STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION RULES Pascual v.

Pascual-Bautista, 207 SCRA 561

a) Exception: Inapplicability in criminal cases
Ratio Legis: Spirit of the law/Legislative Intent as the Primary Object CASE: People v. Santayana, 74 SCRA 25 in
1. As expressed in the literal reading of the text relation to People v. Mapa, 20 SCRA 1164
General rule: if statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its 2. As determined through Construction
literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. a. General Rule: Statute must be capable of construction, otherwise inoperative
a. Verba legis (literal or plain meaning rule)  If no judicial certainty can be had as to its meaning, the court is not at liberty
× Index animi sermo – speech is the index of intention. to supply nor to make one
× Words employed by the legislature in a statute correctly express its intent or CASE: Santiago v. COMELEC, 270 SCRA 106
will In this case, the Court adopted a literal
× Verba legis non est recedendum – from the words of a statute there should be meaning thus, concluded that RA 6735 is
no departure inadequate to implement the power of the
× Thus, what is not clearly provided in the law cannot be extended to those people to amend the Constitution (initiative on
matters outside its scope amendments) for the following reasons:
× Judicial legislation – an encroachment upon legislative prerogative to define
1) Does not suggest an initiative on
the wisdom of the law. Courts must administer the law as they find it without amendments on to the Constitution
regard to consequences because it is silent as to amendments on
CASES: the Constitution and the word
Republic v. Manalo, G.R. No. 221029, April 24, “Constitution” is neither germane nor
2018 relevant to said section
Bustamante v. NLRC, 265 SCRA 61 2) Does not provide for the contents of a
petition for initiative on the Constitution
IBAA Employees Union v. Inciong, 132 SCRA
Does not provide for subtitles for initiative
663
on the Constitution
Chartered Bank Employees Association v. 3) RA is incomplete and does not provide a
Ople, 138 SCRA 273 sufficient standard
(1) Dura lex sed lex b. Specific Rules
 Dura lex sed lex – the law may be harsh but it is still the law (1) Mens Legislatoris: Ascertain spirit/intent/purpose of the law
 Absoluta sentential expositore non indigent – when the language of the law is
 Don’t literally construe the law if it will render it meaningless, lead to
clear, no explanation of it is required
ambiguity, injustice or contradiction
 When the law is clear, it is not susceptible of interpretation. It must be applied
 The spirit of the law controls its letter
regardless of who may be affected, even if it may be harsh or onerous
 Ratio legis – interpretation according to the spirit or reason of the law
 Hoc quidem perquam durum est, sed ital ex scripta est – it is exceedingly
 Spirit or intention of a statute prevails over the letter
hard but so the law is written
 A law should accordingly be so construed as to be in accordance with, and
 A decent regard to the legislative will should inhibit the court from engaging in
not repugnant to, the spirit of the law
judicial legislation to change what it thinks are unrealistic statutes that do not
 Presumption: undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative
conform with ordinary experience or practice
measure
o If there is a need to change the law, amend or repeal it, remedy may be
 Verba intentioni, non e contra, debent inservire – words ought to be more
done through a legislative process, not by judicial decree
subservient to the intent and not the intent to the words
 Where the law is clear, appeals to justice and equity as justification to
 Guide in ascertaining intent – conscience and equity
construe it differently are unavailing – Philippines is governed by CIVIL LAW
 It is possible that a statute may be extended to cases not within the literal
or POSITIVE LAW, not common law
meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent.
o EXCEPTION: Equity is available only in the absence of law and not its
 Statutes should be construed in the light of the object to be achieved and the
replacement evil or mischief to be suppressed
o Aequitas nunquam contravenit legis – equity never acts in contravention of  As between two statutory interpretations, that which better serves the purpose
the law of the law should prevail
CASES: CASES:
Matabuena v. Cervantes, 38 SCRA 284
King v. Hernandez, 114 SCRA 730
1) Issue: whether or not a Chinese (parang si
RA and Serge) may be employed in a non-
control position in a retail establishment, a
wholly nationalized business under RA
1180 Retail Trade Law (this law has been
repealed by the Retail Trade Liberalization
Act)
2) Held: No, the law has to be construed with
the Anti-Dummy Law – prohibiting an alien
from intervening in the management,
operation, administration or control thereof
3) When the law says you cannot employ
such alien, you cannot employ an alien.
