2.1 PABLITO V. SANIDAD vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS choice of the forum where he may express his view.

where he may express his view. This form of regulation is

[G.R. No. 90878. January 29, 1990.]
Facts:
Republic Act No. 6766 entitled "An Act Providing for an Organic Act
for the Cordillera Autonomous Region” was enacted into law, and pursuant to
it, the City of Baguio and the provinces comprising the Cordillera
Autonomous Region, shall take part in a plebiscite for the ratification of the
Organic Act. COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2167 to govern the
conduct of the plebiscite on the said Organic Act for the Cordillera
Autonomous Region. Petitioner filed a petition, assailing the constitutionality
of Section 19 of said resolution because it violates the constitutional guarantees
of the freedom of expression and of the press enshrined in the Constitution.
Section 19 provides that during the plebiscite campaign period, on the
day before and on plebiscite day, no mass media columnist, commentator,
announcer or personality shall use his column or radio or television time
to campaign for or against the plebiscite issues. COMELEC maintains that the
questioned provision of COMELEC Resolution No. 2167 does not violate the
freedom of expression and of the press. Rather, it is a valid implementation
of the power of the COMELEC to supervise and regulate media during
election or plebiscite periods as enunciated in Article IX-C, Section 4 of the
1987 Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not Section 19 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2167 is
unconstitutional.
Held:
The Court held that Section 19 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2167 is
unconstitutional. Article IX-C, Section 4 of the Constitution provides that what
was granted to the COMELEC was the power to supervise and regulate the use
and enjoyment of franchises, permits or other grants issued for the operation
of transportation or other public utilities, media of communication or
information to the end that equal opportunity, time and space, and the right to
reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information
campaigns and forums among candidates are ensured. However, it does
not grant the COMELEC the power to supervise and regulate the exercise by
media practitioners themselves of their right to expression during plebiscite
periods. While Section 19 of COMELEC Resolution 2167 does not absolutely
bar petitioner-columnist from expressing his views and or from campaigning
for or against the organic act because he may do so through the COMELEC
space and/or COMELEC radio/television time, it is still a restriction on his
tantamount to a restriction of petitioner's freedom of expression for
no justifiable reason. Therefore, Section 19 of COMELEC Resolution
No. 2167 is unconstitutional
2.1 In Re Ramon Tulfo
AM 90-4-1545-0, April 17, 1990
Facts:
In Oct. 13, 1989, Tulfo wrote an article in his column in PDI 'On Target' stating
that the Supreme Court rendered an idiotic decision in legalizing checkpoints,
and again on Oct. 16, 1989, where he called the Supreme Court stupid and
"sangkatutak na mga bobo justices of the Philippine Supreme Court". Tulfo
was required to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt. Tulfo
said that he was just reacting emotionally because he had been a victim of
harassment in the checkpoints, and "idiotic" meant illogical and unwise, and
"bobo" was just quoted from other attorneys, and since the case had been
decided and terminated, there was not contempt. Lastly, the article does not
pose any clear and present danger to the Supreme court.
Issue: Whether or not Tulfo is in contempt
Held: Yes.
1. At the time Tulfo wrote the article, the checkpoints case had not yet
been decided upon, and the Supreme Court was still acting on an MR
filed from the CA.
2. Power to punish is inherent as it is essential for self-preservation.
Contempt of ocurt is defiance of the authority, justice and dignity of
the courts. It brings disrepute to the court. There are two kinds of
publications which can be punished for contempt:
a. those whose object is to affect the decision in a pending case.
b. those whose object is to bring courts to discredit.
Tulfo's article constituted both.
3. It should have been okay to criticize if respectful language was used,
but if its object is only to degrade and ridicule, then it is clearly an
obstruction of justice. Nothing constructive can be gained from them.
Being emotional is no excuse for being insulting. Quoting is not an
excuse also, because at the end of his article, Tulfo said, "So you bobo
 justices, watch out!" Also, he said he was not sorry for having written
the articles.
Tulfo is found in contempt of court and is gravely censured.
2.1-a. IN RE: ATTY. EMIL JURADO
JULY 12, 1990
Facts:
Emiliano P. Jurado, a lawyer and journalist who writes in a newspaper of
general circulation wrote about alleged improprieties and irregularities in the
judiciary over several months. What was particularly given attention by the
Supreme Court his column entitled, "Who will judge the Justices?" referring
to a report that six justices, their spouses, children and grandchildren (a total
of 36 persons) spent a vacation in Hong Kong, and that luxurious hotel
accommodations and all their other expenses were paid by a public utility firm
and that the trip was arranged by the travel agency patronized by this public
utility firm. This column was made amidst rumors that a Supreme Court
decision favorable to the public utility firm appears to have been authored by
a lawyer of the public utility firm. The Chief Justice issued an administrative
order creating an ad hoc committee to investigate the said reports of corruption
in the judiciary. A letter affidavit was also received from the public utility,
denying the allegations in Jurado's column. The Supreme Court then issued a
resolution ordering that the matter dealt with in the letter and affidavit of the
public utility company be docketed and acted upon as an official Court
proceeding for the determination of whether or not the allegations made by
Jurado are true.
Held:
Jurado's actuations, in the context in which they were done, demonstrate gross
irresponsibility, and indifference to factual accuracy and the injury that he
might cause to the name and reputation of those of whom he wrote. They
constitute contempt of court, directly tending as they do to degrade or abase
the administration of justice and the judges engaged in that function. The Court
declares Atty. Jurado guilty of contempt of court and sentences him to pay a
fine of one thousand pesos (P1,000.00)
Free press not to be preferred to an independent judiciary. The court
underscores the importance of both the constitutional guarantee of free speech
and the reality that there are equally important public interests which need on
occasion to be balanced against and accommodated with one and the other.
One such public interest is in the maintenance of the integrity and orderly
functioning of the administration of justice. There is no antinomy between free
expression and the integrity of the system of administering justice. For the
protection and maintenance of freedom of expression itself can be secured only
within the context of a functioning and orderly system of dispensing justice,
within the context, in other words, of viable independent institutions for
delivery of justice which are accepted by the general community. As Mr.
Justice Frankfurter put it: ". . . A free press is not to be preferred to an
independent judiciary, nor an independent judiciary to a free press. Neither has
primacy over the other; both are indispensable to a free society." Mr. Justice
Malcolm of this Court expressed the same thought in the following terms: 'The
Organic Act wisely guarantees freedom of speech and press. This
constitutional right must be protected in its fullest extent. But license or abuse
of liberty of the press and of the citizens should not be confused with liberty
in its true sense. As important as the maintenance of an unmuzzled press and
the free exercise of the rights of the citizens is the maintenance of the
independence of the Judiciary. Respect for the Judiciary cannot be had if
persons are privileged to scorn a resolution of the court adopted for good
purposes, and if such persons are to be permitted by subterranean means to
diffuse inaccurate accounts of confidential proceedings to the embarrassment
of the parties and the court.' (In Re Severino Lozano and Anastacio Quevedo,
54 Phil. 801 at 807 [1930])."
Excercise of freedom of speech not to be abused.
The Civil Code, in its Article 19 lays down the norm for the proper exercise of
any right, constitutional or otherwise, viz.: "ARTICLE 19. Every person must,
in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith." The
provision is reflective of the universally accepted precept of "abuse of rights,"
"one of the most dominant principles which must be deemed always implied
in any system of law."
Requirement to exercise bona fide care in ascertaining the truth of the
statements when publishing statements which are clearly defamatory to
identifiable judges or other public officials.
