents

Page
1 SAFETY ASSESSMENTS FOR OFFSHORE FACILITIES................................................................ 1
2 OFFSHORE SAFETY AT DNV ............................................................................................................ 2
3 RANGE OF SERVICES......................................................................................................................... 3
3.1 Concept Safety Evaluations......................................................................................................... 3
3.2 Quantified Risk Assessment (QRA) ............................................................................................ 3
3.3 Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP)................................................................................... 5
3.4 Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) ...................................................................................................... 6
3.5 Evacuation Studies ..................................................................................................................... 6
3.6 Ship Collision Studies................................................................................................................. 6
3.7 Human Factors ........................................................................................................................... 7
3.8 Pipeline Studies .......................................................................................................................... 7
3.9 Simultaneous Drilling and Production ........................................................................................ 8
3.10 Subsea Systems........................................................................................................................... 8
3.11 Platform Modifications ............................................................................................................... 8
3.12 Reliability Studies....................................................................................................................... 8
3.13 Production Regularity/Availability Studies.................................................................................. 8
3.14 Studies by other DNV Departments ............................................................................................ 9
4 SOFTWARE......................................................................................................................................... 10
4.1 OHRAT.................................................................................................................................... 10
4.2 PHAST..................................................................................................................................... 10
4.3 DNV-Pro 97 ............................................................................................................................. 11
4.4 LEAK....................................................................................................................................... 11
4.5 CRASH .................................................................................................................................... 11
4.6 ESCAPE................................................................................................................................... 11
4.7 CARA ...................................................................................................................................... 12
4.8 TECSIM................................................................................................................................... 12
4.9 TECJET ................................................................................................................................... 12
4.10 RAMA...................................................................................................................................... 12
5 DNV - THE COMPANY AND ITS RESOURCES.............................................................................. 14
5.1 COMPANY BACKGROUND .................................................................................................. 14
5.2 COMPUTING AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS.................................................................... 15
5.3 QUALITY ASSURANCE......................................................................................................... 15
5.3.1 Independence and Objectivity ..................................................................................... 15
5.3.2 Technical and Scientific Quality ................................................................................. 16
5.3.3 Practical Benefit to Clients ......................................................................................... 16
6 EXPERIENCE IN OFFSHORE SAFETY STUDIES ......................................................................... 17

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Det Norske Veritas Statement of Capability
Offshore 1 February 1998

1 SAFETY ASSESSMENTS FOR OFFSHORE FACILITIES


The importance of safety in the design and operation of offshore oil and gas installations has
been recognized since the first exploitation of the oil and gas reserves in the North Sea. In the
early days there was a strong reliance placed on codes of practice. As time went on there was
an increasing trend towards the use of various forms of formal safety assessment as part of the
continuing effort to achieve safe conditions for those working offshore and to reduce
investment risks. These safety studies have ranged from simple qualitative safety audits of
existing installations to detailed fault tree analyses of complex systems and quantified risk
assessments of complete integrated platforms.
Safety assessment techniques have particular relevance to offshore operations as those working
on offshore facilities are exposed to a variety of different hazards. These are likely to include
fires and explosions from releases of hydrocarbons from processing equipment or from
blowouts, extreme weather, ship collisions, falling objects, etc. In order to make sensible
decisions on managing the safety of personnel, the relative importance of these hazards needs
to be compared objectively. In order to achieve this, it is necessary to quantify both the degree
of hazard (the magnitude of resulting loss or damage) and the likelihood, or frequency, of that
damage occurring.
Our worldwide experience at DNV has shown that such quantified assessment methods can
provide a valuable input to the engineering design, for example:
• identification of dominant contributors to risk (e.g., inventories that cannot be isolated
easily);
• selection of cost effective solutions (e.g., optimization of wellhead protection systems);
• setting requirements for optimum protection (e.g., specifications for fire and blast
walls; active versus passive fire protection systems);
• finding possible solutions to problems that have been identified, and quantifying their
effectiveness (e.g., alternative layouts, improving reliability of critical components, etc).