The unscrupulous alien may resort to flout
the law or defeat its purpose.
4) It is imperative that the law be interpreted
in a manner that would stave off any
attempt at circumvention of the legislative
purpose
Bustamante v. NLRC, supra
1) Issue: how to compute for backwages to
which an illegally dismissed employee
would be entitled until his actual
reinstatement
2) 3 ways:
o 1st – before Labor Code – to be
deducted from the amount of backwages is
the earnings elsewhere during the period
of illegal dismissal
o 2nd – Labor Code Art. 279 – the amount
of backwages is fixed without deductions
or qualifications but limited to not more
than 3 years
o 3rd – amended Art. 279 – full backwages
or without deductions from the time the
laborer’s compensation was withheld until
his actualreinstatement
3) The clear legislative intent of the
amendment in RA 6715 Labor Code) is to
give more benefits to workers than was
previously given them under the Mercury
Drug rule or the 1st way
US v. Toribio, 15 Phil 85
1) The prohibition of the slaughter of
carabaos for human consumption so long
as these animals are fit for agricultural
work/ draft purposes was a “reasonable
necessary limitation” on private ownership
2) Purpose or object of the law – to protect
large cattle against theft and to make easy
recovery and return of such cattle to their
owners, when lost, strayed or stolen
3) Issue: whether the slaughter of large cattle
outside the municipal slaughterhouse
without a permit by the municipal treasurer
is prohibited?
4) Held: YES! Outside or inside without permit
is prohibited
Bocobo v. Estanislao, 72 SCRA 520
1) Issue: whether the CFI and a municipal
court in the capital of a province have
concurrent jurisdiction over the crime of
libel
2) RPC – grants jurisdiction with CFI
3) Judiciary Act grants jurisdiction with the
municipal court in the capital of a province
in offenses where the penalty is not more
than prission correctional or fine not
exceeding 6,000Php (penalty for libel)
Planters Association of Negros, Inc. v.
Ponferrada, G.R. No. 114087,  October 26,
1999
1) 2 apparently conflicting provisions should
be construed as to realize the purpose of
the law
2) The purpose of the law is to INCREASE
the worker’s benefits
3) Benefits under RA 6982 shall be IN
ADDITION to the benefits under RA 809
and PD 621
4) “Substituted” cannot be given literal
interpretation
a) Instance when the literal import must yield to spirit/intent: in election-
related cases
CASE:
Villanueva v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-54718,
December 4, 1985 (Read the dissent of Justice
Aquino for the caveat on this rule)
Rufino Lopez & Sons, Inc. v. CTA, 100 Phil 850
b) When the reason of the law ceases, the law itself ceases
× The reason which induced the legislature to enact a law is the
heart of the law
 × Cessante ratione legis, cessat et ipsa lex – when the reason of
the law ceases, the law itself ceases
× Ratio legis est anima – reason of the law is its soul
CASES:
Comendador v. De Villa, GR No. 93177,
August 2, 1991
1) Issue: whether PD 39, which withdrew the
right to peremptorily challenge members of
a military tribunal, had been rendered
inoperative by PD 2045 proclaiming the
termination of a state of martial law
2) Held: YES! The termination of the martial
law and the dissolution of military tribunals
created thereunder, the reason for the
existence of PD 39 ceased automatically
and the decree itself ceased
People v. Almuete, supra.