Judges, by becoming such, are rightly regarded as voluntarily subjecting
themselves to norms of conduct which embody more stringent standards of
honesty, integrity, and competence than are commonly required from private
persons. Nevertheless, persons who seek or accept appointment to the
Judiciary cannot reasonably be regarded as having forfeited any right to private
honor and reputation. For to so rule will be to discourage all save those who
feel no need to maintain their self-respect from becoming judges. The public
interest involved in freedom of speech and the individual interest of judges
(and for that matter, all other public officials) in the maintenance of private
honor and reputation need to be accommodated one to the other. And the point
of adjustment or accommodation between these two legitimate interests is
precisely found in the norm which requires those who, invoking freedom of
speech, publish statements which are clearly defamatory to identifiable judges
or other public officials to exercise bona fide care in ascertaining the truth of
the statements they publish. The norm does not require that a journalist
guarantee the truth of what he says or publishes. But the norm does prohibit
the reckless disregard of private reputation by publishing or circulating
defamatory statements without any bona fide effort to ascertain the truth
thereof.
2.1-b. BURGOS vs CHIEF OF STAFF
Facts:
On 7 December 1982, Judge Ernani Cruz-Paño, Executive Judge of the then
CFI Rizal [Quezon City], issued 2 search warrants where the premises at 19,
Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City, and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon
Avenue, Quezon City, business addresses of the “Metropolitan Mail” and “We
Forum” newspapers, respectively, were searched, and office and printing
machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in
the printing, publication and distribution of the said newspapers, as well as
numerous papers, documents, books and other written literature alleged to be
in the possession and control of Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the “We
Forum” newspaper, were seized. A petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus with preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction was filed
after 6 months following the raid to question the validity of said search
warrants, and to enjoin the Judge Advocate General of the AFP, the city fiscal
of Quezon City, et.al. from using the articles seized as evidence in Criminal
Case Q-022782 of the RTC Quezon City (People v. Burgos).
Issue:
Whether allegations of possession and printing of subversive materials may be
the basis of the issuance of search warrants.
Held:
Section 3 provides that no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible
officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized. Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances
which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the
offense are in the place sought to be searched. In mandating that “no warrant
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce”; the Constitution requires no less than personal knowledge by
the complainant or his witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of a
search warrant may be justified. Herein, a statement in the effect that Burgos
“is in possession or has in his control printing equipment and other
paraphernalia, news publications and other documents which were used and
are all continuously being used as a means of committing the offense of
subversion punishable under PD 885, as amended” is a mere conclusion of law
and does not satisfy the requirements of probable cause. Bereft of such
particulars as would justify a finding of the existence of probable cause, said
allegation cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant. Further,
when the search warrant applied for is directed against a newspaper publisher
or editor in connection with the publication of subversive materials, the
application and/or its supporting affidavits must contain a specification, stating
with particularity the alleged subversive material he has published or is
intending to publish. Mere generalization will not suffice.
2.2. CORRO VS LISING
FACTS: Respondent Judge issued a search warrant for the seizure of
articles allegedly used by petitioner in committing the crime of sedition. Seized
were printed copies of the Philippine Times, newspaper dummies, typewriters,
mimeographing machines and tape recorders, video machines and tapes. The
petitioner moved to quash the warrant but his motion was denied.
HELD: The statements made in the affidavits are mere conclusions of law
and do not satisfy the requirement of probable cause. The language used is all
embracing as to include all conceivable words and equipment of petitioner
regardless of whether they are legal or illegal. The search warrant under
consideration was in the nature of a general warrant which is objectionable.
Respondent RTC Judge Esteban Lising, upon application filed by Lt. Col.
Berlin Castillo of the Philippine Constabulary Criminal Investigation Service,
issued a search warrant authorizing the search and seizure of articles allegedly
used by petitioner in committing the crime of inciting to sedition.
1. Printed copies of Philippine Times;
2. Manuscripts/drafts of articles for publication in the Philippine Times;
3. Newspaper dummies of the Philippine Times;
4. Subversive documents, articles, printed matters, handbills, leaflets, banners;
5. Typewriters, duplicating machines, mimeographing and tape recording
machines, video machines and tapes
Petitioner filed an urgent motion to recall warrant and to return
documents/personal properties alleging among others that the properties seized
are typewriters, duplicating machines, mimeographing and tape recording
machines, video machines and tapes which are not in any way, inanimate or
mute things as they are, connected with the offense of inciting to sedition.
Respondent Judge Lising denied the motion. Hence, this petition praying that
the search warrant issuedby respondent Judge Esteban M. Lising be declared
null and void ab initio that the padlocked office premises of the Philippine
Times be reopened. Respondents would have this Court dismiss the petition
stating that probable cause exists justifying the issuance of a search warrant,
the articles seized were adequately described in the search warrant, a search
was conducted I n an orderly manner and the padlocking of the searched
premises was with the consent of petitioner's wife.
Held: Section 3, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution provides: SEC. 3. ...no
search warrant or warrant of arrest issue except upon probable cause to be
determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized
by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized and, Section 3, Rule 126 of the New
Rules of Court, states that:
SEC. 3.Requisites for issuing search warrant.
— et.al., their subsequent interrogation, and the filing of libel suits against Suarez
A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with
one specific offense to be determined by the judge or justice of the peace after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
2.3. Babst vs. National Intelligence Board
[GR L-62992, 28 September 1984]
Facts:
Arlene Babst, Odette Alcantara, Ceres P. Doyo, Jo-Ann Q. Maglipon,
Domini Torrevillas-Suarez, Lorna Kalaw-Tirol, Cielo Buenaventura, Sylvia
Mayuga, Sheila S. Coronel, et al. are columnists, feature article writers and
reporters of various local publications. At different dates since July 1980, some
of them have allegedly been summoned by military authorities who have
subjected them to sustained interrogation on various aspects of their works,
feelings, sentiments, beliefs, associations and even their private lives. Aside
from the interrogations, a criminal complaint for libel was filed by Brig. Gen.
Artemio Tidier, Jr. on 9 February 1983 with the Office of the City Fiscal,
Manila, against Domini Torrevillas-Suarez, editor of the Panorama, and Ma.
Ceres Doyo based on an article written by Doyo and published in the 28 March
1982 issue of the Panorama, on which the author had been interrogated by
Brig. Gen. Wilfredo Estrada (Ret.), Col. Renato Ecarma, NBI Asst. Director
Ponciano Fernando, Col. Balbino Diego, Col. Galileo Kintanar, Col. Eustaquio
Peralta, et. al. The complaint included an staggering P10 million claim for
damages. (An information for libel has since been filed with the Regional Trial
Court of the National Capital Region against Suarez and Doyo.) On 3 March
1983, Babst, et. al. filed a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction,
which was superseded by the amended and supplemental petition for
prohibition with preliminary injunction, seeking to prohibit the respondents (a)
from issuing subpoenas or letters of invitation to Babst, et. al. and interrogating
them, and (b) from filing libel suits on matters that have been the subject of
inquiry by the National Intelligence Board (NIB).
Issue:
Whether the issuance by the NIB of letters of invitation to Babst,
and Dayo, are illegal and unconstitutional as they are violative of the
constitutional guarantee on free expression since they have the effect of
imposing restrictive guidelines and norms on mass media.
Held:
Prohibition will not issue in respect of the libel charges now pending
in court against Suarez and Doyo and similar suits that might be filed. The writ
of prohibition is directed against a tribunal, board or person acting without or
in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion vis-a-vis certain
proceedings pending before it. The libel cases adverted to are not pending
before the NIB or any other respondent. Further, the issue of validity of the
libel, charges by reason of their alleged collision with freedom of expression,
is a matter that should be raised in the proper forum, i.e., before the court where
the libel cases are pending or where they may be filed. The same rule applies
to the issue of admissibility as evidence of matters that have been elicited in
the course of an inquiry or interrogation conducted by the NIB, which Babst,
et. al. claim to have been illegally obtained. Finally, the right to seek redress
when libeled is a personal and individual privilege of the aggrieved party, and
no one among the officials has the authority to restrain any of his subordinates
who has been libeled from vindicating his right by instituting a libel suit. Brig.