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Det Norske Veritas Statement of Capability
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2 OFFSHORE SAFETY AT DNV


In DNV, we recognize that safety assessment studies do not in themselves result in
improvements in safety. This is only achieved by changes in design or operational practices.
We therefore place a strong emphasis on ensuring that studies are based on a proper
understanding of the engineering of the process or facility so that the results of the study can be
fed back directly into the design process or to practical modifications of the installation.
Safety assessments are no substitute for close attention to the fundamentals of safety
throughout the design process or for design reviews such as Hazard and Operability Studies.
However, they do provide a quantitative technique for assessing the overall safety of a facility
from a range of hazards, a means for highlighting key areas for greater attention and a tool for
comparing alternative options (for example, alternative layouts, fire protection options or
emergency shut-down options).
At DNV, we have been closely involved in the development of methods for offshore safety
studies for over 15 years, and their application to a very wide range of facilities. This is evident
from a glance at the project lists in Section 6 of this document. The studies range from
Concept Safety Evaluations to complete platform risk assessments, from HAZOP studies of
topsides facilities to the reliability of the release mechanism of a free fall life boat, from human
factors assessments of behavior during evacuation to the assessment of damage to a template
during installation of a GBS, from the risk of ship collisions to the effectiveness of evacuation
means and many more.
DNV personnel have applied safety analysis techniques to a wide range of offshore facilities
and pipeline systems including:
• fixed and mobile rigs.
• deepwater development.
• subsea completions.
• floating systems.
Our staff covers a range of disciplines and this enables us to build appropriate multi-disciplinary
teams to meet the needs of each project. A particular hallmark of the DNV approach is our
ability to blend the experience of engineers who have spent time in industry with the analytical
ability of high caliber recent graduates. We strongly believe that our work must be of practical
benefit to our clients, and strive to present the results of our work so as to provide the best
possible basis for decision-making within a practical engineering and operational framework.

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Det Norske Veritas Statement of Capability
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3 RANGE OF SERVICES
DNV aims to provide a full range of services to clients in the area of safety assessments of
offshore facilities. The main types of service are described briefly below under broad subject
headings.

3.1 Concept Safety Evaluations


Concept Safety Evaluation (CSE) is the term used to determine studies carried out in response
to the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate's (NPD) "Guidelines for Safety Evaluation of
Platform Conceptual Design". The NPD regulations require operators to submit a CSE with
their "Plan for Development and Operation" as part of the approval process. The guidelines set
out the general approach to be adopted and establish criteria to be achieved.
The CSE is by definition carried out in the early conceptual design stage, before any detailed
design has been carried out. The study focuses on three prime safety functions: the structure,
the shelter areas and the escape ways. The analysis involves identifying and analyzing those
hazards that may impair any of these three safety functions and must show that the overall
frequency of events that can impair the functions (e.g., lead to loss of integrity of the shelter
area within two hours) is less than the target value (10-4 per year, or 1 in 10,000 years). Such
events are referred to as Residual Accidental Events.
This type of analysis provides an effective review of the key safety issues at an early stage in the
design and provides a direct input into the later stages of design in the form of "Design
Accidental Events". These are events which the platform is designed to withstand without
impairment of the safety functions, and frequently lead directly to the specification of design
loads (e.g., the required blast resistance of a fire wall).
The relative importance of the set of residual accidental events also provides a ready focus for
identifying possible risk reducing measures.
DNV has built up a considerable experience in carrying out this type of study for a range of
facilities, including semi-submersible and jack-up drilling units, flotels and floating production
units as well as fixed platforms. A number of studies have also been carried out at the pre-
conceptual stage, as part of the comparison of alternative design concepts.
Although developed in response to the NPD Guidelines, CSE type studies have been used to
assess platform designs in other offshore sectors, especially the UK continental shelf.
In carrying out such studies, we are always keen to ensure that they contribute creatively to the
design process, and are not merely a rubber-stamping exercise to satisfy the regulatory
authorities. Studies have been used to establish the design basis for safety equipment (e.g.,
firewall rating, reliability of deluge system, etc.).

