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2/4/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 702

G.R. No. 188708. July 31, 2013.*

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ALAMADA


MACABANDO, appellant.

Remedial Law; Evidence; Circumstantial Evidence; To justify


a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, the combination of
circumstances must be interwoven in such a way as to leave no
reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused.—It is settled that
in the absence of direct evidence, circumstantial evidence may be
sufficient to sustain a conviction provided that: “(a) there is more
than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are
derived have been proven; and (c) the combination of all the
circumstances results in a moral certainty that the accused, to the
exclusion of all others, is the one who has committed the crime.
Thus, to justify a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, the
combination of circumstances must be interwoven in such a way
as to leave no reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused.”

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* SECOND DIVISION.

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People vs. Macabando

Criminal Law; Simple Arson; Presidential Decree No. 1613;


P.D. No. 1613 contemplates the malicious burning of public and
private structures, regardless of size, not included in Article 320 of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Republic Act No.
7659.—P.D. No. 1613 contemplates the malicious burning of
public and private structures, regardless of size, not included in
Article 320 of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659.
This law punishes simple arson with a lesser penalty because the
acts that constitute it have a lesser degree of perversity and
viciousness. Simple arson contemplates crimes with less

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significant social, economic, political, and national security


implications than destructive arson.
Same; Same; Same; Elements of.—The elements of simple
arson under Section 3(2) of P.D. No. 1613 are: (a) there is
intentional burning; and (b) what is intentionally burned is an
inhabited house or dwelling. Both these elements have been
proven in the present case. The Information alleged that the
appellant set fire to his own house, and that the fire spread to
other inhabited houses. These allegations were established
during trial through the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
which the trial and appellate courts found credible and
convincing, and through the report of the Bureau of Fire
Protection which stated that damaged houses were residential,
and that the fire had been intentional. Moreover, the
certification from the City Social Welfare and Development
Department likewise indicated that the burned houses were used
as dwellings. The appellant likewise testified that his burnt two-
story house was used as a residence. That the appellant’s act
affected many families will not convert the crime to destructive
arson, since the appellant’s act does not appear to be heinous or
represents a greater degree of perversity and viciousness when
compared to those acts punished under Article 320 of the RPC.
The established evidence only showed that the appellant intended
to burn his own house, but the conflagration spread to the
neighboring houses.
Same; Same; Same; Penalties; Under Section 3, paragraph 2,
of P.D. No. 1613, the imposable penalty for simple arson is
reclusion temporal, which has a range of twelve (12) years and one
(1) day, to reclusion perpetua.—Under Section 3, paragraph 2, of
P.D. No. 1613, the imposable penalty for simple arson is reclusion
temporal, which has a range of twelve (12) years and one (1) day,
to reclusion perpetua. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
the penalty im-

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People vs. Macabando

posable should be an indeterminate penalty whose minimum term


should be within the range of the penalty next lower in degree,
which is prision mayor, or six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve
(12) years, and whose maximum should be the medium period of
reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua, or sixteen (16) years and
one (1) day to twenty (20) years, taking into account the absence
of any aggravating or mitigating circumstances that attended the

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commission of the crime. Taking these rules into account, we


therefore impose on the appellant the indeterminate penalty of
ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to
sixteen (16) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum.
Same; Actual Damages; To seek recovery of actual damages, it
is necessary to prove the actual amount of loss with a reasonable
degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof and on the best
evidence obtainable.—As regards the award of damages, we
sustain the lower courts’ findings that the records do not
adequately reflect any concrete basis for the award of actual
damages to the offended parties. To seek recovery of actual
damages, it is necessary to prove the actual amount of loss with a
reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof
and on the best evidence obtainable.

APPEAL from a decision of the Court of Appeals.


   The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
  Office of the Solicitor General for appellee.
  Public Attorney’s Office for appellant.

BRION, J.:
This is an appeal filed by appellant Alamada Macabando
assailing the February 24, 2009 decision1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00208-MIN. The CA
decision affirmed in toto the August 26, 2002 judgment2 of
the

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1 Rollo, pp. 5-16: penned by Associate Justice Edgardo T. Lloren, and
concurred in by Associate Justice A. Camello and Associate Justice Jane
Aurora C. Lantion.
2 Records, pp. 453-460; penned by Judge Noli T. Catli.