Gen. Tadiar has filed the libel case against Suarez and Doyo in his personal
capacity. Moreover, he is not even a member of the NIB. And the NIB does
not appear to have anything to do with Gen. Tadiar's private right to complain
of libel.
2.4. Elizalde vs. Gutierrez
Elizalde vs. Gutierrez,76 SCRA 448 (In order that any news item relating to a
judicial proceeding will not be actionable, the same must be [a] a true and fair
report of the actual proceedings; [b] must be done in good faith; and [c] no
comments nor remarks shall be made by the writer}
A publication of a dispatch coming from the Philippine News Agency by
thesensationalist newspaper Evening News about the Maggie dela Riva rape
case involving prominent individuals is not libelous. Courts must be careful
not to unnecessarily prosecute members of the press if it finds the prosecution
to be baseless, they should immediately dismiss the case and not allow the
editor and publisher to be derailed from their work by being dragged into trial.
2.5. Policarpio Vs. Manila Times
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendant is guilty of having publishedlibelous/defamatory
articles?
FACTS:
Policarpio was executive secretary of UNESCO Nat’l Commission.As such,
she had filed charges against Herminia Reyes, one of her subordinates in the
Commission, & caused the latter to beseparated from the service. Reyes, in
turn, filed counter-charges which were referred for investigation. Pending
completion, Reyes filed a complaint against Policarpio for alleged
malversation of public funds & another complaint for estafa thru falsification
of public documents. Policarpio filed a libel suit to Manila Times Publishing
Co. for publishing two defamatory, libelous and false articles/news items in
Saturday Mirror of August 11, 1956 and in the Daily Mirror of August 13,
1956.
2.6. Lopez vs. Court of Appeals
[GR L-26549, 31 July 1970]
Facts: In the early part of January 1956, there appeared on the front page of
The Manila Chronicle, of which Eugenio Lopez was the publisher, as well as
on other dailies, a news story of a sanitary inspector assigned to the Babuyan
Islands, Fidel Cruz by name, sending a distress signal to a passing United
States Airforce plane which in turn relayed the message to Manila. He was not
ignored, an American Army plane dropping on the beach of an island an
emergency-sustenance kit containing, among other things, a two-way radio set.
He utilized it to inform authorities in Manila that the people in the place were
living in terror, due to a series of killings committed since Christmas of 1995.
Losing no time, the Philippines defense establishment rushed to the island a
platoon of scout rangers led by Major Wilfredo Encarnacion. Upon arriving at
the reported killermenaced Babuyan Claro, however, Major Encarnacion and
his men found, instead of the alleged killers, a man, the same Fidel Cruz, who
merely wanted transportation home to Manila. In view of this finding, Major
Wilfredo Encarnacion branded as a "hoax," to use his own descriptive word,
the report of Fidel Cruz. That was the term employed by the other newspapers
when referring to the incident. This Week Magazine of the Manila Chronicle,
then edited by Juan T. Gatbonton, devoted a pictorial article to it in its issue of
15 January 1956. Mention was made that while Fidel Cruz story turned out to
he false, if brought to light the misery of the people living in that place, with
almost everybody sick, only two individuals able to read and write, food and
clothing being scarce. Then in the 29 January 1956 issue of This Week
Magazine, the "January News Quiz" included an item on the central figure in
what was known as the Calayan Hoax, who nevertheless did the country a good
turn by calling the government's attention to that forsaken and desolate corner
of the Republic. Earlier in its Special Year End Quiz appearing in its issue of
18 January 1956, reference was made to a health inspector who suddenly felt
"lonely" in his isolated post, cooked up a story about a murderer running loose
on the island of Calayan so that he could be ferried back to civilization. He
was given the appellation of "Hoax of the Year." The magazine on both
occasions carried photographs of the person purporting to be Fidel Cruz.
Unfortunately, the pictures that were published on both occasions were that of
Fidel G. Cruz, a businessman-contractor from Santa Maria, Bulacan. It turned
out that the photographs of Cruz and that of Fidel Cruz, sanitary inspector,
were on file, in the library of the Manila Chronicle in accordance with the
standard procedure observed in other newspaper offices, but when the news
quiz format was prepared, the two photographs were inadvertently switched.
As soon, however, as the inadvertent error was brought to the attention of
Lopez and Gatbonton, the following correction was immediately published in
This Week Magazine on January 27, 1957: "While we were rushing to meet
the deadline for January 13th issue of This Week, we inadvertently published
the picture of former Mayor Fidel G. Cruz of Sta. Maria, Bulacan, businessman
and contractor, in 'Our Own Who's Who feature in the Year End Quiz' of This
Week in lieu of the health inspector Fidel Cruz, who was connected with a
story about a murderer running loose on Calayan Island. We here express our
profound regrets that; such an error occurred." Together with the foregoing
correction, Lopez and Gatbonton published the picture of Fidel Cruz; the
photographs and the correction moreover were enclosed by four lines, the type
used was bolder than ordinary, and the item was placed in a conspicuous place
in order to call the attention of the readers to such amends being made. The
businessman Fidel G. Cruz sued Lopez and Gatbonton in the Court of First
Instance of Manila for the Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 14 ) Narratives (Berne
Guerrero) recovery of damages alleging the defamatory character of the above
publication of his picture. After trial duly had, he was awarded P5,000 as actual
damages, another P5,000 as moral damages, and P1,000 for attorney's fees.
That judgment was affirmed on appeal to the appellate Court. Lopez and
Gatbonton filed the petition for certiorari.
Issue: Whether the claim of freedom of the press negates Lopez’ and
Gatbonton’s liability arising from libel.
Held: A libel was defined as a "malicious defamation, expressed either in
writing, printing, or by signs or pictures, or the like, tending to blacken the
memory of one who is dead or to impeach the honesty, virtue, or reputation,
or publish the alleged or natural defects of one who is alive, and thereby expose
him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule." There was an express provision
in such legislation for a tort or a quasi-delict action arising from libel. There is
reinforcement to such a view in the new Civil Code providing for the recovery
of moral damages for libel, slander or any other form of defamation. According
to the standard treatise of Newell on Slander and Libel: "Publication of a
person's photograph in connection with an article libelous of a third person, is
a libel on the person whose picture is published, where the acts set out in the
article are imputed to such person." Why libel law has both a criminal and a
civil aspect is explained by Hale in his Law of the Press thus: "On the one
hand, libeling a person results in depriving him of his good reputation. Since
reputation is a thing; of value, truly rather to be chosen than great riches, an
impairment of it is a personal wrong. To redress this personal wrong money
damages are awarded to the injured person. On the other hand, the publication
of defamatory statements tends strongly to induce breach of the peace by the
person defamed, and hence is of peculiar moment to the state as the guardian
of the public peace. Viewed from this angle, libel is a crime, and as such
subjects the offender to a fine or imprisonment." No inroads on press freedom
should be allowed in the guise of punitive action visited in what otherwise
could be characterized as libel whether in the form of printed words or a
defamatory imputation resulting from the publication of Cruz's picture with
the offensive caption as in complained of. This is not to deny that the party
responsible invites the institution either of a criminal prosecution or a civil suit.
