FULL CASE LEE YICK HON, petitioner-appellee, vs.

THE INSULAR COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS

This is an appeal by the Insular Collector of Customs from the action of the Court of First Instance of Manila in imposing upon
him a fine of P50 for an alleged contempt of court. The circumstances connected with the incident which gave rise to the
proceeding are these:

It appears that on July 23, 1920, a petition for the writ of habeas corpus was filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila by one
Lee Yick Hon, alleging he had lately arrived from China at the port of Manila with a view to entering the Philippine Islands, but
was presented from so doing by the Insular Collector of Customs, who was detaining him for deportation. Upon the presiding in
Sala IV of said court, cited the collector to appear and show cause in writing why the writ of habeas corpus should not be issued
as prayed. This citation was served at about 11 a.m., at which house arrangement had already been perfected for the deportation
of Lee Yick Hon on a boat scheduled to leave Manila for Hongkong at noon on the same day; and either by oversight or design
the Insular Collector failed to contermand the order for his embarcation on that boat. The result was that Lee Yick Hon was
deported within two or three hours after the Insular Collector had been served with the citation to show cause in the habeas
corpus proceeding. Thereupon contempt proceedings were instituted against the Insular Collector, with the result already
stated.

We are of the opinion that the action of the lower court in imposing fine on the appellant cannot be sustained; and the judgment
must accordingly be reserved.

The conditions under which a person can be punished for contempt are precisely defined in sections 231 and 232 of the Code of
Civil Procedure; and unless the reprobated conduct legitimately falls under those provisions, it cannot be punished as for
contempt. The first of these sections contemplates misbehavior in the presence of the court or so near the court of judge as to
obstruct the administration of justice. With this situation we are not here concerned, as the act which constitutes the alleged
contempt was committed away from the presence of the court and if punishable at all, it falls under subsection (1) of section
232, wherein it is declared that nay person may be punished as for contempt who is guilty of "disobedience of or resistance to a
lawful writ, process, order, judgment, or command of the court or injunction granted by a court or judge."

In this case before us, if it be asked what lawful writ, process, order, judgment or command of the court or judge below was
disobeyed or resisted by the appellant, the answer must be: None whatever. The citation that was served upon the appellant
required him to appear at a stated time in the Court of First Instance of Manila and show cause if any there might be, why the
writ prayed for should not issue. That citation was literally complied with when, on July 30, 1920, the Attorney-General, on
behalf of the Insular Collector, filed his answer, wherein it was in effect stated that the case of Lee Yick Hon had been regularly
passed upon by the special Board of Inquiry, and that it had been found that he had entered the Philippine Islands in
contravention of the Immigration and Exclusion Acts, wherefore the Insular Collector had ordered his deportation. That answer,
so far as appears in this case, has not been found to be false or insufficient; and the sole ground relied upon to sustain the
judgment finding the appellant guilty to contempt is that by allowing Lee Yick Hon to be deported under the conditions stated
he has frustrated the possible issuance of the writ of habeas corpus for which application had been made.

At this point attention should be directed to the fact that the order to show cause, a copy of which was served on the Insular
Collector of Customs on July 23, 1920, is not the peremptory writ of habeas corpus, unconditionally commanding the respondent
to have the body of the detained person before the court at a time and place therein specified. The requisites of the peremptory
writ of habeas corpus are stated in section 533 of the Code of Civil Procedure; and appropriate forms are supplied in section 534
of said Code and in section 82 of General Orders, No. 58. The order served in the case before us was merely a preliminary citation
requiring the respondent to appear and show cause why the peremptory writ should not be granted. The practice of issuing a
preliminary citation of this character, upon applications for the writ of habeas corpus, has, as all legal practitioners are aware,
become common in our courts; and upon considerations of practical convenience, the usage has must be commend it, in cases
where the necessity for the immediate issuance of the peremptory writ is not manifest. Nevertheless in a case like that now
before us, it is necessary to take account of the difference between the preliminary citation and the real writ of habeas corpus;
and when advertence is had to this point, and the actual terms of the citation are considered, it is at one obvious that the appellant
did not put himself in contempt by allowing Lee Yick Hon to be deported.

Of course if the judge issuing the citation had his attention directed to the fact that the deportation of Lee Yick Hon was imminent,
and there had been any reason to fear that the Collector of Customs might proceed with his deportation notwithstanding the
service of the bare citation, his Honor could have penned a few additional words, adding to the citation an admonition to the
effect that the petitioner should not be deported until his application for the writ of habeas corpus should be heard. If a temporary
restraining order of that kind had been issued, it would no doubt have been respected.

In proceeding against a person alleged to be guilty of contempt of court, it is not to be forgotten that such proceedings are
commonly treated as criminal in their nature even when the acts complained of are incidents of civil actions. For this reason the
mode of procedure and rules of evidence in contempt proceedings are assimilated as far as practicable to those adapted to
criminal prosecutions. (6 R. C. L., p. 530.) Moreover, it is well settled that a person cannot be held liable for contempt in the
violation of an injunction or in fact of any judicial order unless the act which is forbidden or required to be done is clearly and
exactly defined, so as to leave no reasonable doubt or uncertainty as to what specific act or thing is forbidden or required.
(U.S. vs. Atchison, etc., R. Co., 146 Fed., 176, 183.) A party cannot be punished for contempt in failing to do something not specified
in the order. (13 C. J., 15.) In the case before us, the deportation of the petitioner was not forbidden by any order of the court,
and hence that act cannot be considered as disobedience to the court.

Upon principle the point is clear; and although no case exactly identical with the present one has been called to our attention
from the decisions of American courts, something very similar is found in Ex parte Lake (37 Tex. Crim. Rep. 656; 66 Am. St. Rep.
848). The facts involved in that case were these: One Edwards had been charged with the commission of a criminal offense in
Oklahoma, but he fled to the State of Texas; and upon requisition from the Governor of Oklahoma, a warrant was issued by the
Governor of Texas for his arrest in that State. Upon his being arrested, application was made in his behalf before on of the Texas
courts for the writ of habeas corpus to secure his release. During the period when the propriety of granting the writ was under
consideration in said court, one Lake, the legally appointed extradition agent, acting under the authority of a proper warrant
issued by the Governor of Texas, obtained the custody of Edwards from the sheriff who had him in charge and hurriedly departed
with the prisoner for Oklahoma. The result was that the proceedings upon the application for the writ habeas corpus were
frustrated and the writ was in fact never issued — as occurred in the case now before us. The judge before whom the application
for the writ of habeas corpus was pending thereupon caused Lake to be arrested and fined him 50 dollars for the supposed
contempt. It was held by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals that his action could not be sustained and the judgment was
reversed.

Among the reasons stated for this decision was the fact that the alleged contemner has disobeyed no order issued by the judge,
for there was none of any character made in the case, "and there was no order, decree, writ, or any other process in existence,
forbidding him form doing just what he did". Speaking further of this aspect of the case, the court said: "We have found no case
authorizing punishment by contempt for such conduct as is attributed to Lake, and we believe none can be found. The authorities
have been closely and exhaustively examined, and the rule deducible therefrom, is that unless the court has jurisdiction of the
supposed contemner, or some order, decree, or process has been resisted or disobeyed, the court has no jurisdiction to punish
for contempt. Jurisdiction over the party will not confer power to punish for contempt unless some order, decree, or process has
been disobeyed or the party is guilty of some act of the nature of malpractice in the case, or has disobeyed the reasonable rules
of the court". (Ex parte Lake, supra.)

The considerations found in that decision are applicable to the case now before us and corroborate the conclusion to be
inevitably drawn form our own provisions relative to contempt, namely, that the deportation of Lee Yick Hon by the Insular
Collector under the circumstances stated was not a contempt of court.

Judgment is reversed and the defendant absolved, with costs de oficio. So ordered.

NURHIDA JUHURI AMPATUAN vs. JUDGE VIRGILIO V. MACARAIG

FACTS:
Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head of the COMELEC Legal Department, was killed at the corner of M. H. Del Pilar and Pedro
Gil Streets, Ermita, Manila. Investigation conducted by the Manila Police District Homicide Section yielded the identity of the
male perpetrator as PO1 Ampatuan. Consequently, PO1 Ampatuan was commanded to the MPD District Director for proper
disposition. Likewise, inquest proceedings were conducted by the Manila Prosecutor’s Office.
On 18 April 2008, Police Senior Superintendent Guinto, rendered his Pre-Charge Evaluation Report against PO1
Ampatuan, finding probable cause to charge PO1 Ampatuan with Grave Misconduct (Murder) and recommending that said PO1
Ampatuan be subjected to summary hearing.
Meanwhile, on 21 April 2008, the City Prosecutor of Manila recommended that the case against PO1 Ampatuan be set
for further investigation and that the latter be released from custody unless he is being held for other charges/legal grounds.
Armed with the 21 April 2008 recommendation of the Manila City’s Prosecution Office, petitioner, who is the wife of
PO1 Ampatuan, filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus before the RTC of Manila on 22 April 2008.
On 24 April 2008, RTC ordered the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus commanding therein respondents to produce
the body of PO1 Ampatuan and directing said respondents to show cause why they are withholding or restraining the liberty of
PO1 Ampatuan.
Seeking the reversal of RTC, the respondents averred that the filing of the administrative case against PO1 Ampatuan is
a process done by the PNP and this Court has no authority to order the release of the subject police officer. The petitioner
countered that the letter resignation of PO1 Ampatuan has rendered the administrative case moot and academic. Respondent
however stressed that the resignation has not been acted by the appropriate police officials of the PNP, and that the
administrative case was filed while PO1 Ampatuan is still in the active status of the PNP. The RTC reversed and dismissed the
petition.

ISSUE:
The respondent court gravely abused its discretion when it failed to consider that the arrest and detention of po1 basser
b. Ampatuan was made without any warrant and therefore, illegal.