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People vs. Macabando

Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 25, Cagayan de Oro


City, finding the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of destructive arson, and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The Case
The prosecution’s evidence showed that at around 4:00
p.m. on December 21, 2001, the appellant broke bottles on
the road while holding a G.I. pipe, and shouted that he

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wanted to get even (“manabla ko”).3 Afterwards, he uttered


that he would burn his house.4
At 6:35 p.m. of the same day, Cornelio Feliciano heard
his neighbors shout that there was a fire. When Cornelio
went out of his house to verify, he saw smoke coming from
the appellant’s house. He got a pail of water, and poured its
contents into the fire.5 Eric Quilantang, a neighbor whose
house was just 10 meters from that of the appellant, ran to
the barangay headquarters to get a fire extinguisher. When
Eric approached the burning house, the appellant, who was
carrying a traveling bag and a gun, told him not to
interfere; the appellant then fired three (3) shots in the
air.6 The appellant also told the people around that
whoever would put out the fire would be killed.7
Upon hearing the gunshots, Cornelio hurriedly went
home to save his nephews and nieces.8 Eric also returned to
his house to save his belongings.9

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3 TSN, January 28, 2002, p. 6.
4 TSN, March 4, 2002, p. 8.
5 TSN, January 28, 2002, pp. 8-9.
6 TSN, February 4, 2002, pp. 8-10.
7 TSN, March 4, 2002, pp. 7-8.
8 TSN, January 28, 2002, p. 9.
9 TSN, February 4, 2002, pp. 19-20.

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Fire Officer (FO) II — Victor Naive and FOI Reynaldo


Maliao conducted a spot investigation of the incident, and
concluded, among others, that the fire started in the
appellant’s house; and that it had been intentional.10
Barangay Chairman Modesto Ligtas stated that the fire
gutted many houses in his barangay, and that he assisted
the City Social Welfare and Development Department
personnel in assessing the damage.11
The defense, on the other hand, presented a different
version of the events.
The appellant declared on the witness stand that he
lived in the two-storey house in Barangay 35, Limketkai
Drive, which was owned by his sister, Madji Muslima
Edemal.12 He admitted that he felt angry at around 2:00
p.m. on December 21, 2001 because one of his radio

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cassettes for sale had been stolen.13 The appellant claimed


that he went to sleep after looking for his missing radio
cassette, and that the fire had already started when he
woke up. He denied making a threat to burn his house, and
maintained that he did not own a gun. He added that the
gunshots heard by his neighbors came from the explosion of
firecrackers that he intended to use during the New Year
celebration.14
Lomantong Panandigan, the appellant’s cousin, stated,
among others, that he did not see the appellant carry a
revolver or fire a shot on December 21, 2001.15 Dimas
Kasubidan, the appellant’s brother-in-law, stated that he
and the appellant lived in the same house, and that the
latter was

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10 Records, pp. 99-101.
11 TSN, April 12, 2002, pp. 5-11.
12 TSN, June 3, 2002, pp. 3-4.
13 Id., at pp. 7-8.
14 Id., at pp. 9-11.
15 TSN, May 2, 2002, p. 8.

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People vs. Macabando

asleep in his room at the ground floor before the fire broke
out.16
The prosecution charged the appellant with the crime of
destructive arson under Article 320 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC), as amended, before the RTC.17 The appellant
pleaded not guilty to the charge on arraignment.18 In its
judgment dated August 26, 2002, the RTC found the
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC judgment in toto. It
gave weight to the RTC’s factual findings since these
findings were based on unrebutted testimonial and
documentary evidence. The CA held that the totality of the
presented circumstantial evidence led to the conclusion
that the appellant was guilty of the crime charged.
The Court’s Ruling
We deny the appeal, but modify the crime
committed by the appellant and the penalty imposed

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on him.
Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence
We point out at the outset that no one saw the appellant
set fire to his house in Barangay 35, Limketkai Drive,
Cagayan de Oro City. The trial and appellate courts thus
resorted to circumstantial evidence since there was no
direct evidence to prove the appellant’s culpability to the
crime charged.
It is settled that in the absence of direct evidence,
circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to sustain a
conviction provided that: “(a) there is more than one
circumstance; (b)

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16 Id., at pp. 27-28.
17 Records, p. 4.
18 Id., at p. 12.