It must be admitted that what was done did invite such a dire consequence,
considering the value the law justly places on a man's reputation. This is
merely to underscore the primacy that freedom of the press enjoys. It ranks
rather high in the hierarchy of legal values. If the cases mean anything at all
then, to emphasize what has so clearly emerged, they call for the utmost care
on the part of the judiciary to assure that in safeguarding the interest of the
party allegedly offended, a realistic account of the obligation of a news media
to disseminate information of a public character and to comment thereon as
well as the conditions attendant on the business of publishing cannot be
ignored. However, the correction promptly made by Lopez and Gatbonton
would thus call for a reduction in the damages awarded. It should be noted that
there was no proof of any actual pecuniary loss arising from the above
publication. It is worthwhile to recall what Justice Malcolm referred to as the
tolerant attitude on the part of appellate courts on this score, the usual practice
being "more likely to reduce damages for libel than to increase them."
2.7. New York Times vs. Sullivan
[376 US 254, 9 March 1964]
Facts: L. B. Sullivan is one of the three elected Commissioners of the City of
Montgomery, Alabama. He was "Commissioner of Public Affairs and the
duties are supervision of the Police Department, Fire Department, Department
of Cemetery and Department of Scales." He brought the civil libel action
against the four individual petitioners, who are Negroes and Alabama
clergymen, and against the New York Times Company, a New York
corporation which publishes the New York Times, a daily newspaper.
Sullivan's complaint alleged that he had been libeled by statements in a full-
page advertisement that was carried in the New York Times on 29 March 1960.
Entitled "Heed Their Rising Voices," the advertisement began by stating that
"As the whole world knows by now, thousands of Southern Negro students are
engaged in widespread non-violent demonstrations in positive affirmation of
the right to live in human dignity as guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution and
the Bill of Rights." It went on to charge that "in their efforts to uphold these
guarantees, they are being met by an unprecedented wave of terror by those
who would deny and negate that document which the whole world looks upon
as setting the pattern for modern freedom." Succeeding paragraphs purported
to illustrate the "wave of terror" by describing certain alleged events. The text
concluded with an appeal for funds for three purposes: support of the student
movement, "the struggle for the right-to-vote," and the legal defense of Dr.
Martin Luther King, Jr., leader of the movement, against a perjury indictment
then pending in Montgomery. The text appeared over the names of 64 persons,
many widely known for their activities in public affairs, religion, trade unions,
and the performing arts. Below these names, and under a line reading "We in
the south who are struggling daily for dignity and freedom warmly endorse
this appeal," appeared the names of the four individual petitioners and of 16
other persons, all but two of whom were identified as clergymen in various
Southern cities. The advertisement was signed at the bottom of the page by the
"Committee to Defend Martin Luther King and the Struggle for Freedom in
the South," and the officers of the Committee were listed. Of the 10 paragraphs
of text in the advertisement, the third and a portion of the sixth were the basis
of Sullivan's claim of libel. Third paragraph read as "In Montgomery,
Alabama, after students sang `My Country, 'Tis of Thee' on the State Capitol
steps, their leaders were expelled from school, and truckloads of police armed
with shotguns and tear-gas ringed the Alabama State College Campus. When
the entire student body protested to state authorities by refusing to re-register,
their dining hall was padlocked in an attempt to starve them into submission,"
while the sixth paragraph reads "Again and again the Southern violators have
answered Dr. King's peaceful protests with intimidation and violence. They
have bombed his home almost killing his wife and child. They have assaulted
his person. They have arrested him seven times - for 'speeding,' 'loitering' and
similar 'offenses.' And now they have charged him with `perjury' - a felony
under which they could imprison him for ten years." A jury in the Circuit Court
of Montgomery County awarded him damages of $500,000, the full amount
claimed, against all the petitioners, and the Supreme Court of Alabama
affirmed. Background on Alabama laws on the matter: Under Alabama law, a
publication is "libelous per se" if the words "tend to injure a person in his
reputation" or to "bring [him] into public contempt"; the trial court stated that
the standard was met if the words are such as to "injure him in his public office,
or impute misconduct to him in his office, or want of official integrity, or want
of fidelity to a public trust." The jury must find that the words were published
"of and concerning" the plaintiff, but where the plaintiff is a public official his
place in the governmental hierarchy is sufficient evidence to support a finding
that his reputation has been affected by statements that reflect upon the agency
of which he is in charge. Once "libel per se" has been established, the defendant
has no defense as to stated facts unless he can persuade the jury that they were
true in all their particulars. His privilege of "fair comment" for expressions of
opinion depends on the truth of the facts upon which the comment is based.
Unless he can discharge the burden of proving truth, general damages are
presumed, and may be awarded without proof of pecuniary injury. A showing
of actual malice is apparently a prerequisite to recovery of punitive damages,
and the defendant may in any event forestall a punitive award by a retraction
meeting the statutory requirements. Good motives and belief in truth do not
negate an inference of malice, but are relevant only in mitigation of punitive
damages if the jury chooses to accord them weight. Further, Alabama law
denies a public officer recovery of punitive damages in a libel action brought
on account of a publication concerning his official conduct unless he first
makes a written demand for a public retraction and the defendant fails or
refuses to comply.
Issue: Whether printed allegations or criticism against official conduct should
be supported by actual facts, to free persons from liabilities attendant to libel.
Held: The general proposition that freedom of expression upon public
questions is secured by the First Amendment has long been settled by the
Court's decisions. The constitutional safeguard was fashioned to assure
unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social
changes desired by the people. The maintenance of the opportunity for free
political discussion to the end that government may be responsive to the will
of the people and that changes may be obtained by lawful means, an
opportunity essential to the security of the Republic, is a fundamental principle
of our constitutional system. It is a prized American privilege to speak one's
mind, although not always with perfect good taste, on all public institutions,
and this opportunity is to be afforded for "vigorous advocacy" no less than
"abstract discussion." The First Amendment presupposes that right
conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than
through any kind of authoritative selection. Against the background of a
profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include
vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government
and public officials. The present advertisement, as an expression of grievance
and protest on one of the major public issues of our time, would seem clearly
to qualify for the constitutional protection. Authoritative interpretations of the
First Amendment guarantees have consistently refused to recognize an
exception for any test of truth - whether administered by judges, juries, or
administrative officials - and especially one that puts the burden of proving
truth on the speaker. The constitutional protection does not turn upon "the
truth, popularity, or social utility of the ideas and beliefs which are offered."
Some degree of abuse is inseparable from the proper use of everything; and in
no instance is this truer than in that of the press. That erroneous statement is
inevitable in free debate, and that it must be protected if the freedoms of
expression are to have the "breathing space" that they "need to survive." Injury
to official reputation affords no more warrant for repressing speech that would the labor dispute if it appears that the result of the picketing is create an
otherwise be free than does factual error. Where judicial officers are involved, impression that a labor dispute exists between him and the picketing union.
the Court has held that concern for the dignity and reputation of the courts does
not justify the punishment as criminal contempt of criticism of the judge or his
decision. This is true even though the utterance contains "half-truths" and 3.a ATTY. PHILIP SIGFRID A. FORTUN vs. ATTY. PRIMA JESUSA
"misinformation." Such repression can be justified, if at all, only by a clear and B. QUINSAYAS, et. al.
present danger of the obstruction of justice. If judges are to be treated as "men G.R. No. 194578, February 13, 2013, 690 SCRA 623
of fortitude, able to thrive in a hardy climate," surely the same must be true of FACTS: Atty. Fortun is the counsel for the Ampatuans, the principal accused
other government officials, such as elected city commissioners. Criticism of in the Maguindanao Massacre.
their official conduct does not lose its constitutional protection merely because
it is effective criticism and hence diminishes their official reputations. A rule Atty. Quinsayas filed a disbarment complaint against Atty. Fortun for
compelling the critic of official conduct to guarantee the truth of all his factual misleading the prosecution and trial court under the rules and muddled the
assertions - and to do so on pain of libel judgments virtually unlimited in issues and diverted the attention away from the main subject matter of the case.
amount - leads to a comparable "self-censorship." Allowance of the defense of
truth, with the burden of proving it on the defendant, does not mean that only Atty. Fortun filed an indirect contempt against Atty. Quinsayas and the media
false speech will be deterred. Even courts accepting this defense as an adequate group for active dissemination of the details of the disbarment complaint
safeguard have recognized the difficulties of adducing legal proofs that the against him in violation of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court on confidential
alleged libel was true in all its factual particulars. Under such a rule, would-be nature of disbarment proceedings.
critics of official conduct may be deterred from voicing their criticism, even
though it is believed to be true and even though it is in fact true, because of The media group denied the posting and publication of the articles about the
doubt whether it can be proved in court or fear of the expense of having to do disbarment complaint. It would appear that only Atty. Quinsayas was
so. They tend to make only statements which "steer far wider of the unlawful responsible for the distribution of copies of the disbarment complaint to the
zone." The rule thus dampens the vigor and limits the variety of public debate. members of the media.