3.2 Quantified Risk Assessment (QRA)


The objective of a QRA is to provide an estimate of the risk to individuals expressed in
terms of probability of a fatality per year and the risk to the environment expressed in

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terms of probability of a small, significant, large, very large hydrocarbon release to the sea.
A flow diagram for a typical QRA can be seen in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Flow Diagram For a QRA

SYSTEM DEFINITION
Define scope & objectives
Select methodology & criteria
Define installation & environment

HAZARD IDENTIFICATION
Hazard assessment
Failure case selection

FREQUENCY ANALYSIS CONSEQUENCE MODELING


Likelihood of each failure Consequence/impacts for each
case failure case

RISK PRESENTATION
Summation of frequency/consequance results

ASSESSMENT RISK REDUCTION


Evaluation of risks No Selection of risk
using risk criteria. reduction measures using
Are risks acceptable? cost-benefit analysis

The first stage of a QRA is the System Definition. The System Definition defines the
installation or the activity whose risks are to be analyzed. The scope of work for the QRA
should define the boundaries for the study to be analyzed, identifying which activities are
included and which are excluded.
The next stage is to carry out some form of Hazard Identification exercise. The Hazard
Identification consists of a qualitative review of possible accident scenarios that may occur
based upon previous accident experience or judgment where necessary. For the actual
QRA the hazard identification exercise provides a list of possible failure scenarios which
are suitable for modeling quantitatively.
Once the hazards have been identified, a Frequency Analysis estimates how likely it is for
the accidents to occur. The frequencies can be obtained from either analysis of previous
accident experience, or by some form of quantitative modeling.
In parallel with the Frequency Analysis, Consequence Modeling evaluates the resulting
effects if the accidents occur, and their impact on personnel, equipment, structures, and
the environment. Estimation of the consequences of each possible event often requires

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Det Norske Veritas Statement of Capability
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some form of computer modeling, but may be based on accident experience or judgment if
appropriate.
When the frequency and consequences of each event have been estimated, they can be
combined to form measures of overall risk.
The QRA methodology can also be used to estimate the Temporary Refuge Impairment
Frequency (TRIF) and identify issues that could impact engineering and costs, or those
that need special attention during detailed engineering

3.3 Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP)


HAZOP provides a systematic method of checking a process design for features that could lead
to unexpected hazards or problems in operability. The technique was developed in the UK in
the late 1960s and early 1970s, is now used extensively in the chemical and petroleum
industries worldwide, and has become an accepted part of most topsides design projects.
The quality of any HAZOP depends critically on the experience and leadership qualities of the
chairman. DNV has assembled a panel of very experienced HAZOP chairmen, including some
who were involved in the original development of the HAZOP technique.
While the HAZOP technique was initially developed for reviewing process designs, it has been
shown to have far wider applications. It is particularly useful for reviewing activities that have
a high degree of operator interaction, e.g., in drilling activities. Indeed, DNV has been
responsible for the development of a special Drillers' HAZOP technique which has been applied
to assessing shallow gas blowout risks, simultaneous drilling from a jack-up over a wellhead
platform and other applications.
We have also applied HAZOP to such procedures as the mating of a GBS (Gravity Base
Structure) to the deck, platform tow out and field installation, all of which involved special
attention to human factors issues.

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3.4 Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA)


Cost-Benefit analysis (CBA) is a technique for comparing the costs and benefits of a
project, developed to help appraise public sector projects. In risk assessment, it is usually
used to assess additional safety measures on a project by comparing:
• The cost of implementing the measure,
• The benefit of the measure, in terms of the risk-factored cost of the accidents it
would avert
The purpose of CBA is to show whether the benefits of a measure outweigh its costs, and
thus indicated whether it is appropriate to implement the measure. CBA cannot provide a
definitive decision, because factors other than risks and costs may be relevant, but it
provides an important guide.

3.5 Evacuation Studies


DNV has carried out a number of studies which have concentrated on the performance of the
platform evacuation system, and have developed a computer program (ESCAPE), to evaluate
the performance of various types of evacuation systems e.g., TEMPSCs, life rafts, free fall
lifeboats, dry evacuation systems, etc. Such studies allow the overall effectiveness of the
evacuation systems to be assessed for a range of hazard types and weather conditions.
Similar studies have also considered the effectiveness of rescue facilities, including stand-by
boats, pick up boats, field helicopters, SAR helicopters, etc. One such study was used by an
operator to assess the need for an upgraded field helicopter with SAR capabilities.
The assessment of the behavior of people in emergencies, using human factors techniques, is an
important part of such studies, as well as the effectiveness of the hardware itself.
This kind of study has been particularly useful in optimizing the overall field performance of the
contingency planning or emergency preparedness systems. Regulatory requirements often refer
to installations without reference to relationships between different installations and fields in the
area.