HELD:
The objective of the writ is to determine whether the confinement or detention is valid or lawful. If it is, the writ cannot
be issued. What is to be inquired into is the legality of a person's detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the application for
the writ of habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of some supervening events, such
as the instances mentioned in Section 4 of Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of the application
In this case, PO1 Ampatuan has been placed under Restrictive Custody. Republic Act No. 6975 (also known as the
Department of Interior and Local Government Act of 1990), as amended by Republic Act No. 8551 (also known as the Philippine
National Police Reform and Reorganization Act of 1998), clearly provides that members of the police force are subject to the
administrative disciplinary machinery of the PNP.
Given that PO1 Ampatuan has been placed under restrictive custody, such constitutes a valid argument for his continued
detention. This Court has held that a restrictive custody and monitoring of movements or whereabouts of police officers under
investigation by their superiors is not a form of illegal detention or restraint of liberty.
Restrictive custody is, at best, nominal restraint which is beyond the ambit of habeas corpus. It is neither actual nor
effective restraint that would call for the grant of the remedy prayed for. It is a permissible precautionary measure to assure the
PNP authorities that the police officers concerned are always accounted for.
In sum, petitioner is unable to discharge the burden of showing that she is entitled to the issuance of the writ prayed
for in behalf of her husband, PO1 Ampatuan. The petition fails to show on its face that the latter is unlawfully deprived of his
liberty guaranteed and enshrined in the Constitution.

SUSAN GO v. FERNANDO L. DIMAGIBA

Facts:
Respondent Fernando L. Dimagiba issued to Petitioner Susan Go thirteen (13) checks which, when presented to the
drawee bank for encashment or payment on the due dates, were dishonored for the reason "account closed.
Dimagiba was subsequently prosecuted for 13 counts of violation of BP 22
On February 27, 2001, Dimagiba filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the MTCC Order. He prayed for the recall of the
Order of Arrest and the modification of the final Decision, arguing that the penalty of fine only, instead of imprisonment also,
should have been imposed on him.
The RTC held that this rule should be retroactively applied in favor of Dimagiba. [23] It further noted that (1) he was a
first-time offender and an employer of at least 200 workers who would be displaced as a result of his imprisonment; and (2) the
civil liability had already been satisfied through the levy of his properties.[24] questions of law

Issues:
Whether the Petition for habeas corpus was validly granted

Ruling:
The issue of retroactivity of SC-AC No. 12-2000 was settled in De Joya v. Jail Warden
In the present case, the Petition for a writ of habeas corpus was anchored on the ruling in Vaca and on SC-AC No. 12-
2000, which allegedly prescribed the imposition of a fine, not imprisonment, for convictions under BP 22. Respondent sought
the retroactive effect of those rulings, thereby effectively challenging the penalty imposed on him for being excessive.
The following alternative penalties are imposable under BP 22: (1) imprisonment of not less than 30 days, but not more
than one year; (2) a fine of not less or more than double the amount of the check, a fine that shall in no case exceed P200,000;
or (3) both such fine and imprisonment, at the discretion of the court
When the circumstances of the case clearly indicate good faith or a clear mistake of fact... without taint of negligence,
the imposition of a fine alone may be considered as the preferred penalty. Should the judge deem that imprisonment is
appropriate, such penalty may be imposed. SC-AC No. 12-2000 did not delete the alternative penalty of imprisonment. The
competence to amend the law belongs to the legislature, not to this Court. Petitioners argue that respondent is not entitled to
the benevolent policy enunciated in SC-AC No. 12-2000, because he is not a "first time offender... t is the trial court's discretion
to impose any penalty within the confines of the law. SC-AC No. 13-2001 explains thus, good faith or a clear mistake of fact...
without taint of negligence, the imposition of a fine alone should be considered as the more appropriate penalty. Needless to
say, the determination of whether the circumstances warrant the imposition of a fine alone rests solely upon the Judge.
The Judges concerned, may in the exercise of sound discretion, and taking into consideration the peculiar circumstances
of each case, determine whether the imposition of a fine alone would best serve the interests of justice, or whether forbearing
to impose imprisonment... would depreciate the seriousness of the offense, work violence on the social order, or otherwise be
contrary to the imperatives of justice. The Court notes that the Petition for a writ of habeas corpus relied mainly on the alleged
retroactivity of SC-AC No. 12-2000, which supposedly favored BP 22 offenders. The rule on retroactivity states that criminal
laws may be applied retroactively if favorable to the accused. SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 is not a penal law; hence, Article
22 of the Revised Penal Code is not applicable. The circular applies only to those cases pending as of the date of its effectivity
and not to cases already terminated by final judgment.
 SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 merely lays down a rule of preference in the application of the penalties for violation of
B.P. Blg. 22. It does not amend B.P. Blg. 22, nor defeat the legislative intent behind... the law. SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000
merely urges the courts to take into account not only the purpose of the law but also the circumstances of the accused -- whether
he acted in good faith or on a clear mistake of fact without taint of negligence -- and such other circumstance which the trial
court or the appellate court believes relevant to the penalty to be imposed. Because the Circular merely lays down a rule of
preference, it serves only as a guideline for the trial courts. Thus, it is addressed to the judges, who are directed to consider the
factual circumstances of each case prior to imposing the appropriate penalty. In other words, the Administrative Circular does
not confer any new right in favor of the accused, much less those convicted by final judgment.
Indeed, SC-AC No. 12-2000 necessarily requires a review of all factual circumstances of each case. Such a review can no
longer be done if the judgment has become final and executory. Hence, RTC-Branch 5 did not have the jurisdiction to modify the
lawful judgment in the guise of granting a writ of habeas corpus. Respondent seeks the retroactive application of SC-AC No. 12-
2000 in his favor on the basis alone of the alleged settlement of his civil liability.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Orders NULLIFIED. Respondent's Petition for habeas corpus
is hereby DENIED.

Principles:
Writ of habeas corpus required the imposition of a fine only if the accused was not a recidivist or a habitual delinquent.
The writ of habeas corpus applies to all cases of illegal confinement or detention in which individuals are deprived of liberty.
The writ may not be availed of when the person in custody is under a judicial process or by virtue of a valid judgment
However, as a post-conviction remedy, it may be allowed when, as a consequence of a judicial proceeding, any of the
following exceptional circumstances is attendant: (1) there has been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the
restraint of a person; (2) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or (3) the imposed penalty has been excessive,
thus voiding the sentence as to such excess it is merely a rule of preference as to which penalty should be imposed under the
peculiar circumstances of a case.
The law punishes the act not as an offense against property but an offense against public order."

GO VS. RAMOS
G.R. No. 167569 Sept. 4, 2009 Bail, Writ of Habeas Corpus, Deportation / October 16, 2017

FACTS:
These petitions stemmed from the complaint-affidavit for deportation initiated by Luis T. Ramos before the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation (now Bureau of Immigration) against Jimmy T. Go alleging that the latter is an illegal and
undesirable alien. Luis alleged that while Jimmy represents himself as a Filipino citizen, Jimmy’s personal circumstances and
other records indicate that he is not so. To prove his contention, Luis presented the birth certificate of Jimmy, issued by the
Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo City, which indicated Jimmy’s citizenship as “FChinese.”
Luis argued that although it appears from Jimmy’s birth certificate that his parents, Carlos and Rosario Tan, are Filipinos,
the document seems to be tampered, because only the citizenship of Carlos appears to be handwritten while all the other entries
were typewritten. He also averred that in September 1989 or thereabout, Jimmy, through stealth, machination and scheming
managed to cover up his true citizenship, and with the use of falsified documents and untruthful declarations, was able to
procure a Philippine passport from the Department of Foreign Affairs.

ISSUE: Can the bailbond cancellation be assailed via a petition for habeas corpus?

RULING:
No. A petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is a special proceeding governed by Rule 102 of the Revised
Rules of Court. The objective of the writ is to determine whether the confinement or detention is valid or lawful. If it is, the writ
cannot be issued.
Once a person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer question his detention through a petition for issuance
of a writ of habeas corpus. His remedy would be to quash the information and/or the warrant of arrest duly issued. The writ of
habeas corpus should not be allowed after the party sought to be released had been charged before any court. The term “court”
in this context includes quasi-judicial bodies of governmental agencies authorized to order the person’s confinement, like the
Deportation Board of the Bureau of Immigration. Likewise, the cancellation of his bail cannot be assailed via a petition for habeas
corpus. When an alien is detained by the Bureau of Immigration for deportation pursuant to an order of deportation by the
Deportation Board, the Regional Trial Courts have no power to release such alien on bail even in habeas corpus proceedings
because there is no law authorizing it.
IN RE: WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS FOR REYNALDO DE VILLA REYNALDO DE VILLA v. DIRECTOR
GR No. 158802, 2004-11-17

Facts:
(DNA) testing on samples allegedly collected from the petitioner and a child born to the victim of the rape. By final
judgment we found petitioner guilty of the rape of Aileen Mendoza, his niece by affinity; sentenced him to suffer the penalty of
reclusión perpetua; and ordered him to pay the offended party civil indemnity, moral damages, costs of the suit, and support for
Leahlyn Corales Mendoza, the putative child born of the rape. Serving his sentence at the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City
April 1994 Aileen Mendoza woke up in her family's rented room in Sagad, Pasig, Metro Manila, to find petitioner on top
of her. Aged 12 years and ten months covered her mouth with a pillow and threatened to kill her. Petitioner succeeded in
inserting his penis inside her vagina resulted in Aileen's pregnancy, which was noticed by her mother, Leonila Mendoza,
sometime in November 1994. Aileen revealed that petitioner raped her confirmed that she was eight months pregnant and
found in her hymen healed lacerations at the 5:00 and 8:00 positions he was already 67 years old. Old age and sickness had
rendered him incapable of having an erection... holding a grudge against him... he was in his hometown of San Luis guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified rape, and sentenced him to death, to indemnify the victim in the amount of P50,000.00,
to pay the costs of the suit and to support the child, Leahlyn Mendoza.
Date of birth of Aileen's child was medically consistent with the time of the rape. Three years after the promulgation of
our Decision, Petitioner-relator in this case, June de Villa, is the son of Reynaldo unaware that there was a scientific test that
could determine once and for all if Reynaldo was the father of the victim's child, Leahlyn. Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG)
Anti-Death Penalty Task Force, which took over as counsel for petitioner. Implicitly denied in our Decision of February 21, 2001.
Reynaldo de Villa filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the Decision, wherein he once more prayed that DNA
tests be conducted. [13] The Motion was denied with finality in a Resolution dated November 20, 2001. Leahlyn readily agreed
and did so four grandchildren of Reynaldo de Villa transport to the DNA Analysis Laboratory at the National Science Research
Institute (NSRI).
Requested the NSRI to conduct DNA testing on the sample given by Leahlyn Mendoza, those given by the grandchildren
of Reynaldo de Villa, and that given by Reynaldo de Villa himself, that Reynaldo de Villa could not have sired any of the children
whose samples were tested, due to the absence of a match between the pertinent genetic markers in petitioner's sample and
those of any of the other samples, including Leahlyn's... petitioner argues as follows:
DNA ANALYSIS ON PATERNITY SHOWS CONCLUSIVELY THAT PETITIONER DE VILLA IS NOT THE FATHER OF LEAHLYN
MENDOZA; HIS CONVICTION FOR RAPE, BASED ON THE FACT THAT LEAHLYN WAS SIRED AS A RESULT OF THE ALLEGED
RAPE, CANNOT STAND AND MUST BE SET ASIDE