It is inconsistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
ISSUE: Whether Atty. Quinsayas is guilty of indirect contempt in violation of
Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.
2.8 LIWAYWAY PUBLICATIONS v. PCWU
HELD: YES. Atty. Quinsayas is bound by Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules
108 SCRA 16
of Court both as a complainant and as a lawyer in the disbarment case against
FACTS: The picket held by defendant-appellant union against their employer Atty. Fortun.
prevented herein plaintiff-appellee's truck from loading and unloading of its
products inside the premises of Permanent Concrete Products, where the
As a lawyer and an officer of the Court, Atty. Quinsayas is familiar with the
plaintiff-appellee was occupying as a sub-lessee. Hence, the latter sought to
confidential nature of disbarment proceedings. However, instead of preserving
enjoin the picket.
its confidentiality, she disseminated copies of the disbarment complaint
ISSUE: May a picket be enjoined at the instance of a third party? against Atty. Fortun to members of the media which act constitutes contempt
of court.
HELD: Yes. Peaceful picketing, while being allowed as a phase of freedom
of expression guaranteed by the Constitution and could not be curtailed even
in the absence of employer-employee relationship, is not an absolute right. The
courts are not without power to localize the sphere of demonstration, whose
interest are foreign to the context of the dispute. Thus the right may be
recognized at the instance of an "innocent bystander" who is not involved in
3.b BLO UMPAR ADIONG vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
Citation : G.R. No. 103956 March 31, 1992
Facts : A Resolution No. 2347 was promulgated by the COMELEC which provides that
decals and stickers may be posted only in any of the authorized posting areas,
prohibiting posting in "mobile" places, public or private. Petitioner Blo Umpar
Adiong is a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections. Adiong is
assailing the Resolution. In addition, Adiong believes that with the ban on
radio, television and print political advertisements, he, being a neophyte in the field of
politics stands to suffer grave and irreparable injury with this prohibition.
Issue : Whether or Not the COMELEC’s prohibition is unconstitutional.
Held :The prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen's fundamental right of free speech. The
preferred freedom of expression calls all the more for the utmost respect when
what may be curtailed is the dissemination of information to make more
meaningful the equally vital right of suffrage. The so-called balancing of
interests — individual freedom on one hand and substantial public interests on
the other— is made even more difficult in election campaign cases because the
Constitution also gives specific authority to the Commission on Elections to
supervise the conduct of free, honest, and orderly elections. When faced with
border line situations where freedom to speak by a candidate or party and
freedom to know on the part of the electorate are invoked against actions
intended for maintaining clean and free elections, the police, local officials and
COMELEC, should lean in favor of freedom. The regulation of election
campaign activity may not pass the test of validity if it is too general in its
terms or not limited in time and scope in its application, if it restricts one's
expression of belief in a candidate or one's opinion of his or her qualifications,
if it cuts off the flow of media reporting, and if the regulatory measure bears
no clear and reasonable nexus with the constitutionally sanctioned objective.
The posting of decals and stickers in mobile places like cars and other moving
vehicles does not endanger any substantial government interest. There is no clear public
interest threatened by such activity so as to justify the curtailment of the cherished citizen's right
of free speech and expression. Under the clear and present danger rule not only must the danger
be patently clear and pressingly present but the evil sought to be avoided must be so
substantive as to justify a clamp over one's mouth or a writing instrument to
be stilled. The regulation strikes at the freedom of an individual to express his
preference and, by displaying it on his car, to convince others to agree with
him. A sticker may be furnished by a candidate but once the car owner agrees
to have it placed on his private vehicle, the expression becomes a statement by
the owner, primarily his own and not of anybody else. The restriction as to
where the decals and stickers should be posted is so broad that it encompasses
even the citizen's private property, which in this case is a privately-owned
vehicle. In consequence of this prohibition, another cardinal rule prescribed by the
Constitution would be violated. Section 1, Article III of the Bill of Rights provides that
no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law.
3.c NATIONAL PRESS CLUB VS. COMELEC
[201 SCRA 1; G.R. NO. 1026653; 5 MAR 1992]
Facts: Petitioners in these cases consist of representatives of the mass media
which are prevented from selling or donating space and time for political
advertisements; two (2) individuals who are candidates for office (one for
national and the other for provincial office) in the coming May 1992 elections;
and taxpayers and voters who claim that their right to be informed of election
Issue and of credentials of the candidates is being curtailed. It is principally
argued by petitioners that Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 66461 invades
and violates the constitutional guarantees comprising freedom of expression.
Petitioners maintain that the prohibition imposed by Section 11 (b) amounts to
censorship, because it selects and singles out for suppression and repression
with criminal sanctions, only publications of a particular content, namely,
media-based election or political propaganda during the election period of
1992. It is asserted that the prohibition is in derogation of media's role, function
and duty to provide adequate channels of public information and public
opinion relevant to election Issue. Further, petitioners contend that Section 11
(b) abridges the freedom of speech of candidates, and that the suppression of
media-based campaign or political propaganda except those appearing in the
Comelec space of the newspapers and on Comelec time of radio and television
broadcasts, would bring about a substantial reduction in the quantity or volume
of information concerning candidates and Issue in the election thereby
curtailing and limiting the right of voters to information and opinion.
Issue: Whether or Not Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646 constitutional.
Held: Yes. It seems a modest proposition that the provision of the Bill of
Rights which enshrines freedom of speech, freedom of expression and freedom
of the press has to be taken in conjunction with Article IX (C) (4) which may
be seen to be a special provision applicable during a specific limited period —
i.e., "during the election period." In our own society, equality of opportunity
to proffer oneself for public office, without regard to the level of financial
resources that one may have at one's disposal, is clearly an important value.
One of the basic state policies given constitutional rank by Article II, Section
26 of the Constitution is the egalitarian demand that "the State shall guarantee
equal access to opportunities for public service and prohibit political dynasties
as may be defined by law." The essential question is whether or not the assailed
legislative or administrative provisions constitute a permissible exercise of the
power of supervision or regulation of the operations of communication and
information enterprises during an election period, or whether such act has gone
beyond permissible supervision or regulation of media operations so as to
constitute unconstitutional repression of freedom of speech and freedom of the
press. The Court considers that Section 11 (b) has not gone outside the
permissible bounds of supervision or regulation of media operations during
election periods.
Section 11 (b) is limited in the duration of its applicability and enforceability.