3.6 Ship Collision Studies


The risk of ship collisions has been shown to be a significant factor for certain platforms. The
Department of Energy has sponsored the development by DNV of a computer model
(CRASH) to predict the risk of ship-platform collisions anywhere on the UK Continental Shelf.
This has been used both for special ship collision studies and as part of other CSE or overall
risk studies. We have extended this model and the data to cover the whole North Sea area, and
are able to provide rapid predictions of the risk of ship collision.

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Det Norske Veritas Statement of Capability
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3.7 Human Factors


Human Factors studies provide a key input to offshore safety assessments at all stages of
design. DNV strives to ensure that human factors issues are properly addressed. Some of the
more important applications are:
• Organization and Communications: Especially relevant for tasks involving a large
amount of coordination, e.g. float out and installation of GBS, simultaneous drilling
and production.
• Man-Machine Interface: e.g., computer displays, control room design, alarm
displays.
• Working Instructions and Working Practices: Reviewing methods of working and
instructions to reduce the opportunities for human error.
• Procedure Design: Review of procedure documents (e.g., operating manuals) to
ensure that presentation and content minimize the chance of errors occurring.
• Evacuation: Evaluation of escape routes and human factors considerations for
mustering as well as behavior during evacuation itself.
• Emergency Response: Evaluation of information available to operators, how it is
displayed, what operators are required to do. Evaluation of performance shaping
factors.

3.8 Pipeline Studies


DNV has been particularly active in the development and application of risk assessment
techniques to pipeline systems. A number of studies have been carried out over the years that
have specifically considered the risks to the installation from pipelines, especially gas pipelines.
Several of these studies have considered the effectiveness of subsea valves in reducing the risk
and the optimum location for such valves. In addition, the risk from pipelines has been
routinely considered as part of other safety studies (e.g., concept safety evaluations).
Pipelines have long been recognized as a major contributor to the risk on platforms, and failure
of pipelines has been identified by the Department of Energy as one of the factors that led to
the rapid escalation in the Piper disaster. Since then we have carried out studies for a number
of operators to assess the effectiveness of subsea valves and other possible measures, and to
determine the best location for a subsea valve.
Risk assessment is an ideal tool for comparing the effectiveness of such a measure with other
possible risk reducing measures.

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Det Norske Veritas Statement of Capability
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3.9 Simultaneous Drilling and Production


In the current economic climate there is an increasing number of development concepts that
involve unmanned or simple wellhead platforms where the wells would be drilled by a
cantilevered jack-up over the jacket. In these cases, it is often necessary to be able to produce
from one set of wells while drilling further wells, for the project to be economically viable. To
do this the operator will need to demonstrate that the proposals do not result in a significant
increase in risk.
DNV has carried out a number of studies of Simultaneous Drilling and Production operations
that have been submitted for approval to the Department of Energy. Such studies include a
review of the proposed procedures using the Drillers' HAZOP technique, and with particular
attention to the human factor considerations, as well as a qualification of the risk.

3.10 Subsea Systems


DNV has carried out a number of studies on subsea production or wellhead systems. These
have included interactions with well servicing or intervention vessels, an assessment of
alternative well kill options, and evaluation of template production for dropped objects, and
assessment of SIMOP for Subsea Systems.

3.11 Platform Modifications


Over the life of an offshore installation, there will be many modifications to the original design.
These will range from small pipework modifications and changes in process conditions to the
addition of new modules and the tie-ins of new pipelines or flowlines. It is essential that such
modifications, even small ones, be given careful consideration, as they can often affect and
sometimes circumvent critical safety features.
Many of the techniques already described, such as HAZOP and safety assessments, can be
applied to assessing modifications, including the construction phase, to ensure that an
acceptable level of safety is maintained.

3.12 Reliability Studies


Techniques such as Fault Tree Analysis can be used to determine the reliability of critical
systems. This may be as part of a safety assessment (for example to determine the probability
that the deluge systems would operate on demand) or separate studies on specific systems. For
example, DNV has carried out a study to determine the probability that the Emergency Shut
Down (ESD) system on a platform would fail to operate on demand. In another study the
reliability of the release mechanism for a free fall lifeboat was analyzed. Both studies led to
proposals for design improvements.