1) Agricultural Tenancy Act is repealed by the
Agricultural Land Reform Code
2) Agricultural Tenancy Act – punishes pre-
reaping or pre-threshing of palay on a date
other than that previously set without the
mutual consent of the landlord and tenant
= Share tenancy relationship
3) Agricultural Land Reform Code – abolished
share tenancy relationship, thus does not
punish pre-reaping or pre-threshing of
palay on a date other than that previously
set without the mutual consent of the
landlord and tenant anymore = Leasehold
system
b.) When the reason of the law ceases, the law itself ceases
CASES:
Comendador v. De Villa, GR No. 93177, August 2, 1991
People v. Almuete, supra
(2) ut magis valeat quam pereat: construe statute as a whole
CASE:
Sajonas v. CA, G. R. No. 102377, July 5, 1996
Resident Marine Mammals v. Reyes, supra
Planters Association v. Ponferrada, supra
Aisporna v. CA, supra
a) Harmonize and give effects to all provisions
whenever possible; reconcile apparently conflicting
provisions
CASES:
Planters Association of Negros, Inc. v.
Ponferrada, supra
National Tobacco Admin v. COA, 311 SCRA 755
(1999)
Republic v. CA, 263 SCRA 758 (1996)
Dreamwork Contruction v. Janiola, supra
(3) Redendo singula singulis
CASE:
King v. Hernandez, supra
(4) Construe Statute in Relation to the Constitution and
Other Statutes
a) Supremacy of the Constitution
b) When statutes admit of two constructions, one
constitutional and the other unconstitutional,
construction in favor of constitutionality should be
favoured
CASE: De la Cruz v. Paras, GR No. 42571-72,
July 25, 1983
c) Statutes in Pari Materia
CASES:
Vda. de Urbano v. GSIS, GR No. 137904, Oct 19,
2001
Cabada v. Alunan, 260 SCRA 828 (1996)
Declarador v. Gubaton, G.R. No. 159208 August
18, 2006
Naga City v. Agna, GR No. 36049, May 31, 1976
King v. Hernandez, supra
(5) Between two statutory interpretations, that which better
serves the purpose of the law should prevail
CASE: Planters Association of Negros, Inc. v.
Ponferrada, supra
(6) Construe statute in relation to the object for which it
was enacted
CASE: US v. Toribio, supra
(7) When the law does not distinguish, courts should not
distinguish
CASES:
Ty-Delgado v. HRET, G.R. No. 219603, January 26,
2016
Republic v. Manalo, supra
Ramirez v. CA, 248 SCRA 590 (1995)
Garvida v. Sales, 271 SCRA 767 (1997)
(8) Meaning of Words and Phrases
a) Statutory definition
CASE: Victorias Milling v. Social Security
Commission, 114 SCRA 555 (1962)
b) Ordinary sense of the words vs. technical or legal
meaning
 CASES:
Matuguina Integrated Wood v. CA, 263 SCRA 490
(1996)
Mustang Lumber v. CA, 257 SCRA 430 (1996)
Grego v. COMELEC, 274 SCRA 481 (1997)
c) Specific words
1. “May” vs. “Shall”
May:
o The word “may” denotes discretion and cannot be construed as having
mandatory effect.
Shall:
General rule:
o The word “shall” ordinarily connotes an imperative and indicates the
mandatory character of a statute.
Exception:
o Not an absolute rule in statutory construction.
o The import of the word ultimately depends upon a consideration of
entire provisions, its nature, object and consequences that would follow from
construing it one way or the other.
o Where the statute provides for the doing of some act which is required
by justice or public duty, or where it invest a public body, municipality or
officer with power and authority to take some action which concerns the
public interest or rights of individuals, the permissive language will be
construed as mandatory and the execution of the power may be insisted
upon as a duty.
CASES:
Director of Lands v. CA, 276 SCRA 276 (1997)
Capati v. Ocampo, 113 SCRA 799 (1982)
Held:
 It is a well settled that the word ‘may is merely permissive and
confers discretion upon a party
 Under ordinary circumstances, the term ‘may’ connotes
possibility.