By virtue of the operation of Article IX (C) (4) of the Constitution, Section 11
(b) is limited in its applicability in time to election periods. Section 11 (b) does
not purport in any way to restrict the reporting by newspapers or radio or
television stations of news or news-worthy events relating to candidates, their
qualifications, political parties and programs of government. Moreover,
Section 11 (b) does not reach commentaries and expressions of belief or
opinion by reporters or broadcasters or editors or commentators or columnists
in respect of candidates, their qualifications, and programs and so forth, so
long at least as such comments, opinions and beliefs are not in fact
advertisements for particular candidates covertly paid for. In sum, Section 11
(b) is not to be read as reaching any report or commentary other coverage that,
in responsible media, is not paid for by candidates for political office. Section
11 (b) as designed to cover only paid political advertisements of particular
candidates.
The limiting impact of Section 11 (b) upon the right to free speech of the
candidates themselves is not unduly repressive or unreasonable.
3.d. Zaldivar vs. Sandiganbayan [GR 79690-707, 1 February 1989];
also Zaldivar vs. Gonzales [GR 80578]
Facts: [Acquired from 27 April 1988 decision] Enrique A. Zaldivar, governor
of the province of Antique, sought, through a petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition, and Mandamus, to restrain the Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan
Raul Gonzalez from proceeding with the prosecution and hearing of Criminal
Cases 12159 to 12161 and 12163-12177 on the ground that said cases were
filed by said Tanodbayan without legal and constitutional authority, since
under the 1987 Constitution which took effect on 2 February 1987, it is only
the Ombudsman (not the present or incumbent Tanodbayan) who has the
authority to file cases with the Sandiganbayan. Similarly, Enrique A. Zaldivar,
on substantially the same ground as the first petition, prays that Tanodbayan
Gonzalez be restrained from conducting preliminary investigations and filing
similar cases with the Sandiganbayan. The Supreme Court granted the
consolidated petitions filed by Zaldivar and nullified the criminal informations
filed against him in the Sandiganbayan; and ordered Raul Gonzalez to cease
and desist from conducting investigations and filing criminal cases with the
Sandiganbayan or otherwise exercising the powers and functions of the
Ombudsman. [Present case] Tanodbayan Gonzales allegedly made
contumacious acts or statements in a pleading filed before the Court and in
statements given to the media. In its Resolution dated 2 May 1988, the
Supreme Court required Tanodbayan Gonzales to explain "why he should not
be punished for contempt of court and/or subjected to administrative
sanctions" and in respect of which, Gonzales was heard and given the most
ample opportunity to present all defenses, arguments and evidence that he
wanted to present for the consideration of this Court. The Court did not
summarily impose punishment upon Gonzales which it could have done under
Section 1 of Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court had it chosen to consider
Gonzales' acts as constituting "direct contempt." In the per curiam resolution
dated 7 October 1988, the Court found Tanodbayan Gonzalez to be "guilty
both of contempt of court in facie curiae and of gross misconduct as an officer
of the court and member of the bar." Gonzales filed a motion for
reconsideration. Issue: Whether the statements made by Tanodbayan Gonzales
transcended the permissible limits of free speech. Held: The "clear and present
danger" doctrine is not a magic incantation which dissolves all problems and
dispenses with analysis and judgment in the testing of the legitimacy of claims
to free speech, and which compels a court to exonerate a defendant the moment
the doctrine is invoked, absent proof of impending apocalypse. The "clear and
present danger" doctrine has been an accepted method for marking out the
appropriate limits of freedom of speech and of assembly in certain contexts. It
is not, however, the only test which has been recognized and applied by courts.
Although the prevailing doctrine is that the clear and present danger rule is
such a limitation; another criterion for permissible limitation on freedom of
speech and of the press, which includes such vehicles of the mass media as
radio, television and the movies, is the "balancing-of interests test." The
principle requires a court to take conscious and detailed consideration of the
interplay of interests observable in a given situation or type of situation' Still,
under either the "clear and present danger" test or the "balancing-of-interest
test" the Corut believes that the statements made by Gonzalez are of such a
nature and were made in such a manner and under such circumstances, as to
transcend the permissible limits of free speech. This conclusion was implicit
in the per curiam Resolution of October 7, 1988. It is important to point out
that the "substantive evil" which the Supreme Court has a right and a duty to
prevent does not, in the present case, relate to threats of physical disorder or
overt violence or similar disruptions of public order. What is here at stake is
the authority of the Supreme Court to confront and prevent a "substantive evil"
consisting not only of the obstruction of a free and fair hearing of a particular
case but also the avoidance of the broader evil of the degradation of the judicial
system of a country and the destruction of the standards of professional
conduct required from members of the bar and officers of the courts. The
"substantive evil" here involved, in other words, is not as palpable as a threat
of public disorder or rioting but is certainly no less deleterious and more far
reaching in its implications for society.
3.e Eastern Broadcasting Corporation vs. Dans
[GR L-59329, 19 July 1985]
Facts: Radio Station DYRE was closed on the ground that the radio station was
used to incite people to sedition. A petition was filed by Eastern Broadcasting
to compel the Minister of Transportation and Communications, Ceferino S.
Carreon (Commissioner, National Telecommunications Commission), et. al.
to allow the reopening of Radio Station DYRE which had been summarily
closed on grounds of national security; alleging denial of due process and
violation of its right of freedom of speech. On 25 March 1985, before the Court
could promulgate a decision squarely passing upon all the issues raised,
Eastern Broadcasting through its president, Mr. Rene G. Espina suddenly filed
a motion to withdraw or dismiss the petition. Eastern Broadcasting alleged that
(1) it has already sold its radio broadcasting station in favor of Manuel B.
Pastrana as well as its rights and interest in the radio station DYRE in Cebu
including its right to operate and its equipment; (2) the National
Telecommunications Commission has expressed its willingness to grant to the
said new owner Manuel B. Pastrana the requisite license and franchise to
operate the said radio station and to approve the sale of the radio transmitter of
said station DYRE; (3) in view of the foregoing, Eastern Broadcasting has no
longer any interest in said case, and the new owner, Manuel B. Pastrana is
likewise not interested in pursuing the case any further. Issue: Whether radio
broadcasting enjoys a more limited form Held: The case has become moot and
academic. However, for the guidance of inferior courts and administrative
tribunals exercising quasi-judicial functions, the Court issues the following
guidelines: (1) The cardinal primary requirements in administrative
proceedings laid down by the Court in Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial
Relations (69 Phil. 635) should be followed before a broadcast station may be
closed or its operations curtailed; (2) it is necessary to reiterate that while there
is no controlling and precise definition of due process, it furnishes an
unavoidable standard to which government action must conform in order that
any deprivation of life, liberty, or property, in each appropriate case, may be
valid (Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association v. City Mayor,
20 SCRA 849); (3) All forms of media, whether print or broadcast, are entitled
to the broad protection of the freedom of speech and expression clause. The
test for limitations on freedom of expression continues to be the clear and
present danger rule - that words are used in such circumstances and are of such
a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that the lawmaker has a right to prevent; (4) the clear and
present danger test, however, does not lend itself to a simplistic and all
embracing interpretation applicable to all utterances in all forums.
Broadcasting has to be licensed. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated
among qualified users; (5) The clear and present danger test must take the
particular circumstances of broadcast media into account. The supervision of
radio stations — whether by government or through self-regulation by the
industry itself calls for thoughtful, intelligent and sophisticated handling; (6)
the freedom to comment on public affairs is essential to the vitality of a
representative democracy; and (7) Broadcast stations deserve the special
protection given to all forms of media by the due process and freedom of
expression clauses of the Constitution. A broadcast corporation cannot simply
appropriate a certain frequency without regard for government regulation or
for the rights of others.All forms of communication are entitled to the broad
protection of the freedom of expression clause. Necessarily, however, the
freedom of television and radio broadcasting is somewhat lesser in scope than
the freedom accorded to newspaper and print media. Radio broadcasting, more
than other forms of communications, receives the most limited protection from
the free expression clause, because: First, broadcast media have established a
uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all citizens. Material presented over
the airwaves confronts the citizen, not only in public, but in the privacy of his
home. Second, broadcasting is uniquely accessible to children. Bookstores and
motion picture theaters may be prohibited from making certain material
available to children, but the same selectivity cannot be done in radio or
television, where the listener or viewer is constantly tuning in and out. Similar
considerations apply in the area of national security. The broadcast media have
also established a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all Filipinos.