Issues:
DNA ANALYSIS ON PATERNITY SHOWS CONCLUSIVELY THAT PETITIONER DE VILLA IS NOT THE FATHER OF LEAHLYN
MENDOZA; HIS CONVICTION FOR RAPE, BASED ON THE FACT THAT LEAHLYN WAS SIRED AS A RESULT OF THE ALLEGED
RAPE, CANNOT STAND AND MUST BE SET ASIDE
A NEW TRIAL TO CONSIDER NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE IS PROPER AND MAY BE ORDERED BY THIS COURT IN VIEW OF
THE RESULTS OF THE DNA TESTS CONDUCTED
This Court is thus tasked to determine, first, the propriety of the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus to release an individual
already convicted and serving sentence by virtue of a final and executory judgment; and second, the propriety of granting a
new... trial under the same factual scenario
Ruling:
Petitioner relies upon the DNA evidence gathered subsequent to the trial in order to re-litigate the factual issue of the
paternity of the child Leahlyn Mendoza crucial, considering that his conviction in 2001 was based on the factual finding that he
sired the said child. Since this paternity is now conclusively disproved, he argues that the 2001 conviction must be overturned.
Petitioner invokes the remedy of the writ of habeas corpus to collaterally attack the 2001 Decision... remedy of a motion for new
trial is resorted to solely to allow the presentation of what is alleged to be newly-discovered evidence.
Habeas corpus relief for those seeking liberty from any unwarranted denial of freedom of movement illegal confinement
necessitates that a person be illegally deprived of his liberty
If an individual's liberty is restrained via some legal process, the writ of habeas corpus is unavailing the writ of habeas
corpus cannot be used to directly assail a judgment rendered by a competent court or tribunal which, having duly acquired
jurisdiction, was not deprived or ousted of this jurisdiction through some anomaly in the conduct of the proceedings (a) there
has been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person; (b) the court had no jurisdiction to impose
the sentence; or (c) an excessive penalty has been imposed, as such sentence is void as to such excess this Court stated the
general rule that the writ of habeas corpus is not a writ of error, and should not be thus used a habeas corpus petition reaches
the body, but not the record of the case mere errors of fact or law, which did not have the effect of depriving the trial court of its
jurisdiction over the case and the person of the defendant, are not correctible in a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas
corpus the writ of habeas corpus was held to be available where an accused was deprived of the constitutional right against self-
incrimination. A defect so pronounced as the denial of an accused's constitutional rights results in the absence or loss of
jurisdiction, and therefore invalidates the trial and the consequent conviction of the accused void judgment of conviction may
be challenged by collateral attack, which precisely is the function of habeas corpus the inquiry on a writ of habeas corpus would
be addressed, not to errors committed by a court within its jurisdiction, but to the question of whether the proceeding or
judgment under which a person has been restrained is a complete nullity the denial of a constitutional right has not been alleged
by petitioner does not reveal any constitutional right of which the petitioner was unduly deprived it appears that in the middle
of the appeal, the petitioner's counsel of record, a certain Atty. Alfonso G. Salvador, suddenly and inexplicably withdrew his
appearance as counsel, giving the sole explanation that he was "leaving for the United States for an indefinite period of time by
virtue of a petition filed in his favor." find that there was such negligence committed by his earlier counsel so as to amount to a
denial of a constitutional right.
We find that petitioner invokes the remedy of the petition for a writ of habeas corpus to seek a re-examination of the
records of People v. de Villa, without asserting any legal grounds therefor seeks a reevaluation of the evidentiary basis for his
conviction.
The petition for habeas corpus must, therefore, fail. It must be stressed that the issue of Leahlyn Mendoza's paternity
is not central to the issue of petitioner's guilt or innocence rape of the victim Aileen Mendoza is an entirely different question,
separate and distinct from the question of the father of her child we ruled that the fact or not of the victim's pregnancy and
resultant childbirth are irrelevant in determining whether or not she was raped centrally relevant to the civil award of child
support
It is only tangentially related to the issue of petitioner's guilt if it can be conclusively determined that the petitioner did
not sire Leahlyn Mendoza, this may cast the shadow of reasonable doubt, and allow the acquittal of the petitioner on this basis
A motion for new trial, under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, is available only for a limited period of time, and
for very limited grounds fifteen (15) days from its promulgation or notice.

Principles:
Review of a judgment of conviction is allowed in a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus only in very
specific instances, such as when, as a consequence of a judicial proceeding, (a) there has been a deprivation of a constitutional
right resulting in the restraint of a person; (b) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or (c) an excessive penalty
has been imposed, as such sentence is void as to such excess the burden of proving illegal restraint by the respondent rests on
the petitioner who attacks such restraint
Pregnancy is not an essential element of the crime of rape

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS ENGR. ASHRAF KUNTING

Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides when the writ is not allowed:
SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in
the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and
that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be
allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality
or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged
with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.
In this case, Kunting's detention by the PNP-IG was under process issued by the RTC. He was arrested by the PNP by
virtue of the alias order of arrest issued by Judge Danilo M. Bucoy, RTC, Branch 2, Isabela City, Basilan. His temporary detention
at PNP-IG, Camp Crame, Quezon City, was thus authorized by the trial court.

FACTS
Kunting was arrested in Malaysia for violation of the Malaysian Internal Security Act, then the Royal Malaysian Police
in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, turned over Kunting to the PNP-IG and Task Force Salinglahi pursuant to warrants for his arrest
issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Isabela City. Kunting was charged with four counts of Kidnapping for Ransom and
Serious Illegal Detention with the RTC.
Petitioner was immediately flown to the Philippines and brought to the PNP-IG at Camp Crame for booking and custodial
investigation. The PNP-IG informed the RTC that Kunting was already in their custody but PNP-IG requested for Kunting's
temporary detention at the PNP-IG, Camp Crame, Quezon City due to the high security risks involved and prayed for the issuance
of a corresponding commitment order,to which the RTC granted.
Subsequently, the RTC issued an Order the turn over Kunting to the trial court since Kunting filed an Urgent Motion for
Reinvestigation.
The PNP-IG Director wrote DOJ requesting for representation and a motion to be filed for the transfer of the venue of
the trial from Isabela City, Basilan to Pasig City, for the following reasons: (1) Several intelligence reports have been received by
the PNP-IG stating that utmost effort will be exerted by the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) to recover the custody of Kunting from the
PNP considering his importance to the ASG; and (2) there is a big possibility that Kunting may be recovered by the ASG if he will
be detained in Basilan due to inadequate security facility in the municipal jail and its proximity to the area of operation of the
ASG.
 In February 2005, the RTC issued an Order denying Kunting's Motion to Set Case for Preliminary Investigation since the
PNP-IG has not turned over Kunting. The trial court reiterated its Order directing the Police Superintendent and Chief, Legal
Affairs Division, PNP-IG, to turn over Kunting to the court. The Legal Affairs Division of PNP-IG, filed with the RTC a Motion to
Defer Implementation of the Order citing, among other grounds, the existence of a pending motion for the transfer of the venue
of the trial against Kunting, which was allegedly filed by the DOJ before the Supreme Court.

Thereafter, Kunting filed the petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. Kunting stated that he has been
restrained of his liberty since June 12, 2003 by the PNP-IG and alleged that he was never informed of the charges filed against
him until he requested his family to research in Zamboanga City.

ISSUE
Whether the petition for habeas corpus can prosper.

RULING
Under Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas corpus extends to "all case of illegal confinement or
detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the
person entitled thereto." The remedy of habeas corpus has one objective: to inquire into the cause of detention of a person, and
if found illegal, the court orders the release of the detainee. If, however, the detention is proven lawful, then the habeas corpus
proceedings terminate.
Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides when the writ is not allowed:
SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in
the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and
that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be
allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality
or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged
with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.

In this case, Kunting's detention by the PNP-IG was under process issued by the RTC. He was arrested by the PNP by
virtue of the alias order of arrest issued by Judge Danilo M. Bucoy, RTC, Branch 2, Isabela City, Basilan. His temporary detention
at PNP-IG, Camp Crame, Quezon City, was thus authorized by the trial court.
Moreover, Kunting was charged with four counts of Kidnapping for Ransom and Serious Illegal Detention in Criminal
Case Nos. 3608-1164, 3537-1129, 3674-1187, and 3611-1165. In accordance with the last sentence of Section 4 above, the writ
cannot be issued and Kunting cannot be discharged since he has been charged with a criminal offense. Bernarte v. Court of
Appeals holds that "once the person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer question his detention by a petition for
the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus."
Nevertheless, this Court notes that the RTC in its Orders directed the Police Superintendent and Chief, Legal Affairs
Division, PNP-IG, Camp Crame, Quezon City, to turn over Kunting to the court. The trial court has been waiting for two years for
the PNP-IG to turn over the person of Kunting for the trial of his case. The PNP-IG has delayed the turn over because it is waiting
for the DOJ to request for the transfer of venue of the trial of the case from Isabela City, Basilan to Pasig City. In the absence of
evidence that the DOJ has indeed filed a motion for the transfer of venue, In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General stated
that the PNP-IG is presently awaiting the resolution of the Motion for Transfer of Venue it requested from the DOJ. In this regard,
the Police Chief Superintendent is, therefore, directed to take positive steps towards action on said motion and comply with the
Order of the trial court.

