PALE DIGESTS - 2017

1. SUSAN LOBERES-PINTAL, Complainant, vs. ATTY. RAMONCITO B. BAYLOSIS, Respondent.

A.C. No. 11545 [Formerly CBD Case No. 12-3439]

FACTS

Complainant filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Baylosis for committing perjury, falsification of
public documents and the use of falsified documents. She alleged that Roldan C. Pintal (Roldan) filed a
Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, before the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City (RTC); that
Atty. Baylosis conspired with Roldan by making it appear in the petition that he was a resident of Caloocan
City when, in truth and in fact, he was a resident of Quezon City; and that Atty. Baylosis notarized the
verification and certification against non-forum shopping of the petition on May 13, 2011, but, at that time,
Roldan was out of the country. Complainant submitted a Certification 2 from the Barangay Chairman of
Barangay 12, Zone 1, District II of Caloocan City, attesting that Roldan was not a resident thereof and a
Certification3 from the Bureau of Immigration showing that he was out of the country from April 10, 2011
to September 8, 2011.

Atty. Baylosis denied the accusation and insisted that Roldan personally appeared before him, swore in
accordance with law and verified his petition in accordance with the Rules of Court Atty. Baylosis further
averred that the date of recording on May 13, 2011 of the Verification and Certification of the petition was
an honest mistake and excusable error on the part of his staff but his claim that Roldan personally appeared
before him to attest to the truthfulness of the verification and certification was true.

The Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) set the case for mandatory conference but before its conclusion,
on September 7, 2012, complainant filed an Affidavit of Desistance 6 manifesting that she was no longer
interested in continuing with the complaint and that she was withdrawing it.

For said reason, the CBD, in its Report and Recommendation, 7 recommended the dismissal of the complaint
against Atty. Baylosis.

In its Notice of Resolution No. XXI-2014-610,8 dated September 27, 2014, the IBP-Board of Governors
reversed and set aside the report and recommendation of the CBD. In its Extended Resolution,9 the IBP-
Board of Governors found Atty. Baylosis guilty of violating the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice when he
made it appear that Roldan was present during the notarization of the petition on May 13, 2011 and
recommended the immediate revocation of his notarial commission and his disqualification from being
commissioned as notary public for two (2) years.

ISSUE

WON Atty. Baylosis guilty of violating the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice

RULING

YES. Rule IV, Section 2(b) of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice specifically provides:

Section 2. Prohibitions. - (a) x x x

(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the instrument or
document -
(1) is not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the notarization; and
(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary public through
competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules.1âwphi1
Without a quibble, Atty. Baylosis was negligent in the performance of his duty as a notary public when he
notarized the petition for declaration of the nullity of marriage without the presence of Roldan. This was
evidenced by the Certification) issued by the Bureau of Immigration that Roldan was not in the Philippines
on May 13, 2011 as he had left the Philippines on April 10, 2011 and came back only on September 8, 2011.
Atty. Baylosis' contention that he personally interviewed Roldan when the latter went into his office and
personally read and signed the petition cannot be accorded a shred of credence.

In notarizing a document in the absence of a party, Atty. Baylosis violated not only the rule on notarial
practice but also the Code of Professional Responsibility which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in any
unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct. 10 By affixing his signature and notarial seal on the
document, he attested that Roldan personally appeared before him on the day it was notarized and verified
the contents thereof. His conduct is fraught with dangerous possibilities considering the conclusiveness on
the due execution of a document that our courts and the public accord to notarized documents. 11

It must be emphasized that a lawyer commissioned as a notary public, is mandated to discharge with
fidelity the sacred duties appertaining to his office, such duties being dictated by public policy and
impressed with public interest. 12 It is for this reason that a notary public must observe with utmost care
the basic requirements in the performance of their duties; otherwise, the public's confidence in the integrity
of the document would be undermined. 13 In Gonzales v. Atty. Ramos, 14 it was written:

Notarization is not an empty, meaningless routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest. The
notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public document, making it admissible
in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is, by law, entitled to full faith and
credit upon its face. A notary public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the
performance of their duties; otherwise, the public's confidence in the integrity of the document would be
undermined.15

Following the pronouncement in Re: Violation of Rules on Notarial Practice, 16 Atty. Baylosis should be
permanently barred from being commissioned a notary public.

2.. ORLANDO S. CASTELO, ELENA C. CAMA, OSWALDO CASTELO, JOCELYN LLANILLO, AND
BENJAMIN CASTELO, Complainants, v. ATTY. RONALD SEGUNDINO C. CHING, Respondent.

FACTS:

In 2013, complainants Castelo heirs received summons from the MeTC for an ejectment case filed against
them by Leonida Delen and Spouses Nestor Delen and Julibel Delen (the Delens), who alleged that they
were the owners of the house and lot located in Sta Cruz, Manila. The subject property was the residence
of the Castelo heirs and covered by a TCT in the name of the Delens.

Upon verifying the authenticity of TCT with the RD, the Castelo heirs discovered that the previous title
covering the subject property which was in the name of the Castelo heirs' parents, Spouses Castelo, had
been cancelled by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale dated March 24, 2010. The Deed was purportedly
executed by the Spouses Castelo and the Delens, and was notarized by Respondent Atty. Ronald Segundino
C. Ching despite the fact that Perzidia S. Castelo died on May 4, 2009. Also, the acknowledgment page of the
Deed showed that only community tax certificates had been presented to Atty. Ching, and not valid
government -issued identification cards as required by the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. The Castelo
heirs filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) this administrative case against Atty. Ching based
on the latter's gross negligence in notarizing the Deed. Atty. Ching denied notarizing the deed, countering
that he did not know the Spouses Castelo and the Delens, and that the Deed presented by the Castelo heirs
had been falsified.
Atty. Ching's notarial books were presented. However, Atty. Ching failed to attend the said conference and
refute the authenticity of the Deed. Upon verification, the IBP concluded that the copy of the Deed presented
by the Castelo heirs in their Complaint was indeed a faithful machine copy of the original contained in Atty.
Ching's notarial books. Thereafter, the Castelo heirs submitted their position paper. Atty. Ching, however,
failed to submit his.

Commissioner Robles rendered a Report and Recommendation, finding that Atty. Ching was grossly
negligent in notarizing the Deed. The IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt and approve with
modification the said Report and Recommendation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Ching was grossly negligent. (YES)

RULING:

Gross negligence on the part of a notary public encompasses the failure to observe any of the requirements
of a notarial act under the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice which would result in putting the rights of a
person to his liberty or property in jeopardy. This includes, among others, failing to require the presence
of the signatories to a notarial instrument and ascertaining their identities through competent evidence
thereof, and allowing, knowingly or unknowingly, people, other than the notary public himself, to sign
notarial documents, affix the notarial seal therein, and make entries in the notarial register.

Commissioner Robles observed that while Atty. Ching denied having notarized the Deed by showing the
discrepancy between his purported signature therein and the specimen signatures when he submitted in
his Answer, he miserably failed to explain how the Deed ended up in his notarial books. Commissioner
Robles concluded that while it would not be fair to conclude that Atty. Ching actually signed the Deed, he
was nonetheless grossly negligent for failing to give a satisfactory reason why a supposedly forged Deed
was duly recorded in his notarial books.

The Court agrees. Atty. Ching failed in ensuring that only documents which he had personally signed and
sealed with his notarial seal, after satisfying himself with the completeness of the same and the identities
of the parties who affixed their signatures therein, would be included in his notarial register. This also
means that Atty. Ching failed to properly store and secure his notarial equipment in order to prevent other
people from notarizing documents by forging his signature and affixing his notarial seal, and recording such
documents in his notarial books, without his knowledge and consent. This is gross negligence.

Such gross negligence on the part of Atty. Ching in letting another person notarize the Deed had also unduly
put the Castelo heirs in jeopardy of losing their property.

As for the penalty to be imposed, and taking into account the possible undue deprivation of property on the
part of the Castelo heirs as a result of Atty. Ching's gross negligence, the Court agrees with, and hereby
adopts, the recommended penalty of the IBP.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

WHEREFORE, Atty. Ronald Segundino C. Ching is found GUILTY of gross negligence in the performance of
his duties as notary public. His existing notarial commission, if any, is hereby REVOKED, and he is also
PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a notary public. Moreover, he is hereby
SUSPENDED FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW FOR SIX (6) MONTHS. He is STERNLY WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.
3.
EN BANC
A.C. No. 7594, February 09, 2016
ADELPHA E. MALABED, Complainant, v. ATTY. MELJOHN B. DE LA PEÑA, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
FACTS:
Complainant charged respondent with dishonesty for "deliberately and repeatedly making
falsehood" that "misled the Court.". The Certificate to File Action in the complaint filed by respondent refers
to a different complaint, that is the complaint filed by complainant's brother against Fortunato Jadulco. In
effect, there was no Certificate to File Action, which is required for the filing of a civil action, in the complaint
filed by respondent on behalf of his client Fortunato Jadulco.
Respondent did not furnish her counsel with a copy of the free patent covered by Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 1730, but respondent forwarded a copy to the Court of Appeals. She could not
properly defend herself without a copy of the title, and the title presented by the respondent was fabricated.
She presented Certifications from the DENR and the Registry of Deeds in Naval, Biliran, allegedly confirming
that there is no file in their offices of OCT No. 1730. Respondent was guilty of conflict of interest when he
represented the occupants of the lot owned by complainant's family, who previously donated a parcel of
land to the Roman Catholic Church, which deed of donation respondent notarized. She accused respondent
of conniving with Regional Trial Court (RTC) Judge who was his former client in an administrative case, to
rule in his clients' favor. She narrated the outcomes in the cases of Estrellers.
She further charged respondent with grave misconduct when he defied the accessory penalty of
his dismissal as a judge. Respondent worked as Associate Dean and Professor of the Naval Institute of
Technology (NIT) - University of Eastern Philippines College of Law, which is a government institution, and
received salaries therefor, in violation of the accessory penalty of dismissal which is his perpetual
disqualification from reemployment in any government office.
Respondent opposed the allegations and claimed that the [Certificate to File Action] he used when
he filed Civil Case No. [B-] 1118 for quieting of title before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Naval, Biliran
was the certification of Lupon Chairman. The free patent title was attached to the folio of the records in
Civil Case No. B-1118 and he furnished a copy of the same to complainant's counsel. He argued that the
notarization of the deed of donation had no relation to the case filed against the occupants of the lot. The
matter regarding Judge Asis's rulings favorable to his clients should be addressed to Judge Asis himself.
He was no longer connected with the NIT College of Law; and thus, this issue had become moot.
His designation as Assistant Dean was only temporary, and he had not received any salary except
honorarium. Respondent stated that he even furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) and the MCLE
Office a copy of his designation as Associate Dean, and since there were no objections, he proceeded to
perform the functions appurtenant thereto. He likewise submitted an affidavit from Edgardo Garcia,
complainant in the administrative case against him, who interposed no objection to his petition for judicial
clemency filed before this Court.
IBP noted the foul language used by respondent in his pleadings submitted before the IBP.
Respondent described complainant's counsel as "silahis" and accused complainant of "cohabiting with a
married man x x x before the wife of that married man died. Such offensive language "[is a] clear
manifestation[] of respondent's gross misconduct that seriously affect his standing and character as an
officer of the court."; found that respondent is guilty of the same "as evidenced by the numerous documents
attached by complainant in all the pleadings she has submitted."; recommended the suspension from the
practice of law for one year.

ISSUE:
Whether respondent is guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct

HELD:
Using foul language in pleadings - In his Rejoinder, respondent maintained that such language is not foul,
but a "dissertation of truth designed to debunk complainant's and her counsel's credibility in filing the
administrative case." .We are not convinced. Aside from such language being inappropriate, it is irrelevant
to the resolution of this case. While respondent is entitled and very much expected to defend himself with
vigor, he must refrain from using improper language in his pleadings. In Saberon v. Larong, x x x [W]hile a
lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the use of
offensive and abusive language. Language abounds with countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but
respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive. Respondent violated Rule 8.01 of
Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states: Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his
professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.

Non-submission of certificate to file action

The submission of the certificate to file action, which evidences the non-conciliation between the parties in
the barangay, is a pre-condition for the filing of a complaint in court.14 Complainant claims that there is no
such certificate in the complaint filed by respondent on behalf of Fortunato Jadulco, et al. Instead, what
respondent submitted was the certificate to file action in the complaint filed by complainant's brother,
Conrado Estreller, against Fortunato Jadulco. Respondent counters that what he used "when he filed Civil
Case No. [B-] 1118 for Quieting of Title, etc. x x x was the certification x x x issued on May 9, 2001, x x x."
Based on the records, the complaint for quieting of title in Civil Case No. B-1118 was filed with the
RTC on 18 October 2000. The Certificate of Endorsement, which respondent claimed was the certificate to
file action he used in Civil Case No. B-1118, was issued on 9 May 2001, or after the filing of the complaint
on 18 October 2000. It is apparent that the Certificate of Endorsement did not exist yet when the complaint
in Civil Case No. B-1118 was filed. In other words, there is no truth to respondent's allegation that the
subject matter of Civil Case No. B-1118 was brought before the Lupon Tagapamayapa and that a certificate
to file action was issued prior to the filing of the complaint.

Failure to furnish opposing counsel with copy of title – did not constitute dishonesty. Court of Appeals
was furnished a copy of OCT No. 1730, which means that a copy of the title exists. There is no showing that
respondent deliberately did not furnish complainant's counsel with a copy of the title. The remedy of
complainant should have been to file with the Court of Appeals a motion to furnish complainant or counsel
with a copy of the title so she and her counsel could examine the same.
Whether OCT No. 1730 is fabricated, as complainant alleges, is a question of fact demanding an
examination of the parties' respective evidence. This matter falls outside the scope of this administrative
case, absent any clear and convincing proof that respondent himself orchestrated such fabrication. The
DENR and Registry of Deeds certifications do not prove that respondent manufactured OCT No. 1730. Such
documents merely confirm that OCT No. 1730 does not exist in their official records.

Conflict of interest - notarization is different from representation. A notary public simply performs the
notarial acts authorized by the Rules on Notarial Practice, namely, acknowledgments, oaths and
affirmations, jurats, signature witnessings, and copy certifications. Legal representation, on the other hand,
refers to the act of assisting a party as counsel in a court action.
As regards complainant's serious accusations against respondent of conniving with Judge Asis and
conspiring with the latter to render judgments favorable to respondent's clients, such are bare allegations,
without any proof. Complainant simply narrated the outcomes of the proceedings. She conveniently failed
to present any concrete evidence proving her grave accusation of conspiracy between respondent and
Judge Asis. Charges of bias and partiality on the part of the presiding judge should be filed against the judge,
and not against the counsel allegedly favored by the judge.

Violation of prohibition on reemployment in government office

We dismissed respondent as Acting Judge for partiality, with prejudice to reappointment to any
public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
 Respondent knows full well the consequences of his dismissal as a judge, one of which is the
accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification from reemployment in any government office, including
government-owned or controlled corporations. Despite being disqualified, respondent accepted the
positions of Associate Dean and Professor of NIT-College of Law, a government institution, and received
compensation therefor. The prohibition on reemployment does not distinguish between permanent and
temporary appointments. Hence, that his designation was only temporary does not absolve him from
liability. Further, furnishing a copy of his designation to the OBC and MCLE office does not in any way
extinguish his permanent disqualification from reemployment in a government office. Neither does the fact
that complainant in his previous administrative case did not object to his petition for clemency. Failure to
comply with Court directives constitutes gross misconduct, insubordination or disrespect which merits a
lawyer's suspension or even disbarment.
-ash

4. VIRGILIO J. MAPALAD, SR., Complainant, v. ATTY. ANSELMO S. ECHANEZ, Respondent.

A.C. No. 10911. June 06, 2017. En Banc. Tijam,J.

FACTS:

Complainant was one of the plaintiffs in a civil action for Recovery of Possession, while respondent was the
defendants’ counsel therein. It was alleged that when respondent filed a Notice of Appeal in said case,
respondent indicated his Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) Compliance number without
indicating the date of issue thereof. The same thing happened when respondent filed the appellants’ brief.

Similarly, in a petition for injunction filed by respondent for the same clients, he once again only indicated
his MCLE Compliance Number. Respondent also filed a Motion for Leave of Court in the said special civil
action, indicating his MCLE Compliance Number without the date of issue.

Upon inquiry by the complainant, the MCLE Office issued a Certification stating that respondent had not yet
complied with his MCLE requirements. Hence, this complaint. Complainant argues that respondent's act of
deliberately and unlawfully misleading the courts, parties, and counsels into believing that he had complied
with the MCLE requirements when in truth he had not, is a serious malpractice and grave misconduct.

The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found respondent guilty and recommended that Atty. Echanez be
disbarred. The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the report and recommendation of the CBD-
IBP Investigating Commissioner. It should be noted that respondent was given ample opportunity to
answer the imputations against him and defend himself but he did not do so despite due notices.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent should be administratively disciplined based on the allegations in the
complaint and evidence on record?

HELD: YES.

First, respondent violated Bar Matter No. 850. No less than the MCLE Office had issued a certification stating
that respondent had not complied with the first and second compliance period of the MCLE.

Second, despite such non-compliance, respondent repeatedly indicated a false MCLE compliance number
in his pleadings before the trial courts. In indicating patently false information in pleadings filed before the
courts of law, not only once but four times, the respondent acted in manifest bad faith, dishonesty, and
deceit. Respondent's act of filing pleadings that he fully knew to contain false information is a mockery of
the courts, especially this Court, considering that it is this Court that authored the rules and regulations
that the respondent violated. The Lawyer's Oath in Rule 138, Section 3 of the Rules of Court requires
commitment to obeying laws and legal orders, doing no falsehood, and acting with fidelity to both court
and client. In using a false MCLE compliance number in his pleadings, respondent also put his own clients
at risk. Such deficiency in pleadings can be fatal to the client's cause as pleadings with such false information
produce no legal effect. In so doing, respondent violated his duty to his clients as enunciated in Canons 17
and 18 of the CPR.