Newspapers and current books are found only in metropolitan areas and in the
poblaciones of municipalities accessible to fast and regular transportation.
Even here, there are low income masses who find Constitutional Law II, 2005
( 46 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) the cost of books, newspapers, and
magazines beyond their humble means. Basic needs like food and shelter
perforce enjoy high priorities. On the other hand, the transistor radio is found
everywhere. The television set is also becoming universal. Their message may
be simultaneously received by a national or regional audience of listeners
including the indifferent or unwilling who happen to be within reach of a
blaring radio or television set. The materials broadcast over the airwaves reach
every person of every age, persons of varying susceptibilities to persuasion,
persons of different I.Q.s and mental capabilities, persons whose reactions to
inflammatory or offensive speech would be difficult to monitor or predict. The
impact of the vibrant speech is forceful and immediate. Unlike readers of the
printed work, the radio audience has lesser opportunity to cogitate, analyze,
and reject the utterance. Still, the government has a right to be protected against
broadcasts which incite the listeners to violently overthrow it. Radio and
television may not be used to organize a rebellion or to signal the start of
widespread uprising. At the same time, the people have a right to be informed.
Radio and television would have little reason for existence if broadcasts are
limited to bland, obsequious, or pleasantly entertaining utterances. Since they
are the most convenient and popular means of disseminating varying views on
public issues, they also deserve special protection.
3.f. NEWSWEEK, INC. vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
Nature of the Case:
- Special action for certiorari, prohibition with preliminary injunction seeking
to annul the decision of the IAC sustaining the Order of CFI Bacolod denying
petitioner's Motion to Dismiss the complaint for libel filed by private
respondents
Facts:
- Private respondents, incorporated associations of sugarcane planters in
Negros Occidental filed a case in their own behalf and/or as a class suit in
behalf of all sugarcane planters in the province against Newsweek Inc. and two
of their non-resident correspondents/reporters, Fred Bruning and Barry Came.-
The complaint alleged that petitioner committed libel against them by the
publication of the article "An Island of Fear" in their magazine. The article
supposedly portrayed the island as a place dominated by big landowners or
sugarcane planters who exploited the impoverished sugarcane laborers and
brutalized and killed them with impunity. They claim that the article showed
a malicious use of falsehood, slanted presentation and misrepresentation
of facts, putting them in a bad light- Petitioner argues that private respondents'
complaint failed to state a cause of action because the complainant made no
allegation that anything contained in the article referred specifically to any one
of them--and libel can be committed only against individual reputation OR, if
is claimed to be directed at a group, there i defamation only if the libel can be
said to reach beyond the mere collectivity to do damage to a specific,
individual group member's reputation.
Ruling:
- Decision of the IAC is reversed and the respondents' complaint is dismissed.
Rationale:
- There is no cause of action.
- Corpus v Cuaderno, Sr.: In order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that
the victim be identifiable, although it is not necessary that he be named
.- Defamatory matter which does not reveal the identity of the person upon
whom the imputation is case affords no ground of action unless it be shown
that the readers could have identified the personality of the individual defamed.
- This principle is important especially where a group or class of persons claim
to have been defamed because the larger the collectivity, the more difficult it
is for the individual member to prove that the defamatory remarks apply to
him.
- Where the defamatory is alleged to have been directed at a group or lass, it is
essential that the statement must be so sweeping or all-embracing as to apply
to every individual in the that group OR sufficiently specific so that each
individual prove the defamatory statement specifically pointed to him so that
he can bring action separately.
- The case is NOT a class suit. It is not a case where one or more may sue for
the benefit of all or where the representation of class interest affected by the
decree is indispensable to make each member an actual party.
- The plaintiffs here have a separate and distinct reputation in the community.
They do not have a common or general interest in this controversy.
- The disputed portion of the article that they claim is libelous never singled
out plaintiff Sola as a sugar planter. The report merely stated that the victim
has been arrested by members of a special police unit brought into the area by
Sola, the mayor of Kabankalan. The report, referring as it does to an official
act performed by an elective public official, is within the real of privilege and
protected by the constitutional guarantees of free speech and press.- The article
in question is not libelous in nature.- The complaint contains a recital of the
favorable working conditions of the agricultural workers in the sugar industry
and various foundations and programs supported by planters' associations for
the benefit of the workers.- Undoubtedly, the statements in the article are
sweeping and exaggerated, but these articles may also serve to prick the
consciences of those who have but are not doing anything or enough for those
who do not have.
-The case at bar is not a class suit. It is not a case where one or more may sue
for the benefit of all.
- We have here a case where each of the plaintiffs has a separate and distinct
reputation in the community. They do not have a common or general interest
in the subject matter of the controversy.
3.g. KAPISANAN NG MANGGAGAWA SA CAMARA SHOES v.
CAMARA SHOES
111 SCRA 478
FACTS: Petitioner Ramos was suspended for writing the phrase "under
protest" in the company payroll to object to the P1.0 deduction made by the
respondent for allegedly getting P500 worth of lumber in 1964. The deduction
started only in 1969, at the peak of union activities of the petitioner when
several complaints of unfair labor practices were filed by the union against the
respondent.
ISSUE: Is the action of the petitioner a lawful exercise of freedom of
expression?
HELD: Yes. The freedom of expression is available to individual workers
subject to legal limitation of industrial peace to air valid grievances. It is thus
too clear from the foregoing that petitioner Ramos was justified in airing his
grievances against the unauthorized and illegal deductions made by respondent
company. By writing "under protest" on the company payroll, petitioner
Ramos was well within the ambit of his constitutional freedom of expression
as well as the right to petition against what was obviously a calculated undue
harassment amounting to unfair labor practice perpetuated by respondent
employer herein.
3.h. IN RE ATTY. EMMANUEL S. TIPON, 79 SCRA 372
Facts:
The Postmaster General in a first indorsement to the Chief Justice
dated May 17, 1965 transmitted certain papers purporting to show that Atty. Emmanuel
S. Tipon (admitted to the bar in 1956) might have violated the lawyer's oath
for having imported the magazine Playboy, which was considered as non-
mailable matter.
Held:
In that indorsement Secretary Raquiza rendered the opinion that
Playboy magazine cannot be character as obscene and that it can be carried
and deposited in Philippine mails. The Secretary concluded that "there is
absolutely no to show that Atty. Tipon had violated or intended to violate the
postal laws, the lawyer's oath or the Canons of Legal Ethics.“ Secretary Raquiza
requested that the Postmaster General's complaint of May 17,1965 be
considered
withdrawn. WHEREFORE, this case is considered closed for having become
moot andacademic.
3.i PEDRO S. LACSA, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
G.R. No. 74907, 23 May 1988 SARMIENTO, J.
Important Doctrine:
An incendiary utterance, where the libelous allegations are expressly laid out,
is not the only possible ground for conviction. Following US v. O’Connell ,
speech where the readers/hearers are merely induced to be suspicious of the
victim’s merit/honor may suffice. Explanations of the accused as to the
meaning of the assailed utterances are, in a way, immaterial: what matters is
the meaning of the utterances as understood by the readers, taking the material
as a whole, and reading it in its plain and ordinary meaning. (US v. Sotto;
Jimenez v. Reyes)
Information (charge): *not specified*
CFI of Manila: Libel (complainant: Ponciano Marquez)
 Guilty (P2,000)
Intermediate Appellate Court: Affirmed, in toto, Judgment of CFI
Facts:
Lacsa is a Certified Public Accountant (CPA) by profession. As such,
he offered his services pro bono to serve as auditor of the Philippine
Columbian Association (having previously been a former member of its Board
of Directors, and, then, a representative of one of its institutional members).
