1 Cruz Civillaw

ChanRobles Internet Bar Review : ChanRobles Professional Review, Inc.
Chan-RobleS
On-line Bar Review
IN
CIVIL LAW
(10 May 2019 )
ATTY. TERESITA L. CRUZ

www.chanroblesbar.com : www.chanroblesbar.com.ph
PRELIMINARY
TITLE
(ARTS. 1- 43 NCC)
Article 2 NCC:
GATBONTON vs. NLRC AND MAPUA,
GR 146779, JAN. 23, 2006
MIT Rules
implementing
civil Renato RA 7877
engineering Gatbonton (Anti-Sexual
Harassment Act)
student
published on
1. for unfair/unjust
Feb. 23, 1999
grading system
2. sexual harassment
3. conduct 30-day preventive
unbecoming an suspension effective
academician Jan. 11, 1999
Administrative rules and

regulations must be published if their
purpose is to enforce or implement an
existing law pursuant to a valid
delegation of legislative power.
Publication must be in full or it is

no publication at all since its purpose
is to inform the public of its contents.
HONASAN vs. THE PANEL OF INVESTIGATING

PROSECUTORS OF THE DOJ, et. al., GR 15947,
APRIL 13, 2004
Sen. Gregorio Panel of DOJ OMB-DOJ Joint

Honasan Prosecutors Circular No. 95-
(SG 31) 001
(not pu
ublished)
Oakwood Ombudsman
Mutiny
OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-0001

is merely an INTERNAL CIRCULAR
between the DOJ & the Ombudsma an,
outlining au
uthority and
responsibilities among prosecutors
of the DOJ and the Office of the
Ombudsman in the conduct of
preliminary investigations. THIS
CIRCULAR DOES NOT REGULATE THE
COONDUCT OF PERSONS OR THE
PUBLIC IN GENERAL, HENCE, THERE
IS NO NEED FOR R SAID
D CIRCULAR TO
BE PUBLISHE ED.
Article 3 NCC:
Marcos vs. Judge Fernando Vil.
Pamintuan, RTC Br. 3, Baguio City, A.M.
No. RTJ-07-2062, Jan. 18, 2011.
Complainant charged Judge Pamintuan

with gross ignorance of the law for reversing
motu proprio the final and executory order of
the Acting Presiding Judge Antonio Reyes
dated May 30, 1996 as modified in his Sept.
2, 1996 order. Ten years later, Judge
Pamintuan set the case for hearing on June
29, 2006.
Judge Fernando Pamintuan

manifested gross ignorance of
the law in reversing a final and
executory judgment which has
become immutable and
unalterable. He failed to conform
to the high standards of
competence required of judges
under the Code of Judicial
Conduct.
IGNORANCE OF THE LAW,

which everyone is bound to
know, EXCUSES NO ONE,
NOT EVEN JUDGES.
PENALTY - DISMISSAL from the

service with forfeiture of all
retirement benefits except accrued
leave credits and perpetual
disqualification from re-employment
in any government agency including
government owned and controlled
corporations.
Article 4 NCC:
PEOPLE vs. QUIACHON, GR 170236,
AUG. 31, 2006
Quiachon common-law-wife
qualified another
Rowena Rowel
rape child
(8-yr-old
deaf-mute)
1. RTC decision (Sept. 9, 2003) : conviction

2. CA decision (2005) : affirmed RTC conviction
3. SC decision (Dec. 13, 2005) : affirmed RTC/CA conviction
4. Enactment of RA 9346 on 6/24/2006 prohibiting the
imposition of the death penalty
R.A. No. 9346 is applicable in this case.

Penal laws which are favorable to the
accused are given retroactive effect. This
principle is embodied under Article 22 of
the RPC which provides as follows:
Retroactive effect of penal laws. - Penal laws
shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they
favor the persons guilty of a felony, who is not a
habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule
5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time
of the publication of such laws, a final sentence
has been pronounced and the convict is serving
the same.
JARILLO vs. PEOPLE, GR 164435,

JUNE 29, 2010
Rafael Victoria Emmanuel

Alocillo Jarillo Uy
5/24/74 11/26/79
charged 7/9/2001 - convicted
w/bigamy by RTC Pasay;
5/3/2000 7/21/2003 - conviction
affirned by CA.
1. Oct. 5, 2000 – Filed case for declaration of nullity of 1 st marriage
due to psychological incapacity;
2. Mar. 28, 2003 – Makati RTC declared 1st marriage null & void due
to psychological incapacity;
3. July 9, 2003 – Makati RTC decision became final;
4. Jarillo appealed for reversal of her conviction for bigamy.
Without a judicial declaration

of its nullity, the 1st marriage is
presumed to be subsisting. The
subsequent judicial declaration of
the nullity of the 1st marriage was
immaterial because prior to the
declaration of nullity, the crime
had already been consummated.
Can Art. 40 of the Family Code be

given retroactive effect?
A: YES. Article 40 which is a rule of

procedure should be applied retroactively
because Article 256 of the Family Code itself
provides for its own retroactivity “in so far
as it does not prejudice or impair vested or
acquired rights.”
The fact that procedural statutes may

somehow affect the litigant’s rights may not
preclude their retroactive application to
pending actions. As a general rule, NO
VESTED RIGHT MAY ATTACH TO, NOR
ARISE FROM, PROCEDURAL LAWS.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs.

REYES, GR 159694/GR 163581, JAN. 27, 2006
Sec. 228 of
Estate of RA 8428
BIR Maria C. (Taxx Reform
Actt of 19
997)
Tancinco
Preliminary
Assessment notice
(2/12/98) Notice in writing
of the facts & the
Final assessment law on which the
notice
Heirs assessment had
(5/2/98) (Reyes) been maade.
RA 8424 has already amended the provision of

Section 229 on protesting an assessment. The old
requirement of merely notifying the taxpayer of the
CIR's findings was changed in 1998 to informing the
taxpayer of not only the law, but also of the facts
on which an assessment would be made;
otherwise, the assessment itself would be invalid.
It was on February 12, 1998, that a preliminary

assessment notice was issued against the estate. On
April 22, 1998, the final estate tax assessment notice,
as well as demand letter, was also issued. During
those dates, RA 8424 was already in effect. The
notice required under the old law was no longer
sufficient under the new law.
The general rule is that statutes are

prospective. However, statutes that are
remedial, or that do not create new or take
away vested rights, do not fall under the
general rule against the retroactive operation
of statutes. Section 228 of RA 842 28 provides
for the procedure in case an assessment is
protested. It does not create new or take away
vested rights, hence, it can be applied
retroactively.
Article 6 NCC:
GUY vs. CA, GR 163707, Sept. 15, 2006
Sima Wei
Shirley (a.k.a. Rufino Guy) Remedios
(+1992)
E= P10M
2 daughters
5 children
6-7-93 --- Release &
Waiver of Claim
Q : Was there a valid waiver of inheritance by

the illegitimate children?
RELEASE & WAIVER OF CLAIM
“xxx received P300,000.00 and an

educational plan for her minor
daughters as financial assistance and
in full settlement of any and all
claims of whatever nature and kind
xxx”.
A: NO. To be valid and effective, a waiver must be

couched in clear and unequivocal terms which leave no
doubt as to the intention of a party to give up a right or
benefit which legally pertains to him. A waiver may not be
attributed to a person when its terms do not explicitly and
clearly evince an intent to abandon a right.
In this case, there was no waiver of hereditary rights.

The Release and Waiver of Claim does not state with clarity the
purpose of its execution. It merely states that Remedios
received P300,000.00 and an educational plan for her minor
daughters "by way of financial assistance and in full settlement
of any and all claims of whatsoever nature and kind x x x
against the estate of the late Rufino Guy“. Since the document
did not specifically mention private respondents' hereditary
share in the estate of Sima Wei, it cannot be construed
as a waiver of successional rights.
ART. 1044. Any person having the free

disposal of his property may accept or
repudiate an inheritance.
Any inheritance left to minors or

incapacitated persons may be accepted by
their parents or guardians. Parents or
guardians may repudiate the inheritance
left to their wards only by judicial
authorization.
Article 15 NCC:
REPUBLIC vs. IYOY, GR 152577, Sept. 21, 2005
Fely Stephen
Micklus
Crasus 12/16/1961
Iyoy 1984 left for the US;
obtained a divorce decree
5 children in 1984 and married
Stephen in 1984.
Filed petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage based on
Art. 36 FC on 3/25/97; RTC Q: Is Article 26 (2)
granted petition; CA affirmed, applicable in this
additionally invoking Art. 26 (2) case?
Family Code.
A: NO. Article 26 (2) CANNOT be applied in this

case because at the time Fely obtained her
divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen. Based on
Article 15 of the NCC, she was still bound by
Philippine law, even when she was already living
abroad. Phil. laws, then & even now, do NOT
recognize divorce between Filipino spouses.
While this Court commiserates with Crasus for

being continuously shackled to a hopeless and
loveless marriage, this is one of those situations
where neither law nor society can provide the specific
answer to every individual problem.
REPUBLIC vs. CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III,

GR 154380, October 5, 2005
Lady Myros Innocent

Cipriano
Orbecido III Villanueva Stanley
5/24/1981
Son
Kristoffer Lady
Kimberly
Kim
petition for
authority to left for the US in 1986 &
re-marry became a US citizen;
obtained a divorce
decree in 2000 & married
a US citizen
Q: Is Article 26 (2) applicable in this case?

