RULE 7 CASES | SENYORA SANTIBANEZ
Then, the picketing reccurred. The respondent filed a petition to declare the
BUKLURAN NG MANGGAGAWA VS CA
FACTS:
Respondent Clothman Knitting Corporation (CKC) is a domestic corporation
engaged in knitting/textiles.2 It has approximately one hundred forty-four (144)
rank-and-file employees. The petitioner union is a legitimate labor organization
of rank-and-file employees therein. The petitioners were rank-and-file
employees of the respondent and were also members and officers of the
petitioner union.
In the year 2001, the rank-and-file employees at the CKC banded together and
formed the petitioner union. It was registered with the Department of Labor
and Employment (DOLE) on February 23, 2001. In reaction thereto, the
respondent, headed by its President, Paul U. Lee, gathered the employees and
advised them not to listen to outsiders.3
Meanwhile, another group of rank-and-file employees banded together and
formed the Nagkakaisang Lakas ng Manggagawa sa Clothman Corporation –
Katipunan (NLM-Katipunan). The NLM-Katipunan was issued a certificate of
registration on April 23, 2001 by the DOLE.4 A petition for certification election
was later filed by the petitioner union with the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR).
Pending the resolution of the petition for certification election, the respondent
issued a Memorandum5 dated March 2, 2001, informing the employees of the
change in the schedule brought about by the decrease in the orders from the
customers.
On March 10, 2001, another Memorandum6 was issued by the respondent
informing its employees at the Dyeing and Finishing Division that a temporary
shutdown of the operations therein would be effected for one week, from
March 12 to 17, 2001. The employees were advised to go on vacation leave,
and were asked to verify any changes in the schedule from the Human
Resources Division on March 17, 2001.
Unable to solve its financial problems, the respondent decided to temporarily
shutdown its operations at the Dyeing and Finishing Division effective the next
day, scheduled to resume until further notice. It notified the DOLE of the said
shutdown on May 26, 2001.7 The operations of the other divisions of the CKC
remained normal.
For its reduced dyeing and finishing needs, the respondent brought the textiles
to Crayons, Inc., a sister company. On June 11, 2001, while the respondent’s
service truck with plate number TBK-158 was to deliver fabrics in Bulacan, the
group of petitioner Raymond Tomaroy and some companions approached the
truck as it made its way towards Don Pedro Street and blocked its way. As a
result, the driver of the service truck decided to return to the respondent’s
compound. Later that day, petitioner Tomaroy, with sixteen (16) members of
the petitioner union, staged a picket in front of the respondent’s compound,
carrying placards
1
strike illegal before the arbitration branch of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC). The LA declared the strike as illegal for failrue to
comply with the requisites of a strike.
NLRC Affirmed the decision.
Petition before the CA
CA dismissed the petition. The CA found that, contrary to Section 3, Rule 46
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition for certiorari filed by the
petitioner union did not contain the full names and actual addresses of all
the petitioners and the respondents, as the petition merely mentioned
"BMC-SUPER, et al." as the petitioners. Further, the petition and the
certification on non-forum shopping were signed by Raymond P. Tomaroy,
who claimed to be the union president/authorized representative of
petitioners without, however, any such authorization from the labor union
and the other petitioners covered by the abbreviation et al. Moreover, the
petition was not verified as required by Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure; hence, did not produce legal effect as provided for in
Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court..
ISSUE: was it proepr to dismiss on mere technicalities?
RULING:
Bukluran is wrong. They are of the erroneous impression that the only
respondent in the NLRC was the petitioner union and that it was sued in its
representative capacity. The fact of the matter is that the respondent sued
not only the petitioner union as respondent, but also its officers and
members of its Board of Directors as principal respondents, and sought the
termination of the employment of the said officers. The Labor Arbiter
rendered judgment against all the respondents therein and declared the
officers to have lost their employment status. The NLRC affirmed the
decision on appeal. It was not only the union that assailed the decision of
the NLRC in the CA, but also the dismissed officers.
Under Section 3 of Rule 46 in relation to Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, the petition for certiorari shall contain the full names and actual
addresses of all the petitioners and the respondents, and that the failure of
the petitioners to comply with the said requirement shall be sufficient
ground for the dismissal of their petition:
Sec. 3. Contents and filing of petition; effect of non-compliance with
requirements. – The petition shall contain the full names and actual
addresses of all the petitioners and respondents, a concise statement of the
matters involved, the factual background of the case and the grounds
relied upon for the relief prayed for.
It shall be filed in seven (7) clearly legible copies together with proof of
service thereof on the respondent with the original copy intended for the
court indicated as such by the petitioner, and shall be accompanied by a
clearly legible duplicate original or certified true copy of the judgment,
RULE 7 CASES | SENYORA SANTIBANEZ
order, resolution, or ruling subject thereof, such material portions of the record
as are referred to therein and other documents relevant or pertinent thereto.
The certification shall be accomplished by the proper clerk of court or by his
duly authorized representative, or by the proper officer of the court, tribunal,
agency or office involved or by his duly authorized representative. The other
requisite number of copies of the petition shall be accompanied by clearly
legible plain copies of all documents attached to the original.
The petitioner shall also submit together with the petition a sworn certification
that he has not theretofore commenced any other action involving the same
issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or different divisions thereof,
or any other tribunal or agency; if there is such other action or proceeding, he
must state the status of the same; and if he should, thereafter, learn that a
similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme
Court, the Court of Appeals, or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal
or agency, he undertakes to promptly inform the aforesaid courts and other
tribunal or agency thereof within five (5) days therefrom.
The petitioner shall pay the corresponding docket and other lawful fees to the
clerk of court and deposit the amount of ₱500.00 for costs at the time of the
filing of the petition.
The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements
shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.
Moreover, under Section 1, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, the title of the action
indicates the names of the parties who shall be named in the original petition:
Section 1. Caption. – The caption sets forth the name of the court, the title of
the action, and the docket number, if assigned.
The title of the action indicates the names of the parties. They shall all be
named in the original complaint or petition; but in subsequent pleadings, it
shall be sufficient if the name of the first party on each side be stated with an
appropriate indication when there are other parties.
Their respective participation in the case shall be indicated.
In this case, the title of the petition for certiorari filed in the CA does not
contain the names of the petitioners officers of the petitioner BMC-SUPER and
of the members of the Board of Directors; even the petition itself does not
contain the full names and addresses of the said officers and members of the
Board of Directors of the petitioner union. We quote the title of the petition
and the averments thereof having reference to the parties-petitioners:
BUKLURAN NG MANGGAGAWA SA CLOTHMAN KNITTING CORPORATION –
SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES FOR EMPOWERMENT AND
REFORMS (BMC-SUPER), ET AL.,Petitioner,
-vs-
2
CLOTHMAN KNITTING CORPORATION, Respondents.29
…
Petitioners, BUKLURAN NG MANGGAGAWA SA CLOTHMAN – SOLIDARITY
OF UNIONS FOR EMPOWERMENT AND REFORMS (BMC-SUPER), et al., is a
legitimate labor organization with Charter Certificate No. S-102, can be
served with summons and other processes at 4th Floor Perlas Building, 646
Quezon Avenue, Quezon City.1awphi1.nét
Private Respondent, CLOTHMAN KNITTING CORPORATION, is a domestic
corporation organized and existing under and by virtue of Philippine Laws
engaged in textile industry with principal place of business at No. 57 Don
Pedro Street, Don Pedro Village, Marulas, Valenzuela City.
Public Respondents, National Labor Relations Commission, Second Division,
herein impleaded as the tribunal exercising judicial functions who issued
the assailed decision in NLRC Case No. 05-03332-2001.30
The petitioners’ reliance on the ruling of this Court in Davao Free Workers
Front v. CIR31 is misplaced. In the said case, the Court held that the failure
to specify the details regarding the number and names of the striking
members of a labor union in the decision or in the complaint was of no
consequence. This is due to the fact that it was established that all the
union members went on strike as a result of the unfair labor practice of the
employer, in consonance with the rule that it is precisely the function of a
labor union to carry the representation of its members, particularly against
the employer’s unfair labor practices against it and its members, and to file
an action for their benefit and behalf without joining each and every
member as a separate party.
Significantly, the full names and addresses of the officers and members of
the Board of Directors of the petitioner union are set forth in their petition
at bench; proof that, indeed, there is a need for the full names and
addresses of all the petitioners to be stated in the title of the petition and in
the petition itself.
On the other hand, Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court reads:
Sec. 5. Certification against forum shopping. – The plaintiff or principal
party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading
asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and
simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not, therefore, commenced
any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal
or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other
action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action
or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he
should, thereafter, learn that the same or similar action or claim has been
filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to
the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been
filed.
RULE 7 CASES | SENYORA SANTIBANEZ
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere
amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for
the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon
motion and after hearing. The submission of a false certification or non-
compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect
contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and
criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful
and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary
dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause
for administrative sanctions.
As gleaned from the petition for certiorari in the CA, only the petitioner
Raymond P. Tomaroy signed the certification of non-forum shopping in his
capacity as the president of the petitioner union. The officers and members of
the Board of Directors, who were, likewise, principal petitioners, did not execute
any certification of non-forum shopping as mandated by the said Rule. The rule
is that the certification of non-forum shopping must be signed by all the
petitioners and that the signing by only one of them is insufficient.34 Although
petitioner Tomaroy was authorized by virtue of his position as president of the
petitioner union to execute the certification for and in its behalf, he had no
authority to do so for and in behalf of its petitioners-officers, as well as the
members of the Board of Directors thereof. The execution by the individual
petitioners of a special power of attorney subsequent to the dismissal of the
petition by the CA authorizing petitioner Tomaroy to execute the requisite
certification does not cure the fatal defect in their petition.
ON THE ISSUE ON THE LAWYER’S SIGNATURE
ISSUE: The respondent alleges that the petition for certiorari filed before the CA
was correctly dismissed as it was not signed by counsel. The respondent noted
that petitioner Tomaroy was not a lawyer and that petitioner Enrique Belarmino
did not manifest in the petition that he was the lawyer. The respondent, thus,
contends that Tomaroy and Belarmino engaged in the illegal practice of law, in
violation of Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court provides that every pleading must be
signed by the party or counsel representing him.36 Considering that the union
is one of the petitioners, Tomaroy, as its president, may sign the pleading. For
this reason alone, the CA cannot dismiss the petition.
Even if we glossed over the procedural lapses of the petitioners and resolved
the petition on its merits, we find that the petitioner union, along with its
supporters, staged a strike without complying with the requirements laid down
in Article 263 of the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules.
METRO DRUC DISTRIBUTION VS NARCISO
An illegal dismissal complaint was filed be Narciso against metro drug in 1997.
The LA decided in favor of metro drug and dismissed teh case for lack of merit.
3
NLRC affirmed LA’s findings.
MR filed but denied to a petition for certiorari was filed before CA (Rule 65)
but was denied because :
1. The caption of the petition did not specify all the petitioners as required
on Section 1, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; and
2. The certification against forum shopping was executed and signed by the
alleged Vice-President for Finance and Human Resources without any
evidence to prove his authority from the Board of Directors to represent the
petitioner corporation. Being a defective certification, it is equivalent to
non-compliance with the requirement of Section 1 par. 2 of Rule 65 and
Section 3 par. 3, Rule 46, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
ISSUE: did the CA err in dismissing the case?
RULING:
It therefore follows that a party invoking a liberal application of the rules of
procedure should at least exert some effort to comply with them.
Here, petitioners failed to specify all the petitioners in the caption as
required by Section 1, Rule 716 of the Rules of Court. Despite the dismissal
of their petition because of this admitted inadvertence, they carelessly
committed the same mistake in their motion for reconsideration.
The same error occured with respect to their certificate against forum
shopping which failed to conform to the requirements of Section 1 (2), Rule
6517 and Section 3 (3), Rule 46.18 The appellate court correctly ruled that
the certificate was defective because it was signed by the Vice-President for
Finance and Human Resources without evidence of her authority to
represent petitioner corporation and the officers impleaded. Again, despite
the dismissal of the petition on this ground, petitioners repeated the
omission in their motion for reconsideration. They failed to attach the
required proof. The appellate court therefore found no reason to
reconsider the dismissal of the petition.
Petitioners maintain that the procedural requirements they allegedly
disregarded applied only to original complaints or petitions. Thus, even if
they wanted to comply, they deliberately did not do so in their motion for
reconsideration. We find this explanation unacceptable. In justifying their
non-compliance, petitioners lost sight of the fact that subsequently
conforming with the rules could have cured the procedural defects of their
petition and could have provided a basis for reconsideration. In many
instances, courts have reconsidered petitions initially deficient in form upon
an erring party's satisfactory explanation and subsequent compliance with
the rules.19
Petitioners also insist that the Rules of Court did not require the
presentation of an authority from the board of directors for the validity of a
certification of non-forum shopping. The lack of authority from petitioners'
RULE 7 CASES | SENYORA SANTIBANEZ
board of directors should not have affected the validity of the certification
considering that it had already been signed by the Vice-President for Finance
and Human Resources.
In Zulueta v. Asia Brewery, Inc.,20 we held that the requirement for petitioner to
sign the certificate of non-forum shopping applied even to corporations,
considering that the mandatory directives of the Rules of Court made no
distinction between natural and juridical persons.
In case of a corporation, it has long been settled that the certificate must be
signed for and on its behalf by a specifically authorized officer or agent who
has personal knowledge of the facts required to be disclosed.
We discussed the rationale behind the rule in National Steel Corporation v.
Court of Appeals:21
Unlike natural persons, corporations may perform physical actions only through
properly delegated individuals; namely, its officers and/or agents.
The corporation, such as the petitioner, has no powers except those expressly
conferred on it by the Corporation Code and those that are implied or
incidental to its existence. In turn, a corporation exercises said powers through
its board of directors and/ or its duly authorized officers or agents. Physical
acts, like the signing of documents, can be performed only by natural persons
duly authorized for the purpose by corporate by-laws or by specific act of the
board of directors.22
Consequently, without the needed proof from the board of directors, the
certificate would be considered defective. Thus, in another case,23 we held that
even the regular officers of a corporation, like the chairman and president, may
not even know the details required in a certificate of non-forum shopping; they
must therefore be authorized by the board of directors just like any other
officer or agent.
The right to file a special civil action for certiorari is neither a natural right nor a
part of due process.24 The acceptance of a petition for certiorari as well as the
grant of due course thereto is addressed to the sound discretion of the court.
GALINDO VS ROXAS
FACTS:
 When Marciano A. Roxas died, he was survived by his widow, Cirila
Roxas and their nine children
 The said heirs filed an action for specific performance against the
heirs of Gregorio Galindo, namely, Florencio, Felisa, Mercedes and
Urbano, all surnamed Galindo, including his grandson Federico de
Guzman, with the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of CFI Bulacan to
compel the latter to execute a deed of absolute sale over the Lot
located in Sta. Maria, Bulacan.
 After the trial, the following facts emerged:
o That the lot was was possessed by the late Gregorio
Galindo who, during his lifetime, had been paying rentals
thereon to the government.
4
o Gregorio died leaving his heirs, his children and
grandson; subsequently the heirs sold their rights and
interests in the lot to Marciano Roxas
o One of the heirs, Urbano is a minor thus did not sign
the document but executed an affidavit signifying his
conformity to the sale executed by his brother and
sisters
o While the receipts for payment of the installments due
to the government were issued in the name of
Gregorio Galindo, yet the property had been declared
for tax purposes in the name of Marciano A. Roxas
who paid the real estate taxes thereon during his
lifetime
 Court concluded that plaintiffs are entitled to the lot based on
the “Documento de Compromiso” for when Urbano was already
of age, he ratified the actuation of his brother and sisters by
executing an affidavit whereby he signified that he was
agreeable thereto.
 CA affirmed; Urbano died leaving his wife and 7 children who
executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate in which they
adjudicated unto themselves, as owners, the undivided rights
and interests which they claimed Urbano had over the Lot
 Heirs of Marciano Roxas through Reginald S. Roxas (one of the
children of the children of Marciano, Lolo nya si Marciano) filed a
complaint against Juanita Galindo Rivera (one of the children of
Urbano) in the RTC for annulment of documents, cancellation of
title and damages with prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction.
 Defendant filed a MTD but the Trial court denied the motion and
ruled that plaintiffs are the real parties-in-interest which the CA
affirmed
ISSUE:
(1) whether Felicissima, Nestor, Beatriz, Catalina, Danilo, Librada and Cesar,
all surnamed Galindo, are proper parties as petitioners in this case; and
(2) whether the trial court committed a grave abuse of its discretion in
denying petitioner Juanita Galindo Rivera’s motion to dismiss on the
ground that Reginald S. Roxas had no legal capacity to sue for and in
behalf of the heirs of Marciano Roxas, and that the action of the
respondents had already prescribed when they filed their complaint on
April 7, 1999.
RULING:
1st issue -
The general rule is that only those parties in a case and their privies and
successors-in-interest are bound by the order or decision of the trial court.
Persons or entities who are not parties to the case are not and should not
be bound or adversely affected by the said order or decision; otherwise,
they will be deprived of their right to due process. Since the petitioners,
except petitioner Juanita Galindo Rivera, were not parties in the RTC and in
the CA, they are not bound by the assailed orders of the RTC and the
decision of the CA against petitioner Juanita Galindo Rivera; hence, they are
not the proper parties to appeal from and assail the said orders of the RTC
and the decision of the CA.
2ND ISSUE -
On the second issue, we agree with the petitioners that the RTC committed
a grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in
denying their motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of the
RULE 7 CASES | SENYORA SANTIBANEZ
respondents’ failure, as plaintiffs, to sufficiently allege in their complaint and
prove that Reginald Roxas had the representative capacity to sue as such
representative of all the heirs of the deceased Marciano Roxas.
Section 1, Rule 316 of the Rules of Court provides that only persons or juridical
persons or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action. Section 4,
Rule 817 of the said Rules further provides that facts showing the capacity of a
party to sue or be sued or the authority of a party to sue or be sued in a
representative capacity must be averred in the complaint. In order to maintain
an action in a court of justice, the plaintiff must have an actual legal existence,
that is, he or she or it must be a person in law and possessed of a legal entity as
either a natural or an artificial person, and no suit can lawfully be prosecuted in
the name of that person.18 The party bringing suit has the burden of proving
the sufficiency of the representative character that he claims. If a complaint is
filed by one who claims to represent a party as plaintiff but who, in fact, is not
authorized to do so, such complaint is not deemed filed and the court does not
acquire jurisdiction over the complaint. An unauthorized complaint does not
produce any legal effect.19 Corollary, the defendants can assail the facts
alleged in the complaint through a motion to dismiss on the ground that the
plaintiff has no capacity to sue under Section 1(d) of Rule 16 of the Rules of
Court, that is, that he does not have the representative he claims.20
Section 1, Rule 721 of the Rules of Court, likewise, provides that the names of
the parties should be included in the caption of the original complaint.
In this case, the caption of the complaint of the respondents states that the
"Heirs of Marciano Roxas," represented by Reginald S. Roxas, are the plaintiffs.
The following were, likewise, alleged in the body of the complaint:
1. That plaintiffs’ representative, Reginald S. Roxas, is of legal age, married, and
a resident of 36 Narcisus St., Roxas District, Quezon City; whereas, defendant is
of legal age, married, and a resident of Alley Guevarra St., Pag-asa, Obando,
Bulacan, where she may be served with summons and other processes of this
Court;
2. That the Register of Deeds of Meycauayan, Bulacan, is impleaded in his
official capacity to accord complete relief where it may be served with
summons at its office address at Meycauayan, Bulacan;
3. That plaintiffs are the legitimate children of the late Marciano A. Roxas,
namely: Maximiano Roxas (deceased), Benjamin Roxas (deceased), Eleazar
Roxas (deceased), Lydia Roxas, Prescilla Roxas-De Perio (deceased), Elisa Roxas-
Medina, Virginia Roxas-Santos (deceased), Uriel Roxas (deceased) and
Fortunato Roxas; plaintiffs’ representative, Reginald S. Roxas, is one of the eight
(8) children of the said deceased Eleazar Roxas;
4. That the said late Marciano A. Roxas (died on June 4, 1950) is an owner of a
parcel of land consisting of 48,089 sq.m., more or less, under Lot No. 1048 of
the Sta. Maria de Pandi Estate situated at Sta. Maria, Bulacan, as evidenced by a
Decision dated August 12, 1965 rendered by the then Court of First Instance of
Malolos, Bulacan, under Civil Case No. 1067 and billed as "Heirs of M. Roxas vs.
F. Galindo, et al." for Specific Performance, copy of a certified xerox copy of the
same is attached hereto and marked as Annex "A" and submarkings.22
5
As gleaned from the averments of the complaint, of the nine plaintiffs, six
are already deceased, namely, Maximiano Roxas, Benjamin Roxas, Eleazar
Roxas, Prescilla Roxas-de Perio, Virginia Roxas-Santos and Uriel Roxas.
There is no allegation in the complaint that a special proceeding to settle
the estate of the said deceased had been filed and was pending. Indeed,
neither a dead person nor his estate may be a party-plaintiff in a court
action.23 As explained by this Court:
… A deceased person does not have such legal entity as is necessary to
bring action so much so that a motion to substitute cannot lie and should
be denied by the court. An action begun by a decedent’s estate cannot be
said to have been begun by a legal person, since an estate is not a legal
entity; such an action is a nullity and a motion to amend the party plaintiff
will not, likewise, lie, there being nothing before the court to amend.
Considering that capacity to be sued is a correlative of the capacity to sue,
to the same extent, a decedent does not have the capacity to be sued and
may not be named a party defendant in a court action.24
In fine, the deceased Maximiano, Benjamin, Eleazar and Uriel, all surnamed
Roxas, Prescilla Roxas-de Perio and Virginia Roxas-Santos have no capacity
to sue and may not be sued as parties-plaintiffs. Neither does respondent
Reginald Roxas have the capacity to represent the said deceased as party-
plaintiff, nor is there any allegation in the complaint that Lydia Roxas, Elisa
Medina and Fortunato Roxas are of legal age and have the capacity to sue.
MAROHOMSALIC VS COLE
Petitioner Romulo J. Marohomsalic was employed as Special Land
Investigator I of the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office of
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (PENRO-DENR) in
Koronadal City.
Respondent Reynaldo D. Cole2 had a pending land dispute case in the
PENRO-DENR in Koronadal City. Sometime in February 2001, he went to
said office to inquire on the status of his case. He met Marohomsalic and
asked him for assistance as he was not from Koronadal but from General
Santos City.
Marohomsalic, on one hand, asserted that on March 8, 2001, Cole gave him
cash purportedly to cover the expenses for photocopying the documents
needed in the case. On the other hand, Cole claimed (and the Ombudsman
affirmed) that Marohomsalic demanded P15,000 to secure the reversal of
the PENRO-DENR decision against him (Cole).
Marohomsalic was caught in flagrante delicto receiving bribe money of
P2,700 from Cole.
An administrative complaint3 for grave misconduct was filed against
Marohomsalic in the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao. After evaluating
the respective allegations of the parties, the Ombudsman found
Marohomsalic guilty and dismissed him from the service.
RULE 7 CASES | SENYORA SANTIBANEZ
Marohomsalic’s appeal with the CA was dismissed. In his petition for review, teh
CA acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing his case due to
technicalities.
ISSUE; Didi the CA err in dismissing his case? (reason: Marohomsalic considers
as grave abuse of discretion the CA's dismissal of his petition on technical
grounds, namely, the absence of a written explanation as to why his petition
was filed via registered mail instead of personally, and improper verification.)
RULING: NO. The CA did not err in dismissing teh case.
Marohomsalic, through counsel, assumed that the CA would understand that,
because of the distance between Manila and South Cotabato, the petition could
not be filed personally.9 The CA, however, was correct in holding that under
Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, personal service of petitions and
other pleadings is the general rule while resort to the other modes of service
and filing is the exception.10 When recourse is made to the exception, a written
explanation of why the service and the filing are not done personally becomes
indispensable. If no explanation is offered to justify resorting to the other
modes (i.e., the exception), the discretionary power of the court to expunge the
pleading comes into play.11
Regarding the improper verification, Marohomsalic avers that the allegations in
his pleading were based on authentic records. He argues that such was
substantial compliance with the rule on verification. There was no further need
for him to state in the verification that the allegations were also based on his
personal knowledge. To require him to do so would be contrary to law.
Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 4. Verification. - xxx
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and
that the allegations therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or
based on authentic records.
A pleading required to be verified xxx or lacks a proper verification, shall be
treated as an unsigned pleading.
VERIFICATION is the assurance that the allegations of the petition have been
made in good faith, or are true and correct and not merely speculative.12
Marohomsalic has apparently missed the import of the foregoing rule. Hun
Hyung Park v. Eung Won Choi13 is instructive on this point:
A reading of [the above-quoted] Section 4 of Rule 7 indicates that A
PLEADING MAY BE VERIFIED UNDER EITHER OF THE TWO GIVEN MODES
OR UNDER BOTH. The veracity of the allegations in a pleading may be
affirmed based on:
1. either one's own personal knowledge or
6
2. on authentic records, or
3. both, as warranted.
The use of the preposition "or" connotes that either source qualifies as a
sufficient basis for verification and, needless to state, the concurrence of
both sources is more than sufficient. Bearing both a disjunctive and
conjunctive sense, this parallel legal signification avoids a construction that
will exclude the combination of the alternatives or bar the efficacy of any
one of the alternatives standing alone.
Contrary to petitioner's position, the range of permutation is not left to the
pleader's liking, but is dependent on the surrounding nature of the
allegations which may warrant that a verification be based either purely on
personal knowledge, or entirely on authentic records, or on both sources.
As pointed [out by respondent], "AUTHENTIC RECORDS" as a basis for
verification bear significance in petitions wherein the greater portions of
the allegations are based on the records of the proceedings in the court of
origin and/or the court a quo, and not solely on the personal knowledge of
the petitioner. xxx
We reiterate: WHETHER THE VERIFICATION SHOULD BE BASED ON THE
PLEADER'S PERSONAL BELIEF OR ON AUTHENTIC RECORDS, OR BOTH,
DEPENDS LARGELY ON THE NATURE OF THE ALLEGATIONS. It is not a
matter of simple preference. Otherwise, the rationale of the rule will be
trivialized and its resoluteness diminished.
The CA correctly ruled thaT THE REQUIREMENT WAS NOT MERELY
TECHNICAL FOR IT SERVED A PURPOSE THAT WAS RELEVANT TO THE
NATURE OF THE ACTION. In an appeal by petition for review under Rule
43 of the Rules of Court, the petition may be resolved on the basis of the
pleadings before the appellate court without the necessity of elevating the
records from the quasi-judicial officer, tribunal or body where the case
began.
This is in contrast with an appeal by writ of error under Rule 41 according
to which the appellate court may not act on the appeal until after the
elevation of the records from the lower court.
It was important therefore for petitioner to have stated in his verification
that
(1) his allegations in the petition were true and correct of his personal
knowledge and
(2) if the petition relied on documents and records attached to the petition,
that his allegations were based on records whose authenticity he
warranted.
BUT GRANTING ARGUENDO THAT MAROHOMSALIC'S CONTENTION
WAS CORRECT, HIS PETITION MUST NEVERTHELESS STILL FAIL. The CA
found that only the March 24, 2004 order of the Office of the Ombudsman
was an original copy. The copy of the February 23, 2004 decision of the
RULE 7 CASES | SENYORA SANTIBANEZ 7

Ombudsman was a machine copy. Furthermore, of the ten other documents
attached to the petition, none was certified as a true and authentic copy. The
only conclusion we can make is that Marohomsalic's verification was not based
either on personal knowledge or on authentic records.
While procedural rules may be relaxed in the interest of justice, it is well-settled
that these are tools designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases. The
relaxation of procedural rules in the interest of justice was never intended to be
a license for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity. Liberality in the
interpretation and application of the rules can be invoked only in proper cases
and under justifiable causes and circumstances. While litigation is not a game
of technicalities, every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the
prescribed procedure to ensure an orderly and speedy administration of justice.
another executed by Vicente B., the plaintiff, based on plaintiff’s motion for
leave to amend complaint.1avvphi1.zw+ This motion recited that during the
hearing [on] x x x July 3, 2002, this Honorable Court told this representation
to amend the complaint because the verification/certification of non-forum
shopping x x x should have been executed by plaintiff Vicente B. del
Rosario who is the real party in interest x x x and to allege that the amount
deposited in escrow inclusive of interest accrued should be paid to plaintiff
by way of rentals.
Judge gako ordered teh rescission of teh contract and the court granted
the motion for execution pending appeal.

TANJUATCO VS GAKO
Tanjuatco filed a complaint against RTC judge Gako with Knowingly Rendering
Unjust Judgment, Gross Partiality and/or Gross Ignorance in connection with a
contract rescission case filed with respondent’s court.
Apropos the allegation about his having instructed the plaintiff’s counsel on
what to do in the case, respondent judge gako countered that it is the
court’s duty, in the course of a hearing, to suggest to litigants and their
counsels to follow the proper procedures so that cases be speedily
resolved.
FACTS RELATED TO RULE 7

As complainant claims, respondent judge instructed Pantaleon’s counsel to

By Resolution dated August 9, 2006, the Court resolved to refer the
administrative complaint, which was earlier redocketed as a regular
administrative matter, to Court of Appeals (CA) Associate Justice Josefina
Guevarra-Salonga for investigation, recommendation, and report.
amend the complaint in Civil Case No. CEB-27334 and to attach to the
amended complaint the verification of his son, Vicente B., and to allege that
the amount deposited in escrow, exclusive of the interest accrued, should
be paid to Vicente B. by way of rentals.

ISSUE: Whether said actuations of respondent judge is "partial, irregular

Complainant’s father, Vicente S. del Rosario (Vicente S.), and her brother, and in direct violation of procedural rules," and the complaint should have
Pantaleon, co-owned eight (8) parcels of land in Cebu. been dismissed outright pursuant to Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court.