CANON 17 – A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be mindful of the trust
and confidence reposed upon him.

CANON 18 – A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

Third, the respondent also repeatedly failed to obey legal orders of the trial court, the IBP-CBD, and also
this Court despite due notice. In the special civil action, the trial court directed the respondent to file a
comment, but he did not file any. This Court also directed respondent to file a comment on the instant
complaint but he failed to do so. When this Court issued a show cause order against the respondent, he did
not heed the order. The IBP-CBD also notified the respondent to appear before it for mandatory
conference/hearing but the said notice was also ignored. Clearly, respondent's act of ignoring the said court
orders despite notice violates the lawyer's oath and runs counter to the precepts of the CPR.

Respondent's culpability is further highlighted by the fact that respondent had already been sanctioned by
the IBP twice. Respondent was found guilty of engaging in notarial practice without a notarial commission
in 2 different occasions. Taken altogether, considering respondent's act of using a false MCLE compliance
number in his pleadings, his repeated failure to obey legal orders, and the fact that he had already been
sanctioned twice by this Court on separate cases, we are constrained to affirm the recommendation for
respondent’s disbarment to prevent him from further engaging in legal practice.

WHEREFORE, respondent Anselmo S. Echanez is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law, and his
name is ORDERED STRICKEN FROM THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS. Let a copy of this Decision be entered
in his record as a member of the Bar; and let notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

- Denise

5. DR. EDUARDO R. ALICIAS, JR. Complainant, vs. ATTY. VIVENCIO S. BACLIG, Respondent.

FACTS:
Lamorena, et. al. filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of void documents, recovery of ownership and
possession, accounting of fruits derived from illegal occupation of property, exercise of right of legal
redemption and application for a writ of preliminary injunction. In the said complaint, Lamorena, et al.
questioned the occupancy of Dr. Eduardo Alicias and his co-defendants of a certain parcel of land.
Lamorena, et. al. claimed that they are entitled to possession of the same, being the surviving heirs of the
lawful owners of the subject property, spouses Vicente and Catalina Lamorena (Catalina).
Dr. Alicias and his co-defendants filed their Answer, stressing, that they legally acquired the subject
property by virtue of a contract of sale from its lawful owner, Catalina, as the same is her paraphernal
property.
It appears, however, that an amended complaint for reconveyance, annulment of deeds and quieting of title
was filed by Lamorena, et. al. against herein complainant and Urvillo Paa before the MTCC in Vigan City.
However, it was not Atty. Baclig who acted as counsel in this case.
Dr. Alicias filed an administrative case for disbarment against Atty. Baclig. He averred that Atty. Baclig
consented to false assertions when his clients allegedly made false statements in their amended complaint.
Complainant also stated that Atty. Baclig knowingly filed an action which was: (1) already barred by res
judicata and laches; and (2) without the jurisdiction of the RTC where such complaint was filed. Lastly, Dr.
Alicias claimed that Atty. Baclig consented to the filing of a complaint, which asserted similar relief, when a
similar case was filed before the MTCC.
Atty. Baclig contended that the allegations in the subject complaint contained absolutely privileged
communication, which insulates him from liability. Also, the issues as to whether or not the assertions in
the subject complaint are false statements and whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the action are yet to be decided; hence, the complaint against him holds no water.
ISSUE:

Is Atty. Baclig administratively liable? Yes.

RULING:

1. A case of suspension or disbarment is sui generis and not meant to grant relief to a complainant as in a
civil case, but is intended to cleanse the ranks of the legal profession of its undesirable members in order
to protect the public and the courts.

Jurisprudence is replete with cases reiterating that in disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests
upon the complainant. The proper evidentiary threshold in disbarment cases is substantial evidence.

Dr. Alicias alleged that Atty. Baclig consented to falsehood when the allegations in the amended complaint
specified, among others, that the subject property is a hereditary property when in fact it is a paraphernal
property; that the property is unregistered property; and that it was inherited in 1952 when it was not.

However, noteworthy is the fact that such assertions are the matters in dispute in the case before the RTC.
In other words, the assertions as to the nature of the property and the time when it was inherited also deal
with the main issue of the case. To recall, Lamorena, et. al.'s main contention is that the subject property is
a hereditary property, being the property of their parents. On the other hand, Dr. Alicias alleged that they
brought the property from Catalina and the latter had every right to sell it even without the consent of her
spouse because it is her paraphernal property. In other words, the issue in the amended complaint is who
between Lamorena, et. al. and complainant herein has the right of possession over the subject property.
Hence, Atty. Baclig cannot be faulted for consenting to his clients' act of asserting such statements.

At any rate, it must be considered that Atty. Baclig's pleadings were privileged and would not occasion any
action against him as an attorney.

2. As regards res judicata, laches, and jurisdiction, the same are not founded on substantial evidence.

3. As to the matter of forum shopping, the court finds that Atty. Baclig resorted to the same.

It must be noted that an amended complaint was filed by Lamorena, et. al. against Dr. Alicias and Paa before
the MTCC in February 2010. In sum, such amended complaint sought for the nullification of the mortgage
contract and deed of sale which transferred the property to herein complainant and his co-defendants and
the declaration of Lamorena, et. al. as the absolute owners of the subject property. Eventually, the case
before the MTCC was dismissed with prejudice.

However, another amended complaint was filed by Lamorena, et. al. against complainants, Robert and Paa,
but this time, before the RTC. A cursory reading of the complaint reveals that the reliefs sought pertain to
the nullification of any and all the documents in the form of a written agreement which may be executed
without the consent of Lamorena, et. al. In esse, such complaint before the RTC prayed for similar reliefs as
those which were sought for in the complaint before the MTCC.
Atty. Baclig consented to the filing of another complaint before another forum which deals with the same
parties and same reliefs. Thus, a ruling in one case would resolve the other, and vice versa. Regardless of
the fact that Atty. Baclig did not act as counsel in the case before the MTC, it would not exempt him from
culpability. Atty. Baclig did not categorically deny the allegations of complainant regarding the commission
of forum shopping. Moreover, it is surprising that he was able to answer the 10 causes of action raised by
complainant, except the issue on forum shopping. Hence, he is deemed to have admitted that he has
knowledge of the pendency of a similar complaint before the MTC when a complaint before the RTC was
filed.

The filing of another action concerning the same subject matter runs contrary to Canon 1 and Rule 12.04 of
Canon 12 of the CPR. Canon 1 of the CPR requires a lawyer to exert every effort and consider it his duty to
assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice and Rule 12.04 of Canon 12 prohibits the undue
delay of a case by misusing court processes.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, We find the complaint meritorious and accordingly CENSURE Atty.
Vivencio S. Baclig for violating Canon 1 and Rule 12.04 of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. He is STERNLY WARNED that any future violation of his duties as a lawyer will be dealt
with more severely.
- alit

6. JOY T. SAMONTE, Complainant vs. ATTY. VIVENCIO V. JUMAMIL, Respondent

A.C. No. 11668, July 17, 2017, FIRST DIVISION, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

FACTS:

Complainant alleged that sometime in October 2012, she received summons from the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC), Regional Arbitration Branch Xl, Davao City, relative to an illegal dismissal
case, i.e., NLRC Case RAB-XI-10-00586-12, filed by four (4) persons claiming to be workers in her small
banana plantation. Consequently, complainant engaged the services of respondent to prepare her position
paper, and paid him the amount of ₱8,000.00 as attorney's fees. Despite constantly reminding respondent
of the deadline for the submission of her position paper, complainant discovered that he still failed to file
the same. As such, on January 25, 2013, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision based on the evidence on
record, whereby complainant was held liable to the workers in the total amount of ₱633,143.68. When
complainant confronted respondent about the said ruling, the latter casually told her to just sell her farm
to pay the farm workers. Because of respondent's neglect, complainant claimed that she was left
defenseless and without any remedy to protect her interests against the execution of the foregoing
judgment; hence, she filed the instant complaint.
In its Report and Recommendation dated March 14, 2014, the IBPCBD found respondent administratively
liable and, accordingly, recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1)
year. Essentially, the IBP-CBD found respondent guilty of violating Rule 10.01, Canon 10, and Rule 18.03,
Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), as well as the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.

In a Resolution dated December 13, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the aforesaid
Report and Recommendation, finding the same to be fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable. (YES)

RULING:
The Court concurs with and affirms the findings of the IBP, with modification, however, as to the penalty in
order to account for his breach of the rules on notarial practice.
The relationship between a lawyer and his client is one imbued with utmost trust and confidence. In this
regard, clients are led to expect that lawyers would be ever-mindful of their cause, and accordingly, exercise
the required degree of diligence in handling their affairs. Accordingly, lawyers are required to maintain, at
all times, a high standard of legal proficiency, and to devote their full attention, skill, and competence to
their cases, regardless of their importance, and whether they accept them for a fee or for free. To this end,
lawyers are enjoined to employ only fair and honest means to attain lawful objectives. These principles are
embodied in Rule 10.01 of Canon 10 and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the CPR, which respectively read as
follows:

CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he
mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.1âwphi1
CANON 18 -A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.

In this case, it is undisputed that a lawyer-client relationship was forged between complainant and
respondent when the latter agreed to file a position paper on her behalf before the NLRC and, in connection
therewith, received the amount of ₱8,000.00 from complainant as payment for his services. Case law
instructs that a lawyer-client relationship commences when a lawyer signifies his agreement to handle a
client's case and accepts money representing legal fees from the latter, as in this case. From then on, as the
CPR provides, a lawyer is duty-bound to "serve his client with competence and diligence," and in such
regard, "not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him."

However, it is fairly apparent that respondent breached this duty when he admittedly failed to file the
necessary position paper before the NLRC, which had, in fact, resulted into an adverse ruling against his
client, i.e., herein complainant. To be sure, it is of no moment that complainant purportedly failed to
produce any credible witnesses in support of her position paper; clearly, this is not a valid justification for
respondent to completely abandon his client's cause. By voluntarily taking up complainant's case,
respondent gave his unqualified commitment to advance and defend the latter's interest therein. Verily, he
owes fidelity to such cause and must be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. In A bay v.
Montesino, it was explained that regardless of a lawyer's personal view, the latter must still present every
remedy or defense within the authority of the law to support his client's cause.

In light of the foregoing, the Court therefore agrees with the IBP that respondent should be held
administratively liable for violation of Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR.
Likewise, the IBP correctly found that respondent violated Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the CPR. Records show
that he indeed indulged in deliberate falsehood when he admittedly prepared and notarized the affidavit
of complainant's intended witness, Romeo, despite his belief that Romeo was a perjured witness. In Spouses
Umaguing v. De Vera, the Court highlighted the oath undertaken by every lawyer to not only obey the laws
of the land, but also to refrain from doing any falsehood.

Notably, the notarization of a perjured affidavit also constituted a violation of the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice. Section 4 (a), Rule IV thereof pertinently provides:

SEC. 4. Refusal to Notarize. - A notary public shall not perform any notarial act described in these Rules for
any person requesting such an act even if he tenders the appropriate fee specified by these Rules if:
(a) the notary knows or has good reason to believe that the notarial act or transaction is unlawful or
immoral[.]
On this score, it is well to stress that "notarization is not an empty, meaningless routinary act. It is invested
with substantive public interest. It must be underscored that the notarization by a notary public converts
a private document into a public document, making that document admissible in evidence without further
proof of authenticity thereof. A notarial document is, by law, entitled to full faith and credit upon its face.
For this reason, a notary public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance
of their duties; otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of this form of conveyance would be
undermined."
Having established respondent's administrative liability, the Court now determines the proper penalty.

The appropriate penalty to be meted against an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial
discretion based on the surrounding facts. In Del Mundo v. Capistrano, the Court suspended the lawyer for
a period of one (1) year for his failure to perform his undertaking under his retainership agreement with
his client. Similarly, in Conlu v. Aredonia, Jr., the same penalty was imposed on a lawyer for his inexcusable
negligence in failing to file the required pleading to the prejudice of his client. Hence, consistent with
existing jurisprudence, the Court adopts the penalty recommended by the IBP and accordingly suspends
respondent from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year. Moreover, as in the case of Dela Cruz v.
Zabala, where the notary public therein notarized an irregular document, the Court hereby revokes
respondent's notarial commission and further disqualifies him from being commissioned as a notary public
for a period of two (2) years.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Vivencio V. Jumamil is found GUILY of violating Rule 10.01, Canon 10 and
Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED for
a period of one (1) year, effective upon his receipt of this Resolution. Moreover, in view of his violation of
the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, his notarial commission, if still existing, is hereby REVOKED, and he is
DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a notary public for a period of two (2) years. Finally, he is
STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.

7. PACES INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION v. ATTY. EDGARDO M. SALANDANAN

A.C. No. 1346, July 25, 2017, PERALTA, J.:

FACTS: In October 1973, Salandanan became a stockholder of Paces, and later became its Director,
Treasurer, Administrative Officer, VP for Finance, then its counsel. In one case, E.E. Black Ltd., through its
counsel, sent a letter to Paces regarding the latter's outstanding obligation to it. In the negotiations that
transpired thereafter, Salandanan was the one who represented Paces.

Meanwhile, disagreements on various management policies ensued among the stockholders and officers in
the corporation. Eventually, Salandanan and his group were forced to sell out their shareholdings in the
company to the group of Mr. Nicolas C. Balderama.

After said sell-out, Salandanan started handling the case between E.E. Black Ltd. and Paces, but now,
representing E.E. Black Ltd. Salandanan then filed a complaint with application for preliminary attachment
against Paces for the collection of its obligation to E.E. Black Ltd. He later succeeded in obtaining an order
of attachment, writ of attachment, and notices of garnishment to various entities which Paces had business
dealings with.

Thus, Paces filed a complaint against Salandanan. It argued that when he acted as counsel for E.E. Black
Ltd., he represented conflicting interests and utilized, to the full extent, all the information he had acquired
as its stockholder, officer, and lawyer. On the other hand, Salandanan claimed that he was never employed
nor paid as a counsel by Paces. There was no client-lawyer contract between them. He maintained that his
being a lawyer was merely coincidental to his being a stockholderofficer and did not automatically make
him a lawyer of the corporation, particularly with respect to its account with E.E. Black Ltd. He added that
whatever knowledge or information he had obtained on the operation of Paces only took place in the
regular, routinary course of business as him being an investor, stockholder, and officer, but never as a
lawyer of the company.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Salandanan is administratively liable.

RULING: Yes. It is clear that his duty had been to fight a cause for Paces, but it later became his duty to
oppose the same for E.E. Black Ltd. His defense for Paces was eventually opposed by him when he argued
for E.E. Black Ltd. Thus, Salandanan had indisputably obtained knowledge of matters affecting the rights
and obligations of Paces which had been placed in him in unrestricted confidence. The same knowledge led
him to the identification of those attachable properties and business organizations that eventually made
the attachment and garnishment against Paces a success. To allow him to utilize said information for his
own personal interest or for the benefit of E.E. Black Ltd., the adverse party, would be to violate the element
of confidence which lies at the very foundation of a lawyer-client relationship.

The rule prohibiting conflict of interest was fashioned to prevent situations wherein a lawyer would be
representing a client whose interest is directly adverse to any of his present or former clients. In the same
way, a lawyer may only be allowed to represent a client involving the same or a substantially related matter
that is materially adverse to the former client only if the former client consents to it after consultation. The
rule is grounded in the fiduciary obligation of loyalty. Throughout the course of a lawyer-client relationship,
the lawyer learns all the facts connected with the client's case, including the weak and strong points of the
case. Knowledge and information gathered in the course of the relationship must be treated as sacred and
guarded with care. It behooves lawyers, not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid
the appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their
secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice. The nature of
that relationship is, therefore, one of trust and confidence of the highest degree.

In the absence of the express consent from Paces after full disclosure to it of the conflict of interest,
Salandanan should have either outrightly declined representing and entering his appearance as counsel for
E.E. Black Ltd., or advised E.E. Black Ltd. to simply engage the services of another lawyer. Unfortunately, he
did neither, and must necessarily suffer the dire consequences.

WHEREFORE, the Court SUSPENDS Atty. Edgardo M. Salandanan from the practice of law for three (3)
years.

8. NANETTE B. SISON, REPRESENTED BY DELIA B. SARABIA, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. SHERDALE

M. VALDEZ, RESPONDENT.

A.C. No. 11663, July 31, 2017; PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

FACTS:

Complainant, an overseas Filipino worker in Australia, engaged respondent's legal services to file an action
against Engr. Eddie S. Pua of B.S. Pua Construction and Engr. Dario Antonio for failing to construct
complainant's house.

Although no written agreement was executed between the parties specifying the scope of legal services,
respondent received the total amount of P215,000.00 from complainant. Respondent acknowledged
receipt of the first two (2) installments in a handwritten note, stating that the amount of P165,000.00 was
for litigation expenses, i.e., attorney's fees, filing fees, bond, and other expenses.The last payment was
deposited online to the bank account of respondent's wife, Ma. Analyn M. Valdez.

On a certain time, complainant terminated respondent's legal services via e-mail and text messages with a
demand to return the amount given by which was not heeded notwithstanding several demands. Hence,
complainant, filed the instant disbarment complaint before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) -
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), alleging that despite receipt of her payments:

a) respondent failed to render his legal services and update her regarding the status of the
case;

b) commingled her money with that of respondent's wife;

c) misappropriated her money by failing to issue a receipt for the last installment of the
payment received; and

d) fabricated documents to justify retention of her money.