A: YES. The twin elements for the

application of Article 26 (2) FC are:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated

between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien

spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of

the parties at the time of the celebration of
the marriage, but their citizenship at the time
a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
SAN LUIS vs. SAN LUIS, GR 133743,

Feb. 6, 2007
Felicisimo
(12/18/92)
P30M Estate
(+) Virginia Felicidad

3/17/42 Merry Lee Corwin 6/20/74
LA, Calif., USA
(US Citizen)
10/15/71
6 children
Tobias
Absolute divorce 1. Dissolution of CPG
from Hawaii FC 2. Letter of Adm. before
12/14/73 RTC of Makati
Q: Can Art. 26 (2) FC be given retroactive effect even if it would impair

vested rights in derogation of Art. 256 FC?
JURISPRUDENTIAL BASES:
1. VAN DORN vs. ROMILLO, GR-L-68470,
October 8, 1985
“Pursuant to his national law,
respondent is no longer the husband
of petitioner. To maintain, as
respondent does, that under our laws,
petitioner has to be considered still
married to respondent and still
subject to a wife’s obligations under
the Civil Code, cannot be just. She
should not be discriminated against in
her own country if the ends of justice
are to be served.”
2. PILAPIL vs. IBAY-SOMERA,

GR 80116, June 30, 1989
“The alien spouse is not a

proper party in filing the adultery
suit against the Filipino wife.
The severance of the marital
bond had the effect of
dissociating the former spouses
from each other, hence the
actuations of one would not
affect the other.”
3. QUITA vs. CA & DANDAN, GR12486

December 22, 1998
“Once proved that petitioner was

no longer a Filipino citizen at the time
of their divorce, the case of VAN
DORN would become applicable and
petitioner could very well lose her
right to inherit from Arturo.”
*N.B. The divorce was obtained in 1954

although the case was decided in 1998.
QUITA vs. DANDAN

N, GR 124862, 12/22/98
Ruperto (bro.)
(+) 4/16/72 intestate

Fe 1) Arturo Padlan Blandina
2) Felix Tupaz 4/22/47 1. Claro
5/18/41
2. Alexis
3) Wernimont 3. Ricardo
4. Emmanuel
divorce in SF, California 5. Zenaida
7/23/54 6. Yolanda
private agreement to live

separately and partition
their property
Article 16 NCC:
1. Bellis vs. Bellis, 20 SCRA 358

2. Aznar vs. Garcia, 7 SCRA 95
3. Miciano vs. Brimo, 50 SCRA 867
Article 17 NCC:
FORMALITIES
of CONTRACTS, PUBLIC
INSTRUMENTS & WILLS
HUMAN RELATIONS
• ART. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of
his rights and in the performance of his duties,
act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith.
• Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law,

wilfully or negligently causes damage to another,
shall indemnify the latter for the same.
• Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or

injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.
DIAZ vs. ENCANTO, et. al., GR 171303,

January 20, 2016
5/10/88 – Lazaro, Chair of the Broadcast
Dept., recommended that Diaz be
granted any LOA she may be qualified
for; In her 5/2/88 letter, Diaz indicated
her unwillingness to teach, hence,
Diaz has been in the service of Lazaro deleted Diaz’s name in the final
UP since 1963 & Asso. Prof. in schedule of classes for the 1st sem., AY
the College of Mass 1988-89; Diaz’s request for sabbatical
Communications (CMC) in 1987; leave was denied due to shortage of
May 3,1988, she applied w/ the teaching staff & exigencies of the
Office of the UP President for service. While Diaz was able to teach
sabbatical leave w/ pay for 1 during the 2nd semester, AY 1988-89,
year effective July’88 to May’89. she was not able to claim her salaries
for her refusal to submit the Report
for Duty Form.
Q. Was there abuse of right done by the UP officials

in denying Diaz’s request for sabbatical leave?
Malice or bad faith is at the core of Article 19 of the Civil

Code. Good faith consists of the intention to abstain from
taking an unconscionable and unscrupulous advantage of
another. It is presumed. Malice connotes ill will or spite and
speaks not in response to duty. It implies an intention to do
ulterior and unjustifiable harm. Malice is bad faith or bad
motive. He who alleges bad faith has the burden to prove the
same.
A sabbatical leave is not a right but a privilege and Diaz

cannot demand its grant. Diaz failed to prove bad faith on
respondents’ part. Nothing in the records show that respondents
purposely delayed the resolution of her application to prejudice
and injure her. Any delay that occurred was due to the fact that her
application for sabbatical leave did not follow the usual procedure,
hence, the processing of said application took time.
California Clothing, Inc., et. al. vs

Quinones, G.R. 175822, October 23, 2013
Shirley did
NOT pay
the black
Shirley – Reservation jeans worth
Ticketing Agent of
P2,098.00
Cebu Pacific in Lapu-
Lapu City
Wrote to Cebu Pacific and Robinson’s

Dept. Store informing the 2 offices of
Shirley’s non-payment of the black jeans.
Q: Was there abuse of right on the part of California

Clothing and its employees warranting damages in favor
of Quinones?
A. YES. The exercise of a right is not without

limitations. Any abuse in the exercise of such right
and in the performance of a duty causing
damage to another is actionable under the
New Civil Code.
While it is true that they had the right to verify from

Quinones whether she has paid or not, and collect from her
if she did not, they however, went overboard, thus they
abused their right. When they sent letters to the
employer, on the guise of asking assistance, they
imputed bad acts on the part of Quinones. They
accused her that she was not completely honest.
Clearly, these statements were accusatory which were
intended to tarnish her reputation in the eyes of her
employer.
Quinones is entitled to moral damages.

Moral damages may be awarded whenever the
defendant’s wrongful act or omission is the
proximate cause of plaintiff’s physical suffering,
mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation and similar injury as provided for under
Article 2219 of the Civil Code. Moral damages are
not a bonanza. They should reasonably
approximate the extent of hurt caused and the
gravity of the wrong done. They are awarded not
to enrich the complainant but to enable the latter to
obtain means, diversions, or amusements that will
serve to alleviate the moral suffering she has
undergone.
JOYCE ARDIENTE vs. SPS. PASTO ORFIDDE,

7, 20
et. al., G.R. 161921, July 17 013
MOA
“4. that the water & power bill of the
subject property shall be for the
account of Ma. Theresa Pastorfide
effective June 1, 1994.”
3/12/99 – W/O notice, the water

connection of Spouses Pastorfide was
cut-off by the COWD thru the instance
Q. Was there abuse of of Joyce Ardiente.
right on the part of
Ardiente? Spouses Pastorfide’s water line was
restored only on Dec. 14, 1999.
A: YES. It is true that it is within

petitioner's right to ask and even require Sps.
Pastorfide to cause the transfer of the former's
account with COWD to the latter's name pursuant
to their MOA. However, the remedy to enforce
such right is not to cause the disconnection of the
respondent spouses' water supply. The exercise
of a right must be in accordance with the
purpose for which it was established and must
not be excessive or unduly harsh; there must
be no intention to harm another. Otherwise,
liability for damages to the injured party will
attach.
RAVINA vs. MARY ANN VILLA ABRILLE et al, GR 160708,

October 16, 2009
Mary Ann Pedro
Sale in 1991 to
Sps. Ravina
4 children
555 sq. m. lot in Matina,
Davao City (Lot 7)
Firmly established in our civil law is the

doctrine that “Every person must, in the
exercise of his rights & in the performance
of his duties, act w/justice, give everyone
his due & observe honesty & good faith.
When a right is exercised in a manner that
does not conform w/such norms & results
in damage to another, a legal
wrong is thereby committed
for which the wrong doer
must be held responsible.
NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN vs.

REYES, GR 154259, FEB. 28, 2005
Nikko Hotel Mr. Tsuruoka’s

birthday party Reyes
Mla. Garden
Ms. Ruby
Lim
The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria (“to which a

person assents is not esteemed in law as injury”)
refers to self-inflicted injury or to the consent to
injury – which precludes the recovery of damages by
one who knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to
danger, even if he is not negligent in doing so.
SPS. HING vs. CHOACHUY, et. al., G.R.

179736, June 26, 2013
Article 26 NCC. Every person shall respect the dignity,

personality and peace of mind of his neighbors and other
persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not
constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action
for damages, prevention and other relief:
(1). Prying into the privacy of

another’s residence; xxxx
This provision recognizes that a man’s house is his castle,

where his right to privacy cannot be denied or even restricted
by others. It includes “any act of intrusion into, peeping or
peering inquisitively into the residence of another without
the consent of the latter.” However, it does not mean that
only the residence is entitled to privacy.
The right to privacy is enshrined in our

Constitution and in our laws. It is defined as “the
right to be free from unwarranted exploitation
of one’s person or from intrusion into one’s
private activities in such a way as to cause
humiliation to a person’s ordinary
sensibilities.” It is the right of an individual “to
be free from unwarranted publicity, or to live
without unwarranted interference by the
public in manners in which the public is not
necessarily concerned”. Simply put, the right
to privacy is “the right to be let alone”.
Article 22. Every person who through an act or

performance by another, or any other means,
acquires or comes into possession of something at
the expense of the latter without just or legal
ground shall return the same to him.
Article 23. Even when an act or event causing

damage to another’s property was not due to the
fault or negligence of the defendant, the latter
shall be liable for indemnity if through the act or
event he was benefited.
Articles 37- 41 NCC:

PERSONS AND PERSONALITY
CIVIL PERSONALITY
Article 37 NCC: Juridical capacity, which is
the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, is
inherent in every natural person and is lost only
through death. Capacity to act, which is the
power to do acts with legal effect, is acquired
and may be lost.
Article 39 NCC: The following circumstances

modify or limit capacity to act: age, insanity,
imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute,
penalty, prodigality, family relations, alienage,
absence, insolvency, and trusteeship.x x x.
NATURAL PERSONS
ARTICLES 40 – 41 NCC:
Article 43 NCC: If there is a doubt, as

between two or more persons who are called
to succeed each other, as to which of them
died first, whoever alleges the death of one
prior to the other, shall prove the same; in
the absence of proof, it is presumed that
they died at the same time and there shall be
no transmission of rights from one to the
other.
THE FAMILY CODE
MARRIAGE
ACEBEDO vs. ARQUERO, A.M. P-94-1054, 3/11/2013

(Process server, MTC
Brooke’s Pt. Palawan)
Ed i A
Edwin b d
Acebedo Dedje Irader Eddie Arquero
7/10/79
“KASUNDUAN” Desiree
ree
born 5/21/89
“consenting and giving freedom to either of
them to seek any partner and live with him or
her”
The KASUNDUAN had absolutely no force and effect on the
validity of the marriage between complainant and his wife.
Article 1 FC provides that “marriage is an inviolable social
institution whose nature, consequences and incidents are
governed by law and NOT subject to stipulation ”. It is an
institution of public order or policy governed by rules
established by law which CAN NOT be made inoperative by the
stipulation of the parties.
ESPINOSA et.al. vs. Atty. JULIETA A. OMAÑA