Via a "Contract to Buy and Sell" Vicente and Pantaleon sold the property to the
RULING: NO
City of Cebu, for the latter’s abattoir project. As agreed upon, the purchase
price was to be deposited and to remain in escrow with the Philippine National Sec. 5 of the pre-trial guidelines reads:
Bank (PNB) until lot titles shall have been delivered to the city. Following the
1986 Edsa event, however, the newly-designated OIC-Mayor of Cebu City, John
H. Osmeña, unilaterally stopped the construction of the abattoir.
5. If all efforts to settle fail, the trial judge shall:

Later developments saw Vicente S.’s heirs filing a petition for the partition of his
a. Adopt the minutes of preliminary conference as part of the pre- trial
estate. Such case landed in teh sala of Judge Gako.
proceedings and confirm markings of exhibits or substituted photocopies
and admissions on the genuineness and due execution of documents;

According to the respondent, he held "preliminary conferences among the heirs

of Vicente S. x x x for the purpose of settling the case amicably."4 The
b. Inquire if there are cases arising out of the same facts pending before
complainant, on the other hand, narrated that the respondent held several
other courts and order its consolidation if warranted;
meetings in his chambers during the preliminary conferences.5 Upon the heirs’
motion, the respondent subsequently inhibited himself from handling the case.

c. Inquire if the pleadings are in order. If not, order the amendments if

necessary;
Vicente B. del Rosario (Vicente B.), represented by his father, Pantaleon, filed a
case against the City of Cebu for the rescission of the "Contract to Buy and Sell"
covering the eight (8) lots.
d. Inquire if interlocutory issues are involved and resolve the same;