MONCUPA VS. ENRILE

(Special Proceedings – Temporary release with involuntary restraints does not render the petition for writ of habeas corpus
moot and academic)

Facts:
Petitioners were arrested and detained on the allegation that they were members of a subversive organization. Petitioners filed
a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss after the petitioner was temporarily released from
detention on the ground that the petition for habeas corpus may be deemed moot and academic since the petitioner is free and
no longer under the respondent’s custody. Petitioner argues that his temporary release did not render the instant petition moot
and academic because of the restrictions imposed by the respondents which constitute an involuntary and illegal restraint on
his freedom.

Issue:
WON a petition for a writ of habeas corpus becomes moot and academic in view of the detained person’s release with
restrictions.

Held:
No. Restraints attached to temporary release of a detained person warrant the Supreme Court’s inquiry into the nature
of the involuntary restraint and relieving him of such restraints as may be illegal.
Reservation of the military in the form of restrictions attached to the detainee’s temporary release constitutes restraints
on the liberty of the detainee. It is not physical restraint alone which is inquired into by the writ of habeas corpus.
Temporary release of detainee from detention with involuntary restraints does not render the petition for writ of
habeas corpus moot and academic. It is available where a person continue to be unlawfully denied of one or more of his
constitutional freedoms, where there is denial of due process, where the restraints are not merely involuntary but are necessary,
and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has later become arbitrary.

ROBERTO RAFAEL PULIDO vs. Gen. EFREN ABU

Facts:
In line with their participation in the “Oakwood Mutiny” that led to Pres. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo’s issuance of
Proclamation No. 427 declaring the country to be under a "state of rebellion” and General Order No. 4 directing the AFP and the
PNP to carry out all reasonable measures, giving due regard to constitutional rights, to suppress and quell the "rebellion.",
petitioners were taken into custody by their Service Commander. Gonzales and Mesa were not charged before a court martial
with violation of the Articles of War. They were, however, among the soldiers charged before Branch 61 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Makati City, with the crime of Coup D’etat as defined under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code. They were
consequently detained in Fort Bonifacio under the custody of the Philippine Marines. A petition for bail was filed by the accused
soldiers which the RTC subsequently granted. Despite of the order and the service thereof, petitioners were not released. As a
response, the People of the Philippines moved for partial reconsideration of the order granting bail. With the denial of the Motion
for Partial Reconsideration, the People filed with the Court of Appeals on 4 February 2005 a special civil action for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with urgent prayer for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction. Moreover, since Gonzales and Mesa continued to be in detention, a Petition for Habeas Corpus was filed by petitioner
Pulido on their behalf. In response, Respondents prayed that the Petition for Habeas Corpus be dismissed primarily on two
grounds: (1) the continued detention of Gonzales and Mesa is justified because of the pendency of the Petition for Certiorari
questioning the order dated 8 July 2004 of the RTC granting bail to Gonzales and Mesa before the 7th Division of the Court of
Appeals and (2) petitioner is guilty of forum shopping because of his failure to state in the petition that the order granting bail
has been elevated to the Court of Appeals and pending before its 7th Division. Thus, we have this case.

Issue:
Whether or not the petition for habeas corpus was proper despite of the pending special civil action for certiorari before
the Court of Appeals 7th Division.

Held:
No. That the present petition has direct and intimate links with the certiorari case is beyond doubt as they involve two
sides of the same coin. The certiorari case filed by the People seeks to prevent the release of Gonzales and Mesa by annulling the
lower court’s grant of bail. The present petition, on the other hand, was filed in behalf of Gonzales and Mesa to secure their
immediate release because the order granting bail is already executory. In effect, the petitioner seeks to implement through a
petition for habeas corpus the provisional release from detention that the lower court has ordered. The question this
immediately raises is: can this be done through a petition for habeas corpus when the validity of the grant of bail and the release
under bail are live questions before another Division of this Court?
We believe and so hold that his cannot and should not be done as this is precisely the reason why the rule against forum
shopping has been put in place. The remedies sought being two sides of the same coin (i.e., the release of Gonzales and Mesa),
they cannot be secured through separately-filed cases where issues of jurisdiction may arise and whose rulings may conflict
with one another. To be sure, we clearly heard the petitioner say that there can be no conflict because the effectiveness of our
ruling in this petition will depend on the nature and tenor of the ruling in the certiorari case; there is no basis for a release on
habeas corpus if this same Court will rule in the certiorari case that the grant of bail is improper. For this very same reason, we
should not entertain the present petition as the matter before us is already before another co-equal body whose ruling will be
finally determinative of the issue of Gonzales’ and Mesa’s release. The Decision of the Seventh Division of this Court, heretofore
footnoted, ordering the release on bail of Gonzales and Mesa drives home this point.
XXX XXX XXX
When the release of the persons in whose behalf the application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus was filed is effected, the
Petition for the issuance of the writ becomes moot and academic. With the release of both Mesa and Gonzales, the Petition for
Habeas Corpus has, indeed, been rendered moot. Courts of justice constituted to pass upon substantial rights will not consider
questions where no actual interests are involved. Thus, the well-settled rule that courts will not determine a moot question.
Where the issues have become moot and academic, there ceases to be any justiciable controversy, thus rendering the resolution
of the same of no practical value. This Court will therefore abstain from expressing its opinion in a case where no legal relief is
needed or called for.

ALIENTES V. ABANILLA
G.R. No. 162734, 29 August 2006

FACTS:
Private respondent Loran S.D. Abanilla and petitioner Marie Antonette Abigail C. Salientes are the parents of the minor
Lorenzo Emmanuel S. Abanilla. They lived with Marie Antonette’s parents, petitioners Orlando B. Salientes and Rosario C.
Salientes. Due to in-laws problems, private respondent suggested to his wife that they transfer to their own house, but Marie
Antonette refused. So, he alone left the house of the Salientes. Thereafter, he was prevented from seeing his son. Later, Loran
S.D. Abanilla in his personal capacity and as the representative of his son filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus and Custody which
the trial court granted. However, petitioners contend that the order is contrary to Article 213 of the Family Code, which provides
that no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order
otherwise. They maintain that herein respondent Loran had the burden of showing any compelling reason but failed to present
even a prima facie proof thereof, and even assuming that there were compelling reasons, the proper remedy for private
respondent was simply an action for custody, but not habeas corpus. Petitioners assert that habeas corpus is unavailable against
the mother who, under the law, has the right of custody of the minor. Respondent on the other hand, asserts that the writ of
habeas corpus is available against any person who restrains the minors’ right to see his father and vice versa.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for habeas corpus is available and should be granted to the petitioner.

RULING:
Yes. Habeas corpus may be resorted to in cases where rightful custody is withheld from a person entitled thereto. Under
Article 211 of the Family Code, respondent Loran and petitioner Marie Antonette have joint parental authority over their son
and consequently joint custody. Further, although the couple is separated de facto, the issue of custody has yet to be adjudicated
by the court. In the absence of a judicial grant of custody to one parent, both parents are still entitled to the custody of their child.
In the present case, private respondents cause of action is the deprivation of his right to see his child as alleged in his petition.
Hence, the remedy of habeas corpus is available to him. In a petition for habeas corpus, the child’s welfare is the supreme
consideration. The Child and Youth Welfare Code unequivocally provide that in all questions regarding the care and custody,
among others, of the child, his welfare shall be the paramount consideration. Again, it bears stressing that the order did not grant
custody of the minor to any of the parties but merely directed petitioners to produce the minor in court and explain why private
respondent is prevented from seeing his child. This is in line with the directive in Section 9 of A.M. 03-04-04-SC that within
fifteen days after the filing of the answer or the expiration of the period to file answer, the court shall issue an order requiring
the respondent (herein petitioners) to present the minor before the court. This was exactly what the court did. Moreover, Article
213 of the Family Code deals with the judicial adjudication of custody and serves as a guideline for the proper award of custody
by the court. Petitioners can raise it as a counter argument for private respondents’ petition for custody. But it is not a basis for
preventing the father to see his own child. Nothing in the said provision disallows a father from seeing or visiting his child under
seven years of age.

DAVID E. SO v. HON. ESTEBAN A. TACLA, JR.

G.R. No. 190108, 19 October 2010

FACTS:
Petitioner David E. So (So) filed the petition for the writs of habeas corpus and amparo on behalf of his daughter, Ma.
Elena So Guisande (Guisande), accused of Qualified Theft in the criminal case pending before Judge Tacla. Petitioner So alleged,
among others, that Guisande was under a life-threatening situation while confined at the NCMH, the government hospital
ordered by the RTC Mandaluyong City to ascertain the actual psychological state of Guisande, who was being charged with a
non-bailable offense.
The case arose from the following facts. Prior to the institution of the criminal proceedings, Guisande was committed
by So for psychiatric treatment and care at the Makati Medical Center (MMC). Thus, the return of the warrant for the arrest of
Guisande, issued by Judge Tacla which states that the former was confined at MMC for Bipolar Mood Disorder and that she was
"not ready for discharge". Judge Tacla ordered Guisande’s referral to the NCMH for an independent forensic assessment of
Guisande’s mental health to determine if she would be able to stand arraignment and undergo trial for Qualified Theft.
Subsequently, Judge Tacla, upon motion of the NCMH, ordered that accused Guisande be physically brought to the NCMH to have
temporary legal custody of the accused, and thereafter, Judge Tacla would issue the corresponding order of confinement of
Guisande in a regular jail facility upon the NCMHs determination that she was ready for trial.
Eventually, claiming "life-threatening" circumstances surrounding her confinement at the NCMH which supposedly
worsened her mental condition and violated her constitutional rights against solitary detention and assistance of counsel,
accused Guisande and her father filed a Motion for Relief from Solitary Confinement and the present petition for the issuance of
the writs of habeas corpus and amparo.
The court granted the Motion for Relief. On the petition for habeas corpus and amparo, the court resolved to issue a
joint writ of habeas corpus and amparo and refer the petition to the Court of Appeals for decision. Meanwhile, NCMH submitted
its Evaluation Report according to which, Guisande is competent to stand the rigors of court trial.
Hence, the petition for review on certiorari.
During the pendency of these consolidated cases, various events occurred which ultimately led to the incident before
this Court. Public respondent Judge ordered the dismissal of Criminal Case for Qualified Theft against Guisande. In view of such
dismissal, Judge Tacla contends that the cases for issuance of the writs of habeas corpus and amparo and the petition for review
on certiorari should be dismissed for having been rendered moot and academic.