A.C. No. 9081, October 12, 2011
Rodolfo Espinosa
Atty. Julieta Omaña
E
Elena Marantal
(11/17/1997)
((7/23/1983)
19
983)
“Kasunduan ng Paghihiwalay ”
The extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal

partnership without judicial approval is VOID.
A notary public should NOT facilitate the disintegration
of a marriage and the family by encouraging the
separation of the spouses and extra-judicially
dissolving the conjugal partnership.
VDA. DE AVENIDO vs. AVENIDO, GR 173540,

January 22, 2014
Tecla Eustaquio Peregrina

9/30/42 3/30/79
Talibon, Bohol +9/22/89
Davao City
Climaco, Apolinario, Editha,

& Eustaquio, Jr.
While a marriage certificate is considered

the primary evidence of a marital union, it is
not regarded as the sole and exclusive evidence
of marriage. Jurisprudence teaches us that the fact
of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence
other than the marriage certificate.
The celebration of marriage between Tecla and

Eustaquio was established by the testimonial
evidence furnished by Adelina who appears to be
present during the marriage ceremony, and by Tecla
herself as a living witness to the event. The loss was
shown by the certifications issued by the NSO and
LCR of Talibon, Bohol. These are relevant,
competent and admissible evidence. Since the
due execution and the loss of the marriage
contract were clearly shown by the evidence
presented, secondary evidence – testimonial and
documentary – may be admitted to prove the fact
of marriage.
REPUBLIC vs. ALBIOS, GR 198780,

October 16, 2013
Never lived together as
H & W; left for USA; did not
Liberty Daniel Lee Fringer process Liberty’s citizenship
10-22-04 ; Mand. MTC
Agreed to pay Fringer $2K Q: Is a marriage, contracted for the sole purpose of
to acquire US citizenship acquiring US citizenship in consideration of $2K,
void ab initio on the ground of lack of consent?
A: Consent was not lacking between Albios & Fringer.

That their consent was freely given is best evidenced by
their conscious purpose of acquiring US citizenship through
marriage. There was a full and complete understanding of the
legal tie that would be created between them since it was that
precise legal tie w/c was necessary to accomplish their goal.
Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex.

The right to marital privacy allows married couples to structure
their marriage in almost any way they see fit, to live together or
live apart, to have children or no children, love one another or not
and so on. Marriages entered for other purposes, limited or
otherwise, such as convenience, money, status and title,
provided they comply with all legal requisites, are VALID.
ation in a marriage
Love, though the ideal consideration marriag
ge contract, is not
e.
the only valid cause for marriage.
Albios has made a mockery off the sacred institution

of marriage. Allowing her marriage with Fringer to be declared
void would only further trivialize this inviolable institution. These
unscrupulous individuals cannot be allowed to use the courts
as instruments in their fraudulent schemes. Albios already
misused a judicial institution to enter into a marriage of
convenience; she should not be allowed to again abuse it
to get herself out of an inconvenient situation.
ABBAS vs. ABBAS, G.R.

183896, January 30, 2013
Ma.
Gloria Syed Azhar Corazon
8/9/92 --- Taiwan (Pakistani)
1/9/93 --- Phil.
2002 - Filed
bigamy case
against Syed; Aliea Fatima
Information born 6/15/93 8/1/03- Filed petition for nullity
dated 1/10/03 of marriage due to lack of ML
pending at RTC
Mla.
Marriage Contract of Gloria and Syed stated that Marriage

License No. 9969967 issued at Carmona, Cavite on
January 8, 1993 was presented to the solemnizing officer.
11 July 2003
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify as per Registry Records of Marriage Licences

filed in this office, Marriage Licence No. 9969967 was
issued in favor of MR. ARLINDO GETALADO and MISS
MYRA MABILANGAN on January 19, 1993.
No Marriage Licence appear to have been issued to

MR. SYED AZHAR ABBAS and MISS GLORIA F. GOO on
January 8, 1993.
XXX
LEODIVINIA C. ENCARNACION
Municipal Civil Registrar
Carmona, Cavite
ISSUE: WON a ML was issued for the couple?
Article 4 FC is clear: “The absence of any of

the essential or formal requisites shall render the
marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article
35(2).” Article 35(3) of the FC provides that a
marriage solemnized without a marriage license is
VOID from the beginning, except those exempt
from the license requirement under Articles 27 to
34 of the same Code. This marriage cannot be
characterized as among the exceptions, thus,
having been solemnized without a marriage
license, is VOID AB INITIO.
SANTIAGO vs. PEOPLE, GR 200233, 7/15/15

believed Nicanor was
testified she
single; NO ML, VOID
informed Leonila
2nd marriage.
she was Santos’
wife in Mar ’97. 4 mos. after their
Leonila marriage, bigamy
Estela Nicanor
6/2/74 7/29/97 filed vs. H & W ; H
escaped; Leonila
was convicted of
MARRIAGE CERTIFICATE bigamy.
“marriage was celebrated W/O
a ML based on Art. 34 FC”,
Nicanor & Leonila’s Marriage Certificate contained the

misrepresentation perpetrated by them that they were eligible to
contract marriage without a ML under Art. 34 FC. Our penal
laws on marriage, such as bigamy, punish an individual’s
deliberate disregard of the permanent and sacrosanct
character of this special bond between spouses.
RONULO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

GR 182438, JULY 2, 2014
No ML
Joey Claire
3/29/2003 Fr. Mario Ragaza
refused to solemnize
Sta Rosa Catholic Parish the marriage
Church of San Nicolas,
Ilocos
Fr. Ronulo
Solemnized
Aglipayan Church the marriage
W/O a ML
Q: Was the alleged “blessing” by petitioner

tantamount to an “illegal marriage ceremony”
punishable under Article 352 of the RPC?
GO- BANGAYAN vs. BANGAYAN,

GR 201061, JULY 3, 2013
lived as H & W
in Feb. ’82;
Signed a
Azucena Benjamin purported
9/10/73 3/7/82
Sally
MC on 3/7/82;
Caloocan City Pasig City
3 children
2 children left for Canada
w/2 children in
Left for the PDN of the 2nd 1994; filed
US in Dec. marriage for bigamy and
1981 being falsification of
bigamous & public document
w/o a ML vs. Benjamin
The marriage between Sally & Benjamin

HELD: was NOT bigamous. The 2nd marriage was
VOID not because of the existence of the
1st marriage but because of the LACK OF
A VALID MARRIAGE LICENSE. The
marriage was “made only in jest” and a
“simulated marriage”, NOT IN EXISTENCE
IN THE EYES OF LAW. In short, it was a
fictitious marriage.
Benjamin and Sally cohabited without the

benefit of marriage, hence, their property
relations is governed by Article 148 of the FC.
Thus, only the properties acquired by them
through their actual joint contribution of
money, property, or industry shall be owned
by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions.
CARIÑO vs. CARIÑO, GR 132529,

Feb. 2, 2001
Susan SPO4 Santiago

SP Susan
Nicdao S. Cariño Yee
6/20/1969 (+11/23/1992) 11/10/1992
Sahlee Sandee
P146,000.00 P21,000.00
death benefits burial benefits
Certification from LCR of San Juan, Metro

Manila dated March 9, 1994:
“xxx this office has NO RECORD of the marriage
license of Spouses Santiago Cariño and Susan
Nicdao, who are married in this municipality on
June 20, 1969.xxx”
SC HELD: Such certification of the LCR is

adequate to prove the non-issuance of a
marriage license and enjoys probative
value, he being the officer charged under
the law to keep a record of all data relative
to the issuance of a marriage license.
CARIÑO vs. CARIÑO, GR 132529,

Feb. 2, 2001
Susan SPO4 Santiago

SP Susan
Nicdao S. Cariño Yee
6/20/1969 (+11/23/1992) 11/10/1992
Sahlee Sandee
P146,000.00 P21,000.00 burial

death benefits benefits
NO ML VOID NO JDNM VOID

Art. 147 FC Art. 148 FC
SY vs. CA, GR 127263, April 2, 2000
Filipina Fernando mistress

11/15/73 9/15/83
Frederick Farah
(7/8/75) (2/14/78)
1. Feb. 11, 1987 – petition for legal separation; petition for

separation of property judgment rendered
dissolving their conjugal partnership.
2. May 1988 – crim. case for attempted homicide

Order of RTC Manila dated 4/26/90
convicting Fernando of slight physical injuries &
sentenced him to 20 days imprisonment .
3. Action for legal separation granted by RTC

Pampanga in its decision dated Dec. 4, 1991
due to repeated physical violence & sexual
infidelity of Fernando.
4. Aug. 4, 1992 – petition for declaration of nullity of

marriage due to psychological incapacity of
Fernando RTC denied petition
Affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE: Whether the marriage between

Filipina & Fernando is VOID due to lack
of a Marriage License at the time of the
marriage ceremony.
MARRIAGE CONTRACT
Date of issue of Marriage License:

September 17, 1974
Date of celebration of marriage :
November 15, 1973
KHO vs. REPUBLIIC, GR

R 187462, June 1,, 2016
PDNM due to
lack of a ML
Veronica Raquel
June 1, 1972; Arteche,
Eastern Samar CERTIFICATION
“XXX NO MARRIAGE LICENSE
found in our records “
To be considered VOID on the ground of

absence of a marriage license, the law requires
that the absence of such marriage license must
be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the
very least, supported by a certification from the
local civil registrar that no such marriage
license was issued to the parties.
NIÑAL vs. BAYADOG, GR 133778, 3/14/00
(+2/19/97)
Teodulfa Pepito Norma
9/26/74 AOC; 12/11/86
(+4/24/85)
5 children
PDN of Pepito’s marriage
with Norma for lack of a ML
The 5-year cohabitation period w/c is counted

back from the date of the celebration of the
marriage should be characterized by exclusivity –
that is, no 3rd party was involved at any time within
the 5 years and continuity – that is, unbroken.
Q. May the heirs of a deceased person file a

petition for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage after his death?
YES. A VOID marriage can be attacked

collaterally. Void marriages can be questioned even
after the death of either party but voidable
marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of
the parties and not after the death of either.
The law makes either the action or defense for

the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
imprescriptible.
QUIAZON, et. al. vs. BELEN,