3.13 Production Regularity/Availability Studies


Another use for safety assessment techniques has been in predicting the regularity of supply
from a field. This is another form of probabilistic analysis of failure events, this time geared to

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the economic risk of failures. DNV has used simulation techniques successfully for such
studies, especially where there is a pipeline network.

3.14 Studies by other DNV Departments


Several other departments within DNV are able to provide services that complement or
build upon the above studies. These departments include:
• Risk Based Inspection
• Certification
• Loss Control Management
• Field Services
• Offshore Services
• Product Verification
• Maritime Services
• Mechanical Integrity

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Det Norske Veritas Statement of Capability
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4 SOFTWARE
The experience of highly qualified engineers, scientists, and human factors experts, backed-up
by an excellent portfolio of risk assessment software, provides a unique ability to supply safety
and risk assessment consultant services to industry.

4.1 OHRAT
OHRAT (Offshore Hazard and Risk Analysis Toolkit) is an advanced and powerful software
package for QRA studies of offshore installations. It includes a wide range of consequence
models and risk-impact models, presented in a structure that allows exceptional flexibility and
tractability. This means that it is ideally suited to reflecting the developments affecting the
installation as they occur over time, so that the risk analysis can easily be kept up-to-date,
following the advice of the Cullen Report on the inquiry into the loss of Piper Alpha, and as
required by Norwegian legislation.
OHRAT was developed by DNV under a system of sponsorship involving most of the major
oil companies operating in the North Sea. A major factor in this development was the desire for
a more uniform and standardized approach to offshore QRA and the tools used, and OHRAT
makes such an approach possible.
In 1992 DNV completed the development of OHRAT. OHRAT is a major development in the
application of software technology to offshore risk assessment, and is supported by leading
operators in the North Sea. OHRAT combines existing modeling with the latest graphics,
overlaying a relational database management system.
DNV is currently in the process of updating OHRAT and it will be available in a Windows
format in 1999.

4.2 PHAST
The PHAST Professional program is a complete package for consequence analysis and
risk analysis in onshore process engineering. PHAST Professional’s sophisticated
modeling calculates effect distances produced by hazardous events. With this information,
you can evaluate the need for mitigating measures such as changes in design, operation or
response. PHAST software can be used to model a proposed facility or operational
change to ease the selection of the most effective solutions. PHAST Professional is a
leader in its field, and is used at over 800 sites throughout the world.
With PHAST Professional, you can define special events, model a leak of a mixture of
materials, model the change in a leak over time, investigate the details of behavior with special
stand-alone models and much, much more.

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4.3 DNV-Pro 97
DNV-Pro 97 is the result of a partnership between DNV and Dyadem International. DNV-Pro
97 is a system that allows customization of displays, templates and reporting functions. DNV-
Pro 97 is a guideword, knowledge-based hazard identification tool that supports:
• HAZOP
• Failure Modes Effects Analysis (FMEA)
• What/If checklist
• Preliminary Hazards Analysis
• Your own customized methodology.
DNV-Pro 97 replaces HAZSEC, DNV’s DOS based recording system.

4.4 LEAK
LEAK is a tool for calculating leak frequencies for process plants and installations. The core of
LEAK is a background database that contains leak and reliability data for a wide range of
equipment, collected from operators worldwide. To obtain the leak frequency for a particular
group of equipment on your installation, you specify the number and type of items in the group,
and LEAK cross-references with the database to calculate the total frequency.

4.5 CRASH
This is a tool for Risk Analysts dealing with offshore installations. It contains a database of
shipping routes and traffic for the UK sector of the Continental Shelf, and uses this to calculate
the risk of ship collision for a platform at any given location in this sector. CRASH was
developed by DNV Technica and SPD on behalf of the UK Department of Energy.