ISSUE:
Whether the petition for habeas corpus should be dismissed for having been rendered moot and academic

HELD:
The petition should be dismissed. The petition for the writs of habeas corpus and amparo was based on the criminal
case for Qualified Theft against petitioner Sos daughter, Guisande.
There is no affirmation of petitioner So’s claim that the confinement of accused Guisande at the NCMH was illegal.
Neither were the respective acts performed by respondents Judge Tacla and Dr. Vicente in ascertaining the mental condition of
accused Guisande to withstand trial declared unlawful. On the contrary, the NCMH, a well-reputed government forensic facility,
albeit not held in high regard by petitioner Sos and accused Guisandes family, had assessed Guisande fit for trial.
The Rules on the Writs of Habeas Corpus and Amparo are clear; the act or omission or the threatened act or omission
complained of - confinement and custody for habeas corpus and violations of, or threat to violate, a person’s life, liberty, and
security for amparo cases - should be illegal or unlawful.
The most basic criterion for the issuance of the writ, therefore, is that the individual seeking such relief is illegally
deprived of his freedom of movement or place under some form of illegal restraint. If an individual’s liberty is restrained via
some legal process, the writ of habeas corpus is unavailing. Fundamentally, in order to justify the grant of the writ of habeas
corpus, the restraint of liberty must be in the nature of an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action.
While habeas corpus is a writ of right, it will not issue as a matter of course or as a mere perfunctory operation on the
filing of the petition. Judicial discretion is called for in its issuance and it must be clear to the judge to whom the petition is
presented that, prima facie, the petitioner is entitled to the writ. It is only if the court is satisfied that a person is being unlawfully
restrained of his liberty will the petition for habeas corpus be granted. If the respondents are not detaining or restraining the
applicant of the person in whose behalf the petition is filed, the petition should be dismissed.
In the cases at bar, the question before the CA was correctly limited to which hospital, the NCMH or a medical facility of
accused’s own choosing, accused Guisande should be referred for treatment of a supposed mental condition. In addition, it was
procedurally proper for the RTC to ask the NCMH for a separate opinion on accused’s mental fitness to be arraigned and stand
trial.
Certainly, with the dismissal of the non-bailable case against accused Guisande, she is no longer under peril to be
confined in a jail facility, much less at the NCMH. Effectively, accused Guisande’s person, and treatment of any medical and mental
malady she may or may not have, can no longer be subjected to the lawful processes of the RTC Mandaluyong City. In short, the
cases have now been rendered moot and academic which, in the often cited David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, is defined as "one that
ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical
use or value."

EDGARDO E. VELUZ vs. LUISA R. VILLANUEVA and TERESITA R. PABELLO

FACTS:
This is a petition for review1 of the resolutions February 2, 2005 and September 2, 2005 of the C.A. where the petition
for habeas corpus was denied.
The nephew of Eufemia E. Rodriguez was a 94-year old widow, allegedly suffering from a poor state of mental health
and deteriorating cognitive abilities filed for habeas corpus after demanding the return of Eufemia from her adopted
daughters. The C.A. ruled that petitioner failed to present any convincing proof that respondents (the legally adopted children
of Eufemia) were unlawfully restraining their mother of her liberty. He also failed to establish his legal right to the custody of
Eufemia as he was not her legal guardian. Thus, in a resolution dated February 2, 2005, the C.A. denied his petition.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was also denied. Hence, this petition.
Petitioner claims that, in determining whether or not a writ of habeas corpus should issue, a court should limit itself to
determining whether or not a person is unlawfully being deprived of liberty and that there is no need to consider legal custody
or custodial rights. Thus, a writ of habeas corpus can cover persons who are not under the legal custody of another. According
to petitioner, as long as it is alleged that a person is being illegally deprived of liberty, the writ of habeas corpus may issue so
that his physical body may be brought before the court that will determine whether or not there is in fact an unlawful deprivation
of liberty.
However, respondents state that they are the legally adopted daughters of Eufemia and her deceased spouse, Maximo
Rodriguez. Respondents point out that it was petitioner and his family who were staying with Eufemia, not the other way around
as petitioner claimed. Eufemia paid for the rent of the house, the utilities and other household needs.
Sometime in the 1980s, petitioner EDGARDO E. VELUZ was appointed as administrator of the properties of Eufemia and
her deceased spouse. By this appointment, he took charge of collecting payments from tenants and transacted business with
third persons for and in behalf of Eufemia and the respondents who were the only compulsory heirs of the late Maximo.Eufemia
and the respondents demanded an inventory and return of the properties entrusted to petitioner. His failure to heed gave rise
to a complaint of estafa. Consequently, and by reason of their mother’s deteriorating health, respondents decided to take custody
of Eufemia on January 11, 2005. She willingly went with them. Petitioner failed to prove either his right to the custody of Eufemia
or the illegality of respondents’ action.

ISSUE: Whether or not habeas corpus should be granted.

RULING:
Petition Denied. The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person
is deprived of his liberty or by which the rightful custody of a person is being withheld from the one entitled thereto. It is issued
when one is either deprived of liberty or is wrongfully being prevented from exercising legal custody over another person. Thus,
it contemplates two instances: (1) deprivation of a person’s liberty either through illegal confinement or through detention and
(2) withholding of the custody of any person from someone entitled to such custody.

According to the S.C., if the respondents are not detaining or restraining the applicant or the person in whose behalf the petition
is filed, the petition should be dismissed

In this case, the C.A. made an inquiry into whether Eufemia was being restrained of her liberty. It found that she was
not. Petition was DENIED.

FULL CASE VICENTE VS. MAJADUCON

In a letter-complaint dated July 21, 2000, addressed to then Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo, Dante Vicente charged
respondent Judge Jose S. Majaducon of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of General Santos City, Branch 23, with gross ignorance of
the law, grave abuse of authority and manifest partiality, praying that he be administratively disciplined and terminated from
the service.

The instant administrative complaint stemmed from a series of criminal cases involving a certain Evelyn Te of General Santos
City. The factual and procedural antecedents leading to the instant administrative case is summarized in this Court’s Resolution
of February 19, 2001, in G.R. Nos. 145715-18 entitled, People of the Philippines vs. Evelyn Te, pertinent portions of which read as
follows:

In a joint decision dated May 31, 1995, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, General Santos City, found Evelyn Te guilty on four
counts of violation of B. P. Blg. 22, otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law, and sentenced her to two (2) months of
imprisonment on each count. The decision became final and executory after this Court had denied Te’s petition for review from
the affirmance of the trial court’s decision by the Court of Appeals.

On March 11, 2000, Te sought clarification from the trial court whether she should serve her sentences successively or
simultaneously. In an order, dated May 25, 2000, the trial court clarified that she should serve her sentences successively, but
‘for humanitarian reason’ and in accordance with Art. 70 of the Revised Penal Code, it held that ‘instead of serving imprisonment
of EIGHT months, the prisoner EVELYN TE should serve only six months.’

On June 2, 2000, Te filed a motion for reconsideration, which she prayed be also considered as a petition for issuance of the writ
of habeas corpus. Citing Vaca v. Court of Appeals, 298 SCRA 656 (1998), in which the sentence of imprisonment of a party found
guilty of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 was reduced to a fine equal to double the amount of the check involved, Te prayed that her
sentence be similarly modified and that she be immediately released from detention. In a supplemental motion, Te argued that
she had been denied equal protection of the law because the trial judge in another case involving multiple counts of robbery
directed the accused to simultaneously serve his sentences.

On June 20, 2000, the trial court denied Te’s petition for issuance of the writ of habeas corpus on the ground that Te was detained
by virtue of a final judgment.

On June 22, 2000, Te filed an omnibus motion praying for her release on the ground that she had been in jail since March 15,
2000 and had fully served the three months minimum of her total sentence under the Indeterminate Sentence Law. In the
alternative, Te prayed for release on recognizance.

On June 23, 2000, Te moved for reconsideration of the trial court’s order of June 20, 2000, alleging that the finality of the joint
decision against her did not bar her application for the writ of habeas corpus. She prayed that pending determination as to
whether the Vaca ruling applied to her, she also be allowed to post bail pursuant to Rule 102, §14.

On July 5, 2000, the trial court allowed Te to post bail in the amount of one million pesos, holding that it would order her release
upon the approval of her bail bond and thereafter certify the proceedings to the Court as the latter has concurrent jurisdiction
over proceedings for habeas corpus.

On July 7, 2000, the trial court approved Te’s bail bonds in the reduced amount of ₱500,000.00 and ordered her release. The
trial court also directed its clerk of court to certify the proceedings to the Court.

On July 11, 2000, Assistant City Prosecutor Marie Ellengred L. Baliguiat moved for reconsideration of the trial court’s resolution
of July 5, 2000.

On July 18, 2000, Te filed a notice of appeal from the order, dated June 20, 2000, and the resolution, dated July 5, 2000, of the
trial court.