The complaint originally carried the Verification/Certification of Non- Forum

Shopping signed by Pantaleon. The verification was subsequently replaced by e. Consider the adding or dropping of parties.
RULE 7 CASES | SENYORA SANTIBANEZ
As it were, respondent judge noticed that the person who verified Vicente B.’s
complaint was his attorney-in-fact, obviously leading the respondent to
conclude that the verification was defective. He believed a correction was in
order to prevent future complications, such as the filing of a motion to dismiss
the complaint which undeniably will only prolong or delay the case.
In actuality, no clear benefit redounded to Vicente B. as a result of respondent’s
suggestion, for the requirement on verification may be made by the party, his
lawyer or his representative or any person who personally knows the truth of
the facts alleged in the pleading.11
Thus, Pantaleon’s verification accompanying the original complaint would have
had sufficed.
Complainant’s assertion that respondent made it appear that Pantaleon was the
plaintiff is a bit specious. The title of the case, no less, clearly indicated that
Vicente B. is the plaintiff, not Pantaleon.
The Investigating Justice erred too when she concluded that the complaint
should have been dismissed outright under Sec. 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court.
Sec. 5, Rule 7 refers to certification against forum shopping. The correct and
applicable rule is the preceding Sec. 4 of Rule 7 which deals with verification.
Even if the Investigator cited the correct Rule (Sec. 4, Rule 7), she would still be
incorrect in her conclusion that the complaint should be dismissed, for it is
basic that verification is only a formal, not jurisdictional, requisite.12
Accordingly, even if the verification is flawed or defective, the Court may still
give due course to the pleading if the circumstances warrant the relaxation of
the rule in the interest of justice.
AGDEPPA ET AL VS HEAIRS OF BONETE
FACTS: In 1979, respondent Dorotea Bonete (Dorotea), widow of the late
Ignacio Bonete and mother of respondents Hipolito Bonete, Milagros Bonete,
Mauricio Bonete, Fernando Bonete, and Ophelia Bonete (respondents),
obtained a loan in the amount of ₱55,000.00 from Development Bank of the
Philippines (DBP), Cotabato City Branch, in order to buy farm implements. A
parcel of agricultural land issued in the name of Dorotea and situated in
Demapaco, Libungan, Cotabato (subject property), was used as collateral to
secure the said loan.
In 1982, respondents, through Dorotea, received a notice of collection from
DBP. Respondents alleged that herein petitioner and counsel, Atty. Littie Sarah
A. Agdeppa (Littie Sarah), expressed deep concern and sympathy for them.
Consequently, Littie Sarah accompanied Dorotea to DBP and obligated herself
to pay the loan. Thereafter, Dorotea was allegedly made to sign a document as
Littie Sarah’s security for the amount which the latter paid to DBP in connection
with the said loan. Further, respondents alleged that, since 1982, Littie Sarah
and her representatives had been gradually easing them out of the subject
8
property and that they were ordered to stop the cultivation of their
respective ricefields. Eventually, respondents were forcibly ejected from the
subject property.
Respondents found out that the title to the subject property which was in
teh name of their predecessor in interest was transferred to littie sarah.
Thus, respondents filed a Complaint5 for Recovery of Ownership and
Possession and/or Annulment of Deed of Sale of the Subject Property with
Damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 484 before the RTC.
Littie Sarah filed a Motion to Dismiss6 the Complaint based on the
following grounds:
1) that respondents had no legal capacity to sue;
2) that respondents were not the real parties in interest;
3) that the Complaint stated no cause of action; and
4) that the claim or demand set forth in the Complaint had already been
waived and extinguished.
Later, the Complaint was amended, impleading herein petitioners Lynn
Sarah Agdeppa, Louella Jeanne Agdeppa, and Lalaine Lilibeth Agdeppa,
together with Littie Sarah, as defendants (petitioners).
RTC issued an Order dismissing the Amended Complaint with costs against
respondents. It held that the Amended Complaint did not show the
character and representation that respondents claimed to have. TCT No. T-
56923, covering the subject property, was not in the name of the late
Ignacio Bonete but in Dorotea's name. Thus, the RTC held that respondents
were not real parties in interest.
CA reversed and set aside the RTC Order, and remanded the case to the
RTC for further proceedings because Dorotea, being the former owner of
the subject property, was a real party in interest.
ISSUE: Whether there was procedural infirmities which warranted dismissal
of the action
RULING: NO
While it is true that respondents committed a procedural infraction before
the RTC, such infraction does not justify the dismissal of the case.
Misjoinder of parties does not warrant the dismissal of the action.15 Rule 3,
Section 11 of the Rules of Court clearly provides:
RULE 7 CASES | SENYORA SANTIBANEZ
Sec. 11. Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties. — Neither misjoinder nor non-
joinder of parties is ground for dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped
or added by order of the court on motion of any party or on its own initiative at
any stage of the action and on such terms as are just. Any claim against a
misjoined party may be severed and proceeded with separately.
It bears stressing that TCT No. T-56923, covering the subject property, was
issued in the name of Dorotea. This is established by the record, and petitioners
themselves admit this fact. However, because TCT No. T-75454, allegedly issued
in favor of Littie Sarah, and the purported deed of sale, allegedly executed by
Dorotea in favor of Littie Sarah, are not on record. Considering the allegations
in the pleadings, it is best that a trial on the merits be conducted.1avvphi1
We fully agree with the apt and judicious ruling of the CA, when it said:
As the former owner of the subject property, the same having been titled in her
name under TCT No. T-56923, Dorotea Cariaga Bonete, being the real party [in]
interest, has the legal capacity to file the instant case for reconveyance and
annulment of deed of sale. The complaint was filed by the [respondents]
precisely to question the issuance of TCT No. T-75454 in the name of Littie
Sarah Agdeppa as the transaction allegedly contemplated was only to secure
Dorotea’s loan.
Why the property became the subject of the deed of sale which is being
disputed by Dorotea should be threshed out in a full-blown trial on the merits
in order to afford the contending parties their respective days in
court. As held in Del Bros. Hotel Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 210 SCRA 33,
the complaint is not supposed to contain evidentiary matters as this will have to
be done at the trial on the merits of the case.
A final note.
A liberal construction of the Rules is apt in situations involving excusable formal
errors in a pleading, as long as the same do not subvert the essence of the
proceeding, and they connote at least a reasonable attempt at compliance with
the Rules.16 The Court is not precluded from rectifying errors of judgment, if
blind and stubborn adherence to procedure would result in the sacrifice of
substantial justice for technicality. To deprive respondents, particularly Dorotea,
of their claims over the subject property on the strength of sheer technicality
would be a travesty of justice and equity.
SARI SARI GROUP OF COMPANIE VS PIGLAS KAMAO
Doctrine: The purpose of requiring a verification is to secure an assurance that
the allegations of the petition have been made in good faith, or are true and
correct, not merely speculative. On the other hand, the rule against forum
shopping is rooted in the principle that a party-litigant shall not be allowed to
pursue simultaneous remedies in different fora, as this practice is detrimental to
orderly judicial procedure.
9
Facts:
In December 1990, Mariko Novel Wares, Inc. (petitioner) began its retail
outlet operations under the name Sari-Sari in the basement of Robinsons
Galleria. Among its employees were: Head Checker Ronnie Tamayo,
Checker Jose del Carmen, Section Heads Jocylene Padua, Vicky Bermeo,
and Elizabeth Matutina (respondents), all of whom were assigned at the
Robinsons Galleria branch.
On November 30, 1993, respondents organized a union known
as Piglas Kamao (Sari-Sari Chapter). At the time of the formation, the
officers of the union were respondents Ronnie Tamayo, President; Jose del
Carmen, Vice-President; and Jocelyne Padua, Secretary. Respondents claim
that petitioner, through its President, Rico Ocampo, interfered with the
formation of the union.
Meanwhile, respondents were informed of the petitioner’s plan to close
the basement level store to give way to the opening of a Sari-Sari outlet on
the third floor of Robinsons Galleria. Respondents were supposed to be
absorbed in other Sari-Sari store branches. However, on January 9, 1994,
petitioner put up an advertisement in the Manila Bulletin, announcing its
need for inventory, accounting, and sales clerks.
On January 26, 1994, as a result of the aforementioned events, respondent
union filed an unfair labor practice case with the Labor Arbiter (LA) against
the petitioner for harassment, coercion, and interference with the workers
right to self-organization.
On the next day, January 27, 1994, petitioner notified DOLE and the
respondents of the closure of the Galleria branch due to irreversible losses
and non-extension of the lease of the store premises, to be effective on
February 28, 1994. Moreover, the respondents were told that they would
not be absorbed in the other branches of the petitioner because of
redundancy.
On February 11, 1994, respondents Tamayo, Del Carmen, and Padua filed
amended complaints of unfair labor practice and illegal dismissal against
petitioner. On March 28, 1994, respondents filed six supplemental
complaints for illegal dismissal, non-payment of premium pay for holiday
and rest day for the years 1992 and 1993, and non-payment of 13th month
pay for the year 1994 as well as for moral and exemplary damages.
The LA rendered his decision dismissing the complaint for illegal dismissal,
unfair labor practices and damages for lack of merit. However, the LA
ordered the petitioner to pay the respondents separation pay and
proportionate 13th month pay. The decision was appealed to the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
The NLRC affirmed the decision of the LA but dismissed the claims
of Bermeo, Matutina and Padua as they had executed
quitclaims. Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was
denied by the NLRC. Respondents then appealed to the CA.
RULE 7 CASES | SENYORA SANTIBANEZ
The CA ruled that petitioner failed to discharge its burden of submitting
competent proof to show the irreversible substantial losses it suffered
warranting the closure of the Galleria branch. CA denied petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration.
Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in taking cognizance of the petition
considering that only one of the respondents signed and verified the petition?
RULING: NO
Effect of Non-Verification by All Parties
Section 1 of Rule 6529 in relation to Section 3 of Rule 4630 of the Rules of
Court requires that a petition for review filed with the CA should be verified and
should contain a certificate of non-forum shopping.
The purpose of requiring a verification is to secure an assurance that the
allegations of the petition have been made in good faith, or are true and
correct, not merely speculative.31 On the other hand, the rule against forum
shopping is rooted in the principle that a party-litigant shall not be allowed to
pursue simultaneous remedies in different fora, as this practice is detrimental to
orderly judicial procedure.32
A distinction must be made between non-compliance with the requirements for
Verification and noncompliance with those for Certification of Non-Forum
Shopping. As to Verification, non-compliance therewith does not necessarily
render the pleading fatally defective; hence, the court may order a correction if
Verification is lacking; or act on the pleading although it is not verified, if the
attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the Rules may be
dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may thereby be served.33
A pleading which is required by the Rules of Court to be verified may be given
due course even without a verification of the circumstances warranting the
suspension of the rules in the interest of justice.34 When circumstances
warrant, the court may simply order the correction of unverified pleadings or
act on them and waive strict compliance with the rules in order that the ends of
justice may thereby be served.35 Moreover, many authorities consider the
absence of Verification a mere formal, not jurisdictional defect, the absence of
which does not of itself justify a court in refusing to allow and act on the
case.36
In Torres v. Specialized Packing Development Corporation,37 the problem was
not lack of Verification, but the adequacy of one executed by only two of the
twenty-five petitioners, similar to the case at bar. The Court ruled:
These two signatories are unquestionably real parties in interest, who
undoubtedly have sufficient knowledge and belief to swear to the truth of the
allegations in the Petition. This verification is enough assurance that the matters
10
alleged therein have been made in good faith or are true and correct, not
merely speculative. The requirement of verification has thus been
substantially complied with.38
Based on the foregoing, the lone Verification of respondent Jose del
Carmen is sufficient compliance with the requirements of the law.
On the other hand, the lack of a Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping, unlike
that of Verification is generally not curable by the submission thereof after
the filing of the petition.39 The submission of a certificate against forum
shopping is thus deemed obligatory, albeit not jurisdictional.40
The rule on certification against forum shopping may, however, be also
relaxed on grounds of "substantial compliance" or "special circumstances or
compelling reasons."41
Applicable to this case is Cavile v. Heirs of Clarita Cavile.42 Finding that the
petitioners were relatives and co-owners jointly sued over property in which
they had common interest, this Court in that case held that the signature of
just one co-owner on the Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping in the
petition before the Court substantially complied with the rule in this wise:
We find that the execution by Thomas George Cavile, Sr. in behalf of all the
other petitioners of the certificate of non-forum shopping constitutes
substantial compliance with the Rules. All the petitioners, being relatives
and co-owners of the properties in dispute, share a common interest
thereon. They also share a common defense in the complaint for partition
filed by the respondents. Thus, when they filed the instant petition, they
filed it as a collective, raising only one argument to defend their rights over
the properties in question. There is sufficient basis, therefore, for Thomas
George Cavili, Sr. to speak for and in behalf of his co-petitioners that they
have not filed any action or claim involving the same issues in another
court or tribunal, nor is there other pending action or claim in another court
or tribunal involving the same issues.43
In the case at bar, respondent Jose del Carmen shares a common interest
with the other respondents as to the resolution of the labor dispute
between them and the petitioner. They collectively sued the petitioner for
illegal dismissal and unfair labor practices and have collectively appealed
the NLRC decision. Similarly, there is sufficient basis for Jose del Carmen to
speak on behalf of his co-respondents in stating that they have not filed
any action or claim involving the same issues in another court or tribunal,
nor is there any other pending action or claim in another court or tribunal
involving the same issues. Thus, even if only respondent Jose del Carmen
signed the Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping, the rule on substantial
compliance applies. The CA therefore did not commit any error in
entertaining the appeal of the respondents.
HUTAMA RSEA/ SUPERMAX VS KCD BUILDERS
KCD Builders Corporation filed a complaint for sum of money against
appellants [Hutama-RSEA/Super Max, Philippines and/or Charles H.C. Yang]
before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. Its cause of action arose from a
RULE 7 CASES | SENYORA SANTIBANEZ
written contract which was the Notice to Proceed dated 10 November 2000
executed by the parties whereby appellant [Hutama] as principal contractor of
Package 2-Site Works in Philips Semiconductors Phils. Inc. – Integrated Circuits
Plant Phase II Project located at the Light Industry and Science Park of the
Philippines-2 (LISPP-2) Calamba, Laguna contracted with appellee [KCD] as sub-
contractor for the said project. The final billing dated 20 September 2001 was
submitted to appellant Charles H.C. Yang, and despite a joint evaluation by the
parties through their respective representatives who agreed on the amount [of]
₱2,967,164.71 as HUTAMA’s total obligation to appellee [KCD], and a letter of
demand, appellant corporation [Hutama] failed and refused to pay.
[KCD] filed a Motion to Declare Defendant/s [Hutama and Yang] in Default for
failure to file the responsive pleading within the extended period, and set the
same for hearing on 26 April 2002.
During the hearing on appellee’s [KCD’s] motion to declare defendant/s
[Hutama and Yang] in default, the trial court noted the filing of appellants’
[Hutama and Yang’s] respective motion to dismiss and answer with
counterclaim but noted that the filing thereof on 27 March 2002 was too late
considering that they were only given an extended period up [to] 16 March
2002 to do the same. Thus, the trial court granted the motion to declare
defendants [Hutama and Yang] in default and directed, upon appellee’s [KCD’s]
motion, the presentation of evidence ex-parte before the branch clerk of court
who was appointed as commissioner to received evidence.
RTC rendered a decision in favor of KCD and ordered Hutama and Yang to pay.
CA affirmed RTC decision
Hutama questions the verification and certification on non-forum shopping of
KCD, issued by its board of directors, because the same was signed by the
latter’s president without proof of authority to sign the same.
ISSUE:
RULING:
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that an affiant has read the pleading and
that the allegations therein are true and correct as to his personal knowledge or
based on authentic records. The party does not need to sign the verification. A
party's representative, lawyer, or any person who personally knows the truth of
the facts alleged in the pleading may sign the verification.131avvphi1
On the other hand, a certification of non-forum shopping is a certification
under oath by the plaintiff or principal party in the complaint or other initiatory
pleading, asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto
and simultaneously filed therewith, that (a) he has not theretofore commenced
any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or
quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or
claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a
complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter
learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he
11
shall report that fact within five days therefrom to the court wherein his
aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.14
It is true that the power of a corporation to sue and be sued is lodged in
the board of directors that exercises its corporate powers.15 However, it is
settled – and we have so declared in numerous decisions – that the
president of a corporation may sign the verification and the certification of
non-forum shopping.
In Ateneo de Naga University v. Manalo,16 we held that the lone signature
of the University President was sufficient to fulfill the verification
requirement, because such officer had sufficient knowledge to swear to the
truth of the allegations in the petition.
In People’s Aircargo and Warehousing Co., Inc. v. CA,17 we held that in the
absence of a charter or bylaw provision to the contrary, the president of a
corporation is presumed to have the authority to act within the domain of
the general objectives of its business and within the scope of his or her
usual duties. Moreover, even if a certain contract or undertaking is outside
the usual powers of the president, the corporation’s ratification of the
contract or undertaking and the acceptance of benefits therefrom make the
corporate president’s actions binding on the corporation.
UY VS WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION
deceased Ki Lam Uy, also known as Vicente Uy, was killed by robbers at the
farm house (bodega) of private respondent Lucy Perez at Sitio Agay-ayan,
Barrio Tugbong, Kananga, Leyte.
On November 15, 1974, claimants-petitioners filed a Notice and Claim for
Compensation in Death Cases before Regional Office No. 9, Department of
Labor, Tacloban City, seeking to recover death compensation benefits for
the death of their father, Ki Lam Uy, from private respondent, Lucy Perez.
a copy of the claim was sent by special delivery to private respondent, Lucy
Perez, by the Chief of the Workmen's Compensation Unit, Regional Office
No. 9, Department of Labor, Tacloban City, requiring the said private
respondent to submit to said office the enclosed Workmen's Compensation
Form No. 3, Employer's Report of Accident or Sickness
For failure of private respondent to accomplish the required Employer's
Report, the Acting Chief of the Workmen's Compensation Unit pursuant to
Section 2, Rule, 11, Rules of the Workmen's Compensation Commission,
after processing the claim and the supporting evidence submitted by
claimants-petitioners, issued an Award dated December 27, 1974, granting
death compensation benefits to claimants-petitioners, including Pura
Primer, the common-law widow of the deceased, in the amount of
P6,000.00, pursuant to Section 8 (b) of the Workmen's Compensation Act,
as amended, plus the sum of P200.00 as burial expenses. Private
respondent, Lucy Perez was also required to pay the additional sum of
P3,000.00 under Section 4-A of the Act, due to private respondent's
violation of Bureau of Labor Standards Safety Orders Nos. 1, 6 (pars. 1 & 2)
and 7, Section 56 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended and for
RULE 7 CASES | SENYORA SANTIBANEZ
private respondent's failure to secure a permit to employ an alien pursuant to
Department Order No. 2, and for violation of the Nationalization and Retail
Trade Law.
After several hearings conducted by the aforesaid Hearing Officer, a decision
was rendered which states among others, "that although the respondent has
failed to controvert the claim within the period provided for under Section 45
of the Act, a hearing of the case, with notice to all the parties was conducted to
determine the compensability of the claim"
On November 12, 1975, a motion for reconsideration was filed by private
respondent, thru counsel on the following grounds, to wit: 1) that Honorable
Office [Workmen's Compensation Unit Regional Office No. 9] gravely erred in
considering deceased Ki Lam Uy as respondent's employee; 2) assuming that
deceased was an employee, respondent had already complied with her
obligation in accordance with the Workmen's Compensation Act
Workmen's Compensation Commission rendered a decision reversing the
decision of the Hearing Officer on the ground that the deceased, Ki Lam Uy was
not an employee of private respondent, thereby absolving herein private
respondent from any liability
Private respondent in her answer to the instant petition claims that the petition,
not being verified by the petitioners but by their counsel, is fatally defective.
ISSUE:Whether the petition has no merit for not being verified
RULING: NO
The claim has no merit. In the past, it has been the constant rulings of this
Court that lack of verification is merely a formal defect. "In fact, many
authorities consider the absence of verification a mere formal, not jurisdictional
defect, the absence of which does not of itself justify a court in refusing to allow
and act in the case" (71 C.J.S. 744-745). This Court declared:
The requirement regarding verification of a pleading is simply intended to
secure an assurance that what are alleged in the pleadings are true and correct
and not the product of the imagination on a matter of speculation, and that the
pleading is filed in good faith. The requirement regarding verification of a
pleading is a formal, not a jurisdictional requisite. The requirement regarding
verification of a pleading is simply a condition affecting the form of pleading
(Rule 7 of the Rules of Court is entitled 'Formal Requirements of Pleadings and
it is under this Rule [Sec. 6] that the requirement regarding verification is
provided the non-compliance of which does not necessarily render the
pleading fatally defective. The Court may order the correction of the pleading if
the verification is lacking, or act on the pleading although it is not verified if the
attending circumstances are such that the strict complaince with the rule may
be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice or the law may thereby be
served (Oshita vs. Republic, L-21180, March 31, 1967, 19 SCRA 700; Miller, et al.
vs. The Director of Lands, et al, L-16761, Oct. 31, 1964; Nicolas vs. Director of
Lands, et al. L-19147-8, Dec. 28, 1963; The Philippine Bank of Commerce vs.
Macaraeg, et al., L-14174, Oct. 31, 1960; Tavera vs. E. Hogar Filipino, Inc., et al.
98 Phil. 481; Malagum vs. Pablo, 46 Phil. 19).
12
The above-quoted ruling was reiterated by this Court through Mr. Justice
Barredo in Valino vs. Munoz (L-26151, OCT 22,1970), which held.
Assuming that the rule of verification, Sec. 6 of Rule 7, has not been strictly
complied with, it has been held anyway that absence of verification is a
mere formal, not jurisdictional defect, particularly when the facts alleged
are more or less indisputable or home clearly by the records.
Furthermore, while it is true that the petition now before Us was not
verified by the claimants-petitioners, it was, however, verified by their
counsel. Herein private respondent contends that the verification by the
counsel and not by the claimants-petitioners, is fatal. WE believe otherwise.
A verification by the attorney is adequate compliance with Rule 7, Sec. 6, it
being presumed that facts by him alleged are true to his knowledge in view
of the sanctions provided in Sec. 5 of the Rules of Court (Guerra Enterprises
Company, Inc. vs. Court of First Instance of Lanao del Sur, L-28310, April 17,
1970, 32 SCRA 314 — citing Arambulo vs. Perez, 78 Phil. 387; Cajefe vs.
Fernandez, L-15409, Oct. 19, 1960).
Earlier, We held that "it is only when the person verifying is other than the
attorney who signs the pleading that the affiant must state that the
allegations thereof are true of his own knowledge, but when the complaint
is signed by the attorney the latter's oath couched in the usual form
'subscribed and sworn to before me, etc.' is substantial compliance with the
Rules of Court (Arambulo vs. Perez, 78 Phil. 387 [1947];
TORRES VS SPECIALIZED PACKING DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
FACTS
Petitioners claim to be employees of the Specialized Packaging
Development Corporation (SPDC), a business entity engaged in the
repackaging of cosmetic products. In three separate Complaints, they
charged SPDC and alleged labor recruiters Eusebio Camacho General
Services (ECGS) and MPL Services with illegal dismissal; and with
nonpayment of overtime, premium and 13th month pays, and night
differential.
The cases were later consolidated and assigned to Labor Arbiter (LA)
Salimathar Nambi. On June 30, 1995, the LA issued his Decision in favor of
petitioners, because SPDC and MPL Services had failed to submit their
position papers on or before the deadline. SPDC was ordered to reinstate
all petitioners to their former positions and to pay them back wages,
premium pay for holidays and rest days, service incentive leave pay and
13th month pay.
The LA's Decision was appealed by SPDC to the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC), which set aside the ruling and ordered the case
remanded to LA Nambi for further proceedings.
RULE 7 CASES | SENYORA SANTIBANEZ
The case was then set again for hearings. Respondents SPDC and ECGS
submitted their position papers five months after the case had been considered
submitted for decision.
On December 14, 1999, LA Nambi issued a second Decision finding petitioners'
employment to have been illegally terminated by SPDC. The NLRC, however,
again reversed and set aside this new Decision on June 9, 2000.
On January 29, 2001, petitioners appealed to the CA.
CA - dismissed teh petition
there are twenty-five (25) principal parties-petitioners who were former workers
of private respondent Corporation and complainants in NLRC NCR Case Nos.
00-04-03325-94, 00-05-03727-94 and 00-05-03971-94 as a result of their being
laid-off from employment. Perusing the verification and certification[,] however,
it also appears that it was executed and signed by only two (2) petitioners,
namely, Evelyn Dolom and Criselina Anquilo, among the said twenty-five (25)
principal petitioners. The duty to verify and certify under oath is strictly
addressed to all the twenty-five (25) principal petitioners. - in violation of
Admin Circular 4-94 (now Sec 5 Rule 7)
ISSUE: Did teh CA err in dismissing for failure to verify?
RULING: YES
(NLRC REVIEW TOPIC)
At the outset we note that the present Petition is anchored on Rule 45, and that
it assails the two CA Resolutions dismissing petitioners' earlier Petition for
Certiorari. In accordance with Section 1 of Rule 45,8 the herein Petition alleges
reversible errors based on the supposedly defective verification and certification
against forum shopping.
The above-quoted issues raised in the Memorandum of petitioners, however,
were not the same ones raised in the Petition. Because these three substantive
issues were sprung by the former only in their own Memorandum, respondents
were not able to traverse these directly in their Comment9 or Memorandum.10
Hence, save for perfunctory references to the NLRC Decision, the latter were
not given the opportunity to defend themselves on these questions.
Elementary due process -- which means giving the opposite party the
opportunity to be heard, and the assailed court to consider every argument
presented11 -- bars this Court from taking up these three issues in this
Decision, even if doing so would speed up the final resolution of the case. Basic
is the rule that issues not presented below cannot for the first time be taken up
on appeal.
REVIEW OF NLRC DECISIONS
13
The proper procedure for seeking a review of the final dispositions of the
NLRC was laid down in 1998 in St. Martin Funeral Homes v. NLRC.13 That
case heralded two very important rules: 1) decisions and final resolutions of
the NLRC may be reviewed only via a special civil action for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court; and 2) such petition must be filed with the CA
in strict observance of the doctrine of the hierarchy of courts.
Thus, after St. Martin became final, special civil actions challenging NLRC
rulings have been referred by this Court to the CA for proper disposition.
Exceptions to this rule were those instances when -- prior to the finality of
St. Martin -- both parties had already filed their respective memoranda with
this Court, and it then opted to take final cognizance of the case.14 Under
AM No. 99-2-01-SC, however, all new cases erroneously filed with this
Court after June 1, 1999, were dismissed forthwith.
PROPRIETY OF THE CA'S DISMISSAL OF THE PETITION
In their present Petition, petitioners plead a liberal construction of the rules.
They argue that the verification and the certification against forum
shopping executed by only two of the 25 petitioners have already satisfied
the requirements under Sections 415 and 516 of Rule 7. On the other hand,
the CA ruled that all 25 petitioners should have signed the verification and
the certification of non-forum shopping. We clarify.
Actually, two separate rules are involved in the present controversy – one,
on verification; and the other, on the certification against forum shopping.
TWO SIGNATURES SUFFICIENT FOR VERIFICATION
The verification requirement is provided under Section 4 of Rule 7 of the
Rules of Court, as follows:
"SEC. 4. Verification. – Except when otherwise specifically required by law or
rule,17 pleadings need not be under oath, verified or accompanied by
affidavit.
"A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading
and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his knowledge and
belief.
"A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on
'information and belief,' or upon 'knowledge, information and belief,' or
lacks a proper verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading." (Italics
supplied)
The PURPOSE OF REQUIRING A VERIFICATION is to secure an assurance
that the allegations of the petition have been made in good faith; or are
true and correct, not merely speculative.
RULE 7 CASES | SENYORA SANTIBANEZ
This requirement is simply a condition affecting the form of pleadings, and
noncompliance therewith does not necessarily render it fatally defective.
Indeed, VERIFICATION IS ONLY A FORMAL, NOT A JURISDICTIONAL,
REQUIREMENT.
IN THE PRESENT CASE, the problem is NOT THE LACK OF A VERIFICATION,
BUT THE ADEQUACY OF ONE EXECUTED BY ONLY TWO OF THE 25
PETITIONERS. These two signatories are unquestionably real parties in interest,
who undoubtedly have sufficient knowledge and belief to swear to the truth of
the allegations in the Petition. THIS VERIFICATION IS ENOUGH ASSURANCE
THAT THE MATTERS ALLEGED THEREIN HAVE BEEN MADE IN GOOD
FAITH OR ARE TRUE AND CORRECT, NOT MERELY SPECULATIVE. The
requirement of verification has thus been substantially complied with.
CERTIFICATION AGAINST FORUM SHOPPING
SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLIED WITH
For petitions for certiorari, on the other hand, a certification against forum
shopping is required under Section 3 of Rule 4621 of the Rules of Court, as
follows:
"SEC. 3. Contents and filing of petition; effect of non-compliance with
requirements. - x x x
xxx xxx xxx
"The petitioner shall also submit together with the petition a sworn certification
that he has not theretofore commenced any other action involving the same
issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or different divisions thereof,
or any other tribunal or agency; if there is such other action or proceeding, he
must state the status of the same; and if he should thereafter learn that a
similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme
Court, the Court of Appeals, or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal
or agency, he undertakes to promptly inform the aforesaid courts and other
tribunal or agency thereof within five (5) days therefrom.
xxx xxx xxx
"The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements
shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition."
The certification requirement is rooted in the principle that a party-litigant shall
not be allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies in different fora, as this
practice is detrimental to an orderly judicial procedure.22 The lack of a
certification against forum shopping, unlike that of verification, is generally not
cured by its submission after the filing of the petition.23
14
The submission of a certificate against forum shopping is thus deemed
obligatory, though not jurisdictional.24 (Jurisdiction over the subject or
nature of the action is conferred by law.) Not being jurisdictional, the
requirement has been relaxed under justifiable circumstances25 under the
rule of substantial compliance.
In the present case, petitioners aver that the signatures of only two of them
suffice as substantial compliance with the attestation requirement for a
certificate against forum shopping. In effect, they are asking this Court to
disregard a defect33 in their Petition.
Petitioners need only show, therefore, that there was reasonable cause for
the failure of some of them to sign the certification against forum
shopping, and that the outright dismissal of the Petition would defeat the
administration of justice.
We find their reasons meritorious. First, as pointed out in the Motion for
Reconsideration filed with the CA, the case dragged for an undeniably long
time, because its remand to the labor arbiter forced many of the petitioners
to go back to the provinces to await the final outcome, while those who
remained in Metro Manila were forced out of temporary quarters every so
often.36 Under these circumstances, it was extremely difficult to secure all
the required signatures.
Second, it is safe to assume that the matters alleged in the certificate
against forum shopping have been complied with by the non-signing
petitioners. Twenty-one of the petitioners executed in favor of their
counsel, a "Natatanging Gawad ng Kapangyarihan,"37 which gives him
authority to represent them in all matters connected with the case. As it has
not been revoked or superseded, the possibility of any of them filing
another action or claim through another counsel is effectively foreclosed.
Third, the apparent merits of the substantive aspects of the case, as in Uy,
should be deemed as a "special circumstance" or "compelling reason" for
allowing the Petition. Pertinent thereto, the Court notes that the conflicting
findings of the NLRC and of the labor arbiter -- who ruled twice in favor of
petitioners -- provide ample justification for the CA's review of the merits.
The outright dismissal of the Petition was therefore prejudicial to the
substantial rights of the parties.
Indeed, rules of procedure are established to secure substantial justice.38
Being instruments for the speedy and efficient administration of justice,
they must be used to achieve such end, not to derail it.39 Technical
requirements may thus be dispensed with in meritorious appeals.
POLANCO VS CRUZ
Respondent Carmen Cruz, through her attorney-in-fact, Virgilio Cruz, filed a
complaint for damages7 against petitioners for allegedly destroying her
palay crops. While admitting that petitioners own the agricultural land she
tilled, respondent claimed she was a lawful tenant thereof and had been in
actual possession when petitioners maliciously filled so with soil and palay
husk on July 1 and 2, 2000. Respondent prayed that petitioners be held
RULE 7 CASES | SENYORA SANTIBANEZ
liable for actual damages, moral damages, exemplary damages, litigation
expenses and attorney’s fees, and costs of the suit.
Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss,8 which was denied by the trial court in an
Order9 dated December 4, 2000. It held that it has jurisdiction over the case
because the allegations in the Complaint made a claim for damages, and not an
agrarian dispute which should be referred to the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB); and that the Complaint was properly filed
because the Certification of Non-forum Shopping was signed by respondent’s
attorney-in-fact.
Petitioners simultaneously filed an Answer10 to the complaint and a Motion for
Reconsideration11 of the December 4, 2000 Order. However, the court a quo
denied the motion for lack of merit in an Order12 dated September 10, 2001.
On January 9, 2002, the trial court issued an Order13 dismissing the case due to
respondent’s failure to prosecute.
CA Respondent Carmen Cruz, through her attorney-in-fact, Virgilio Cruz, filed a
complaint for damages7 against petitioners for allegedly destroying her palay
crops. While admitting that petitioners own the agricultural land she tilled,
respondent claimed she was a lawful tenant thereof and had been in actual
possession when petitioners maliciously filled so with soil and palay husk on
July 1 and 2, 2000. Respondent prayed that petitioners be held liable for actual
damages, moral damages, exemplary damages, litigation expenses and
attorney’s fees, and costs of the suit.
Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss,8 which was denied by the trial court in an
Order9 dated December 4, 2000. It held that it has jurisdiction over the case
because the allegations in the Complaint made a claim for damages, and not an
agrarian dispute which should be referred to the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB); and that THE COMPLAINT WAS
PROPERLY FILED BECAUSE THE CERTIFICATION OF NON-FORUM
SHOPPING WAS SIGNED BY RESPONDENT’S ATTORNEY-IN-FACT.
The trial court issued an Order13 dismissing the case due to respondent’s
failure to prosecute.
ISSUE:
RULING:
FORUM SHOPPING
The Court of Appeals correctly noted that petitioners raised the matter of
respondent’s alleged forum shopping for the first time only in their Motion for
Reconsideration. Issues not previously ventilated cannot be raised for the first
time on appeal,18 much less when first raised in the motion for reconsideration
of a decision of the appellate court.
At any rate, this Court does not find respondent’s allegations in her complaint
in Civil Case No. 542-M-00 to be constitutive of the elements of forum-
shopping. Respondent merely described herself as a tenant of petitioners and
15
mentioned that there was an unlawful detainer case19 involving the parcel
of land which is also involved in the instant civil case for damages.
There is forum-shopping when as a result of an adverse decision in one
forum, or in anticipation thereof, a party seeks a favorable opinion in
another forum through means other than appeal or certiorari. Forum-
shopping exists when two or more actions involve the same transactions,
essential facts, and circumstances; and raise identical causes of action,
subject matter, and issues. Still another test of forum-shopping is when the
elements of litis pendencia are present or where a final judgment in one
case will amount to res judicata in another – whether in the two or more
pending cases, there is an identity of (a) parties (or at least such parties as
represent the same interests in both actions), (b) rights or causes of action,
and (c) reliefs sought.20
Although there is an identity of some of the parties in the instant case for
damages and the unlawful detainer case, there is, however, no identity of
reliefs prayed for. The former is for recovery of damages allegedly caused
by petitioners’ acts on respondent’s palay crops; while the latter case
involved possessory and tenancy rights of respondent. As such, respondent
did not violate the rule on forum-shopping.
ANOTHER ISSUE:
Section 1, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure imposes upon the
plaintiff the duty to promptly move ex parte to have the case set for pre-
trial after the last pleading has been served and filed. Moreover, Section 3,
Rule 1721 provides that failure on the part of the plaintiff to comply with
said duty without any justifiable cause may result to the dismissal of the
complaint for failure to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of
time or failure to comply with the rules of procedure.1avvphi1
It must be stressed that even if the plaintiff fails to promptly move for pre-
trial without any justifiable cause for such delay, the extreme sanction of
dismissal of the complaint might not be warranted if no substantial
prejudice would be caused to the defendant, and there are special and
compelling reasons which would make the strict application of the rule
clearly unjustified.22
In the instant case, the Court of Appeals correctly held that the dismissal of
respondent’s complaint is too severe a sanction for her failure to file a
motion to set the case for pre-trial. It must be pointed out that respondent
prosecuted her action with utmost diligence and with reasonable dispatch
since filing the complaint – she filed an opposition to petitioners’ motion to
dismiss the complaint; a comment to petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration of the December 4, 2000 Order of the trial court; and an
Answer to Counterclaim of petitioners. When the trial court issued an order
dismissing the case, respondent filed without delay a motion for
reconsideration; and upon its denial, she immediately filed a Notice of
Appeal.23 Moreover, contrary to petitioners’ claim that respondent was
silent for one year since she filed her Answer to Counterclaim until the trial
court’s dismissal order,24 records show that between said period, both
parties and the trial court were threshing out petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration of the December 4, 2000 Order.
RULE 7 CASES | SENYORA SANTIBANEZ
While "heavy pressures of work" was not considered a persuasive reason to
justify the failure to set the case for pre-trial in Olave v. Mistas,25 however,
unlike the respondents in the said case, herein respondent never failed to
comply with the Rules of Court or any order of the trial court at any other time.
Failing to file a motion to set the case for pre-trial was her first and only
technical lapse during the entire proceedings. Neither has she manifested an
evident pattern or a scheme to delay the disposition of the case nor a wanton
failure to observe the mandatory requirement of the rules. Accordingly, the
ends of justice and fairness would best be served if the parties are given the full
opportunity to litigate their claims and the real issues involved in the case are
threshed out in a full-blown trial. Besides, petitioners would not be prejudiced
should the case proceed as they are not stripped of any affirmative defenses
nor deprived of due process of law.
This is not to say that adherence to the Rules could be dispensed with.
However, exigencies and situations might occasionally demand flexibility in
their application.
CHAVEZ VS CA
VARGAS OWNED A 5 hectare cocnut land and rice field. Petitioner Evelina G.
Chavez had been staying in a remote portion of the land with her family,
planting coconut seedlings on the land and supervising the harvest of coconut
and palay. Fidela and Evelina agreed to divide the gross sales of all products
from the land between themselves. Since Fidela was busy with her law practice,
Evelina undertook to hold in trust for Fidela her half of the profits.
But Fidela claimed that Evelina had failed to remit her share of the profits and,
despite demand to turn over the administration of the property to Fidela, had
refused to do so. Consequently, Fidela filed a complaint against Evelina and her
daughter, Aida C. Deles, who was assisting her mother, for recovery of
possession, rent, and damages with prayer for the immediate appointment of a
receiver before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulan, Sorsogon.
After hearing, the RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction based on
Fidela’s admission that Evelina and Aida were tenants who helped plant
coconut seedlings on the land and supervised the harvest of coconut and palay.
CA
Fidela appealed to the CA. She also filed with that court a motion for the
appointment of a receiver. On April 12, 2006 the CA granted the motion and
ordained receivership of the land
DARAB
Parenthetically, Fidela also filed three estafa cases with the RTC of Olongapo
City and a complaint for dispossession with the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB) against Evelina and Aida. In all these cases, Fidela
asked for the immediate appointment of a receiver for the property.
ISSUE:
16
Whether or not respondent Fidela is guilty of forum shopping considering
that she had earlier filed identical applications for receivership over the
subject properties in the criminal cases she filed with the RTC of Olongapo
City against petitioners Evelina and Aida and in the administrative case that
she filed against them before the DARAB
RULING:
One. BY FORUM SHOPPING, a party initiates two or more actions in
separate tribunals, grounded on the same cause, trusting that one or the
other tribunal would favorably dispose of the matter.
The ELEMENTS OF FORUM SHOPPING are the same as in litis pendentia
where the final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the
other. The elements of forum shopping are:
(1) identity of parties, or at least such parties as would represent the same
interest in both actions;
(2) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded
on the same facts; and
(3) identity of the two preceding particulars such that any judgment
rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful,
amount to res judicata in the action under consideration.
Here, however, the various suits Fidela initiated against Evelina and Aida
involved DIFFERENT CAUSES OF ACTION AND SOUGHT DIFFERENT
RELIEFS. The present civil action that she filed with the RTC sought to
recover possession of the property based on Evelina and Aida’s failure to
account for its fruits.
The ESTAFA CASES SHE FILED WITH THE RTC accused the two of
misappropriating and converting her share in the harvests for their own
benefit.
Her COMPLAINT FOR DISPOSSESSION UNDER REPUBLIC ACT 8048
WITH THE DARAB sought to dispossess the two for allegedly cutting
coconut trees without the prior authority of Fidela or of the Philippine
Coconut Authority.
The above cases are similar only in that they involved the same parties and
Fidela sought the placing of the properties under receivership in all of
them. But receivership is not an action. It is but an auxiliary remedy, a mere
incident of the suit to help achieve its purpose. Consequently, it cannot be
said that the grant of receivership in one case will amount to res judicata on
the merits of the other cases. The grant or denial of this provisional remedy
will still depend on the need for it in the particular action.
CRISOSTOMO VS SEC
Sixto Crisostomo, Felipe Crisostomo, Juanito Crisostomo et al were the
original stockholders of the United Doctors Medical Center (UDMC), which
was organized in 1968 with authorized capital stock of P1 million (later
RULE 7 CASES | SENYORA SANTIBANEZ
increased to P15 million in 1972). They owned 40% of the outstanding stock
while the majority belonged to the members of the United Medical Staff
Association (UMSA)
1.Despite their minority status, the Crisostomo group has managed UDMC from
its inception with Juanito Crisostomo as president and petitioner Sixto
Crisostomo as director and legal counsel
2.In 1988, UDMC defaulted in its obligation to pay P55 million to DBP. In the
last quarter of 1987, UDMC’s assets and those of the Crisostomos which had
been given to DBP as collateral, faced foreclosure by the Asset Privatization
Trust (APT), which had taken over UDMC’s loan.
3.As such, UDMC, through Ricardo Alfonso and Juanito Crisostomo, persuaded
the Yamadas and Enatsu (Shoji Yamada and Tomatada Enatsu are Japanese
doctors) to invest fresh capital in UDMC. The wife of Enatsu is a Filipina. They
invested P57 million in UDMC
4.The investment was effected by means of a stock purchase agreement and an
amended memorandum of agreement whereby the private respondents
subscribed to 82.09% of the outstanding shares of UDMC. Both transactions
were authorized by the BOD and stockholders of UDMC, and approved by BSP
and SEC
5.The said capital not only saved the assets of UDMC from foreclosure but also
freed the Crisostomos group their individual and solidary liabilities as sureties
for the DBP loan
6.However, petitioner Sixto Crisostomo filed an SEC case against Juanito
Crisostomo, Yamada and Enatsu to stop the holding of the stockholder’s and
BOD meeting and to disqualify the Japanese investors from holding a
controlling interest in UDMC
7.Subsequently, petitioner filed a case with RTC Makati seeking a preliminary
injunction and identical reliefs prayed for by him in the SEC case.
8.Petitioner alleged that Yamada and Enatsu violated the Constitutional
prohibition against foreigners practicing a profession in the Philippines (Sec 14,
Art XII 1987 Constitution
Sixto Crisostomo sought a review of the SEC's en banc resolution in the Court
of Appeals
CA dismissed the petition..
Thus, a petition for review was filed before teh SC.
ISSUE: W/N there was forum shopping?
RULING: YES
Additionally, in his petition for review (G.R. No. 89555) he prays this Court to
giant "all the reliefs" prayed for by him in CA-G.R. SP No. 17435. Here is a clear
case of forum-shopping.
There is forum-shopping whenever as a result of an adverse opinion in one
forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in
another. The principle applies not only with respect to suits filed in the courts
but also in connection with litigations commenced in the courts while an
administrative proceeding is pending, as in this case, in order to defeat
administrative processes and in anticipation of an unfavorable administrative
ruling and a favorable court ruling. This is specially so, as in this case, where the
court in which the second suit was brought, has no jurisdiction. (Villanueva vs.
Adre, G.R. No. 8063, April 27, 1989.) (p. 303, Rollo)
Forum-shopping is prohibited by the Interim Rules of Court for it trifles with the
courts and abuses their processes (E. Razon, Inc. vs. Phil. Port Authority, 101
SCRA 450). Section 17 of the Interim Rules of Courts provides:
17
17. Petitions for writs of certiorari, etc., — No petition for certiorari,
mandamus, prohibition, habeas corpus or quo warranto may be filed in the
Intermediate Appellate Court if another similar petition has been filed or is
still pending in the Supreme Court. Nor may such petition be filed in the
Supreme Court if a similar petition has been filed or is still pending in the
Intermediate Appellate Court, unless it be to review the action taken by the
Intermediate Appellate Court on the petition filed with it. A violation of this
rule shall constitute contempt of court and shall be a cause for the
summary dismissal of both petitions, without prejudice to the taking of
appropriate action against the counsel or party concerned. (Interim Rules of
Court.)
Forum-shopping makes the petitioner subject to disciplinary action and
renders his petitions in this Court and in the Court of Appeals dismissible (E.
Razon, Inc. vs. Philippine Port Authority, et al., G.R. No. 75197, Resolution
dated July 31, 1986; Buan vs. Lopez, Jr., 145 SCRA 34, 38-39; Collado vs.
Hernando, L-43886, May 30, 1988). For this reason, if not for their lack of
merit, the petitions should be, as they are hereby, dismissed.
TRAVENO VS BOBONG BANANA
Petitioner Oldarico Traveño and his 16 co-petitioners worked at a banana
plantation at Bobongan Santo Tomas, Davao del Norte. Sometime in 2000,
they filed three separate complaints for illegal dismissal, individually and
collectively, with the NLRC against said respondents including respondent
Dole Asia Philippines as it then supposedly owned TACOR, for unpaid
salaries, overtime pay, 13th month pay, service incentive leave pay,
damages, and attorney’s fees.
DFI answered for itself and TACOR denied that they hired petitioners; That
it had an arrangement with several landowners for them to extend financial
and technical assistance to them for the development of their lands into a
banana plantation on the condition that the bananas produced therein
would be sold exclusively to TACOR and it was the landowners who worked
on their own farms and hired laborers to assist them and that the
landowners themselves decided to form a cooperative in order to better
attain their business objectives;
The Cooperative failed to file a position paper despite due notice,
prompting the Labor Arbiter to consider it to have waived its right to
adduce evidence in its defense.Nothing was heard from respondent Dole
Asia Philippines.
Labor Arbiter, found respondent Cooperative guilty of illegal dismissal. It
dropped the complaints against DFI, TACOR and Dole Asia Philippines.
NLRC sustained the Labor Arbiter’s ruling that the employer of petitioners
is the Cooperative, there being no showing that the earlier mentioned
Orders of the DOLE Secretary had been set aside by a court of competent
jurisdiction. It partially granted petitioners’ appeal, however, by ordering
the Cooperative to pay them their unpaid wages, wage differentials, service
incentive leave pay, and 13th month pay. It thus remanded the case to the
Labor Arbiter for computation of those awards.
CA
the appellate court dismissed petitioners’ petition for certiorari on the
ground that the accompanying verification and certification against forum
shopping was defective, it having been signed by only 19 of the 22 therein
named petitioners.
RULE 7 CASES | SENYORA SANTIBANEZ
Petition for review on certiorari was then field before the SC
ISSUE did the CA err in dismissing the case?
RULING
Respecting the appellate court’s dismissal of petitioners’ appeal due to the
failure of some of them to sign the therein accompanying verification and
certification against forum-shopping, the Court’s guidelines for the bench and
bar in Altres v. Empleo,20 which were culled "from jurisprudential
pronouncements," are instructive:
For the guidance of the bench and bar, the Court restates in capsule form the
jurisprudential pronouncements already reflected above respecting non-
compliance with the requirements on, or submission of defective, verification
and certification against forum shopping:
1) A distinction must be made between non-compliance with the requirement
on or submission of defective verification, and non-compliance with the
requirement on or submission of defective certification against forum shopping.
2) As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein does not
necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. The court may order its
submission or correction or act on the pleading if the attending circumstances
are such that strict compliance with the Rule may be dispensed with in order
that the ends of justice may be served thereby.
3) Verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample
knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition
signs the verification, and when matters alleged in the petition have been made
in good faith or are true and correct.
4) As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a
defect therein, unlike in verification, is generally not curable by its subsequent
submission or correction thereof, unless there is a need to relax the Rule on the
ground of "substantial compliance" or presence of "special circumstances or
compelling reasons."
5) The certification against forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs
or petitioners in a case; otherwise, those who did not sign will be dropped as
parties to the case. Under reasonable or justifiable circumstances, however, as
when all the plaintiffs or petitioners share a common interest and invoke a
common cause of action or defense, the signature of only one of them in the
certification against forum shopping substantially complies with the Rule.
6) Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be executed by the
party-pleader, not by his counsel. If, however, for reasonable or justifiable
reasons, the party-pleader is unable to sign, he must execute a Special Power of
Attorney designating his counsel of record to sign on his behalf. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
18
The foregoing restated pronouncements were lost in the challenged
Resolutions of the appellate court. Petitioners’ contention that the appellate
court should have dismissed the petition only as to the non-signing
petitioners or merely dropped them as parties to the case is thus in order.
INSTEAD OF REMANDING THE CASE TO THE APPELLATE COURT,
HOWEVER, THE COURT DEEMS IT MORE PRACTICAL TO DECIDE THE
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE RAISED IN THIS PETITION SO AS NOT TO
FURTHER DELAY THE DISPOSITION OF THIS CASE.21 And it thus
resolves to deviate as well from the general rule that factual questions are
not entertained in petitions for review on certiorari of the appellate court’s
decisions in order to write finis to this protracted litigation.
CAVILE VS HEIRS OF CLARITA CAVILE
Bernardo Cavili contracted three marriages. The first marriage was with Ines
Dumat-ol with whom he had one child, Simplicia. The second was with
Orfia Colalho with whom he had two children: Fortunato and Vevencia. And
the third was with Tranquilina Galon with whom he had three children:
Castor, Susana and Benedicta. Throughout his lifetime, Bernardo Cavili
acquired six parcels of land which became the subject of the instant case.
In October 1977, the descendants of Bernardo’s first and second marriage
(herein respondents) filed a complaint for partition against the descendants
of his third marriage (herein petitioners). The complaint alleged, among
others, that respondents and petitioners were co-owners of the properties
in question, having inherited the same from Bernardo Cavili. Upon the
death of Bernardo, his son by his third marriage, Castor Cavili, took
possession of the properties as administrator for and in behalf of his co-
owners. However, when Castor died, his children took possession of the
parcels of land but no longer as administrators. They claimed the properties
as well as their fruits as their own and repeatedly refused respondents’
demand for partition.
As petitioners failed to file an Answer within the reglementary period, they
were declared in default and respondents were allowed to present evidence
ex parte. The trial court rendered a decision on October 5, 1979 ordering
the partition of the six parcels of land.
However, upon motion of Primitivo Cavili and Quirino Cavili who were not
properly served with summons, the trial court held a new trial and allowed
said parties to present evidence. Among the evidence they proferred was a
Deed of Partition which appeared to have been executed by the heirs of
Bernardo Cavili on April 5, 1937.2 Giving weight to the documentary
evidence presented by Primitivo Cavili and Quirino Cavili, the trial court
rendered another decision on May 7, 1991 dismissing the complaint for
partition.
CA
The appellate court reversed the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE:
RULE 7 CASES | SENYORA SANTIBANEZ
W/N case should be dismissed because the certification against forum
shopping attached to the petition was signed by only one of the petitioners.
RULING:
The rule is that the certificate of non-forum shopping must be signed by all the
petitioners or plaintiffs in a case and the signing by only one of them is
insufficient. However, the Court has also stressed that the rules on forum
shopping, which were designed to promote and facilitate the orderly
administration of justice, should not be interpreted with such absolute
literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective.7 The rule of
substantial compliance may be availed of with respect to the contents of the
certification. This is because the requirement of strict compliance with the
provisions regarding the certification of non-forum shopping merely
underscores its mandatory nature in that the certification cannot be altogether
dispensed with or its requirements completely disregarded. It does not thereby
interdict substantial compliance with its provisions under justifiable
circumstances.8
We find that the execution by Thomas George Cavile, Sr. in behalf of all the
other petitioners of the certificate of non-forum shopping constitutes
substantial compliance with the Rules. All the petitioners, being relatives and
co-owners of the properties in dispute, share a common interest thereon. They
also share a common defense in the complaint for partition filed by the
respondents. Thus, when they filed the instant petition, they filed it as a
collective, raising only one argument to defend their rights over the properties
in question. There is sufficient basis, therefore, for Thomas George Cavili, Sr. to
speak for and in behalf of his co-petitioners that they have not filed any action
or claim involving the same issues in another court or tribunal, nor is there
other pending action or claim in another court or tribunal involving the same
issues. Moreover, it has been held that the merits of the substantive aspects of
the case may be deemed as "special circumstance" for the Court to take
cognizance of a petition for review although the certification against forum
shopping was executed and signed by only one of the petitioners.
SAN MIGUEL BUKID VS CITY OF MANDALUYONG
Petitioner San Miguel Bukid Homeowners Association, Inc. (formerly known as
Bukid Neighborhood Landless Association), an association of urban poor
dwellers of San Miguel Bukid Compound, Plainview, Mandaluyong City, filed
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaluyong City a Complaint3 for
specific performance and damages against respondents City of Mandaluyong
(City) and A.F. Calma General Construction (Calma).
It is alleged therein that pursuant to the City’s Land for the Landless Program,
petitioner and the City entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA),
whereby the City purchased lots and then transferred the same to petitioner
with a first real estate mortgage in favor of the City.
Subsequently, the City and Calma entered into a Contract Agreement for the
latter to construct row houses and medium-rise buildings on the
aforementioned lots within 540 calendar days for the benefit of petitioner’s
members. In June 1995, Calma began construction, but in June 1996, work on
the project was stopped. The period of 540 days elapsed sometime in
November 1996, but the houses and buildings were not yet completed.
19
Petitioner’s letters sent to the Mayor of the City requesting an update on
the project remained unanswered.
Hence, petitioner filed the complaint praying that the City and Calma be
ordered to perform their respective undertakings and obligations under the
Contract Agreement and to pay petitioner attorney’s fees, exemplary
damages and litigation expenses.
The City’s main defense was that the MOA had already been abrogated due
to petitioner’s failure to secure a loan from the Home Mortgage and
Finance Corporation, and that petitioner had no standing or personality to
institute the action, as it was not a party to the Contract Agreement.
Calma did not file an Answer.
Upon reaching teh CA, the case was dismissed because the person who
signed the Verification/Certification of Non-Forum Shopping thereof did
not appear to be authorized by petitioner.
ISSUE: Did CA err in dismissing teh case?
RULING: NO
The Resolutions of the CA which petitioner seeks to nullify are orders of
dismissal. In Magestrado v. People,12 the Court explained that an order of
dismissal is a final order which is a proper subject of an appeal, not
certiorari. This was reiterated in Pasiona v. Court of Appeals,13 where it was
emphasized that if what is being assailed is a decision, final order or
resolution of the CA, then appeal to this Court is via a verified petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. In cases where an
appeal was available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground therefor
is grave abuse of discretion.14 The existence and availability of the right of
appeal are antithetical to the availability of the special civil action for
certiorari, although where it is shown that the appeal would be inadequate,
slow, insufficient, and will not promptly relieve a party from the injurious
effects of the order complained of, or where appeal is inadequate and
ineffectual, the extraordinary writ of certiorari may be granted.15
Clearly, since the present case involves a final order of dismissal issued by
the CA, the proper course of action would have been to file a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45. Although there are exceptions to the
general rule, petitioner utterly failed to allege and prove that the
extraordinary remedy of the writ of certiorari should be granted, because
an appeal, although available, would be inadequate, insufficient and not
speedy enough to address the urgency of the matter. There is nothing in
the petition to show that this case qualifies as an exception to the general
rule. The circumstances prevailing in this case reveal that whatever
grievance petitioner may be suffering from the dismissal of its petition with
the CA could be properly addressed through a petition for review on
certiorari.
RULE 7 CASES | SENYORA SANTIBANEZ
On the ground alone that petitioner resorted to an improper remedy, the
present petition is already dismissible and undeserving of the Court’s attention.
However, even on the merits, the petition must be struck down.
IN THIS CASE, THE CERTIFICATE OF BOARD RESOLUTION ATTACHED TO
THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED WITH THE CA READS AS FOLLOWS:
x x x in a meeting of the Board of Directors of the SAN MIGUEL BUKID
HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, held on 7 November 1999, the following
resolution was unanimously adopted by the General Assembly of the
Association:
RESOLVED, that the ASSOCIATION re-file its Complaint for Specific
Performance with Damages against the CITY GOVERNMENT OF
MANDALUYONG and A.F. CALMA GENERAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION in
order to enforce their obligations under the CONTRACT AGREEMENT for a
housing project in favor of the ASSOCIATION;
RESOLVED, further, that MR. EVELIO D. BARATA, President of the ASSOCIATION,
be authorized to initiate, sign, file and prosecute the COMPLAINT.18
EVIDENTLY, PETITIONER ONLY AUTHORIZED ITS PRESIDENT, EVELIO
BARATA, TO INITIATE, SIGN, FILE AND PROSECUTE THE COMPLAINT FOR
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.
Certiorari, as a special civil action, is an original action invoking the original
jurisdiction of a court to annul or modify the proceedings of a tribunal, board
or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.19 It is an original and
independent action that is not part of the trial or the proceedings on the
complaint filed before the trial court.20 The petition for certiorari before the CA
is, therefore, a separate and distinct action from the action for specific
performance instituted before the RTC, as the writ of certiorari being prayed for
is directed against the judicial or quasi-judicial body, not against the private
parties in the original action for specific performance. Such being the case, the
November 7 1999 Resolution of the Board of Directors of petitioner association
is not and cannot be considered as an authorization for its President, Evelio
Barata, to initiate, sign, file and prosecute another case for the special civil
action of certiorari. The CA was, thus, correct in dismissing the petition for lack
of authority of Evelio Barata to sign the Certification of Non-Forum Shopping in
representation of petitioner.
THE SUBMISSION OF A SECRETARY’S CERTIFICATE WITH THE MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION IS ALSO INSUFFICIENT TO CURE THE INITIAL
DEFECT. Said Certificate stated that petitioner’s Board of Trustees approved a
Resolution at a meeting held on April 7, 2002, confirming and ratifying the
authority of Mr. Barata to sign all necessary papers for the petition for certiorari.
Note that the petition was filed on March 26, 2002, or before the date of said
Resolution. There is no certification as to when petitioner’s Board of Trustees
originally granted Mr. Barata authority to show that as of the date of the filing
of the petition for certiorari, Mr. Barata had been authorized to perform such
acts. Moreover, as ruled in Tible and Tible Company, Inc. v. Royal Savings and
Loan Association,21 to wit:
20
In Athena Computers, Inc. v. Reyes, the Court stressed that "certiorari, being
an extraordinary remedy, the party who seeks to avail of the same must
strictly observe the rules laid down by the law." x x x.
xxxx
x x x subsequent compliance does not ipso facto entitle a party to a
reconsideration of the dismissal order. As the Court aptly observed in Batoy
v. Regional Trial Court, Br. 50, Loay, Bohol:
x x x the requirement under Administrative Circular No. 04-94 for a
certificate of non-forum shopping is mandatory. The subsequent
compliance with said requirement does not excuse a party’s failure to
comply therewith in the first instance. In those cases where this Court
excused the non-compliance with the requirement of the submission of a
certificate of non-forum shopping, it found special circumstances or
compelling reasons which made the strict application of said Circular clearly
unjustified or inequitable.
In this case, such special circumstances are absent.
ESPIRITU VS PETRON
1.Petron Corporation (PETRON) sold and distributed liquefied petroleum
gas (LPG) in cylinder tanks that carried its trademark Gasul.
2.Carmen J. Doloiras owned and operated Kristina Patricia Enterprises (KPE),
the exclusive distributor of Gasul LPGs in the whole of Sorsogon, managed
by Jose Nelson Doloiras (JOSE).
3.Bicol Gas Refilling Plant Corporation (BICOL GAS), also in the business of
selling and distributing LPGs in Sorsogon, their tanks carry the trademark
Bicol Savers Gas, managed by Audie Llona (LLONA).
4.Due to trade and competition, any distributor of LPGs at times acquired
possession of LPG cylinder tanks belonging to other distributors operating
in the same area (a.k.a. captured cylinders).
5.JOSE: April 2001 Bicol Gas agreed with KPE for the swapping of captured
cylinders (one distributor could not refill captured cylinders with its own
brand of LPG).
6.In the course of implementing this arrangement, JOSE visited the BICOL
GAS refilling plant --- he noticed several Gasul tanks in Bicol Gas’
possession.
7.They agreed to have a swap (after LLONA was given permission for the
swap) involving around 30 Gasul tanks held by Bicol Gas in exchange for
assorted tanks held by KPE.
8.JOSE noticed that Bicol Gas still had a number of Gasul tanks in its yard --
- offered to make a swap for these but LLONA declined --- Bicol Gas
owners wanted to send those tanks to Batangas.
9.JOSE observed on almost a daily basis that Bicol Gas trucks carried a load
of Gasul tanks (he noted that KPEs volume of sales dropped significantly
from June to July 2001).
10.August 4, 2001 - JOSE saw a Bicol Gas truck on the Maharlika Highway --
- it had on it one unsealed 50-kg Gasul tank and one 50-kg Shellane tank.
RULE 7 CASES | SENYORA SANTIBANEZ
11.JOSE followed the truck and when it stopped at a store, he asked the driver,
Jun Leorena, and the Bicol Gas sales representative, Jerome Misal, about the
Gasul tank in their truck (JOSE found that it wasn’t empty) --- Misal and
Leorena then admitted that the Gasul and Shellane tanks on their truck
belonged to a customer who had them filled up by Bicol Gas.
12.Because of the incident, KPE filed a complaint for violations of R.A. 623
(illegally filling up registered cylinder tanks), as amended, and Sections 155
(infringement of trade marks) and 169.1 (unfair competition) of the Intellectual
Property Code (R.A. 8293).
Provincial Prosecutor – Probable Cause only for violation of R.A. 623, only
Mirabena, Misal, Leorena, and petitioner Llona, could be charged.
Office of the Regional State Prosecutor, Region V (Pet. For Review) - ordered
the filing of additional informations against the four employees of Bicol Gas for
unfair competition, no case for trademark infringement was present.
Secretary of Justice - denied appeal of Petron and KPE and their motion for
reconsideration.
CA (certiorari) - reversed the Secretary of Justices ruling.
ISSUE: Whether or not the certificate of non-forum shopping that accompanied
the petition filed with the Court of Appeals, signed only by Atty. Cruz on behalf
of Petron, complied with what the rules require;
RULING:
First. Petitioners Espiritu, et al. point out that the certificate of non-forum
shopping that respondents KPE and Petron attached to the petition they filed
with the Court of Appeals was inadequate, having been signed only by Petron,
through Atty. Cruz.
But, while procedural requirements such as that of submittal of a certificate of
non-forum shopping cannot be totally disregarded, THEY MAY BE DEEMED
SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLIED WITH UNDER JUSTIFIABLE CIRCUMSTANCES.
One of these circumstances is where the petitioners filed a collective action in
which they share a common interest in its subject matter or raise a common
cause of action. In such a case, the certification by one of the petitioners may
be deemed sufficient.8
Here, KPE and Petron SHARED A COMMON CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST
PETITIONERS ESPIRITU, ET AL., NAMELY, THE VIOLATION OF THEIR
PROPRIETARY RIGHTS WITH RESPECT TO THE USE OF GASUL TANKS AND
TRADEMARK. FURTHERMORE, ATTY. CRUZ SAID IN HIS CERTIFICATION
THAT HE WAS EXECUTING IT "FOR AND ON BEHALF OF THE
CORPORATION, AND CO-PETITIONER CARMEN J. DOLOIRAS." Thus, the
object of the requirement – to ensure that a party takes no recourse to multiple
forums – was substantially achieved. Besides, the failure of KPE to sign the
certificate of non-forum shopping does not render the petition defective with
respect to Petron which signed it through Atty. Cruz.10 The Court of Appeals,
therefore, acted correctly in giving due course to the petition before it.
MID PASIG LAND DEVELOPMENT CORP VS TABLANTE
21
Petitioner is the registered owner of a piece of land situated in Pasig City,
bounded by Meralco Avenue, Ortigas Avenue, Doña Julia Vargas Avenue,
and Valle Verde Subdivision. On December 6, 1999, petitioner, represented
by its Chairman and President, Ronaldo Salonga, and ECRM Enterprises,
represented by its proprietor, Mario P. Tablante, executed an agreement
whereby the former would lease to the latter an area, approximately one (1)
hectare, of the aforesaid land, for a period of three (3) months, to be used
as the staging area for the Home and Garden Exhibition Fair. On March 6,
2000, the date of the expiration of the Lease Agreement,
Tablante assigned all his rights and interests under the said agreement to
respondents Laurie M. Litam and/or Rockland Construction Company, Inc.
(Rockland) under a Deed of Assignment of the same date. Petitioner
eventually learned that respondent Tablante had executed a Contract of
Lease with respondent MC Home Depot, Inc. on November 26, 1999 over
the same parcel of land. Thereafter, respondent MC Home Depot, Inc.
constructed improvements on the land and subdivided the area into fifty-
nine (59) commercial stalls, which it leased to various entities. Upon the
expiration of the lease on March 6, 2000, petitioner demanded that
respondents vacate the land. A final demand was made in a letter dated
December 20, 2000.2
In order to forestall ejectment from the premises, respondent Rockland
filed a case for Specific Performance with the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 266, Pasig City, on January 11, 2001, compelling petitioner to
execute a new lease contract for another three (3) years, commencing in
July 2000. This was docketed as Civil Case No. 68213. Petitioner moved to
dismiss the complaint on the ground that it was anticipatory in nature.
Consequently, on August 22, 2001, petitioner filed Civil Case No. 8788 for
unlawful detainer against herein respondents, raffled to the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC), Pasig City, Branch 70. Simultaneously, petitioner filed a
supplemental motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 68213, on the ground of litis
pendentia. Petitioner’s motion to dismiss was denied. The denial was
questioned and eventually elevated to the Supreme Court.
MTC rendered judgment in the unlawful detainer (ejectment) case. In the
main, the trial court ruled that the issue did not involve material or physical
possession, but rather, whether or not ECRM had the right to exercise an
option to renew its lease contract. The MTC stated that, considering that
this issue was incapable of pecuniary estimation, jurisdiction over the case
was vested in the RTC.
On appeal, the RTC, Pasig City, Branch 160, affirmed in toto.
CA resolved to dismiss the petition on the following grounds:
1) The verification and certification against non-forum shopping was signed
by a certain Antonio A. Merelos as General Manager of the petitioner-
corporation without attaching therewith a Corporate Secretary’s certificate
or board resolution that he is authorized to sign for and on behalf of the
petitioner
RULE 7 CASES | SENYORA SANTIBANEZ 22

ISSUE: Did teh CA err in dismissing teh case?