GR189121, JULY 31, 2013
((+12/12/92) lived as
Filipito Ma. H& W
Sandico Amelia Eliseo Lourdes from 1972
until 1992
Jenneth Jennifer Ma. Lourdes

MC issued by the
Diocese of Tarlac, Elise
signed by the
priest of the
Parish of San Letters of adm. claiming to be
Nicolas de the acknowledged natural
daughter of Eliseo → BC signed
Tolentino, Capas,
Tarlac. by Eliseo as her father.
Q: Can an illegitimate child impugn the validity of her

father’s marriage when her father is already dead?
The Supreme Court
took judicial notice of the fact that the 1st

marriage was celebrated more than 50
years ago, thus the possibility that a
record of marriage can no longer be found
in the National Archives. In the absence
of showing that the said marriage had
been dissolved at the time Amelia &
Eliseo’s marriage was solemnized, the
inescapable conclusion is that the
latter marriage is bigamous, hence,
void ab initio.
A: YES. In a VOID marriage, it was

though no marriage has taken place, thus it
cannot be the source of rights. Any interested
party may attack the marriage directly or
collaterally. A VOID marriage can be
questioned even beyond the lifetime of the
parties to the marriage.
At the time of Amelia and Eliseo’s

marriage, the law in effect was the Civil Code
and NOT the Family Code, hence, the case of
Ninal vs. Bayadog was applicable.
AM No. 02-11-10 SC: Rule on the

Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages effective on March 15, 2003.
• Sec. 1. Scope: • Sec. 2 (a):
This Rule shall That a petition for
govern petitions for declaration of
absolute nullity of
declaration of
a void marriage
absolute nullity of may be filed
marriage and solely by the
annulment of husband or wife.
voidable marriages
under the Family
Code.
CARLOS vs. SANDOVAL, GR 179922,

Dec. 16, 2008
“ONLY A SPOUSE can initiate an

action to sever the marital bond for
marriages solemnized during the
effectivity of the FC, except cases
commenced PRIOR to March 15, 2003.
The nullity and annulment of a marriage
CANNOT be declared in a judgment on the
pleadings, summary judgment, or
confession of judgment.”
REPUBLIC vs. JOSE DAYOT, GR 175581,

March 28, 2008
Felisa Jose Rufina

Tecson Dayot Pascual
11/24/86 8/31/90
Pasay City Hall
7/7/93 – Declaration of nullity of

marriage w/Felisa NO ML
AOC
The falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating

to the period of Jose and Felisa’s cohabitation CANNOT be
a mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the
law precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the
parties under oath. If the essential matter in the sworn
affidavit is a lie, then it is a mere scrap of paper, WITHOUT
force and effect. It is as if there was NO AFFIDAVIT at all.
DE CASTRO vs. DE CASTRO, GR 160172,

2/13/08 June 4, 1998 – filed a
complaint for support of
Reinna Tricia
Reinel Annabelle
AOC; 3/13/95; MTC Pasig City Q: Was the marriage
of Reinel & Annabelle
Reinna Tricia
ia valid ?
(born 11/13/95))
1. Reinel and Annabelle became sweethearts in 1991;
2. They applied for a marriage license w/the LCR of Pasig in

Sept.1994; had their 1st sexual relation in Oct. 1994 and regularly
engaged in sex thereafter;
3. Couple went back to the LCR but the ML had already expired.
They executed AOC on 3/13/95 and got married to each other;
4. After the marriage, the couple went back to their respective

homes and did not live together as H & W.
A: NO. The falsity of the affidavit cannot

be considered as a mere irregularity in the
formal requisites of marriage. xxx In the instant
case, there was no “scandalous cohabitation” to
protect; in fact, there was NO COHABITATION
at all. The false affidavit which petitioner and
respondent executed so they could push through
with the marriage has no value whatsoever; it is
a mere scrap of paper. They were not exempt
from the marriage license requirement. Their
failure to obtain and present a marriage
license renders their marriage VOID AB
INITIO.
LLAVE vs. REPUBLIC and TAMANO,

GR 169766, March 30, 2011
(+1994)
Zorayda Sen. Mamintal Estrellita

Tamano Llave
5/31/1958 - civil rites;
(DIVORCED) 5/27/93 - Islamic laws
- Muslim rites 6/2/93 - civil rites
PD 1083
Adib 8 other legitimate
children Code of Muslim
Personal Laws
Q: Was the marriage of Sen.

11/23/94 - Declaration of nullity of Tamano and Estrellita valid?
marriage of Estrellita and Sen.
Tamano for being bigamous
A: NO. The marriage between Sen. Tamano and

Zorayda was celebrated in 1958, solemnized under
civil and Muslim rites. The only law in force governing
marriages between Muslims and non-Muslims was the
Civil Code of 1950 where only ONE marriage can
exist at any given time and divorce is NOT
recognized.
PD 1083 or the Muslim Code took effect on

Feb. 4,1977 and this law CANNOT retroactively
override the Civil Code. A new law ought to affect the
future, NOT what is past. In the case of subsequent
marriage laws, NO vested rights shall be impaired that
pertain to the protection of the legitimate union of a
married couple.
UY vs. SPS . LACSAMANA, GR 20622, AUG. 19, 2015

Contended she was never married
to Uy; marriage ceremonyy was
NOT coonsummated due to
bombings during WW II; she
lawfully acquired the properties &
Luis Uy Petra Rosca
(+2/18/81) 1944-1973 (+5/10/96) constructed the house using her
own paraphernal funds.
8 children
1/29/64 - DOS of 484 sq. m. lot; 4/18/79-- DOS in favor of Spouses
TCT issued in the name Lacsamana.
of“P Petra Rosca married to
L u is Uy”; Rosca
constructed a split-level
house on said lot. Q: Was there a valid marriage
nd Uy w/c
between Rosca an
6/15/64 - DOS of a 215 sq.m. lot warranted Uy’s writtten
adjacent to the 484 sq. m. consent to the DOS to
lot. Spouses Lacsaman na?
A: NONE. Uy was NOT able to present any copy of

their marriage certificate. NO MARRIAGE TOOK
PLACE BETWEEN UY AND ROSCA AS THERE
WAS NO MARRIAGE CEREMONY THAT
ACTUALLY HAPPENED.
Based on the evidence she presented, Rosca was able

to sufficiently overcome the presumption that any
property acquired while living together shall be owned by
the couple in equal shares. The words “married to” do
not always mean that the property is conjugal. The house
and lot were clearly Rosca’s paraphernal properties
and she had every right to sell the same even
WITHOUT Uy’s consent.
MORIGO vs. PEOPLE, GR 145226, 2/6/04
Lucia Lucio Morigo Maria Lumbago

8/30/90 10/4/92
obtained a divorce decree 10/19/93 -- charged of bigamy;
in Canada on 1/17/92. 8/5/96 -- convicted by RTC;
10/21/99 -- conviction affirmed by CA.
NO MARRIAGE CEREMONY was performed by an authorized

solemnizing officer.” Morigo and Lucia merely signed a marriage
contract on their own. The mere private act of signing a marriage
contract bears NO semblance to a valid marriage and thus needs
NO JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF NULLITY. Such act alone cannot
be deemed an ostensibly valid marriage for which petitioner
might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial
declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.
FOREIGN DIVORCE OBTAINED

BY ONE SPOUSE
General Rule: Article 15 NCC
Exception: Article 26(2) FC
REPUBLIC vs. IYOY, GR 152577, Sept. 21, 2005
Crasus Iyoy Fely Stephen Micklus

12/16/1961
1984 left for the US; obtained a
5 children divorce decree in 1984 and married
Stephen in 1984.
Filed PDNM based on Art. 36 FC on 3/25/97; RTC granted petition; CA

affirmed the decision additionally invoking Art. 26 (2) of the FC.
Article 26 (2) CANNOT be applied in this case because at

the time Fely obtained her divorce, she was still a Filipino
citizen. Based on Article 15 of the NCC, she was still bound
by Phil. law, even when she was already living abroad.
Phil. laws, then and even now, do NOT recognize divorce
between Filipino spouses.
REPUBLIC vs. CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III,

GR 154380, October 5, 2005
Lady Myros Innocent

Cipriano
Orbecido III Villanueva Stanley
5/24/1981
Son
Kristoffer Lady
Kimberly
Kim
petition for
authority to left for the US in 1986 &
re-marry became a US citizen;
obtained a divorce
decree in 2000 & married
a US citizen
Q: Is Article 26 (2) applicable in the case at bar?