For his part, respondent claimed that the expenses where applied to the sending of demand letters, drafting
of a complaint for breach of contract and damages. Respondent further averred that he was supposed to
personally meet complainant for the first time upon the latter's arrival in the Philippines in the second
week of November 2012. During the meeting, he intended to personally report the status of the case, have
the pleadings signed, and explain how her payments would be applied. However, no phone call or e-mail
was made by complainant to confirm the meeting. Respondent later learned from complainant's new
contractor that she did not want to meet with him for fear that he would only ask for more money.

Instead of filing their respective position papers before the IBP-CBD, the parties filed a Joint Manifestation
agreeing to settle the matter amicably and acknowledging that the disbarment complaint was filed because
of "misapprehension of facts due to pure error in accounting and honest mistakes by respondent." In turn,
complainant undertook not to pursue nor testify against respondent in this administrative case, as well as
in the Estafa case.

The IBP - CBD Investigating Commissioner (IC) recommended that respondent be reprimanded for
violating his obligations under the CPR with a stem warning never to commit the same mistakes again.

At the outset, the IC disapproved the Joint Manifestation, noting that a compromise agreement would
not operate to exonerate a lawyer from a disciplinary case. As to respondent's liability, the IC observed
that he committed several violations of the CPR during the period of his engagement with complainant from
September 2012 up to January 8, 2013.

First, he failed to inform his client about the status of the case. The IC acknowledged that
respondent rendered some legal services to complainant, but only came up with the list of services
after his termination, thus, supporting the conclusion that he indeed failed to update his client
about the developments of the case.

Second, he asked for payment of fees from complainant even before he prepared the draft
complaint. The IC explained that a prudent lawyer would first wait for the computation of court
fees before seeking payment of filing and bond fees.

Third, respondent failed to issue the proper receipt for the full amount he received from
complainant.

Fourth, respondent commingled the funds of his client with that of his wife when he asked that the
P50,000.00 be deposited to his wife's bank account.

Hence, in a Resolution IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the IC's Report and
Recommendation, but modified the penalty to suspension from the practice of law for a period of six
(6) months. Respondent moved for reconsideration, but was denied in a Resolution.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable for the acts complained of

RULING: YES.

CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within
a reasonable time to the client's request for information.

Once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client, a lawyer is duty-bound to serve the latter with
competence and to attend to such client's cause with diligence, care, and devotion. He owes fidelity
to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed upon him. In this
relation, a lawyer has the duty to apprise his client of the status and developments of the case and
all other relevant information.

In this case, respondent alleged that he waited for complainant's arrival in the Philippines in
November 2012 to personally report on his accomplishments, to have the necessary pleadings
signed, and to explain how the money given will be applied. However, the meeting did not push
through.

Indeed, respondent cannot justify his non-compliance by shifting the blame to complainant for
failing to meet with him, especially so that he failed to inform his client of the pleadings she needed
to sign.

CANON 16 - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY
COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.

Rule 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the
client.

Rule 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand.
However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be necessary to
satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his client.

The highly fiduciary nature of an attorney-client relationship imposes on a lawyer the duty to
account for the money or property collected or received for or from his client. Money entrusted to
a lawyer for a specific purpose, such as for the filing and processing of a case, if not utilized, must
be returned immediately upon demand. His failure to return gives rise to a presumption that he
has appropriated it for his own use, and the conversion of funds entrusted to him constitutes a
gross violation of his professional obligation under Canon 16 of the CPR.

In this case, respondent failed to account for the money received from complainant when he only
acknowledged receipt of P165,000.00 for litigation expenses despite admittedly receiving
P215,000.00. When complainant terminated his legal services, the fact that no case has been filed
in court should have prompted him to immediately return to complainant the amounts intended
as filing and bond fees, as these were obviously unutilized.

In fact, respondent admitted that, based on his belief, he was entitled to only P65,000.00 as
compensation for his legal services. As such, he should have returned the excess amount of
P150,000.00 out of the P215,000.00 he received from complainant.

Notably, Rule 16.03 of the CPR allows a lawyer to retain the amount necessary to satisfy his lawful
fees and disbursements.Hence, respondent's persistent refusal to return the money to complainant
despite several demands renders him administratively liable.
Considering the surrounding circumstances of this case, such as the short duration of the engagement,
respondent's return of the money, his expression of humility and remorse, and the fact that this is his first
administrative case, the Court finds the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period
of three (3) months sufficient and commensurate to respondent's violations.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Sherdale M. Valdez is found GUILTY of violating Rule 18.04, Canon 18, as
well as Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of three (3) months effective from the finality of this
Resolution, and is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more
severely.

-Ina

9. ELIBENA A. CABILES, Complainant, vs. ATTY. LEANDRO S. CEDO,, Respondent.

A.C. No. 10245, August 16, 2017, DEL CASTILLO, J.

FACTS:

Complainant Elibena Cabiles filed this administrative complaint before the IBP seeking the disbarment of
Atty. Leandro Cedo for neglecting the two cases she referred to him to handle. According to Elibena, she
engaged the services of respondent lawyer to handle an illegal dismissal case, where therein respondents
were Elibena’s business partners. Respondent lawyer was paid Php5, 500.00 for drafting therein
respondents' position paper and Php2,000.00 for his every appearance in the NLRC hearings.

During the hearing, only Danilo Ligbos, the complainant therein, showed up and submitted his Reply. On
the other hand, respondent lawyer did not file a Reply for his clients, despite being paid his appearance fee
earlier. The Labor Arbiter ruled for Danilo, and ordered the clients of respondent lawyer to pay Danilo
backwages, separation pay, and 13th month pay. Worse still, the NLRC likewise dismissed the appeal of the
clients of respondent lawyer for failure to post the required cash or surety bond, an essential requisite in
perfecting an appeal.

According to Elibena, respondent lawyer misled them by claiming that it was Danilo who was absent during
the said hearing; and that moreover, because of the failure to submit a Reply, they were prevented from
presenting the cash vouchers that would refute Danilo' s claim that he was a regular employee.

Elibena moreover claimed that respondent lawyer failed to indicate his Mandatory Continuing Legal
Education (MCLE) compliance in the position paper and in the memorandum of appeal that he prepared.
Elibena pointed to a certification issued by the MCLE Office that respondent lawyer had not at all complied
with the first, second, and third compliance periods of the (MCLE) requirement.

Elibena also averred that she hired respondent lawyer to file a criminal case for unjust vexation against
Emelita Claudit; that as evidenced by a handwritten receipt, she paid respondent lawyer his acceptance
fees, the expenses for the filing of the case, and the appearance fees totalling Php45,000.00; and that in
order to come up with the necessary amount, she sold to respondent lawyer her 1994 Model Mitsubishi
Lancer worth Php85,000.00, this sale being covered by an unnotarized Deed of Sale. Elibena claimed that,
despite payment of his professional fees, respondent lawyer did not exert any effort to seasonably file her
Complaint for unjust vexation before the City Prosecutor's Office; that the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Muntinlupa City dismissed her Complaint for unjust vexation on the ground of prescription.

The Investigating Commissioner found respondent lawyer guilty of having violated Canons 5, 17, and 18 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for two
years. Aside from respondent lawyer's failure to comply with the MCLE requirements, the Investigating
Commissioner also found him grossly negligent in representing his clients, particularly (1) in failing to
appear on the March 26, 2009 hearing in the NLRC, and file the necessary responsive pleading; (2) in failing
to advise and assist his clients who had no knowledge of, or were not familiar with, the NLRC rules of
procedure, in filing their appeal and; 3) in failing to file seasonably the unjust vexation complaint before
the city prosecutor's office, in consequence of which it was overtaken by prescription.

The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Investigating Commissioner's Report and
Recommendation, but modified the recommended administrative sanction by reducing the suspension to
one year.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent lawyer violated the Code of Professional Responsibility. (YES)

RULING:

Firstly, Bar Matter 850 mandates continuing legal education for IBP members as an additional
requirement to enable them to practice law. This is "to ensure that throughout their career, they keep
abreast with law and jurisprudence, maintain the ethics of the profession and enhance the standards of the
practice of law." Non-compliance with the MCLE requirement subjects the lawyer to be listed as a
delinquent IBP member.

Respondent lawyer failed to indicate in the pleadings filed in the said labor case the number and date
of issue of his MCLE Certificate of Compliance for the Third Compliance Period, i.e., from April 15, 2007
to April 14, 2010, considering that NLRC NCR Case No. 00-11-16153-08 had been pending in 2009. In fact,
upon checking with the MCLE Office, Elibena discovered that respondent lawyer had failed to comply with
the three MCLE compliance periods. For this reason, there is no doubt that respondent lawyer violated
Canon 5, which reads:

CANON 5 - A LAWYER SHALL KEEP ABREAST OF LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS, PARTICIPATE IN CONTINUING

LEGAL EDUCATION PROGRAMS, SUPPORT EFFORTS TO ACH1EVE HIGH ST AND ARDS IN LAW SCHOOLS
AS WELL AS IN THE PRACTICAL TRAINING OF LAW STUDENTS AND ASSIST IN DISSEMINATING
INFORMATION REGARDING THE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE.

Further, the circumstances of this case indicated that respondent lawyer was guilty of gross
negligence for failing to exert his utmost best in prosecuting and in defending the interest of his
client. Hence, he is guilty of the following:

CANON 17 - A LA WYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF
THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.

CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.

Furthermore, respondent lawyer's act of receiving an acceptance fee for legal services, only to
subsequently fail to render such service at the appropriate time, was a clear violation of Canons 17
and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Respondent lawyer did not diligently and fully attend to the cases that he accepted, although he had been
fully compensated for them. First off, respondent lawyer never successfully refuted Elibena's claim that he
was paid in advance his Php2,000.00 appearance fee on March 21, 2009 for the scheduled hearing of the
labor case on March 26, 2009, during which he was absent. Furthermore, although respondent lawyer had
already received the sum of Php45,000.00 to file an unjust vexation case, he failed to promptly file the
appropriate complaint therefor with the City Prosecutor's Office, in consequence of which the crime
prescribed, resulting in the dismissal of the case.

Case law further illumines that a lawyer's duty of competence and diligence includes not merely
reviewing the cases entrusted to the counsel's care or giving sound legal advice, but also consists of
properly representing the client before any court or tribunal, attending scheduled hearings or
conferences, preparing and filing the required pleadings, prosecuting the handled cases with
reasonable dispatch, and urging their termination without waiting for the client or the court to prod
him or her to do so.

Conversely, a lawyer's negligence in fulfilling his duties subjects him to disciplinary action. While
such negligence or carelessness is incapable of exact formulation, the Court has consistently held
that the lawyer's mere failure to perform the obligations due his client is per se a violation.

With regard to the labor case for which he opted not to file a Reply and refused to present the cash vouchers
which, according to Elibena, ought to have been submitted to the NLRC, we hold that even granting that he
had the discretion being the handling lawyer to present what he believed were available legal defenses for
his client, and conceding, too, that it was within his power to employ an allowable legal strategy, what was
deplorable was his way of handling the appeal before the NLRC. Aside from handing over or delivering the
requisite pleading to his clients almost at the end of the day, at the last day to file the appeal before the
NLRC, he never even bothered to advise Elibena and the rest of his clients about the requirement of the
appeal bond. He should not expect Elibena and her companions to be conversant with the indispensable
procedural requirements to perfect the appeal before the NLRC. And, in the criminal case, he should have
known the basic rules relative to the prescription of crimes that operate to extinguish criminal liability. All
these contretemps could have been avoided had respondent lawyer displayed the requisite zeal and
diligence.

The appropriate penalty for an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on
the surrounding facts. Given herein respondent lawyer's failure to maintain a high standard of legal
proficiency with his refusal to comply with the MCLE as well as his lack of showing of his fealty to Elibena’s
interest in view of his lackadaisical or indifferent approach in handling the cases entrusted to him, we find
it apt and commensurate to the facts of the case to adopt the recommendation of the IBP to suspend him
from the practice of law for one year.

Prepared by: Sherissa Marisse Bernabe

10. CARMELO IRINGAN v. ATTY. CLAYTON B. GUMANGAN

A.C. No. 8574. August 16, 2017, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

CTCs no longer qualifies as competent evidence of the parties' identity as defined under Rule II, Section 12 of
the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.

FACTS:

Carmelo believes that the Contract of Lease, which was being used as basis for Illegal Detainer case filed by
Renato, was spurious as he had never entered into such a contract with the latter. In fact, by simple
examination, the same was executed and subscribed before him on December 30, 2005, when in fact
Renato’s CTC was issued on January 17, 2006; That Carmelo's own CTC does not appear thereon, meaning
that he never appeared to execute it; That besides not appearing before Atty. Gumangam Carmelo has not
been or seen the alleged witnesses to the contract. As a consequence, he filed a disbarment case against
Atty. Gumangan.

On the other hand, Atty. Gumangan admitted that he notarized the Contract of Lease, but maintained that
Carmelo, together with Renato, personally executed said Contract before Atty. Gumangan and in the
presence of two witnesses, namely, Hilda Langgaman (Langgaman) and Narcisa Padua (Padua). Atty.
Gumangan attached to his Comment/Answer the Joint Affidavit dated July 20, 2009 in which Langgaman
and Padua affirmed that they were personally present at Atty. Gumangan's office when Carmelo and Renato
signed the Contract of Lease, and that they saw with their own eyes Carmelo signing said Contract.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Gumangan should be held administratively liable.

RULING:

Yes. Atty. Gumangan herein violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice by notarizing the Contract of Lease
on December 30, 2005 without competent evidence of identity of Renato and Carmelo and, thus,
committing an expressly prohibited act under the Rules.

Atty. Gumangan did not allege that he personally knew Renato and Carmelo when they appeared before
him on December 30, 2005 for the notarization of the Contract of Lease. There was no showing that Renato
and Carmelo presented current identification documents issued by an official agency bearing their
photographs and signatures before Atty. Gumangan notarized their Contract of Lease. Langgaman and
Padua witnessed Renato and Carmelo signing the Contract of Lease in person at Atty. Gumangan's office,
but they did not attest under oath or affirmation that they personally knew Renato and Carmelo, and
neither did they present their own documentary identification.

According to Renato, Atty. Gumangan asked them to present their CTCs, but neither Renato nor Carmelo
had CTCs at that moment. Renato only secured a CTC on January 17, 2006, which he belatedly presented to
Atty. Gumangan for recording.

CTCs no longer qualifies as competent evidence of the parties' identity as defined under Rule II, Section 12
of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. In Baylon v. Almo, considering the ease with which a CTC could be
obtained these days and recognizing the established unreliability of a CTC in proving the identity of a
person who wishes to have his document notarized, the Court did not include the CTC in the list of
competent evidence of identity that notaries public should use in ascertaining the identity of persons
appearing before them to have their documents notarized. Worse, neither Renato nor Carmelo had CTCs
with them on December 30, 2005, yet, Atty. Gumangan still proceeded with notarizing the Contract of Lease,
allowing Renato to belatedly present his CTC weeks later, while Carmelo did not present any CTC at all.

WHEREFORE, his incumbent commission as notary public, if any, is REVOKED, and he is PROHIBITED
from being commissioned as a notary public for two (2) years, effective immediately.

11. RAFAEL PADILLA, Complainant, vs. ATTY. GLENN SAMSON,, Respondent.

August 22, 2017

A.C. No. 10253

 PERALTA, J

FACTS:

Complainant Rafael Padilla filed a Complaint on November 25, 2013 against his former counsel, respondent
Atty. Glenn Samson, in connection with his case, entitled Indelecia Balaga and Enrique Balaga v. Rafael
Padilla. Padilla contends that Samson suddenly cut all communications with him, which almost caused
him to miss the due date for the filing of a required pleading. He even wrote a demand letter asking Samson
to withdraw his appearance and return all the documents pertinent to his case, but to no avail. Also, Padilla
had been asking Samson for the refund of his overpayment amounting to ₱19,074.00. However, Samson
failed to offer any response.

When ordered by the Court as well as the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) to refute the allegations in Padilla's complaint and explain his side, Samson refused to do
so. On January 26, 2016, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP recommended Samson’s suspension
for six (6) months. the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XXII-2016-176,2 which adopted and
approved, with modification by increasing the penalty to one (1) year suspension considering the
gravity of the offense committed by the Respondent, the abovementioned recommendation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Respondent Atty. Samson should be held administratively liable?

RULING:

The Court sustains the findings and recommendations of the IBP that Samson should be held
administratively accountable.

Ordinarily, lawyers may decline employment and refuse to accept representation, if they are not in a
position to carry it out effectively or competently. But once they agree to handle a case, attorneys are
required by the Canons of Professional Responsibility (CPR) to undertake the task with zeal, care, and
utmost devotion. Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship and
gives rise to the duty of fidelity to the client's cause. Every case which a lawyer accepts deserves full
attention, diligence, skill, and competence, regardless of importance.

Canons 15, and 17, Rule 18.03 of Canon 18, and Rule 19.01 of Canon 19 of the CPR provide:

CANON 15 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS
AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.

CANON 17 - A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL
OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.

CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.

CANON 19 - A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF THE LAW.
 Rule 19.01 - A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his
client and shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal
charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or proceeding.

In the case at bar, Samson completely abandoned Padilla without any justification, notwithstanding his
receipt of the professional fees for services rendered as well as the latter's efforts to reach him. His
continuous inaction despite repeated follow-ups reveals his cavalier attitude and appalling indifference
toward his client's cause, in blatant disregard of his duties as a lawyer. Also, despite numerous demands,
Samson has unjustifiably refused to return Padilla's documents and the amount of P19, 074.00 as
overpayment for his legal services. It is a hornbook principle that a lawyer's duty of competence and
diligence includes, not merely reviewing the cases entrusted to his care or giving sound legal advice, but
also consists of properly representing the client before any court or tribunal, attending scheduled hearings
or conferences, preparing and filing the required pleadings, prosecuting the handled cases with reasonable
dispatch, and urging their termination even without prodding from the client or the court. Further, Samson
failed to file his Answer to the complaint despite due notice from the Court and the IBP. His unwarranted
tenacity simply shows, not only his lack of responsibility, but also his lack of interest in clearing his name,
which, as pronounced in case law, is indicative of an implied admission of the charges levelled against him.