On July 31, 2000, the trial court denied the motion for reconsideration of the Assistant City Prosecutor. It also denied due course
to Te’s notice of appeal on the ground that there was no necessity for the appeal to the Court of Appeals because it had already
ordered that the whole records be forwarded to this Court pursuant to Rule 102, §14. 1

In the present case, complainant, who claims to be the station manager of Radyo Bombo, General Santos City, alleges that while
Te was in prison, respondent judge allowed her to be released and confined at a local hospital in the guise that she was suffering
from certain illnesses. Complainant further alleges that respondent judge approved Te’s application for bail as part of habeas
corpus proceedings even though no petition for habeas corpus in favor of Te was filed and docketed. As a result of respondent
judge’s order allowing the provisional liberty of Te, the local media in General Santos City made an uproar and criticized
respondent judge for his action on the said case. In retaliation, respondent judge cited for indirect contempt a group of mediamen
who published a critical article against him. Complainant contends that respondent judge will not hesitate to use his clout and
power to stifle criticism and dissent. In addition, complainant alleges that in a separate case, respondent judge allowed the
release of the accused without the posting of the necessary bail. On the basis of the above allegations, complainant prays that
respondent judge be investigated and if warranted, be terminated and removed from service. 2

In his Comment, dated October 17, 2000, respondent judge submitted the following contentions which we quote verbatim:

1. The certified records of the above-mentioned cases against Evelyn Te were forwarded to the Supreme Court on
August 5, 2000, upon the order of undersigned by the Branch Clerk of Court for review of our questioned Order
(attached as ANNEX ‘1’ of letter Complaint);

2. On June 2, 2000, Evelyn Te’s counsel filed not only a motion for reconsideration denying our previous order denying
her motion for release from detention but also a petition for Habeas Corpus in the same cases;

3. In the exercise of sound discretion and after hearing the comment of the public prosecutor, we issued the questioned
Order, which is self-explanatory;

4. We believed then that we had the discretion to allow her to be released on bail, based on Sec. 14, Rule 102 of the
Revised Rules of Court;

5. We were thinking then that in such a dilemma, whether or not to release her on bail, it was a better judgment to
release her from bail on a writ of habeas corpus, because, Evelyn Te might be right in her contention that she is
considered to have served her sentences simultaneously. If we denied her petition for Habeas Corpus, and on appeal,
she could get a favorable decision from the Supreme Court, surely, she could return and charge us with a graver offense
of ignorance of the law and abuse of discretion. She could even file other cases against us under the Revised Penal Code,
such as rendering an unjust order, or under the Civil Code for moral damages in millions of pesos;

6. To obviate such a possible move on Te’s part, we opted to allow her release on bail through the writ of habeas
corpus proceedings. Anyway, the Supreme Court has the last say on that matter;

7. Therefore, we are of the view that the letter complaint of Mr. Dante Vicente is legally premature as it concerned cases
which are still sub judice;
 8. Besides, we are of the opinion that Mr. Vicente has no personality as a third party to charge us with anything as he
has not shown any damage that he could have suffered because of our Order;

9. We are convinced that Mr. Vicente is trying to pre-empt our move to charge his radio station for libel or cite the
announcer for indirect contempt of Court when his radio station and announcer had been reviling and attacking us for
many days on the air for having allowed Evelyn Te to be treated and confined in a hospital upon recommendation of a
government doctor and for having allowed her release from imprisonment on bail; a certified Xerox copy of the letter
of the Regional Director of the Department of Transportation and Communication (National Telecommunications
Commission) dated August 9, 2000, in reply to our request for copies of the broadcast tapes, is attached herewith as
ANNEX "1";

10. As to the charge that we are stifling criticism by the print and broadcast media, we are of the view that if media has
the privilege to criticize the Courts and the Judges, we have also the right to charge them for indirect contempt of Court
and libel, because there are laws regarding this matter. The article of a certain Joseph Jubelag is now a subject of an
indirect contempt charge before us, which we are about to resolve;

11. Regarding our Order in Criminal Case No. 14072 in the case of ‘People vs. Jhoyche Gersonin-Palma’, RTC Br. 36, it
was done with sound discretion on our part because it was already 6:30 in the evening and the offices were closed and
being a Friday, the accused would be detained for two days and three nights, unless we accepted and approved the bail
bond. Besides, the law requires judges to approve bail even during the holidays. Immediately, on Monday, the money in
the amount of ₱6,000.00 was deposited with the Clerk of Court as shown in the official receipt (ANNEX ‘6’ of letter
complaint);

12. Regarding our competence, honesty and integrity, modesty aside, as a judge for the last thirteen years in General
Santos City, the records of the Municipal Trial Court and RTC, Branches 23 and 22 (being a pairing judge of the latter
court since October last year) show that most of our decisions appealed to the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court
have been sustained or affirmed;

13. As to our reputation in the community, let other members of the media and a member of the Philippine Bar speak
about it. We are enclosing herewith a Xerox copy of a news clipping of Philippine Daily Inquirer, July 8, 2000 issue
(attached herewith as ANNEX ‘2’), about how we tried and decided the celebrated case of People vs. Castracion, et. al.
when the Supreme Court assigned us to hear the evidence of the defense and decide the case. We did our work in that
case as best we could as we have done in all cases being tried and decided by us, mindful of our duty to do our work
with faithful diligence, honesty, and integrity. We do not expect praises from others as we do not also wish to be
criticized or attacked by Radio Bombo station in General Santos City especially by its manager, Mr. Dante Vicente,
without basis or competent proof and evidence. Atty. Rogelio Garcia, who vouched for our honesty, competence and
integrity is a former assemblyman of South Cotabato and General Santos City, and an ex-Assistant Minister of Labor. He
has known us in the community for almost twenty five years;

14. Complainant Dante Vicente is just a newcomer to General Santos and he and his radio station have a bad and
notorious reputation of attacking the character and good name of some people here as shown by cases for libel filed in
our courts.3

In its Report dated March 11, 2002, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) confirmed that Criminal Cases Nos. 9456-9460
were indeed certified by respondent to this Court.4 However, this Court in its Resolution of February 19, 2001 in G.R. Nos.
145715-18, resolved to return the records of the consolidated cases to the RTC of General Santos City, Branch 23, and to order
the said court to give due course to Evelyn Te’s notice of appeal from the Order denying her petition for habeas corpus and from
the Order requiring her to post bail in the amount of one million pesos for her release from detention. This Court made the
following pronouncements:

Rule 102, §14 provides:

When person lawfully imprisoned recommitted, and when let to bail. – If it appears that the prisoner was lawfully committed,
and is plainly and specifically charged in the warrant of commitment with an offense punishable by death, he shall not be
released, discharged, or bailed. If he is lawfully imprisoned or restrained on a charge of having committed an offense not so
punishable, he may be recommitted to imprisonment or admitted to bail in the discretion of the court or judge. If he be admitted
to bail, he shall forthwith file a bond in such sum as the court or judge deems reasonable, considering the circumstances of the
prisoner and the nature of the offense charged, conditioned for his appearance before the court where the offense is properly
cognizable to abide its order or judgment; and the court or judge shall certify the proceedings, together with the bond, forthwith
to the proper court. If such bond is not so filed, the prisoner shall be recommitted to confinement.

The foregoing provision, however, applies to cases where the applicant for the writ of habeas corpus is restrained by virtue of a
criminal charge against him, not where, as here, he is serving sentence by reason of a final judgment. Indeed, Rule 102, §4
disallows issuance of the writ where the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is ‘suffering imprisonment under lawful
judgment.’

The certification of a case under Rule 102, §14, moreover, refers to cases where the habeas corpus court finds that the applicant
is charged with the noncapital offense in another court. Thus, the certification of this case to this Court is clearly erroneous.5
On the basis of the above-quoted Resolution and the provisions of Section 24, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, the OCA, in its
Report in the present case, found respondent judge guilty of gross ignorance of the law and recommended that he be fined in
the amount of ₱20,000.00.6

The Court agrees with the findings of the OCA except for the recommended penalty.

Section 24, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court is plain and clear in prohibiting the grant of bail after conviction by final judgment and
after the convict has started to serve sentence. It provides:

SEC. 24. No bail after final judgment; exception. – An accused shall not be allowed bail after the judgment has become final,
unless he has applied for probation before commencing to serve sentence, the penalty and the offense being within the
purview of the Probation Law. In case the accused has applied for probation, he may be allowed temporary liberty under his
bail, but if no bail was filed or the accused is incapable of filing one, the court may allow his release on recognizance to the
custody of a responsible member of the community. In no case shall bail be allowed after the accused has commenced to
serve sentence. (Emphasis supplied)

The only exception to the above-cited provision of the Rules of Court is when the convict has applied for probation before he
commences to serve sentence, provided the penalty and the offense are within the purview of the Probation Law.

In the case of Evelyn Te, the judgment finding her guilty of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 on four counts and imposing upon her the
penalty of imprisonment for two months on each count has already become final and executory. She did not apply for probation.
At the time respondent judge granted her bail she was already serving her sentence.

From the foregoing, it is evident that Te is not entitled to bail. Respondent judge contends that under Section 14, Rule 102 of the
Rules of Court, he has the discretion to allow Te to be released on bail. However, the Court reiterates its pronouncement in its
Resolution of February 19, 2001 in G.R. Nos. 145715-18 that Section 14, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court applies only to cases
where the applicant for the writ of habeas corpus is restrained by virtue of a criminal charge against him and not in an instance,
as in the case involved in the present controversy, where the applicant is serving sentence by reason of a final judgment.

The Court agrees with the observation of the OCA that respondent judge’s ignorance or disregard of the provisions of Section
24, Rule 114 and Section 14, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court is tantamount to gross ignorance of the law and procedure. A judge
is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules. 7 It is imperative that he be
conversant with basic legal principles and be aware of well-settled authoritative doctrines.8 He should strive for excellence
exceeded only by his passion for truth, to the end that he be the personification of justice and the Rule of Law.9 When the law is
sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to simply apply it; anything less than that would be gross ignorance of the law.10

In the present case, considering that the granting of bail is common in the litigation of criminal cases before trial courts, we are
not impressed with the explanation of respondent judge in granting bail to Te. Respondent judge contends that he was caught
in a dilemma whether or not to grant bail in favor of Te. However, he thought that it would be better for him to release Te on
bail rather than deny her application; for if such denial is later found out by the appellate courts to be erroneous, Te could charge
him with gross ignorance of the law and abuse of discretion, or hold him liable for rendering an unjust order or for damages.
Hence, to obviate such possible move on Te’s part, he simply allowed her to be released on bail and relieved himself of any
burden brought about by the case of Te by certifying the same to this Court contending that, "[a]nyway, the Supreme Court has
the last say on (the) matter."