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions of the

Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. However, in view of the
RULING: developments which have rendered the issue of the right of possession
over the subject property moot and academic, the main case is hereby
It must be borne in mind that Sec. 23, in relation to Sec. 25 of the Corporation
considered CLOSED AND TERMINATED.
Code, clearly enunciates that all corporate powers are exercised, all business
conducted, and all properties controlled by the board of directors. A
corporation has a separate and distinct personality from its directors and
officers and can only exercise its corporate powers through the board of
directors. Thus, it is clear that an individual corporate officer cannot solely
exercise any corporate power pertaining to the corporation without authority
from the board of directors. This has been our constant holding in cases
instituted by a corporation.

STANDARD INSURANCE VS CUARESMA

In a slew of cases, however, we have recognized the authority of some
corporate officers to sign the verification and certification against forum
shopping. In Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. CA, we recognized
the authority of a general manager or acting general manager to sign the Two vehicles, one driven by Jefferson Cham and insured with petitioner
verification and certificate against forum shopping; x x x. Standard Insurance Co., Inc., and the other owned by respondent Arnold
Cuaresma and driven by respondent Jerry B. Cuaresma, figured in an
accident at North Avenue, Quezon City.3 Consequently, the damage on the
vehicle driven by Cham was repaired, the cost of which was borne by
In sum, we have held that the following officials or employees of the company
petitioner.
can sign the verification and certification without need of a board resolution: (1)
the Chairperson of the Board of Directors, (2) the President of a corporation, (3)
the General Manager or Acting General Manager, (4) Personnel Officer, and (5)
an Employment Specialist in a labor case.1avvphi1 Cham then executed a Release of Claim in favor of petitioner subrogating
the latter to all his rights to recover on all claims, demands, and rights of
action on account of the loss, damage, or injury sustained as a
consequence of the accident from any person liable thereto.
While the above cases do not provide a complete listing of authorized
signatories to the verification and certification required by the rules, the
determination of the sufficiency of the authority was done on a case to case
basis. The rationale applied in the foregoing cases is to justify the authority of An Information6 was filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of
corporate officers or representatives of the corporation to sign the verification Quezon City charging Cham of the crime of Reckless Imprudence Resulting
or certificate against forum shopping, being "in a position to verify the in Damage to Property docketed as Criminal Case No. 020256. During the
truthfulness and correctness of the allegations in the petition."10 pendency thereof, on March 17, 2008, petitioner, claiming that respondents
collided with Cham's vehicle in a reckless and imprudent manner, filed a
Complaint7 for Sum of Money with the MeTC of Manila against
respondents.
From the foregoing, it is thus clear that the failure to attach the Secretary’s
Certificate, attesting to General Manager Antonio Merelos’s authority to sign
the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping, should not be
considered fatal to the filing of the petition. Nonetheless, the requisite board METC ruled in favor of the respondents.
resolution was subsequently submitted to the CA, together with the pertinent
documents.11 Considering that petitioner substantially complied with the rules,
the dismissal of the petition was, therefore, unwarranted. Time and again, we RTC, however, reversed the ruling of the MeTC.
have emphasized that dismissal of an appeal on a purely technical ground is
frowned upon especially if it will result in unfairness. The rules of procedure
ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense for they have been
CA likewise found that the evidence proffered by petitioner is insufficient to
adopted to help secure, not override, substantial justice. For this reason, courts
support its averment of negligence.
must proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of statutory appeal;
rather, they must ensure that all litigants are granted the amplest opportunity
for the proper and just ventilation of their causes, free from the constraint of
technicalities.12 Petitioner contends that the testimonies of its witnesses Cham and Obello
sufficiently prove its claims, since the former has personal knowledge on
the events that transpired during the vehicular accident and the latter was
in a position to prove the amount incurred for the repair of the damages on
After a finding that the CA erred in dismissing the petition before it, a remand
Cham's vehicle. It also argues that its failure to present SPO2 Felicisimo V.
of the case is in order. However, a perusal of the records reveals that this is no
Cuaresma, the police investigator who prepared the traffic accident report
longer necessary in light of relevant developments obtaining in the case at bar.
submitted in evidence, is not fatal to its cause of action.

Dispositive portion:
RULE 7 CASES | SENYORA SANTIBANEZ
In their Comment,13 respondents counter that the bare allegations of Cham on
negligence cannot be deemed sufficient to prove petitioner's claim. They also
claim that in order for the traffic accident report to obtain probative value, the
police officer who prepared it must be identified in court. On a procedural
matter, respondents allege that petitioner, in failing to disclose the pendency of
the criminal suit against its assured Cham, is guilty of forum shopping.
ISSUE: was there forum shopping? NO
RULING:
We address the issue of forum shopping in saying that the essence of forum
shopping is the filing by a party against whom an adverse judgment has been
rendered in one forum, seeking another and possibly a favorable opinion in
another suit other than by appeal or special civil action for certiorari.14 It is the
act of filing multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of
action, either simultaneously or successively for the purpose of obtaining a
favorable judgment.15 However, as the RTC already mentioned, there exists no
forum shopping herein for the filing of the instant suit is expressly allowed to
proceed independently of the criminal action filed by respondents.
In the similar case of Casupanan v. Laroya,16 wherein as a result of a vehicular
accident, a party involved therein filed a criminal case for reckless imprudence
resulting in damage to property against the other party, who, in turn, filed a
civil suit against the party instituting the criminal action, We held that the party
filing the separate civil action cannot be liable for forum shopping in the
following wise:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
xxx However, there is no forum shopping in the instant case because the law
and the rules expressly allow the filing of a separate civil action which can
proceed independently of the criminal action.
Laroya filed the criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to
property based on the Revised Penal Code, while Casupanan and Capitulo filed
the civil action for damages based on Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Although
these two actions arose from the same act or omission, they have different
causes of action. The criminal case is based on culpa criminal punishable under
the Revised Penal Code, while the civil case is based on culpa aquiliana
actionable under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code. These articles on
culpa aquiliana read:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
"Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties,
is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is
entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence
under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the
same act or omission of the defendant."
Any aggrieved person can invoke these articles provided he proves, by
preponderance of evidence, that he has suffered damage because of the fault
23
or negligence of another. Either the private complainant or the accused can
file a separate civil action under these articles. There is nothing in the law or
rules that state only the private complainant in a criminal case may invoke
these articles.
Moreover, paragraph 6, Section 1, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal
Procedure ("2000 Rules" for brevity) expressly requires the accused to
litigate his counterclaim in a separate civil action, to
wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
"SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. - (a) x x x.
No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the
accused in the criminal case, but any cause of action which could have been
the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action." (Italics
supplied)
Since the present Rules require the accused in a criminal action to file his
counterclaim in a separate civil action, there can be no forum-shopping if
the accused files such separate civil action.
EULOGIO VS BELL
Respondents the Bell siblings are the unmarried children of respondent
Spouses Paterno C. Bell and Rogelia Calingasan-Bell (Sps. Bell). In 1995, the
Bell siblings lodged a Complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 4581 at the
(RTC) of Batangas City for annulment of documents, reconveyance, quieting
of title and damages against petitioners Enrico S. Eulogio and Natividad
Eulogio (the Eulogios).
The Complaint sought the annulment of the contract of sale executed by
Spouses Bell over their residential house and lot, as well as the cancellation
of the title obtained by petitioners by virtue of the Deed.
The RTC granted respondents' prayers and ordered the Register of Deeds
of Batangas City to cancel TCT in the name of defendants the Eulogios and
to reconstitute TCT as "family home" of the plaintiffs the Bell siblings and
Sps. Bell.
However RTC declared Spouses Bell liable to petitioners in the amount of PI
million plus 12% interest per annum.
On 9 June 2004 the RTC issued a Writ of Execution, as a result of which
respondents' property covered by the newly reconstituted TCT was levied
on execution. Upon motion by respondents, the trial court, on 31 August
2004, ordered the lifting of the writ of execution on the ground that the
property was a family home.
RTC issued on 25 November 2004 an Order directing the issuance of a writ
of execution. Consequently, respondents filed before the CA a
RULE 7 CASES | SENYORA SANTIBANEZ
Supplemental Petition with an urgent prayer for a temporary restraining order.
Respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari and Injunction before the CA
docketed as 87531. CA eventually enjoined the execution.
On 09 February 2009,18 the CA denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.
Hence, this Petition.
Issues: (1) whether petitioners are guilty of forum-shopping
RULING: NO
PETITIONERS ARE NOT GUILTY OF FORUM-SHOPPING.
Forum shopping can be committed in three ways; (1) by filing multiple cases
based on the same cause of action and with the same prayer, the previous case
not having been resolved yet (where the ground for dismissal is litis pendentia);
(2) by filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and with the
same prayer, the previous case having been finally resolved (where the ground
for dismissal is res judicata); and (3) by filing multiple cases based on the same
cause of action but with different prayers, or by splitting of causes of action
(where the ground for dismissal is also either litis pendentia or res judicata).19
The essence of forum shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same
parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for
the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment through means other than by
appeal or certiorari.20 Forum shopping does not apply to cases that arise from
an initiatory or original action that has been elevated by way of appeal or
certiorari to higher or appellate courts or authorities. This is so because the
issues in the appellate courts necessarily differ from those in the lower court,
and the appealed cases are but a continuation of the original case and treated
as only one case.21
Respondents contend that the Decision in Civil Case No. 4581, which declared
that property in dispute was a family home, had long attained finality.
Accordingly, respondents maintain that petitioners’ bid to re-litigate the
present value of the property in the course of the execution proceedings is
barred by res judicata, and that petitioners should be cited for contempt of
court because of forum-shopping.22
Recall that although the trial court had nullified the Deed of Sale over
respondents’ family home in Civil Case No. 4581 for lack of a written consent
from its beneficiaries as required under Article 158 of the Family Code,23 the
court still recognized the validity of the transaction as an unsecured loan.
Hence, it declared Spouses Bell liable to petitioners in the amount of 1 million
plus 12% interest per annum.
Petitioners’ bid to satisfy the above judgment cannot be considered an act of
forum shopping. Simply, the execution of a decision is just the fruit and end of
a suit and is very aptly called the life of the law.24 It is not separate from the
24
main case. Similarly, the filing of the instant Petitions as a continuation of
the execution proceedings does not constitute forum shopping. Seeking a
reversal of an adverse judgment or order by appeal or certiorari does not
constitute forum shopping. Such remedies are sanctioned and provided for
the rules.25
Indeed, as will be presently discussed, the causes of action in the main
proceedings in Civil Case No. 4581 and the consequent execution
proceedings are identical. Suffice it to say, however, that the danger of a
multiplicity of suits upon one and the same cause of action, which the
judicial policy against forum shopping seeks to prevent, does not exist in
this case.
RE-LITIGATING THE ISSUE OF THE VALUE OF RESPONDENTS’ FAMILY
HOME IS BARRED BY RES JUDICATA.
Res judicata (meaning, a "matter adjudged") is a fundamental principle of
law that precludes parties from re-litigating issues actually litigated and
determined by a prior and final judgment.26 Under the 1997 Rules of
Court, there are two aspects of res judicata, namely: bar by prior
judgment.27 and conclusiveness of judgment.28
There is "bar by prior judgment" when, as between the first case in which
the judgment has been rendered and the second case that is sought to be
barred, there is an identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action.
In this instance, the judgment in the first case constitutes an absolute bar to
the second action. The judgment or decree on the merits of the court of
competent jurisdiction concludes the litigation between the parties, as well
as their privies, and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving the
same cause of action before same or any other tribunal.29
On the other hand, there is "conclusiveness of judgment" where there is an
identity of parties in the first and second cases, but no identity of causes of
action. Under this rule, the first judgment is conclusive only as to those
matters actually and directly controverted and determined and not as to
matters merely involved therein. Stated differently, any right, fact, or matter
in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of
an action before a competent court in which judgment is rendered on the
merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot again be
litigated between the parties and their privies whether or not the claim,
demand, purpose, or subject matter of the two actions is the same.
WE RULE THAT THERE IS NO RES JUDICATA.
"Cause of action" is the act or omission by which a party violates the right
of another.34 It may be argued that the cause of action the main
proceedings was the sale of the property in dispute, while in the execution
proceedings it was the indebtedness of Spouses Bell to petitioners.
The settled rule, however, is that identity of causes of action does not mean
absolute identity. Otherwise, a party could easily escape the operation of
res judicata by changing the form of the action or the relief sought.
RULE 7 CASES | SENYORA SANTIBANEZ
Among several tests resorted to in ascertaining whether two suits relate to a
single or common cause of action are: (1) whether the same evidence would
support and sustain both the first and the second causes of action and (2)
whether the defenses in one case may be used to substantiate the complaint in
the other. Also fundamental is the test for determining whether the cause of
action in the second case existed at the time of the filing of the first
complaint.37
Applying the above guidelines, the Court finds that the entirety of Civil Case
No. 4581 – including the bid of petitioners to execute the money judgment
awarded to them by the trial court – is founded on a common cause of action.
Records show that the sole evidence submitted by petitioners during the
execution proceedings was the Deed of Sale, which the trial court had nullified
in the main proceedings. Concomitantly, the very sane defense raised by
petitioners in the main proceedings, i.e., that they had bought the property
from Spouses Bell for 1 million – was utilized to substantiate the claim that the
current value of respondents’ family home was actually 1 million. In fact, the
trial court’s order for respondent’s family home to be levied on execution was
solely based on the price stated in the nullified Deed of Sale.
Res judicata applies, considering that the parties are litigating over the same
property. Moreover, the same contentions and evidence advanced by the
petitioners to substantiate their claim over respondents’ family home have
already been used to support their arguments in the main proceedings.
Any lingering doubt on the application of res judicata to this case should be
put to rest by the trial court’s discussion of the nature and alienability of the
property in dispute
UY VS CA
In 1979, private respondent Carmencita Naval-Sai (Naval-Sai) acquired
ownership of a parcel of land described as Lot No. 54-B (LRC) Psd 39172 and
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-19586 from herbrother. The
land was later subdivided, with the corresponding titles issued in Naval-Sai's
name in the Register of Deeds of North Cotabato.
Subsequently, Naval-Sai sold Lot No. 54-B-76(LRC) Psd 173106 to a certain
Bobby Adil on installment, onthe condition that the absolute deed of sale will
be executed only upon full payment. Adil failed to pay the amortization, forcing
him to sell his unfinished building on the property to spouses Francisco and
Louella Omandac.7
Meanwhile, Naval-Sai borrowed money from a certain Grace Ng. As security,
Naval-Sai delivered to Ng TCTs No. T-58334 and No.T-58335 covering Lots No.
54-B-8 and No. 54-B-9, respectively. Ng, on the other hand, borrowed money
from petitioner and also delivered to the latter the two titles to guarantee
payment of the loan.
Sometime thereafter, Naval-Sai learned that petitioner filed a case for recovery
of possession (Civil Case No. 1007) against Francisco Omandac. Branch 17 of
25
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Kidapawan City ruled in favor of
petitioner.9 Naval-Sai filed a motion for new trial before the Court of
Appeals, arguing that her signature in the purported deed of sale presented
in the case between her and petitioner was a forgery. Civil Case No. 1007,
however, became final and executory in 2001.10 The spouses Omandac
were ejected from the property and petitioner gained possession of the
same.11
In July 1999, Naval-Sai filed a Complaint for Annulment of Deed with
Damages12 before the same Branch 17 of the RTC in Kidapawan City
against petitioner. The subject of the complaint was the deed of sale
allegedly executed between Naval-Sai and petitioner involving Lots No. 54-
B-8 and No. 54-B-9. Naval-Sai prayed that the deed of sale be declared null
and void ab initiobecause the alleged sale between her and petitioner was
a forgery. Naval-Sai argued that she never sold the lots and that her
signature in the purported deed of sale is spurious.
Naval-Sai filed an Amended Complaint13 dated July 29, 1999. She asserted
that the subject TCTs were already cancelled by virtue of the deed of sale.
TCT No. T-62446 was issued in lieu of TCT No. T-58334 and TCT No. T-
62447 replaced TCT No. T-58335. Hence, the Amended Complaint added as
a relief the declaration of TCTs No. T-62446 and No.T-62447, which were
registered in the name of petitioner, as null and void abinitio.UNLIKE THE
ORIGINAL COMPLAINT, HOWEVER, THE AMENDED COMPLAINT WAS
NOT SIGNED BY NAVAL-SAI, BUT BY HER COUNSEL.
The petitoner here raised special and affirmative defenses of, among
others, NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUISITE CERTIFICATION OF
NON-FORUM SHOPPING and prescription.
The RTC dismissed the complaint on the grounds of prescription and a
defective certification against forum shopping.
CA
The Court of Appeals set aside the order of the RTC in the now assailed
Decision20dated January 26, 2006.The Court of Appeals ruled that there
was substantial compliance with the requirement of verification and
certification of non-forum shopping. It noted that the original complaint
has a proper verification and certification of non-forum shopping signed by
Naval-Sai herself. What was signed by Naval-Sai’s counsel was the
amended complaint dated July 29, 1999. Its verification and certification
carries the statement "x xxthat this [a]mended [c]omplaint should be taken
and read together with the original complaint; x xx"21 which the Court of
Appeals found to be a "cautionary move" tantamount to substantial
compliance.22The Court of Appeals further explained that the rule on
certification against forum shopping was complied with in the original
complaint because although an amended complaint supersedes the
pleading that it amends, it is not an initiatory pleading contemplated under
the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: Should case be dismissed for failrue to comply with teh rules on
forum shopping?
RULING: NO
RULE 7 CASES | SENYORA SANTIBANEZ
There was substantial compliance with the requirements on certification against
forum shopping.
A certification against forum shopping is a peculiar and personal responsibility
of the party, an assurance given to the court or other tribunal that there are no
other pending cases involving basically the same parties, issues and causes of
action.28 It must be executed by the party-pleader, not by his counsel. If,
however, for reasonable or justifiable reasons, the party-pleader is unable to
sign, he must execute a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) designating his
counsel of record to sign on his behalf.29
Here, the original complaint contained a proper verification and certification
against forum shopping duly signed by Naval-Sai as plaintiff. The verification
and certification in the amended complaint, on the other hand, was only signed
by her counsel, Atty. Norberto L. Ela. Atty. Ela was not authorized to sign on
behalf of Naval-Sai, as in fact, she assigned one Rodolfo Florentino as agent.30
The Court of Appeals pointed out that in the certification in the amended
complaint, Atty. Ela specified that it should be taken and read together with the
original complaint. The Court of Appeals took this as a cautionary move on the
part of Naval-Sai, justifying the relaxation of the rules on the ground of
substantial compliance. We find, however, that this cautionary move is
ineffectual because under the Rules of Civil Procedure, an amended complaint
supersedes the original complaint.31 For all intents and purposes, therefore, the
original complaint and its verification and certification ceased to exist. This,
notwithstanding, we find there was still substantial compliance with the Rules.
In the case of Far Eastern Shipping Company v. Court of Appeals,32 while we
said that, strictly, a certification against forum shopping by counsel is a
defective certification, the verification, signed by petitioner’s counsel in said
case, is substantial compliance because it served the purpose of the Rules of
informing the Court of the pendency of another action or proceeding involving
the same issues. We then explained that procedural rules are instruments in the
speedy and efficient administration of justice which should be used to achieve
such end and not to derail it.33
We also find that the prima facie merits of the case serve as a special
circumstance or a compelling reason to relax the rules on certification against
forum shopping.
In Sy Chin v. Court of Appeals,34 we recognized the flaw in the certification
against forum shopping which was signed only by the counsel, and not by the
party. In LDP Marketing, Inc. v. Monter,35 there was initially no proof that the
one who signed the certification was authorized to do so in behalf of the
corporation. In these two cases, we nonetheless chose to overlook the
procedural lapses in the interest of substantial justice and the existence of
prima facie merit in the petitions.
We have ruled that the general rule is that non-compliance or a defect in the
certification is not curable by its subsequent submission or correction. However,
there are cases where we exercised leniency and relaxed the rules on the
ground of substantial compliance, the presence of special circumstances or
compelling reasons.36 The rules on forum-shopping are designed to promote
and facilitate the orderly administration of justice and "should not be
interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and
26
legitimate objective or the goal of all rules of procedure— which is to
achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as possible."
BANDILLION VS LA FILIPINA UYGONGCO CORPORATION (LFUC)
1. Petitioners Bandillion (employees) are truck drivers and employees of
respondent La Filipina Uygongco Corporation (LFUC).
2. They filed a complaint for violation of labor standard laws against the
latter before the DOLE Region VI. Upon inspection, a finding of "no
violation" was made by the Labor Enforcement Officer, a finding that was
upheld on appeal to the DOLE-VI Regional Director.
3. The employees filed an appeal with the Secretary of Labor and
Employment (DOLE Secretary). Dole Secretary overturned the order, held
LFUC liable for underpayment of wages, non-payment of holiday pay, rest
day pay, and overtime pay and remanded the case to the DOLE-Regional
Office VI for the appropriate computation of the workers' individual
entitlements.
4. LFUC filed MR – denied. Hence, they filed petition for certiorari with CA –
denied. MR with CA – denied.
5. LFUC filed petition for certiorari with SC.
6. Consequently, the employees filed a Motion for Execution before the
DOLE Region VI to enforce the DOLE Secretary's Order. Regional Director
Carlos L. Boteros made an order directing LFUC to pay Php3,345,657.94, or
Php88,043.63 for each of the employees in differentials on wages, holiday
pay, rest day pay and overtime pay, on compliance with DOLE Secretary's
Order.
7. DOLE Region VI then issued a Writ of Execution. But LFUC filed petition
for certiorari and injunction with the CA on the grounds that: (1) the same
was immediately issued without first issuing a "compliance order" which is
provided for in Section 18 of Rule II of the Rules on the Disposition of Labor
Standard Contests; and (2) grave abuse was committed by the Regional
Director in denying LFUC's motion to recall the writ.
8. Apparently, LFUC was not yet served with the Order of the DOLE-VI
Regional Director when it filed the petition for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals. Subsequently, however, LFUC was served a copy of the Order.
Thus, LFUC filed with DOLE Region VI a MR (treated as an Appeal) wherein
it called the said order a "Compliance Order" that was allegedly issued in
grave abuse of discretion for it deprived LFUC of its right to due process
since the latter was not given the opportunity to adduce evidence to refute
the workers' allegations, specifically the latter's monetary claims. It alleged
that the employees were piece-rate truck drivers and, thus, were not
entitled to overtime, holiday and rest day pay as well as wage differentials,
and that some already had executed waivers and quitclaims. MR denied.
9. Meanwhile, the petition before the CA was duly opposed by the
employees as well as by the DOLE-VI Regional Director, who alleged that
the petition had been rendered moot and academic by LFUC's filing of a
motion for reconsideration of the Order.
10. The DOLE issued an Entry of Judgment, stating that the Resolution had
become final and executory and thereby was recorded in the Book of
Entries of Judgments. Thereafter, the DOLE-VI Regional Director-Officer-in-
Charge (OIC) issued another Writ of Execution.
11. Meanwhile, on July 8, 2011, the CA issued a Resolution denying LFUC's
application for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and submitting the case
for decision. It REMANDED the case to the DOLE Regional Director for
reception of evidence and recomputation of monetary awards.
- CA found that DOLE-VI
RULE 7 CASES | SENYORA SANTIBANEZ
Regional Director arrived at its computations of the payment due to the
workers without any evidence from the parties, and without considering the
fact that the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) has a final decision
upholding as valid the dismissal of most of the employees.
- CA held that due process was not observed.
12. Hence, petition for review on certiorari by employees to SC.
On forum shopping:
Petitioners also accuse LFUC of violating the rule against forum shopping in its
filing of the petition while a motion for reconsideration was pending.
Respondent LFUC alleges that several of the concerned employees did not sign
the Special Power of Attorney (SPA)48 authorizing their union president and
co-petitioner, Ronaldo C. Payda, to file this petition, and to sign the verification
and certification against forum shopping for such purpose, which allegedly
rendered the said petition defective.
ISSUE: was tehre violation of the rule against forum shopping?
RULING:
This contention lacks merit. According to prevailing jurisprudence, neither the
fact that Payda alone signed the petition's verification and certification against
forum shopping, nor the fact that the SPA authorizing the filing of the petition
was not signed by all petitioners, invalidate nor render the petition defective, as
the present case is one of those instances when the rules are interpreted more
liberally in order to attain substantial justice. We hold that Payda's lone
signature and the SPA signed by most of the petitioners already substantially
comply with the requirements for a properly and validly filed petition.
Indeed, Payda alone signed the verification and certification against forum
shopping - as the person authorized in the SPA to do so - but instead of
rendering the petition defective or invalid, this Court, as it has previously ruled
in Altres, et at. v. Empleo, et al.49 regards the same as already in substantial
compliance with the rules. In that case, it was held that in certain instances, the
signature of even just one person out of many petitioners in the verification
and certification against forum shopping can be deemed as enough to meet
the requirements of the rules. In sum, the Court laid down the guidelines as
follows:cralawlawlibrary
For the guidance of the bench and bar, the Court restates in capsule form the
jurisprudential pronouncements already reflected above respecting non-
compliance with the requirements on, or submission of defective, verification
and certification against forum shopping:
1) A distinction must be made between non-compliance with the requirement
on or submission of defective verification, and non-compliance with the
requirement on or submission of defective certification against forum shopping.
2) As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein does not
necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. The court may order its
submission or correction or act on the pleading if the attending circumstances
are such that strict compliance with the Rule may be dispensed with in order
that the ends of justice may be served thereby.
3) Verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample
knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition
signs the verification, and when matters alleged in the petition have been made
in good faith or are true and correct.
27
4) As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or
a defect therein, unlike in verification, is generally not curable by its
subsequent submission or correction thereof, unless there is a need to relax
the Rule on the ground of "substantial compliance" or presence of "special
circumstances or compelling reasons."
5) The certification against forum shopping must be signed by all the
plaintiffs or petitioners in a case; otherwise, those who did not sign will be
dropped as parties to the case. Under reasonable or justifiable
circumstances, however, as when all the plaintiffs or petitioners share a
common interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense, the
signature of only one of them in the certification against forum shopping
substantially complies with the Rule.
6) Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be executed by
the party-pleader, not by his counsel. If, however, for reasonable or
justifiable reasons, the party- pleader is unable to sign, he must execute a
Special Power of Attorney designating his counsel of record to sign on his
behalf, x x x50
IN THE CASE AT BAR, the subject SPA is an authorization granted by the
employees in favor of their union president Payda to, among other things,
"file the appropriate petition before the Supreme Court relative to the
Court of Appeals' Decision and Resolution dated September 13, 2011 and
May 24, 2012, respectively," and to sign the petition's verification and
certification against forum shopping for such purpose. The said employees,
who are the SPA's principals, along with Payda himself, became the
petitioners in the petition, which is the case that is now being resolved.
Payda performed his mandate under the SPA and, for himself and for on
behalf of his principals, filed the instant petition and alone signed the
accompanying verification and certification against forum shopping. The
SPA was signed by the great majority of the persons named as petitioners
in the case.51 We hold the same to have duly complied with the
jurisprudential guidelines on the rules on verification and certification
against forum shopping as outlined above.
While Payda alone signed, per the SPA, the petition is neither invalid nor
defective as LFUC alleges because, as for the verification requirement,
Payda signed as one who has "ample knowledge to swear to the truth of
the petition's allegations," being himself a petitioner and the employees'
union president who personally knows the story and facts of the case; and
as for the certification against forum shopping, Payda, as a co-employee of
his co-petitioners, "shares a common interest and invokes a common cause
of action or defense" as the rest and, as their attorney-in-fact tasked to
initiate the action, he himself has the knowledge of whether or not he has
initiated similar actions or proceedings in different courts or agencies. Both
already satisfy the guidelines' requirements on when a lone signature of a
petitioner substantially complies with the requirements for a valid
verification and certification against forum shopping.
But more importantly, unlike other lone signatories in jurisprudence52
whose petitions were declared improperly filed by this Court due to lack of
authority from their co-petitioners to file such action on the latter's behalf,
Payda, in the case at bar, is armed with such an authority - the SPA signed
by his co-petitioners. It has been held that when an SPA was constituted
precisely to authorize the agent to file and prosecute suits on behalf of the
principal, then it is such agent who has actual and personal knowledge
whether he or she has initiated similar actions or proceedings before
various courts on the same issue on the principal's behalf, thus satisfying
RULE 7 CASES | SENYORA SANTIBANEZ 28

the requirements for a valid certification against forum shopping.53 In such a Issue:
case, when it is the agent or attomey-in-fact who initiated the action on the
Whether CA acted with grave abuse of discretion in refusing to
principal's behalf and who signed the certification against forum shopping, the
dismiss the petition for certiorari before it on the ground of non-
rationale behind the rule that it must be the "petitioner or principal party
compliance with the requirements of verification and certification against
himself who should sign such certification does not apply; the rule on the
forum shopping.
certification against forum shopping has been properly complied with.

RATIONALE:
Ruling:
We treat the instant case in this manner in part due to the particular
circumstances of the petitioners in the case at bar. First, the petitioners YES.
are so numerous that their filing of a single petition through a
Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure states that "[a] pleading is
representative is in fact a commendable act compared to the
verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the
alternative of flooding this Court with a multiplicity of suits involving
allegations therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or based
the same parties, subject matter, cause and relief. Second, as claimed
on authentic records." "A pleading required to be verified which x x x lacks
by LFUC itself,55 most of the petitioners have since been separated
a proper verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading."
from LFUC's employment, the natural consequence of which is that the
employees have now changed employment and residences, a
development which, combined with their meager monetary resources,
On the other hand, Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure
presents logistical difficulties to them as litigants unless they choose,
provides that "[t]he plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the
as they did, the practical and cost-effective option of appointing a
complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a
representative, in this case their union president Payda, via the SPA, to
sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a)
represent them and file a petition in this case on their behalf. The
that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim
Court is not unmindful of such pragmatic nature of petitioners' stance
involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency
so that it is one more reason, in addition to supporting jurisprudence,
and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending
to allow the petition instead of dismissing it based on the grounds
therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete
raised by respondent LFUC.
statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn
that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he
shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his
We also consider LFUC's allegation that the petition was defective
aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed." "Failure to
because the SPA was not signed by all petitioners, or that it was signed
comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere
by some only through unauthorized representatives, to hold no water.
amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause
In the case at bar, the SPA was signed by everyone but five (5) of the
for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided x
petitioners.56 According to Altres v. Empleo, the only consequence of
x x."
such an incomplete signing is that "the non-signing petitioners (as to
the certification against forum shopping) are dropped as parties to the
case."57 However, the petition itself survives and not rendered invalid,
In this case, it is undisputed that the Verification/Certification against
especially as to the petitioners who signed, who would remain as
Forum Shopping62 attached to the petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No.
parties therein. As for those petitioners who are not deceased but who
109427 was not accompanied with a valid affidavit/properly certified under
signed through representatives, they, too, remain as parties, because
oath. This was because the jurat thereof was defective in that it did not
the acts of such representatives may be ratified by these petitioners or
indicate the pertinent details regarding the affiants' (i.e., private
the representatives may belatedly submit proof of their authority to act
respondents) competent evidence of identities.
on the petitioners' behalf.