The CPR requires lawyers to give their candid and best opinion to their clients on the merit or lack of merit
of the case. Knowing whether a case would be potentially successful is not only a function, but also an
obligation on the part of lawyers. If ever Samson found that his client's cause was defenseless, then he
should have met with Padilla so that they would be able to discuss their possible options, instead of
abruptly dropping the case without any notice or explanation. Samson's failure to fulfill this basic
undertaking constitutes a violation of his duty to observe candor, fairness, and loyalty in all his dealings
and transactions with his clients.

Withal, his persistent refusal to return Padilla's money and case files despite frequent demands clearly
reflects his lack of integrity and moral soundness. Lawyers are deemed to hold in trust their client's money
and property that may come into their possession. Thus, Samson's failure to return Padilla's money
upon demand gave rise to the presumption that he had converted it to his own use and thereby
betrayed the trust that was reposed upon him, which constitutes a gross violation of professional ethics
and a betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession.

The Code does not only exact from lawyers a firm respect for the law, legal processes, and the courts, but
also mandates the utmost degree of fidelity and good faith in dealing with the moneys entrusted to them
pursuant to their fiduciary relationship. Verily, Samson fell short of the demands required of him as a
faithful member of the bar. His inability to properly discharge his duty to his client makes him answerable,
not just to Padilla, but also to the Court, to the legal profession, and to the general public. Given the crucial
importance of his role in the administration of justice, his misconduct diminished the confidence of the
public in the integrity and dignity of the legal profession.

In previous cases, lawyers who have been held liable for infractions similar to those which Samson
committed were suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years. Finally, Samson must
also return all the properties and documents in his possession relative to Padilla's case, and the amount of
Pl 9,074.00 as overpayment of fees since the same is intrinsically linked to his professional engagement.
While the Court has previously held that disciplinary proceedings should only revolve around the
determination of the respondent-lawyer’s administrative and not his civil liability, it must be clarified that
said rule remains applicable only when the claim involves moneys received by the lawyer from his client in
a transaction separate and distinct from and not intrinsically linked to his professional engagement. And
considering the fact that Samson's receipt of said amount and documents from Padilla remains undisputed,
the Court finds the return of the same to be in order.

-JV FERMIN
12. LITO V. BUENVIAJE v. ATTY. MELCHOR G. MAGDAMO

A.C. No. 11616 [Formerly CBD Case No. 08-2141], August 23, 2017, PERALTA, J.:

FACTS:

Buenviaje alleged that he was married to the late Fe Gonzalo-Buenviaje as evidenced by NSO issued
Marriage Contract. Meanwhile, Atty. Magdamo was the counsel of Fe's sisters, Lydia and Florenia Gonzalo,
who filed a criminal case for bigamy against Buenviaje. They claimed that Buenviaje was married to a
certain Amalia Ventura in 1978, thus, making him guilty of bigamy. In an attempt to protect the rights and
interests of his clients in securing the monies of their sibling, deceased Fe Gonzalo, Atty. Magdamo sent a
Notice of Death of Depositor to the Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI)-Dagupan Branch where Buenviaje
and Fe appeared to have a joint account.

Buenviaje averred that in Atty. Magdamo's Notice of Death of Depositor dated October 11, 2007 sent to the
BPI-Dagupan Branch, he untruthfully and maliciously quoted the following statements: (1) "a clever
swindler by the name of Lito Buenviaje made it appear on spurious document that he is the husband of Fe
Gonzalo when in truth and in fact Lito Buenviaje is married to Amalia Valero", (2) "since August 24, 2007, Lito
V. Buenviaje has been a fugitive from justice as he has been hiding from the criminal charge in People of the
Philippines versus Lito Buenviaje y Visayana, case number 7H-103365 pending in the City of Manila", and (3)
"Fe never had a husband or child in her entire life" to his prejudice.

Buenviaje filed an administrative complaint against respondent Atty. Melchor G. Magdamo, docketed as A.C.
No. 11616 for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) recommended that Atty. Magdamo be reprimanded for his
unethical actuations. However, the IBP-Board of Governors, in a Notice of Resolution suspended Atty.
Magdamo from the practice of law for three (3) months.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Magdamo should be held administratively liable (YES)

HELD:

We cannot countenance Atty. Magdamo's use of offensive and disrespectful language in his Notice
addressed to BPI-Dagupan. He clearly violated Canons 8 and 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
for his actions erode the public's perception of the legal profession. We, thus, sustain the findings and
recommendation of the IBP-Board of Governors.

The practice of law is a privilege given to lawyers who meet the high standards of legal proficiency and
morality. Any violation of these standards exposes the lawyer to administrative liability. Canon 8 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

CANON 8 — A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor towards his
professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against the opposing counsel.

Rule 8.01. — A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive,
offensive or otherwise improper.

The records show that he referred to Buenviaje as a "swindler". He made this imputation with pure malice
for he had no evidence that Buenviaje is committing swindling activities. Even if he was suspicious of
Buenviaje, he should have refrained from making such malicious reference or name-calling for he should
know as a lawyer that the mere filing of a complaint against a person does not guarantee a finding of guilt,
and that an accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty. Undoubtedly, his malicious imputation
against Buenviaje is unfair as the latter was unnecessarily exposed to humiliation and shame even as there
was no actual case yet to be filed in the courts.

Moreover, Atty. Magdamo is likewise out of line when he made inference to the marriage documents of
Buenviaje and Fe as "spurious" as well as his conclusion that "Fe never had a husband or child in her entire
life". He should know better that without the courts' pronouncement to this effect, he is in no position to
draw conclusions and pass judgment as to the existence, and validity or nullity of the marriage of Buenviaje
and Fe. At the very least, Atty. Magdamo's actuations are blatant violation of Rule 10.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides:

Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper, the
language or the argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or knowingly
cite as law a provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact
that which has not been proved

Equally incredulous is Atty. Magdamo's statement in the Notice that "Lito V. Buenviaje has been a fugitive
from justice as he has been hiding from the criminal charge in People vs. Lito Buenviaje y Visayana, case
number 7H-103365, pending in the City of Manila". Upon review, it appears that case number 7H-103365 is
the same bigamy case which Fe's siblings filed against Buenviaje before the Prosecutor's Office of Manila.
At the time Atty. Magdamo made the subjects statement in the Notice to BPI-Dagupan, he knew that there
was no final resolution yet from the prosecutor's office, no case has yet to be filed in the courts, there was
no warrant of arrest against Buenviaje, and more importantly, there was no evidence that Buenviaje had
any intent to flee prosecution as he even filed the instant case and participated in the proceedings hereto.

We had an occasion to say that the use of disrespectful, intemperate, manifestly baseless, and malicious
statements by an attorney in his pleadings or motions is a violation of the lawyer's oath and a transgression
of the canons of professional ethics. Needless to state, the lawyer’s fidelity to his client must not be pursued
at the expense of truth and the administration of justice, and it must be done within the bounds of reason
and common sense.

Prepared by: Mika Ituriaga

13. JOAQUIN G. BONIFACIO, Complainant vs. ATTY. EDGARDO O. ERA and ATTY. DIANE KAREN B.
BRAGAS, Respondents
October 3, 2017, A.C. No. 11754, TIJAM, J.:

FACTS:

Sometime in 2003, an illegal dismissal case was lodged against Bonifacio and his company, Solid Engine
Rebuilders Corporation. Complainants therein (Abucejon Group) were represented by Era and Associates
Law Office through Atty. Era. The Labor Arbiter found Bonifacio and the corporation liable for illegal
dismissal. Bonifacio and the corporation brought their case up to the Supreme Court but they suffered the
same fate as their appeals and motions were decided against them. Thus, a Writ of Execution was issued to
implement the decision. Two alias were later on issued, directing the sheriff to collect the sum representing
the judgment award plus interest and attorney's fees. Meanwhile, an administrative complaint was filed
against Atty. Era for representing conflicting interests. In July 16, 2013 Decision, this Court found Atty.
Era guilty of the charge and imposed the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for two years
for its guidance.

On November 28, 2013, the scheduled public auction over Bonifacio's and/or the corporation's properties
in the business establishment was conducted to implement the alias writ. Atty. Era actively participated
therein. On the same day, a certificate of sale was issued, which Atty. Era presented to the corporation's
officers and employees who were there at that time. Armed with such documents, Atty. Era led the pulling
out of the subject properties but eventually stopped to negotiate with Bonifacio's children for the payment
of the judgment award instead of pulling out the auctioned properties. As the parties were not able to settle,
on December 3, 2013, Attys. Era and Bragas went back to Bonifacio's business establishment together with
their clients and several men, and forced open the establishment to pull out the auctioned properties. This
prompted Bonifacio to file a criminal complaint for malicious mischief, robbery, and trespassing. In its
Resolution, the Office of the City Prosecutor found probable cause to indict Attys. Era and Bragas for grave
coercion.

Meanwhile, Atty. Era's name remains to appear in pleadings filed before the NLRC and this Court sometime
in February and with regard to the subject labor case. Bonifacio filed the instant administrative complaint.
In his defense, Atty. Era further argued that he did not violate the Court's order of suspension from the
practice of law as he merely acted as his clients' attorney-in-fact pursuant to a Special Power of Attorney
(SPA). It is Atty. Era's theory that with such SPA, he was not engaged in the practice of law in
representing his clients in the implementation of the alias writ. He added that he never signed any
document or pleading on behalf of his clients during his suspension. For Atty. Bragas, being an
associate of Era and Associates Law Firm, she was merely representing the Abucejo Group as said
law firm's clients.

In his Report and Recommendation, Investigating Commissioner Jose Villanueva Cabrera recommended
the dismissal of the instant administrative complaint for insufficiency of evidence. The IBP Board of
Governors (Board April 18, 2015 reversed and set aside the Investigating Commissioner's findings and
conclusions. Corollary to this, the Board also found Atty. Bragas liable for allowing and assisting Atty.
Era to engage in an unauthorized practice of law. The Board concluded that Atty. Bragas ought to know
that Atty. Era's acts during the satisfaction of the alias writ could be performed only by a member of the bar
in good standing. Pursuant to Section 12(b), Rule 139-B of the Rules, the records of the instant case were
transmitted to this Court.

ISSUES:

a) Whether or not Atty. Era’s acts constituted “practice of law”. (YES)

b) Whether or not Atty. Era was engaged in the practice of law during his suspension
therefrom that would warrant another disciplinary action against him. (YES)

c) (If the first issue is in the affirmative):Whether or not Atty. Bragas is guilty of directly or
indirectly assisting Atty. Era in his illegal practice of law that would likewise warrant
this Court's exercise of its disciplining authority against her. (YES)

RULING:

We sustain the findings and recommendations of the Board of Governors.

1. YES. Atty. Era's acts constituted ''practice of law".

Black defines "practice of law" as: "The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application
of legal principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to
appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of
pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of
legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients
and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law. An attorney engages in the practice of law
by maintaining an office where he is held out to be an attorney, using a letterhead describing himself as an
attorney, counseling clients in legal matters, negotiating with opposing counsel about pending litigation,
and fixing and collecting fees for services rendered by his associate."
Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients
as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or
outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law." (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v. CS.
Dudley and Co.)

In this case, it is undisputed that Atty. Era committed the following acts: (1) appeared on behalf of his
winning clients in the public auction of the condemned properties; (2) tendered bid in the auction for his
clients; (3) secured the certificate of sale and presented the said document to the corporation's officers and
employees present in the premises at that time; (4) insisted that his clients are now the new owners of the
subject properties, hence, should be allowed entry in the premises; (5) initiated the pull out of the
properties; and (6) negotiated with Bonifacio's children in his law office as regards the payment of the
judgment award with interest instead of pulling out the properties.

It is true that being present in an auction sale and negotiating matters relating to the same may not
be exclusively for lawyers, as opined by the Investigating Commissioner. However, in this case, Atty.
Era's acts clearly involved the determination by a trained legal mind of the legal effects and
consequences of each course of action in the satisfaction of the judgment award. Precisely, this is
why his clients chose Atty. Era to represent them in the public auction and in any
negotiation/settlement with the corporation arising from the labor case as stated in the SPA being
invoked by Atty. Era. Such trained legal mind is what his clients were relying upon in seeking redress for
their claims. This is evident from the fact that they agreed not to enter into any amicable settlement without
the prior written consent of Atty. Era, the latter being their lawyer. It could readily be seen that the said
SPA was executed by reason of Atty. Era being their legal counsel. Thus, this Court is one with the Board's
submission that the said SPA cannot be invoked to support Atty. Era's claim that he was not engaged in the
practice of law in performing the acts above-cited as such SPA cunningly undermines the suspension
ordered by this Court against Atty. Era, which We cannot countenance.

2. YES. Atty. Era was engaged in an unauthorized practice of law during his suspension

As mentioned, Atty. Era was suspended from the practice of law for a period of two years in this Court's
Decision dated July 16, 2013. He performed the above-cited acts on the same year, specifically November
to December 2013. Indubitably, Atty. Era was engaged in an unauthorized law practice.

Atty. Era's acts constitute willful disobedience of the lawful order of this Court, which under Section 27,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is a sufficient cause for suspension or disbarment. Further, Atty. Era's
intentional maneuver to circumvent the suspension order not only reflects his insubordination to authority
but also his disrespect to this Court's lawful order which warrants reproach. Members of the bar, above
anyone else, are called upon to obey court orders and processes. Graver responsibility is imposed upon a
lawyer than any other to uphold the integrity of the courts and to show respect to their processes.

3. YES. Atty. Bragas is guilty of assisting Atty. Era in his unauthorized practice of law and,
thus, must likewise be reproved.

There is no question that Atty. Bragas has knowledge of Atty. Era's suspension from the practice of law and
yet, she allowed herself to participate in Atty. Era's unauthorized practice. Clearly, Atty. Bragas violated the
CPR, specifically: CANON 9 - A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized
practice of law. Indeed, it is a lawyer's duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized
practice of law. Such duty is founded upon public interest and policy, which requires that law practice be
limited only to individuals found duly qualified in education and character.

As correctly observed by the Board, Atty. Bragas ought to know that Atty. Era's acts constitutive of law
practice could be performed only by a member of the Bar in good standing, which Atty. Era was not at that
time. Hence, she should have not participated to such transgression.Being an associate in Atty. Era's law
firm cannot be used to circumvent the suspension order. The factual circumstances of the case clearly
shows that Atty. Bragas did not act to replace Atty. Era as counsel for his and/or the law firm's clients during
the latter's suspension. Atty. Bragas merely assisted Atty. Era, who admittedly was the one actively
performing all acts pertaining to the labor case he was handling.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, Atty. Edgardo O. Era is found GUILTY of willfully disobeying this
Court's lawful order and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of three (3) years,
while Atty. Diane Karen B. Bragas is likewise found GUILTY of violating CANON 9 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) month, effective immediately
from receipt of this Decision. Also, both Attys. Era and Bragas are WARNED that a repetition of the same or
similar offense, or a commission of another offense will warrant a more severe penalty.

Prepared by: Nicole Ann Crysta M. Romero

14.
LUZVIMINDA S. CERILLA V. ATTY. SAMUEL SM. LEZAMA
A.C. No. 11483 October 3, 2017 Peralta, J.

FACTS:
Luzviminda S. Cerilla, complainant, filed an administrative complaint for gross misconduct against Atty.
Samuel Lezama, respondent, before the IBP.

In her complaint, complainant alleged that she is one of the co-owners of a parcel of land, located in Sibulan,
Negros Oriental. The heirs of Gringio sold it to heirs of Fabio Solmayor, including the complainant.

Being co-owner, complainant engaged the services of respondent to file an unlawful detainer case against
Garlito with the MTC.

However, at that time, complainant was working at Camp Aguinaldo in EDSA; hence, she executed a special
power of attorney (SPA) in favor of respondent to represent her in filing of the case, to appear during
preliminary conference, including amicable settlement of the case if necessary.

Thereafter, by virtue of the SPA, respondent entered into a compromise agreement with the defendant, to
sell the property of complainant for P350,000, without her consent or special authority. The compromise
agreement was approved; hence, a writ of execution was issued.

Complainant argued that the respondent should be suspended or disbarred because he misrepresented
that she was willing to sell the property, considering there are other co-owners, and respondent
misconduct was the proximate cause of loss of property.
In defense, respondent argued that he was duly armed with an SPA to enter into a compromise agreement,
and the price of P350,000 was the actual price paid by complainant to owner. Hence, he entered into the
compromise agreement under the honest and sincere belief that it was the fairest and most equitable
arrangement.

The IBP- Commissioner found respondent guilty of violating Canons 15 and 17 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and recommended a suspension from the practice of law for two (2) years. During the
preliminary conference, respondent admitted that complainant did not grant him the authority to sell the
property in P350,000. Hence, he acted beyond the scope of his authority.

The IBP- Board of Governors adopted and approved the report and recommendation of the investigating
commissioner.

ISSUE:
Whether respondent is guilty of gross misconduct.

RULING:

Yes, respondent is found guilty of violating Canons 5, 15, and 17 of the CPR. Therefore, the Supreme Court
affirmed the suspension from the practice of law for a period of 2 years.

The Supreme Court ruled that it is imperative that lawyers be conversant with basic legal principles. Here,
nowhere it is expressly stated in the SPA that respondent is authorized to compromise on the sale of
property. Hence, he clearly acted beyond the scope of his authority.