A: YES. The twin elements for the

application of Article 26 (2) FC are:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated

between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien

spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of

the parties at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid
divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating the latter to remarry.
CORPUZ vs. STO. TOMAS, G.R. 186571,

Aug. 11, 2010
Another Daisylyn Gerbert Another Filipina

Man (former Filipino)
1/18/05
1. Registered divorce decree Divorce decree from

with Pasig City LCR Canadian Court, effective
2. Judicial recognition of 1/08/2006
foreign divorce and/or
declaration of marriage as
dissolved invoking Art.
26(2) of the Family Code
ISSUE: Whether Article 26 (2) extends to foreigners

the right to petition a court for
recognition of a foreign divorce decree.
The alien spouse can claim NO RIGHT

under the 2nd paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code as the substantive right it
establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse.
The divorce obtained by the alien abroad may be

recognized in the Philippines provided the divorce is
valid according to his national law. The foreign
judgment and its authenticity must be proven as
facts under our rules on evidence, together with
the alien’s applicable national law to show the
effect of the judgment on the alien himself.
LAVADIA vs. HEIRS of LUNA, GR 171

1914,
JULY 23, 2014
Separated
de facto
after 20
years;
Executed (+7/12/97)
Agreement
for Eugenia Atty. Luna Soledad
Separation 1/12/76, Sto.
9/10/47
& Property 9/12/48 Domingo, D.R.
Settlement
on 11/12/75
7 children Condo unit w/ CCT -

“Juan Luna married
to Soledad Luna,
1/12/76 - - Divorce 25/100 share”; law
decree from CFI of Sto. books
Domingo, Dominican
Republic
“Divorce between Filipinos is VOID and

ineffectual under the nationality rule adopted
by Philippine law. Any settlement of property
between the parties of the first marriage involving
Filipinos submitted as an incident of a divorce
obtained in a foreign country lacks competent
judicial approval, and CANNOT be enforceable
against the assets of the husband who
contracts a subsequent marriage.”
Xxx Acquisition of title and registration thereof

are two different acts. It is well settled that
registration does not confer title but merely
confirms one already existing. The phrase
“married to” preceding “Soledad L. Luna” is merely
descriptive of the civil status of ATTY.
LUNA at the time of registration of title.
1. Atty. Luna’s first marria

age with Eugenia subsisted
d
up to the time of his death.
Pursuant to the nationality rule, Philippine laws
governed this case by virtue of both Atty. Luna and
Eugenia having remained Filipinos until the death of
Atty. Luna on July 12, 1997 terminated their
marriage.
2. The Agreement for Separation and Property

Settlement was VOID for lack of court approval.
With the divorce not being itself valid and
enforceable under Philippine law for being contrary
to Philippine public policy and public law, the
approval of the Agreement made by the CFI of Sto.
Domingo, Dominican Republic, was not also legally
valid and enforceable under Philippine law.
Dr. Elmar Perez vs. ATTY. TRISTAN CATINDIG

& Atty. Karen Baydo, A.C. No. 5816, 3/10/2015
Corazon Tristan Dr. Perez Atty. Baydo
Gomez
7/14/84 – USA
5/18/68
Tristan Joseph
4 children
n
Filed PDNM of 1st
1984- divorce
rce decree,
d marriage on 8/13/01; 4/25/01- Discovered
Dominican RRepublic abandoned Dr. Perez relationship of Tristan
& Tristan on 10/31/01 w/ Atty. Baydo
Atty. Catindig made a mockery out of the

institution of marriage, taking advantage of his legal
skills in the process. He exhibited a deplorable lack
of that degree of morality required of him as a
member of the bar, which thus warrant the penalty of
DISBARMENT.
FUJIKI vs. MARINAY, et al., G.R. 196049, 6/26/13
Minoru Fujiki Ma. Paz Marinay Shinichi Maekara

1/23/04, Pasay City 5/15/08, Q.C
2010 - Judgment from Japanese Court declaring
2nd marriage void due to bigamy.
1/14/11- filed w/ QC RTC a PJRFD (or Decree of Absolute
Nullity of Marriage) due to bigamy.
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to

recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment
nullifying Marinay and Maekara’s marriage due to
bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status
as married to Marinay. He also has the personality to file
a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage
between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the
basis of the Japanese Family Court decree.
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign

judgment relating to the status of a marriage
where one of the parties is a citizen of a
foreign country, the petitioner only needs to
prove the foreign judgment as a fact under
the Rules of Court. Petitioner may prove the
Japanese Family Court judgment through (1)
an official publication or (2) a
certification or copy attested by the
officer who has custody of the judgment.
If the office which has custody is in a foreign
country such as Japan, the certification may
be made by the proper diplomatic or consular
officer of the Philippine foreign service in
Japan and authenticated by the seal of office.
MEDINA vs. KOIKE, et. al., GR 215723, JULY 27, 2016

6/14/12 – Spouses filed for
divorce before the Mayor of
Ichinomiya City, Aichi
Doreen Michiyuki Prefecture, Japan; divorce
6/14/05, QC decree was granted on the
same date & duly recorded in
Masato Fuka the official Family Register of
(1/23/06) (4/14/07)
Michiyuki Koike.
2/7/2013 - filed a PJRFD & declaration
of capacity to remarry based on Art. 26
(2) FC w/ the QC RTC; NO ONE opposed
the petition; RTC DENIED the petition Q: Is Article 26(2) FC
since the copies of the Japanese Civil
applicable in the
Code were NOT AUTHENTICATED by our
consul in Japan AND NO EXPERT WITNESS
case at bar?
was presented to prove the Japanese law
on marriage.
A: YES. Doreen presented the ff.: "Certificate of

Receiving/ Certificate of Acceptance of Divorce "and
"Family Register of Michiyuki Koike“, both issued by the
Mayor of Ichinomiya City and authenticated by the
Philippine Consul for Osaka, Japan; a certified machine
copy of a "Divorce Certificate" issued by the Consul for
the Ambassador of Japan in Manila and authenticated by
the DFA, with a Certification by the LCR of Manila that
the original divorce certificate was filed and recorded in
the said Office; photocopies of the Civil Code of Japan
and their English translation; two (2) books entitled “The
Civil Code of Japan 2000” and the “Civil Code of
Japan 2009”, not authenticated by the Phil. consul in
Japan, as proof of Japan’s law on divorce.
Philippine Law does not provide for absolute

divorce, hence, our courts cannot grant it. However,
Art. 26(2) FC- which addresses foreign marriages or
mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner-
allows a Filipino spouse to contract a subsequent
marriage in case the divorce is validly obtained
abroad by an alien spouse capacitating him or her
to remarry.
Our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign

judgments and laws. The foreign judgment & its
authenticity must be proven as facts under our
rules on evidence, together with the alien’s
applicable national law to show the effect of the
judgment on the alien himself.
REPUBLIC vs. MARELYN TANEDO MANALO

GR 221029, April 24, 2018
10/15/12 – RTC denied the petition
based on Art. 15 NCC contending
that “Phil. Law does not afford to
Marelyn Yoshino Minoro Filipinos the right to file for divorce,
whether they are in the Phil. or
abroad , whether they are married
daughter to Filipinos or foreigners, unless
1/10/12 - filed a Petition for Filipinos are naturalized as citizens
Cancellation of Entry of Marriage in of another country XXX”; CA
the San Juan City LCR due to a overturned RTC decision applying
divorce proceeding SHE INITIATED Art. 26(2) FC.
and a divorce decree SHE
OBTAINED from a Japanese Court Q: Was the CA correct
on 12/6/11; she filed an amended in applying Art. 26
petition for JRFD. (2) FC in this case?
A: YES. The purpose of Art. 26 (2) FC is to avoid

the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse, who after a
foreign divorce decree that is effective in the
country where it was rendered, is no longer
married to the Filipino spouse. The provision is a
corrective measure to address an anomaly where the
Filipino spouse is tied to the marriage while the foreign
spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her
country. Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the
foreign divorce proceeding or not, a favorable
decree dissolving the marriage bond and
capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will
have the same result: the Filipino spouse will
effectively be without
a husband or a wife.
A Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce pro-

ceeding is in the same place and in like circumstance
as a Filipino who is in the receiving end of an alien
initiated proceeding. In both instances, it is extended
as a means to recognize the residual effect of the
foreign divorce decree on Filipinos whose marital ties
to their alien spouses are severed by operation of the
latter’s national law.
Presentation solely of the divorce decree will not

suffice. The fact of divorce must still first be proven.
Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by
our courts, the party pleading it must prove the
divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the
foreign law allowing it. Since the divorce was raised by
Manalo, the burden of proving the pertinent Japanese
law validating it and her former husband’s capacity to
remarry, fall squarely upon her.
PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY
SUAZO vs. SUAZO, GR 164493, MAR. 12, 2010
Jocelyn Angelito Another woman
3/3/86
children
10/8/97 – nullity of marriage
due to psychological incapacity
HELD: Habitual drunkenness, gambling & refusal to

find a job,while indicative of psychological
incapacity, do NOT, by themselves, show
psychological incapacity.
CHI MING TSOI vs. CA, GR 119190,

JAN. 16, 1997
Chi Ming Tsoi Gina Lao Tsoi

5/22/88
Mla. Cathedral
HELD: One of the essential marital obligations under

the Family Code Is “To procreate children
based on the universal principle that
procreation of children through sexual
cooperation is the basic end of marriage.”
The senseless and protracted refusal of one
of the parties to fulfill the above marital
obligation is equivalent to psychological
incapacity.
SANTOS vs. CA, 310 SCRA 21 (1995)
HELD: Psychological incapacity must be

characterized by gravity, juridical
antecedence and incurability.
REPUBLIC vs. CA & MOLINA,

GR 108763, FEB. 13, 1997
HELD: The Court laid down the guidelines in
the interpretation and application of
Article 36 of the Family Code.
MARCOS vs. MARCOS, GR 136490,

OCTOBER 19, 2000
Psychological incapacity may be established by the

totality of evidence presented. There is no requirement that
the respondent be personally examined by a physician or a
psychologist/psychiatrist as a condition sine qua non for
such declaration.
NGO TE vs. YU-TE, GR 161793,

February 13, 2009
Each case must be judged, NOT on the basis of a priori
assumptions, predilections, or generalizations, but according
to its own facts. Courts should interpret the provision
on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings
of experts & researchers in psychological disciplines and
the decisions of church tribunals.
ANTONIO vs. REYES, GR 155800,

March 10, 2006
Respondent has the propensity to lie

about almost anything, be it her
occupation, health, singing abilities,
income, etc. She practically lived in a
world of make believe. Such persistent
lying is abnormal and pathological and
constitutes psychological incapacity.
HALILI vs. HALILI & REPUBLIC,

GR 165424, JUNE 9, 2009
Lester Chona Santos- Never lived together as

H&W
Halili Halili
“JOKE”
mixed personality
disorder; dependent &
self-defeating
personality disorder
HELD: Courts should interpret the provision on psychological incapacity (as
a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage) on a case-to-case
basis – guided by experience, the findings of experts & researchers in
psychological disciplines and by decision of church tribunals.
By the very nature of Article 36 FC,

courts, despite having the primary task and
burden of decision-making, must consider as
essential the expert opinion on the
psychological and mental disposition of the
parties. In this case, the testimony of
petitioner's expert witness revealed that
petitioner was suffering from dependent
personality disorder. It has been
sufficiently established that petitioner
had a psychological condition that was
grave and incurable and had a deeply
rooted cause.
BACCAY vs. BACCAY, GR 173138, DEC. 1,2010