4.6 ESCAPE
ESCAPE simulates the launch of a lifeboat of specified design in specified weather
conditions, modeling the swinging descent of ht boat. It calculates the probability that the
boat is damaged by impact with the platform’s structure during the descent. The program
performs the calculations for a representative range of weather conditions, producing a
balanced picture of the risk of an unsuccessful launch.
The ESCAPE program consists of four separate sections:
• Mobile Rig Motion
• Survival Craft Descent to the Water
• Survival Craft Departure from the Platform
• Survival Craft Impact Resistance and Failure Probability
Two of these are numerical simulations of the process of lowering a lifeboat and of the
lifeboat moving away from the platform, and are used to find the probabilities of failure in
these two operations as functions of weather, boat position, etc. The third section
combines these probabilities with other user-specified probabilities to obtain the overall

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probabilities of success for the various lifeboats as functions of weather, etc. The fourth
and last, section uses the probabilities to decide upon allocation of personnel to the
various lifeboats, and assesses the overall effectiveness of the set of lifeboats.

4.7 CARA
CARA (Computer Aided Reliability Analysis) is a suite of software programs designed for
Reliability Engineers. CARA consists of four modules, which you can either access through a
menu system, or run separately:
• CAFTAN: Now, re-written for Windows, A graphical Fault Tree package with
automatic generation of minimal cut sets.
• FMECA: For Failure Mode, Effect and Criticality Analysis.
• CCA: For Cause Consequence diagrams, and Event Tree analysis.
• ANEX: For failure rate estimation and confidence intervals.

4.8 TECSIM
TECSIM is an advanced tool for Reliability Engineers. It is a next-event simulation system that
uses discrete time-steps for modeling the availability of plant as a function of maintenance
regimes. It takes into account the system structure, component failure and repair, staff and
spares resourcing, maintenance schedules and component operation rules. TECSIM was
developed by DNV Technica SPD in association with Robert Gordon University, Aberdeen.

4.9 TECJET
The TECJET package contains a powerful model for continuous jet releases - the most
prevalent form of hazardous material release. The TECJET model deals smoothly with the full
range of variables that can occur in real jets: high or low initial velocity, dense or buoyant
material, any release angle (even into the wind), and liquid droplets in the jet. No comparable
model can match this capability.

4.10 RAMA
The RAMA (Reliability Availability Maintainability Analysis) software was developed by
DNV Technica to analyze reliability and availability problems using the Reliability Block
Diagram (RBD) method, RAMA includes the ability to handle flow calculations, and the
program calculates the results analytically. Thus RAMA is not another Monte Carlo
simulation program. RAMA replaces complex spreadsheet models, with improved
efficiency and better quality. Moreover, it is used as verification for more complex studies
such as Monte Carlo simulation (MIRIAM, SPRA, etc.)
RAMA calculates the system availability, together with the fraction of time the system and
blocks have at different capacities. In addition, RAMA outputs the results to t a standard

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DOS text file or even as a Word document including drawing of diagrams and presenting
results in tables.
Carrying out availability studies can be done quite easily with RAMA. The calculation
times are eligible compared to Monte Carlo type simulation programs. In situations where
one i interested in carrying out a number of sensitivities RAMA will be found
exceptionally useful by copying blocks and diagrams, changing certain parameters, and
running the different system configurations and sets of parameters.

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5 DNV - THE COMPANY AND ITS RESOURCES