Respondent, in his Answer and Motion for Reconsideration of Resolution No.:XXI-2014-386, stated that his
action was based on an honest belief that he was serving both the interest of his client and the policy of the
law to settle cases amicably. However, his justification does not persuade, because his alleged honest belief
prejudiced his client, since the property she was not willing to sell was sold at a price decided upon by
respondent on his own, which caused his client and her co-owners to file further cases to recover their
property that was sold due to respondent's mistake. He overlooked the fact that he was not authorized by
his client to sell the property. Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:

CANON 5 – A LAWYER SHALL KEEP ABREAST OF LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS, PARTICIPATE IN

CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION PROGRAMS, SUPPORT EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE HIGH
STANDARDS IN LAW SCHOOLS AS WELL AS IN THE PRACTICAL TRAINING OF LAW STUDENTS
AND ASSIST IN DISSEMINATING INFORMATION REGARDING THE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE.

As found by the IBP Board of Governors, respondent also violated Canons 15 and 17 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility:

CANON 15 – A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS
DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENT.

CANON 17- A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE
MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.

Prepared by: Paola E. Camilon

15. A.C. No. 8887 ROMAN DELA ROSA VERANO* , Complainant vs.

ATTY. LUIS FERNAN DIORES, JR., Respondent

November 7, 2017, PER CURIAM

FACTS:

Verano executed an SPA in favor of Atty. Diores authorizing the latter to use Verano's as guaranty
to obtain a bail bond for particular criminal cases4 that had been filed against Atty. Diores.

Verano was surprised when he subsequently discovered that Atty. Diores executed a
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with Visayan Surety and Insurance Corporation (Visayan Surety) in
order to use the subject property as guarantee to obtain bail bonds for at least 61 cases of Estafa and
Violation of B.P. Blg. 22 that had been filed against him. Verano alleged that he did not authorize Atty. Diores
to enter into such MOA, much less to use the subject property as collateral for bail bonds of the more than
61 Estafa cases filed against the latter which were other than those he authorized under the SPA, causing
great loss and damage to Verano.

Thereafter, the RTC branch, where the estafa cases were pending, found Atty. Diores guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of six (6) counts of Estafa through false pretenses and fraudulent means under Article
315 (2) (a) of the Revised Penal Code by engaging in a Ponzi scheme.

Verano filed this letter-complaint against Atty. Diores. After due proceedings, the Commissioner
recommended that respondent be SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of TWO (2) YEARS
with a stem warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. In its
Resolution, the IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt and approve the said Report and
Recommendation, but recommended that Atty. Diores be disbarred.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Diores should be disbarred.

RULING:

YES.

In dealing with clients or other people, lawyers are expected to observe the highest degree of good
faith, fairness and candor, both in their private and professional capacities. Thus, any form of deception or
fraudulent act committed by a lawyer in either capacity is not only disgraceful and dishonorable, but also
severely undermines the trust and confidence of people in the legal profession, violates Canon 1, Rule 1.01
of the CPR, and puts the lawyer's moral character into serious doubt as a member of the Bar, rendering him
unfit to continue his practice of law. Moreover, a lawyer has the duty to obey lawful orders of a superior
court and the IBP. Willful disobedience to such orders, especially to those issued by this Court, is a sufficient
ground to disbar a lawyer or suspend him from the practice of law under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules
of Court.

In this case, Commissioner Antiquiera observed that while there was an SPA executed by Verano
in favor of Atty. Diores for the latter to use Verano's land as guarantee for the bail bonds, it only authorized
Atty. Diores to use the same for specific criminal cases, and not for the other criminal cases filed against
him. In addition, Atty. Diores failed to file his comment to Verano's letter-complaint filed against him
despite two (2) notices from the Court ordering him to do so, failed to attend the mandatory conference
and file his position paper despite orders from the IBP, and jumped bail in the criminal cases filed against
him.

The Court agrees with Commissioner Antiquiera's observation. While the SPA executed by Verano
empowered Atty. Diores, in his private capacity, to use the subject property as guaranty for his bail bond in
some of his criminal cases, this did not grant him carte blanche to use the said property to secure bail
bonds in his other criminal cases which were not included in the SPA, much less enter into a MOA with
Visayan Surety for the said purpose. Such act not only violates the trust granted to him by Verano, but also
shows doubt as to his moral character.

Moreover, the fact that Atty. Diores jumped bail in the criminal cases filed against him, failed to file
a comment in the instant case despite notice from the Court, and also failed to attend the mandatory
conference and file his position paper when he was directed to do so by the IBP, shows his propensity to
willfully disobey the orders - of the Court, no less - and other judicial authorities, including the IBP, which
is a grave affront to the legal profession, and which should be penalized to the greatest extent.
 As for the recommended penalty, the Court agrees with, and hereby adopts, the IBP's
recommendation that Atty. Diores should be disbarred, in view of the totality of infractions he had
committed, compounded by his conviction for six (6) counts of Estafa by the RTC.

It is also well-settled that Estafa, which is an act of defrauding another person, whether committed
through abuse of confidence, false pretenses or other fraudulent acts, is a crime involving moral turpitude
which is also a violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the CPR, and a ground to disbar or suspend a lawyer as
gross misconduct under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

Here, Atty. Diores was convicted of not only one, but six (6) counts of Estafa through false pretenses
and fraudulent means under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code. Such conviction simply shows his
criminal tendency to defraud and deceive other people into remitting to him their hard-earned money,
which the legal profession condemns in the strongest terms.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Luis Fernan Diores, Jr. is found GUILTY of Deceit in violation of Rule 1.01
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and Willful Disobedience to a Lawful Order of the Court and
Conviction for Estafa, both in violation of Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. He is hereby
DISBARRED, and his name is ordered STRICKEN FROM the Roll of Attorneys effective immediately upon
the date of his receipt of this Decision.

PREPARED BY: ROCHELLE NIEVA D. CURIBA

16. [ AC. No. 10532, Nov 07, 2017 ]

REYNALDO A. CABUELLO v. ATTY. EDITHA P. TALABOC +

FACTS: On October 12, 2010, complainant Reynaldo A. Cabuello filed an administrative complaint against
respondent Atty. Editha P. Talaboc with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). Complainant engaged
the services of respondent to represent his parents who were charged with the crime of qualified theft of
coconuts. Complainant alleged that he paid for the legal services of respondent, but she did not attend any
hearing. She also failed to file the necessary complaint against the policemen (who arrested the accused)
as agreed upon by them. Complainant alleged that because respondent did not attend the hearings of the
case, he was forced to go back and forth from Manila to the province for 10 months to attend to the cases
of his parents. Every time he went home to the province, he spent P5,000.00 for his bus and plane fares and
P1,000.00 for the van. He spent a total amount of about P150,000.00 due to the negligence of respondent.
Unsatisfied with respondent's legal services, complainant sent respondent a demand letter[2] dated
February 15, 2009 and a second demand letter[3] dated September 13, 2010, asking respondent to return
the payments given to her, but respondent disregarded his demand letters. Complainant stated that he filed
this complaint so the respondent will not repeat her negligence of duty toward her client's case and for the
return of the payments given to respondent, because she failed to fulfill her legal obligation toward his
parents as their lawyer. On October 13, 2010, the IBP Director for Bar Discipline ordered respondent to file
her Answer within 15 days from notice. However, respondent failed to file her answer despite receipt of
the order. The hearing was reset many times for failure of the respondent to file an answer. Ultimately, the
respondent never filed an answer before the IBP. Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner On July 25, 2011, Investigating Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez submitted his Report and
Recommendation[9] on the administrative complaint, finding respondent guilty of violating Canons I 7 and
18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommended the suspension of respondent from the
practice of law for six months. The IBP Commissioner found that the cases of complainant's parents were
set for arraignment on July 27, 2007. On the said date, respondent failed to appear. Hence, a counsel de
officio was assigned to assist complainant's parents. Thereafter, the hearing was set on October 1 and 12,
2007. On August 31, 2007, respondent filed a Motion to Transfer Dates of Hearing, [10] praying that the
hearings set on October 1, 2007 and on October 12, 2007 be cancelled and transferred to November 8 and
9, 2007 allegedly for convenience, economic reason and to maximize efforts and results.
After the trial court granted the motion to transfer the hearing to November 8 and 9, 2007, respondent
again filed an Urgent Motion to Reset Hearing (Scheduled on November 8 and 9, 2007)[11] to January 18,
2008, because respondent was allegedly suffering from severe and recurring back pains due to a vehicular
accident that occurred on September 7, 2007, and she submitted a medical certificate[12] therefor. Thus,
the pre-trial was reset to November 28 and 29, 2007,[13] which did not proceed, because respondent filed
another motion to reset the hearing to December 19 and 20, 2007.[14] Several postponements followed
until June 19, 2008 when respondent failed to appear because of peptic ulcer.[15] (In the Order[16] dated
June 19, 2008, the trial court issued a warrant of arrest for the apprehension of the accused). Thereafter,
respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Lift Warrant of Arrest with Apologia Cum
Explanation, [17] and requested that the hearing of the motion be set on July 25, 2008, but since the court
would not be in session on the said date, the hearing of the motion was set on July 31, 2008.[18] On the said
date, respondent again failed to appear despite due notice. This was followed by other settings until the
pre-trial conference was set on September 25, 2008.[19] On the scheduled pre-trial conference on
September 25, 2008, respondent again failed to appear despite due notice. Hence, the trial court appointed
Atty. Prescilla A. Salvacion of the Public Attorney's office (PAO) as counsel for complainant's parents.
Notwithstanding the appointment by the trial court of a counsel de officio due to the repeated absences of
the respondent, the latter still filed a Motion to Reset Hearing, [20] praying that the hearings of the case for
trial on the merits scheduled on November 27, 2008 and December 11, 2008 be reset to January 15, 2009
and February 19, 2009, which motion was denied by the trial court.[21] On December 11, 2008, before the
prosecution presented its first witness, Atty. Salvacion manifested to the trial court that respondent's
secretary called up to inform her that respondent would still be appearing in the said case and that she
would be available on January 15, 2009. Thereafter, the respondent never communicated with the
complainant or his family. The demand letters sent by complainant to respondent for the return of the
payments made to her were just ignored.

Respondent admitted that she was engaged to represent the accused Spouses Cabuello in the criminal cases
for qualified theft. However, she said that at that time, she already intimated to Mr. Cabuello that she has
health problems so that in case she cannot attend the hearings, she may have to withdraw from the case,
although in terms of legwork or filing of pleadings and the like, her assistant Marivic Alusitain can assist
them. Thus, respondent filed an Omnibus Motion in the second case for Qualified Theft, which motion
prayed for:
(1) the early resolution of accused's prayer for reduction of bail incorporated in respondent's (as accused's
counsel) Formal Entry of Appearance;
(2) the remand of the custody of both the accused, pending the proceedings of the case, from the provincial
jail to the Calbiga Municipal Jail where they were previously detained; and
(3) the cancellation of the hearing of the case on August 17, 2007 and resetting it on October 1, 2007 or
October 12, 2007 at 8:30 a.m.

Respondent caused a request for reduction of the bail of the accused, and in the trial court gave notice that
the request for reduction of bail from P24,000.00 and P30,000.00, respectively, to P5,000.00 for both cases
would be heard on August 17, 2007.

In the Order, the court stated that coaccused Cecilia Cabuello posted thru Marivic Alusitain the amount of
P22,000.00 as cash bail for both cases. In view thereof, co-accused Cecilia Cabuello was ordered released
from detention.

In one of the hearings of the case, both accused were indisposed due to medical reasons; hence, an order
for the issuance of a warrant of arrest against them was issued. Thus, respondent filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the said Order with an Affidavit of Waiverso that the absence of the accused thereafter
may be excused.

During the subsequent hearings of the case, either the court or the respondent, who was afflicted with
several ailments, [reset the hearings] as evidenced by the orders of the court for the resetting of the case
and some of the medical certificates attached to the motion.
All the resetting of the hearings of the case that were filed by the respondent were with the knowledge and
conformity of her clients as well as complainant Reynaldo Cabuello.

Thus, respondent and Mr. Cabuello agreed, for economic reasons, that the Cabuellos would verify from the
court, days before a hearing is scheduled, if the hearing would push through so that there would be no need
for them to go to court in case a hearing is or would be cancelled.

For the February 6, 2008 hearing, respondent purchased a PAL ticket, but she was informed by
complainant Reynaldo Cabuello the day before the hearing that the said February 6, 2008 hearing was
cancelled due to the retirement of the Presiding Judge of the court.

j) Because of the foregoing events and incidents, which have caused problems, stress and inconvenience as
well as expenses for all parties, both accused, thru complainant Reynaldo Cabuello, informed the
respondent that they will terminate her services and they will get a new lawyer to represent them. As far
as respondent knows, the accused were already represented by a new counsel of record in the case (per
the trial court's Order[34] dated February 5, 2009).

Thus, respondent filed a Motion to Withdraw as Counsel for the Accused with the conformity of the accused
and duly received by the court. Corollary thereto, respondent surrendered to the accused all the records of
the case in her possession, as evidenced by the Acknowledgmentof Ms. Cabuello.

Ruling of the IBP Board of Governor

The penalty meted by Atty. Editha Talaboc increased from six (6) months SUSPENSION from the practice
of law to two (2) years. Moreover, she is hereby Ordered to Return the amount received from Complainant
with legal interest from the time the demand was made within thirty (30) days from notice.

Issue: WON the respondent is guilty of violating Canons 17 and 18 (YES)

Ruling: The Court agrees with the finding of the Investigating Commissioner and affirms Resolution No.
XX-2013-234 and Resolution No. XXI-2014-96 of the IBP Board of Governors, but modifies the penalty
imposed on the respondent and the amount of money to be refunded by respondent to complainant.
The records show that as counsel of the complainant's parents, respondent was remiss in her duty toward
them by never appearing in the hearings of the criminal case, which contributed to the delay of the pre-trial
of the case for eleven months or almost a year until the trial court finally appointed a counsel de officio for
respondent's clients so the pre-trial and trial on the merits could proceed. Respondent kept on filing a
motion to reset the scheduled pre-trial, including those dates of hearings requested by her, from the start
until her withdrawal as counsel. This is borne out by the Orders of the RTC having jurisdiction over the
cases of complainant's parents. The Order dated June 19, 2008 states:

It appears from the records that the arraignment of these cases was conducted on July 27, 2007 yet but no
pre-trail conference was conducted because Atty. Editha Talaboc, the counsel for both accused had filed a
series of postponemenis alleging every thinkable ground as reasons for her nonappearance.

Considering that sufficient time had already been granted by the Court to the accused, further considering
that in all of these scheduled hearings both accused were not present, issue a warrant of arrest for the
apprehension of accused Alejandro Cabuello and Cecilia Cabuello.

To the Order quoted above, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Lift Warrant of
Arrest with Apologia cum Explanation[ dated June 24, 2008. The trial court set the respondent's motion for
hearing on July 31, 2008.
In the Order dated July 31, 2008, the trial court lifted the warrant for the arrest of the accused as they were
present in court. Respondent, however, was not available on that day, so the court re-scheduled the pre-
trial conference on August 28, 2008 and stated that if respondent would not appear on that day, the court
will appoint a counsel de officio to assist the accused.

In an Order dated August 21, 2008, the pre-trial conference was reset to September 25, 2008. On
September 25, 2008, respondent was not present, so the court appointed Atty. Prescilla A. Salvacion of the
PAO to represent complainant's parents. Thereafter, the hearing for the presentation of the evidence for
the prosecution was scheduled on November 27, 2008 and December 11, 2008. Respondent again filed a
Motion to Reset Hearing, alleging that she was not available during the scheduled hearings as she was
committed to appear in other branches of the RTC in Metro Manila, and praying that the trial of the cases
be reset to January 15,2009 and February 19,2009.

The trial court denied the motion as it had already appointed Atty. Prescilla A. Salvacion to assist the
accused and she had already ably assisted the accused during the pre-trial conference of the case on
September 25, 2008. During the hearing of the presentation of evidence for the prosec ution scheduled on
December 11, 2008, Atty. Prescilla A. Salvacion informed the court that respondent's secretary called up to
inform her that respondent will still be representing the accused in the case and that she is available on
January 15, 2009.

Based on the foregoing, it is clear that respondent indeed violated Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, thus:

Canon 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed in him.

Canon 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

A member of the legal profession owes his/her client entire devotion to the latter's genuine interest, and
warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his/her rights.An attorney is expected to exert his/her best
efforts and ability to preserve his/her client's cause, for the unwavering loyalty displayed to his/her client,
likewise, serves the ends of justice.Verily, the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the
corresponding duties, not only to the client, but also to the court, to the bar and to the public.

Camara v. Atty. Reyes held: Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for
private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare and for the purpose of
preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney
is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant is in no sense a
party, and has generally no interest in the outcome of the case. This is also the reason why this Court may
investigate charges against lawyers regardless of complainant's standing.

In regard to the refund sought for payments made to respondent alleged to be in the total amount of
P97,500.00, complainant failed to present receipts or documents to evidence the same. The attorney's fees
shall be those stipulated in the retainer's agreement between the client and the attorney, which constitutes
the law between the parties for as long as it is not contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy
or public order.