The Court finds respondent’s reasoning shallow and unjustified. He cannot simply shirk responsibility by conveniently passing
the buck, so to speak, to this Court on the pretext that we have the final say on the matter. This is hardly the kind of trait expected
of a judge. Rule 3.02, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that in every case, a judge shall endeavor diligently to
ascertain the facts and the applicable law unswayed by partisan interests, public opinion or fear of criticism. In Dimatulac vs.
Villon,11 we held that:

The judge, on the other hand, "should always be imbued with a high sense of duty and responsibility in the discharge of his
obligation to promptly and properly administer justice." He must view himself as a priest for the administration of justice is akin
to a religious crusade. Thus, exerting the same devotion as a priest "in the performance of the most sacred ceremonies of
religious liturgy," the judge must render service with impartiality commensurate with public trust and confidence reposed in
him.12

In the present case, respondent judge fell short of the above-cited ideals expected of a magistrate.

Complainant’s allegation that no petition for habeas corpus was filed does not hold water. As borne by the records, the
Certification issued by one Atty. Elmer D. Lastimosa, Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of General Santos City, shows that
Evelyn Te’s petition for habeas corpus was incorporated in the pleadings she filed in Criminal Cases Nos. 9456-9460, although
no docket fees and other charges were paid.13 There is no showing that respondent should be held administratively liable for
the non-payment of docket and other lawful fees. At any rate, the matter may be considered in the appeal taken by Te, as earlier
adverted to in G.R. Nos. 145715-18.

Complainant further claims that on several occasions, respondent judge allowed Te to be released and confined at a local hospital
on account of false illnesses. However, the Court does not find sufficient evidence to prove this charge. On the contrary, records
on hand show that the confinement of Te in the hospital is recommended by a panel of government doctors and that such
confinement is made without the objection of the public prosecutor.14 Hence, the Court finds respondent judge’s act of allowing
the temporary confinement of Te in the hospital as justified. The Court agrees with the observation of the OCA that in the absence
of contradictory evidence, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty should be upheld in favor of
respondent judge.15

The Court likewise finds no sufficient evidence to find respondent judge guilty of the charge that he uses his clout and power to
stifle criticism and dissent. In the present case, the Court finds nothing irregular or arbitrary in his act of requiring a number of
journalists to show cause why they should not be cited for indirect contempt. Freedom of speech and of expression, as
guaranteed by the Constitution, is not absolute.16 Freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated
with the requirements of equally important public interests such as the maintenance of the integrity of courts and orderly
functioning of the administration of justice.17 In the instant case, the Court finds nothing whimsical or despotic in respondent
judge’s act of issuing the subject show-cause order. Instead, respondent is merely exercising his right to protect his honor and,
more importantly, the integrity of the court which he represents.

As to the issue that respondent judge allowed the release of an accused in Criminal Case No. 14072, entitled People vs. Jhoyce
Gersonin-Palma, without the required bail bond being posted, it is not within the jurisdiction of this Court to resolve the same
on the basis of the OCA Report as it is already the subject of a separate administrative case against respondent. 18

Having found respondent guilty of gross ignorance of the law, as discussed earlier, the Court now determines the proper
imposable penalty. Section 8(9), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended, classifies gross ignorance of the law or procedure
as a serious charge. Under Section 11(A) of the same Rule, the imposable penalties, in case the respondent is found culpable of
a serious charge, range from a fine of not less than ₱20,000.00 but not more than ₱40,000.00 to dismissal from the service with
forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, except accrued leaves, and disqualification from
reinstatement or appointment to any public office including government-owned or controlled corporations.

However, on February 24, 2002, respondent retired upon reaching the compulsory retirement age of 70. 19 Considering that
respondent can no longer be dismissed or suspended, the Court is left with no recourse but to impose the penalty of fine.

Further, it is noted that on July 8, 2002, the Third Division of this Court, in Administrative Matter No.10874-Ret., concerning the
compulsory retirement of respondent, resolved to release his retirement benefits but set aside ₱100,000.00 thereof in view of
several administrative cases still pending against him.20

In the administrative complaints filed against respondent, two cases have, so far, resulted in his being fined. In Chan vs.
Majaducon,21 respondent was found guilty of violating among others, Rules 1.01 and 2.01 and Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial
conduct and was meted the penalty of fine in the amount of ₱10,000.00. In the more recent case of Alconera vs.
Majaducon,22 respondent was found guilty of gross ignorance of procedure and was fined ₱40,000.00. In view of the foregoing,
it is proper to impose the maximum fine of ₱40,000.00 to be deducted from the ₱100,000.00 set aside from respondent’s
retirement benefits in A.M. No. 10874-Ret.

WHEREFORE, respondent judge is found GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law or procedure. He is ordered to pay a FINE of
₱40,000.00 to be deducted from the ₱100,000.00 set aside from his retirement benefits in A.M. No. 10874-Ret.

SO ORDERED.

In the Matter of the Petition for the Writ of Amparo and the Writ of Habeas Data in Favor of Melissa C. Roxas
MELISSA C. ROXAS VS. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, ET AL.
G. R. No. 189155, September 7, 2010,

FACTS:
Roxas is an American citizen of Filipino descent. While in the United States, she is enrolled in an exposure program to
the Philippines with the group Bagong Alyansang Makabayan- United States of America (BAYAN-USA) of which she is a member.
During the course of her immersion, Roxas toured various provinces and towns in Central Luzon and, in April of 2009, she
volunteered to join members of BAYAN-Tarlac in conducting an initial health survey in La Paz, Tarlac for a future medical
mission.
After doing survey work on 19 May 2009, Roxas and her companions, Carabeo amd Jandoc, decided to rest in the house
of Mr. Paolo in Sitio Bagong Sikat, Barangay Kapanikian, La Paz, Tarlac. At around 1:30 in the afternoon, however, Roxas, her
companions and Mr. Paolo were startled by the loud sounds of someone banging at the front door and a voice demanding that
they open-up. Suddenly 15 heavily armed men forcibly opened the door, banged inside, tied and blindfolded Roxas and her
companions, Carabeo and Jandoc, then dragged them inside a van parked outside the house. The armed men were all in civilian
clothes and were wearing bonnets to conceal their faces.
After about an hour of travelling, the van stopped. Roxas, Carabeo and Jandoc were ordered to alight. After she was
informed that she was detained for being a member of the Communist Party of the Philippines – New People’s Army (CPP-NPA),
Roxas was separated from her companions and was escorted to a room which she believed is a jail cell from the sound of the
metal doors. From there she could hear the sounds of gunfire, the noise of planes taking off and landing and some construction
bustle. Roxas inferred that she was taken to the military camp of Fort Magsaysay in Laur, Nueva Ecija.
 On May 25, 2009, Roxas was finally released and returned to her uncle’s house in Quezon City. Before being release, the
abductors gave her a cellphone with a sim card, a slip of paper cantaining an email address with password, a plastic bag
containing biscuits and books, the handcuffs used on her, a blouse and a pair of shoes. She was also sternly warned not to report
the incident to the group Karapatan or else something bad will happen to her and her family. Sometime after her release, Roxas
continued to receive calls from one of her abductors via the cellular phone given to her. Out of apprehension that she was being
monitored and also fearing for the safety of her family, Roxas threw away the cellphone.
Roxas fied a petition for writ of amparo and writ of habeas data.
The Court of Appeals granted her petition for writ of amparo and writ of habeas data. However, the appellate court
absolved the respondents from the petition. Her prayer for the return of her personal belongings and for the inspection order
and production order were denied. Roxas invokes he doctrine of command responsibility to implicate the high-ranking civilian
and military authorities.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the principle of command responsibility shall apply in writ of amparo?
Whether or not the respondents are liable in her abduction and torture?
Whether or not her prayer for the return of her personal belongings be granted?
Whether or not her prayer for inspection order be granted?
Whether or not the grant of writ of habeas data is proper?