 It does not connote certainty. ‘May’ is an auxiliary verb indicating
liberty, opportunity, permission, or possibility.
 Here, the court held that the stipulation as to venue in the
contract in question is simply permissive.
 By the said stipulation, the parties did not agree to file solely and
exclusively w/ the CFI of Naga. They merely agreed to
submit their disputes to the said court w/o waiving their
right to seek recourse in the court specially indicated in
Sec. 2 (b), Rule 4 of the Rules of Court.
PCFI v. NTC and PLDT, 131 SCRA 200 (1984) (But see dissent of
Abad Santos, J.)
Issue: Is the promulgation of rules and regulations a mandatory
prerequisite under sec 2. Of P.D 217?
Held:
 1983 decision interprets the rule-making authority under sec. 2
of P.D. 217 as mandatory.
 In statutory construction, the word used in the law must be given
its ordinary meaning, unless a contrary inter is manifest from the
law itself.
 Hence, the phrase ‘may be promulgated ‘should not be construed
to mean ‘shall’ or ‘must’.
 Here, It shall be interpreted in its ordinary sense as permissive or
discretionary on the part of the delegate – Department of Public
Works, Transportation and Communication’s Board of
Communications then, now NTC – WON to promulgate pertinent
rules and regulations.
 There is nothing in P.D. 217 which commands that the phrase
“may be promulgated” should be construed as “shall be
promulgated.”
 Both words ‘shall’ and ‘may’ are employed in the lone sentence of
sec 2 of P.D. 217. This demonstrates that the law preserves the
distinction between their ordinary, usual or normal sense.
Abad Santos dissent:
 The first decision relied on the canons INDEX ANIMI SERMO
EST (speech is the indication of intent) and A VERBIS LEGIS
NON EST RECEDENDUM( from the words of the statute there
be no departure)
 Canons of stat construction march in pairs of opposite. Thus
as opposed to the abovementioned we have : verba intentioni,
non e contra, debent inservire( words ought to be more
subservient to the intent and not the intent to the words)
 Here, compelling reasons dictate that the provisions of the
P.D. 217 should be construed as mandatory rather than
merely directory.
Berces v. Guingona, 241 SCRA 539 (1995)
Sajonas v. Court of Appeals, supra
2. “Or” vs. “And”
CASES:
Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. v. COMELEC, G.R.
No. 190529, April 29, 2010
GMCR v. Bell Telecom, 271 SCRA 790 (1997)
 Issue:
Is the NTC a collegial body?
Held:
 Sec 16 of E.O No. 546 states that “the Commission is
composed of a Commissioner AND two (2) depute
commissioners”, not the commissioner alone.
 The word ‘and’ whether it is used to connect words,
phrases or full sentences, must be accepted as binding
together and as relating to one another
 Hence, the NTC is a collegial body.
Hda. Luisita Inc. v. PARC, G.R. No. 171101, Resolution, November 22,
2011
Gonzales v. Comelec, G.R. No. L-28196, November 9, 1967
Romulo, Mabanta, et al. v. HDMF, G.R. No. 131082. June 19, 2000
Centeno v. Villalon-Pornillos, 236 SCRA 197
3. “Principally”/” Primarily” vs. “Exclusively”
 Principally/Primarily means “ mainly, principally, mostly, generally.”
 position)
CASES:
Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014
Alfon v. Republic, 97 SCRA 859 (1980)
Facts: Petitioner, as per civil register, was named Maria Estrella Alfon Duterte.
She, however, grew up wit her maternal uncle and aunt and since birth has
been using her mother’s surname, Alfon.
She filed a petition for a change of name in the civil registry from Duterte to
Alfon
The trial court denied the petition, citing Article 364 of the Civil Code which
provides:
Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the
father.”
The denial of the petition was appealed to the Supreme Court.
Issue: Does Article 364 preclude the use of the mother’s surname?