Under Section 6, Rule II of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC63 dated July 6, 2004,

GO QUE CONSTRUCTION VS CA
entitled the "2004 Rules on Notarial Practice" (2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice), & jurat refers to an act in which an individual on a single occasion:

Facts:

A complaint for illegal dismissal was filed against petitioner. (a) appears in person before the notary public and presents an instrument
or document;
LA found petitioner to have illegally dismissed private respondents, and
declared them to be regular employees entitled to reinstatement to their
former positions without loss of seniority rights and backwages.
(b) is personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary
NLRC reversed and set aside the LA ruling, holding that private respondents public through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules;
were validly dismissed as they stole from petitioner.

When the case reached the CA, the Affidavit of Service and the
(c) signs the instrument or document in the presence of the notary; and
Verification/Certification of Non-Forum Shopping was noted to have a
defective jurat. To cure the defect, photocopies of the IDs of dismissed
employees were submitted, including an employee who could not be properly
(d) takes an oath or affirmation before the notary public as to such
located. Petitioner assails their validity as the jurat did not indicate the pertinent
instrument or document.
details regarding the affiants’ competent evidence of identities.
RULE 7 CASES | SENYORA SANTIBANEZ
Under Section 12, Rule II of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, "competent
evidence of identity" as used in the foregoing provision refers to the
identification of an individual based on:
(a) at least one current identification document issued by an official agency
bearing the photograph and signature of the individual, such as but not limited
to, passport, driver's license, Professional Regulations Commission ID, National
Bureau of Investigation clearance, police clearance, postal ID, voter's ID,
Barangay certification, Government Service and Insurance System (GSIS) e-card,
Social Security System (SSS) card, Philhealth card, senior citizen card, Overseas
Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) ID, OFW ID, seaman's book, alien
certificate of registration/immigrant certificate of registration, government
office ID, certification from the National Council for the Welfare of Disabled
Persons (NCWDP), Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD)
certification; or
(b) the oath or affirmation of one credible witness not privy to the instrument,
document or transaction who is personally known to the notary public and who
personally knows the individual, or of two credible witnesses neither of whom is
privy to the instrument, document or transaction who each personally knows
the individual and shows to the notary public documentary identification.
Evidently, not being documents of identification issued by an official agency,
the photocopies of the IDs64 of private respondents Singson, Pasaqui, and
Lominiqui from La Vista Association, Inc., R.O. Barra Builders & Electrical
Services, and St. Charbel Executive Village, respectively, do not constitute
competent evidence of their identities under Section 12 (a), Rule II of the 2004
Rules on Notarial Practice. In the same vein, their Joint-Affidavit65 identifying
Andales and assuring the CA that he was a party-litigant is not competent
evidence of Andales's identity under Section 12 (b), Rule II of the same rules,
considering that they (i.e., Singson, Pasaqui, and Lominiqui) themselves are
privy to the instrument, i.e., the Verification/Certification of Non-Forum
Shopping, in which Andales's participation is sought to be proven. To note, it
cannot be presumed that an affiant is personally known to the notary public;
the jurat must contain a statement to that effect.66 Tellingly, the notarial
certificate of the Verification/Certification of Non-Forum Shopping67 attached
to private respondents' petition before the CA did not state whether they
presented competent evidence of their identities, or that they were personally
known to the notary public, and, thus, runs afoul of the requirements of
verification and certification against forum shopping under Section 1,68 Rule
65, in relation to Section 3,69 Rule 46, of the Rules of Court.
In Fernandez v. Villegas70 (Fernandez), the Court pronounced that non-
compliance with the verification requirement or a defect therein "does not
necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. The court may order its
submission or correction or act on the pleading if the attending circumstances
are such that strict compliance with the Rule may be dispensed with in order
that the ends of justice may be served thereby."71 "Verification is deemed
substantially complied with when one who has ample knowledge to swear to
the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification,
and when matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are
true and correct."72 Here, there was no substantial compliance with the
verification requirement as it cannot be ascertained that any of the private
respondents actually swore to the truth of the allegations in the petition for
certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 109427 given the lack of competent evidence of any
of their identities. Because of this, the fact that even one of the private
respondents swore that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct of
his knowledge and belief is shrouded in doubt.
29
For the same reason, neither was there substantial compliance with the
certification against forum shopping requirement. In Fernandez, the Court
explained that "non-compliance therewith or a defect therein, unlike in
verification, is generally not curable by its subsequent submission or
correction thereof, unless there is a need to relax the Rule on the ground of
'substantial compliance' or presence of'special circumstances or compelling
reasons.'"73 Here, the CA did not mention - nor does there exist - any
perceivable special circumstance or compelling reason which justifies the
rules' relaxation. At all events, it is uncertain if any of the private
respondents certified under oath that no similar action has been filed or is
pending in another forum.
In fact, on both procedural aspects, the CA failed to address the evident
variance in the signatures74 of the remaining private respondents, i.e.,
Lominiqui and Andales, in their petition for certiorari and their previous
pleadings. Earlier, petitioner had already questioned Andales's participation
in the case as he was already missing when the complaint was filed, and his
signature in the Verification attached to private respondents' Position Paper
did not match those in the payroll documents.75 In sum, the authenticity of
the signatures of Lominiqui and Andales, and their participation in the
instant case were seriously put into question.
Case law states that "[v]erification is required to secure an assurance that
the allegations in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and
correct, and not merely speculative."76 On the other hand, "[t]he
certification against forum shopping is required based on the principle that
a party-litigant should not be allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies in
different fora."77 The important purposes behind these requirements
cannot be simply brushed aside absent any sustainable explanation
justifying their relaxation. In this case, proper justification is especially called
for in light of the serious allegations of forgery as to the signatures of the
remaining private respondents, i.e., Lominiqui and Andales. Thus, by simply
treating the insufficient submissions before it as compliance with its
Resolution78 dated August 13, 2009 requiring anew the submission of a
proper verification/certification against forum shopping, the CA patently
and grossly ignored settled procedural rules and, hence, gravely abused its
discretion. All things considered, the proper course of action was for it to
dismiss the petition.
BACOLOR VS VL MAKABALI
Facts:
Petitioners were six (6) resident physicians at petitioner hospital. They
filed an action against the hospital for illegal dismissal before the Labor
Arbiter.
The Labor Arbiter decided in their favor. However, on appeal to the NLRC,
the latter decided in favor of the hospital.
On appeal to the CA, the CA dismissed the case on the ground that the
petition was not complaint with the requirement provided under the Rules
of Court because only three petitioners signed Verifications/ Certificates of
Non-Forum Shopping while the Verifications/ Certificates of Non-Forum
Shopping for the other three (3) was signed for by their counsel.
RULE 7 CASES | SENYORA SANTIBANEZ
Petitioners argue that the verifications executed by three of the six petitioners
and the verification executed by their counsel constituted full compliance with
the required verification. They contended that the three petitioners who made
their verification are real parties-in-interest, and their counsel who also verified
the Petition had been in possession of authentic and relevant records of the
case.
Also, petitioners posit that the failure of Drs. Villegas, Canlas and Zheila to
execute a certificate of non-forum shopping should not have caused the
dismissal of the Petition for Certorari. They insist that under justifiable
circumstances, the signature of one of the petitioners in the certificate against
forum shopping substantially complies with the rules. They further point out
that all of them share a common interest and invoke a common cause of action
under the same set of facts.
Issue:
Whether or not the failure of any of the petitioner to sign a Verifications/
Certificates of Non-Forum Shopping is a ground for dismissal of the case.
RULING:
The Petition is meritorious.
In Altres v. Empleo,34 the Court summarized the basic tenets involving non-
compliance with the requirements on, or filing of defective verification and
certificate against forum shopping, to wit:
1) A distinction must be made between non-compliance with the requirement
on or submission of defective verification, and non-compliance with the
requirement on or submission of defective certification against forum shopping.
2) As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein does not
necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. The court may order its
submission or correction or act on the pleading if the attending circumstances
are such that strict compliance with the Rule may be dispensed with in order
that the ends of justice may be served thereby.
3) Verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample
knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition
signs the verification, and when matters alleged in the petition have been made
in good faith or are true and correct.
4) As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a
defect therein, unlike in verification, is generally not curable by its subsequent
submission or correction thereof, unless there is a need to relax the Rule on the
ground of "substantial compliance" or presence of "special circumstances or
compelling reasons".
30
5) The certification against forum shopping must be signed by all the
plaintiffs or petitioners in a case; otherwise, those who did not sign will be
dropped as parties to the case. Under reasonable or justifiable
circumstances, however, as when all the plaintiffs or petitioners share a
common interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense, the
signature of only one of them in the certification against forum shopping
substantially complies with the Rule.
6) Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be executed by the
party-pleader, not by his counsel. If, however, for reasonable or justifiable
reasons, the party-pleader is unable to sign, he must execute a Special
Power of Attorney designating his counsel of record to sign on his behalf.
As properly pointed out by the CA, the Verification/Certificate of Non-
Forum Shopping with Undertaking executed by petitioners' counsel is not
valid. As stated in Altres, a certificate against forum shopping must be
signed by the party and in case his counsel signs the same on his behalf,
the counsel must be armed with a special power of attorney. Since
petitioners' counsel is not shown to have been authorized by Drs. Villegas,
Canlas and Zheila to sign a certificate of non-forum shopping on their
behalf, the execution of said certificate by counsel violates the foregoing
rules.
Nonetheless, the CA failed to consider the concept of "substantial
compliance" to the requirements of verification and certificate of non-
forum shopping, as it has been shown that three of the six petitioners
executed their own verification and certificate against forum shopping.
The verification of a pleading is a formal and not a jurisdictional
requirement. It is intended to assure that the allegations in a pleading are
true and correct. As such, the court may order the correction of unverified
pleadings, or it may act on them and waive strict compliance with the
rules.36
The verification requirement is deemed substantially complied with when a
person who has sufficient knowledge to swear to the truth of the
allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification; and matters
alleged therein have been made in good faith or are true and correct. Thus,
there is substantial compliance if at least one of the petitioners makes a
proper verification.37
In Ateneo de Naga University v. Manalo,38 the signature of one of three
petitioners therein was considered substantial compliance with the
verification requirement. The Court held that Fr. Tabora, the petitioner who
signed the verification, has sufficient knowledge to swear to the truth of the
allegations in the petition filed with the CA; and his signature was ample
assurance that the allegations have been made in good faith or are true
and correct.
In this case, three out of six petitioners signed three separate verifications
appended to the Petition for Certiorari. Their signatures are sufficient
assurance that the allegations in the Petition were made in good faith, or
are true and correct. Thus, there is substantial compliance with the
verification requirement.
RULE 7 CASES | SENYORA SANTIBANEZ 31

compliance provided that there are justifiable circumstances for the

relaxation of the rules.
On the other hand, as a rule, the certificate against forum shopping must be
signed by all plaintiffs or petitioners; otherwise, those who did not sign will be
dropped as parties to the case. Under reasonable or justifiable situations, such
as when the plaintiffs or petitioners share a common interest and invoke a
common cause of action or defense, the signature of one of them in the
FONTANA DEVELOPMENT CORP VS SASCHA VUKASINOVIC
certificate against forum shopping is considered substantial compliance with
the rules.40cralawred

1. In July 2009, respondent Sascha Vukasinovic was hired by petitioner

Fontana Development Corporation (FDC) as its Director for Business
In Abaria v. National Labor Relations Commission,41 47 out of 88 petitioners
Development for one year.
signed the certificate against forum shopping. The Court ruled that the
petitioning employees shared a common interest and cause of action when
they filed the case for illegal dismissal. The Court decreed ,that when petitioners
therein appealed to the CA, they pursued the case as a collective body, 2. Sometime in May 2010, he allegedly received a text message from one
invoking one argument in support of their cause of action, which is, the illegal Jenny Mallari informing him that Nestor Dischoso (Dischoso) and Chief
dismissal purportedly committed by their employer when union members Hotel Engineer Jaime Villareal (Engr. Villareal), both officers of petitioner
resorted to strike due to the employer's refusal to bargain with officers of the FDC, were receiving commissions from company transactions.
local chapter.

Furthermore, in Torres v. Specialized Packaging Development Corp.,42 the
Court allowed the relaxation of the rules on submission. of certificate against
forum shopping. One of the compelling grounds for the allowance of said
certificate therein where only two of 25 petitioners signed the same was the
"apparent merits of the substantive aspects of the case." It noted that the
varying views of the LA and the NLRC give ample basis for the necessity of a
review on the merits and the outright dismissal of the petition was prejudicial
to the substantive rights.
3. Sascha met with Mallari and offered her money in exchange for evidence
that will support her allegations. Mapari handed over to respondent a
photocopy of a check issued to Engr. Villareal, as proof of receiving
commission. Respondent then paid Mallari the total amount of fourteen
thousand pesos (P14,000) on different occasions.
4. Mallari eventually gave respondent two invoices issued by one of the
suppliers of petitioner FDC as proof of her allegations. Further
investigations were conducted on the alleged corruptions of Engr. Villareal.

Here, three of six petitioners signed the certificate of non-forum shopping. At

the least, the CA could have ordered that those who did not sign it be dropped 5. Engr. Villareal and Mallari were brought to the NBI Office for questioning.
as parties, but not the outright dismissal of the Petition.

The Court, nevertheless, holds that there are justifiable reasons for the
relaxation of the rules on the filing of a certificate of non-forum shopping and
that the certificate against forum shopping signed by three out of six
petitioners suffices.
6. During the inquiry, Mallari denied that Engr. Villareal asked for
commissions from her and revealed that she merely fabricated the story
against Engr. Villareal so that she can ask money from respondent.

7. Following this turn of events, FDC received a complaint from Engr.

Villareal claiming that Sascha paid Mallari a substantial amount of money to
Specifically, petitioners' cause of action revolves on the same issue, that is, concoct a story depicting Engr. Villareal as a corrupt
respondents illegally dismissed them under similar circumstances. They were all employee.chanrobleslaw
resident physicians who were purportedly 1) re-employed by the Hospital even
after the expiration of their respective one year contracts; 2) forced to resign
and offered to be re-engaged as fixed term employees but declined; 3)
8. On October 2, 2010, respondent received a Show Cause/Preventive
demoted; 4) accused of violations of the Hospital rules and regulations; and, 5)
Suspension Order from petitioner FDC's Human Resources Department,
dismissed.
informing him of the complaint filed by Engr. Villareal and directing him to
explain why no disciplinary action should be taken against him for violating
the provisions of the Company Code of Conduct on Dishonesty.
Moreover, substantial justice dictates that the Petition for Certiorari be given
due course and be resolved on the merits. This is especially so since the
findings of the LA are contrary to those of the NLRC,43 particularly on the
9. Sascha did not deny the allegations against him and, instead, admitted
issues of whether respondents illegally dismissed petitioners and of whether
that he gave money to Mallari because "it is a common practice in Fontana
they were afforded due process of law.
to give money to informants for vital information." a

The requirement of strict compliance with the rules on filing of certificate

against forum shopping highlights the mandatory character of the submission
of such certificate. However, this mandatory requirement allows substantial
RULE 7 CASES | SENYORA SANTIBANEZ
10. FDC approved the recommendation of the Investigating Panel and
terminated respondent's employment after finding him guilty of acts of
dishonesty in the form of "bribery in any form or manner"
11. Respondent, however, refused to acknowledge the receipt of the notice of
dismissal and, instead, filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, illegal suspension,
regularization, non-payment of salaries, service incentive leave, 13th month
pay, actual, moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees and demands for his
reinstatement with full backwages against petitioner FDC and its officers.
12.The Ruling of the Labor Arbiter: dismissed the complaint for lack of factual
or legal basis, and ruled that respondent cannot be regularized as he is an
employee with a legal and valid fixed-term employment and that his dismissal
was for a just cause.
13. Respondent appealed the said Decision to the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC).
14. The Ruling of the NLRC: dismissed and the noted that Sascha had previously
filed another complaint before the same branch of the NLRC in San Fernando,
Pampanga, involving the same facts, issues, and prayer, entitled Sascha
Vukasinovic v. Jimei International Ltd., Suk Man Choi, as Group Financial
Comptroller, and Chris Cheng, as Deputy Group Financial Comptroller, and
docketed as NLRC Case No. RAB III-09-18113-11. This previous case has been
dismissed 11 by Labor Arbiter on the ground of forum shopping. The dismissal
was eventually sustained by both the NLRC and the CA.
15. Respondent then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA
16. The Ruling of the CA: The CA agreed with the NLRC when it ruled that
herein respondent's employment had not ripened into regular employment and
that he was validly dismissed. Respondent, being a managerial employee, can
be terminated on the ground of loss of trust and confidence. However, contrary
to the Decision of the NLRC, the CA ordered the award of unpaid salaries to
respondent. So the case is REMANDED to the Labor Arbiter for the
computation, with dispatch, of the amounts due.
whether the CA gravely erred in not dismissing the petition for deliberate forum
shopping. YES. Respondent is guilty of forum shopping
WHAT CONSTITUTES FORUM SHOPPING
There is forum shopping when a party repetitively avails of several judicial
remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially
founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts and
circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues either pending in or
already resolved adversely by some other court. Forum shopping is an act of
malpractice that is prohibited and condemned because it trifles with the courts
and abuses their processes. It degrades the administration of justice and adds
to the already congested court dockets.nrobleslaw
32
WHAT THE PROHIBITION ON FORUM SHOPPING SEEKS TO PREVENT
The grave evil sought to be avoided by the rule against forum shopping is
the rendition by two competent tribunals of two separate and contradictory
decisions. Unscrupulous party litigants, taking advantage of a variety of
competent tribunals, may repeatedly try their luck in several different fora
until a favorable result is reached.
TEST OF FORUM SHOPPING
The test for determining the existence of forum shopping is whether a final
judgment in one case amounts to res judicata in another or whether the
following elements of litis pendentia are present: (a) identity of parties, or
at least such parties as representing the same interests in both actions; (b)
identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded
on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars,
such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of
which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under
consideration. Said requisites are also constitutive of the requisites for auter
action pendant or lis pendens.16chanrobleslaw
IN THE INSTANT CASE, THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT ALL THE ELEMENTS
OF LITIS PENDENTIA HAVE ALREADY BEEN ESTABLISHED.
It should be noted that in his Decision in NLRC Case, Labor Arbiter Abdon
observed that there is an identity of parties between the 2 cases. He
pointed out that both complaints show that petitioners Chris Cheng and
Man Choi are similarly impleaded in their capacities as officers of petitioner
FDC and that there is also an identity of causes of action and reliefs prayed
for by respondent. This was affirmed by the NLRC and the CA.
What is truly important to consider in determining whether Forum
shopping exists or not is the vexation caused the courts and parties
litigants by a party who asks different courts and/or administrative agencies
to rule on the same or related causes and/or grant the same or
substantially the same reliefs, in the process creating the possibility of
conflicting decisions being rendered by the different for a upon the same
issues.
WHEN THERE IS FORUM SHOPPING, ALL PENDING
CLAIMS ON THE SAME CLAIM MUST BE DISMISSED
the penalty is summary dismissal not only of the petition pending before
this Court, but also of the other case that is pending in a lower court. This is
so because twin dismissal is the punitive measure to those who trifle with
the orderly administration of justice.chanrobleslaw
Consequently, the CA should have dismissed the case outright without
rendering a decision on the merits of the case. Respondent should be
RULE 7 CASES | SENYORA SANTIBANEZ
penalized for willfully and deliberately trifling with court processes. The purpose
of the law will be defeated if respondent will be granted the relief prayed for
despite his act of deliberately committing forum shopping.
REPORT ON THE JUDICIAL AUDIT CONDUCTED IN TEH RTC, BRANCH 60
CEBU
In anticipation of the forthcoming compulsory retirement of respondent Judge
Ildefonso B. Suerte on January 23, 2005 and in response to newspaper reports
questioning the alleged highly irregular handling by the same respondent of
the murder case of Cedrick Devinadera, the self-confessed accessory in the
killing of Alona Bacolod Ecleo, wife of Philippine Benevolent Missionaries
Association supreme leader Ruben Ecleo, Jr., Deputy Court Administrator
Christopher Lock recommended that a judicial audit be immediately conducted
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 60, Barili, Cebu. DCA Lock likewise
recommended that an investigation be conducted to determine compliance by
Judge Suerte with this Court’s Administrative Order (AO) No. 36-2004, which
specifically provides:
As Assisting Judge, Judge Cañete shall act on all newly filed cases in the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 60, Barili, Cebu, as well as all civil and criminal cases
in said court where pre-trial has not been terminated as of the date of the
Administrative Order.
In a Memorandum dated June 4, 2004, the Honorable Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr. directed DCA Lock to immediately proceed to Cebu to conduct an
inquiry into the matter and determine if Judge Suerte violated the aforecited
AO in relation to the Devinadera case, as well as to other cases which Judge
Suerte heard, tried or decided after the issuance of the AO. In the same
Memorandum, the judicial audit team headed by Atty. Rullyn S. Garcia which
was then in Cebu was likewise instructed to include Branch 60 of the Regional
Trial Court in Barili, Cebu in their audit.
Among the anomalies discovered were cases which should not have been taken
cognizance.
Included among those cases which, in the first place, should not have been
taken cognizance of by said respondent are the following because they were
filed after the effectivity of AO No. 36-2004 on March 3, 2004, where,
incidentally, the Court’s judicial audit team further found gross irregularities:
A. Petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage and annulment of marriage.
1. Leyson, Jr. v. Bontuyan, CEB-BAR-377
The given address of the petitioner therein as alleged in the petition is "c/o
Virgilio Concepcion, Poblacion, Barili", while that of the respondent is "Hi-way
77, Talamban, Cebu City." This should have engendered suspicion on the part
of Judge Suerte that the parties did not reside within the territorial jurisdiction
of Branch 60. Besides, the Court also agrees with the observation of the judicial
33
audit team that the use of the abbreviation "c/o" connotes that petitioner
was not an actual resident of said place. Respondent Judge Suerte should
have, at the very least, required petitioner to show cause why the petition
should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
2. Mitchell v. Mitchell, CEB-BAR-380
The given address of the petitioner as alleged in the petition therein filed
was changed from "San Roque, Quiot Pardo, Cebu City" to "Brgy. Tapon,
Dumanjug, Cebu," a municipality which falls under the territorial jurisdiction
of Branch 60. This generates doubt as to the veracity of the new address,
which apparently was effected to clothe Branch 60 with jurisdiction to try
and decide the case.
3. Tabarno v. Tabarno, CEB-BAR-372
The given address of the petitioner as appearing in the CERTIFICATE OF
NON-FORUM SHOPPING, which is an integral part of the petition, was
changed from "Tisa, Cebu City" to "Barili, Cebu." Again the change of
address was apparently effected as an after-thought to enable Branch 60 to
exercise jurisdiction over the case.
4. Caray v. Baruel, CEB-BAR-376
The given address of petitioner as alleged in the petition is "c/o Dionisia
Baruel Kaindoy, Poblacion, Barili, Cebu," while that of the respondent is
Surigao City. Again, the use of the abbreviation "c/o" raises doubt as to the
veracity of petitioner being a genuine resident of the given address.
5. Ora v. Ora, CEB-BAR-373
The given address of the petitioner as alleged in the body of the petition is
"Poblacion, Dumanjug, Cebu." However, his address AS INDICATED IN
THE VERIFICATION OF THE PETITION is "Osmeña Blvd., Cebu City." The
variance of the address of the petitioner as appearing in the body of the
petition and in the verification should have been looked into by respondent
Judge Suerte to determine which of the two is correct.
B. Special Proceedings:
In the Matter of Settlement of the Intestate Estate of the Late Jose Stockli of
Lambug, Badian, Cebu, SP-BAR-266
In this particular case, respondent Judge Suerte ordered the appointment
of a special administrator of the estate of the decedent one day following
the filing of the petition. Let alone the fact that respondent judge’s
actuation constitutes gross violation of AO 36-2004 because the petition
was filed only on June 1, 2004, the same actuation is a blatant disregard of
the rules on notice and hearing as provided for in Section 3, Rule 79 of the
RULE 7 CASES | SENYORA SANTIBANEZ 34

Rules of Court. More than a mere ignorance of the law, respondent conduct is Cebu City" to "Barili, Cebu." Again the change of address was apparently
even a willful and malevolent disregard of procedural rules, which amount to effected as an after-thought to enable Branch 60 to exercise jurisdiction
grave misconduct. over the case.

C. Criminal Case 4. Caray v. Baruel, CEB-BAR-376

People vs. Devinadera, Crim. Case No. CEB-BRL-1039
The Information in this case was filed on March 29, 2004, which is after the
effectivity of AO No. 36-2004. Respondent Judge Suerte was clearly bereft of
any authority to take cognizance of said case. Despite his awareness of AO No.
36-2004 and, worse, despite knowledge on his part of the pendency of another
case in RTC, Cebu City, docketed therein as Criminal Case No. CBU-62308,
which involves the same subject matter, respondent Judge Suerte convicted
accused Devinadera on the sole basis of a sworn extra-judicial confession and
sentenced him accordingly.
ISSUE: W/N Judge suerte committed gross misconduct ?
The given address of petitioner as alleged in the petition is "c/o Dionisia
Baruel Kaindoy, Poblacion, Barili, Cebu," while that of the respondent is
Surigao City. Again, the use of the abbreviation "c/o" raises doubt as to the
veracity of petitioner being a genuine resident of the given address.
5. Ora v. Ora, CEB-BAR-373
The given address of the petitioner as alleged in the body of the petition is
"Poblacion, Dumanjug, Cebu." However, his address as indicated in the
verification of the petition is "Osmeña Blvd., Cebu City." The variance of the
address of the petitioner as appearing in the body of the petition and in the
verification should have been looked into by respondent Judge Suerte to
determine which of the two is correct.

RULING: YES
B. Special Proceedings:

A. Petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage and annulment of marriage.

In the Matter of Settlement of the Intestate Estate of the Late Jose Stockli of
Lambug, Badian, Cebu, SP-BAR-266
1. Leyson, Jr. v. Bontuyan, CEB-BAR-377

In this particular case, respondent Judge Suerte ordered the appointment

of a special administrator of the estate of the decedent one day following
The given address of the petitioner therein as alleged in the petition is "c/o
the filing of the petition. Let alone the fact that respondent judge’s
Virgilio Concepcion, Poblacion, Barili", while that of the respondent is "Hi-way
actuation constitutes gross violation of AO 36-2004 because the petition
77, Talamban, Cebu City." This should have engendered suspicion on the part
was filed only on June 1, 2004, the same actuation is a blatant disregard of
of Judge Suerte that the parties did not reside within the territorial jurisdiction
the rules on notice and hearing as provided for in Section 3, Rule 79 of the
of Branch 60. Besides, the Court also agrees with the observation of the judicial
Rules of Court. More than a mere ignorance of the law, respondent conduct
audit team that the use of the abbreviation "c/o" connotes that petitioner was
is even a willful and malevolent disregard of procedural rules, which
not an actual resident of said place. Respondent Judge Suerte should have, at
amount to grave misconduct.
the very least, required petitioner to show cause why the petition should not be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

2. Mitchell v. Mitchell, CEB-BAR-380

ORIX METRO LEASING AND FINANCE CORPORATION VS CARDLINE

The given address of the petitioner as alleged in the petition therein filed was
changed from "San Roque, Quiot Pardo, Cebu City" to "Brgy. Tapon, Dumanjug,
Cebu," a municipality which falls under the territorial jurisdiction of Branch 60.
This generates doubt as to the veracity of the new address, which apparently
was effected to clothe Branch 60 with jurisdiction to try and decide the case.
3. Tabarno v. Tabarno, CEB-BAR-372
INC
Facts: Cardline leased four machines (machines) from Orix as evidenced by
three similarly-worded lease agreements. Cardline’s principal stockholders
and officers - Mary C. Calubad, Sony N. Calubad, and Ng Beng Sheng
(individual respondents) – signed the suretyship agreements in their
personal capacities to guarantee Cardline’s obligations under each lease
agreement.