5.1 COMPANY BACKGROUND


Established in 1864, Det Norske Veritas is an independent foundation working with the
objective of 'safeguarding life, property and the environment'. DNV has a total of 4,400
employees, and comprises a network of 300 exclusive offices in 100 countries. DNV's
Head Office is in Oslo, Norway. DNV has had offices in the United States for over 100
years, and currently employs over 500 employees in 15 offices.
The DNV Risk and Reliability organization came into existence in February 1992, when DNV
bought a 100% interest in Technica Ltd. Both groups had staff working in the areas of
Industrial Safety and Environment and these groups joined forces under the DNV Technica
flag, and more recently simply as DNV.
DNV provides a consultancy service to both industry and government, on the technical and
engineering aspects of industrial activities, with special emphasis on designing for safety, on
HAZOP and hazard analysis and on environmental protection. DNV Risk and Reliability has
offices in London, Stockport, and Aberdeen, U.K.; U.S. offices in Houston; European offices
in Oslo and Stavanger, Norway and Brussels, Belgium; an office in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia;
and another in Sydney, Australia.
DNV's professional team has established a reputation as one of the foremost groups in
engineering safety. It encompasses a wide range of engineering and applied science experience
including people with both academic and industrial backgrounds in fields as diverse as
ergonomics, computational fluid dynamics, process design, environmental science and process
design and commissioning. They have extensive experience of participating in, and leading
multi-disciplinary teams tackling safety and environmental problems.
DNV has recognized, during many studies of process and engineering systems, that the
chemical engineering discipline plays a significant part in the design, project engineering,
construction, commissioning and operation of chemical plants and offshore topside systems.
The fundamental understanding of the systems specified and installed is essential to any multi-
disciplinary study carried out by DNV and hence a team of highly qualified chemical engineers
are a significant proportion of the permanent staff. This team combines experienced
professionals and younger graduates with very good academic qualifications. In addition,
qualified scientists of various disciplines provide analytical capability at a more fundamental
level, and are supported by a strong computing department. DNV maintains links with a large
number of independent consultants who provide specialized skills when required.
The company is covered under the normal range of insurance provisions. It is a full member of
the Association of Consulting Scientists and subscribes to the codes of conduct of that
association and those of the professional institutions under which its personnel are chartered.

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5.2 COMPUTING AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS


DNV has its own computing facilities, software, computer databases, library and technical files,
all of which have been built up specially for safety, gas, petroleum and environmental work.
The Library consists of large collection of books, reports, standards, codes and papers covering
all DNV’s areas of interest including offshore oil and gas, marine transport, the process
industries, safety management, environmental management and pollution, quality management,
process safety and risk assessment. The Library and Information Service subscribes to over 80
journals providing current information on all these topics. A comprehensive collection of DNV
consultancy reports is maintained and includes many produced by other offices. The Library
and Information Service provides a wide range of services, including information research,
database searching, document ordering and current awareness. A number of databases are
maintained including a library catalogue and a data reference system. An on-line search service
is available with access to over 500 international databases for retrieval of information on a
wide range of topics. A number of databases are held on CD-ROM including HSELINE,
MHIDAS and ENDS. The Library and Information Service is managed by a qualified and
experienced Information Scientist.

5.3 QUALITY ASSURANCE


DNV is committed to achieving the highest level of quality in all aspects of the company's
work. The department has been certified to ISO 9000 standards.
The purpose of the QA system is to ensure that the company's Quality Objectives are being
achieved, and that monitoring procedures are followed and documented to ensure traceability.
The main principles of the QA system are that:
• The identity of the person(s) responsible for carrying out various parts of a project
should be documented.
• The basis for all results, conclusions and calculations should be traceable.
• All work should be reviewed by an appropriately qualified person.
DNV considers three elements to be essential to the overall quality of the company's services:
• Independence and Objectivity
• Technical and Scientific Quality
• Practical Benefit to Clients

5.3.1 Independence and Objectivity


DNV strives to approach, as closely as possible, the ideal of scientific objectivity in its work.
The company does not knowingly allow its technical opinion to be influenced by extraneous
pressure from interested parties, and believes that the interests of its clients are best served by
this policy.

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Det Norske Veritas Statement of Capability
Offshore 16 February 1998

5.3.2 Technical and Scientific Quality


The advice offered by DNV is based on systematic technical and scientific investigations, and
we are committed to performing all our work to the highest standards. This is achieved by
combining good theoretical knowledge with a practical working approach, based on industry
experience and a sound understanding of the client's needs. Continuous attention is paid to
developing the services to reflect the state-of-the-art in modeling and analysis of technical
systems.

5.3.3 Practical Benefit to Clients


The advice offered by DNV is aimed at identifying and solving technical and operational
problems. It is therefore of key importance to:
• have the most effective approach to identification of potential problems in order to
ensure the greatest possible degree of coverage,
• understand the "decision context" in which the client will consider DNV's advice,
• present conclusions and recommendations which provide the best possible basis for
decision-making within a practical engineering and operational framework.

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Det Norske Veritas Statement of Capability
Offshore 17 February 1998

6 EXPERIENCE IN OFFSHORE SAFETY STUDIES


DNV has completed over one thousand safety and reliability assessment studies of offshore oil
and gas installations. These studies have covered a range of different types of installation and
all stages of project development. A summary list of this experience is given below:

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