Held:
 The lower court should have granted the petition.
 The only reason why the lower denied the petition was because of
article 364. The word ‘principally’ as used in said article is not
equivalent to ‘exclusively so that there is no legal obstacle if a legitimate
or legitimated child should choose to use the surname of its mother to
which it is equally entitled.
Floresca v. Philex Mining, supra
Facts: sec. 46 Jurisdiction shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide
claims for compensation under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, subject to
appeal to the Supreme Cout, x x x.”
Issue: Does CFI have jurisdiction over the complaint?
Held:
There were several opinions from amicus curiae as to the nature of the
remedies provided for under the WCA, namely:
1.CUMULATIVE
2.) EXLCUSIVE Senator Angara believes that recovery under the WCA is
exclusive and there precludes an action of damages under the Civil Code.
3.) SELECTIVE- which the heirs had the option of choosing between availing of
the compensation under the WCA or filing an action for damages arising out of
negligence under the provisions of the Civil Code. (The court agreed with this
Chavez v. NHA, G.R. No. 164527, August 15, 2007
Issue: WON, NHA and RBI have been granted the power and authority to
reclaim lands of public domain (Chavez claims that the power to reclaim lands
of public domain is vested exclusively with PEA)
Held:
 Although PEA was designated under E.O 525 as the agency
primarily responsibile for integratingm directing and coordinating
all reclamation projects, its charter does not mention that it has
the exlusive and sole power and authority to reclaim lands of
public domain.
 Principally/Primarily means “mainly, principally, mostly, generally.” Thus
not all reclamation projects fall under PEA’s authority of supervision,
integration, and coordination.
Vda. de Urbano v. GSIS, supra
4. “Term” vs. “Tenure”
 Term- the period that an officer may hold office and upon the
expiration of such term, his rights, duties and authority as a
public officer must cease.
  Tenure
CASE: Aparri v. CA, 127 SCRA 231 (1984)
R.A. No. 1160 created NARRA. Sad law empowered its Board of
Directors to appoint and fix the term of office of the General Manager
subject to the approval of the President.
On January 15, 1960, the Board approved Resolution No. 13 appointing
Bruno Appari as Gen. Manager of NARRA.
On march 14,1962, the Board passed Reso. No . 24, fixing the term of
the incumbent Gen Manager up to March 31, 1982
Apparri filed with the CFI of Manila an action to annul Reso. No. 24
The CFI dismissed the action.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals sustained the dismissal of the case on
the ground that Aparri’s cessation from office involves no removal but
merely the expiration of the term of office and the term of office could
be fixed by the board.
He appealed to Sc.
Issue: WON Resolution No. 24 constitutes removal of Aparri without
cause.
Held:
 His term of office expired on march 31,1982
 R.A. No. 1160 expressly gives the Board the power to appoint
and fix the term of office of the General Manager.
 The word ‘term’ describes the period that an officer may hold
office and upon the expiration of such term, his rights, duties
and authority as apublic officer must cease. It is necessary to
interpret the word ‘term’ within the purview of the statute as to
effectuate the statutory scheme pertaining to the office under
examination. In this case, the term of office is not fixed by law,
but by the board.
 Resolution No. 24 speaks of no removal but an expiration of the
term of office of Aparri.
 The statute is clear If the words and phrases are not
obscure or ambiguous its meaning and intention must be
determined from the language employed. There is no room
for construction. The courts may not speculate as to the
probable intent of the legislature apart from the words. The
legislature must be presumed to know the meaning of the
words, to have used words advisedly and to have
expressed its intent by the use of such words, as are found
in the statue.
5. “Every”
 Every’ means each one of a group without exception. It
means all possible and all taken one by one.
CASE: NHC v. Juco, G.R. No. L-64313 January 17, 1985 (Read
however the latter case of NASECO v. NLRC, G.R. No. L-69870
November 29, 1988)
Facts:
Benjamin C. Juco, an engineer of the National Housing
Corporation(NHC) was dismissed from service for having been
implicated in a crime of theft and malversation of public funds.