The given address of the petitioner as appearing in the certificate of non-forum

shopping, which is an integral part of the petition, was changed from "Tisa,
RULE 7 CASES | SENYORA SANTIBANEZ
Cardline defaulted in paying the rent: the unpaid obligations amounted to
P9,369,657.00 as of July 12, 2007. Orix formally demanded payment from
Cardline but the latter refused to pay.
Orix filed a complaint for replevin, sum of money, and damages with an
application for a writ of seizure against Cardline and the individual respondents
(collectively, the respondents) before the RTC. The case was docketed as Civil
Case No. 07-855.
The RTC issued a writ of seizure allowing Orix to recover the machines from
Cardline.
Thereafter, the RTC declared the respondents in default for failing to file an
answer, and allowed Orix to present evidence ex parte. The respondents filed a
motion to set aside the order of default, but the RTC denied their motion. On
May 6, 2008, the RTC rendered judgment in Orix’s favor and ordered the
respondents to pay Orix
CA granted the petition, annulled the RTC’s order
Orix argues that the respondents engaged in forum shopping,.
ISSUE: was there forum shopping?
RULING:
Orix asserts that the respondents committed forum shopping by instituting
several actions essentially seeking to nullify the RTC’s decision.
First, the respondents appealed before the CA to reverse the RTC’s judgment
which held them liable for the unpaid rent. The CA, and subsequently this Court
via a petition for review on certiorari,24 affirmed the RTC’s judgment. The
decision became final and executory.
Second, Ng Beng Sheng filed a petition for annulment of judgment,25 dated
September 4, 2010, which the CA dismissed on the grounds of forum shopping
and res judicata.1âwphi1
Third, the respondents filed the petition for prohibition,26 dated February 21,
2011, to prevent the execution of the RTC’s judgment.
We disagree with Orix’s assertions.
Section 5 Rule 7 of the Rules prohibits forum shopping. The rule against forum
shopping seeks to address the great evil of two competent tribunals rendering
two separate and contradictory decisions.27 Forum shopping exists when a
party initiates two or more actions, other than appeal or certiorari, grounded on
the same cause to obtain a more favorable decision from any tribunal.28
35
The elements of forum shopping are: (i) identity of parties, or at least such
parties representing the same interest; (ii) identity of rights asserted and
relief prayed for, the latter founded on the same facts; (iii) any judgment
rendered in one action will amount to res judicata in the other action.29
In Reyes v. Alsons,30 the petitioner filed a petition for annulment of
judgment raising the issue of the RTC’s lack of jurisdiction to enforce the
lower court’s judgment. This Court held that this jurisdictional issue has
been resolved in the previous cases filed by the petitioner. Thus, the
petition for annulment of judgment was barred by res judicata and the
policy against forum shopping.31
In the present case, the CA correctly denied Ng Beng Sheng’s petition for
annulment of judgment. As in Reyes, the CA correctly reasoned out that the
issue on jurisdiction had been resolved with finality in the review on
certiorari. Thus, the issue could no longer be re-litigated.
After the denial of the petition for annulment of judgment, Ng Beng Shen
joined the other respondents in filing a petition for prohibition. We are now
called upon to ascertain whether the recourse to the petition for
prohibition amounted to forum shopping.
We rule in the negative.
The two cases filed collectively by the respondents are similar only in that
they involve the same parties. The cases, however, involve different causes
of actions. The petition for review on certiorari was filed to review the
merits of the RTC's judgment. On the other hand, the petition for
prohibition respects the finality of the RTC's judgment on the merits but
interprets the dispositive portion in a way that would render the execution
unnecessary. Thus, the elements of forum shopping are not present in the
two cases.
Moreover, the resort to a remedy under Rule 65 is expressly allowed by the
Rules of Court. Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides that an
aggrieved party may file the appropriate civil action under Rule 65 to
challenge an order of execution. Accordingly, the respondents filed their
petition for prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
With respect to Ng Beng Sheng's petition for annulment of judgment, the
CA has already ruled that the filing of the petition constituted forum
shopping, specifically due to the jurisdictional issue raised. The petition for
prohibition, however, involves a different cause of action. Thus, there is no
forum shopping.
RE: DECISION DATED AUGUST 19 2008
RULE 7 CASES | SENYORA SANTIBANEZ
On July 27, 2001, Dionisio Donato T. Garciano (Garciano), then Mayor of Baras,
Rizal, sought to appoint Rolando Pilapil Lacayan (Lacayan) as Sangguniang
Bayan Secretary, replacing Nolasco Vallestero (Vallestero).7 The appointment
was opposed by Wilfredo Robles (Robles), then Vice Mayor of Baras, Rizal. He
said that the position is not vacant and that it is the vice mayor, not the mayor,
who has the authority8 to appoint the Sangguniang Bayan Secretary.
Garciano insisted and removed Vallestero's name from the payroll.9 Vallestero
sued Garciano before the Sandiganbayan.10 Vallestero, Robles, and other
Sangguniang Bayan members also filed a "complaint for mandamus and
damages with preliminary mandatory injunction"11 against Garciano and other
municipal officials12 (Garciano, et al.) before the Regional Trial Court of
Morong, Rizal. They sought for the payment of their respective salaries.13
RTC ordered Garciano, et al. to release the funds and pay Vallestero's salaries
and other benefits.15 Garciano, et al. did not heed the Regional Trial Court's
order;16 hence, they were found liable for indirect contempt.
Appealing the trial court's ruling, Garciano, et al., through their counsel, Atty.
Ferrer, filed a Petition for Certiorari (First Petition) on October 9, 2003 before
the Court of Appeals.
Garciano, et al., through Atty. Ferrer, filed another Petition for Certiorari with a
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order21 (Second Petition) before the Court of Appeals.
On the same day, Garciano, et al. filed before the Court of Appeals Eleventh
Division an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Withdraw Petition Under Rule 17 Section
124 of the Revised Rules of Court.25 They allegedly moved to withdraw the
First Petition to avail themselves of other remedies, especially since a comment
had not yet been filed.
the Court of Appeals Third Division dismissed the Second Petition with
prejudice due to the deliberate violation of the rule against forum shopping.
The Court of Appeals found that Garciano, et al., through Atty. Ferrer, filed two
(2) Petitions for Certiorari successively.36 It also held that the withdrawal of the
First Petition was "intended to camouflage the glaring and blatant irregularity
committed"37 by Garciano, et al. through their counsel.38 If the withdrawal
was, indeed, impelled by the lack of verification of the other petitioners in the
First Petition, then Garciano, et al. should have called the attention of the
Eleventh Division instead of filing the Second Petition.39 The Court of Appeals
held that when the Second Petition was filed (and the existence of the First
Petition concealed), forum shopping had already been committed.
ISSUE: W/N there was forum shopping
RULING: YES
We affirm the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the Report and
Recommendation of Commissioner Hababag. Respondent is guilty of violating
the rule against forum shopping.
36
Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of Court provides the rule against forum
shopping:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Sec. 5. Certification against forum shopping. — The plaintiff or principal
party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading
asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and
simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced
any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal
or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other
action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action
or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he
should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been
filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to
the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been
filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by
mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be
cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise
provided, upon motion and after hearing. The submission of a false
certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall
constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the
corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or
his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the
same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall
constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions.
(n)
In Asia United Bank v. Goodland Company, Inc.,68 this court enumerated
the instances where forum shopping takes place:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
There is forum shopping "when a party repetitively avails of several judicial
remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially
founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts and
circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues either pending
in or already resolved adversely by some other court." The different ways by
which forum shopping may be committed were explained in Chua v.
Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Forum shopping can be committed in three ways: (1) filing multiple cases
based on the same cause of action and with the same prayer, the previous
case not having been resolved yet (where the ground for dismissal is litis
pendentia); (2) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and
the same prayer, the previous case having been finally resolved (where the
ground for dismissal is res judicata); and (3) filing multiple cases based on
the same cause of action, but with different prayers (splitting causes of
action, where the ground for dismissal is also either litis pendentia or res
judicata).69 (Citations omitted)
In Dy v. Mandy Commodities Co, Inc.,70 the court elaborated on the
purpose of the rule against forum shopping:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The grave evil sought to be avoided by the rule against forum shopping is
the rendition by two competent tribunals of two separate and contradictory
decisions. Unscrupulous party litigants, taking advantage of a variety of
competent tribunals, may repeatedly try their luck in several different fora
RULE 7 CASES | SENYORA SANTIBANEZ
until a favorable result is reached. To avoid the resultant confusion, this Court
strictly adheres to the rules against forum shopping, and any violation of these
rules results in the dismissal of a case.71ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Respondent filed multiple cases based on the same cause of action and with
the same prayer. All the elements necessary for the commission of forum
shopping are present.
The Court of Appeals correctly held that respondent could have easily filed a
manifestation that the other petitioners had yet to verify the First Petition.
Respondent's reason that the failure of other petitioners to verify the First
Petition may imperil the issuance of a temporary restraining order cannot justify
the willful violation of the rule against forum shopping.
Respondent must be reminded that the withdrawal of any case, when it has
been duly filed and docketed with a court, rests upon the discretion of the
court, and not at the behest of litigants.72 Once a case is filed before a court
and the court accepts the case, the case is considered pending and is subject to
that court's jurisdiction.
Thus, it was incumbent upon respondent to inform the court or division where
he subsequently filed his Second Petition that he had already filed the First
Petition. The Court of Appeals correctly held that courts cannot take judicial
notice of actions that have been filed either before their courts or before other
courts.
This court's Circular No. 28-91 is instructive on this point:
[I]n every petition filed with the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals, the
petitioner . . . must certify under oath all of the following facts or undertakings:
(a) he has not theretofore commenced any other action or proceeding
involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any
other tribunal or agencies; (b) to the best of his knowledge, no such action or
proceeding is pending in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or different
Divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency; (c) if there is such other
action or proceeding pending, he must state the status of the same; and (d) if
he should thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or
is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or different
Divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency, he undertakes to promptly
inform the aforesaid courts and such other tribunal or agency of that fact within
five (5) days therefrom. (Emphasis supplied).73ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
As a lawyer, respondent is expected to anticipate the possibility of being held
liable for forum shopping. He is expected to be aware of actions constituting
forum shopping. Respondent's defense of substantial compliance and good
faith cannot exonerate him. The elements of forum shopping are expected to
be fundamentally understood by members of the bar, and a defense of good
faith cannot counter an abject violation of the rule.
THE WELLEX GROUP VS SHERIFF ADGARDO URIETA
37
Wellex obtained a loan in the principal amount of P500,000,000.00 from the
IMA Account with BDO. As security for the loan, Wellex mortgaged the WPI
shares.
By the time the loan obligation matured on 29 January 2001, Wellex was
not able to settle the same; however, BDO, as investment manager of the
IMA Account did not institute any foreclosure proceeding against the WPI
shares.
Thereafter, BDO, through a Letter dated 14 March 2001, informed Wellex
that it shall cease to manage the IMA Account effective 2 May 2001. In the
same letter, BDO informed Wellex that on 29 January 2000, the· Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR) issued a Notice of Constructive Distraint against the
IMA Account, which effectively froze all goods, chattels or personal
property owned by Jose Velarde, including the WPI shares, which BOO
could consequently neither remove nor dispose of without the express
authority of the BIR.
Subsequently, Wellex alleged that considering that BDO had relinquished
its authority to act as the investment manager of the IMA Account, and that
W ellex had supposedly settled its loan obligation in full directly with Jose
Velarde, BOO, as the principal of the IMA Account, should return the WPI
shares to Wellex. BDO, however, did not.
In the meantime, on 12 September 2007, the Sandiganbayan in Criminal
Case No. 26558 found former President Estrada guilty of the crime of
plunder. The conviction ultimately carried with it the penalty of forfeiture,6
wherein all ill-gotten wealth amassed by former President Estrada,
including the IMA Account and the assets therein, were forfeited in favor of
the State.
Former President Estrada was, thereafter, pardoned by former President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on 25 October 2007; nonetheless, the said
forfeiture remained in force.
Consequently, the Sandiganbayan, in the same case, issued a Resolution
dated 24 September 2008 directing the Sheriff of the Sandiganbayan to
cause the forfeiture of, among others, the IMA Account, including the WPI
shares in favor of the State.
Wellex sought to intervene in Criminal Case No. 26558 and moved for the
reconsideration of the above-mentioned Resolution dated 24 September
2008. Wellex argued that the WPI shares should be excluded from the
forfeiture order. However, the Sandiganbayan, in a Resolution dated 02
April 2009, denied the said reconsideration sought by Wellex.
By virtue of the foregoing resolutions, respondent Sheriff Edgardo A. Urieta
(Urieta) of the Sandiganbayan issued to BDO a Notice to deliver dated 20
April 2009. BDO delivered to Urieta, among others, the WPI shares, which
shares Urieta subsequently scheduled7 for sale at a public auction on 15
May 2009.
RULE 7 CASES | SENYORA SANTIBANEZ
As mentioned above, Wellex filed G.R. No 187951 to question the inclusion of
the WPI shares among the forfeited assets; however, this Court affirmed the
inclusion of the WPI shares as part of the assets covered by the forfeiture order.
Subsequently, Wellex filed Civil Case No. 09-399 with the trial court for the
recovery of the possession of the WPI shares. In essence, Wellex claims that it is
the owner of the WPI Shares; that it fully paid its loan obligation and that it is
entitled to the return thereof. Wellex prayed that the trial court issue a
temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction against the
Sandiganbayan to enjoin them from selling the WPI shares at a public auction.
Wellex alleged that it instituted the case as a third (3rd) party claimant because
the Sandiganbayan failed to observe the requirements under Section 16, Rule
39 of the Rules of Court,8 and that Wellex was left with no recourse but to file
an action with a competent court to recover ownership of the WPI shares by
virtue of the extinguishment of the obligation through payment.
Well ex contends that the trial court erred in its ruling dismissing Civil Case No.
09-399 because it can take cognizance of the same by determining the
existence of legal and formal requirements for executing on a security,
particularly on the WPI shares. Thus, Wellex seeks that this Court set aside the
dismissal order and direct the resumption of proceedings.
ISSUE:
RULING:
Before delving into the merits of the Petition, this Court recognizes the crucial
need to emphasize that as per the Decision in G.R. 187951, this Court had
already declared with absolute finality that the WPI shares were and should
rightfully be included among the forfeited assets in favor of the State.
Therefore, this matter is beyond cavil. This Court aptly and succinctly ruled "[i]t
is beyond doubt that IMA Trust Account No. 101- 78056-1 and its assets were
traceable to the· account adjudged as ill-gotten. As such, the trust account and
its assets were indeed within the scope of the forfeiture Order issued by the
Sandiganbayan in the plunder case"9 against former President Estrada.
However, this Court is cognizant of the fact that the issues in this case are, while
novel, unambiguous: whether the Sandiganbayan may proceed to sell outright,
at public auction, the forfeited WPI shares; and whether the trial court may take
cognizance of Civil Case No. 09-399.
To resolve these issues, there is a need to first establish the nature of the WPI
shares.
In its final and executory Decision in G.R. No. 187951, this Court had already
ruled that:
There is no dispute that the subject shares of stock were mortgaged by
petitioner Wellex as security for its loan. These shares being the subject of a
contract that was accessory to the Wellex loan and being an asset of
38
the forfeited IMA Trust Account, the said shares necessarily follow the fate
of the trust account and are forfeited as well. However, the forfeiture of the
said trust account, together with all its assets and receivables, does not
affect the validity of the loan transaction between BDO the creditor and
Wellex the debtor. The loan continues to be valid despite the forfeiture by
the government of the IMA Trust Account and is considered as an asset.
Consequently, the forfeiture had the effect of subrogating the state to the
rights of the trust account as creditor. 10 (Underscoring supplied)
Thus, this Court reiterates that the WPI shares assume the character of a
security for a valid and existing loan obligation, which is included in the
IMA Account. Stated in simpler terms, one (1) of the assets in the IMA
Account is a receivable secured by a chattel mortgage, more particularly
the valid and existing loan obligation between BDO and petitioner, secured
by the WPI shares.
Consequently, considering that the loan .obligation of petitioner is valid
and existing, it necessarily follows that BDO, the creditor, or its successor-
in-interest, cannot be allowed to unilaterally sell the chattel securing the
loan and apply the proceeds thereof as payment, full or partial, to the said
loan. This would constitute a clear case of pactum
commissorium, which is expressly prohibited by Article 2088 11 of the Civil
Code. 12
In line with our holding in The Wellex Group, Inc. v. Sandig.anbayan, 13 that
"the forfeiture had the effect x x x as creditor," the state has stepped into
the shoes of the BDO. As this Court has consistently· ruled, "[ s ]ubrogation
is the substitution of one person by another with reference to a lawful claim
or right, so that he who is substituted succeeds to the rights of the other in
relation to a debt or claim, including its remedies or securities. x x x It
contemplates full substitution such that it places the party subrogated in
the shoes of the creditor, and he may use all means that the creditor could
employ to enforce payment."14 Given that the subrogee merely steps into
the shoes of the creditor, he acquires no right greater than those of the
latter.
Considering that the WPI shares serves as security to an acknowledged
valid and existing loan obligation, the subrogee, in this case the State, is
obliged to avail of the very same remedies available to the original creditor
to collect the loan obligation, which is to first demand from the original
debtor to pay the same, and if not paid despite demand, institute either
foreclosure proceedings, or the appropriate action for collection before· the
proper forum. In either case, the debtor will be afforded the opportunity to
pay the obligation, or to assert any claim or defense, which the debtor may
have against the original creditor. This is the essence of constitutional right
to due process. In this case, the action of public respondent in offering for
sale, at public auction, the WPI shares would unavoidably trample upon a
constitutionally enshrined right.
This Court is well aware that the Sandiganbayan had earlier asserted in
Criminal Case No. 26558 that as regards the BDO loan, Wellex is considered
RULE 7 CASES | SENYORA SANTIBANEZ
a delinquent debtor.1avvphi1 However, the pronouncement cannot be an
excuse to omit the steps needed to be taken regarding the mortgaged WPI
shares. It is a fact that Wellex was not impleaded as a party to the said case,
ergo, the effect of the pronouncement cannot be extended to it. It is axiomatic
that no man shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger, and
strangers to a case are not bound by any judgment rendered by the court. 15
Thus, only those who have had their day in court are considered· the real
parties· in interest in an action, and it is they who are bound by the judgment
therein and by writs of execution issued pursuant thereto. 16
Even more important, this Court riotes that the subject matter of controversy
brought forth by Wellex is purely civil in nature. This involves the third (3rd)
party claim of Wellex against the WPI shares vis-a-vis the loan obligation per se,
which should be properly lodged before and heard by the regular trial courts.
To the mind of this Court, it is clear that the same does not pertain to the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Jurisdiction, which is the authority to hear
and the right to act in a case, is conferred by the Constitution and by law.
Although the Sandiganbayan, a constitutionally-mandated court, is a regular
court, it has, nevertheless, only a special or limited jurisdiction. 17
While this Court has time and again affirmed 18 that the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction over the civil aspect of criminal cases, as conferred to it by law, the
case before the trial court does not involve the civil aspect of Criminal Case No.
26558. The same has nothing to do with the ownership of the IMA Account
and/or any of its financial assets, which, as ·stated above, has been adjudged
forfeited in favor of the State. In contrast, the said case is an ordinary civil case
entailing the propriety of the actions of a creditor in proceeding against the
security for its loan, which necessitates the application of the provisions of the
Civil Code, therefore falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Courts. 19
Given that the cause of action of Wellex in Civil Case No. 09-399 partakes of a
valid third (3rd) party claim sanctioned by the Rules of Court, affording Wellex
the opportunity to assert its c;laim or defense against its creditor, presently the
State, the latter should likewise avail of this avenue to affirm its own claims, as
creditor, against the loan and/or mortgage securing the said loan, paving the
way to the realization of any of the fruits of plunder. Thus, this Court deems it
proper to remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings, where all
the civil issues may properly be ventilated.
At this point, this Court commends the trial court for acting cautiously and
exercising prudence in applying the principle of hierarchy of courts when it
issued its Order dated 9 January 2012 and Resolution dated 15
January 2014. As a consequence of the rulings rendered in this case, that is, that
the State, acting through the Sandiganbayan, may not sell the WPI shares
outright without first complying with the requirements set by law, the
prayer of petitioner for injunctive relief against the Sandiganbayan is now
rendered moot and academic. And as previously stated, given the fact that the
State has validly substituted BDO as the creditor of Wellex, the cause of action
of Well ex against BDO is, Iikewise, rende.red moot and academic.
CITY OF TAGUIG VS CITY OF MAKATI
39
Doctrine:
Simultaneously pursuing an appeal (or motion for reconsideration) and a
petition for annulment of judgment is an act of forum shopping. This act,
which heaps vexation upon courts and parties-litigants, is illustrated by the
facts of this case in which conflicting decisions have been rendered by
different courts upon the same issue. The actions of respondent City of
Makati (Makati) through its counsels is at the border of what appears to be
a contumacious attempt to obfuscate the resolution of cases through the
abuse of legal processes.
FACTS:
On November 22, 1993, Taguig filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Pasig, a Complaint against Makati for a “Judicial Confirmation of the
Territory and Boundary Limits of Taguig and a Declaration of the
Unconstitutionality and Nullity of Certain Provisions of Presidential
Proclamation 2471 and 518.”
In its complaint, Taguig averred that areas comprising the Enlisted Men’s
Barangays (EMBOs) and the Inner Fort in Fort Andres Bonifacio (Fort
Bonifacio) are within its territory and jurisdiction.
Makati filed its answer, stating that it has claim rightful ownership over the
disputed areas.
RTC: Rendered its decision on July 8,2011 – in favor of Taguig. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
xxx xxx xxx
1.Fort Bonifacio Military Reservation is confirmed part of the territory of the
Plaintiff
City of Taguig:
2.Proclamation No. 2475, Series of 1986 and [Proclamation] No. 518 Series
1990 are hereby declared UNCONSITUTIONAL and INVALID, insofar as
they altred boundaries and diminished the areas of territorial jurisdiction of
the City of Taguig without benefit of a plebiscite as required in Section 10,
Article 10 of the 1987 Constitution.
xxx xxx xxx
On July 28 2011 - Makati filed a Motion for Reconsideration (MR) Ad
Cautelam before the RTC.
At the same time (July 28,2011), Makati also filed a Petition for Annulment
of Judgement for the CA, (docketed as CA-Gr SP No. 120495) challenging
the RTC decision on the ground that it was rendered by Judge Briccio
Ygana (Judge Ygana) after he had already retired from office.
RULE 7 CASES | SENYORA SANTIBANEZ
RTC on MR: Rendered its decision on December 19, 2011 – ruling that Makati
was guilty of Forum Shopping.
Omnibus order of RTC on MR: Dated February 13, 2012 opined that “the finding
of facts and conclusions of law in the Decision dated July 8, 2011, are all in
order and soundly based.”
On January 5, 2012, Makati filed its Notice of Appeal Ad Cautelam –
questioning the RTC’s decision and order. On October 5, 2012, Makti filed its
Appellant’s Brief Ad Cautelam.
On January 23, 2011 – Taguig, in response filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal on
the ground of forum shopping.
CA: On July 30, 2013 – it ruled in favor of Makati. It essentially held that the RTC
erred:
xxx xxx xxx
2. in declaring the disputed areas as part of the territory of Taguig;
3. in declaring Presidential Proclamation No. 2475, and Presidential
[Proclamation] No.418
as unconstitutional and invalid since it said proclamations did not alter the
boundaries of the disputed areas but instead confirmed that the same are
under the jurisdiction of Makati.
On September 3, 2013, Taguig filed an MR assailing the CA’s July 30, 2013
decision.
In the meantime, the CA case (CA-Gr SP No. 120495) reached the Supreme
Court (SC).
SC: On July 15, 2016 in the case of City of Taguig v. City of Makati Gr No.
208393
the SC found Makati guilty of willful and deliberate forum shopping
for pursuing
2 simultaneous remedies:
40
1.a Petition for Annulment of Judgement under Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules
of Court; and
2.a MR Ad Cautelam
Hence, Taguig filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of Forum Shopping.
ISSUE: Whether Makati committed willful and deliberate forum shopping
RULING (CA on MR): YES.
CA granted Taguig’s Motion to Dismiss for Forum Shopping.
Top Rate Construction & General Services, Inc. v. Paxton Development
Corporation85 explained that:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Forum shopping is committed by a party who institutes two or more suits
in different courts, either simultaneously or successively, in order to ask the
courts to rule on the same or related causes or to grant the same or
substantially the same reliefs, on the supposition that one or the other
court would make a favorable disposition or increase a party's chances of
obtaining a favorable decision or action.86chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
First Philippine International Bank v. Court of Appeals87 recounted that
forum shopping originated as a concept in private international
law:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
To begin with, forum-shopping originated as a concept in private
international law, where non-resident litigants are given the option to
choose the forum or place wherein to bring their suit for various reasons or
excuses, including to secure procedural advantages, to annoy and harass
the defendant, to avoid overcrowded dockets, or to select a more friendly
venue. To combat these less than honorable excuses, the principle of forum
non conveniens was developed whereby a court, in conflicts of law cases,
may refuse impositions on its jurisdiction where it is not the most
"convenient" or available forum and the parties are not precluded from
seeking remedies elsewhere.
In this light, Black's Law Dictionary says that forum-shopping "occurs when
a party attempts to have his action tried in a particular court or jurisdiction
where he feels he will receive the most favorable judgment or verdict."
Hence, according to Words and Phrases, "a litigant is open to the charge of
'forum shopping' whenever he chooses a forum with slight connection to
factual circumstances surrounding his suit, and litigants should be
encouraged to attempt to settle their differences without imposing undue
expense and vexatious situations on the courts."88 (Emphasis in the
original)
Further, Prubankers Association v. Prudential Bank and Trust Co.89
recounted that:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The rule on forum-shopping was first included in Section 17 of the Interim
Rules and Guidelines issued by this Court on January 11, 1983, which
imposed a sanction in this wise: "A violation of the rule shall constitute
contempt of court and shall be a cause for the summary dismissal of both
petitions, without prejudice to the taking of appropriate action against the
RULE 7 CASES | SENYORA SANTIBANEZ
counsel or party concerned." Thereafter, the Court restated the rule in Revised
Circular No. 28-91 and Administrative Circular No. 04-94. Ultimately, the rule
was embodied in the 1997 amendments to the Rules of
Court.90chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Presently, Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a
Certification against Forum Shopping be appended to every complaint or
initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief. It also provides for the
consequences of willful and deliberate forum
shopping:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
RULE 7
PARTS OF A PLEADING
....
SEC. 5. Certification against forum shopping. — The plaintiff or principal party
shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a
claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously
filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed
any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial
agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is
pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete
statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn
that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall
report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid
complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere
amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for
the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon
motion and after hearing. The submission of a false certification or non-
compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect
contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and
criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful
and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary
dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause
for administrative sanctions. (Emphasis supplied)
Though contained in the same provision of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
the rule requiring the inclusion of a Certification against Forum Shopping is
distinct from the rule against forum shopping. In Korea Exchange Bank v.
Gonzales:91
The general rule is that compliance with the certificate of forum shopping is
separate from and independent of the avoidance of the act of forum shopping
itself. Forum shopping is a ground for summary dismissal of both initiatory
pleadings without prejudice to the taking of appropriate action against the
counsel or party concerned.92chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Top Rate Construction discussed the rationale for the rule against forum
shopping as follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
It is an act of malpractice for it trifles with the courts, abuses their processes,
degrades the administration of justice and adds to the already congested court
dockets. What is critical is the vexation brought upon the courts and the
litigants by a party who asks different courts to rule on the same or related
causes and grant the same or substantially the same reliefs and in the process
creates the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by the different
fora upon the same issues, regardless of whether the court in which one of the
suits was brought has no jurisdiction over the
action.93chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
41
Jurisprudence has recognized that forum shopping can be committed in
several ways:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
(1) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and with the
same prayer, the previous case not having been resolved yet (where the
ground for dismissal is litis pendentia); (2) filing multiple cases based on the
same cause of action and the same prayer, the previous case having been
finally resolved (where the ground for dismissal is res judicata); and (3) filing
multiple cases based on the same cause of action but with diiferent prayers
(splitting of causes of action, where the ground for dismissal is also either
litis pendentia or res judicata).94 (Emphasis in the original)
Similarly, it has been recognized that forum shopping exists "where a party
attempts to obtain a preliminary injunction in another court after failing to
obtain the same from the original court."95chanrobleslaw
The test for determining forum shopping is settled. In Yap v. Chua, et al.:96
To determine whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping, the
most important factor to ask is whether the elements of litis pendentia are
present, or whether a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata
in another; otherwise stated, the test for determining forum shopping is
whether in the two (or more) cases pending, there is identity of parties,
rights or causes of action, and reliefs sought.97chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
For its part, litis pendentia "refers to that situation wherein another action is
pending between the same parties for the same cause of action, such that
the second action becomes unnecessary and vexatious."98 For litis
pendentia to exist, three (3) requisites must
concur:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The requisites of litis pendentia are: (a) the identity of parties, or at least
such as representing the same interests in both actions; (b) the identity of
rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same
facts; and (c) the identity of the two cases such that judgment in one,
regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the
other.99chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On the other hand, res judicata or prior judgment bars a subsequent case
when the following requisites are satisfied:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
(1) the former judgment is final; (2) it is rendered by a court having
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it is a judgment or
an order on the merits; (4) there is — between the first and the second
actions — identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action.100
(Emphasis in the original)
These settled tests notwithstanding:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Ultimately, what is truly important to consider in determining whether
forum-shopping exists or not is the vexation caused the courts and parties-
litigant by a party who asks different courts and/or administrative agencies
to rule on the same or related causes and/or to grant the same or
substantially the same reliefs, in the process creating the possibility of
conflicting decisions being rendered by the different fora upon the same
issue.101chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that, apart
from being a ground for summary dismissal, "willful and deliberate forum
shopping . . . shall constitute direct contempt, [and is] a cause for
administrative sanctions." Thus, it would be inadequate to stop with a mere
declaration that respondent City of Makati, which acted through its
counsels, engaged in forum shopping.
It was among the matters prayed for by petitioner City of Taguig that
appropriate sanctions be imposed for respondent City of Makati's wilful
and deliberate forum shopping. So too, respondent City of Makati's
RULE 7 CASES | SENYORA SANTIBANEZ
defenses have been duly pleaded and considered in this case. Under Rule 71,
Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, direct contempt committed
against a Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank is
punishable by imprisonment not exceeding 10 days and/or a fine not
exceeding P2,000.00. Accordingly, a fine of P2,000.00 is imposed on each of
respondent City of Makati's counsels who filed the Petition for Annulment of
Judgment before the Court of Appeals: Atty. Pio Kenneth I. Dasal, Atty. Glenda
Isabel L. Biason, and Atty. Gwyn Gareth T. Mariano.
CIR VS APO CEMENT CORPROATION
the Bureau of Internal Revenue sent Apo Cement Corporation (Apo Cement) a
Final Assessment Notice (FAN) for deficiency taxes for the taxable year 1999
Apo Cement protested the FAN.6 The Bureau issued the Final Decision on
Disputed Assessment dated June 15, 2006 denying the Apo Cement's protest.
On August 3, 2006, Apo Cement filed a Petition for Review with the Court of
Tax Appeals.9
In its Answer, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue admitted that Apo Cement
had already paid the deficiency assessments reflected in the Bureau's Final
Decision on Disputed Assessment, except for the documentary stamp taxes.10
The deficiency documentary stamp taxes were allegedly based on several real
property transactions of the corporation consisting of the assignment of several
parcels of land with mineral deposits to Apo Land and Quarry Corporation, a
wholly owned subsidiary, and land acquisitions in 1999.11 According to the
Commissioner, Apo Cement should have paid documentary stamp taxes based
on the zonal value of property with mineral/quarry content, not on the zonal
value of regular residential property.12
On January 25, 2008, Apo Cement availed of the tax amnesty under Republic
Act No. 9480, particularly affecting the 1999 deficiency documentary stamp
taxes.
On June 11, 2009, the Court of Tax Appeals (Second Division) granted16 Apo
Cement's Motion to Cancel Tax Assessment. It found Apo Cement a qualified
tax amnesty applicant under Republic Act No. 9480;17 and fully compliant with
the requirements of the law, the Department Order No. 29-07, and Revenue
Memorandum Circular No. 19-2008.
ISSUE: was there violation of the rule against forum shopping
RULING:
Through the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping29 attached
to the present Petition, Deputy Commissioner Estela V. Sales of the Legal and
Inspection Group of the Bureau of Internal Revenue states that the contents of
the Petition are true and correct of her own "knowledge and belief based on
authentic records."30
In the Court's Resolution31 dated December 8, 2010, the petitioner was
directed to submit a sufficient verification within five (5) days from notice.
Petitioner did not comply.
Petitioner would argue however that while the verification still stated "belief," it
was qualified by "based on authentic records." Hence, "the statement implies
that the contents of the petition were based not only on the pleader's belief but
ultimately they are recitals from authentic records."32
42
We are not persuaded.
The amendment to Section 4, Rule 7 entirely removed any reference to
"belief" as basis.33 This is to ensure that the pleading is anchored on facts
and not on imagination or speculation, and is filed in good faith.
In Go v. Court of Appeals:34
Mere belief is insufficient basis and negates the verification which should
be on the basis of personal knowledge or authentic records. Verification is
required to secure an assurance that the allegations of the petition have
been made in good faith, or are true and correct and not merely
speculative.35
To emphasize this further, the third paragraph of Rule 7, Section 4 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, expressly treats pleadings with
a verification based on "information and belief' or "knowledge, information
and belief," as unsigned.36
In Negros Oriental Planters Association, Inc. v. Hon. Presiding Judge of RTC-
Negros Occidental, Branch 52, Bacolod City,37 the Court explained that the
amendment in the rules was made stricter so that a party cannot be
allowed to base his statements on his belief. Otherwise, the pleading is
treated as unsigned which produces no legal effect. The court, though, in
its discretion, may give the party a chance to remedy the insufficiency.
Thus:
Clearly, the amendment was introduced in order to make the verification
requirement stricter, such that the party cannot now merely state under
oath that he believes the statements made in the pleading. He cannot even
merely state under oath that he has knowledge that such statements are
true and correct. His knowledge must be specifically alleged under oath to
be either personal knowledge or at least based on authentic records.
Unlike, however, the requirement for a Certification against Forum
Shopping in Section 5, wherein failure to comply with the requirements is
not curable by amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading,
Section 4 of Rule 7, as amended, states that the effect of the failure to
properly verify a pleading is that the pleading shall be treated as unsigned:
A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on
"information and belief", or upon "knowledge, information and belief", or
lacks a proper verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading.
Unsigned pleadings are discussed in the immediately preceding section of
Rule 7:
SEC. 3. Signature and address. - ....
....
RULE 7 CASES | SENYORA SANTIBANEZ
An unsigned pleading produces no legal effect. However, the court may, in its
discretion, allow such deficiency to be remedied if it shall appear that the same
was due to mere inadvertence and not intended for delay. Counsel who
deliberately files an unsigned pleading, or signs a pleading in violation of this
Rule, or alleges scandalous or indecent matter therein, or fails to promptly
report to the court a change of his address, shall be subject to appropriate
disciplinary action. (5a)
A pleading, therefore, wherein the Verification is merely based on the party's
knowledge and belief produces no legal effect, subject to the discretion of the
court to allow the deficiency to be remedied.38
In this case, petitioner did not submit a corrected verification despite the order
of this Court. This alone merits the denial of the Petition outright.
In any case, we find respondent had fully complied with the requirements of
Republic Act No. 9480. Hence, the Court of Tax Appeals properly cancelled the
remaining assessment for deficiency documentary stamp taxes.
PALAO VS FLORENTINO INTERNATIONAL
In its assailed Decision, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the
September 22, 2008 Order4 of Intellectual Property Office Director General
Adrian S. Cristobal, Jr. and reinstated respondent Florentino III International,
Inc.'s (Florentino) appeal from Decision No. 2007-31,5 dated March 5, 2007, of
the Bureau of Legal Affairs of the Intellectual Property Office.
Decision No. 2007-31 denied Florentino's Petition for Cancellation of Letters
Patent No. UM-7789, which the Intellectual Property Office had issued in favor
of Palao. 6
Letters Patent No. UM-7789 pertained to "A Ceramic Tile Installation on Non-
Concrete Substrate Base Surfaces Adapted to Form Part of Furniture,
Architectural Components and the Like."7
In its Petition for Cancellation, Florentino claimed that the utility model covered
by Letters Patent No. UM-7789 was not original, new, or patentable, as it had
been publicly known or used in the Philippines and had even been the subject
of several publications.8 It added that it, as well as many others, had been using
the utility model well before Palao' s application for a patent.9
In its Decision No. 2007-31,10 the Bureau of Legal Affairs of the Intellectual
Property Office denied Florentino's Petition for Cancellation. It noted that the
testimony and pictures, which Florentino offered in evidence, failed to establish
that the utility model subject of Letters Patent No. UM-7789 was publicly
known or used before Palao' s application for a patent. 11
In its Resolution No. 2008-1412 dated July 14, 2008, the Bureau of Legal Affairs
of the Intellectual Property Office denied Florentino' s Motion for
Reconsideration.
43
On July 30, 2008, Florentino appealed to the Office of the Director General
of the Intellectual Property Office. 13 This appeal's Verification and
Certification of Non-Forum Shopping was signed by Atty. John Labsky P.
Maximo (Atty. Maximo) of the firm Balgos and Perez. 14 However,
Florentino failed to attach to its appeal a secretary's certificate or board
resolution authorizing Balgos and Perez to sign the Verification and
Certification of Non-Forum Shopping. 15 Thus, on August 14, 2008, the
Office of the Director General issued the Order requiring Florentino to
submit proof that Atty. Maximo or Balgos and Perez was authorized to sign
the Verification and Certification ofNon-Forum Shopping. 16
On August 19, 2008, Florentino filed a Compliance. 17 It submitted a copy
of the Certificate executed on August 15, 2008 by Florentino's Corporate
Secretary, Melanie Marie A. C. Zosa-Tan, supposedly showing its counsel's
authority to sign. 18 This Certificate stated:
[A]t a meeting of the Board of Directors of the said corporation on 14
August 2008, during which a majority of the Directors were present, the
following resolution was unanimously adopted:
'RESOLVED, as it is hereby resolved, that BALGOS & PEREZ, or any of its
associates, be, as they are hereby, authorized to sign for and on behalf of
the corporation, the Verification and Certification on NonForum Shopping
and/or all other documents relevant to the Appeal filed by the Corporation
with the Office of the Director General of the Intellectual Property Office
entitled "Philippine Chambers of Stonecraft Industries, Inc. and Florentino III
International, Inc. vs. Divina Palao".'
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand on these presents, this
15 August 2008 in Cebu City, Cebu. 19
In his Order dated September 22, 2008, Intellectual Property Office Director
General Adrian S. Cristobal, Jr. (Director General Cristobal) dismissed
Florentino's appeal.20 He noted that the Secretary's Certificate pertained to
an August 14, 2008 Resolution issued by Florentino' s Board of Directors,
and reasoned that the same Certificate failed to establish the authority of
Florentino's counsel to sign the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum
Shopping as of the date of the filing of Florentino's appeal (i.e., on July 30,
2008).21
Florentino then filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Review
under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. In its assailed January 8,
2009 Decision,22 the Court of Appeals faulted Director General Cristobal
for an overly strict application of procedural rules. Thus, it reversed Director
General Cristobal's September 22, 2008 Order and reinstated Florentino' s
appeal. 23
In its assailed March 2, 2009 Resolution,24 the Court of Appeals denied
Palao's Motion for Reconsideration.
ISSUE: whether there was violation of the rule against forum shopping
RULE 7 CASES | SENYORA SANTIBANEZ
RULING: NO, subtantial compliance sufficed.
The need for a certification of non-forum shopping to be attached to
respondent's appeal before the Office of the Director General of the Intellectual
Property Office is established.
Section 3 of the Intellectual Property Office's Uniform Rules on Appeai25
specifies the form through which appeals may be taken to the Director General:
Section 3. Appeal Memorandum. - The appeal shall be perfected by filing an
appeal memorandum in three (3) legible copies with proof of service to the
Bureau Director and the adverse party, if any, and upon payment of the
applicable fee, Reference Code 127 or 128, provided in the IPO Fee Structure.
Section 4(e) specifies the need for a certification of non-forum shopping.
Section 4 reads in full:
Section 4. Contents of the Appeal Memorandum. - The appeal memorandum
shall:
a) State the full name or names, capacity and address or addresses of the
appellant or appellants;
b) Indicate the material dates showing that it was filed on time;
c) Set forth concisely a statement of the matters involved, the issues raised, the
specification of errors of fact or law, or both, allegedly committed by the
Bureau Director and the reasons or arguments relied upon for the allowance of
the appeal;
d) Be accompanied by legible copies of the decision or final order of the Bureau
Director and of the material portions of the record as would support the
allegations of the appeal; and
e) Contain a certification of non-forum-shopping. (Emphasis supplied)
These requirements notwithstanding, the Intellectual Property Office's own
Regulations on Inter Partes Proceedings (which governs petitions for
cancellations of a mark, patent, utility model, industrial design, opposition to
registration of a mark and compulsory licensing, and which were in effect when
respondent filed its appeal) specify that the Intellectual Property Office "shall
not be bound by the strict technical rules of procedure and evidence. "26
Rule 2, Section 6 of these Regulations provides:
44
Section 6 Rules of Procedure to be Followed in the Conduct of Hearing of
Inter Partes Cases
In the conduct of hearing of inter partes cases, the rules of procedure
herein contained shall be primarily applied. The Rules of Court, unless
inconsistent with these rules, may be applied in suppletory character,
provided, however, that the Director or Hearing Officer shall not be bound
by the strict technical rules of procedure and evidence therein contained
but may adopt, in the absence of any applicable rule herein, such mode of
proceedings which is consistent with the requirements of fair play and
conducive to the just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of cases, and
which will give the Bureau the greatest possibility to focus on the technical
grounds or issues before it. (Emphasis supplied)
This rule is in keeping with the general principle that administrative bodies
are not strictly bound by technical rules of procedure:
[A]dministrative bodies are not bound by the technical niceties of law and
procedure and the rules obtaining in courts of law. Administrative tribunals
exercising quasi-judicial powers are unfettered by the rigidity of certain
procedural requirements, subject to the observance of fundamental and
essential requirements of due process in justiciable cases presented before
them. In administrative proceedings, technical rules of procedure and
evidence are not strictly applied and administrative due process cannot be
fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense.27
In conformity with this liberality, Section 5(b) of the Intellectual Property
Office's Uniform Rules on Appeal expressly enables appellants, who failed
to comply with Section 4' s formal requirements, to subsequently complete
their compliance:
Section 5. Action on the Appeal Memorandum - The Director General shall:
a) Order the adverse party if any, to file comment to the appeal
memorandum within thirty (30) days from notice and/or order the Bureau
Director to file comment and/or transmit the records within thirty (30) days
from notice; or
b) Order the appellant/appellants to complete the formal requirements
mentioned in Section 4 hereof;
c) Dismiss the appeal for being patently without merit, Provided, that the
dismissal shall be outright if the appeal is not filed within the prescribed
period or for failure of the appellant to pay the required fee within the
period of appeal. (Emphasis supplied)
Given these premises, it was an error for the Director General of the
Intellectual Property Office to have been so rigid in applying a procedural
rule and dismissing respondent's appeal.
RULE 7 CASES | SENYORA SANTIBANEZ
Petitioner-in her pleadings before this Court-and Director General Cristobal-in
his September 2, 2008 Order-cite Decisions of this Court (namely: Philippine
Public School Teachers Association v. Heirs of lligan28 and Philippine Airlines,
Inc. v. Flight Attendants & Stewards Association of the Philippines29) to
emphasize the need for precise compliance with the rule on appending a
certification of non-forum shopping.
Philippine Public School Teachers Association states:
Under Section 3 of the same Rule, failure to comply shall be sufficient ground
for the dismissal of the petition. The rule on certification against forum
shopping is intended to prevent the actual filing of multiple
petitions/complaints involving identical causes of action, subject matter and
issues in other tribunals or agencies as a form of forum shopping. This is rooted
in the principle that a party-litigant should not be allowed to pursue
simultaneous remedies in different forums, as this practice is detrimental to
orderly judicial procedure. Although not jurisdictional, the requirement of a
certification of non-forum shopping is mandatory. The rule requires that a
certification against forum shopping J should be appended to or incorporated
in the initiatory pleading filed before the court. The rule also requires that the
party, not counsel, must certify under oath that he has not commenced any
other action involving the same issue in the court or any other tribunal or
agency.
The requirement that the certification of non-forum shopping should be
executed and signed by the plaintiff or principal means that counsel cannot
sign said certification unless clothed with special authority to do so. The reason
for this is that the plaintiff or principal knows better than anyone else whether a
petition has previously been filed involving the same case or substantially the
same issues. Hence, a certification signed by counsel alone is defective and
constitutes a valid cause for dismissal of the petition. In the case of natural
persons, the Rule requires the parties themselves to sign the certificate of non-
forum shopping. However, in the case of the corporations, the physical act of
signing may be performed, on behalf of the corporate entity, only by
specifically authorized individuals for the simple reason that corporations, as
artificial persons, cannot personally do the task themselves. It cannot be
gainsaid that obedience to the requirements of procedural rules is needed if we
are to expect fair results therefrom. Utter disregard of the rules cannot justly be
rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction.30
Philippine Airlines, for its part, states that:
The required certification of non-forum shopping must be valid at the time of
filing of the petition .. An invalid certificate cannot be remedied by the
subsequent submission of a Secretary's Certificate that vests authority only after
the petition had been filed. 31
As pointed out by the Court of Appeals, 32 however, the strict posturing of
these Decisions are not entirely suitable for this case. Both Philippine Public
School Teachers Association and Philippine Airlines involved petitions filed
before the Court of Appeals, that is, petitions in judicial proceedings. What is
involved here is a quasi-judicial proceeding that is "unfettered by the strict
application of the technical rules of procedure imposed in judicial
proceedings."33
45
In any case, even in judicial proceedings, this Court has rebuked an overly
strict application of the rules pertaining to certifications of non-forum
shopping.1âwphi1
In Pacquing v. Coca-Cola Philippines, Inc.:34
[T] he rules on forum shopping, which were designed to promote and
facilitate the orderly administration of justice, should not be interpreted
with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate
objective. Strict compliance with the provision regarding the certificate of
non-forum shopping underscores its mandatory nature in that the
certification cannot be altogether dispensed with or its requirements
completely disregarded. It does not, however, prohibit substantial
compliance therewith under justifiable circumstances, considering
especially that although it is obligatory, it is notjurisdictional.35
This Court acknowledged that, in the strict sense, the Court of Appeals was
correct: "The ruling of the [Court of Appeals] that [the Philippine Public
School Teachers Association] was negligent when it failed to append in its
petition a board resolution authorizing petitioner Asuncion to sign the
certification of non-forum shopping in its behalf is correct.'44
However, this Court did not end at that. It went on to state that "a strict
application of [the rule] is not called for": 45
We have reviewed the records, however, and find that a strict application of
Rule 42, in relation to Section 5, Rule 7 of the Revised Rules of Court is not
called for. As we held in Huntington Steel Products, Inc. v. National Labor
Relations Commission, while the requirement of strict compliance
underscores the mandatory nature of the rule, it does not necessarily
interdict substantial compliance with its provisions under justifiable
circumstances. The rule should not be interpreted with such absolute
literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective which is
the goal of all rules of procedure, that is, to achieve justice as expeditiously
as possible. A liberal application of the rule may be justified where special
circumstances or compelling reasons are present.
Admittedly, the authorization of petitioner PPSTA's corporate secretary was
submitted to the appellate court only after petitioners received the
comment of respondents. However, in view of the peculiar circumstances of
the present case and in the interest of substantial justice, and considering
further that petitioners submitted such authorization before the [Court of
Appeals] resolved to dismiss the petition on the technical ground, we hold
that, the procedural defect may be set aside pro hac vice. Technical rules of
procedure should be rules enjoined to facilitate the orderly administration
of justice. The liberality in the application of rules of procedure may not be
invoked if it will result in the wanton disregard of the rules or cause
needless delay in the administration of justice. Indeed, it cannot be gainsaid
that obedience to the requirements of procedural rule is needed if we are
to expect fair results therefrom.46 (Emphasis supplied)
The "peculiar circumstances"47 in Philippine Public School Teachers
Association pertained to a finding that the signatory of the verification and
certification of non-forum shopping, Ramon G. Asuncion, Jr., was "the
RULE 7 CASES | SENYORA SANTIBANEZ 46