The husband’s evidence merely showed that his
wife refused to have sexual intercourse with him after
their marriage, and that she left him after their quarrel
when he confronted her about her alleged miscarriage.
Psychological incapacity must be more than just a
“refusal”, or a “difficulty”, or a “neglect” in the
performance of some marital obligations. An
unsatisfactory marriage is not a null and void
marriage.
LIGERALDE vs. PATALINGHUG, GR 168796,
Apr. 15, 2010
Respondent’s adulterous acts, emotional immaturity,
and irresponsibility do not constitute psychological
incapacity within the contemplation of the Family
Code. The root cause of the psychological incapacity
must be explained and established by the totality of
evidence presented during the trial.
MATUDAN vs. REEPUBLIC & MARILYN B. MATUDAN

N,
GR 203284, NOVEMBER 14, 2016
Q: Is abandonment by the wife of her family tantamount to PI to
warrant a declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 FC?
1985 – Marilyn left to work

Nicolas Marilyn abroad; Nicolas & the children
10/26/76; Samar lost contact w/her; she had not
been seen nor heard from
4 children again.
6/20/08 - filed PDNM based on Art. 36 Marilyn is “not ready for a lasting &
FC; Marilyn consistently neglected & permanent commitment like
failed to provide the H & their children marriage”; she cannot properly &
w/the necessary emotional & financial morally take on the responsibility of a
care, support & sustenance; loving and caring wife.”
A: NO. 'Psychological incapacity,' as a ground to

nullify a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code,
should refer to no less than a mental--not merely
physical incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage which include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and
fidelity and render help and support. Psychological
incapacity must be confined to the most serious cases
of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage.
KALAW vs. FERNANDEZ, GR 166357,

September 19, 2011
The grounds cited by petitioner are

his wife’s infidelity, habitual mahjong
sessions, frequent night-outs with friends,
visits to the beauty parlor, and neglect of
their children. What transpired between
the parties is acrimony and infidelity,
which may be grounds for legal
separation, but not psychological
incapacity that voids a marriage.
KALAW vs. FERNANDEZ,

GR 166357, January 14, 2015
The guidelines have turned- out to be rigid, such that their
application to every instance practically condemned the
petitions for declaration of nullity to the fate of certain rejection.
Article 36 of the FC must not be so strictly and too literally
read and applied. XXX
In the task of ascertaining the presence of PI as a ground

for the nullity of marriage, the courts, which are concededly not
endowed with expertise in the field of psychology, must of
necessity rely on the opinions of experts in order to inform
themselves on the matter, and thus enable themselves to arrive
at an intelligent and judicious judgment. The conditions for
the malady of being grave, antecedent and incurable
demand the in-depth diagnosis by experts.
The fact that respondent brought her children with her to

her mahjong sessions did not only point to her neglect of
parental duties, but also manifested her tendency to expose
them to a culture of gambling. Her willfully exposing her
children to the culture of gambling on every occasion of
her mahjong sessions was a very grave and serious act
of subordinating their needs for parenting to the
gratification of her own personal and escapist desires.
Xxx In Article 36 , there is no marriage to speak

of, as the same is VOID from the very beginning. To
indulge in imagery, the declaration of nullity under
Article 36 FC will simply provide a
decent burial to a stillborn marriage.
REPUBLIC vs. RODOLFO DE GRACIA,

GR 171557, FEB. 12, 2014
Rodolfo Natividad Eng. Terez Antonio Mondarez

2/15/69 1/11/91
Ma. Ma.
Julie Ann
Reynilda Rizza
12/28/98→DNM under Art. 36 of

the FC due to Natividad’s
emotional immaturity,
irresponsibility and promiscuity
Natividad's refusal to live with Rodolfo and to

assume her duties as wife and mother as well as
her emotional immaturity, irresponsibility and
infidelity do not rise to the level of psychological
incapacity that would justify the nullification of the
parties' marriage. To be declared clinically or
medically incurable is one thing; to refuse or
be reluctant to perform one's duties is another.
Psychological incapacity refers only to the
most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity
or inability to give meaning and significance to
the marriage.
VIÑAS vs. VIÑAS, GR 208790,

JAN. 21, 2015
Mar. ‘06 – left

for Dubai as
OFW
Glenn Mary Grace
4/26/99 – Lipa Batangas
2/18/09--- filed PDNM under Art.

36 FC contending that Mary baby died (possibly
Grace was insecure, extremely due to Mary Grace’s
jealous, thoroughly enjoyed heavy drinking and
night life, smoked and drank smoking when she
heavily while pregnant, refused was pregrant)
to perform basic household
chores; self-centered, selfish, &
immature.
Citing Navales vs. Navales, the SC HELD:
Article 36 FC contemplates downright incapacity or

inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital
obligations. Mere “difficulty,” “refusal” or “neglect” in
the performance of marital obligations or “ill will” on
the part of the spouse is different from “incapacity”
rooted on some debilitating psychological condition or
illness. Irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or
perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, and
the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of
psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the same may
only be due to a person’s refusal or unwillingness to assume
the essential obligations of marriage and not due to some
psychological illness that is contemplated by said rule.
MALLILIN vs. JAMESOLAMIN & REPUBLIC,

GR 192718, FEB. 18, 2015
US citizen
Robert Luz
9/6/72
3 children
5/8/00 → PAM with
3/16/94 – PDNM Metropolitan Tribunal
under Art. 36 FC of First Instance for
1. he did the cleaning 5. Luz dated diff. men; the Archdiocease of
of their house; loitered w/ male
Manila.;
2. his mother cooked students; received
their meals; male visitors at 10/10/02 → MT
3. his sister washed home; allowed declared marriage
their clothes; another man to void due to “grave
4. his sister took care sleep at home;
lack of due
of the children; contracted loans
discretion”; decision
w/o his knowledge.
affirmed by NAMT.
Psychological incapacity as required

by Article 36 must be characterized by
(a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence
and (c) incurability. The incapacity must
be grave or serious such that the party
would be incapable of carrying out the
ordinary duties required in marriage. It
must be rooted in the history of the
party antedating the marriage, although
the overt manifestations may only emerge
after the marriage. It must be incurable or,
even if it were otherwise, the cure would
be beyond the means of the party
involved.
Maria Teresa Tani - Dela Fuente vs. Rodolfo

Dela Fuente, Jr., GR 188400, March 8, 2017
PI is a mental illness that leads to
an iinability
bili to comprehend or comply with the
essential marital obligations. The SC agreed with
the findings of the psychologist that Rodolfo was
suffering from paranoid personality disorder
manifested by damaging behavior like reckless driving
and extreme jealousy; his being distrustful and
suspicious; his being irresponsible and lack of
remorse; his resistance to treatment; and his
emotional coldness and severe immaturity. His
disorder is one of the severe forms of
personality disorders probably caused by
pathogenic parental mode as his father was a
psychiatric patient and he might have developed
psychic contamination called double insanity.
His disorder is serious and incurable because of
his severe paranoia.
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY:
No less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes

a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants
that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage.
Most serious cases of personality disorders clearly

demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage.
More than just a “difficulty”, “refusal”, or “neglect” in the

performance of some marital obligations, much less, “ill-
will”, on the part of the errant spouse.
Malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of

awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume.
ARTICLE 40. FAMILY CODE
CAPILI vs. PEOPLE et. al., GR 183850, 7/3/13
Karla James Walter Shirley

9/3/1999 12/8/1999
PDN of 2nd marriage

charged w/ bigamy before
before Antipolo City
Pasig City RTC on 6/28/2004.
RTC
declared the 2nd MTD bigamy case

marriage void on
12/1/04 due to
bigamy. MTD granted by Pasig City RTC
Q: Is the declaration of nullity of the second

marriage a ground for the dismissal of the
bigamy case?
A: NO. The subsequent judicial declaration

of the nullity of the 2nd marriage was
immaterial because prior to the declaration
of nullity, the crime of bigamy had already
been consummated. The outcome of the civil
case had no bearing upon the determination
of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the
criminal case for bigamy, because all that is
required for the charge of bigamy to prosper
is that the 1st marriage be subsisting at the
time the 2nd marriage is contracted.
BANSIG vs. ATTY. ROGELIO JUAN A. CELERA,

A.C. No. 5581, JAN. 14, 2014
Gracemarie Rogelio Ma. Cielo

5/8/97 1/8/98
Manila San Juan, M. M.
Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of

that degree of morality required of him as a
member of the Bar. He made a mockery of
marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect
& dignity. His act of contracting a 2nd marriage
while his 1st marriage is subsisting constituted
grossly immoral conduct and are grounds for
disbarment under Sec. 27, Rule 138, Rules of
Court.
JARILLO vs. PEOPLE, GR 164435,

JUNE 29, 2010
Rafael Victoria Emmanuel

Alocillo Jarillo Uy
5/24/74 11/26/79
charged 7/9/2001 - convicted
w/bigamy by Pasay City RTC ;
5/3/2000 7/21/2003 - conviction
affirned by CA.
1. Oct. 5, 2000 – Filed case for declaration of nullity of 1 st marriage
due to Alocillo’s psychological incapacity;
2. Mar. 28, 2003 – Makati RTC declared the 1st marriage null & void
due to psychological incapacity;
3. July 9, 2003 – Makati RTC decision became final;
4. Jarillo appealed for reversal of her conviction for bigamy.
The Supreme Court HELD:
Under the law, a marriage, even

one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed
valid until declared otherwise in a judicial
proceeding. Even if the accused eventually
obtained a declaration that her 1st marriage
was void ab initio, the point is, both the 1st
and 2nd marriage were subsisting before
the 1st marriage was declared null and
void. The subsequent declaration of
nullity of the 1st marriage is immaterial
because prior to the declaration of nullity,
the crime of bigamy had already been
consummated.
Garrido vs. Attys. Angel E. Garrido & Romana

P. Valencia, A.C. No. 6593, Feb. 4, 2010
Constancia Angel Maelotisea Roma
Romana
(+ 12/26/77)
6/23/62 – Mla.
dren
6 children
1978 - H k
Hongkong
Admitted to the barr