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People vs. Macabando

the facts from which the inferences are derived have been
proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances
results in a moral certainty that the accused, to the
exclusion of all others, is the one who has committed the
crime. Thus, to justify a conviction based on circumstantial
evidence, the combination of circumstances must be
interwoven in such a way as to leave no reasonable doubt
as to the guilt of the accused.”19
In the present case, the following circumstances
constitute an unbroken chain that leads to an unavoidable
conclusion that the appellant, to the exclusion of others,
set fire to his house: first, the appellant, while holding an
iron lead pipe, acted violently and broke bottles near his
house at around 4:00 p.m. of December 21, 2001; second,
while he was still in a fit of rage, the appellant stated that
he would get even, and then threatened to burn his own
house; third, Judith Quilantang saw a fire in the
appellant’s room approximately two hours after the
appellant returned to his house; fourth, the appellant
prevented Cornelio, Eric, and several other people from
putting out the fire in his house; fifth, the appellant fired
shots in the air, and then threatened to kill anyone who
would try to put out the fire in his house; sixth, the
appellant carried a traveling bag during the fire; and

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finally, the investigation conducted by the fire marshals of


the Bureau of Fire Protection revealed that the fire started
in the appellant’s house, and that it had been intentional.
The combination of these circumstances, indeed, leads to
no other conclusion than that the appellant set fire to his
house. We find it unnatural and highly unusual for the
appellant to prevent his neighbors from putting out the fire
in his house, and threaten to kill them if they did, if he had
nothing to do with the crime. The first impulse of an
individual whose

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19 See Buebos v. People, G.R. No. 163938, March 28, 2008, 550 SCRA
210, 223, citing People v. Casitas, G.R. No. 137404, February 14, 2003, 397
SCRA 382.

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People vs. Macabando

house is on fire is to save his loved ones and/or belongings;


it is contrary to human nature, reason and natural order of
things for a person to thwart and prevent any effort to put
out the fire in his burning property. By carrying (and
firing) a gun during the fire, the appellant showed his
determination to repel any efforts to quell the fire.
Important to note, too, is the fact that the appellant carried
a traveling bag during the fire which, to our mind, showed
deliberate planning and preparedness on his part to flee
the raging fire; it likewise contradicted his statement that
he was asleep inside his house when the fire broke out, and
that the fire was already big when he woke up. Clearly, the
appellant’s indifferent attitude to his burning house and
his hostility towards the people who tried to put out the
fire, coupled with his preparedness to flee his burning
house, belied his claim of innocence. Notably, the appellant
failed to impute any improper motive against the
prosecution witnesses to falsely testify against him; in fact,
he admitted that he had no misunderstanding with them
prior to the incident.
The Crime Committed
The CA convicted the appellant of destructive arson
under Article 320 of the RPC, as amended, which reads:

Article 320. Destructive Arson.—The penalty of reclusion


perpetua to death shall be imposed upon any person who shall
burn:
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1. One (1) or more buildings or edifices, consequent to one


single act of burning, or as a result of simultaneous
burnings, committed on several or different occasions.
2. Any building of public or private ownership, devoted to the
public in general or where people usually gather or
congregate for a definite purpose such as, but not limited to,
official governmental function or business, private
transaction, commerce, trade, workshop,

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meetings and conferences, or merely incidental to a definite


purpose such as but not limited to hotels, motels, transient
dwellings, public conveyances or stops or terminals,
regardless of whether the offender had knowledge that
there are persons in said building or edifice at the time it is
set on fire and regardless also of whether the building is
actually inhabited or not.
3. Any train or locomotive, ship or vessel, airship or airplane,
devoted to transportation or conveyance, or for public use,
entertainment or leisure.
4. Any building, factory, warehouse installation and any
appurtenances thereto, which are devoted to the service of
public utilities.
5. Any building the burning of which is for the purpose of
concealing or destroying evidence of another violation of
law, or for the purpose of concealing bankruptcy or
defrauding creditors or to collect from insurance.
xxxx
The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall also be
imposed upon any person who shall burn:
1. Any arsenal, shipyard, storehouse or military powder or
fireworks factory, ordinance, storehouse, archives or
general museum of the Government.
2. In an inhabited place, any storehouse or factory of
inflammable or explosive materials.

In sum, “Article 320 contemplates the malicious burning


of structures, both public and private, hotels, buildings,
edifices, trains, vessels, aircraft, factories and other
military, govern-

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People vs. Macabando

ment or commercial establishments by any person or group


of persons.”20
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1613,21 on the other hand,
currently governs simple arson. Section 3 of this law
provides:

Section 3. Other Cases of Arson.—The penalty of Reclusion


Temporal to Reclusion Perpetua shall be imposed if the property
burned is any of the following:
1. Any building used as offices of the government or any of its
agencies;
2. Any inhabited house or dwelling;
3. Any industrial establishment, shipyard, oil well or mine
shaft, platform or tunnel;
4. Any plantation, farm, pastureland, growing crop, grain
field, orchard, bamboo grove or forest;
5. Any rice mill, sugar mill, cane mill or mill central; and
6. Any railway or bus station, airport, wharf or warehouse.
[italics and emphasis ours]

P.D. No. 1613 contemplates the malicious burning of


public and private structures, regardless of size, not
included in Article 320 of the RPC, as amended by Republic
Act No. 7659.22 This law punishes simple arson with a
lesser penalty because the acts that constitute it have a
lesser degree of perversity and viciousness. Simple arson
contemplates crimes with less significant social, economic,
political, and national security implications than
destructive arson.23

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20 People v. Murcia, G.R. No. 182460, March 9, 2010, 614 SCRA 741,
752.
21 A Decree Amending the Law on Arson.
22 People v. Malngan, 534 Phil. 404, 443; 503 SCRA 294, 328 (2006).
23 People v. Soriano, 455 Phil. 77, 93; 407 SCRA 367, 375 (2003).