former Acting General Manager"48 of the Philippine Public School Teachers confectionery, and honey under Class 30 of the International Classification
Association and was, thus, previously "authorized to sign a verification and of Goods.7
certification of non-forum shopping"49 on behalf of the Association. By the
time the Association actually filed its petition before the Court of Appeals,
however, his authority as the Acting General Manager had ceased, and the
On 5 December 2008, Nestle filed an opposition8 against Puregold's
Association's Board of Directors needed to give him specific authority to sign a
application for registration. Nestle alleged that it is the exclusive owner of
certification of non-forum shopping:
the "COFFEE-MATE" trademark and that there is confusing similarity
between the "COFFEE-MATE" trademark and Puregold's "COFFEE MATCH"
application.9 Nestle alleged that "COFFEE-MATE" has been declared an
We agree with respondents' contention that when they filed their complaint in internationally well-known mark and Puregold's use of "COFFEE MATCH"
the MTC, they impleaded petitioner Asuncion as party defendant in his capacity would indicate a connection with the goods covered in Nestle's "COFFEE-
as the Acting General Manager of petitioner PPST A. As such officer, he was MATE" mark because of its distinct similarity. Nestle claimed that it would
authorized to sign a verification and certification of non-forum shopping. suffer damages if the application were granted since Puregold's "COFFEE
However, he was no longer the Acting General Manager when petitioners filed MATCH" would likely mislead the public that the mark originated from
their petition in the CA, where he was in fact referred to as "the former Acting Nestle.
General Manager." Thus, at the time the petition was filed before the CA,
petitioner Asuncion's authority to sign the verification and certification of non-
forum shopping for and in behalf of petitioner PPSTA ceased to exist. There was
Bureau of Legal Affairs Intellectual Property Office (BLA-IPO) dismissed
a need for the board of directors of petitioner PPS TA to authorize him to sign
Nestle's opposition. The BLA-IPO ruled that Nestle's opposition was
the requisite certification of non-forum shopping, and to append the same to
defective because the verification and certification against forum shopping
their petition as Annex thereof. 50
attached to Nestle's opposition did not include a board of directors'
resolution or secretary's certificate stating Mr. Dennis Jose R. Barot's (Barot)
authority to act on behalf of Nestle.
We find this case to be attended by analogous circumstances. As pointed out
by the Court of Appeals, respondent's counsel, Balgos and Perez, has been
representing respondent (and signing documents for it) "since the [original]
Office of the ODG-IPO dismissed Nestle's appeal. The ODG-IPO held that
Petition for Cancellation of Letter Patent No. UM-7789 was filed." 51 Thus, its
Barot's authority to sign the certification against forum shopping was not
act of signing for respondent, on appeal before the Director General of the
sufficiently proven by Nestle.
Intellectual Property Office, was not an aberration. It was a mere continuation
of what it had previously done.

CA dismissed Nestle's petition for review on procedural grounds.

It is reasonable, therefore-consistent with the precept of liberally applying

procedural rules in administrative proceedings, and with the room allowed by
jurisprudence for substantial compliance with respect to the rule on ISSUE: was there a violation of the rule against forum shopping
certifications of non-forum shopping-to construe the error committed by
respondent as a venial lapse that should not be fatal to its cause. We see here
no "wanton disregard of the rules or [the risk of] caus[ing] needless delay in the RULING: YES
administration of justice."52 On the contrary, construing it as such will enable a
full ventilation of the parties' competing claims. As with Philippine Public School
Teachers Association, we consider it permissible to set aside, pro hac vice, the
Nestle failed to properly execute a
procedural defect. 53 Thus, we sustain the ruling of the Court of Appeals.
certification against forum shopping

as required by Section 5, Rule 7

of the Rules of Court.

SOCIETE DES PRODUITS, NESTLE, S.A., VS. PUREGOLD PRICE CLUB, INC

Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court provides:

Petitioner Societe des Produits Nestle, S.A. (Nestle) is a corporation organized
and existing under the laws of Switzerland which is engaged in the business of
marketing and selling of coffee, ice cream, chocolates, cereals, sauces, soups,
condiment mixes, dairy and non-dairy products, etc.4 Respondent Puregold Section 5. Certification against forum shopping. -The plaintiff or principal
Price Club, Inc. (Puregold) is a corporation organized under Philippine law party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading
which is engaged in the business of trading goods such as consumer goods on asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and
wholesale or on retail basis.5 simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced
any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal
or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other
action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action
On 14 June 2007, Puregold filed an application6 for the registration of the
or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) ifhe
trademark "COFFEE MATCH" with the lqtellectual Property Office (IPO). The
should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been
registration was filed by Puregold for use on coffee, tea, cocoa, sugar, artificial
filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to
coffee, flour and preparations made from cereals, bread, pastry and
RULE 7 CASES | SENYORA SANTIBANEZ 47

the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed. this requirement would easily be circumvented by the signature of every
counsel representing corporate parties."40 Likewise, in Eslaban, this Court
held that a certification signed by counsel alone is defective and constitutes
a valid cause for the dismissal of the petition.41
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere
amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for
the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon
motion and after hearing. The submission of a false certification or non- Nestle, itself, acknowledged in this petition the absence of a board
compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect resolution or secretary's certificate issued by the board of directors of
contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and Nestle to prove the authority of Barot to sign the certification against forum
criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful shopping on behalf of Nestle, to wit: "[t]hus, while there is no board
and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary resolution and/or secretary's certificate to prove the authority of Dennis
dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause Jose R. Barot to file the petition and Verification/Certification of NonForum
for administrative sanctions. (Emphasis supplied) Shopping on behalf of petitioner-corporation, there is a Power of Attorney
evidencing such authority."42 The power of attorney submitted by Nestle in
favor of Barot was signed by Celine Jorge. However, the authority of Celine
Jorge to sign the power of attorney on behalf of Nestle, allowing Barot to
In Zulueta v. Asia Brewery, Inc.,33 this Court ruled that the requirements under
represent Nestle, was not accompanied by a board resolution or secretary's
the Rules of Court involving the certification against forum shopping apply
certificate from Nestle showing that Celine Jorge was authorized by the
both to natural and juridical persons, to wit: "[t]he requirement that the
board of directors of Nestle to execute the power of attorney in favor of
petitioner should sign the certificate of non-forum shopping applies even to
Barot. In Development Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,43 this
corporations, considering that the mandatory directives of the Circular and the
Court held that the failure to attach a copy of a board resolution proving
Rules of Court make no distinction between natural and juridical persons."34
the authority of the representative to sign the certification against forum
shopping was fatal to its petition and was sufficient ground to dismiss since
the courts are not expected to take judicial notice of board resolutions or
In Fuentebella v. Castro,35 this Court held that the certification against forum secretary's certificates issued by corporations, to wit:
shopping must be signed by the principal party. In case the principal party
cannot sign, the one signing on his or her behalf must have been duly
authorized, to wit: "the petitioner or the principal party must execute the
What petitioners failed to explain, however, is their failure to attach a
certification against forum shopping. The reason for this is that the principal
certified true copy of Resolution No. 0912 to their petition for certiorari in
party has actual knowledge whether a petition has previously been filed
CA-G.R. SP No. 60838. Their omission is fatal to their case. Courts are not,
involving the same case or substantially the same issues. If, for any reason, the
after all, expected to take judicial notice of corporate board resolutions or a
principal party cannot sign the petition, the one signing on his behalf must
corporate officer's authority to represent a corporation. To be sure,
have been duly authorized."36
petitioners' failure to submit proof that Atty. Demecillo has been authorized
by the DBP to file the petition is a "sufficient ground for the dismissal
thereof."44 (Emphasis supplied)
Juridical persons, including corporations, that cannot personally sign the
certification against forum shopping, must act through an authorized
representative.1âwphi1 The exercise of corporate powers including the power
Accordingly, the CA did not err in ruling that the petition for review should
to sue is lodged with the board of directors which acts as a body representing
be dismissed due to the failure of Nestle to comply with the proper
the stockholders. For corporations, the authorized representative to sign the
execution of the certification against forum shopping required by Section 5,
certification against forum shopping must be selected or authorized collectively
Rule 7 of the Rules of Court.
by the board of directors. In Eslaban, Jr. v. Vda. de Onorio,37 this Court ruled
that if the real party in interest is a corporation, an officer of the corporation
acting alone has no authority to sign the certification against forum shopping.
An officer of the corporation can only validly sign the certification against UNITED ALLOY PHILIPPINES CORP VS UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS
forum shopping if he or she is authorized by the board of directors through a BANK
board resolution or secretary's certificate. In Gonzales v. Climax Mining Ltd. ,38
this Court ruled that a board resolution authorizing a corporate officer to
execute the certification against forum shopping is a necessary requirement
United Alloy Philippines Corporation (UNIALLOY) applied for and was
under the Rules. A certification signed by a person who was not duly authorized
granted a credit accommodation by herein respondent United Coconut
by the board of directors renders the petition for review subject to dismissal.39
Planters Bank

The authority of the representative of a corporation to sign the certification

(UCPB) in the amount of PhP50,000,000.00, as evidenced by a Credit
against forum shopping originates from the board of directors through either a
Agreement. 3 Part of UNIALLOY's obligation under the Credit Agreement
board of directors' resolution or secretary's certificate which must be submitted
was secured by a Surety Agreement,4 dated December 18, 2000, executed
together with the certification against forum shopping. In Zulueta, this Court
by UNIALLOY Chairman, Jakob Van Der Sluis (Van Der Sluis), UNIALLOY
declared invalid a petition for review with a certification against forum
President, David Chua and his spouse, Luten Chua (Spouses Chua), and one
shopping signed by the party's counsel which was not supported by a board
Yang Kim Eng (Yang). Six (6) Promissory Notes,5 were later executed by
resolution or secretary's certificate proving the counsel's authority. This Court
UNIALLOY in UCPB's favor
dismissed the case and held: "[t]he signatory in the Certification of the Petition
before the CA should not have been respondents' retained counsel, who would
not know whether there were other similar cases of the corporation. Otherwise,
RULE 7 CASES | SENYORA SANTIBANEZ
In addition, as part of the consideration for the credit accommodation,
UNIALLOY and UCPB also entered into a "lease-purchase" contract wherein the
former assured the latter that it will purchase several real properties which
UCPB co-owns with the Development Bank of the Philippines.
Subsequently, UNIALLOY failed to pay its loan obligations. As a result, UCPB
filed against UNIALLOY, the spouses Chua, Yang and Van Der Sluis an action for
Sum of Money with Prayer for Preliminary Attachment
On the other hand, on even date, UNIALLOY filed against UCPB, UCPB Vice-
President Robert Chua and Van Der Sluis a complaint for Annulment and/or
Reformation of Contract with Damages, with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction or Temporary Restraining Order.
UNIALLOY filed an Urgent Motion to Dismiss8 the collection case (Civil Case
No. 01-1332) filed by UCPB on the ground of litis pendentia and forum
shopping. UNIALLOY contended that its complaint for annulment of contract
(Civil Case No. 2001-219) and the collection case filed by UCPB involves the
same parties and causes of action. On October 31, 2001, the RTC of Makati
issued an Order9 denying UNIALLOY's motion to dismiss.
In the meantime, UCPB and its co-defendants also filed a Motion to Dismiss
UNIALLOY's complaint for annulment of contract on the grounds of improper
venue, forum shopping, litis pendentia, and harassment or nuisance suit. On
September 13, 2001, the RTC of CDO issued an Order10 dismissing UNIALLOY's
complaint for annulment of contract.
ISSUE: Was there a violation on the rule against forum shopping?
RULING: YES
With regard forum-shopping, our review of the records of this case revealed
that UniAlloy did not disclose in the Verification/Certification of the Complaint
the pendency of Civil Case No. 2001-156 entitled "Ernesto Paraiso and United
Alloy Philippines Corporation v. Jakob Van Der Sluis." The trial court took
judicial notice of its pendency as said case is also assigned and pending before
it. Thus, we adopt the following unrebutted finding of the RTC:
These two civil cases have identical causes of action or issues against defendant
Jakob Van Der Sluis for having misrepresented to plaintiff and its stockholders
that he can extend financial assistance in running the operation of the
corporation, such that on April 6, 2001 plaintiff adopted a Stockholders
Resolution making defendant Jakob chairman of the corporation for having the
financial capability to provide the financial needs of plaintiff and willing to
finance the operational needs thereof; that a Memorandum of Agreement was
subsequently entered between the parties whereby defendant Jakob obligated
to provide sufficient financial loan to plaintiff to make it profitable; that Jakob
malicious! y and willfiilly reneged [on] his financial commitments to plaintiff
prompting the stockholders to call his attention and warned him of avoiding
the said agreement; that defendant who had then complete control of plaintiffs
bank account with defendant UCPB, through fraudulent machinations and
manipulations, was able to maliciously convince David C. Chua to pre-sign
several checks; that defendant Jakob facilitated several huge loans purportedly
48
obtained by plaintiff which defendant himself could not even account and
did not even pay the debts of the corporation but instead abused and
maliciously manipulated plaintiffs account. Forum-shopping indeed exists
in this case, for both actions involve the same transactions and same
essential facts and circumstances as well as identical causes of action,
subject matter and issues, x x x
As mentioned above, this Court's Decision in the above case has become
final and executory on January 20, 2016.
Thus, contrary to petitioners' position, there is no longer any possibility that
the Decision of the RTC of CDO may conflict with the disposition of the
present case because UNIALLOY's complaint for annulment of contract has
already been dismissed with finality.
DE LIMA VS GUERRERO
FACTS: The Senate and the House of Representatives conducted several
inquiries on the proliferation of dangerous drugs syndicated at the New
Bilibid Prison (NBP), inviting inmates who executed affidavits in support of
their testimonies. These legislative inquiries led to the filing of the four
consolidated criminal cases against the Petitioner. The DOJ Panel of
Prosecutors (DOJ Panel) was directed to conduct the requisite preliminary
investigation.
Petitioner alleged evident partiality on th e part of the DOJ Panel, the
petitioner contended that the DOJ prosecutors should inhibit themselves
and refer the complaints to the Office of the Ombudsman. The DOJ Panel
proceeded with the conduct of the preliminary investigation and in its Joint
Resolution dated February 14, 2017, recommended the filing of
Informations against petitioner De Lima.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash, mainly raising the following: the RTC
lacks jurisdiction over the offense charged against petitioner; the DOJ Panel
lacks authority to file the Information; the Information charges more than
one offense; the allegations and the recitals of facts do not allege the
corpus delicti of the charge; the Information is based on testimonies of
witnesses who are not qualified to be discharged as state witnesses; and
the testimonies of these witnesses are hearsay.
On February 23, 2017, respondent judge issued the presently assailed Order
finding probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest against De
Lima and her co-accused. Thereafter, petitioner repaired to this court via a
petition praying for granting a writ of certiorari annulling and setting aside
the Oder date 23 February 2017, the Warrant of Arrest dated the same
date, and the Order dated 24 February 2017 of the RTC Muntinlupa City.
ISSUE
Whether or not petitioner, in filing the present petition, violated the rule
against forum shopping given the pendency of the Motion to Quash the
Information
RULE 7 CASES | SENYORA SANTIBANEZ
RULING: YES
In her Affidavit, Atty. Tresvalles-Cabalo disproves the OSG's allegation that she
did not notarize the petitioner's Verification and Certification against Forum
Shopping and Affidavit of Merit in this wise:
4. On February 24, 2017 at or around nine in the morning (9:00 AM), I went to
PNP, CIDG, Camp Crame, Quezon City to notarize the Petition as discussed the
previous night.
5. I met Senator De Lima when she was brought to the CIDG at Camp Crame
and I was informed that the Petition was already signed and ready for
notarization.
6. I was then provided the Petition by her staff. I examined the signature of
Senator De Lima and confirmed that it was signed by her. I have known the
signature of the senator given our personal relationship. Nonetheless, I still
requested from her staff a photocopy of any of her government-issued valid
Identification Cards (ID) bearing her signature. A photocopy of her passport
was presented to me. I compared the signatures on the Petition and the
Passport and I was able to verify that the Petition was in fact signed by her.
Afterwards, I attached the photocopy of her Passport to the Petition which I
appended to my Notarial Report/Record.
7. Since I already know that Sen. De Lima caused the preparation of the Petition
and that it was her who signed the same, I stamped and signed the same.
8. To confirm with Senator De Lima that I have already notarized the Petition, I
sought entry to the detention facility at or around three in the afternoon (3:00
PM). x x x
xxxx
11. Since I was never cleared after hours of waiting, I was not able to talk again
to Senator De Lima to confirm the notarization of the Petition. I then decided to
leave Camp Crame.35
At first glance, it is curious that Atty. Tresvalles-Cabalo who claims to have
"stamped and signed the [Verification and Certification and Affidavit of Merit]"
inside Camp Crame, presumably in De Lima's presence, still found it necessary
to, hours later, "confirm with Senator De Lima that [she had] already notarized
the Petition." Nonetheless, assuming the veracity of the allegations narrated in
the Affidavit, it is immediately clear that petitioner De Lima did not sign the
Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping and Affidavit of Merit in
front of the notary public. This is contrary to the jurats (i.e., the certifications of
the notary public at the end of the instruments) signed by Atty. Tresvalles-
Cabalo that the documents were "SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me."
Such clear breach of notarial protocol is highly censurable36 as Section 6, Rule
II of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice requires the affiant, petitioner De Lima
in this case, to sign the instrument or document in the presence of the notary,
viz.:
49
SECTION 6. Jurat. - "Jurat" refers to an act in which an individual on a single
occasion:
(a) appears in person before the notary public and presents an instrument
or document;
(b) is personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary
public through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules;
(c) signs the instrument or document in the presence of the notary; and
(d) takes an oath or affirmation before the notary public as to such
instrument or document.(Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
While there is jurisprudence to the effect that "an irregular notarization
merely reduces the evidentiary value of a document to that of a private
document, which requires /roof of its due execution and authenticity to be
admissible as evidence,"37 the same cannot be considered controlling in
determining compliance with the requirements of Sections 1 and 2, Rule 65
of the Rules of Court. Both Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 6538 require that the
petitions for certiorari and prohibition must be verified and accompanied
by a "sworn certificate of non-forum shopping."
In this regard, Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure states that
"[a] pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading
and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his personal
knowledge or based on authentic records." "A pleading required to be
verified which x x x lacks a proper verification, shall be treated as an
unsigned pleading." Meanwhile, Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure provides that "[t]he plaintiff or principal party shall certify under
oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief,
or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed
therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed
any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial
agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is
pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a
complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should
thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is
pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court
wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed."
"Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by
mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be
cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise
provided x x x."
In this case, when petitioner De Lima failed to sign the Verification and
Certification against Forum Shopping in the presence of the notary, she has
likewise failed to properly swear under oath the contents thereof, thereby
rendering false and null the jurat and invalidating the Verification and
Certification against Forum Shopping. The significance of a proper jurat and
the effect of its invalidity was elucidated in William Go Que Construction v.
Court of Appeals,39where this Court held that:
RULE 7 CASES | SENYORA SANTIBANEZ
In .this case, it is undisputed that the Verification/Certification against Forum
Shopping attached to the petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 109427 was
not accompanied with a valid affidavit/properly certified under oath. This was
because the jurat thereof was defective in that it did not indicate the pertinent
details regarding the affiants' (i.e., private respondents) competent evidence of
identities.
Under Section 6, Rule II of AM. No. 02-8-13-SC 63 dated July 6, 2004, entitled
the "2004 Rules on Notarial Practice" (2004 Rules on Notarial Practice), ajurat
refers to an act in which an individual on a single occasion:
xxxx
In Fernandez v. Villegas (Fernandez), the Court pronounced that noncompliance
with the verification requirement or a defect therein "does not necessarily
render the pleading fatally defective. The court may order its submission or
correction or act on the pleading if the attending circumstances are such that
strict compliance with the Rule may be dispensed with in order that the ends of
justice may be served thereby." "Verification is deemed substantially complied
with when one who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the
allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification, and when matters
alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct."
Here, there was no substantial compliance with the verification requirement as
it cannot be ascertained that any of the private respondents actually swore to
the truth of the allegations in the petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No.
109427 given the lack of competent evidence of any of their identities. Because
of this, the fact that even one of the private respondents swore that the
allegations in the pleading are true and correct of his knowledge and belief is
shrouded in doubt.
For the same reason, neither was there substantial compliance with the
certification against forum shopping requirement. In Fernandez, the Court
explained that "non-compliance therewith or a defect therein, unlike in
verification, is generally not curable by its subsequent submission or correction
thereof, unless there is a need to relax the Rule on the ground of 'substantial
compliance' or presence of 'special circumstances or compelling reasons."'
Here, the CA did not mention - nor does there exist - any perceivable special
circumstance or compelling reason which justifies the rules' relaxation. At all
events, it is uncertain if any of the private respondents certified under oath that
no similar action has been filed or is pending in another forum.
xxxx
Case law states that "[v]erification is required to secure an assurance that the
allegations in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct,
and not merely speculative." On the other hand, "[t]he certification against
forum shopping is required based on the principle that a party-litigant should
not be allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies in different fora." The
important purposes behind these requirements cannot be simply brushed aside
absent any sustainable explanation justifying their relaxation. In this case,
proper justification is especially called for in light of the serious allegations of
forgery as to the signatures of the remaining private respondents, i.e.,
Lominiqui and Andales. Thus, by simply treating the insufficient submissions
before it as compliance with its Resolution dated August 13, 2009 requiring
50
anew the submission of a proper verification/certification against forum
shopping, the CA patently and grossly ignored settled procedural rules and,
hence, gravely abused its discretion. All things considered, the proper
course of action was for it to dismiss the petition.40 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied.)
Without the presence of the notary upon the signing of the Verification and
Certification against Forum Shopping, there is no assurance that the
petitioner swore under oath that the allegations in the petition have been
made in good faith or are true and correct, and not merely speculative. It
must be noted that verification is not an empty ritual or a meaningless
formality. Its import must never be sacrificed in the name of mere
expedience or sheer caprice,41 as what apparently happened in the present
case. Similarly, the absence of the notary public when petitioner allegedly
affixed her signature also negates a proper attestation that forum shopping
has not been committed by the filing of the petition. Thus, the petition is,
for all intents and purposes, an unsigned pleading that does not deserve
the cognizance of this Court.42 In Salum bides, Jr. v. Office of the
Ombudsman,43the Court held thus:
The Court has distinguished the effects of non-compliance with the
requirement of verification and that of certification against forum shopping.
A defective verification shall be treated as an unsigned pleading and thus
produces no legal effect, subject to the discretion of the court to allow the
deficiency to be remedied, while the failure to certifv against forum
shopping shall be cause for dismissal without prejudice, unless otherwise
provided, and is not curable by amendment of the initiatory pleading.
(Emphasis and italicization from the original.)
Notably, petitioner has not proffered any reason to justify her failure to sign
the Verification and Certification Against Forum Shopping in the presence
of the notary. There is, therefore, no justification to relax the rules and
excuse the petitioner's non-compliance therewith. This Court had reminded
parties seeking the ultimate relief of certiorari to observe the rules, since
nonobservance thereof cannot be brushed aside as a "mere technicality."44
Procedural rules are not to be belittled or simply disregarded, for these
prescribed procedures ensure an orderly and speedy administration of
justice.
Thus, as in William Go Que Construction, the proper course of action is to
dismiss outright the present petition.
VICTORIANO VS DOMINGUEZ
On January 29, 2003, the Spouses Narciso and Josephine Victoriano
(Spouses Victoriano) purchased a house and lot located at Nakagang,
Sabangan, Mountain Province from the Philippine National Bank (PNB),
Bontoc, Mountain Province. Victoriano was an employee of the Bureau of
Fire Protection at Nakagang, Sabangan, Mountain Province. The sale was
processed by Benedicto Vasquez (Vasquez), Branch Manager of the PNB in
Bontoc, Mountain Province.4 On even date, the parties signed a Deed of
Sale (January Deed of Sale), which indicated a purchase price of Php
150,000.00.5
Barely a month after, on February 12, 2003, the parties again executed
another Deed of Sale (February Deed of Sale) involving the same property,
RULE 7 CASES | SENYORA SANTIBANEZ
but this time changing the purchase price to reflect the higher amount of Php
850,000.00. Both Deeds of Sale included a proviso stating that the payment of
taxes shall be shouldered by the buyer.6 The Spouses Victoriano submitted the
January Deed of Sale to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) for taxation
purposes.
On December 4, 2006, respondent Juniper Dominguez (Dominguez) filed
criminal and administrative complaints before the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for the Military and Other Law Enforcement Offices (OMB MOLEO)
against the Spouses Victoriano and Vasquez.7 In his Complaint, Dominguez
charged the Spouses Victoriano as vendees, and Vasquez as vendor, with
Falsification of Public Documents Defrauding the Government of Taxes Due.
According to Dominguez, the parties deliberately executed two separate deeds
of sale covering the same subject property to evade the payment of correct
taxes, which should have been based on the true selling price of Php
850,000.00.8
On May 19, 2011, the OMB MOLEO issued a Joint Resolution9 dismissing the
Complaint.
CA dismissed - among teh reasons - the Certification on non-forum shopping
does not state that to the best knowledge of the affiant, no such other action is
pending
ISSUE: did teh CA err in dismissing the petition outright due to technical
grounds.
RULING:
1. FORUM SHOPPING
It must be noted at the outset that a party aggrieved by the decision of the
OMB in an administrative case, may appeal the adverse ruling by filing a
petition for review under Rule 43 with the CA. The Petition must be filed within
15 days from the receipt of the assailed ruling. 29
Parenthetically, Section 6, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court ordains that the petition
for review must: (i) state the full names of the parties to the case; (ii) contain a
concise statement of the facts and issues involved and the grounds relied upon
for the review; (iii) be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or a
certified true copy of the award, judgment, final order or resolution appealed
from, together with certified true copies of such material portions of the record
referred to therein and other supporting papers; (iv) contain a sworn
certification against forum shopping; and (v) state the specific material dates
showing that the petition was filed on time.30 Failure to comply with the
above-mentioned rules shall be a sufficient ground for the dismissal of the
petition.31
In the instant case, the CA dismissed Victoriano's petition for review outright,
due to the following six infirmities attendant in his Petition, namely, (i) an
incomplete statement of material dates; (ii) absence of an explanation on why
51
personal service was not resorted to; (iii) absence of a statement in his
Verification that the allegations in his petition are true and correct based on
his personal knowledge and based on authentic records; (iv) failure to state
in his Certification on non-forum shopping that to the best of his
knowledge, no such other action is pending; (v) violation of the notarial
rules which ordain the presentation of competent evidence of one's identity
before the notary public; and (vi) failure to indicate the date of issuance of
his counsel's Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) number, which was also
not updated. 32
In his defense, Victoriano claims that he had substantially complied with all
the purported defects pointed out by the CA. He likewise beseeches the
Court's liberality in giving due course to his petition, considering the gravity
of his case, where the OMB meted upon him the supreme penalty of
dismissal from the service.
Analyzing the procedural errors committed in the petition, vis-a-vis the
substance and gravity of the case, the Court rejects the strict application of
the technical rules of procedure, in order to give way to a just resolution of
the case on the merits. This stems from the oft-repeated rule that the
dismissal of an appeal purely on technical grounds is frowned upon.
Significantly, rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid,
technical sense, but must be used to help secure, and not override
substantial justice. After all, the court's primary duty is to render or
dispense justice. 33
In fact, in Hadji-Sirad v. Civil Service Commission, 34 the Court enumerated
the reasons that may provide a justification for the suspension of a strict
adherence to procedural rules. These include (i) "matters of life, liberty,
honor or property; (ii) the existence of special or compelling circumstances;
(iii) the merits of the case; (iv) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault
or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (v) a lack
of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; and
(vi) a showing that the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced
thereby.35
Verily, the merits of case, involving as it does the imposition of the supreme
penalty of dismissal on a government employee, thereby depriving him of
his very livelihood, warrant a departure from a strict and rigid application of
the rules of court. Besides, as will be shown, the perceived errors pointed
out by the CA, may be excused on the basis of substantial compliance with
the rules.
2. VERIFICATION
The Statement in the Verification
"That the Allegations Are True and
Correct of the Affiant's Personal
Knowledge" Constitutes Sufficient
Compliance with the Rule
RULE 7 CASES | SENYORA SANTIBANEZ 52