May 11, 1979
In marrying Maelotisea, he committed the

crime of bigamy as he entered this 2nd marriage
while his 1st marriage with Constancia was
subsisting. He openly admitted his bigamy when
he filed his petition to nullify his marriage with
Maelotisea.
ABSENCE OF ONE SPOU USEE

UNDER ARTICLE 41 of the FC
(Declaration of Presumptiv
ve
Death))
ABSENCE OF ONE SPOUSE

Under Article 41 of the Family Code, the four
(4) essential requisites for the declaration of
presumptive death are : THAT
1. the absent spouse has been missing for four or two

consecutive years;
2. the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the

absent spouse is already dead;
4. the present spouse files a summary proceeding for

the declaration of presumptive
death of the absent spouse.
TADEO-MATIAS vs. REPUBLIC,

GR 230751, April 25, 2018
For the petition for the declaration of
presumptive death under Article 41 FC to prosper, it
must allege the intention of the present spouse to
remarry. In this case, Estrellita filed the petition on April
10, 2012 before the Tarlac City RTC claiming benefits as
survivor of her husband, Wilfredo, a member of the
Philippine Constabulary (PC) who never came back from
his tour of duty in Arayat, Pampanga, a place frequented
by the NPA, in 1979. In Wilfredo’s Service Record issued
by the NAPOLCOM, he has been declared missing
since 1979, the PC had no idea of his whereabouts and
no news of him going AWOL. Since Estrellita filed the
petition for the sole purpose of claiming benefits
under PD 1638, there is no need to file the petition in
court. The law itself under Articles 390 and 391 of the
NCC presume that he is dead.
REPUBLIC vs. CANTOR, GR 184621,

DEC 10, 2013
Ma. Fe Jerry
9/20/97 Jan. ‘98 –
lived as H & W in couple had a
Koronadal City violent
quarrel; left
conjugal
5/2/02 - filed a dwelling;
PJDPD of Jerry; never seen or
inquired from RTC & CA heard since
relatives / friends; declared Jerry then.
checked patients’ presumptively
directory when- dead under
ever she goes to Art. 41 of the
hospitals. Family Code
In the present case, Ma. Fe’s “well-founded

belief” was anchored on her alleged “earnest
efforts” to locate Jerry, which consisted of the
following:
(1) She made inquiries about Jerry’s whereabouts

from her in-laws, neighbors and friends; and
(2) Whenever she went to a hospital, she saw to it

that she looked through the patients’ directory,
hoping to find Jerry.
These efforts, however, fell short of the

“stringent standard” and degree of diligence
required by jurisprudence.
Strict Standard Prescribed Under Article 41

of the Family Code Is for the Present
Spouse’s Benefit
The requisite judicial declaration of

presumptive death of the absent spouse (and
consequently, the application of a stringent
standard for its issuance) is also for the present
spouse’s benefit. It is intended to protect
him/her from a criminal prosecution of bigamy
under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code
which might come into play if he/she would
prematurely remarry sans the court declaration.
REPUBLIC vs. VILLANUEVA, GR 210929,

July 29, 2015
1992 – worked as
domestic helper in SG;
1993 – learned from
her children that Romeo
left their home.
Edna Romeo
12/21/78
Worked as a
Iligan City
Mechanic in
Valencia City,
Took a leave from work; Bukidnon; left
inquired from parents- in- conjugal home
law & friends; went to
Romeo’s birthplace in in 1993.
Negros Oriental to inquire
from his relatives.
RTC & CA declared
8/6/2009 - filed a Romeo
PJDPD of Romeo presumptively dead
under Art. 41 of the
Family Code
The strict standard approach ensures

that a petition for declaration of presumptive
death under Article 41 of the FC is not used as
a tool to conveniently circumvent the laws in
light of the State’s policy to protect and
strengthen the institution of marriage. Courts
should never allow procedural shortcuts
but instead should see to it that the stricter
standard required by the Family Code is
met.
REPUBLIC vs. SAREÑOGON, JR., GR 199194,

FEBRUARY 10, 2016 left to work as a
seaman; for 3 mos. did not
went to Hongkong receive any news from
as a domestic Netchie; no idea about her
helper; never heard whereabouts; while abroad
or seen thereafter. Netchie Jose tried to contact Netchi’s
8/10/96, City Hall Mla parents but they left Clarin
Misamis Occ; inquired from
Lived together as H Netchie’s relatives &
& W only for 1 month friends w/c proved futile.
RTC declared Netchiee

presumptively dead in filed PJDPD of Netchie
its decision dated
1/31/11
Q: Is the RTC decision declaring Netchie

presumptively dead correct?
A. NO. The law did not define “well-founded belief.” To be

able to comply with this requirement, the present spouse must
prove that his belief was the result of diligent and reasonable
efforts and inquiries to locate the absent spouse and that
based on these efforts and inquiries, he believes that the
absent spouse is already dead. It requires exertion of
active effort (not a mere passive one).
Jose’s pathetically anemic efforts to locate Netchie are

notches below the required degree of stringent diligence
prescribed by jurisprudence. Jose did not call to the
witness stand specific persons whom he allegedly met in his
search for Netchie. He did not prove that he sought the
assistance of the pertinent gov’t. agencies and the media. Nor
did he show that he undertook a thorough, determined and
unflagging search for Netchie, say for at least 2 years, (and
what those years were) and the places he went to.
SANTOS vs. SANTOS, GR 187061, Oct.8, 2014
Celerina Ricardo 2nd wife

6/18/80 9/17/08
10/2008 – learned of Ricardo’s petition; 6/15/07- filed petition for

on 11/17/08; filed a Petition for Annulment declaration of Celerina’s
of Judgment w/ the CA due to extrinsic presumptive death.
fraud & lack of jurisdiction; 11/28/08 - CA 7/27/07- Tarlac City RTC
dismissed her petition contending that declared Celerina
the proper remedy is Article 42 of the FC. presumptively dead.
SC HELD: “The proper remedy for a judicial declaration of

presumptive death obtained by extrinsic fraud is an action to
annul the judgment. An affidavit of reappearance is not
the proper remedy when the person declared
presumptively dead has never been absent.”
Celerina does not admit to have been absent. She

also seeks not merely the termination of the
subsequent marriage but also the nullification of its
effects. She contends that reappearance is not a
sufficient remedy because it will only terminate the
subsequent marriage but not nullify the effects of the
declaration of her presumptive death and the subsequent
marriage.
Celerina is correct. If the subsequent marriage is

terminated by mere reappearance, the children of the
subsequent marriage conceived before its termination
shall still be considered legitimate and the property
regime will be the same as in a valid marriage.
Moreover, a judgment declaring presumptive death is
a defense against prosecution for bigamy.
ALMELOR vs. RTC OF LAS PINAS CITY,

GR 79620, AUG. 26, 2008
Manuel Leonida
1/29/89
Q: Is homosexuality a ground to annul a

marriage?
A: NO. Arts. 45 - 47 FC are applicable.
LEGAL SEPARATION
LEGAL SEPARATION
1. Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive
conduct directed against the P, a common child,
or a child of the P;
2. Physical violence or moral pressure to compel

the P to change religious or political affiliation;
3. Attempt of R to corrupt or induce the P, a

common child, or a child of the P to engage in
prostitution, or connivance in such corruption or
inducement;
4. Final judgment sentencing the R to imprisonment

of more than 6 years, even if pardoned;
LEGAL SEPARATION
5. Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the R;
6. Lesbianism or homosexuality of the R;
7. Contracting by the R of a subsequent bigamous

marriage, whether in the Phil. or abroad;
8. Sexual infidelity or perversion;
9. Attempt by the R against the life of the P;
10. Abandonment of P by R without justifiable

cause for more than one year.
BUGAYONG vs. GINEZ, 100 Phil

616, December 28, 1956
Granting that the infidelities amounting

to adultery were committed by the wife, the
act of the husband in persuading her to
come along with him & the fact that she
went with him & together they slept as H &
W, deprives him, as the alleged offended
spouse, of any action for legal separation
against the offending wife because his said
conduct constitutes CONDONATION.
LAPUZ-SY vs. EUFEMIO, GR-L-30977,

Sept.30, 1972
Q: Does the death of the wife before final decree

in an action for legal separation, abate the
action?
A: An action for legal separation w/c involves

bed and board separation of the spouses
is purely personal. Being personal in
character, the death of one party to the action
causes the death of the action itself.
RIGHTS & OBLIGATIONS

BETWEEN H & W
ILUSORIO vs. ILUSORIO-BILDNER,
GR 139789, May 12, 2000
Q: May a wife secure a Writ of Habeas Corpus to compel

her husband to live with her in conjugal bliss?
A: NO. Marital rights including

coverture and living in conjugal
dwelling may NOT be enforced by the extra-ordinary
Writ of Habeas Corpus. NO COURT IS
EMPOWERED AS A JUDICIAL AUTHORITY TO
COMPEL A HUSBAND TO LIVE WITH HIS WIFE.
VALINO vs. ADRIANO, et.al., GR 182894,

APRIL 22, 2014
In the USA at
the time of
H’s death;
Filed a
complaint 11/15/55
that H’s
remains
be exhumed Rosario Atty. Adriano Fe
separated de
& transferred (+)
facto for 20 years
to Holy Cross
Memorial
Cemetery + Interred the
damages 6 children remains of
Atty. Adriano
at the Manila
Memorial Park
Q: Who is entitled to the remains of the

decedent?
Art. 305 NCC. The duty and the right to make

arrangements for the funeral of a relative shall be
in accordance with the order established for
support under Article 294 NCC (Art. 199 FC).
Art. 199 FC. Whenever two or more persons are

obliged to give support, the liability shall devolve upon
the following persons in the order herein provided:
(1) The spouse;
(2) The descendants in the nearest degree;