Lacsa accessed the personal folder of Marquez, then-President of the
Assoc. He found out that Marquez was a “mere associate” of the association:
he questioned Marquez’s qualification to hold the presidency, when only
proprietary members can be voted to that position.
Thus, he wrote a letter to the BoD (21 December 1978) wherein he
impugned the status of Marquez as president and proprietary member. He
contended that the issuance of a proprietary membership to Marquez, w/o the
authority of the Assoc.’s BoD, was erroneous.
He also wrote a letter (2 January 1979) to Marquez, asking the latter
to relinquish the presidency, and referring to the latter as a “de facto president”.
The grounds he cited for such a request were the same as the ones he gave in
his letter to the BoD.
He cc’ed the latter letter to a number of people – including some
familiar names: Justice Claudio Teehankee, Jorge Vargas, and Prof. Renato
Constantino. Eventually, hecaused the letter to be published and circulated
among the member of the Assoc. He also caused the publication, in a
newsletter circulated to the members of the Assoc., an item entitled “Doubts
As to the Legitimacy of the Incumbent President”. Marquez instituted separate
criminal and civil actions against Lacsa, claiming to have been “maligned,
defamed, and exposed to public ridicule” by the latter’s actions. The CFI of
Manila found Lacsa guilty of Libel, and this judgment was later affirmed by
the IAC.
Thus, this petition to SC.
Issues/Holding/Ratio:
1.Did the appellate court err in affirming Lacsa’s conviction for Libel?
NO.
DEFENSE (“de facto president” is not libelous, per se):
SC: Sol Gen correct in saying that calling Marquez a “de facto president” is
equivalent to saying that the latter is a pretender/fraud/impostor – who
arrogated unto himself powers/rights/privileges to which he is not entitled.
 Exposed Marquez to public contempt and ridicule
 Created an impression in the minds of the readers of the libelous
materials
DEFENSE (even presuming “de facto president” is libelous, the letter and
newsletter constitute privileged communication):
To be classified as privileged comm.., the material must be absolutely free
from any taint of malice – not the case here
Lacsa knew beforehand that Marquez was already a proprietary member of
the association, as evidenced by the issuance of the certificate for the latter’s
proprietary membership.
 Evidenced by the accused’s initials, “PSL”, dated 28
September 1978, in a document containing the minutes of a 22 April 1968
meeting. (His initials signified that he had examined the document.)
 Thus, there was no sufficient ground to claim that there was no basis
for the conversion of Marquez’s associate membership into a
proprietary one.
Even assuming that the January 1979 letter was in fact privileged
communication, its status as such was lost upon Lacsa’s publishing and
circulation of the matter in a newsletter.
 SC noted that, as an auditor, Lacsa was under an obligation to keep his
findings in strict confidence bet. Him and the BoD.
 The BoD is the only body that can make the necessary correction in
case there was a mistake in the membership records.
 Immediately going public with is alleged findings is unpardonable.
Trial Court’s Finding of Malice:
 Lacsa’s appointment as
member of the steering committee (
tasked to implement the terms and conditions of MOA w/ Permaline, Inc. for
the construction of the Philippine Columbian Sports Complex – worth P30M)
was not extended; he was only give chairmanship of the finance committee:
the latter position Lacsa rejected, and Marquez, as President, accepted the
rejection
 Lacsa felt aggrieved and thus began looking for ways to criticize
Marquez
Dispostion: Petition DENIED. Questioned decision AFFIRMED.
Additional Notes:
Test of Libelous Meaning, US v. O’Connell, in cases where nothing wrong is
imputed in certain and express terms:
Words calculated to induce suspicion are sometimes more effective
to destroy reputation than false charges directly made. Ironical and
metaphorical language is a favored vehicle for slander. A charge is sufficient
(i) if the words are calculated to induce the hearers to suppose and
understand that the person/s against whom they were uttered were guilty
of certain offenses, (ii) if the words are sufficient to impeach the victim’s
honesty, virtue, or reputation, or (iii) hold the victim up to public ridicule.
On how to analyze allegedly libelous material (US v. Sotto, citing Jimenez v.
Reyes):
The published matter must be construed as a whole. The court will
disregard any subtle/ingenious explanation offered by the publisher: the
question is what the effect of the publication had upon the minds of the readers
– giving the matter such a meaning as is natural and obvious in the plain and
ordinary sense in which the public would naturally understand what was
uttered.
3. j. Kapunan v de Villa
Facts: prohibition and/or habeas corpus, petitioners, who were implicated in
the unsuccessful coup d'etat of August 28, 1987 and relieved of their duties in
the Philippine Military Academy (PMA), seek the issuance of the writs of
certiorari and prohibition (1) to set aside, as null and void, the "pre-trial
investigation" report finding a prima facie case against them and
recommending their trial for mutiny and conduct unbecoming an officer and
the denial of their motion for reconsideration, and (2) to enjoin respondent
General Court Martial No. 8 from further proceeding in the case of "People v.
Lt. Col. Eduardo Kapunan, et al."Further, petitioner Kapunan seeks the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus to procure his release from confinement.
In the aftermath of the failed August 28,1987 coup d'etat where cadets of the
Philippine Military Academy reportedly openly supported the plotters and
issued statements to that effect. PMABoard of Officers to investigate the
alleged involvement of officers and cadets of the PMA [Rollo,p. 187]. A fact-
finding investigation was conducted bythe PMA Board from September 1 to
11, 1987 and on September 23, 1987 it submitted its findings to theAFP Chief
of Staff. Charge sheets were filed against petitioners for mutiny and conduct
unbecoming an officer and a "pre-trial investigation" was conducted by
respondent Maj. Baldonado. Kapunan was allegedly summoned to the General
Headquarters of the AFP fora dialogue, but upon his arrival thereat on
September4, 1987 he was ordered confined under "house arrest" by then Chief
of Staff Gen. Fidel Ramos. On February19, 1988, the arrest of petitioner
Kapunan, together with three (3) others, was ordered by respondent Chief of
Staff De Villa in connection with the killing of Atty. Rolando Olalia and
Leonore Alay-ay
Issue: Whether or not the house arrest or confinement of Kapunan is illegal
Ruling: the Court Resolved to DISMISS the Petition . The Court finds that
petitioner Kapunan's continued confinement is not tainted with illegality.
Among the grounds for the disallowance of the writ of habeas corpus is that
the applicant has been charged with or convicted of in offense [Sec. 4, Rule
102, Rules of Court]. In the instant case, petitioner Kapunan had been charged
with mutiny, a serious offense punishable by death or such other punishment
as a court-martial may direct. There is a legal cause of his confinement. Art.
70. Arrest or confinement.—Any person subject to military law charged with
crime or with a serious offense under these Articles shall be placed in
confinement or in arrest, as circumstances may require; but when charged with
a minor offense only, such person shall not ordinarily be placed in
confinement. Any person placed in arrest under the provisions of this article
shall thereby be restricted to his barracks, quarters, or tent, unless such limits
shall be enlarged by proper authority. ...It cannot be gainsaid that certain
liberties of persons in the military service, including the freedom of speech,
may be circumscribed by rules of military discipline. Thus, to a certain degree,
individual rights may be curtailed, because the effectiveness of the military in
fulfilling its duties under the law depends to a large extent on the maintenance
of discipline within its ranks