The third alleged infirmity pertains to Victoriano's failure to state in his
Verification that the allegations in his petition are true and correct based on his
personal knowledge, and based on authentic records. The CA deemed the
failure to include the adjunct, "and based on authentic records" as an error that
renders the Verification defective, and correspondingly, the petition dismissible.
Essentially, Rule 7, Section 4 of the Rules of Court states that:
Needless to say, a verification is a formal requirement, and is not
jurisdictional. It is mainly intended to secure an assurance that matters
alleged are done in good faith or are true and correct, and not of mere
speculation.59 Resultantly, Victoriano's failure to indicate that the
allegations are true and correct based on authentic records, may be
excused, inasmuch as he already attested to the truth and correctness of
the allegations based on his personal knowledge.

3. FORUM SHOPPIGN AGAIN

Section 4. Verification. - Except when otherwise specifically required by law or
rule, pleadings need not be under oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit.
(Sa) The Certification of Non-Forum Shopping

Which Failed to State that

A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and There is No Other Similar Action
that the allegations therein are true and correct of his knowledge and belief.
Pending in Any Other Court or

Tribunal, Shall Be Excused.

A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on
"information and belief', or upon "knowledge, information and belief', or lacks a
proper verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading. (6a)
Another reason behind the outright dismissal of Victoriano's petition was
the allegedly defective certification of non-forum shopping which did not
specify that to the best of his knowledge, there is no such other action
Notably, a pleading may be verified in any of the following ways, (i) based on pending before any other court.
one's own personal knowledge; (ii) or based on authentic records; (iii) or both,
as the circumstances may warrant. This rule was underscored in Hun Hyung
Park v. Eung Won Choi,55 where the Court affirmed the validity of a verification,
Remarkably, a similar Certification was excused by the Court in Santos v.
which merely stated that the contents of the petition for review are true and
Litton Mills Incorporated and/or Atty. Mariño.60 In that case, the petitioners
correct to the best of the petitioner's personal knowledge. The Court excused
merely attested that they have not commenced any other action or
the petitioner's failure to attest that the contents of the petition are also based
proceeding involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, or any other
on authentic records. The Court explained that:
tribunal or agency; and that if they learn that a similar action or proceeding
has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, or any other
tribunal or agency, they will report the matter within five (5) days to the
A reading of the above-quoted Section 4 of Rule 7 indicates that a pleading Court.61 In Santos and in the instant case, the petitioners failed to
may be verified under either of the two given modes or under both.1âwphi1 specifically state that "there is no other similar action pending in any other
The veracity of the allegations in a pleading may be affirmed based on either court."
one's own personal knowledge or on authentic records, or both, as warranted.
The use of the preposition "or" connotes that either source qualifies as a
sufficient basis for verification and, needless to state, the concurrence of both
In Santos, the Court held that the petitioner's undertaking that she has not
sources is more than sufficient. Bearing both a disjunctive and conjunctive
filed a similar case before any other court or tribunal, and that she would
sense, this parallel legal signification avoids a construction that will exclude the
inform the court if she learns of a pending case similar to the one she had
combination of the alternatives or bar the efficacy of any one of the alternatives
filed therein, was more than substantial compliance with the requirements
standing alone.56 (Citations omitted and emphasis and underscoring Ours)
of the Rules. It has been held that "with respect to the contents of the
certification[,] x x x the rule on substantial compliance may be availed of.
"62 Applying this to the case at bar, Victoriano's assurance in his
Similarly, in Heirs of Faustino Mesina, et al. v. Heirs of Domingo Fian, Sr., et Certification that he had not filed any other case in court, shall likewise
al.,57 the Court extended the same leniency, and stressed that the presence of constitute substantial compliance with the rule on the Certification against
the word "or" serves as a disjunctive article indicating an alternative. "As such, non-forum shopping.
'personal knowledge' and 'authentic records' need not concur in a verification
as they are to be taken separately."58

BANCO FILIPINO VS BANGKO SENTRAL

Besides, the requirement that the contents of a petition should also be based
on authentic records, bears more significance in petitions where the greater
Doctrine:
portions of the allegations are based on the records of the proceedings in the
court of origin, and not solely on the personal knowledge of the petitioner. This
scenario does not obtain in the case at bar.
RULE 7 CASES | SENYORA SANTIBANEZ
A bank which has been ordered closed by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas
(Bangko Sentral) is placed under the receivership of the Philippine Deposit
Insurance Corporation. As a consequence of the receivership, the closed bank
may sue and be sued only through its receiver, the Philippine Deposit Insurance
Corporation. Any action filed by the closed bank without its receiver may be
dismissed.
FACTS:
December 11, 1991, this Court promulgated Banco Filipino Savings & Mortgage
Bank v. Monetary Board and Central Bank of the Philippines,4 which declared
void the Monetary Board's order for closure and receivership of Banco Filipino
Savings & Mortgage Bank (Banco Filipino). This Court also directed the Central
Bank of the Philippines and the Monetary Board to reorganize Banco Filipino
and to allow it to resume business under the comptrollership of both the
Central Bank and the Monetary Board.5
Banco Filipino subsequently filed several Complaints before the Regional Trial
Court, among them a claim for damages in the total amount of
P18,800,000,000.00.
In 2002, Banco Filipino suffered from heavy withdrawals, prompting it to seek
the help of Bangko Sentral.
Banco Filipino submitted its Long--Term Business Plan to Bangko Sentral. It also
claimed that Bangko Sentral already extended similar arrangements to other
banks and that it was still awaiting the payment of P18,800,000,000.00 in
damage claims, "the entitlement to which the Supreme Court has already
decided with finality."
Banco Filipino filed a Petition for Revival of Judgment with the Regional Trial
Court of Makati to compel Bangko Sentral to approve its business plan.
Banco Filipino submitted its 8th Revised Business Plan to Bangko Sentral for
evaluation.
Bangko Sentral informed Banco Filipino that the Monetary Board issued
Resolution No. 1668 granting its request for the P25,000,000,000.00 Financial
Assistance and Regulatory Reliefs to form part of its Revised Business Plan and
Alternative Business Plan. The approval was also subject to certain terms and
conditions, among which was the withdrawal or dismissal with prejudice to all
pending cases filed by Banco Filipino against Bangko Sentral and its officials.
RTC: found that litis pendencia and forum shopping were not present in the
case
CA
Court of Appeals likewise found that the delegation of authority from Banco
Filipino's Board of Directors to the Executive Committee to sign pleadings on its
behalf validated the verification and certification of non-forum shopping signed
only by the Executive Vice Presidents.67 It also ruled that there was no litis
53
pendencia or forum shopping in the case docketed as Civil Case No. 10-
1042 despite the pendency of Civil Case No. 04-823 since the causes of
action and the reliefs prayed for were not the same.
ISSUE: was there violation of the rule against forum shopping?
RULING: YES
In any case, petitioner's verification and certification of non-forum
shopping was signed by its Executive Vice Presidents Maxy S. Abad and
Atty. Francisco A. Rivera, as authorized by its Board of Directors.122 Under
Section 10(b) of the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation Charter, as
amended:
b. The Corporation as receiver shall control, manage and administer the
affairs of the closed bank. Effective immediately upon takeover as receiver
of such bank, the powers, functions and duties, as well as all allowances,
remunerations and prerequisites of the directors, officers, and stockholders
of such bank are suspended, and the relevant provisions of the Articles of
Incorporation and By-laws of the closed bank are likewise deemed
suspended.123 (Emphasis supplied)
When petitioner was placed under receivership, the powers of its Board of
Directors and its officers were suspended. Thus, its Board of Directors could
not have validly authorized its Executive Vice Presidents to file the suit on
its behalf. The Petition, not having been properly verified, is considered an
unsigned pleading.124 A defect in the certification of non-forum shopping
is likewise fatal to petitioner's cause.125
Considering that the Petition was filed by signatories who were not validly
authorized to do so, the Petition does not produce any legal effect.126
Being an unauthorized pleading, this Court never validly acquired
jurisdiction over the case. The Petition, therefore, must be dismissed.
LIHAYLIHAY VS TREASURER OF THE PHILIPPINES ROBETRTO TAN
Doctrine
A writ of mandamus will not issue unless it is shown that there is no other
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. While
this Court exercises original jurisdiction over petitions for mandamus, it will
not exercise jurisdiction over those filed without exhausting administrative
remedies, in violation of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction and the
principle of hierarchy of courts, and when their filing amounts to an act of
forum shopping.
FACTS:
This resolves a Petition for Mandamus and Damages, with a Prayer for a
Writ of Garnishment,1 praying that former Treasurer of the Philippines
RULE 7 CASES | SENYORA SANTIBANEZ
Roberto C. Tan (Treasurer Tan), former Secretary of Finance Margarito B. Teves
(Secretary Teves), the Governor of Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, and the
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(collectively, respondents) be ordered to deliver to Danilo A. Lihaylihay
(Lihaylihay) the amounts of P11,875,000,000,000.00 and P50,000,000,000.00,
and several government lands as informer's rewards owing to Lihaylihay's
alleged instrumental role in the recovery of ill-gotten wealth from former
President Ferdinand E. Marcos (President Marcos), his family, and their cronies.
In his Petition, erstwhile presidential candidate2 Lihaylihay identified himself as
a "Confidential Informant of the State (CIS) pursuant to Republic Act No. 2338,3
duly accredited and registered as such with the Bureau of Internal Revenue
(BIR) and Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG)."4
Lihaylihay particularly recalled sending two (2) letters, both dated March 11,
1987, to Atty. Eliseo Pitargue (Atty. Pitargue), the former head of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue-Presidential Commission on Good Government Task Force,
concerning information on former President Marcos' ill-gotten wealth.
The first letter5 concerned gold bullions and diamonds.
The second letter7 concerned alleged dollar deposits at the Union Bank of
Switzerland
Almost 20 years later, on November 29, 2006, Lihaylihay wrote to then
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Jose Mario C. Buñag (Commissioner Buñag),
demanding payment of 25% informer's reward on the P118,270,243,259.00
supposedly recovered by the Philippine government through compromise
agreements with the Marcoses. He also insisted on the need for the
government to collect Fortune Tobacco Corporation's tax deficiencies
amounting to P97,039,862,933.40, to recover P47,500,000,000,000.00 of Marcos'
deposits in Switzerland, and to deliver to him the informer's rewards
corresponding to the recovery of these.
Acting on Lihaylihay's letter, Assistant Executive Secretary Lynn Danao-Moreno
referred the matter to the Presidential Commission on Good Government,10
which eventually referred the matter to the Department of Finance.11
Lihaylihay wrote to then Department of Finance Secretary Teves on August 11,
2009, reiterating his entitlement to an informer's reward.
without waiting for Secretary Teves' and Treasurer Tan's official actions on his
letters, Lihaylihay filed the present Petition,14 dubbed a Petition for
"Mandamus and Damages, with a Prayer for a Writ of Garnishment."15 Insisting
on his entitlement to informer's rewards, he prays that Treasurer Tan and
Secretary Teves be ordered to deliver to him the amount of
P11,875,000,000,000.00; that the Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources be ordered to transfer to him several government lands; and that the
Governor of Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas be ordered to garnish in his favor
P50,000,000,000.00 worth of jewelry recovered from former First Lady Imelda
Romualdez Marcos.
54
ISSUE:
whether or not petitioner Danilo A. Lihaylihay is entitled to a writ of
mandamus to compel respondents then Treasurer of the Philippines
Roberto C. Tan, then Secretary of Finance Margarito B. Teves, the Secretary
of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, and the
Governor of Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas to deliver to him proceeds and
properties representing 25% informer's reward pursuant to Section 1 of
Republic Act No. 2338
RULING:
Rule 65, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure spells out the
parameters for the issuance of a writ of mandamus:
Section 3. Petition for mandamus. - When any tribunal, corporation, board,
officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the
law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or
unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office
to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts
with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the
respondent, immediately or at some other time to be specified by the
court, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the
petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of
the wrongful acts of the respondent.
The petition shall also contain a sworn certification of non-forum shopping
as provided in the third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46.
2nd ruling:
Finally, petitioner's own pleadings and annexes, a prior resolution of this
Court, and newspaper accounts reveal that the present Petition is but one
of petitioner's many applications for informer's rewards owing to the
recovery of the Marcos family's and their cronies' ill-gotten wealth.
It is incorrect to say that the present Petition is merely the latest
development in the linear and logical progression of the claims that
petitioner initially asserted in his March 11, 1987 letters to Atty. Pitargue.
For one, petitioner admits that the present Petition was filed while the
claims he lodged before former Secretary Teves and former Treasurer Tan
were still pending resolution. Ahead of his claims before them, as well as
those before President Macapagal-Arroyo and Commissioner Buñag,
petitioner interjected himself in at least two (2) cases being tried in the
Sandiganbayan. A review of this Court's own resolutions also reveals that
he had filed before this Court another petition for mandamus, docketed as
G.R. No. 202556, which this Court dismissed in its September 12, 2012
Resolution.58 Similarly, a cursory search for past news reports reveals that
the Commission on Audit has denied petitioner's claim for an informer's
reward.59
RULE 7 CASES | SENYORA SANTIBANEZ
Clearly then, petitioner has engaged in willful and deliberate forum--shopping.
Consistent with Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,60 this is
another reason for dismissing the present Petition.
While this Court appreciates active citizen participation in addressing the
iniquities of public officials, it must underscore the need to comply with
procedural and substantive standards set by law for the grant of remedies. The
availability of reliefs is not a matter of personal preference, but of order and
judicial economy, and due process.
The present Petition could have been dismissed outright for its readily
discernible flaws. This Court has, nevertheless, gone out of its way to
painstakingly explain the plethora of grounds for dismissal. Its indulgence of
petitioner through this extended opinion is made with the hope that an
example is set for the public and for members of the legal profession to be
more judicious in availing of reliefs and that a message is sent to tribunals,
administrative officers, and courts to be more circumspect in their
consideration of cases.
This Decision is rendered with a stem warning for petitioner not to trifle with
court actions. Frivolous litigation translates to injudicious delays, hampers the
resolution of more meritorious cases, and compels courts and tribunals to
unnecessarily expend themselves. Its ultimate result is a weakening of the
courts' and tribunals' capacity to effectively and timely dispense justice.
BERNAS VS ESTATE OF FELIPE YU HAN YAT
FACTS:
The present case involves a parcel of land known as Lot 824-A-4 (subject
property), covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-28758 (30627)
PR-9639 (TCT No. 30627), located at Brgy. Matandang Balara, Quezon City,
consisting of 30,000 square meters, more or less, which is part of Lot 824 of the
Piedad Estate containing an area of 147,072 square meters registered in the
name of respondent Felipe Yu Han Yat (Yu Han Yat).3
Yu Han Yat subdivided the subject property into 60 lots under Subdivision Plan
Psd-13-018013, duly approved by the Bureau of Lands on August 13, 1991, as
part of his plan to develop and convert the subject property.4 As a
consequence, TCT No. 30627 was cancelled and derivative titles, namely TCT
Nos. 47294 to 47353 (Yu Han Yat TCTs), were issued in his name.5
To finance his plan of developing the subject property, Yu Han Yat applied for
loans with several banks using some6 of the Yu Han Yat TCTs as security.
However, when the mortgage instruments7 were presented for registration, the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City refused to record the same on the ground
that the Yu Han Yat TCTs overlapped with the boundaries covered by another
title: TCT No. 336663 registered in the name of Esperanza Nava (Nava).8
However, in Consulta No. 20389 issued on October 15, 1992, the Land
Registration Authority (LRA) reversed the action taken by the Register of Deeds,
and ordered the registration of the mortgage instruments on Yu Han Yat's
TCTs.10
55
Meanwhile, petitioners Jose A. Bernas (Bernas) and Felomena S. Mejia
(Mejia) claimed ownership over the subject property. They claim that Nava
was the registered owner of a parcel of land covered by TCT No. 336663
until she sold parts of the said lot to Mejia and Gregorio Galarosa
(Galarosa).11 On September 15, 1986, Mejia executed with Nava a Deed of
Sale with Right of Redemption by virtue of which Mejia acquired the real
property covered by TCT No. 336663, subject to Nava's right to redeem the
same.12 When Nava failed to redeem the property, Mejia then filed a
petition for consolidation of title under her name. The petition was granted
in a Decision dated June 28, 1990 in Civil Case No. Q-90-5211 rendered by
Branch 85 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City.13
Since TCT No. 336663 bore the annotation "subject to verification," the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City referred the matter to the LRA for
consultation. In a Resolution dated March 15, 1991, in LRA Consulta No.
1890,14 the LRA upheld the registrability of TCT No. 336663 in the name of
Mejia. In LRA Consulta No. 1890, the LRA reasoned that a court decision is
needed to categorically determine that the titles from which TCT No.
336663 were derived were spurious before it could order that the
encumbrance was not registrable.
On February 21, 1992, Bernas, for and on behalf of Wharton Resources
Group (Philippines), Inc. (Wharton), entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement16 with Mejia whereby the latter agreed to sell to Wharton the
parcel of land covered by TCT No. 336663. Subsequently, a Deed of Sale17
was entered into between Mejia and Wharton conveying to the latter the
subject property.
In April 1992, Bernas discovered that there was another title covering about
three hectares which overlapped a portion of the property registered under
TCT No. 336663.18 This other title, TCT No. 30627, indicated Yu Han Yat as
the registered owner pursuant to subdivision plan Psd-2498 of a parcel of
land located in Bayanbayanan, Marikina.19
On June 24, 1992, Bernas filed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim on Yu Han
Yat's TCTs, claiming that a Deed of Sale was executed between himself, for
and on behalf of Wharton, and Mejia over the realty covered by TCT No.
336663 which overlaps portions covered by Yu Han Yat's TCTs.20
On the basis of this adverse claim filed by Bernas, the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City refused to record the subject mortgages affecting the Yu Han
Yat TCTs. This prompted Yu Han Yat to file another consulta with the LRA
which, in a Resolution dated October 15, 1992, ordered the registration of
the mortgage to the properties.21
Afterwards, on September 18, 1992, Yu Han Yat filed a Petition for Quieting
of Title22 before the RTC of Quezon City docketed as Civil Case No. Q-92-
13609 against the Estate of Nava (represented by Antonio N. Crismundo),
Galarosa, Mejia, Bernas, and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City (Estate of
Nava, et al.).23 Mejia then filed an Answer with Compulsory
Counterclaims24 and claimed, among others that, (a) Yu Han Yat's title, TCT
No. 30627, was invalid because it originated from TCT No. 8047, which was
issued on the basis of a spurious subdivision plan, Psd-2498; (b) Psd-2498
was spurious because it represents to cover a parcel of land located in
Barrio Bayanbayanan, Marikina, whereas the actual location of Lot 824
Piedad Estate was in Caloocan City and Quezon City; and (c) the
RULE 7 CASES | SENYORA SANTIBANEZ
registrability of Mejia's rights and ownership over the subject property was
sustained by the LRA in LRA Consulta No. 1890.25 Bernas also filed an Answer
with Application for Injunctive Relief26 dated December 10, 1992 to restrain Yu
Han Yat from undertaking development works on the subject property.
On December 20, 1993, the RTC issued an Order27 granting Bernas' application
for preliminary injunction. The RTC, in the said Order, stated that:
This Court finds the respondents to have amply proven their entitlement to the
relief. Petitioner in this case has failed to convince this Court to act otherwise.
The Court takes notice of a number of allegations brought up by petitioner's
witness in the person of Atty. Bustos, however, the short of it all is that the
respondents' title which is traced back from the title of Dominga Sumulong
remains valid and subsisting insofar as the lot in question is concerned. Under
the decisions rendered in Civil Case No. Q-11962 of then Court of First Instance
of Rizal, Branch 9, Quezon City entitled Zaida M. Santos vs. Dominga Sumulong
and in Civil Case No. 11180 entitled Pilar Ibanez Vda. De Suzuaregui et al., vs
Constitutional Hills Deverlopment (sic) Corporation, Dominga Sumulong, et al.;
it is stated therein that the title of Dominga Sumulong is not wholly null and
void but only insofar as the lots involved are concerned which does not
particularly refer to the lot in question in the instant case.28
On August 12, 1994, Yu Han Yat filed an Amended Petition29 dated August 9,
1994 to implead Wharton, in view of the fact that the latter was the beneficial
owner of the subject property and that Bernas was only its agent.30 On
October 3, 1994, Bernas and Wharton filed an Amended Answer to Amended
Petition31 dated September 29, 1994, adding the following affirmative
defenses: (a) that Yu Han Yat's Amended Petition stated no cause of action
because petitioners are innocent purchasers for value; and (b) although there
was an annotation in TCT No. 336663 that the same was "subject to
verification," the registrability of the title was nevertheless upheld in LRA
Consulta No. 1890. The Amended Answer likewise interposed a cross-claim
against Mejia for possible breach of her Memorandum of Agreement with
Bernas.32
Trial ensued, and on March 15, 2004, the RTC issued a Decision ruling in favor
of the Estate of Nava, et al., and Wharton. The trial court reasoned as follows:
Based on the records and evidence presented[,] the properties subject of the
controversy are TCT No. 30627 of the petitioner (Exhibit "G") and TCT No.
336663 (Exhibit "6" for Mejia as adopted by Bernas). Details underlying the
procurement of those titles from the parties were quite overwhelming. But the
history of how such titles came about does not convince the court to grant the
relief sought by the petitioner.
Careful reading of the amended petition shows the evident objective of the
claim – that is to nullify the respondents' title (TCT 336663) (Rollo, page 276,
Volume 1) that runs to the very core of challenging the indefeasibility of
Torrens title seeking succor under the guise of a petition for quieting of title.
ISSUE: Whether the filing of the Petitions constituted forum shopping; whether
Petitions are barred by res judicata;
56
RULING:
On whether the filing of the Petitions constituted forum shopping, and
whether the Petitions are barred by res judicata
Respondent claims that petitioners violated the rule against forum
shopping when petitioner Bernas failed to inform the Court that a similar
case was pending because Mejia had filed an appeal of the assailed CA
Decision subsequent to the filing by Bernas. This failure supposedly
constitutes a violation of Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, which
states that:
SECTION 5. Certification against forum shopping. — The plaintiff or
principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory
pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed
thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore
commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any
court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge,
no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other
pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status
thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action
or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5)
days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory
pleading has been filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by
mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be
cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise
provided, upon motion and after hearing. The submission of a false
certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall
constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the
corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or
his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the
same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall
constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In addition, respondent also asserts that since the heirs of Esperanza Nava
(Heirs of Nava) did not appeal the CA Decision, then the same constitutes
res judicata as regards petitioners Bernas and Mejia. Thus, the case should
be dismissed.
Respondent's assertions fail to convince. Petitioners did not commit forum
shopping by filing separate appeals. In Young v. Spouses Sy,39 the Court
held that there is forum shopping where there exist:
(a)
identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in
both actions;
(b)
identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on
the same facts; and
RULE 7 CASES | SENYORA SANTIBANEZ 57

(c)

the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment
rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful would
amount to res judicata.40

While there was identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, there was no
identity of parties in the case at bar. Granted that both Mejia and Bernas trace
their title from Nava, this does not, by itself, make their interests identical.
Bernas' and Mejia's interests remain separate, and a judgment on one will not
amount to res judicata on the other as, for instance, Bernas could, and did, raise
the defense that he was an innocent purchaser for value of the subject property
and thus should not be bound by any adverse judgment should Mejia's title be
found defective. The same reasoning applies to respondent's assertion that
Mejia's and Bernas' claims were now barred by res judicata because the Heirs of
Nava did not appeal. The heirs of Nava hold an interest separate from Mejia's
and Bernas', and the latter could not be adversely affected by the fact that the
Heirs of Nava no longer filed an appeal.