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The elements of simple arson under Section 3(2) of P.D.


No. 1613 are: (a) there is intentional burning; and (b) what
is intentionally burned is an inhabited house or dwelling.
Both these elements have been proven in the present case.
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The Information alleged that the appellant set fire to his


own house, and that the fire spread to other inhabited
houses. These allegations were established during trial
through the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses which
the trial and appellate courts found credible and
convincing, and through the report of the Bureau of Fire
Protection which stated that damaged houses were
residential, and that the fire had been intentional.
Moreover, the certification from the City Social Welfare
and Development Department likewise indicated that the
burned houses were used as dwellings. The appellant
likewise testified that his burnt two-story house was used
as a residence. That the appellant’s act affected many
families will not convert the crime to destructive arson,
since the appellant’s act does not appear to be heinous or
represents a greater degree of perversity and viciousness
when compared to those acts punished under Article 320 of
the RPC. The established evidence only showed that the
appellant intended to burn his own house, but the
conflagration spread to the neighboring houses.
In this regard, our ruling in Buebos v. People24 is
particularly instructive, thus:

The nature of Destructive Arson is distinguished from


Simple Arson by the degree of perversity or viciousness of
the criminal offender. The acts committed under Art. 320 of
The Revised Penal Code constituting Destructive Arson are
characterized as heinous crimes “for being grievous, odious
and hateful offenses and which, by reason of their inherent
or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity
are repugnant and outrageous to the common standards
and norms of decency and mora-

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24 Supra note 19, at p. 228.

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lity in a just, civilized and ordered society.” On the other


hand, acts committed under PD 1613 constituting Simple
Arson are crimes with a lesser degree of perversity and
viciousness that the law punishes with a lesser penalty. In
other words, Simple Arson contemplates crimes with less
significant social, economic, political and national security
implications than Destructive Arson.

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The Proper Penalty


Under Section 3, paragraph 2, of P.D. No. 1613, the
imposable penalty for simple arson is reclusion temporal,
which has a range of twelve (12) years and one (1) day, to
reclusion perpetua. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, the penalty imposable should be an indeterminate
penalty whose minimum term should be within the range
of the penalty next lower in degree, which is prision mayor,
or six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years, and
whose maximum should be the medium period of reclusion
temporal to reclusion perpetua, or sixteen (16) years and
one (1) day to twenty (20) years, taking into account the
absence of any aggravating or mitigating circumstances
that attended the commission of the crime. Taking these
rules into account, we therefore impose on the appellant
the indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor, as minimum, to sixteen (16) years and
one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
As regards the award of damages, we sustain the lower
courts’ findings that the records do not adequately reflect
any concrete basis for the award of actual damages to the
offended parties. To seek recovery of actual damages, it is
necessary to prove the actual amount of loss with a
reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent
proof and on the best evidence obtainable.25

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25 We also point out that there is a discrepancy between the affidavit-
complaint of Barangay Chairman Ligtas and the certification issued by
the City Social Welfare and Development Department with

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WHEREFORE, the assailed February 24, 2009 decision


of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00208-MIN
is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
(1) appellant Alamada Macabando is found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of simple arson under
Section 3(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1613; and
(2) he is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty
of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to sixteen (16) years and one (1) day of
reclusion temporal, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.

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Carpio (Chairperson), Del Castillo, Perez and Perlas-


Bernabe, JJ., concur.

Judgment affirmed with modifications.

Notes.—The only difference between a charge for


Murder under Article 248 (3) of the Revised Penal Code
and one for Arson under the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Section 3(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1613,
lies in the intent in pursuing the act. (People vs. Baluntong,
615 SCRA 455 [2010])
A judgment of conviction based on circumstantial
evidence can be sustained when the circumstances proved
form an unbroken chain that results in a fair and
reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the
exclusion of all others, as the perpetrator. (People vs.
Evangelio, 656 SCRA 579 [2011])
——o0o—— 

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regard to the names and number of fire victims, and the estimated cost
of the damage to their respective properties.

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