RULING:
It must be stated at the outset that the use by the petitioner of the doctrine of command responsibility as the justification
in impleading the public respondents in her amparo petition, is legally inaccurate, if not incorrect. The doctrine of command
responsibility is a rule of substantive law that establishes liability and, by this account, cannot be a proper legal basis to implead
a party-respondent in an amparo petition. According to Fr. Bernas, "command responsibility," in its simplest terms, means the
"responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed forces or other persons subject to
their control in international wars or domestic conflict." In this sense, command responsibility is properly a form of criminal
complicity. Since the application of command responsibility presupposes an imputation of individual liability, it is more aptly
invoked in a full-blown criminal or administrative case rather than in a summary amparo proceeding. The obvious reason lies
in the nature of the writ itself: The writ of amparo is a protective remedy aimed at providing judicial relief consisting of the
appropriate remedial measures and directives that may be crafted by the court, in order to address specific violations or threats
of violation of the constitutional rights to life, liberty or security. While the principal objective of its proceedings is the initial
determination of whether an enforced disappearance, extralegal killing or threats thereof had transpired—the writ does not, by
so doing, fix liability for such disappearance, killing or threats, whether that may be criminal, civil or administrative under the
applicable substantive law. It must be clarified, however, that the inapplicability of the doctrine of command responsibility in
an amparo proceeding does not, by any measure, preclude impleading military or police commanders on the ground that the
complained acts in the petition were committed with their direct or indirect acquiescence. In which case, commanders may be
impleaded—not actually on the basis of command responsibility—but rather on the ground of their responsibility, or at least
accountability.
The totality of the evidence presented by the petitioner does not inspire reasonable conclusion that her abductors were
military or police personnel and that she was detained at Fort Magsaysay. First. In amparo proceedings, the weight that may be
accorded to parallel circumstances as evidence of military involvement depends largely on the availability or non-availability of
other pieces of evidence that has the potential of directly proving the identity and affiliation of the perpetrators. Direct evidence
of identity, when obtainable, must be preferred over mere circumstantial evidence based on patterns and similarity, because
the former indubitably offers greater certainty as to the true identity and affiliation of the perpetrators. An amparo court cannot
simply leave to remote and hazy inference what it could otherwise clearly and directly ascertain. In the case at bench, petitioner
was, in fact, able to include in her Offer of Exhibits, the cartographic sketches of several of her abductors whose faces she
managed to see. To the mind of the Court, these cartographic sketches have the undeniable potential of giving the greatest
certainty as to the true identity and affiliation of petitioner’s abductors. Unfortunately for the petitioner, this potential has not
been realized in view of the fact that the faces described in such sketches remain unidentified, much less have been shown to be
that of any military or police personnel. Bluntly stated, the abductors were not proven to be part of either the military or the
police chain of command. Second. The claim of the petitioner that she was taken to Fort Magsaysay was not adequately
established by her mere estimate of the time it took to reach the place where she was detained and by the sounds that she heard
while thereat. Like the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court are not inclined to take the estimate and observations of the
petitioner as accurate on its face—not only because they were made mostly while she was in blindfolds, but also in view of the
fact that she was a mere sojourner in the Philippines, whose familiarity with Fort Magsaysay and the travel time required to
reach it is in itself doubtful. With nothing else but obscure observations to support it, petitioner’s claim that she was taken to
Fort Magsaysay remains a mere speculation.
In an order directing the public respondents to return the personal belongings of the petitioner is already equivalent to
a conclusive pronouncement of liability. The order itself is a substantial relief that can only be granted once the liability of the
public respondents has been fixed in a full and exhaustive proceeding. As already discussed above, matters of liability are not
determinable in a mere summary amparo proceeding. But perhaps the more fundamental reason in denying the prayer of the
petitioner, lies with the fact that a person’s right to be restituted of his property is already subsumed under the general rubric
of property rights—which are no longer protected by the writ of amparo. Section 1 of the Amparo Rule, which defines the scope
and extent of the writ, clearly excludes the protection of property rights.
 The prayer of Roxas for the grant of the inspection order is equivalent to sanctioning a "fishing expedition," which was
never intended by the Amparo Rule in providing for the interim relief of inspection order. An inspection order is an interim
relief designed to give support or strengthen the claim of a petitioner in an amparo petition, in order to aid the court before
making a decision. A basic requirement before an amparo court may grant an inspection order is that the place to be inspected
is reasonably determinable from the allegations of the party seeking the order. While the Amparo Rule does not require that the
place to be inspected be identified with clarity and precision, it is, nevertheless, a minimum for the issuance of an inspection
order that the supporting allegations of a party be sufficient in itself, so as to make a prima facie case. This, as was shown above,
petitioner failed to do. Since the very estimates and observations of the petitioner are not strong enough to make out a prima
facie case that she was detained in Fort Magsaysay, an inspection of the military camp cannot be ordered. An inspection order
cannot issue on the basis of allegations that are, in themselves, unreliable and doubtful.
The writ of habeas data was conceptualized as a judicial remedy enforcing the right to privacy, most especially the right
to informational privacy of individuals. The writ operates to protect a person’s right to control information regarding himself,
particularly in the instances where such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful
ends. Needless to state, an indispensable requirement before the privilege of the writ may be extended is the showing, at least
by substantial evidence, of an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim. This,
in the case at bench, the petitioner failed to do. The main problem behind the ruling of the Court of Appeals is that there is
actually no evidence on record that shows that any of the public respondents had violated or threatened the right to privacy of
the petitioner. The act ascribed by the Court of Appeals to the public respondents that would have violated or threatened the
right to privacy of the petitioner, i.e., keeping records of investigations and other reports about the petitioner’s ties with the
CPP-NPA, was not adequately proven—considering that the origin of such records were virtually unexplained and its existence,
clearly, only inferred by the appellate court from the video and photograph released by Representatives Palparan and Alcover
in their press conference. No evidence on record even shows that any of the public respondents had access to such video or
photograph. In view of the above considerations, the directive by the Court of Appeals enjoining the public respondents from
"distributing or causing the distribution to the public any records in whatever form, reports, documents or similar papers"
relative to the petitioner’s "alleged ties with the CPP-NPA," appears to be devoid of any legal basis. The public respondents
cannot be ordered to refrain from distributing something that, in the first place, it was not proven to have.

SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE VS. MANALO

G.R. No. 180906, October 7, 2008

Facts:
The brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo, farmers from Bulacan who were suspected of being members of the New
People’s Army, were forcibly taken from their home, detained in various locations, and tortured by CAFGU and military units.
After several days in captivity, the brothers Raymond and Reynaldo recognized their abductors as members of the armed forces
led by General Jovito Palparan. They also learned that they were being held in place for their brother, Bestre, a suspected leader
of the communist insurgents. While in captivity, they met other desaperacidos (including the still-missing University of the
Philippines students Karen Empeno and Sherlyn Cadapan) who were also suspected of being communist insurgents and
members of the NPA. After eighteen months of restrained liberty, torture and other dehumanizing acts, the brothers were able
to escape and file a petition for the writ of amparo.

Issue: Whether or not the right to freedom from fear is or can be protected by existing laws.

Held:
Yes. The right to the security of person is not merely a textual hook in Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution. At its core
is the immunity of one’s person against government intrusion. The right to security of person is “freedom from fear,” a guarantee
of bodily and psychological integrity and security.
To whom may the oppressed, the little ones, the desaperacidos, run to, if the Orwellian sword of the State, wielded
recklessly by the military or under the guise of police power, is directed against them? The law thus gives the remedy of the writ
of amparo, in addition to the rights and liberties already protected by the Bill of Rights. Amparo, literally meaning “to protect,”
is borne out of the long history of Latin American and Philippine human rights abuses—often perpetrated by the armed forces
against farmers thought to be communist insurgents, anarchists or brigands. The writ serves to both prevent and cure extralegal
killings, enforced disappearances, and threats thereof, giving the powerless a powerful remedy to ensure their rights, liberties,
and dignity. Amparo, a triumph of natural law that has been embodied in positive law, gives voice to the preys of silent guns and
prisoners behind secret walls.
DANIEL MASANGKAY TAPUZ V HON. JUDGE ELMO DEL ROSARIO
G.R. No. 182484 | June 17, 2007 | J. Brion

FACTS:
The private respondents spouses Sanson filed with the Aklan MCTC a complaint for forcible entry and damages with a
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against the petitioners and other John Does numbering
about 120.
The private respondents alleged in their complaint that: (1) they are the registered owners of the disputed land; (2)
they were the disputed land’s prior possessors when the petitioners – armed with bolos and carrying suspected firearms and
together with unidentified persons – entered the disputed land by force and intimidation, without the private respondents’
permission and against the objections of the private respondents’ security men, and built thereon a nipa and bamboo structure.
In their Answer, the petitioners denied the material allegations and essentially claimed that: (1) they are the actual and
prior possessors of the disputed land; (2) on the contrary, the private respondents are the intruders; and (3) the private
respondents’ certificate of title to the disputed property is spurious. They asked for the dismissal of the complaint and interposed
a counterclaim for damages.
The MCTC, after due proceedings, rendered a decision in the private respondents’ favor, finding prior possession
through the construction of perimeter fence in 1993.
The petitioners appealed the MCTC decision to RTC.
On appeal, Judge Marin granted the private respondents’ motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction upon posting of a bond. The writ – authorizing the immediate implementation of the MCTC decision – was actually
issued by respondent Judge del Rosario after the private respondents had complied with the imposed condition. The petitioners
moved to reconsider the issuance of the writ; the private respondents, on the other hand, filed a motion for demolition.
The respondent Judge subsequently denied the petitioners’ MR and to Defer Enforcement of Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction.
Meanwhile, the petitioners opposed the motion for demolition. The respondent Judge nevertheless issued via a Special
Order a writ of demolition to be implemented fifteen (15) days after the Sheriff’s written notice to the petitioners to voluntarily
demolish their house/s to allow the private respondents to effectively take actual possession of the land.
The petitioners thereafter filed a Petition for Review of the Permanent Mandatory Injunction and Order of Demolition
in CA.
Meanwhile, respondent Sheriff issued the Notice to Vacate and for Demolition. Hence, the present petition for certiorari
with writs of amparo and habeas data.

ISSUE: W/N petition for certiorari with writ of amparo and habeas data is proper

HELD:

No. We find the petitions for certiorari and issuance of a writ of habeas data fatally defective, both in substance and in
form. The petition for the issuance of the writ of amparo, on the other hand, is fatally defective with respect to content and
substance.
Based on the outlined material antecedents that led to the petition, that the petition for certiorari to nullify the assailed
RTC orders has been filed out of time. Based on the same material antecedents, we find too that the petitioners have been guilty
of willful and deliberate misrepresentation before this Court and, at the very least, of forum shopping. In sum, the petition for
certiorari should be dismissed for the cited formal deficiencies, for violation of the non-forum shopping rule, for having been
filed out of time, and for substantive deficiencies.
To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to the extraordinary rise in the
number of killings and enforced disappearances, and to the perceived lack of available and effective remedies to address these
extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an
extraordinary and independent remedy beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to these
Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue
on amorphous and uncertain grounds. Consequently, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo – in line with the extraordinary character
of the writ and the reasonable certainty that its issuance demands – requires that every petition for the issuance of the Writ
must be supported by justifying allegations of fact.
On the whole, what is clear from these statements – both sworn and unsworn – is the overriding involvement of
property issues as the petition traces its roots to questions of physical possession of the property disputed by the private parties.
If at all, issues relating to the right to life or to liberty can hardly be discerned except to the extent that the occurrence of past
violence has been alleged. The right to security, on the other hand, is alleged only to the extent of the threats and harassments
implied from the presence of “armed men bare to the waist” and the alleged pointing and firing of weapons. Notably, none of the
supporting affidavits compellingly show that the threat to the rights to life, liberty and security of the petitioners is imminent or
is continuing.
 These allegations obviously lack what the Rule on Writ of Habeas Data requires as a minimum, thus rendering the
petition fatally deficient. Specifically, we see no concrete allegations of unjustified or unlawful violation of the right to privacy
related to the right to life, liberty or security. The petition likewise has not alleged, much less demonstrated, any need for
information under the control of police authorities other than those it has already set forth as integral annexes. The necessity or
justification for the issuance of the writ, based on the insufficiency of previous efforts made to secure information, has not also
been shown. In sum, the prayer for the issuance of a writ of habeas data is nothing more than the “fishing expedition” that this
Court – in the course of drafting the Rule on habeas data – had in mind in defining what the purpose of a writ of habeas data is
not. In these lights, the outright denial of the petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas data is fully in order. PETITION
DENIED.