(3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and
(4) The brothers and sisters.
It is clear that the law gives the right and

duty to make funeral arrangements to
Rosario, she being the surviving legal wife
of Atty. Adriano. The fact that she was living
separately from her husband and was in the
United States when he died has no controlling
significance. The right and duty to make
funeral arrangements, like any other right,
will not be considered as having been
waived or renounced, except upon clear
and satisfactory proof of conduct
indicative of a free and voluntary intent to
that end.
PROPERTY RELATIONS
BETWEEN HUSBAND
AND WIFE
PROPERTY REGIMES OF
UNIONS W/O VALID
MARRIAGES
PROPERTY RELATIONS:
1. MS Marriage Phil. Laws
Settlement
2. FC Exceptions: (Art. 80)
3. Local Customs • BOTH H&W aliens
• Properties outside RP
VALID if: (Art. 77) VOID if: No marriage

1. In writing; Exception: (Art. 81)
2. Signed by the stipulation does
parties; NOT depend upon
3. Executed before the celebration of
the marriage. marriage.
Binding vs. 3rd parties if:
1. Registered with proper LCR and RD.
DONATIONS
PROPTER
NUPTIAS (Art. 82 FC)
1. made before
marriage
2. in consideration of
3. in favor of 1 or both of the future
spouses.
I. NO donation by future spouses to

each other of > 1/5 of their present
property if property regime is NOT
ACP (Art. 84 FC); any excess is VOID.
II. Property donated subject to

encumbrances VALID (Art. 85 FC)
FORECLOSURE SALE:
1. Proceeds < amt. of obl. Donee
NOT liable for deficiency;
2. Proceeds > amt. of obl. Donee
ENTITLED to excess.
III. Donation of future property

> testate succession
formalities of valid
wills
DONATIONS DURING
MARRIAGE
1. Between H&W VOID
EXCEPTION: (Art. 87 FC)
moderate gifts on occasion
of family rejoicing.
2. NO donation BY either spouse W/O
consent of the other of ACP/CPG
property.
EXCEPTION: (Art. 98/125 FC)
moderate donations for charity/
occasions of family rejoicing or
family distress.
REVOCATION OF DONATION
PROPTER NUPTIAS
MARRIAGE
I. 1. not celebrated;
2. Judicially declared
void;
3. w/o parental or
guardian consent;
4. annulled, donee
acted in BF.
II. Legal separation, donee guilty party;
III. Resolutory condition complied with;
IV. Ingratitude of donee.
PROPERTY REGIME OF
VALID MARRIAGES
ACP CPG SPR

I. Commence at the precise moment of
marriage;
II. No waiver of rights, interest, shares &
effects during the marriage;
EXCEPTION: judicial separation of
prop. or marriage dissolved/annulled.
ed.
a). waiver in public instrument;
t;
b). recorded in proper LCR & RD.
III. Property acquired DURING the marriagege
is PRESUMED to belong to ACP/CPG G
unless proved to be EXCLUDED (Art. 93/116 FC).
ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY
PROPERTY
1. Co-ownership (Art. 90 FC)
2. All properties at the time of marriage
& acquired thereafter (Art. 91 FC)
3. Property EXCLUDED: (Art. 92 FC)
(1). acquired gratuitously;
(2). personal & exclusive use;
EXCEPT: jewelries
(3). acquired before marriage by either
spouse w/ leg. descendants by a
former marriage.
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP
OF GAINS
1. Contract of partnership (Art. 108 FC)
2. Proceeds, products, fruits and income of
H&W’s separate property placed in a
COMMON FUND; net gains ÷ equally
between H&W upon dissolution of
marriage (Art. 106 FC)
3. Property EXC
CLUDED: (Art. 109 FC)
(1). brought to the marriage as own prop.;
(2). acquired by gratuitous title;
(3). bought by exclusive money of H OR W;
(4). acquired by right of redemption, barter
or exchange w/ prop. of H OR W.
SEPARATION OF PROPERTY
REGIME
1. Agreed by H&W in MS;
2. Present or future prop.; total or partial;
prop. not separate shall belong to ACP
(Art. 144 FC);
3. Each spouse own, possess, administer,
enjoy, dispose HIS/HER prop. WITHOUT
consent of the other spouse; to each
spouse belongs all earnings (Art. 145 FC)
4. BOTH bear family expenses in proportion
to their income; if insufficient current
market value of separate property;
5. Liability to creditors for family expenses
SOLIDARY
ADMINISTRATION OF
ACP/CPG (Art. 96/124 FC)
1. Belongs to BOTH spouses jointly;
DISAGREEMENT H’s decision subject
to recourse by wife to the court w/n
5 years from the date of the contract
implementing such decision; (Art. 96/124 FC)
2. Incapacity of one spouse sole
administration by the other spouse w/c does
NOT include powers of disposition or
encumbrance W/O:
a). authority of the court;
b). Written consent of other spouse.
NO “a” or “b” disposition VOID.
TERMINATION OF ACP/CPG
(ART. 99/126 FC)
1. Death of either spouse ACP/CPG
liquidated in estate proceedings; judicial or
extra-judicial liquidation w/n 1 year from
death of spouse.
* NO LIQUIDATION
a). disposition/encumbrance VOID;
b). mandatory regime of COMPLETE
SEPARATION OF PROPERTY of
subsequent marriage (Art. 103/130 FC).
2. Decree of legal separation;
3. Marriage annulled or declared void;
4. Judicial separation of property during the
marriage under Arts. 134-138 FC.
LIQUIDATION OF ACP/CPG
(ART. 102/129 FC)
1. Inventory of properties which are
ACP/CPG and exclusive property;
2. Debts/obl. paid out of assets of ACP/CPG;
P/CPG; if
insufficient separate prop. of spouses;;
3. Balance from exclusive prop. delivered to
spouses;
4. Net assets of ACP/CPG ÷ equally bet. spouses
Exception: different ÷ agreed by spouses in MS;
5. Presumptive legitimes delivered to common
children;
6. Conjugal dwelling & lot spouse w/ whom
majority
j of the children remain; child < 7
ye
years
ea old MOTHER.
EX
EXCEPTION: Court finds compelling reasons
best interest of the child.
SEPARATION DE FACTO BET. H&W

shall NOT AFFECT ACP/CPG (Art. 100/127 FC)
EXCEPTIONS:
1. Spouse who leaves conjugal home W/O JUST
CAUSE NO support
2. Consent of 1 spouse to any transaction
required by law Judicial
authorization in a summary proceeding;
3. Absence of sufficient ACP/CPG
assets separate prop. of both spouses
SOLIDARILY LIABLE for support of family;
4. Spouse W/O JUST CAUSE abandons the
other court petition for receivership,
judicial separation of prop, authority to be
sole administrator (Art. 101 FC).
Administration of Exclusive
Property Transferred to ONE
SPOUSE IF ONE SPOUSE: (Art. 142)
1. becomes the guardian of the other;
2. judicially declared an absentee;
3. sentenced to penalty of
civil interdiction;
4. becomes a fugitive from justice/is in
hiding as an accused in a crim. case
IF SPOUSE NOT QUALIFIED court
shall appoint a SUITABLE
person as administrator.
SEPARATION OF PROPERTY OF
SPOUSES DURING MARRIAGE
Gen. Rule: ONLY by JUDICIAL ORDER
Art. 134 FC
Exception: Express declaration in MS
SUFFICIENTCAUSES: VOLUNTARY
(Art. 135 FC) DISSOLUTION
1. penalty with civil
(Arts. 136-140 FC)
interdiction;
2. spouse judicially 1
1. verified petition filed
declared absentee; by spouses; creditors
3. judicial decree of notified & protected;
loss of P.A.; Joint 2. ACP/CPG liquidated;
4. abandonment/failure Petition of complete separation
to comply with the Spouses of prop. applicable;
family obligations; for the 3. judicial decree of
5. administrator spouse Revival of separation of prop.
abused power; the FORMER recorded in LCR/RD.
6. de facto separation Property
Regime * NO voluntary separation
of H&W for at least 1
of property may thereafter
year & reconciliation
be granted (Art. 141 FC).
highly improbable.

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ChanRobles Internet Bar Review : ChanRobles Professional Review, Inc.

ATTY. TERESITA L. CRUZ

Administrative rules and

Publication must be in full or it is

HONASAN vs. THE PANEL OF INVESTIGATING

Sen. Gregorio Panel of DOJ OMB-DOJ Joint

OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-0001

Complainant charged Judge Pamintuan

Judge Fernando Pamintuan

IGNORANCE OF THE LAW,

PENALTY - DISMISSAL from the

1. RTC decision (Sept. 9, 2003) : conviction

R.A. No. 9346 is applicable in this case.

JARILLO vs. PEOPLE, GR 164435,

Rafael Victoria Emmanuel

Without a judicial declaration

Can Art. 40 of the Family Code be

A: YES. Article 40 which is a rule of

The fact that procedural statutes may

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs.

RA 8424 has already amended the provision of

It was on February 12, 1998, that a preliminary

The general rule is that statutes are

Q : Was there a valid waiver of inheritance by

RELEASE & WAIVER OF CLAIM

“xxx received P300,000.00 and an

A: NO. To be valid and effective, a waiver must be

In this case, there was no waiver of hereditary rights.

ART. 1044. Any person having the free

Any inheritance left to minors or

A: NO. Article 26 (2) CANNOT be applied in this

While this Court commiserates with Crasus for

REPUBLIC vs. CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III,

Lady Myros Innocent

Q: Is Article 26 (2) applicable in this case?

A: YES. The twin elements for the

1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated

2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of

SAN LUIS vs. SAN LUIS, GR 133743,

(+) Virginia Felicidad

Q: Can Art. 26 (2) FC be given retroactive effect even if it would impair

2. PILAPIL vs. IBAY-SOMERA,

“The alien spouse is not a

3. QUITA vs. CA & DANDAN, GR12486

“Once proved that petitioner was

*N.B. The divorce was obtained in 1954

QUITA vs. DANDAN

(+) 4/16/72 intestate

private agreement to live

1. Bellis vs. Bellis, 20 SCRA 358

• Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law,

• Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or

DIAZ vs. ENCANTO, et. al., GR 171303,

Q. Was there abuse of right done by the UP officials

Malice or bad faith is at the core of Article 19 of the Civil

A sabbatical leave is not a right but a privilege and Diaz

California Clothing, Inc., et. al. vs

Wrote to Cebu Pacific and Robinson’s

Q: Was there abuse of right on the part of California

A. YES. The exercise of a right is not without

While it is true that they had the right to verify from