Juco brought an action for arbitration before the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC). NHC opposed the action on the ground
that the NLRC lacks jurisdiction to try the case, since NHC is a 100%
government-owned corporation and, therefore, the case should fall
within the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission. The NLRC
ignored NHC’s position.
Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Are employees of the NHC covered by the Labor Code or by
the laws and regulations governing the Civil Service?
Held:
Section 1, Article XII-B of the 1973 Constitution specifically provides:
“The Civil Service embraces every brance, agency, subdivision and
instrumentality of the government including every government-owned or
controlled corporation.
Said Section uses the word ‘every’ to modify the phrase ‘government-
owned or controlled corporation.’ ‘Every’ means each one of a group
without exception. It means all possible and all taken one by one.
Note: Art. IX-B, Section 2(1) of the 1987 Cinstitution now provides:
 “The Civil Service embraces ALL branches, subdivisions,  Respondent was caught possessing a deady weapon
instrumentalities, and agencies of the government including Issue:
government-owned or controlled corporations with original WON the application of the rule of EJUSDEM GENERIS was proper in
charters.” this case
Held:
“Every” was replaced by “all to avoid ambiguity. The rule is not applicable.
EJUSDEM GENERIS is resorted to only for the purpose of determining
the legislative intent in enacting the law. If that intent clearly appears
6. “foreigner” from other parts of the law and such intent is contrary to the result
CASE: Gatchalian v. COMELEC, 35 SCRA 435 1970) which would be reached by application of the rule, the latter must give
7. “government” way.
CASE: C & C Commercial v. NAWASA, 21 SCRA 984 (1967)
8. “national government” In this case, the proviso clearly indicates the Legislature’s intention to
CASE: Central Bank v. CA, 63 SCRA 431 (1975) include in the prohibition weapons other bladed weapons therein
9. “employer” specified.
CASE: Republic v. Yahon, supra
10. “reinstatement” Note: A provisio is “ A clasuse limiting the application of law,” it begins
CASE: Grego v. COMELEC, supra usually wit the introductory word “provided.”
Facts:
Baso was removed by S.C. as Deputy Sheriff upon a finding of serious b. What a proviso qualifies: only the phrase immediately preceding it
misconduct. CASES:
“Respondent is hereby dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all ALU-TUCP v. NLRC, 234 SCRA 678 (1994)
retirement benefits and with prejudice to REINSTATEMENT to any position in Arenas v. San Carlos City, 82 SCRA 318
the national or local government, including its agencies and instrumentalities, 2. Exceptions
or government-owned or controlled corporations. a. Distinguished from provisos
He ran for councilor, won, and then was challenged by Greco because of sec b. Illustrations
40. (b) LGC. Greco also argued that the term “any position covers both CASES:
appointive and elective positions. Meralco v. PUEA, 79 SCRA 409 (1947)
Samson v. CA, 145 SCRA 654 (1986)
e) Associated Words
Issue: Does the prohibition state in the resolution (on Basco’s removal) 1. Noscitur A Sociis (where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous, consider
include elective positions? the company of words in which it is associated to ascertain the correct
construction)
Held: CASES:
Buenaseda v. Flavier, 226 SCRA 645 (1993)
 Supreme Court disagreed. The law applicable at the time of Magtajas v. Pryce, supra
Basco’s removal was the Civil Service Decre.