In this case, there was no retainer's agreement between the parties to be able to ascertain the attorney's
fees agreed upon and received by respondent. In his Complaint, complainant sought the return of
acceptance fees in the amount of P20,000.00 for the criminal cases and P15,000.00 for the case supposed
to be filed against the police officers who arrested the accused. The Court notes that in Annex "14"[64] of
respondent's motion for reconsideration, respondent admitted to having received the amount of
P25,000.00 as attorney's fee/acceptance fee for the two criminal cases and P15,000.00 for the case
supposed to be filed with the fiscal's office plus P5,000.00 for expenses, and P5,000.00 representing the
refund of the PAL ticket rescheduled four times due to the cancellation and resetting of the court hearings,
totaling P50,000.00, which amount respondent offered to return to complainant's mother Cecilia
Cabuello.Cecilia Cabuello, however, declined and denied receipt of such payment from respondent's
representative, Marivic Alusitain, because she had no right to receive the money that belonged to her
children

Hence, in the absence of receipts or documentary evidence to substantiate the amount of P97,500.00 sought
to be recovered by complainant from respondent, complainant is entitled to a refund in the amount of
P50,000.00, which had been admittedly received by respondent from the Cabuellos as payment for
attorney's/acceptance fees and other expenses including refund of a PAL ticket and which amount
respondent offered to return to Cecilia Cabuello. The Court modifies the penalty of suspension imposed by
the IBP Board of Governors on respondent from two years to one year. In Chang v. Hidalgo, the Court stated
that in several cases, it has imposed the penalty of one (1) year suspension from the practice of law for
violation of Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

17. MANUEL L. VALIN AND HONORIO L. VALIN, Complainants, v. ATTY. ROLANDO T. RUIZ,
Respondent.
A.C. No. 10564, November 07, 2017 -

FACTS

The complainants averred that they are two of the surviving children of their deceased parents, spouses
Pedro F. Valin (Pedro) and Cecilia Lagadon (Cecilia). Pedro was the original registered owner of a parcel of
land (subject land) covered by an OCT.

Pedro died on December 7, 1992 while he was in Hawaii.

Several years later, Honorio discovered that the subject land has been transferred to respondent, the
godson of Pedro, resulting in the cancellation of OCT of TCT in the name of respondent. He learned from
the Register of Deeds that the subject land was conveyed to respondent in consideration of P10,000.00 by
virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale (subject deed), dated July 15, 1996, and executed in Tuguegarao City,
Cagayan purportedly by Pedro with the alleged consent of his spouse, Cecilia.

The complainants alleged that the subject deed was obviously falsified and the signatures therein of Pedro
and Cecilia were forgeries because Pedro was already dead and Cecilia was in Hawaii at that time. The
complainants pointed to respondent as the author of the falsifications and forgeries because the latter
caused the registration of the subject land unto his name and because he was the one who benefited from
the same.

In his Answer, respondent claimed that Rogelio L. Valin (Rogelio), one of the children of Pedro and Cecilia,
sold the subject land to him sometime in 1989 allegedly in representation of Pedro. Rogelio offered to sell
the subject land and claimed that it was his share in their family's properties. He asked Rogelio for his
authority to sell the subject land but the latter claimed that he could not locate his authority from his
parents in their house. Respondent claimed that he knew that it was hard to transfer the title because the
title owner, Pedro, was out of the country at the time of the sale and without a Special Power of Attorney
(SPA) for the purpose; thus, Rogelio undertook to transfer the title.

Respondent also denied having knowledge regarding the execution of the subject deed in 1996. He insisted
that he neither falsified the said deed nor forged the signatures of Pedro and Cecilia as it was Rogelio who
processed the transfer of the title of the subject land in his name.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Respondent should be held administratively liable.

RULING
Atty. Ruiz shall be liable.

Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) states that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." Lawyers must conduct themselves beyond reproach at
all times, whether they are dealing with their clients or the public at large, and a violation of the high moral
standards of the legal profession justifies the imposition of the appropriate penalty, including suspension
and disbarment.

Further, the lawyer's oath enjoins every lawyer not only to obey the laws of the land but also to refrain
from doing any falsehood in or out of court or from consenting to the doing of any in court, and to conduct
himself according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity to the courts as well as
to his clients.

The Court finds that respondent violated the lawyer's oath, Rule 1.01 and 10.01 of the CPR.

From the time that the sale of the subject land was negotiated in 1989 until it was executed and registered
through the subject deed in 1996, there were patent irregularities, which respondent cannot ignore.

First, in 1989, respondent admitted that he entered into with Rogelio a contract of deed of sale over the
subject property owned and registered to Pedro without any SPA. As a lawyer, he knows that "[w]hen a
sale of a piece of land or any interest therein is through an agent, the authority of the latter shall be in
writing; otherwise, the sale shall be void."

Second, in spite of the deficient SPA from Rogelio's father, respondent allowed many years to pass without
probing him regarding the sale of the land. This is obviously contrary to human experience.

Third, it is a difficult pill to swallow that respondent was oblivious of Pedro's death in 1992. He admitted
in his petition that he is a close family friend and godson of Pedro.26 Certainly, he could not claim such
strong ties to the family of Pedro if he never heard about the latter's demise.

Fourth, in 1996, respondent directed his house helper Baligad to sign the release of the title in his name.
He admitted in his answer that he instructed Baligad to go to the RD and sign for him the release of the title
because he was busy at that time. Respondent was neither surprised nor doubtful of the title's release in
his name in 1996. He never attempted to contact Rogelio to verify if he was the one who transferred the
property to his name. He also did not immediately request the production of his authority to sell the subject
land.

Fifth, the subject deed executed in 1996 was readily available at the RD. Respondent could have effortlessly
and briefly verified the said deed, which was the basis of the transfer of the title to him. It is to be noted that
the subject deed was not signed by Rogelio on behalf of Pedro; rather, it was purportedly signed by Pedro
personally and confirmed by Cecilia. Evidently, the sale contemplated by the said deed was not anymore a
sale through an agent, which was the original agreement of respondent and Rogelio back in 1989.

Sixth, as a lawyer, respondent is fully aware of the requisites for the legality of deed of sale and its
registration. He knows how important it is to ensure that the registered instrument is complete and regular
on its face. He is also duty-bound to denounce illegally acquired deeds of sale, which deceive and betray the
general public.
In fine, the Court is convinced that respondent is the author or, at the very least, has connived with the
author of the subject deed and Pedro's CTC for his personal benefits. Respondent incessantly closed his
eyes until he became blind to the anomalies surrounding the sale of the subject land. Whether through
deliberate intent or gross negligence, he participated in the successful registration and release of the title
that originated from an absolutely falsified deed of sale.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Rolando T. Ruiz is found guilty of violating the Lawyer's Oath, Rule 1.01 and Rule 10.01
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Court hereby SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for
two (2) years effective immediately, with a STERN WARNING that the repetition of a similar violation will
be dealt with even more severely.
Prepared by: Zarina

18. FREDDIE A. GUILLEN, Complainant vs. ATTY. AUDIE ARNADO, Respondent

A.C. No. 10547

FACTS

Complainant Freddie Guillen is the registered owner of the City Grill Restaurant. He then invited
respondent Atty. Audie Amado and a certain Cedric Ebo to join the restaurant business. Each of them had
to shell out ₱200,000.00 to make up a total capital of ₱600,000.00. A Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)
was therefore executed and the business was formally launched in May 2003. At first, everything went
smoothly, until Amado's sister-in-law and Ebo's son participated in the management, causing complications
in the business operations, which later forced Guillen and his wife to step down as general manager and
operations manager, respectively. Because of the disagreements among the parties, Guillen offered that he
would waive his claims for profits, provided that Arnado would return the ₱200,000.00 that he paid as
capital. Arnado allegedly claimed that said refund would still be subject to the billings of the Amado and
Associate Law Firm. Thereafter, Guillen was surprised to find out that Arnado had already caused the
incorporation of the restaurant with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), which was approved
on February 16, 2004. Guillen was likewise excluded from the business without the aforementioned refund
of his capital. He was further charged with Estafa before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cebu. Thus,
Guillen initiated the present administrative case.

For his part, Arnado admitted the existence and the contents of the MOA. He also admitted that he caused
the incorporation of City Grill-Sutukil Food Corporation. However, he insisted that the same was done in
accordance with the requirements under the law. Guillen could not validly claim for a refund, and if he was
really entitled, he should simply file an action to that effect. Arnado likewise contended that Guillen's refund
would still be subject to the legal compensation claim of his law firm.

The IBP adopted a resolution suspending Atty Arnado from the practice of law for three (3) months.

ISSUE

WON the IBP erred in its ruling to suspend Atty Arnado from the practice of law for three (3) months.

RULING
No. At the onset, it must be pointed out that the business name City Grill Restaurant registered under
Guillen's name was never dissolved in accordance with the law. Even Arnado failed to prove that the City
Grill Restaurant business had already been terminated. Although said business name was only used for a
short period of time, the same had already acquired goodwill among the residents and customers in the
locality.

On February 26, 2004, City Grill-Sutukil Food Corporation was registered with the SEC. Although Arnado
and Ebo were not included as incorporators, those persons reflected in the articles of incorporation as the
company's incorporators were their relatives. It is clear that when Arnado caused the incorporation of City
Grill-Sutukil Food Corporation, he was fully aware that City Grill Restaurant was still registered in Guillen's
name. Obviously, he did the same to take advantage of the goodwill earned by the name of City Grill
Restaurant. Amado was likewise the one who actually notarized some of City Grill-Sutukil Food
Corporation's legal documents such as the Treasurer's Affidavit and a letter addressed to the SEC.

The IBP Board thus aptly concluded that Arnado is guilty of taking advantage of his knowledge of the law
and of surreptitiously easing out Guillen from their restaurant business partnership by registering a
corporation under a different but similar name and style, in the same line of business, and using the same
trade secrets. Arnado, although not reflected as one of the incorporators of City Grill-Sutukil Food
Corporation, has deceived the public into believing that City Grill Restaurant and City Grill-Sutukil Food
Corporation are one and the same, clearly violating Rule 1.01 of the CPR, which prohibits a lawyer from
engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct.

The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the practice of law is imbued with public interest and that a
lawyer owes substantial duties, not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts,
and to the public, and takes part in the administration of justice, one of the most important functions of the
State, as an officer of the court. Accordingly, lawyers are bound to maintain, not only a high standard of
legal proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing.4

Here, Arnado has certainly fallen short of the high standard of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing
required of him.1âwphi1 On the contrary, he employed his knowledge and skill of the law as well as took
advantage of Guillen to secure undue gains for himself and to inflict serious damage on others.

19. GIZALE O. TUMBAGA, Complainant vs. ATTY. MANUEL P. TEOXON, Respondent.

FACTS:

In a verified complaint dated October 9, 2001 filed directly with the Court, complainant narrated that she
met respondent sometime in September 1999. He was then the City Legal Officer of Naga City from whom
complainant sought legal advice. After complainant consulted with him a few times, he visited her often at
her residence and brought gifts for her son. Respondent assured complainant's mother that although he
was already married to Luzviminda Balang, his marriage was a sham because their marriage contract was
not registered. Complainant believed his representation that he was eligible to marry her.

Eventually, complainant moved in with respondent. She became pregnant and respondent allegedly
wanted to have the baby aborted but complainant refused. After the birth of their son Billy John, respondent
spent more time with them. He used their apartment as a temporary law office and he lived there for two
to three days at a time.

After some time, complainant related that respondent rarely visited them. To make ends meet, she decided
to work in a law office in Naga City. However, respondent compelled her to resign, assuring her that he
would take care of her financial needs. Respondent failed to fulfill his promise. Complainant went to
respondent's office as he reneged on his promise of support. To appease her anger, respondent executed a
promissory note. However, he also failed to honor the same.

In the evening of September 9, 2001, respondent raided complainant's new residence, accompanied by
three SWAT members and his wife. Visibly drunk, respondent threatened to hurt complainant with the bolo
and the lead pipe that he was carrying if she will not return the personal belongings that he left in their
previous apartment unit. As respondent barged into the apartment, complainant sought help from the
SWAT members and one of them was able to pacify respondent.

In his answer, respondent denied the allegations in the complaint. He asserted that complainant merely
wanted to exact money from him. Respondent also denied that he lived together with complainant at the
Puncia Apartment since he was already married. Respondent also claimed that complainant falsified his
signature in the Certificate of Live Birth of Billy John.

The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline issued its Report and Recommendation, finding that respondent
maintained an illicit affair with complainant and that he should be meted the penalty of suspension for a
period of two (2) years. The IBP Board of Governors approved the above recommendation and increased
the recommended period of suspension to three (3) years.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Respondent should be held liable for having illicit relations with Complainant. (YES)

RULING:

The Court agrees with the conclusion of the IBP that the actuations of respondent in this case showed his
failure to live up to the good moral conduct required of the members of the legal profession. Section 27,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides for the imposition of the penalty of disbarment or suspension if a
member of the Bar is found guilty of committing grossly immoral conduct. In order to justify the imposition
of the above administrative penalties on a member of the Bar, his/her guilt must first be established by
substantial evidence.

After a thorough review of the records of the case, the Court upholds the findings of the IBP as there is
indeed substantial evidence that respondent committed gross immorality by maintaining an extramarital
affair with complainant.

One of the key pieces of evidence that the IBP considered in ruling against respondent is the Decision dated
of the MTCC of Naga City in Civil Case for replevin. While the issues in the replevin case and the instant
administrative case are indeed different, they share a common factual backdrop, i.e., the parties' contrasting
account of the true nature of their relationship. From the evidence of both parties, the MTCC chose the
complainant's version of the events. Incidentally, it was respondent himself who brought to light the
existence of the MTCC decision in the replevin case when he attached the same to his answer in the present
case to substantiate his narration of facts. Thus, he cannot belatedly plead that the decision be disregarded
after the statements and findings therein were used against him.

Complainant further attached pictures of respondent with her and Billy John as proof of their romantic
relations. A perusal of these pictures convinces this Court that while the same cannot indeed prove Billy
John's paternity, they are nevertheless indicative of a relationship between complainant and respondent
that is more than merely platonic.

With respect to the affidavit of support, the promissory note, and the Certificate of Live Birth of Billy John
that contained an Affidavit of Acknowledgment/Admission of Paternity, respondent likewise failed to
provide sufficient controverting evidence therefor. As to the Certificate of Live Birth of Billy John,
respondent did file a complaint for the cancellation of his acknowledgment therein. Thus, the Court will no
longer discuss the parties' arguments regarding the validity of respondent's signature in said certificate of
birth as the issue should be threshed out in the proper proceeding.

In light of the foregoing, the Court finds that respondent should be held liable for having illicit relations
with complainant. As to whether respondent also sired complainant's second child, Billy John, the Court
finds that the same was not sufficiently established by the evidence presented in this case. The paternity
and/or acknowledgement of Billy John, if indeed he is respondent's illegitimate child, must be alleged and
proved in separate proceedings before the proper tribunal having jurisdiction to hear the same. However,
considering respondent's blatant attempts to deceive the courts and the IBP regarding his true relationship
with complainant, we agree with the IBP Board of Governors that the proper penalty in this instance is a
three-year suspension from the practice of law.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Manuel P. Teoxon GUILTY of gross immorality and is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of three (3) years effective upon notice hereof,
with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be punished with a more
severe penalty.

20. VICKA MARIE D. ISALOS, Complainant vs. ATTY. ANA LUZ B. CRISTAL, Respondent

FACTS:

Complainant alleged that she is the Director and Treasurer of C Five Holdings, Management &
Consultancy, Inc. (C Five), a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines with
principal office in Libis, Quezon City. Respondent was C Five's Corporate Secretary and Legal Counsel who
handled its incorporation and registration with the Securities and Exchange Commission'(SEC).

When C Five was exploring investment options, respondent recommended the purchase of a resort
in Laguna, with the assurances that the title covering the property was "clean" and the taxes were fully paid.
Relying on respondent's recommendation, C Five agreed to acquire the property and completed the
payment of the purchase price.

Respondent volunteered and was entrusted to facilitate the transfer and registration of the title of
the property in C Five's name. Complainant personally handed the sum of ₱1,200,000.00 to respondent at
her office in Makati City. The said amount was intended to cover the expenses for the documentation,
preparation, and notarization of the Final Deed of Sale, as well as payment of capital gains tax, documentary
stamp tax, and other fees relative to the sale and transfer of the property.

More than a year thereafter, however, no title was transferred in C Five's name. The title covering
the property is a Free Patent, rendering any sale, assignment, or transfer thereof within a period of five (5)
years from issuance of the title null and void. Thus, formal demand 7 was made upon respondent to return
the ₱1,200,000.00 entrusted to her for the expenses which remained unheeded, prompting C Five to file a
criminal complaint for Estafa, as well as the present disbarment case.

Respondent claimed that she paid the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) registration, Mayor's
Permit, business licenses, documentation, and other expenses using the money entrusted to her by
complainant,10 as itemized in a Statement of Expense, and that she was ready to turnover the purchase
price. C Five refused to receive the said amount, insisting that the entire ₱l,200,000.00 should be returned. 12
Moreover, she pointed out that the criminal case for Estafa filed against her by C Five had already been
dismissed 13 for lack of probable cause.14 As such, she prayed that the disbarment case against her be
likewise dismissed for lack of merit.15

IBP found the respondent administratively liable and thereby, recommending her suspension from
the legal profession for a period of three (3) years.

ISSUE: whether or not grounds exist to hold respondent administratively liable

HELD:
 Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose, such as for the processing of transfer of land
title, but not used for the purpose, should be immediately returned. 27 A lawyer's failure to return upon
demand the funds held by him on behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated
the same for his own use in violation of the trust reposed to him by his client. Such act is a gross violation
of general morality, as well as of professional ethics. It impairs public confidence in the legal profession and
deserves punishment.28

In this case, it is indubitable that respondent received the amount of ₱l,200,000.00 from
complainant to be used to cover the expenses for the transfer of title of the subject property under C Five's
name. Respondent admitted having received the same, but claimed that she had spent a portion of it for
various expenses, such as documentation, permits, and licenses, among others, as evidenced by the
Statement of Expenses with attached receipts. However, it has been established that the registration of the
property in C Five's name could not have materialized, as the subject property was covered by a Free Patent
issued on August 13, 2009 which, consequently, bars it from being sold, assigned, or transferred within a
period of five (5) years therefrom. Thus, and as the CBD-IBP had aptly opined,29 there was no longer any
reason for respondent to retain the money.