 The term used in the S.C. order was “Reinstatement” which QF: There was an opening of a casino of PAGCOR in Cagayan de Oro
had a technical meaning referring to appointive positions. through a lease of the Pryce Properties Corporation Inc.. It was widely opposed
d) Specific Phrases/Clauses by local civil society groups etc. CDO local sanggunian enacted Ordinance
1. Provisos 3353, and later ordinance 3375-93
a. Purpose: to limit application of provision; or to except something therefrom;
or to qualify or restrain its general application; or exceptionally, to enlarge
instead of restrict
CASE: U.S. v. Sto. Nino, 13 Phil 141 (1909) AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ISSUANCE OF BUSINESS PERMIT
Facts: AND CANCELLING EXISTING BUSINESS PERMIT TO ANY
ESTABLISHMENT FOR THE USING AND ALLOWING TO BE USED ITS
PREMISES OR PORTION THEREOF FOR THE OPERATION OF CASINO.
Their legal basis was sec. 16 -general welfare of LGC, in addition sec 458 of
LGC provides that local city legislators shall :
shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the
general welfare of he city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code
x x x and shall
(1) Approve ordinances and pass resolutions necessary for an
efficient and effective city government, and in this connection, shall:
Enact ordinances intended to prevent, suppress and
impose appropriate penalties x x x gambiling and other prohibited games of
chance
 the petitioners also attack gambling as intrinsically harmful and cite
various provisions of the Constitution and several decisions of this
Court expressive of the general and official disapprobation of the vice.
They invoke the State policies on the family and the proper upbringing
of the youth. they decry the immorality of gambling.
 SC said : The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling
is not illegal per se. There is nothing in the Constitution categorically
proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for that matter.
ISSUE: the only question they can resolve is the validity of Ordinance
No. 3355 and Ordinance No. 3375-93 as enacted by the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City.
And we shall do so only by the criteria laid down by law and not byour own
convictions on the propriety of gambling
Ruling:
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has
held to be valid, an ordinance must conform to the following substantive
requirements:
It must not contravene the constitution or any statute.
2) It must not be unfair or oppressive.
3) It must not be partial or discriminatory.
4) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade.
5) It must be general and consistent with public policy.
6) It must not be unreasonable.
 under Sec. 458 of the Local Government Code, local government units
are authorized to prevent or suppress, among others, "gambling and
other prohibited games of chance. obviously, this provision excludes
games of chance which are not prohibited but are in fact permitted by
law
 Under the rule of noscitur a sociis, a word or phrase should be
interpreted in relation to, or given the same meaning of, words with
which it is associated. Accordingly, we conclude that since the word
"gambling" is associated with "and other prohibited games of chance,"
the word should be read as referring to only illegal gambling which, like
the other prohibited games of chance, must be prevented or
suppressed.
Aisporna v. CA, supra
“x x x the doctrine of associated words
{NOSCITUR A SOCIIS] provides that where a
particular word or phrase in a statement is
ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of
various meangs, its true meaning may be made
clear and specific by considering the company
in which it is found or with which it is
associated.”
2. Ejusdem Generis (literally: same kind or species; general word or phrase
that follow an enumeration of particular and specific words, which are of
the class or kind, are restricted only to things or cases of the same kind or
class as those specifically mentioned)
When to apply?
 Applies only where the specific words preceding the general
expression are of the same nature.
  Where they are of different genera, the meaning of the general “immediate farm household” as “ members of the family of the tenant, and such
words remain unaffected by its connection with them.” ( Com. Of other person or person, whether related or not, who are dependent upon him
Customs v. CTA 43 SCRA 192) for support and who usually help operate the farm enterprise,” the term
When is it inapplicable: “members of the family of the tenant” includes the tenant’s son, son-in-law,
 When the legislative intent is already apparent. (People v. or grandson even though they are not dependent upon him for support
Echavez) and living separately from him because the qualifying phrase “who are
 When the Specific Words are of different Genera. dependent upon him for support” refers solely to its last antecedent, namely,
 When there is no uncertainty. “such other person or persons, whether related to the tenant or not” and
CASES: because in the absence of a clear and categorical imperative, the court
NPC v. Angas, supra  NOTE: modified rate of interest will not construe statutes in a sense inconsistent with the rational unity of
Republic v. Migriño, 189 SCRA 289 (1990) the Filipino family.