Furthermore, the expenditures enumerated in the Statement of Expenses, except for the
documentation and notarization fees for which no receipts were attached, do not relate to the purposes for
which the money was given, i.e., the documentation and registration of the subject property. As such, even
if official receipts had been duly attached for the other purposes - which, the Court notes, respondent failed
to do despite the opportunity given - the expenditures are not legitimate ones. Hence, the Court finds
respondent to have violated the above-cited rules, to the detriment and prejudice of complainant.

Respondent's assertion that the instant disbarment case should be dismissed, in view of the return
of the full amount to complainant and the latter's withdrawal of the complaint against her is specious. Such
are not ample grounds to completely exonerate the administrative liability of respondent. It is settled that
a case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the
complainant,30 the latter not being a direct party to the case, but a witness who brought the matter to the
attention of the Court.31 A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not a civil action where the
complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent-lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no
private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for
the public welfare, and for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of
persons unfit to practice. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the
court.

-ash

21. SPS. VICENTE and PRECYWINDA GIMENA, Complainants vs. ATTY. JOJO S. VIJIGA, Respondent
A.C. No. 11828. November 22, 2017. Tijam, J.

FACTS:

Spouses Gimena alleged that they hired the respondent to represent them in a civil case for nullity of
foreclosure proceedings and voidance of loan documents filed against Metropolitan Bank and Trust
Company, involving eight parcels of land. The RTC dismissed the said action. Thus, they filed an appeal
before the CA.

The CA issued a notice requiring complainants, (appellants therein), to file the appellants' brief, but the
respondent failed to file the same. The respondent filed an Omnibus Motion, citing illness and the damage
to his law office due to monsoon rains, as reasons for his failure to file the appellants' brief. The CA granted
the motion and gave 15 days within which to file the required brief. However, the respondent still failed to
file it. Hence, the CA appeal was again dismissed.
Complainants alleged that throughout the proceedings in the CA, respondent did not apprise them of the
status of their case. They were thus surprised when a bulldozer suddenly entered their properties.
Complainants thereafter inquired on the status of their case, and it was then that they discovered that their
appeal was dismissed. The spouses alleged that respondent violated Canon 17 and 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and his oath as a lawyer. They claimed that respondent's lapse is tantamount
to gross ignorance, negligence and dereliction of duty.

Investigating Commissioner Arsenio Adriano recommended that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for six (6) months. This was approved by the IBP Board of Governors.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent violated his ethical duties as a member of the Bar in his dealings
with the complainants

HELD: YES.

Canon 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is clear. A lawyer owes his client competent and
zealous legal representation.

CANON 17 - A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE
MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.

CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
xxxx
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.

Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond
within a reasonable time to the client's request for information.

Respondent's failure to submit the appellants' brief and update his clients, complainants herein, of the
status of their appeal falls short of the ethical requirements set forth under the CPR. Being a service-
oriented occupation, lawyers are expected to observe diligence and exhibit professional behavior in all
their dealings with their clients. Lawyers should be mindful of the trust and confidence, not to mention the
time and money, reposed in them by their clients. When a lawyer agrees to act as a counsel, he guarantees
that he will exercise that reasonable degree of care and skill demanded by the character of the business he
undertakes to do, to protect the clients' interests and take all steps or do all acts necessary therefor.

As a lawyer, respondent is presumed to be knowledgeable of the procedural rules in appellate practice. He

is presumed to know that dismissal is an inevitable result from failure to file the requisite brief within the
period stated in the Rules of Court. In this case, the fact that the appeal was twice dismissed further
highlights respondent's indifference to his client's cause. Interestingly, respondent failed to offer any
explanation as to why he failed to submit the appellants' brief within the 45-day period from his receipt of
the notice to file the same, resulting to the dismissal of the appeal for the first time. To the mind of this
Court, such failure is an unequivocal indication of his guilt in the administrative charge. Indeed, failure to
file the required pleadings is per se a violation of Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

In this case, respondent's neglect of his professional duties led to the loss of complainants' properties and
has left them bereft of legal remedies. They lost their case not because of merits but because of
technicalities, specifically the respondent's failure to file the required pleadings. Worse, respondent's
failure to inform complainants of the unfortunate fate of their appeal further amplifies his lack of
competence and diligence. As an officer of the court, it was respondent's duty to inform his client of
whatever important information he may have acquired affecting his client's case. The purpose of informing
the client is to minimize misunderstanding and loss of trust and confidence in the attorney. The lawyer
should not leave the client in the dark on how the lawyer is defending the client's interests.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Jojo S. Vijiga is SUSPENDED FOR SIX (6) MONTHS
from the practice of law with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more
severely. He is ADMONISHED to exercise greater care and diligence in the performance of his duties.

- Denise

22. SIMEON TRINIDAD PIEDAD (deceased) survived and assumed by his heirs, namely: ELISEO
PIEDAD (deceased)*, JOEL PIEDAD, PUBLIO PIEDAD, JR., GLORIA PIEDAD, LOT PIEDAD, ABEL
PIEDAD, ALI PIEDAD, and LEE PIEDAD, Petitioners vs. CANDELARIA LINEHAN BOBILLES and
MARIANO BOBILLES, Respondents.

FACTS:

In 1974, Simeon Piedad (Piedad) filed a case for annulment of an absolute deed of sale against Candelaria
Linehan Bobilles (Candelaria) and Mariano Bobilles (Mariano). The trial court ruled in Piedad's favor and
declared the deed of sale as null and void for being a forgery and ordered Candelaria and Mariano’s heirs
and/or assigns to vacate the house and surrender their possession of said house and all other real
properties which are supposed to have been covered by the voided deed of sale to the administrator of the
estate of spouses Nemesio Piedad and Fortunata Nillas.

Candelaria and Mariano appealed the trial court, but the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal and
affirmed the trial court ruling. Court of Appeals Decision became final and executory on November 1, 1998.
On October 22, 2001, Judge Gaviola issued an order for the issuance of a writ of demolition.

On December 4, 2001, Judge Gaviola issued a Writ of Demolition against Candelaria and Mariano and
referred it to Sheriff Bellones for its implementation. That same day, in the same case, Candelaria filed a
Petition for the Probate of the Last Will and Testament of Simeon Piedad. Judge Gaviola ordered that the
petition be heard independently and that it be raffled to another branch.

Candelaria's Petition for the Probate of the Last Will and Testament of Simeon Piedad was raffled to
Branch 59, RTC Toledo City, presided over by Judge Gaudioso D. Villarin.

Candelaria also filed a verified petition for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or
preliminary injunction against Sheriff Bellones to restrain him from enforcing the writ of demolition. Judge
Cesar 0. Estrera, Executive Judge of the RTC of Toledo City and Presiding Judge of Branch 29, ordered the
raffle of the petition against Sheriff Bellones. A few days later, after summarily hearing the case, Judge
Estrera issued a restraining order against Sheriff Bellones.

Upon Candelaria's motion, Judge Estrera consolidated the two proceedings.

Upon Candelaria's motion, Judge Villarin extended the temporary restraining order against Sheriff Bellones
for 17 days.

The following motions were eventually filed before Judge Villarin, but he never resolved them: (1) a motion
to dismiss, as amended; (2) a motion requesting the issuance of an order lifting the injunction order; and
(3) a joint motion to resolve the motions.

The Heirs of Piedad filed an administrative complaint against Judges Estrera and Villarin. The
administrative complaint charged them with Issuing an Unlawful Order Against a Co-Equal Court and
Unreasonable Delay in Resolving Motions. The SC found both Judges Estrera and Villarin administratively
liable for gross ignorance of the law, and Judge Villarin liable for undue delay in rendering an order.

The Heirs of Piedad filed their Motion Praying that an Order Be Issued to Sheriff Antonio Bellones to
Resume the Unfinished Writ of Execution and/or Writ of Demolition before Regional Trial Court, Branch
29, Toledo City.

Judge Ruben F. Altubar (Judge Altubar) of Branch 29, RTC Toledo City denied the motion. Judge Altubar
opined that since more than 12 years had passed since the Court of Appeals Decision became final and
executory, the execution should have been pursued through a petition for revival judgment, not a mere
motion.

The Heirs of Piedad appealed, but it was dismissed for being the wrong remedy. The appropriate course of
action for the petitioner was to file a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 alleging grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction committed by the presiding judge who issued the assailed
Orders. The Heirs of Piedad filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari before the SC, where they adopted the
findings of fact in the administrative case against Judges Estrera and Villarin.

Petitioners assert that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied their
motion for the resumption of the writ of demolition and their motion for reconsideration. Petitioners
charged Judge Altubar for being equally ignorant of the law as Judges Estrera and Villarin. They also point
out that Court of Appeals Justice Gabriel T. Ingles, who penned the dismissal of their appeal, presided over
when he was still the acting RTC Judge and even issued the Order.

Petitioners pray for the resumption of the writ of demolition. In its October 21, 2013 Resolution, the
granted petitioners' motion for extension and directed respondents to comment on the Petition.

Respondents opine that petitioners' motion for the implementation of the writ of demolition was already
barred by prescription since it was filed 12 years after the Court of Appeals Decision, which upheld the
validity of the writ of demolition, became final and executory. Respondents further claim that the ruling in
the administrative case against Judges Estrera and Villarin cannot bind them since they were not parties to
the case and the issue resolved was the administrative liability of these judges. They emphasize that this
Court did not rule on the validity of Judges Estrera's and Villarin's issuances and orders.

Respondents also question the personality of petitioners to institute the case on Piedad's behalf.

ISSUES:

Whether or not petitioners have duly established their personality to file the petition as heirs of Simeon
Piedad (related to the subject).

RULING:

Petitioners claim to be Piedad's children; thus, they assert that they are the real parties in interest to the
action begun by their father. On the other hand, respondents claim that petitioners did not properly
substitute Piedad upon his death; hence, they failed to substantiate their personality to move for the revival
of judgment.

Respondents fail to convince. Petitioners have been repeatedly recognized as Piedad's rightful heirs not
only by the Court of Appeals but also by the sc. In Heirs of Simeon Piedad v. Exec. Judge Estrera, petitioners
filed an administrative case in their capacity as Piedad's heirs and this Court acknowledged their standing
to sue in this capacity. The same is also true in the assailed Court of Appeals Decision where petitioners
filed their appeal as Piedad's heirs and their personality to represent their father was never questioned or
assailed. The SC sees no reason to deny them the same recognition in the case at bar when the current case
is merely an offshoot of their father's original complaint for nullity of deed of sale.
Furthermore, this Court takes judicial notice of how respondents, through their counsels, deliberately and
maliciously delayed the execution of a final and executory judgment by filing patently dilatory actions.
These actions include:

1. The Petition for the Probate of the Last Will and Testament of Simeon Piedad, filed in the same
case as Piedad's complaint for annulment of absolute deed of sale. The Petition for Probate of
the Last Will and Testament of Simeon Piedad was filed in response to the Writ of Demolition.

2. the petition against Sheriff Bellones to restrain him from enforcing the writ of demolition; and

3. the extent of the insidious machinations employed by respondents and their counsels were
highlighted when they assailed petitioners' motion for execution for purportedly being filed
beyond the prescriptive period of 10 years, when they themselves were part of the reason for
the delay in execution.

Counsels for respondents are "reminded that as officers of the law, they are mandated by Rule 12.04 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility to "not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or
misuse court processes." While counsels for respondents are expected to serve their clients to the utmost
of their ability, their duty to their clients does not include disrespecting the law by scheming to impede the
execution of a final and executory judgment. As members of the Bar, counsels for respondents are enjoined
to represent their clients "with zeal within the bounds of the law."

Thus, counsels for respondents are given a stern warning to desist from committing similar acts which
undermine the law and its processes. Any similar infractions in the future from counsels for respondents
will be dealt with more severely.

- alit
23. ATTY. ROSITA L. DELA FUENTE TORRES, ET AL, Petitioner, vs. ATTY. BAYANI P. DALANGIN,
Respondent

A.C. No. 10758, December 5, 2017, EN BANC, REYES, JR, J.

FACTS:

These are four administrative complaints that were separately filed with the Commission on Bar Discipline
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) by and against substantially the same parties, particularly:

(l) CBD Case No. 11-3215 for gross immorality, malpractice and gross misconduct filed by Atty. Rosita L.
Dela Fuente-Torres (Atty. Torres). et al., against Atty. Bayani P. Dalangin (Atty. Dalangin) and docketed
before the Court as A.C. No. l 0758;

(2) CBD Case No. 12-3292 for gross misconduct filed by Glenda Alvaro (Alvaro) against Atty. Dalangin and
docketed before the Court as A.C. No. 10759;

(3) CBD Case No. 12-3369 for gross misconduct, violation of the lawyer’s oath and violation of Canon 1 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) filed by Atty. Dalangin against Atty. Torres and Atty. Avelino
Andres (Atty. Andres), docketed in this Court as A.C. No. 10760 ; and

(4) CBD Case No. 12-3458 for grave misconduct, dishonesty and violation of Canon 1 of the CPR filed by
Atty. Dalangin against Atty. Torres and docketed in this Court as A.C. No. 10761.

The Antecedents

A.C. No. 10758

The complaint imputed upon Atty. Dalangin several breaches of his duties as a lawyer. First, it was alleged
that Atty. Dalangin filed against employees of the Judiciary and a fellow lawyer groundless suits, which
were merely prompted by his loss in a case and intended to cover up his negligence as counsel. By his acts,
Atty. Dalangin committed gross misconduct, and breached Rule 18.03, Canon 18, Rules 1.02 and 1.03, Canon
1, and Canon 11 of the CPR.

It appeared that prior to the institution of CBD Case No. 11-3215, a complaint for disbannent was filed
against Atty. Torres by Apolonia Marzan (Marzan) and Melody Valdez (Valdez), who were clients of Atty.
Dalangin and the losing parties in an unlawful detainer case decided by Presiding Judge Efren B. Mallare
(Judge Mallare) of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija. Marzan and Valdez later
disclosed to Atty. Torres that the filing of the disbarment case was orchestrated by Atty. Dalangin, who
prepared the affidavit and instructed them to sign it even without explaining the contents and tenor of the
document.

When Marzan and Valdez eventually realized that their affidavit was used to file a disbarment complaint
with the IBP against Atty. Torres, they decided to terminate the services of Atty. Dalangin. By their new
counsel's advice, Marzan and Valdez stopped attending the disbarment hearings, and the case was
eventually dismissed by the IBP. Atty. Dalangin also caused Marzan and Valdez's filing of administrative
cases against Judge Mallare and Noveras, as the Clerk of Court of the MTC, which complaints were
nonetheless likewise dismissed by the Supreme Court upon the IBP’s recommendation.

Second, Atty. Dalangin was accused of maintaining an illicit and immoral affair with one Julita Pascual
(Pascual), a clerk at the Public Attorney's Office (PAO) in Talavera, Nueva Ecija, where Atty. Dalangin
previously worked as district public attorney. After Atty. Dalangin had left PAO, he retained Pascual as his
private secretary, who still remained to be employed with PAO. Atty. Dalangin and Pascual had a daughter
whom they named Julienne, even when each of them had existing marriages with some other persons. The
affair between Atty. Dalangin and Pascual, and the paternity of Julienne, were known to the community,
especially the courts. Julienne was nonetheless entered in the civil registry as Pascual and her legal
husband's own child so as to conceal the fact that Atty. Dalangin was the real father. The foregoing acts
allegedly breached Rule 1.01, Canon 1, and Rule 7.03, Canon 7 of the CPR.

Third, Atty. Dalangin was accused of malpractice for acts that dated back to his prior employment with PAO.
He allegedly collected attorney’s fees from indigent litigants who sought his assistance, like complainant
Camacho from whom he demanded an acceptance fee of ₱8,000.00. When Camacho explained that he could
only produce ₱3,000.00, Atty. Dalangin threw the case records on a table and retorted, "Mabubuhay ba
naman ang abogado [dito]." Without prior authority from his superiors, Atty. Dalangin also willfully
appeared in areas outside his jurisdiction as a district public attorney.

Fourth, the complaint included charges that pertained to Atty. Dalangin's handling of his court cases. It was
claimed that Atty. Dalangin misquoted jurisprudence in a pleading he filed in court, which act constituted
a breach of Rule 10.02, Canon 10 of the CPR. In a case for robbery filed by Samatra against Pascual, Atty.
Dalangin also wielded his influence and prepared perjured statements from supposed witnesses, a clear
violation of Rule 10.02, Canon 10 of the CPR. Finally, Atty. Dalangin violated Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the
CPR when he submitted in a civil case fraudulent and misleading evidence, particularly a certificate of title
without the page reflecting the annotations pertinent to the case.

A.C. No. 10759

CBD Case No. 12-3292, a complaint for gross misconduct, was filed by Alvaro against Atty. Dalangin for an
incident that happened on the morning of November 14, 2011, while Alvaro was waiting for the start of a
hearing at the lobby of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 37, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija. Upon seeing
Alvaro, Atty. Dalangin allegedly hurled slanderous and defamatory remarks against her, as he spoke at the
top of his voice and referred to her as a "certified swindler." He also confronted and threatened Alvaro for
her participation in the filing of CBD Case No. 11-3215, and then precluded her from visiting the PAO in
Talavera, Nueva Ecija. Atty. Dalangin’s tirade was heard and witnessed by several persons, and some of
them executed their respective affidavits to narrate the incident. The foregoing impelled Alvaro to seek
Atty. Dalangin’s disbarment for a violation of Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon 1, Rule 7.03, Canon 7, and Rule
8.02, Canon 8 of the CPR.
A.C. No. 10760

The two other complaints, CBD Case No. 12-3369 and CBD Case No. 12-3458, were instituted by Atty.
Dalangin.

In CBD Case No. 12-3369, Atty. Dalangin sought the disbarment of Atty. Torres and Atty. Andres for gross
misconduct, violation of the lawyer's oath, and breach of Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon 1 of the CPR. He
claimed that both lawyers conspired with their clients in filing CBD Case No. 11-3215, even as they violated
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4200, otherwise known as the Anti-Wiretapping Act.

Submitted to support CBD Case No. 11-3215 was Nonilo Alejo’s (Alejo) affidavit, which contained a
transcript of a recorded telephone conversation between Alejo and one Wilma Pineda (Pineda). The
recording was without the prior knowledge and consent of Pineda.

As a backgrounder, Atty. Dalangin was accused in CBD Case No. 11- 3215 of fabricating testimonies against
Noveras, who was claimed to be a vital witness in a criminal case against Pascual. In an affidavit drafted by
Atty. Dalangin for Pineda, the latter complained of Noveras and Alejo’s failure to return in full the cash bond
that she posted in a case for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law, even after the case had been dismissed
by the trial court. This allegation was negated in the disputed transcript, as Pineda allegedly confirmed
receiving the full ₱8,000.00, but decided to give half thereof to Alejo for a "blow-out" after her case’s
dismissal.

A.C. No. 10761

The complaint docketed as CBD Case No. 12-3458 was filed solely against Atty. Torres for grave misconduct,
dishonesty for violation of Article 18 of the Revised Penal Code, and breach of Canon 1 of the CPR.

Atty. Dalangin faulted Atty. Torres for submitting in CBD Case No. 11-3215 Marzan and Valdez’s affidavit,
which allegedly contained untruthful statements. Marzan and Valdez knew from the beginning that they
were complainants in a disbarment case against Atty. Torres. Atty. Torres, however, later made them issue
the perjured statements by using as a leverage her own complaint for perjury against Marzan and Valdez,
who were then pressured to sign the affidavits in exchange for the perjury case’s dismissal.

Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner

The four administrative complaints were eventually consolidated and jointly resolved by the IBP.

After the parties ’ filing of their respective position papers and the conduct of a series of hearings,
Investigating Commissioner Honesto A. Villamor (Investigating Commissioner) issued a Consolidated
Report and Recommendation dated February 11, 2013, which found sufficient bases for Atty. Dalangin’s
suspension from the practice of law for three years. Atty. Dalangin’s charges against Atty. Dela
Torres and Atty. Andres, on the other hand, were recommended for dismissal.

Recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors

On June 21, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XX-2013-768, which adopted and
approved the Investigating Commissioner’s Consolidated Report and Recommendation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Dalangin should be suspended from the practice of law. (NO)

RULING:

Procedure from Resolutions of the IBP Board of Governors

The Court finds it appropriate to first address the matter of Atty. Dalangin’s immediate recourse to the
Court via a petition for review that questioned the IBP Board of Governors' resolve to affirm the
Investigating Commissioner's recommendation on his administrative liability, notwithstanding the fact
that the Court had not yet taken a final action on the complaints.

When the administrative complaints were resolved by the IBP and the instant petition for review was filed
in Court, the procedure from resolutions of the IBP Board of Governors in administrative cases was as
provided in the former Section 12 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, prior to the amendments introduced
by Bar Matter No. 1645 dated October 13, 2015. The old rule read:

Section 12. Review and decision by the Board of' Governors.

a) Every case heard by an investigator shall be reviewed by the IBP Board of Governors upon the record
and evidence transmitted to it by the Investigator with his report. The decision of the Board upon such
review shall be in writing and shall clearly and distinctly state the facts and the reasons on which it is based.
It shall be promulgated within a period not exceeding thirty (30) days from the next meeting of the Board
following the submittal of the Investigator's report.

b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, determines that the respondent should
be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall issue a resolution setting forth its
findings and recommendations which, together with the whole record of the case, shall forthwith
be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action.

c) If the respondent is exonerated by the Board or the disciplinary sanction imposed by it is less than
suspension or disbarment (such as admonition, reprimand, or fine) it shall issue a decision
exonerating respondent or imposing such sanction. The case shall be deemed terminated unless
upon petition of the complainant or other interested party filed with the Supreme Court within
fifteen (15) days from notice of the Board’s resolution, the Supreme Co mi orders otherwise.

d) Notice of the resolution or decision of the Board shall be given to all parties through their counsel. A copy
of the same shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court. (Emphases supplied)

In B.M. No. 1755 captioned Re: Clarification of Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Bar Discipline, the
Court applied this provision to address the issue therein involved, and explained its proper application in
a Resolution dated June 17, 2008. The Court set the following guidelines:

In case a decision is rendered by the [Board of Governors (BOG)] that exonerates the respondent or
imposes a sanction less than suspension or disbarment, the aggrieved party can file a motion for
reconsideration within the 15-day period from notice. If the motion is denied, said party can file a
petition for a review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with this Court within fifteen (15) days from
notice of the resolution resolving the motion. If no motion for reconsideration is filed, the decision shall
become final and executory and a copy of said decision shall be furnished this Court.

If the imposable penalty is suspension from the practice of law or disbarment, the BOG shall issue a
resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations. The aggrieved party can file a motion for
reconsideration of said resolution with the BOG within fifteen (15) days from notice. The BOG shall
first resolve the incident and shall thereafter elevate the assailed resolution with the entire case
records to this Court for final action. If the 15-day period lapses without any motion for reconsideration
having been filed, then the BOG shall likewise transmit to this Court the resolution with the entire case
records for appropriate action.

Nowhere in his petition did Atty. Dalangin attempt to justify his immediate filing of the petition for review
questioning the IBP resolutions that recommended his suspension. It could nonetheless be inferred from
the circumstances that Atty. Dalangin's chosen course of action was to preclude the forfeiture of his right
to question the dismissal of the administrative cases where he served as complainant, given that Section
12(c) provides that where the respondent is exonerated, (t)he case shall be deemed terminated unless upon
a petition of the complainant or other interested party filed with Supreme Court within fifteen (15) days from
notice of the Board's resolution, the Supreme Court orders otherwise. For this reason, the Court refused to
make an outright denial of Atty. Dalangin’s petition for review notwithstanding the fact that it questioned
the resolve to suspend him from the practice of law.

In any case, it must still be stressed that the filing of the petition for review on the issue of Atty. Dalangin’s
suspension from the practice of law was as yet not among his remedies, considering that the Court still had
to release its final action on the matter. It is the Supreme Court, not the IBP, which has the
constitutionally mandated duty to discipline lawyers. The factual findings of the IBP can only be
recommendatory. Its recommended penalties are also, by their nature, recommendatory. In light of these
precepts, the Court will then not refuse a review of the IBP's recommendation for Atty. Dalangin’s
suspension notwithstanding the premature filing of the petition. In fact, an examination of the IBP
resolutions for his suspension is warranted as a matter of course, even in the absence of a petition,
because it is the Court that has the duty to take a final action on any determination of the IBP for a
lawyer's suspension from the practice of law or disbarment.

A.C. No. 10758

Gross Immorality

Among several cited grounds, the IBP’s recommendation to suspend Atty. Dalangin from the practice of law
for three years was on the pretext that he publicly and openly maintained a romantic relationship with
Pascual even when their marriages with their respective spouses subsisted.

Allegedly, the affair further resulted in the birth of the child Julienne, who was believed to be Atty.
Dalangin’s daughter even when he turned down a challenge for a DNA test that could prove the child's true
filiation.

Time and again, the Court has indeed regarded extramarital affairs of lawyers to offend the sanctity of
marriage, the family, and the community. Illicit relationships likewise constitute a violation of Article XV,
Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution which states that, "[m]arriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.” When lawyers are engaged in wrongful
relationships that blemish their ethics and morality, the usual recourse is for the erring attorney's
suspension from the practice of law, if not disbarment.

Upon the Court’s review, however, it finds no sufficient basis to suspend Atty. Dalangin for a supposed
illicit affair with Pascual. That an amorous relationship actually existed between them was not
adequately proved.

The quantum of proof in administrative cases is substantial evidence. The Court's perusal of the records
reveals an insufficiency of evidence that could warrant the recommended suspension from the practice of
law.

To begin with, the two affidavits considered by the IBP as bases for its finding of Atty. Dalangin’s gross
immorality harped only on general statements of a supposed personal and public knowledge on the
wrongful relationship between Atty. Dalangin and Pascual. The circumstances that could have led them to
their conclusion were scant and unsubstantiated. The most concrete proof that they could offer was the
birth of Julienne, yet even the child's birth certificate, a public document, expressly indicated the girl’s
father to be Pascual's husband, and not Atty. Dalangin. Julienne’s baptismal certificate also provided such
fact, along with a confirmation of Atty. Dalangin’s defense on his closeness to Julienne for being her
godfather.

The Court, nonetheless, does not find Atty. Dalangin totally absolved of fault. While he vehemently denied
any romantic relationship with Pascual, he admitted demonstrating closeness with the latter's family,
including her children. It was such display of affection that could have sparked in the minds of observers
the idea of a wrongful relationship and belief that Julienne was a product of the illicit affair. Atty. Dalangin
should have been more prudent and mindful of his actions and the perception that his acts built
upon the public, particularly because he and Pascual were both married. "As officers of the court,
lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character
and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community." As keepers of public
faith, lawyers are burdened with a high degree of social responsibility and, hence, must handle their
personal affairs with great caution."

The fault, nonetheless, does not warrant Atty. Dalangin’s suspension, much less disbarment. An
admonition should suffice under the circumstances.

Gross Misconduct and Malpractice

Specifically on the claim that Atty. Dalangin failed to fully explain to Marzan and Valdez the contents of the
affidavit that supported a disbarment case against Atty. Torres, the Court takes note of the fact that the
alleged failure to explain did not necessarily equate to the falsity of the claims therein made. It refers
to the joint affidavit executed by Marzan and Valdez, and which was attached to the complaint in CBD Case
No. 11-3215, whereby affiants merely alleged that they signed the affidavit even when they were not fully
apprised of its contents. It was not alleged that they were fraudulently lured or tricked by Atty.
Dalangin into signing the complaint, and that the charges therein hurled against Atty. Torres were
absolutely false. Thus, the claim that Atty. Dalangin knowingly brought a groundless suit against a fellow
lawyer had no leg to stand on.

The charge of malpractice for Atty. Dalangin's supposed demand for attorney's fees while he still worked
as a PAO lawyer also remained unsubstantiated by evidence. Such serious imputation could not have been
adequately established by an affidavit that was executed in 2010 by a lone person, Camacho, from whom
the demand for ₱8,000.00 was allegedly made in 2001. Similarly, while Atty. Dalangin admitted to have
appeared in courts beyond his area of jurisdiction as public attorney, he claimed to have obtained
permission therefor from the Regional Public Attorney, a defense which the complainants failed to refute.
In the absence of contrary evidence, the presumption that the respondent regularly performed his
duty in accordance with his oath shall prevail, especially as the Court considers it highly improbable for
the courts where appearances were made to fail to notice such patent irregularity, if Atty. Dalangin was
indeed not authorized to perform his acts before their courts as a public attorney.

Anent the failure of Atty. Dalangin to submit all pages of a certificate of title in Civil Case No. 336-SD(04)AF
pending with the RTC, Branch 88, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija and entitled Tamayo v. Philippine National
Bank, it has been explained that the error had been corrected at once during the pre-trial conference.

Among the other charges imputed against Atty. Dalangin in A.C. No. 10758, the Court only finds fault for his
misquote of jurisprudence cited in a pleading filed with the RTC, Branch 35, Gapan City for Cad. Case No.
1564-05 entitled Bangko Luzon v. Diaz.

Atty. Dalangin invoked adherence to the substance and spirit of the cited ruling. As counsel and officer of
the court, however, with the corresponding duty to aid the courts in the task of ascertaining the
truth, Atty. Dalangin was remiss in the discharge of his duties under the CPR. Canon 10, Rule 10.02
thereof provides:

"[a] lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of paper, the language or
the argument of the opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or knowingly cite as a
law a provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that
which has not been proved."

The Court, nonetheless, still does not find suspension to be an appropriate penalty for the act. While
the Court detests Atty. Dalangin’s failure to properly indicate that the statement was not a verbatim
reproduction of the cited jurisprudence and, accordingly, calls his attention on the matter, it finds the
admonition to be adequate.

A suspension for the lone incident would be too harsh a penalty. It appeared that the supposed quotation
was Atty. Dalangin’s own conclusion from the cited jurisprudence. There was no clear indication that the
statement was intended to mislead the court or commit a falsehood; there was no brazen deviation from
the principle or doctrine that was embodied in the jurisprudence's original text.

A.C. No. 10759

In relation to A.C. No. 10759 on Atty. Dalangin’s altercation on November 14, 2011 with Alvaro as the latter
was waiting for the start of a court hearing in the RTC of Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija, the records include
affidavits executed by witnesses who did not appear to have any reason to falsely testify against Atty.
Dalangin on the incident.

Affiant Josephine Rivera, in particular, who claimed to be also then waiting for a scheduled hearing,
allegedly saw Atty. Dalangin shout and point at Alvaro, as he threatened to file a case against the latter. Two
security guards stationed at the trial court, evidently disinterested persons who would not have wrongly
testified against Atty. Dalangin, likewise confirmed that such heated confrontation actually transpired.

For the Court, Atty. Dalangin erred in his conduct subject of the complaint, especially since his outburst was
carried out within the court premises and in the presence of several persons who readily witnessed his fit
of anger. Part of Atty. Dalangin’s duties as a lawyer is to maintain the honor that is due the
profession. Members of the legal profession should commit to the mandates of Canon 7, particularly
Rule 7 .03 thereof, to wit:

CANON 7 - A LA WYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD TI-IE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSION XX X.

Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit
of the legal profession.

Although Atty. Dalangin, at that instant, could have been stirred by his frustration or resentment for the
disbarment case filed against him by Alvaro, such circumstance could not have absolved him from any
responsibility for his conduct. At most, this only serves to mitigate the penalty that the Court deems
appropriate to impose, as it likewise considers its finding that Alvaro’s allegations in CBD Case No. 11-3215
on the supposed extra-marital affair of Atty. Dalangin with Pascual were indeed not backed by sufficient
evidence. The Court finds it appropriate to impose upon Atty. Dalangin a fine of ₱5,000.00, with a stem
warning that a more severe sanction will be imposed on him for any repetition of the same or similar
offense in the future.

Although the Court has admonished Atty. Dalangin in A.C. No. 10758, it finds the imposition of this fine still
suitable under the circumstances, given that A.C. No. 10759, although resolved jointly with A.C. No. 10758,
is a distinct administrative case that covers a separate complaint that was instituted solely by Alvaro. The
severity of this offense likewise varies from the other breaches for which the Court has determined the
admonition to be appropriate.

A.C. No. 10760 and A.C. No. 10761

The Court affirms the decision of the IBP to dismiss the administrative complaints filed by Atty. Dalangin
against Atty. Torres and Atty. Andres.

In A.C. No. 10760, Atty. Dalangin sought to support his complaint by referring to the supposed participation
of Atty. Torres and Atty. Andres in a violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Act. He asserted that the act also
violated the lawyer's oath, and breached Canon 1, Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of the CPR.

The alleged violation of the statute is a serious charge that the Court cannot take lightly, in view of the
breach of the basic and constitutional right to privacy of communication that inevitably results from the
act.
In this case, Atty. Dalangin claimed that Atty. Torres and Atty. Andres conspired with Alejo on the wrongful
recording of a private communication with Pineda, along with the use of the transcript thereof to support
Alejo’s affidavit in CBD Case No. 11-3215. However, Pineda's own denial of the truth of the statements in
the transcription lends doubt as to the allegation of a purported secret recording of an actual conversation.
While Pineda denied knowledge that her telephone conversation with Alejo was recorded by the latter, she
still refused to acknowledge the veracity of the assertions that she allegedly made as contained in the
transcript, which then appears to be a rejection of the supposed conversation. Given the circumstances, the
IBP correctly ruled that Atty. Dalangin failed to substantiate the charges in his complaint against
Atty. Torres and Atty. Andres.

The same conclusion equally applies in A.C. No. 10761. The commission of perjury was imputed upon Atty.
Torres, as the person who prepared the affidavits of Marzan and Valdez. As witnesses in CBD Case No. 11-
3215, Marzan and Valdez claimed that Atty. Dalangin prepared an affidavit for Atty. Torres' disbarment
without fully explaining to them the contents thereof. The fact that Atty. Torres induced the affiants to make
perjured statements, however, was not established by clear and convincing proof. Even granting that
statements of affiants were eventually determined to be inaccurate and untruthful, it would be wrong to at
once ascribe error or fault upon the lawyers who drafted the affidavits, in the absence of clear and sufficient
proof that they actively participated in the intentional commission of a fraud or declaration of fabricated
statements.

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the Court rules as follows:

(1) In A.C. No. 10758, respondent Atty. Bayani P. Dalangin is ADMONISHED to be more prudent and
cautious in handling his personal affairs and dealings with courts and the public, with a STERN WARNING
that any repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely;

(2) In A.C. No. 10759, Atty. Bayani P. Dalangin is FINED Five Thousand Pesos (₱5,000.00) for his breach of
Rule 7.03, Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, with a STERN WARNING that a more severe
sanction will be imposed upon him for any repetition of the same or similar offense in the future; and

(3) In A.C. No. 10760 and A.C. No. 10761, Atty. Bayani P. Dalangin’s petition for review is DENIED. The
Court AFFIRMS the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Board of Governors' Resolution No. XX-2013-
768 dated June 21, 2013 and Resolution dated August 8, 2014, insofar as the IBP Board of Governors
dismissed the following complaints: (1) CBD Case No. 12-3369 against Atty. Rosita L. Dela Fuente-Torres
and Atty. Avelino Andres; and (2) CBD Case No. 12-3458 against Atty. Rosita L. Dela Fuente-Torres.