a retired military officer was investiggated by the PCGG for violation of the
Anti-Graft Act in relation to E.O No. 1 and 2 authorizing the PCGG to 1. Expressio Unios est Exclusio Alterius (opposite of the doctrine of
recover ill-gotten wealth of the former President’s subordinates and close necessary implication: express mention of one person, thing, or
associates” “during his administration.” On the issue as to whether PCGG consequence implies the exclusion of all others)
has jurisdiction to investigate the former military officer for being in the CASES:
service during the admin of the former President and was therefore his Santos v. Pano, 120 SCRA 8 (1983)
subordinate, the Court ruled that the term” subordinate” refers only to one Samson v. CA, supra
who enjoys close association or relation with the former President and/or Catu v. Rellosa, A.C. No. 5738, February 19, 2008
his wife and not to any government officer during the former President’s Gomez v. Ventura, 54 Phil 726 (1930)
administration, the term “close associates” having restricted the meaning Javellana v. Tayo, 6 SCRA 1042 (1962)
of “subordinates Centeno v. Villalon-Pornillos, supra
Commissioner of Customs v. CTA, 224 SCRA 665 (1993)
Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 104768, July 21, 2003 2. Cassus Omissus (a person, object or thing omitted from an
Colgate-Palmolive v. Jimenez, 1 Phil 267 (1961) enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally)
RC Archbishop of Manila v. SSC, 1 SCRA 10 (1961) CASES:
People v. Manantan, supra
Rufino Lopez & Sons, Inc. v. CTA, supra
3. Doctrine of last antecedent (qualifying words restrict or modify only
Doctrine of last antecedent- words or phrases to which they are immediately associated)
 Generally speaking, qualifying words restrict or modify only the CASES:
words or phrases to which they are immediately associated. Pangilinan v. Alvendia, 101 Phil 794 (1957)
They do not qualify words or phrases which are distantly or Florentino v. PNB, 98 Phil 959 (1956)
remotely located. Mapa v. Arroyo, 175 SCRA 76 (1989)
 In absence of legislative intent to the contrary, preferential and People v. Tamani, 55 SCRA 153 (1973)
qualifying words and phrases must be applied only to their Amadora v. CA, 160 SCRA 315 (1988)
immediate or last antecedent, and not to the other remote or c. Rules on Implications
preceding words or association of words. (1) Doctrine of Necessary Implication (what is implied in a statute is as
much a part thereof as that which is expressed; opposite of the rule
of expressio unios est exclusio alterius)
Ex. Pangilinan v. Alvendia CASES:
Chua v. CSC, 206 SCRA 65 (1992)
Where a statute defines the word “tenant” as a “person who, himself and Batungbakal v. National Development Co., 93 Phil 182 (1953)
with the aid available from within his immediate farm household, B. Basic Rules of Construing Specific Statutes
cultivates the land belong to, or possessed by another,” and the phrase 1. Political Laws
 a. Election Laws
CASES:
Villanueva v. COMELEC, supra
Rulloda v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 154198, January 20,
2003
b. Local Government Code (See Section 5, RA 7610)
c. Expropriation laws
d. Naturalization laws
2. Labor and Social Legislation
CASES:
IBAA Employees Union v. Inciong, supra
Manahan v. ECC, 104 SCRA 198
Villavert v. ECC, 110 SCRA 223
Floresca v. Philex Mining, supra
3. Penal Statutes: strictly against the State; liberally in favor of the
accused
CASES:
People v. Purisima, 86 SCRA 542 (1978)
People v. Manantan, supra
Centeno v. Villalon-Pornillos, supra

4. Tax Laws
a) Those imposing taxes and custom duties
b) Those granting exemptions
5. Civil Law
a) Family Law
b) Wills and Succession
c) Obligations and Contracts (Read Art. 1370-1379, NCC)
6. Remedial legislation – liberally construed
CASE: City of Baguio v. Marcos, 27 SCRA 342 (1969)